Epistemic Courage

Epistemology is about how to manage our beliefs. Few questions are more urgent or salient. We live in a world of ideologically-driven misinformation. From vaccine-hesitancy, to conspiracy theories, to Donald Trump’s “big lie”, it has become increasingly obvious to many people that epistemological mistakes — rational errors about what to believe—are a major source of social stri...

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Epistemology is about how to manage our beliefs. Few questions are more urgent or salient. We live in a world of ideologically-driven misinformation. From vaccine-hesitancy, to conspiracy theories, to Donald Trump’s “big lie”, it has become increasingly obvious to many people that epistemological mistakes — rational errors about what to believe—are a major source of social strife.

There are two sides to the question of what to believe: we should believe the things we should, and avoid believing the things we shouldn’t. But, I’ll argue, there is too much focus on the latter, negative problem. We worry a lot about the mistake of believing things we shouldn’t believe—both in ourselves, and, especially, in our assessments of others. (Isn’t it incredible, the ridiculous things that some of your political opponents think?) This bias in emphasis, focusing on the mistake of believing beyond the evidence, is very widespread, both in academic philosophy, and in general nonacademic ideas about rationality. My book is about the converse mistake. We need to worry much more than we do about the potential mistake of not believing. Sometimes we suspend judgment when we ought to believe.

This bias leads to theoretical epistemic confusion; but it also leads to moral and political complacency that entrenches oppressive norms. For there are important connections between epistemology, action, and politics—one acts on what one believes, and we judge actions justified only when based on what one is right to believe. Skeptical considerations and negative epistemic norms, then, motivate inaction. In many contexts, this amounts to a tacit endorsement of oppressive features of the status quo. Think of the ways that “he-said–she-said” discourse is used to avoid passing judgment about cases of alleged sexual abuse. The problem isn’t (always) believing that the accusation is false—sometimes the failure to believe it to be true is enough to do.

Failure to believe what one should can be a kind of epistemic cowardice. Suspending judgment feels safe—it often means you don’t have to react proactively to the world around you. A virtuous epistemic agent will exhibit epistemic courage, believing that which they should, even when doing so is difficult. This is important within epistemology—it’s part of doing a good job deciding what to believe. It is also morally, socially, and political important: it is part of being a good person, making good decisions, and making a better world.

Think of the ways that “he-said–she-said” discourse is used to avoid passing judgment about cases of alleged sexual abuse. The problem isn’t (always) believing that the accusation is false—sometimes the failure to believe it to be true is enough to do harm and contribute to rape culture. Think of the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, when the CDC refused to recommend the use of masks, on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence of their effectiveness. Think of the decades of campaigning from the fossil fuel industry, peddling “reasonable doubt” about human contribution to climate change. Think of victims of gaslighting, who worry that their misgivings might be the result of them just being too emotional, and jumping to conclusions. All of these harmful skeptical moves were buttressed by epistemology’s bias to the negative.

My book is an academic monograph, but I aim it at both philosophical researchers and the general public. It will develop the theoretical and practical importance of epistemic courage, grounded both in academic philosophy and in anti-oppressive activism.

(from author's website)

Jonathan Ichikawa is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia. Dr. Ichikawa has published extensively in epistemology, ethics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and feminist philosophy. He is the co-author of The Rules of Thought (2013) and the author of Contextualizing Knowledge (2017). He received his PhD in philosophy from Rutgers University ...

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Jonathan Ichikawa is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia. Dr. Ichikawa has published extensively in epistemology, ethics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and feminist philosophy. He is the co-author of The Rules of Thought (2013) and the author of Contextualizing Knowledge (2017). He received his PhD in philosophy from Rutgers University in 2008, and his MA from Brown University in 2005. Dr. Ichikawa also completed a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of St Andrews in Scotland. His research interests include the nature of knowledge, consent and rape culture, and the ethics of belief.

Introduction 1
1 Skepticism, Caution, and Conservatism 11
1.1 Bizarro Descartes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2 Skepticism and Certainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3 Skepticism and Rationality Stereotypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 Epistemology and Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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Introduction 1
1 Skepticism, Caution, and Conservatism 11
1.1 Bizarro Descartes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2 Skepticism and Certainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3 Skepticism and Rationality Stereotypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 Epistemology and Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5 Conservatism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.6 Status Quo Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.7 Beyond Skepticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2 Positive Epistemology and the Duty to Believe 28
2.1 Epistemology is Normative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2 Negative Bias in Epistemology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3 Misinformation and Conspiracy Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4 Positive Epistemology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5 Prohibitions on Suspension of Judgment? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.6 Social Epistemology, Norms of Belief, and Norms of Inquiry . . . . . . . . 40
2.7 Negative Surrogate Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.8 Arguments Against Positive Epistemic Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.9 What Must We Believe? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.10 Negative Epistemology as Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.11 Taking Stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3 Do Beliefs Need Justification? 49
3.1 ‘Justification’ in the History of Epistemology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2 Homophobic and Ableist Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3 Justification, Excuses, and Presupposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4 Justification is for Presumptive Wrongs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5 Is Epistemic ‘Justification’ Different? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6 Is Belief Presumptively Wrong? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.7 When ‘Justification’ Language is Apt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.8 The Presumptive Status of Belief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.9 Are Beliefs Presumptively Good? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.10 Alternatives to ‘Justification’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4 Moral and Pragmatic Encroachment 69
4.1 Encroachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2 No Encroachment on the Epistemically Fundamental . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3 Pragmatic Encroachment and High Risk of Suspension . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4 Epistemic Privilege, Standpoint Epistemology, and Oppression . . . . . . . 77
4.5 Moral Encroachment and High Risk of Suspension . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.6 Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.7 Non-Evidential Epistemic Reasons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.8 Courage, Hope, and Caution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.9 Epistemic Anxiety, Hopeful Belief, and Epistemic Courage . . . . . . . . . 86
5 Faith and Doubt in Epistemology 88
5.1 Faith Versus Reason? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.2 Evidentially-Supported Faith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.3 Faith, Trust, and Questioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.4 Faith and Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.5 Reasoning and Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.6 Science, Religion, and Political Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.7 Alternative Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.8 Standpoint Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.9 Acquired Perceptual Abilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.10 What is Faith? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.11 Faith and Vicious Circularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.12 The Ethics of Argument and Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.13 Unsettling Questions and Epistemic Courage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6 Epistemic Courage 109
6.1 Virtue Epistemology: Some Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.2 Epistemic Courage, Dogmatism, and Polarization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.3 An Illustration: COVID-19 Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.4 Epistemic Courage, Cowardice, and Rashness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.5 Epistemic Courage as a Meta-Competence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.6 The Relationship Between Epistemic Courage and Moral Courage . . . . . 118
6.7 Cultivating Epistemic Courage: Exemplars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.8 Cultivating Epistemic Courage: Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.9 Cultivating Epistemic Courage: Attention to Likely Sources of Instincts . . 123
6.10 Cultivating Epistemic Courage: Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7 Skepticism and Rape Culture 126
7.1 Testimony and Positive Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7.2 Terminological Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.3 Testimony about Sexual Assault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.4 Outsourcing to the Criminal Justice System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.5 A “He-Said–She-Said” Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.6 Criminal Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7.7 High Stakes (for Him) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.8 Loyalty, Stability, and Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.9 Irrelevant Alternatives? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7.10 Intersectionality and Epistemic Courage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
8 Contextual Injustice 143
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
8.2 Language, Power, and Sexual Harassment Allegations . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
8.3 Contextualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
8.4 The Triviality Worry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
8.5 Single-Scoreboard Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
8.6 Appropriate Contextual Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
8.7 Knowledge, Contextual Parameters, and Social Power . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
8.8 Skepticism and Conservativism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
8.9 Contextual Injustice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
8.10 Beyond ‘Knows’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
8.11 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Bibliography 156
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