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James Cohen
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minor typo - third person singluar of assume = assumes
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Chapter1_Introduction/Chapter1.ipynb

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"The Bayesian world-view interprets probability as measure of *believability in an event*, that is, how confident we are in an event occurring. In fact, we will see in a moment that this is the natural interpretation of probability. \n",
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"For this to be clearer, we consider an alternative interpretation of probability: *Frequentist*, known as the more *classical* version of statistics, assume that probability is the long-run frequency of events (hence the bestowed title). For example, the *probability of plane accidents* under a frequentist philosophy is interpreted as the *long-term frequency of plane accidents*. This makes logical sense for many probabilities of events, but becomes more difficult to understand when events have no long-term frequency of occurrences. Consider: we often assign probabilities to outcomes of presidential elections, but the election itself only happens once! Frequentists get around this by invoking alternative realities and saying across all these realities, the frequency of occurrences defines the probability. \n",
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"For this to be clearer, we consider an alternative interpretation of probability: *Frequentist*, known as the more *classical* version of statistics, assumes that probability is the long-run frequency of events (hence the bestowed title). For example, the *probability of plane accidents* under a frequentist philosophy is interpreted as the *long-term frequency of plane accidents*. This makes logical sense for many probabilities of events, but becomes more difficult to understand when events have no long-term frequency of occurrences. Consider: we often assign probabilities to outcomes of presidential elections, but the election itself only happens once! Frequentists get around this by invoking alternative realities and saying across all these realities, the frequency of occurrences defines the probability. \n",
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"Bayesians, on the other hand, have a more intuitive approach. Bayesians interpret a probability as measure of *belief*, or confidence, of an event occurring. Simply, a probability is a summary of an opinion. An individual who assigns a belief of 0 to an event has no confidence that the event will occur; conversely, assigning a belief of 1 implies that the individual is absolutely certain of an event occurring. Beliefs between 0 and 1 allow for weightings of other outcomes. This definition agrees with the probability of a plane accident example, for having observed the frequency of plane accidents, an individual's belief should be equal to that frequency, excluding any outside information. Similarly, under this definition of probability being equal to beliefs, it is meaningful to speak about probabilities (beliefs) of presidential election outcomes: how confident are you candidate *A* will win?\n",
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