Typo and phrasing change

1. Remove full stop between $X$ and :
2. Replace "computational-intensive" with "computationally-intensive"

Author: williamscott

Chapter1_Introduction/Chapter1_Introduction.ipynb

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@
       "\n",
       "To align ourselves with traditional probability notation, we denote our belief about event $A$ as $P(A)$. We call this quantity the *prior probability*.\n",
       "\n",
-      "John Maynard Keynes, a great economist and thinker, said \"When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?\" This quote reflects the way a Bayesian updates his or her beliefs after seeing evidence. Even — especially — if the evidence is counter to what was initially believed, the evidence cannot be ignored. We denote our updated belief as $P(A |X )$, interpreted as the probability of $A$ given the evidence $X$. We call the updated belief the *posterior probability* so as to contrast it with the prior probability. For example, consider the posterior probabilities (read: posterior beliefs) of the above examples, after observing some evidence $X$.:\n",
+      "John Maynard Keynes, a great economist and thinker, said \"When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?\" This quote reflects the way a Bayesian updates his or her beliefs after seeing evidence. Even — especially — if the evidence is counter to what was initially believed, the evidence cannot be ignored. We denote our updated belief as $P(A |X )$, interpreted as the probability of $A$ given the evidence $X$. We call the updated belief the *posterior probability* so as to contrast it with the prior probability. For example, consider the posterior probabilities (read: posterior beliefs) of the above examples, after observing some evidence $X$:\n",
       "\n",
       "1\\. $P(A): \\;\\;$ the coin has a 50 percent chance of being Heads. $P(A | X):\\;\\;$ You look at the coin, observe a Heads has landed, denote this information $X$, and trivially assign probability 1.0 to Heads and 0.0 to Tails.\n",
       "\n",
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@
       "\n",
       "Denote $N$ as the number of instances of evidence we possess. As we gather an *infinite* amount of evidence, say as $N \\rightarrow \\infty$, our Bayesian results (often) align with frequentist results. Hence for large $N$, statistical inference is more or less objective. On the other hand, for small $N$, inference is much more *unstable*: frequentist estimates have more variance and larger confidence intervals. This is where Bayesian analysis excels. By introducing a prior, and returning probabilities (instead of a scalar estimate), we *preserve the uncertainty* that reflects the instability of statistical inference of a small $N$ dataset. \n",
       "\n",
-      "One may think that for large $N$, one can be indifferent between the two techniques since they offer similar inference, and might lean towards the computational-simpler, frequentist methods. An individual in this position should consider the following quote by Andrew Gelman (2005)[1], before making such a decision:\n",
+      "One may think that for large $N$, one can be indifferent between the two techniques since they offer similar inference, and might lean towards the computationally-simpler, frequentist methods. An individual in this position should consider the following quote by Andrew Gelman (2005)[1], before making such a decision:\n",
       "\n",
       "> Sample sizes are never large. If $N$ is too small to get a sufficiently-precise estimate, you need to get more data (or make more assumptions). But once $N$ is \"large enough,\" you can start subdividing the data to learn more (for example, in a public opinion poll, once you have a good estimate for the entire country, you can estimate among men and women, northerners and southerners, different age groups, etc.). $N$ is never enough because if it were \"enough\" you'd already be on to the next problem for which you need more data.\n",
       "\n",