The #1 New York Times bestseller: a brilliant account—character-rich and darkly humorous—of how the U.S. economy was driven over the cliff. When the crash of the U. S. stock market became public knowledge in the fall of 2008, it was already old news. The real crash, the silent crash, had taken place over the previous year, in bizarre feeder markets where the sun doesn’t shin...
The #1 New York Times bestseller: a brilliant account—character-rich and darkly humorous—of how the U.S. economy was driven over the cliff. When the crash of the U. S. stock market became public knowledge in the fall of 2008, it was already old news. The real crash, the silent crash, had taken place over the previous year, in bizarre feeder markets where the sun doesn’t shine, and the SEC doesn’t dare, or bother, to tread: the bond and real estate derivative markets where geeks invent impenetrable securities to profit from the misery of lower- and middle-class Americans who can’t pay their debts. The smart people who understood what was or might be happening were paralyzed by hope and fear; in any case, they weren’t talking.
The crucial question is this: Who understood the risk inherent in the assumption of ever-rising real estate prices, a risk compounded daily by the creation of those arcane, artificial securities loosely based on piles of doubtful mortgages? Michael Lewis turns the inquiry on its head to create a fresh, character-driven narrative brimming with indignation and dark humor, a fitting sequel to his #1 best-selling Liar’s Poker . Who got it right? he asks. Who saw the real estate market for the black hole it would become, and eventually made billions of dollars from that perception? And what qualities of character made those few persist when their peers and colleagues dismissed them as Chicken Littles? Out of this handful of unlikely—really unlikely—heroes, Lewis fashions a story as compelling and unusual as any of his earlier bestsellers, proving yet again that he is the finest and funniest chronicler of our times.
4.5.还是挺好看的~But it's just fucking sad that most people are still reading it as a kind of 101 preliminary to betting against the market. Plain fucking sad.
The goal of the innovation is to make the financial markets more efficient, but at that time the market was paying bond traders to make the market less efficient. So Munger is right: "If you wanted to...The goal of the innovation is to make the financial markets more efficient, but at that time the market was paying bond traders to make the market less efficient. So Munger is right: "If you wanted to predict how people would behave, you only had to look at their incentives."(展开)
老师推荐的课外读物《The Big Short》(中文译名大空头),英文原著(2010 by Michael Lewis)和中文译本(何正云翻译的)都读了,对应的电影(亚当·麦凯在2015执导的)也看了。很有意思,强烈推荐。书中讲述了四路华尔街的人马在2008年次贷危机前,靠自己对住房次贷市场与经...
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too big to fail没有讲明白的故事,the big short基本上讲给出了答案。too big to fail写的更加流畅,毕竟作者是NYT的财经版首席记者。而the big short对次贷危机写的更透彻,因为作者Michael Liews是princeton和LSE金融背景毕业,在soloman brothers做过trader,是典型的insid...
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2011.8.5,S&P downgraded U.S. credit rating,全球大跌。每天收到合作的基金公司email轰炸。前天又开始新一轮跌,email又来了。与其读那些email,不如读书。 昨天,终于废寝不忘食读完了The Big Short by Michael Lewis。真好看呐,特别是崩盘前夕那段,真揪心,从中环走到...
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3 有用 庄常飞 2010-06-11 09:43:53
果然是Michael Lewis的风格,超级寓教于乐,三天就看完了。里面对次贷危机的解释深入浅出,和其他更为技术的书加起来读味道更佳。作为我们这一代的大萧条,此次危机的题材真是层出不穷啊。
1 有用 Jean 2015-12-28 12:06:07
写的太逗了。虽然电影还没看,但是选Steve Carell演Eisman(电影里改了名字 Mike Baum)这角色太赞了。
1 有用 千载遥望 2018-03-16 02:11:58
角度真好,从做空的人的角度看金融危机的形成。事后标榜自己预测了危机的人有不少,可事前就拿钱做空的人才更可信。结尾最让人唏嘘:做空的人们判断是正确的、赚了钱,可是他们的对手明明判断错了,却也赚了钱,蒙受损失的是main street, tax payer, mortgage borrower. 做空的人并没有因为他们的成功而声名鹊起,金融界无视他们、犹如无视自己失败的尴尬。公平、公正都在哪里呢?
1 有用 Rilkelee 2016-02-04 14:55:32
4.5.还是挺好看的~But it's just fucking sad that most people are still reading it as a kind of 101 preliminary to betting against the market. Plain fucking sad.
0 有用 旧居 2016-04-23 22:14:06
The goal of the innovation is to make the financial markets more efficient, but at that time the market was paying bond traders to make the market less efficient. So Munger is right: "If you wanted to... The goal of the innovation is to make the financial markets more efficient, but at that time the market was paying bond traders to make the market less efficient. So Munger is right: "If you wanted to predict how people would behave, you only had to look at their incentives." (展开)