Exploring De Zerbi’s Build-Up Structure and Principles
Roberto De Zerbi has joined Tottenham. If there is one aspect of De Zerbi’s football that has made him famous, it is his build-up. De Zerbi strongly favours playing out from the back, even in situations where other coaches may prefer to go long. It is a core foundation of his game model.
In this piece, I will discuss De Zerbi’s build-up in depth, including the general ideas behind its structure and the search for numerical advantages, alongside specific build-up patterns and the ways opponents can look to counter it.
Structurally, De Zerbi’s teams often begin in what appears to be a 4–2–4 or 4–2–3–1 (with the #10 often playing next to the CF):
In the first phase, the goalkeeper often becomes a third centre-back by splitting the two central defenders. The double pivot positions itself deep, while the full-backs hold the width and stretch the pitch:
The double pivot is deliberately placed so deep in order to draw the opposition higher up the pitch.
The goalkeeper acting as a third defender allows the centre-backs to occupy slightly wider zones, which in turn allows the full-backs to stay on the touchline while also pushing higher than they otherwise could. The goalkeeper also adds an extra body in build-up, increasing the likelihood that De Zerbi’s teams can create an overload.
For example, if the opposition press with four forwards, which is common, each forward can go man-to-man with De Zerbi’s back line. The opposition midfielders can then mark the double pivot, and suddenly passing options across the pitch begin to disappear:
By involving the goalkeeper, De Zerbi’s team creates a +1 in the first phase:
This makes it impossible for the opposition to mark every passing option without leaving certain players free. Even if they commit more players forward to deal with the goalkeeper, they will leave spare players behind the press:
Those players can then rotate, find space unmarked, be targets for a long ball etc.
This is a key trade-off, and each manager will have a different view on it. Is it better to commit more players forward to ensure the goalkeeper does not provide a +1, meaning an outfielder becomes the spare man elsewhere? Or is it better to allow the goalkeeper to remain free?
Most commonly, the goalkeeper is allowed to be the spare man because of their skillset. Generally, you would rather the goalkeeper be free to receive than a forward or midfielder who has rotated into space higher up the pitch. On the other hand, it can also be argued that leaving the forward as the spare man is safer. If you commit more players to the press and eliminate the overload in the first phase, you may prevent De Zerbi’s team from finding that spare man higher up the pitch and keep them pinned in their own third.
Regardless of the decision the opposition make, De Zerbi’s use of the goalkeeper in build-up ensures that, somewhere on the pitch, there is a spare man who can be used to help his team play out.
One of the most recognisable aspects of De Zerbi’s teams, particularly during his time at Brighton in the Premier League, was the “studs-on-the-ball” action. This was often used by the goalkeeper when he was the spare man and the opposition allowed him time on the ball rather than pressing him. By stopping the ball dead, the player in possession forces the opposition to make a decision. They are not going to win the ball back unless they press the player standing on it. This encourages the opposition to initiate their press, at which point De Zerbi’s team can look to play out and either utilise or find their spare man.
Furthermore, when the player is standing on the ball, their body orientation has not committed them to a single passing lane. For example, if a centre-back receives a pass and turns to face the left side of the pitch, they have essentially cut off the passing lanes on the right-hand side. Their body orientation may even make it difficult to access the centre of the pitch reliably. In most cases, they will play where they are facing.
However, if they are standing on the ball and are square to the opposition, they can see the whole pitch. They can see their midfielders, turn either way once the opposition begin to press, and play into any available teammate. In this position, all passing lanes remain open.
While the double pivot is positioned deeper, it is not necessarily static. Occasionally, one of De Zerbi’s pivot players will drop even deeper, sometimes between or near the pressing forwards, and at other times into the first line to receive the ball inside the box:
This creates an additional problem for the opposition press. A midfielder receiving the ball in these areas is generally a greater threat than the goalkeeper having possession, simply because of their technical skillset and the zones they are comfortable operating in. The opposition must then make a decision: do they follow the midfielder deeper, potentially leaving central space for De Zerbi’s team to target?
If an opposition midfielder tracks the dropping player, they vacate central areas and leave their teammate 1v1 against De Zerbi’s remaining pivot:
This is risky because the space either side of that player becomes available:
Through quick combinations, wall passes, up-back-through patterns and third-man movements, De Zerbi’s team can access this space and play through the press. His players can also rotate into these areas, lose their markers and receive between the lines. Leaving so much central space open is dangerous for the opposition.
While some of this space may have existed before the midfielder dropped deeper, it would have been far easier for the opposition to cover those areas with two midfielders rather than one.
This issue is amplified if De Zerbi’s side already have a spare man higher up the pitch (because the opposition have committed five players to the initial press in order to mark the goalkeeper properly). That spare player can then rotate into the space vacated by the tracking midfielder and be found with a clipped pass, a split pass etc, allowing them to turn and run at opposition defenders who are now suffering from a numerical disadvantage:
However, if the opposition defend these spaces well, they can effectively neutralise the advantage De Zerbi is trying to create through the dropping midfielder.
Of course, the opposition can choose to leave the dropping midfielder. This means De Zerbi’s side now have a +2 overload in the first phase:
However, the trade-off is that they now have a numerical disadvantage centrally, with one midfielder occupied by two opposition players (a 2v1 numerical disadvantage):
In this case, De Zerbi has accepted a central numerical disadvantage in return for an extra player in the first line. The opposition have accepted that their first line of pressure must now deal with an additional player, but they allow this because it gives them a numerical advantage in midfield.
However, De Zerbi does have a solution. Because of this 2v1 disadvantage, one of his forwards can drop into midfield to fill the vacant space and restore balance centrally. This removes the opposition’s advantage by giving De Zerbi’s side both an overload in the first line and a 2v2 centrally:
The problem for the opposition is then transferred from the midfielders to the defenders. They can leave the dropping forward, allowing De Zerbi’s side to maintain a 2v2 centrally while still having an overload in the first phase. Alternatively, they can track the forward into deeper areas where they may not feel comfortable defending.
This is in the scenario where the opposition initially press with four players in the first line. Whatever decision they make involves a trade-off.
On the one hand, they may accept that De Zerbi’s side will have a +1 in the first phase through the goalkeeper. This may be because they would prefer the spare man to be the goalkeeper rather than an outfield player, for the reasons already mentioned. Many teams would be more comfortable allowing the goalkeeper to be free than a midfielder who can drop in, receive and dictate play to a higher standard. In this situation, the opposition may accept this +1 in the first phase in exchange for man-to-man coverage elsewhere on the pitch:
Therefore, they may want to maintain that coverage by tracking all of De Zerbi’s dropping players. This would preserve De Zerbi’s +1 in the first phase, with the goalkeeper remaining as the free man, while still ensuring that the other outfield players, whether forwards or midfielders, are marked sufficiently even when they drop deeper.
On the other hand, the opposition can allow a midfielder or forward to drop. This would likely give De Zerbi’s side a 6v4 in the first phase and would mean the opposition lose their man-to-man coverage of all outfield players. However, the benefit for the opposition is that they would gain a numerical advantage elsewhere on the pitch: likely either a 2v1 centrally or a 4v3 against De Zerbi’s forward line if a forward has dropped into the pivot:
So, if the opposition press with four players in the first line and De Zerbi’s players begin dropping deeper, the key question is whether they want to allow De Zerbi’s GK to be a +1 while preserving their man-to-man coverage on his outfield players, or give that up in favour of an overload elsewhere on the pitch while accepting a significant numerical disadvantage in the first phase.
But what if the opposition initially commit five players to the press? This ensures that the goalkeeper is marked and that De Zerbi’s side no longer have a +1 in the first phase:
It is a much more aggressive approach. However, it also means that the opposition have left a +1 somewhere else on the pitch, most likely creating a 4v3 advantage for De Zerbi’s forwards, assuming the opposition still want to go 2v2 against the double pivot. This is the trade-off — they remove the spare man in the first phase, but allow De Zerbi’s side to have a spare man higher up the pitch.
Of course, this carries greater risk if the press is broken. If De Zerbi’s side play through the first line of pressure, they can attack the opposition’s midfield or back line with a numerical advantage. All it takes is one pass to bypass the press and find the spare man, or one player to turn away from pressure or carry past their marker, and the opposition can quickly find themselves in serious trouble because of their initial commitment.
Alongside this, the spare man higher up the pitch can still rotate into new spaces and offer himself as a passing option for the back line, or try to manipulate and drag the opposition’s back line or midfielders out of position, even if he does not necessarily drop deeper to receive the ball:
When that spare player moves into space and rotates with his teammates, he can confuse the opposition defenders and disrupt their reference points. Therefore, even if the opposition have gone man-to-man in the first phase, the spare man higher up the pitch can still cause major problems.
This added risk is accepted by the opposition as a trade-off for being able to go man-to-man and prevent De Zerbi’s side from gaining a significant advantage in the first phase. They may choose this approach because they view De Zerbi’s build-up as one of his side’s biggest strengths and want to nullify it above everything else.
But what happens if one of De Zerbi’s players drops deeper? As we have seen previously, this would be done to nullify the opposition press and create a +1 in the first phase. In this case, the opposition have two options. They can follow the dropping player, maintaining their man-to-man press in the first phase while preserving their numerical disadvantage higher up the pitch:
In this case, the remaining defenders in the opposition back line would likely have to reorganise themselves in order to cover more central space.
Alternatively, they can choose not to follow him, allowing De Zerbi’s side to create a +1 in the first phase in exchange for being able to go man-to-man against all of his outfield players:
This transition would usually involve one of the front five in the press picking up the dropping player, while allowing the goalkeeper to become the +1:
Higher up the pitch, the opposition can then go man-for-man with De Zerbi’s forward line.
The opposition may want to do this because continuing to go man-for-man in the first phase would require them to commit upwards of six players to the first line of pressure. As already outlined, this is relatively risky. The main issue is not necessarily the numerical disadvantage, because that already exists. Rather, the problem is that the more players they commit forward, the more space there is for the spare man, and the rest of De Zerbi’s forwards, to move into and exploit.
This makes it harder for the opposition to track the spare player and increases the chance of the spaces they have conceded being exploited. Furthermore, if De Zerbi’s side break the press and begin running at the opposition’s midfield or back line, they will have more space to interchange, carry and run into. This is very different from a situation where most of the space is still covered by the opposition, even if they are at a numerical disadvantage in the first phase.
Therefore, the second option is far more likely, as tracking this additional dropping player and leaving only two defenders in the back line would be extremely risky. They simply would not be able to cover enough space to defend both the wide channels and central areas effectively. If one defender moved across to defend a winger 1v1, for example, that would leave space centrally for the central attacker to exploit. Equally, if they stayed narrow to protect the centre of the pitch, they would leave the wide channels open.
Despite this, the opposition may still choose to maintain their man-to-man press in the first phase and accept the added risk in order to ensure that De Zerbi’s players do not gain an advantage in the first phase.
As you can see, these different sequences are all about trade-offs. The side of the trade-off the opposition choose to commit to will depend on a variety of factors.
What is their risk tolerance? Are they comfortable committing upwards of six players into the first line of pressure just to go man-for-man in the first phase? If their press is broken, and they have already accepted a numerical disadvantage higher up the pitch, are they comfortable with De Zerbi’s forwards attacking them in 4v3 or 3v2 situations? What are their strengths as a team? Are they confident enough in their back line to leave them at a numerical disadvantage? Can their defenders cover enough ground to be able to defend both wide and central areas if there is only two of them?
It also depends on how they view De Zerbi’s biggest threats. If they see his build-up as the main danger, and they are comfortable with their back line defending against his forwards, they may commit more players to the press. If they are more concerned about what happens once De Zerbi’s side have broken that press, they may choose to leave more players back.
There are many different reasons why coaches may press in certain ways, track certain players, or leave certain players free.
We have touched on a few specific scenarios, but it is important not to narrow the focus too much. To recap on a more macro level, De Zerbi’s focus in the first phase is to use his goalkeeper to create an overload and gain an advantage. If that advantage is taken away, he will look to drop players deeper, either to draw the opposition forward and exploit the +1 available elsewhere on the pitch, or to create a new +1 in the first phase that can help his side build up.
This focus on overloads, manipulation and reacting to the opposition’s press is a core foundation of his game model. It is now worth looking at the specific ways De Zerbi instructs his players to play out from the back. What passing combinations and rotations are actually used to ensure that they beat the opposition press?
The forward line is essential to ensuring that the first phase is successful for De Zerbi’s teams. Not only do the forwards rotate and drop in to fill any vacated spaces, but they are also crucial in giving the deeper players a clear “target” to find when looking to beat the opposition press.
The most common structure in his forward line involves the two wingers hugging the touchline and pinning the opposition full-backs, while the two central players in the front four, usually the number 10 and the centre-forward, drop deeper between the lines:
With the full-backs also pushing higher and holding the width, De Zerbi’s forward line creates two separate triangles on either side of the pitch, usually consisting of a winger, a central player and a full-back:
Many different passing combinations, as well as certain automatisms, arise from these triangles. If the press is broken out wide and the full-back receives the ball, he can play diagonally into the deeper forward, who can then turn and either play another diagonal pass into the triangle on the opposite side of the pitch, or look to find the winger. The winger may be looking to run in behind, receive to feet, or isolate and attack the opposition full-back.
The full-back can also play into the winger, who then sets the ball back into the central forward player who has dropped. After playing this pass, the winger makes a run in behind, while the central player looks to release him. This is the classic “up-back-through” pattern: full-back to the winger, winger back to the central player, and central player through to the winger’s run:
An alternative variation of the up-back-through pattern involves the centre-back playing into a pivot player, who then sets the ball back first time to the opposite centre-back. From there, the opposite centre-back can play more directly into a full-back or one of the forwards.
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For example, the right centre-back may play into the midfielder, who then bounces the ball back to the left centre-back. The left centre-back can then play forward into the full-back or directly into the forward line:
This baits the press in a few different ways. The opposition may press the initial centre-back on the ball, while the pass into the midfielder can draw them deeper as they look to stay tight to the pivot. The first-time ball back to the opposite centre-back then evades this pressure. Because the opposition have been pulled forward and inward, the next pass can be played into a more advanced player who can turn and play forwards.
Playing into a forward player would be riskier, but it would break multiple lines of pressure. Playing into the full-back would be safer, but he would still need to turn and would likely have to evade pressure from the player marking him.
A variation of this pattern involves the pivot player bouncing the ball into the same-side full-back, who can then play forward to either the winger or a central player in the forward line who has dropped:
Furthermore, from here, the full-back could also switch it to the far-side winger, as long as other players are ready to compete for the second ball:
This is relatively simple to execute because the full-back has usually pushed higher up the pitch and will often be positioned on a similar horizontal line to the pivot player. The full-back just needs to get free from his marker, or receive just in front of him, to become a viable passing option.
An alternative to the up-back-through pattern is a give-and-go. A give-and-go can be a useful way for a full-back (or any other position) to escape their marker if they receive the ball in a situation where that marker is tight to them. For example, the full-back can play into the pivot player, centre-forward or number 10, before continuing their run and looking to receive a return pass higher up the pitch:
From this more advanced position, the full-back may then be able to play into the winger or central forward more easily:
Another repeated build-up mechanism used by De Zerbi is the full-back acting as a bounce option into a free central player. This is similar to one of the up-back-through patterns discussed earlier, but here the focus is more specifically on the benefits of shifting the ball to the full-back as a way of playing through the opposition press.
In this case, the pass into the full-back is used to move the opposition across the pitch. As the opposition shift towards the ball, De Zerbi’s players can lose their markers, escape cover shadows and make themselves available as passing options.
When the centre-backs or goalkeeper have the ball and have successfully baited the press, they can play into the full-back either with a clipped pass over the opposition or along the ground, depending on how tightly the full-back is marked. Ideally, the full-back will have staggered his position to stay outside the opposition’s cover shadows, making the pass along the ground available. At times, however, this may simply not be possible, which is when the clipped pass becomes useful.
When the full-back receives, this is often a trigger for the opposition to try and trap him, with the touchline acting as an additional defender. However, as the opposition shuffle across to press the full-back on reception, he can look to play horizontally back inside to a defensive midfielder or a dropping forward who has moved into space, lost his marker, or escaped an opposition cover shadow. That player can then play it into other teammates who have also escaped their markers, moved out of cover shadows etc, or look to recycle:
Therefore, the full-back is not necessarily the player who progresses the ball himself. Instead, he plays back into a more central player who can then look for progressive options / recycle. The full-back is used to shift the opposition laterally, reopening passing lanes / central options that central lane that may previously have been blocked.
After the full-back has played this pass, they could also continue their run and look to receive again, turning it into a give-and-go:
Another option is for the full-back to play back into the centre-back, who can then immediately look to pass centrally through any gaps that have opened. This is another example of an up-back-through pattern:
Furthermore, because the full-back has shifted the opposition over to one side, he can also look to switch the ball to the far side, provided there are enough teammates positioned there to receive or compete for second balls:
A large part of De Zerbi’s work in the first phase is focused on baiting the press and distorting the opposition’s forward line so that the full-backs or midfielders can receive, turn and progress the ball. We have already looked at methods of progression, such as give-and-goes and up-back-through patterns, as well as methods of distortion, such as shifting the opposition laterally by playing into the full-back.
Across these mechanisms, however, you may have noticed how important the movement of the forward line is in establishing attacking triangles and allowing for easier progression of the ball. The movement of the forward line goes beyond simply dropping deeper to fill a gap left by a teammate. It is crucial in providing a passing option in build-up for a riskier split pass that can help break the press:
Or acting as a passing option for when De Zerbi’s side have broken the first line of pressure and are looking to move the ball forward quickly or take advantage of a transition:
The dropping forwards are the key connection between the build-up unit (however many players that includes) and the attacking triangles formed by De Zerbi’s forward line and full-backs, depending on how high the full-backs have pushed. When the centre-forward or number 10 drops deeper and staggers his position, the opposition back line must decide whether to track him or hold its position.
This is a recurring theme. The opposition midfielders have to decide whether to track De Zerbi’s pivot players when they drop deeper. The forward line then also looks to drop deeper, either to receive or occupy the space left by the pivot player. This means the opposition are constantly forced to make difficult decisions quickly: follow the player or stay in position.
If the dropping forwards are not followed, they can receive and act as a release valve when the ball is being moved up the pitch. If they are pressed from behind or stepped onto by a centre-back, the next action is usually a bounce pass back into a midfielder or full-back who has stepped up to become a passing option. That player can then quickly release the ball wide or forward into another forward player:
This player will usually need to move it quickly because they are likely to have pressure arriving from behind as well, particularly if the receiver is a midfielder. As you may have noticed, this is also another form of an up-back-through pattern.
This means the dropping forward’s role is often not to turn or dictate play himself, but to act as a wall-pass option so that the teammate receiving the bounce pass can become the progressor. This is similar to a previous example we looked at, where the full-back received the ball primarily to shift the opposition across, rather than to act as the main progressor themselves.
Furthermore, if the dropping forwards are followed by the centre-backs, especially if both centre-backs step out, it opens central space for De Zerbi’s wingers to attack:
If the opposition full-back has been forced inwards by De Zerbi’s winger making a diagonal run, and the wide area has been vacated, this frees up space for De Zerbi’s full-back to occupy more permanently. They can then hold the width, allowing the same-side forward to spend more time in central areas, where he may pose a greater threat to the opposition.
This becomes particularly valuable as De Zerbi’s side move further into the opposition half, because it allows the winger to operate closer to goal rather than remaining fixed on the touchline.
If the wingers receive the ball directly, they can also run at the opposition full-backs 1v1, with the opposition centre-backs having to travel further across to provide cover:
Alongside this, the same-side full-back can overlap the winger to overload the isolated opposition full-back:
Furthermore, if De Zerbi’s full-back receives the bounce pass from the dropping forward, or if the midfielder quickly releases the ball wide to him as he makes a forward run, he can also use a give-and-go with the winger to create the overlap and overload in that way:
When in build-up, De Zerbi primarily wants his teams to keep the ball on the ground. He wants them to bait the press, break through it, and then work the ball quickly up the pitch through the different escape routes I have already discussed. However, clipped passes or longer balls over the press are still a legitimate option, especially when the opposition have committed to going man-for-man in the first phase.
While these passes can be used to release wingers in behind, they are also particularly useful when the opposition commit extra players forward to neutralise the numerical advantages or overloads De Zerbi’s team may have created in the first phase. If his side are struggling to play out because the opposition have pushed more players high up the pitch and are able to go man-to-man across the first line and the pivot, this usually means there is a spare man in the forward line. Of course, the difficulty is reaching that player. If the opposition’s increased commitment to the press is working, it will be difficult for De Zerbi’s team to play out and access their usual escape routes. Therefore, a clipped pass / long ball into the forward line allows them to bypass that pressure and utilise the advantage that exists higher up the pitch. If this works, it can take several opposition players out of the game, leaving De Zerbi’s forwards attacking the opposition back line, often in a 4v3.
Realistically, De Zerbi’s forwards will not be able to trap every clipped pass or long ball, turn, and run at the back line consistently. It is a difficult action to execute cleanly. However, they can still knock the ball down into space. Given the numerical advantage against the opposition back line, and the fact that De Zerbi’s pivot should be ready to turn and push up, the odds of winning the second ball should be in De Zerbi’s side’s favour. Even if the pivot is 2v2 against the opposition midfield, De Zerbi’s forward line may still have a 4v3 advantage (if the opposition are man-to-man in the first phase). Overall, when looking at the players competing for the second ball, De Zerbi’s team should have a 6v5 advantage. If the opposition have committed even more players forward, this could even become a 6v4. This is a significant advantage when trying to retain possession from the clipped pass / long ball and exploit the opposition’s level of commitment. It is worth noting that if De Zerbi’s side do not have a numerical advantage higher up the pitch, then they will have one in the first phase, and so they will likely aim to play out without going long.
Overall, while De Zerbi has an obvious preference for playing short, he will still encourage these types of passes if they help his team progress the ball in certain situations. In many teams, going long can often appear to be a sign of nerves, such as when a full-back is trapped on the touchline and simply boots the ball down the line in a panic. However, in this case, the clipped pass / long ball is not a sign of fear or a lack of bravery. Instead, it is a deliberate solution for when the usual escape routes have been blocked and De Zerbi’s side need an alternative way to progress the ball.
One major strength of De Zerbi’s build-up is its ability to turn opposition pressure into an advantage. A high press is designed to help the opposition win the ball back, force mistakes and intimidate your players. De Zerbi turns that pressure against the opposition. His teams deliberately invite pressure in order to manipulate the opponent and break the first line of pressure. This is what makes his structure and game model so effective against aggressive man-to-man pressing sides. The more the opponent jumps, the more space opens up to be exploited.
Another strength is the clarity of relationships across the entire pitch. The players have a clear understanding of where their teammates are, where the ball needs to go, where the spare man is, and how to manipulate the opposition through rotations and passing networks. The forwards who drop deeper act as connectors between the forward line and the build-up unit, while the team constantly adjusts its vertical positioning to create numerical advantages and avoid numerical disadvantages.
Lastly, I want to touch on something that I think is sometimes lost in football analysis: a strength of De Zerbi’s football, particularly in build-up, is that it is fun to watch. It is exciting to see his teams bait pressure and then try to play through it. It is exciting to see players who may previously have been labelled as poor in build-up, perhaps because of the team they played for or the coach they played under, excel in this way of playing.
There is also something enjoyable about watching a whole team operate on the same wavelength, working the ball up the pitch via up-back-through patterns, give-and-goes and quick combinations, while constantly looking to attack quickly and take advantage of transitions. Excitement in football is a strength. It gives fans something to enjoy, something to cheer, and something that gets them out of their seats. It also allows them to see their players perform in a way they may not have thought was possible.
However, this style of build-up does have weaknesses. I have just said that one of the strengths of De Zerbi’s build-up is that:
“it is exciting to see players who may previously have been labelled as poor in build-up… excel in this way of playing”.
This simply means that those players already had these abilities, but they were previously untapped, primarily because of their team’s prior way of playing under a different coach. If a technically strong player is always instructed to go long, they do not get the chance to show that quality. And even when they do get opportunities to show it, they may still struggle if the coaching is poor or if they have not practised those situations enough.
However, even if players practise building up regularly, are coached well, and are encouraged to play through pressure, this does not automatically mean they can do it. This style of football is highly dependent on technical quality, composure and timing. Some players simply do not have those qualities within their skillset. Because the structure invites pressure so close to goal, any poor touch, rushed decision or badly timed pass can lead to a dangerous turnover in deep areas.
Another weakness is that this system can become vulnerable in certain scenarios. One strong approach against it is to defend in a more man-oriented way, especially against the key receivers, such as the dropping forwards or pivot players. If the key receivers are marked out of the game, the opposition can gain a significant advantage. As long as the opposition stay close, avoid being spun, and win their individual duels, they can stop De Zerbi’s side from playing out. Of course, going man-to-man is risky, because every player needs to do their job. All it takes is one player to lose his man / duel and De Zerbi’s side can break the press. However, perhaps it is worth accepting this risk! Of course, this ultimately comes down to the manager / coaching staff and their risk tolerance, but the reward is clear.
Another solution would be to defend more zonally and block off central access, similar to how Manchester City pressed Arsenal in the Carabao Cup final, and for periods of their league meeting at home:
This gives the back line more time on the ball and forces De Zerbi’s side to create an advantage themselves, rather than the opposition giving it to them by pressing aggressively and opening up space.
If the ball goes wide, the focus can be on denying inside passes rather than immediately jumping onto the full-back, although the full-back would still be closed down to an extent:
If the ball is played down the line, the back line or pivot player can shift across and double up on the winger, getting tight and preventing passes back inside:
This forces De Zerbi’s side to move the ball up the pitch more slowly. It also allows the opposition to keep their shape and avoid being attacked in transition, which could happen if they pressed too high. Generally, encouraging De Zerbi’s side to move the ball around the block and allowing their winger to receive in a 1v2 is safer than letting them play quickly and centrally through the team.
This approach can be particularly useful if De Zerbi is managing a team at a qualitative disadvantage and is relying on space, artificial transitions and carefully constructed numerical advantages to hurt the opposition. For example, if De Zerbi does not have wingers who are comfortable in 1v2 situations, going around the block may be very difficult.
Furthermore, if the opposition remain compact centrally, even when De Zerbi’s side manage to find a free player inside the block, receiving in those areas is difficult. The receiver will be closed down quickly and have far less time on the ball. Therefore, this solution depends heavily on whether De Zerbi has players with the individual quality to receive, turn, pass or carry inside the block.
While this zonal approach can work very well, it is more susceptible to being manipulated. Forwards can drop short or pull wide outside the block to try and receive:
And if the ball is worked to a full-back, players in space can still be found, even if the opposition are focused on limiting central access:
It may be better to block off central access with a 4–4–2 rather than a 4–2–4, as this avoids leaving the spaces either side of the pivot free for De Zerbi’s players to rotate into:
But even then, this can still be exploited:
Players can still rotate into space and receive. They just need to wait for the opposition to begin applying pressure (even if that pressure is far less intense than in a man-to-man press) before moving into the spaces that open up.
The solutions available really come down to whether De Zerbi’s side can remain patient, wait for space to eventually appear, and then, once it does, whether they have the individual quality to receive and progress the ball within that space. Even if they go around the block and avoid trying to access these central spaces directly, do they have the individual quality to punish the opposition e.g. their winger winning a 1v2?
This is why a zonal approach can expose the qualitative disadvantage De Zerbi’s team may have more than a man-to-man approach. A man-to-man press can be manipulated, allowing De Zerbi’s players to receive in more space and punish the opposition more effectively. A zonal approach, by contrast, gives them fewer easy openings and places a greater burden on individual quality, despite solutions being available.
Overall, we have covered De Zerbi’s build-up in depth. It is only one part of his game model, but it is the part I find most interesting. Since taking over at Spurs, another aspect of his game model that he has incorporated very well has been a more front-footed high press, which the Spurs players have taken to quickly and used effectively at Villa Park. This may be something worth exploring in the future.
I hope you enjoyed this piece. As always, there is plenty of work out there on De Zerbi’s build-up, so if you are interested, I would definitely recommend looking at other people’s analysis as well. I am sure they have covered many things that I have missed, and reading more widely will allow you to deepen your understanding.
In this piece, I went into detail on De Zerbi’s build-up structure, alongside more specific scenarios, such as certain ways of gaining a numerical advantage, particular build-up patterns etc. However, there are countless possible scenarios and situations that players can find themselves in, and they will not always align perfectly with the examples I have outlined and explored. Therefore, reading other pieces that cover different examples and situations can help broaden your understanding.
I hope you enjoyed! Thanks for reading.
