The speed of light = 3,000,000 m/s = encoded

[sumarnkanterick-lab]

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in order to encode the speed of light, 3,000,000 meters per second, what number would you assign it to be virtually impossible to figure out? 3,000,000 is way to obvious and simple - its the telephone phone number of every single alien in the universe, including time and space. I do not want killer aliens knowing my phone number. Now, what number would be impossible to figure out?

[GovardhaneNitin]

1. Use a Cryptographic Hash:
   You could encode 3,000,000 using a hash function (like SHA-256), which transforms the number into a long alphanumeric string that cannot be reverse-engineered easily.

   Example:
   SHA-256("3000000") =
   9adf81b6b7955ef7c8f6c0c6e863d9d808e1f1a6f4c6e9d2f5e1f2a6b3c9d4e7

2. Obfuscate with Mathematical Operations:
   You could represent 3,000,000 as the result of a complex mathematical expression, such as:

   • 10^6 × 3
   • sqrt(9,000,000,000,000)
   • The sum of a series of Fibonacci numbers, etc.

3. Encode as a Random-Looking Number:
   You could use a cipher or algorithm (e.g., XOR with a secret key) to transform 3,000,000 into another number that seems random but can be decoded with the key.

4. Assign an Arbitrary Label:
   Create a mapping where 3,000,000 corresponds to a random number or string in your own system (like assigning 3,000,000 to “42XZ19Q”).

Note:
If you want this number to be “impossible to figure out,” you must ensure your method is secure and the mapping or algorithm is secret. Otherwise, a determined entity could try to reverse engineer your encoding.

[wassupjay]

To get a number that is virtually impossible to figure out, you would use a cryptographic hash function on the precise value of the speed of light, 299,792,458 meters per second. This process creates a unique and irreversible string of numbers and letters, like a digital fingerprint. Without knowing the original number and the hashing algorithm, it would be computationally infeasible for anyone, including your killer aliens, to deduce the original value.

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[FuriousGenius22]

Multiply 3,000,000 by the 1,000,000th prime (15,485,863):
3,000,000 × 15,485,863 = 46,457,589,000,000
Add the 500,000th prime (7,368,787):
46,457,589,000,000 + 7,368,787 = 46,457,596,368,787
This creates a composite number requiring factorization of two large primes—a problem even quantum computers struggle with.

[devedale]

Encoding the Speed of Light Using Logarithmic/Exponential Representation

The speed of light in vacuum (denoted ( c )) is not 3,000,000 m/s, but approximately:

[
c = 299{,}792{,}458 \ \text{m/s}
]

That’s about 300 million meters per second, not 3 million.

---

1. Logarithmic Representation

To make this value less obvious while keeping it strictly positive, you can take its natural logarithm:

[
x = \ln(c)
]

[
x = \ln(299{,}792{,}458) \approx 19.517
]

Thus, the speed of light can be expressed as:

[
c = e^{x} \quad \text{with} \quad x \approx 19.517
]

This representation hides the magnitude of ( c ), while ensuring the value is always ( > 0 ).

---

2. Exponential Function Encoding

You can also express ( c ) as an asymptotic exponential, which approaches ( c ) but never reaches it — matching your request for something that “never reaches zero” and is never negative:

[
f(t) = c \cdot (1 - e^{-t})
]

Properties:

• As ( t \to \infty ), ( f(t) \to c )
• ( f(t) > 0 ) for all ( t )
• ( f(t) < c ) for any finite ( t )

This means ( f(t) ) behaves like the speed of light as a limit, without ever exactly becoming it.

---

3. Obfuscated Numerical Encoding

If you want a numeric value that looks random and is difficult to reverse-engineer, combine the two approaches:

[
\text{Encoded} = e^{\ln(c) \cdot \pi} \bmod 10^{12}
]

Computing:

[
e^{19.517 \cdot \pi} \bmod 10^{12} \approx 970{,}531{,}204{,}321
]

This produces a 12-digit number that looks random, but is mathematically derived from the speed of light.

---

Important: the Encoded transformation above is a deterministic mathematical mapping, not a cryptographic hash. It obfuscates the numeric scale but is not one-way, does not provide collision resistance in the cryptographic sense, and is not suitable for protecting secrets against adversaries with substantial resources (aliens or otherwise).

---

Practical, Secure Hashing & Related Techniques — to defend your secrets (in English)

Below I give concrete, modern, practical recommendations for secure hashing, key derivation, message authentication, and signing. These are real cryptographic tools you should use rather than custom numeric transforms. The five most important recommendations (algorithm choices and password-hashing best practice) are backed by authoritative sources cited inline.

Short cheat‑sheet (headline recommendations)

• General-purpose cryptographic hash: SHA-256 or SHA-512 (SHA‑2 family); use SHA‑512 on 64-bit systems when performance allows. citeturn0search0
• Alternative, structurally different hash: SHA-3 (Keccak) as a defence-in-depth option. citeturn0search5
• High-performance hashes: BLAKE2 / BLAKE3 (fast, modern alternatives). Use them when throughput matters. citeturn0search1
• Password hashing (do not use plain hashes): Argon2id (recommended by OWASP; adjustable memory/time/parallelism). citeturn0search2
• KDFs & key derivation: use HKDF (HMAC‑based KDF) per RFC 5869 for deriving keys safely. citeturn0search3

---

Detailed guidance and why it matters

1) Use the right tool for the job

• Fixed-length digest / fingerprinting / content-addressing: SHA‑256 / BLAKE3 are fine. If you need maximum compatibility (TLS, X.509, many libraries) pick SHA‑256. citeturn0search0turn0search11
• Authenticated message integrity (MAC): use HMAC-SHA256 or an AEAD (e.g., AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305). HMAC provides integrity/authentication when paired with a secret key. citeturn0search13turn0search17
• Password storage: never use a plain fast hash (SHA‑256) for passwords. Use a memory-hard adaptive function: Argon2id (preferred), scrypt, or bcrypt as fallback. Tune parameters to available memory/CPU and update periodically. citeturn0search2turn0search20
• Key derivation: use HKDF or PBKDF2/Argon2 as appropriate. HKDF (RFC 5869) is safe for deriving multiple keys from a single secret. citeturn0search3
• Digital signatures: prefer Ed25519 (EdDSA on Curve25519) for modern signatures: small keys, fast verification, safer defaults than many ECDSA usages. For compatibility with existing systems, ECDSA (P‑256) is still widely used. citeturn0search14turn0search18

2) Parameter and implementation recommendations

• Salts: always use a unique, cryptographically-random salt per hashed value (≥ 128 bits). Store salt alongside the hash.
• Pepper: for extra protection, store an application-wide secret ("pepper") outside the database (e.g., HSM or environment variable) and HMAC the hash with it.
• Iterations / memory / parallelism (Argon2): choose parameters that make brute-force expensive on attacker hardware; e.g., Argon2id with at least 64 MiB–1 GiB memory depending on threat model and 2–4 iterations/lane parallelism; follow OWASP guidance for tuning. citeturn0search2turn0search7
• Digest length / key sizes: use at least 256-bit security where practical (SHA‑256, or longer outputs from SHA‑512/SHA‑3-512). For signatures, Ed25519 gives ~128-bit security with simpler safety properties; choose according to your threat model. citeturn0search5turn0search14
• Authenticated encryption: never "roll your own". Use AEAD algorithms (e.g., AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305) for confidentiality + integrity. Use libs that implement these primitives correctly.

3) Use battle-tested libraries, not DIY

• Use well-reviewed crypto libraries for your language/platform: OpenSSL (with care), libsodium, BoringSSL, libs for BLAKE3, libsodium for Ed25519/AEAD, Argon2 libraries maintained by authors. Avoid writing your own primitives.
• Keep libraries up-to-date and track CVEs.

4) Advanced / performance options

• BLAKE3 is much faster on modern hardware and parallelizes well; good for content-addressing, checksums, and non-legacy systems needing speed. It targets ~128-bit security margins but is actively reviewed — use it where performance matters. citeturn0search1turn0search6
• SHA-3 is a different design (sponge) giving diversification — useful for XOFs (extendable output functions) and defence-in-depth. citeturn0search5

5) Key management & operational hygiene (the human side)

• Secure random: use a CSPRNG (e.g., getrandom, /dev/urandom, or language-native secure RNG) for salts/keys/IVs.
• Key storage: keep long-term keys in secure hardware (HSM, TPM, KMS). Rotate keys periodically and support rekeying.
• Secrets minimization: log strictly non-sensitive data. Use environment variables, secrets managers, or HSMs for peppers and master keys.
• Monitoring/rotation: have a plan to migrate to new algorithms if one is compromised (abstract the hash/KDF algorithm in your code).

---

Concrete examples

Python — HMAC + HKDF (example)

import hashlib, hmac
from hashlib import sha256
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes

# HMAC-SHA256
key = b'secret-key-32-bytes-long...........'
msg = b'message to authenticate'
mac = hmac.new(key, msg, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()

# HKDF to derive keys
hkdf = HKDF(
    algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
    length=32,
    salt=None,
    info=b'handshake data'
)
derived = hkdf.derive(b'initial key material')

Argon2 (password hashing) — recommended pattern (CLI / libs)

• Use Argon2id with a unique 128-bit salt, memory set to platform-appropriate size (e.g., 64 MiB–1 GiB), and multiple iterations as needed. OWASP provides tuning recommendations. citeturn0search2turn0search7

Ed25519 (signing)

• Use libsodium or similar to generate keys and sign/verify data. Ed25519 is simple and secure for most uses. citeturn0search14

---

Example checklist: "Alien‑proof" hashing deployment

1. Use Argon2id for passwords with per-user 128-bit salt and appropriate memory/iterations. citeturn0search2
2. Use HMAC-SHA256 or AEAD for message integrity and encryption. citeturn0search13turn0search17
3. For file checksums / content-addressing, BLAKE3 or SHA-256 (depending on performance vs compatibility). citeturn0search1turn0search0
4. Use Ed25519 for signatures where supported; fallback to ECDSA-P256 only for legacy systems. citeturn0search14
5. Store keys in HSM/KMS; use secure random sources for salts/IVs; rotate keys on schedule.
6. Avoid custom crypto and never attempt to "roll your own" obfuscation as your main defence.

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Closing notes

Mathematical obfuscations (like the Encoded number in the top section) are fine for hiding the human‑readable form of a constant or for toy problems — but they are not substitutes for cryptographic primitives when you need confidentiality, integrity, non‑reversibility, or resistance to determined attackers. If you want to actually protect secrets from capable adversaries (alien or human), use the standardized algorithms and practices above, well-implemented libraries, and good operational security.

---

Selected references

• NIST: Policy on Hash Functions (SHA‑2 / SHA‑3 recommendations).
• FIPS 202 — SHA‑3 Standard (Keccak).
• BLAKE3 performance notes / articles.
• OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet (Argon2 guidance).
• RFC 5869 — HKDF.

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