The Inconsistency of the Arguments Against Freedom
When I say freedom, I mean the classical liberal understanding of negative freedom in the context of political philosophy, that is, the authority of individuals to dispose of their bodies and property. By arguments against freedom, I mean arguments used both to justify a specific intervention of the state in freedom and to justify a comprehensive non-liberal theory of justice. If my objection is justified, the vast majority of those who try to make arguments against freedom suffer from question begging and some kind of metaphysical confusion about what the state is.
What actions would a moral person, or a moral group organized for a particular purpose, abstain from? Few of the answers to this question are controversial (eg abortion, veganism, etc.), the truth is that there is broad agreement among almost everyone on morality; A moral person does not resort to coercion, theft or deception unless necessary; would not infringe on the rights of others, here is a brief summary of common sense ethics that almost everyone will agree with.
Now suppose that night liquor is legal now, if I went and stole some money from a nighttime liquor store owner, no one would approve of it. Suppose that drugs are legal now, it would be very difficult to say that it would be moral if I went and kidnapped people because they were using or producing drugs and imprisoned them in my garage, or if I had extorted them with a gun. Suppose taxes are reduced, the government cuts social spending, and I come and steal some of your money and donate it to charities. Suppose you started a business and because I didn't like the wage you agreed with your employees, I came and extorted you with a gun. Do the actions in all these hypothetical scenarios seem legitimate to you? Probably, if the conditions in these hypothetical scenarios were real, the overwhelming majority of people would not see my actions as legitimate. The most interesting fact about political conflicts is that people see it as illegitimate for coercive people to use what they see as legitimate for the state to use. This is true for ordinary people as well as for political philosophers. We see the state as subject to more flexible moral constraints on the use of coercion than ordinary people, the coercion of the state being more easily justified than those of ordinary people. The state has a special moral status, a legitimate authority.
Well, what reasons do we have for thinking this way, what characteristic feature of the state puts it in a different moral status from ordinary people. A state is a group of people organized (hierarchically) to use algebra in a particular geography. How exactly do the characteristics mentioned in this sentence make them subject to different moral constraints? Of course, there are other characteristics of that group of people, such as having the greatest power over that geography by far, providing security services, their administrators being elected by vote and wearing suits, algebra practitioners wearing uniforms. But nothing changes, no trait possessed by this group of people makes them subject to more flexible moral constraints than ordinary individuals. Concepts such as state, nation, sovereignty seem too complicated for many to understand their metaphysical qualities, they perceive the state as something that really exists, like a kind of spirit, a mystical entity. The truth is that the state is just a group of people, the state is nothing different and more than a group of people.
The main problem with arguments against freedom is that they are based on metaphysical confusion about what the state is. Because the justifications put forward to legitimize a specific power of coercion of the state do not legitimize the power of coercion of ordinary people, moreover, almost all of the people/philosophers who accept illiberal views accept this. Algebraist views simply assume that justifications that do not legitimize ordinary people's coercion can justify state coercion. Let me open a little.
It is often reasoned: "The government should ban X because X is something harmful, bad, disgusting, virtueless and so on" or "Government should fund X/X should be free because X is something useful, important, good." Do we think that a moral person in everyday life is someone who only tries to maximize the total utility, do benefits and harms justify the coercion of ordinary people in all circumstances? Let's go back to hypothetical scenarios, like if I need the money you have more than you do, can I steal it from you, can I kidnap you with a gun or extort you because the way you use your own body seems disgusting or unpleasant to me? There is no need to rewrite each of them, the benefit/harm calculation would not justify coercion under the conditions I mentioned in the second paragraph. Our primary moral responsibility is not to maximize the total benefit; Not to put an end to all abominations, sins and selfishness, not to make everyone prosperous. Our primary moral responsibility is not to resort to coercion unless necessary and not to violate anyone's rights.
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Let's get to even more ridiculous arguments; Does it mean that we consent to the authority of the political authority if we do not immigrate from this country, use public services or vote? In other words, does it give legitimacy for a forced state to use them, which would be illegitimate if an ordinary person used them? Is there an implicit social contract between us? Some believe such nonsense, it's lousy reasoning. First of all, if I say I don't have consent, I don't. If I had set up a gang in your neighborhood that used force in various ways, not moving from the neighborhood or benefiting from some of the services the gang provided with the tribute they collected would not give an ethical legitimacy to the gang's gang activities. You're assuming from the start that what doesn't give enough justification for the gang can give enough justification for the state, so you've accepted from the start that the state has a morally different status from a gang, which is exactly what you were trying to justify, that's circular reasoning.
Perhaps not specifically one’s own vote, but votes of public in general subject them to different moral constraints than ordinary individuals? If five people gathered and decided to extort one of their money by voting among theirselves, their voting would not legitimize this action. This reasoning is useless without assuming from the outset that a justification that does not justify the coercion of ordinary people can justify the coercion of the state.
Perhaps the principles we think would hypothetically agree if everyone were perfectly rational are principles of justice and guide us as to which policies are legitimate. Well, we faced the same problem again, is this how we decide what is legitimate in daily life, do we resort to such thought experiments when considering whether the existence of a gang or certain activities is legitimate, for example, if I made you a completely reasonable and rational job offer and, if you didn’t accept, could I force you to work according to terms of the offer by resorting to such thought experiments? (So, what does this John Rawls [i] say if the criteria he put forward to justify the existence and certain actions of the state do not serve to justify any coercive activity of another?).
The bottom line is this: the moment you say “The state should ban X” or “the state should spend money on X”, you are expressing that you see a certain kind of coercive power of the state legitimate, but to be consistent when claiming this, an ordinary person or gang should also be justified when they do the same. You have to argue that it’s legitimate to use coercion to prevent X, or steal money to fund X, because the government is nothing more than a group of people. We might call this the "principle of moral equivalence". Those who give the state the power of coercion that has no place in everyday common sense ethics, and even those who directly try to justify the existence of the state, are actually trying to argue against the principle of moral equivalence, but they do this by assuming from the very beginning that the principle of moral equivalence is wrong, in other words, they use circular justification. Under what conditions an ordinary person's coercion is legitimate, the state's coercion is also legitimate under the same conditions. (This means that even the existence of the state is illegitimate if it is not necessary). From the perspective of everyday common sense ethics that almost everyone would agree upon, the state should really prohibit very little and fund very little. If it's legitimate for me to come and beat you when you do X, then X should be banned. If it is legitimate for me to steal from you and spend it on Y, the government should spend money on Y. You would probably find a libertarian ethic justified in daily life in interpersonal relations, which sees coercion justified only when it’s necessary, you can make an important step towards consistency by accepting that the same ethical limitations should be applied to the state.
Further Reading: The Problem Of Political Authority (by Mike Huemer)
[i] The most famous contemporary political philosopher. He defended social democracy, starting from the "original position" thought experiment, which suggested that the principles that we can assume to be agreed upon when individuals get rid of all their prejudices in favor of their interests are actually the principles of justice. According to him, the basic structure of the society is only fair if it is in the greatest favor of the most disadvantaged working class, because this is the principle that everyone will agree on when they get rid of prejudice in favor of their interests and are rational.
This publish was translated from Recep Gülşen.
