Review: Call Sign Chaos
Since its publication several months ago, former Marine General and Secretary of Defense James Mattis’ new book, Call Sign Chaos, has received a large number of glowing reviews. They have come from such eminent reviewers as Anthony King, Lawrence Freedman, and many others. Indeed, I have yet to come across an even mildly negative review. Each has had its specific focus, but they all agree that Call Sign Chaos is an absolute gem that should be “deeply studied and absorbed.” To be frank, I somewhat disagree. It is entirely possible that I did not read the book carefully enough or did not understand all of what Secretary Mattis and Mr. West were saying, but nonetheless — and despite a number of useful points and lessons — I found the tone of the book somewhat offputting, some of it disingenuous, and limited on introspective value.
First, a caveat — this book offers plenty of value to even the most cursory reader. The careful reader will surely find much to learn by reading it. There are a huge number of quotes that read like pure gold, such as the myriad discussions of decentralizing command — and particularly the insidious dangers of rapid electronic communications that prevent decentralization, trusting leaders at all levels, and general thoughts about organizational design that can help to facilitate decentralization and trust. The paragraphs describing the inherent tension between rules and trust on one hand and the corrosion of discipline that comes from senior leaders “losing influence over their troops because their rules are out of touch” could (probably should) be expanded to book length all by themselves. Finally, there are many discussions of the dangers that come along with ballooning staffs. The recognition that the bureaucratization of warfighting organizations is generally detrimental is an essential one in today’s military. It probably would have been a good thing had he attacked this more aggressively as Secretary of Defense, but the book nonetheless provides a useful model in the elimination of Joint Forces Command that can help think about the “nuclear option” when dealing with bureaucracy.
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All of that said, and given the numerous glowing reviews, I found it generally underwhelming. The primary reason I found it offputting was its general superficiality. True, the book covered 40+ years of government service; nonetheless, at no point during the book did I feel that I got more that a cursory/“wavetop” idea of what Secretary Mattis was dealing with. What were his challenges? What particular problems did he face upon entering his new duties? Anthony King writes of how he found the book’s theme to be firing subordinates who couldn’t cut it — that’s fine, but I certainly hope that the removal of these subordinates deserved a more thoughtful treatment than the few paragraphs that the book allocated to these events. If the theme of the book is really the removal of substandard performers, one would think that Mattis and West might spend a bit more time discussing the decisionmaking process that went into determining that they needed to be removed. Although the book is about more than firing people, this is a useful example to be extrapolated to the rest of the subject matter. At no point in the reading did I find myself identifying with or understanding the author’s point of view. My favorite general officer memoirs — Slim, Grant, Truscott, etc — put you in the shoes of the writer; you understand what they’re thinking and why. This is obviously a useful feature for young (or not so young, in my case) military officers who are trying to learn from someone else’s experience. Call Sign Chaos reads far more like standard leadership “how to” book for business executives or a lecture to a staff academy class — full of useful information and even pithy anecdotes, but not the sort of immersive experience that can truly change the way a leader conducts him or herself.
Finally, there are a few minor elements in the book that are truly grating. First, it is entirely possible that Secretary Mattis really was as foresighted as he often claims, but it is far more likely that the book suffers from a severe case of hindsight disease. For example — it is entirely possible that 1st Marine Division knew that the answer to “winning” Iraq in 2004 was to come through the tribes, but that seems at least somewhat unlikely, given the guidance that was still coming from Multinational Force Iraq at the time. Another example is the chapter that discusses his thinking in 2006 — that the Marine Corps would need to restructure and refocus on “great power competition” in the near future. Again, it’s certainly possible that he was thinking this way, but Occam’s Razor might suggest that it is more likely that this book was written with the knowledge and concomitant hindsight of 2018.
Perhaps most grating in the book is the false humility that infuses the end of nearly every chapter. Senior officers love to play the “false humility” game; in Call Sign Chaos it comes as Secretary Mattis says something like “Three-star positions being scarce, I was prepared and ready to go home.” Sentiments like this come as he talks about nearly every promotion in the book — and to be frank, they simply don’t ring true. Perhaps he truly is a uniquely humble individual who genuinely thought that he wasn’t going to be selected to the next rank and would just pack up and retire after his successful command tours, senior staff tours, and general officer tours, but that seems awfully unlikely. It is an unnecessary addition that made me pay less attention to what he actually had to say.
There is a great deal to take away from Secretary Mattis’ 40+ years of experiences as a warfighter, staff officer, and thinker. Unfortunately, for this reader, Call Sign Chaos only scratched the surface. Mattis writes that “reading is an honor and a gift from a warrior or historian who…set aside time to write…and distilled a lifetime of campaigning in order to have a ‘conversation’ with you.” The book did not have the feel of a conversation, but more like a compilation of pithy “Mattis-isms” and overly broad war stories. He has passed on the lessons of his experience, but very little of the experience itself. Understanding the author — how he came to the lessons is perhaps of more value than the specific lessons; for me there was very little of this to be found in Call Sign Chaos.
