The U.S. vs. The Hague
On July 13th, 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that the United States would launch a campaign to “systematically [disable]” the International Criminal Court (ICC). The announcement, made through a State Department press release, video statement, and an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, explained that the U.S. planned to dismantle the court “brick by brick, if necessary.”
Since its establishment in 2002, the U.S. has moved against the court on multiple occasions, and has never followed through. However, this statement was not just a jab at the ICC- it marked the most aggressive escalation of conflict between the U.S. and The Hague yet. This article will walk through how we got here, the plausibility, and the why.
What is the International Criminal Court and why Does the U.S. Dislike it?
The International Criminal Court, in short, is a last resort. They step in to prosecute genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity only when a national government is “unable or unwilling” to do it themselves, according to a Reuters article. The ICC does not replace domestic courts; it exists only to handle any cases that are overlooked.
The ICC was established by the Rome Statute, an international treaty that entered into force 24 years ago, and has since been joined by 125 member states. They are located in The Hague, Netherlands.
The reason the U.S. has issues with the ICC is simple: jurisdiction. There are three situations in which the ICC can assert authority: first, if the crime occurred on the territory of a member state. Second, if the accused is a citizen of a member state. Or lastly, if the UN Security Council refers the situation to the court. This means that, in theory, the court can have jurisdiction over countries that never joined the treaty at all.
The United States, and other superpowers such as China and Russia, are all non-members for similar reasons. The U.S signed the Rome Statute in 2000, but never submitted it for Senate ratification due to sovereignty concerns, according to Congress.gov. President George W. Bush formally withdrew the U.S. signature in 2002.
This jurisdictional situation has been the root of every conflict between the U.S. and ICC since. After the withdrawal in 2002, Congress moved quickly to pass the American Service-Members’ Protection Act, also known as the “Hague Invasion Act.” Essentially, the act authorizes the president to use military force to free any U.S. service member held by the court. Furthermore, under President Bush, the U.S. negotiated approximately 100 Article 98 agreements with other countries, in which those governments pledge to not surrender American nationals to the ICC.
Bensouda to Khan: The Second Term Escalation
During President Trump’s first term, tension with the court flared up again after ICC judges authorized an investigation into alleged war crimes by U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The administration revoked the visa of ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and later sanctioned her. Former President Biden then reversed those sanctions in 2021.
The current conflict begins with Executive Order 14203, signed by Trump in 2025, which declared a national emergency over what he said was illegitimate ICC actions targeting the U.S. and Israel, according to whitehouse.gov. The order authorized sanctions on anyone assisting the court in investigations of “protected persons,” a term that covers both Americans and allied nationals, such as Israelis. This led to the sanctioning of prosecutor Karin Khan.
However, Khan was not the only one- over the next year, the sanctions list grew steadily. Judges connected to the Afghanistan investigation and to the ICC’s arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant were also added. Then two deputy prosecutors, judges, UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese, and three Palestinian human rights organizations completed the list for what Rubio explained as direct engagement with ICC investigations.
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The effects were real. According to PBS, after Khan was sanctioned, Microsoft cut off his email account and his UK bank accounts were frozen. American organizations that had been feeding evidence went quiet, ICC staff who had finances in U.S. institutions began to move money out, and the court migrated their technology away from Microsoft.
Last month, three of the sanctioned judges took action and sued the Trump administration in a New York federal court, arguing the sanctions were unlawful. This month, Rubio announced the new dismantlement campaign. Although the escalation itself is not shocking, the shift from targeted sanctions toward the goal of disabling an entire institution is.
Why the Administration Wants to “Dismantle” the ICC Now
In his op-ed, Rubio described the ICC as a threat to American sovereignty, calling it a coalition of nongovernmental organizations and governments hostile to the United States. To back this, he and other officials have specifically pointed to the court’s investigations of U.S. personnel in Afghanistan and arrest warrants against Israeli leaders as evidence of threat to their sovereignty.
The administration is playing this as a matter of principle: they argue a sovereign nation should not have its citizens subject to prosecution by a court they never joined.
Is It Actually Possible?
Unfortunately, the answer is not so simple. The consensus among legal and policy analysts is that the U.S. does not have any legal mechanism to “disable” the ICC because it was created by a treaty among numerous member states, and the U.S. has no authority over it. What the administration can, and has been doing, is make the court’s operation more difficult through indirect pressure.
Analysts point to several tools within U.S. reach. The travel of ICC personnel to the UN headquarters in New York can be restricted, although this may conflict with the U.S.-UN Headquarters Agreement.
The administration can also sanction the ICC as an institution, instead of simply sanctioning individuals, causing them to be cut off from the U.S. dollar.
Another option is the U.S. could pressure member states by reviving the Article 98 immunity agreements and tying aid to their cooperation with their anti-ICC campaign, or lastly, Congress could try again to pass the Illegitimate Court Counteraction Act that stalled in the Senate last year.
None of these options, however, would lead to a complete dismantling of the ICC. The court would continue to exist under the Rome Statute, especially as its member states show no sign of abandoning it. Most likely, the campaign will not be the court’s collapse, but rather it will slowly erode their ability to function. Some legal analysts have also argued that the campaign will actually cost the U.S. itself more, as it may damage credibility with allies and weaken their claims of supporting international order that it helped build after World War II.
Conclusion
The Trump administration’s campaign against the ICC is not sudden, rather it is only the latest advancement in the conflict between the U.S. and the ICC. This relationship has been uneasy since the court’s founding over 20 years ago, mostly rooted in a jurisdictional question of whether Americans can be prosecuted in a court that the U.S. never joined.
This escalation is a little different than it has been in the past. The new goal is not just to protect American personnel from specific investigations, but to dismantle the institution completely. Whether that is possible is a separate question.
Legally, the U.S. lacks any direct means to dissolve the international, treaty-based body that it is not a member of. However, through sanctions, isolation, and pressure, the U.S. can slowly erode the court. The outcome will depend less on legalities and more on how determined the administration truly is, and how remaining ICC member states choose to respond.
