February 27, 2019: What Went Wrong?
An evaluation of the Indian Air Force’s performance in the February 2019 air battle over Kashmir
This piece has also been posted to Reddit.
Introduction
On the 27th of February 2019, exactly four years ago, the Indian Air Force (IAF) fought its first air battle in nearly fifty years. The exact details of what happened on that fateful day are still obscured beneath layers of claims, counterclaims, disinformation, and at times, outright propaganda — with both Indians and Pakistanis trying to prove that their side came out on top.
While the picture is no less confusing today, I hope that enough time has passed that we can leave our fervour aside and examine the events with some degree of objectivity. This is what my analysis aims to do. We’ll look at how the battle played out; and review the IAF’s performance from a tactical, operational, and strategic perspective.
Some caveats before we dive in: First, I have written this essay from an Indian perspective, and have not subjected the performance of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) to the same level of scrutiny. Second, my assessment is based on a mix of known facts, media reports of varying accuracy, private information, and reasonable extrapolations. It is sure to contain misinterpretations, errors, and inaccuracies. By no means is it the final word on the matter, although I hope it brings us closer to the truth. And finally, it is impossible to divorce the skirmish that took place on February 27th from the events of the previous day, when the IAF bombed a Jaish-e-Mohammad establishment in Balakot. But because the PAF refused (or failed) to put up a fight that night, the details of what transpired do not interest me as much.
The Setup
Following the Balakot airstrike, the PAF was expected to mount a retaliatory strike on India to restore deterrence and seize back control of the escalation ladder. Both sides maintained a sizeable aerial presence in the hours and days that followed, with the PAF looking for an opportunity to land a blow, and the IAF attempting to ward it off.
Things came to a head at approximately 9:30 in the morning of February 27th, when a watchful PAF caught the IAF in a position of momentary weakness and commenced Operation Swift Retort.
At this moment, the IAF had four fighter aircraft on a defensive combat air patrol (CAP) over Kashmir. Two Mirage-2000s in the North near Bandipora (called the Ironman flight) and two Su-30MKI in the South near Naushera (called the Avenger flight). Several MiG-21s, and possibly MiG-29s, were on Operational Readiness Patrol (ORP — a state of high readiness with fighters armed, fuelled, and manned; ready to take off at a moment’s notice) at multiple bases. Four Su-30MKIs and an AEW&C aircraft (Airborne Early Warning and Control — an airborne radar and command post that provides situational awareness and directs all air activity in its sector) were rotating out.
The PAF’s raid consisted of four distinct packages. One flight of four JF-17s was intended to pin down the Ironman flight. Another flight of four F-16s was to suppress the Avenger flight. They would keep the skies safe for two ground attack packages. The main package consisted of four Mirage-IIIs, and four JF-17s, with four F-16s providing escort. One of its targets was reported to be the Indian Army’s Brigade Headquarters in Bhimber. A smaller package of four more Mirage-IIIs was to hit the ammunition dump at Narian. The engagement was directed from a Saab-2000 Erieye AEW&C. A Falcon 20F Electronic Warfare aircraft provided jamming support.
The Battle
The two PAF counter-air flights (4 x JF-17 and 4 x F-16) appear to have had two objectives: to keep Indian fighter aircraft from interfering with the ground attack packages, and to try to score kills on Indian fighter aircraft if possible. The first was a success, but the second was not. While the JF-17s engaged the Mirage-2000s in a beyond visual range (BVR) grind, they were unable to generate firing solutions and launch missiles at them. The F-16s were in a stronger position — they climbed up to 40,000 feet and lobbed AMRAAMs at the Su-30MKIs that were flying at around 25,000 feet. With that difference in altitude, they comfortably outranged the defenders. Even so, these missiles were fired from the extremes of their range, and failed to score kills.
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As soon as the enemy’s intent became clear, the IAF’s MiG-21s on ORP in Srinagar were scrambled. As they climbed to intercept, they flew in the radar shadow cast by the Pir Panjal range, and remained hidden from the PAF’s Erieye AEW&C. They weren’t illuminated until they were nearly atop the main strike package. Their sudden appearance on the PAF’s battle management system appears to have thrown that package into confusion: It released its munitions in haste and scattered. Those munitions were of the type that required manual guidance all the way to their targets, and thus, missed.
In that melee, one MiG-21, flown by Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, appears to have encountered heavy jamming, and crossed the Line of Control in pursuit of the enemy. In the ensuing furball, Abhinandan was shot down. He ejected, was apprehended by the locals, and was taken prisoner. The IAF claims that he downed a Pakistani F-16 before taking fire, but the evidence supporting this claim is purely circumstantial.
At the same time, an unidentified object showed up on the consoles of the air defence operators protecting Srinagar airfield, and was shot down by a SpyDer surface-to-air missile battery. This object turned out to be an IAF Mi-17V-5 helicopter returning to Srinagar from a supply mission. All six personnel onboard were killed, as was a civilian on the ground.
All this happened within minutes. The IAF rushed more aircraft to the scene, but it was already too late. The raid was over.
Assessing the Outcome
The proximate reason the IAF was caught off-guard on that day was its inability to anticipate the quantum of Pakistan’s response. Its leadership calculated that the risk of a massive alpha strike — which could potentially have destroyed the bulk of a forward-deployed fleet on the ground — was too great. It therefore moved its most capable assets to bases deeper inside India’s interior. Since those assets flew in from great distances, their time on station was limited. This, in turn, opened up a gap for the PAF to exploit.
In fairness to the IAF leadership, uncertainty is a fundamental characteristic of war, and commanders are forced to trade-off some risks against others. It is only with the benefit of hindsight that a certain of events appears obvious. One must keep this in mind before faulting the IAF for this slip.
What is unforgiveable, however, is the complete absence of long-term planning and foresight within the military leadership as well as the civilian administration. This resulted in a persistent misalignment between desired ends and available means, and made its impact felt in the various shortcomings that the IAF suffered during the conflict. Consider the fact that hardened shelters capable of accommodating heavy fighters were absent at key bases like Srinagar. Or that antiquated MiG-21s had to be sent into combat in 2019. Or that communications between fighters and controllers were carried out using unsecured voice radios (which the PAF intercepted) instead of encrypted data links. None of these paint an encouraging picture of how the military is run, or of civil-military co-ordination.
The deep-set issues in the Indian military apparatus came together in the perfect storm over Srinagar Air Force Station, where base air defences shot down a friendly Mi-17V-5 helicopter. A court of inquiry later revealed that the helicopter’s Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system, which distinguishes friendly aircraft from enemy ones, had been turned off. The reason cited was the interference with civilian frequencies. As a result, the helicopter showed up on the base air defence consoles as an unidentified object. Faced with limited information and a pressing need to make a quick decision, the officer in charge made the unfortunate choice to shoot it down.
This one incident laid bare the many years of omissions, apathy, and inertia at every level of the civil-military system. A military aircraft having to fly with its IFF transponder disabled — in what was potentially contested airspace — was unconscionable.
The outcome was also a strategic setback. The fact that the IAF did not (or was not allowed to) counterattack, came as a shock to a public that had been brought up on tales of the IAF’s prowess. Between the IAF’s lack of preparation for an all-out air war and the approaching general elections, there was no appetite to initiate a larger conflict. Just as the Balakot raid had exposed the hollowness of Pakistan’s nuclear redlines and expanded India’s options for military action, Operation Swift Retort had helped Pakistan demonstrate its resolve and restore conventional deterrence across the border.
Still, a handful of bright spots did shine through what was an otherwise lacklustre performance. For instance, the procedures to maintain fighters on ORP demonstrated their effectiveness. The response from Srinagar-based MiG-21s was so quick that they surprised the attackers and scattered their strike package. A slew of indigenous systems that were deployed over the course of the tensions — in particular the Netra AEW&C system, the Samyukta electronic warfare system, and the Integrated Air Command and Control System — gave a strong account of themselves.
Aircrew selection and training also proved to be a key strength. In the initial phase of the clash, just four Indian fighters squared off against a well-supported strike package that was six times their size without losing cohesion or discipline. This was followed by two MiG-21s showing exemplary aggression and initiative against an enemy that outnumbered and outgunned them.
On the other side, the PAF timed its raid perfectly. It successfully disguised a large operation as an exercise, and kept the IAF guessing as to its intent until the very last moment. It melded together a clutch of disparate assets sourced from multiple countries, and executed an effective operation that achieved its political objectives. But it is also important to recognize that the raid failed in its operational objective — to hit the Indian Army’s brigade headquarters and ammunition dumps in Kashmir.
The Bottom Line
At the end of the day, Pakistan was seen to win the engagement, because its victories were clear-cut and its shortcomings did not detract from the mission’s key goals. The PAF demonstrated the audacity to target Indian Army establishments, scored a kill on an IAF fighter, and paraded the captured pilot all over social media. Conversely, India’s failures were public, and successes too abstract to convince a lay audience. Doubling down on a questionable claim of an F-16 kill made it appear as if an embarrassed IAF was cooking up stories to cover up its failures. Being the larger and better-resourced force, it was incumbent upon the IAF to produce an unambiguous, lopsided victory. Anything less was going to be seen a loss, and rightly so.
