Rules perform a moral function by restating moral principles in concrete terms, so as to reduce the uncertainty, error, and controversy that result when individuals follow their own unconstrained moral judgment. Although reason dictates that we must follow rules to avoid destructive error and controversy, rules—and hence laws—are imperfect, and reason also dictates that we ought not follow them when we believe they produce the wrong result in a particular case. In The Rule of Rules Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin examine this dilemma. Once the importance of this moral and practical conflict is acknowledged, the authors argue, authoritative rules become the central problems of jurisprudence. The inevitable gap between rules and background morality cannot be bridged, they claim, although many contemporary jurisprudential schools of thought are misguided attempts to do so. Alexander and Sherwin work through this dilemma, which lies at the heart of such ongoing jurisprudential controversies as how judges should reason in deciding cases, what effect should be given to legal precedent, and what status, if any, should be accorded to “legal principles.” In the end, their rigorous discussion sheds light on such topics as the nature of interpretation, the ancient dispute among legal theorists over natural law versus positivism, the obligation to obey law, constitutionalism, and the relation between law and coercion. Those interested in jurisprudence, legal theory, and political philosophy will benefit from the edifying discussion in The Rule of Rules.
1 有用 木子李 2023-04-29 22:30:06 江苏
看范立波老师写论文引用过这本书。本书第一部分讨论了规则,权威与规则的作用,同样也指出了规则与我们的道德慎思之间存在无法消除的gap。第二部分讨论法律解释,作者捍卫了立法者的意图就是规则的含义的立场,类比推理,基于原则,先例的推理方法,对德沃金式原则进行了细致的批评,有一些论证还需要再读。最后一部分讨论法概念论。作者的从句有点多了,看起来很艰难,有些地方还没看懂,后面会再仔细读一遍并完成笔记。