“Good”
This article will involve exploring cognitive meta-ethical theories, which suggest that there is an objective standard for what is considered good and that ethical terms can be true or false. Non-cognitive meta-ethical theories will be discussed in the next article.
Beyond Morality
Meta-ethics goes beyond the practice of ethics; it questions the fundamentals and what ethical terms themselves mean. What does it mean for something to be “good”, “bad”, “right” or “wrong”, and is it even meaningful to use these terms in the first place?
Naturalism
Meta-ethical naturalism presents the view that ethical terms can be defined in relation to facts that exist in nature. Perhaps the most influential and prevalent of ethical naturalist theories lies in that of utilitarianism. Jeremy Bentham, in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, states the following:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure
This serves as the basis of utilitarianism, a naturalist ethical theory, which suggests that what is good is that which brings pleasure, and what is bad is that which causes suffering. Such a premise to ground ethics may seem valid: it seems intuitive that pleasure is a good thing and that suffering is a bad thing.
Whilst flaws can be found with the practice of utilitarianism itself, such as in allowing minority suffering, its metaethical foundations can also be criticised. David Hume’s is/ought distinction suggests that it is logically incoherent to infer moral obligations from that which exists i.e. an ought cannot be derived from what is. Utilitarianism therefore cannot derive that we ought to maximise pleasure from the existence of pleasure alone. In response, one may suggest that the idea that we ought to maximise pleasure is an “axiomatic ought”, a base assumption from which we derive further moral obligations. However, this must itself be justified and does not tell us why pleasure is itself good.
Naturalist theories such as utilitarianism can be appealing in many ways, although it can be challenging to sufficiently justify the meta-ethical positions they rely on.
Intuitionism
In Principia Ethica, G.E.Moore presents his ethical intuitionism, which suggests that what is good is not learnt, as the name of a horse is, but is rather recognised as the colour yellow is.
Good is good, and that is the end of the matter
The intuitionist perspective on meta-ethics can help to make sense of the difficulties to explain morality and why certain moral obligations appear to be self-evident. On the other hand, one can argue that intuitionism is unable to account for cultural relativism. Some cultures have considered ritualistic sacrifice to be morally acceptable, whereas many others would condemn it. If moral truths are known by intuition, this discrepancy must be accounted for. It could be said that this is a consequence of different degrees of intuition, but this may be said to confuse what moral truths are.
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Intuitionism must also explain the origins of moral intuitions; it can be said that moral truths are intuited but there is the question of why that is so. Individuals may suggest that this is a consequence of evolution: that intuition of morality helps to further survival. Alternatively, it may be said that moral intuitions are a consequence of a God-given conscience, although this has a further burden of proof that must be fulfilled. Therefore, meta-ethical intuitionism can help to solve some questions that arise in meta-ethics but can lead to several more that must be answered.
Divine Command Theory
Numerous theologians, including both traditional and contemporary, hold the meta-ethical position of divine command theory. Given this, that which is good is what God defines to be good. What is good is what God dictates to be good, and what is bad is what God dictates to be bad. However, divine command theory can be criticised by works as old as Plato’s Euthyphro, which questions the following:
Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?
If that which is ‘pious’ (or “good”) is said to be good because a deity commands it, it can be so for two reasons:
- first, that it is good because it is commanded to be so
or
- second, that it is good because of a standard of good beyond the deity, that the deity is promoting to be followed.
If the latter is the case, then there must be an objective standard of morality that exists beyond God that is adhered to. In this case, however, it can be implied that objective morality can exist in the absence of God, or that God is limited by a standard of morality beyond Him, both of which can be problematic.
If the former is the case, then moral terms are arbitrarily defined in relation to God, which some may consider to make morality as a whole arbitrary and subjective. One can once again refer to Hume’s is/ought distinction, which would suggest that God’s existence does not result in moral obligations.
Both aspects of the Euthyphro Dilemma can be responded to, with the beliefs that a moral standard beyond God or circular morality dictated by God are not incoherent. For example, a moral standard beyond God can be seen to include obligations that are independent of all wills, including that of God. Alternatively, morality being defined by God can be viewed as coherent, with the idea that God is the supreme arbiter of morality. Whether these responses are convincing is a further undertaking, and is indicative of the scope of meta-ethical discussions.
Conclusion
The cognitive meta-ethical theories that have been discussed are just some of the perspectives that exist, though are able to illustrate some aspects of what discussions in meta-ethics constitute. They offer appeal in that they are able to suggest that ethical terms are meaningful, and that moral claims can be examined just as any other truth claims. They can serve to be problematic, but adequate solutions to these problems may allow them to be convincing. If so, then “good” is real, and the basis for the practice of normative ethics can be sufficiently established.
