FROM KANT TO HEGEL
John Angus MacVannel (1896)
[v] Human life for Hegel is one, and the will is simply the man.¹ Life’s highest ideal is not achieved by the one who “cares but to pass into the silent life,” but by such as live well the every–day life of the world; who see treasured up in the various relations of concrete social life — the family, the state, the church — the spiritual experience of the human race …
[11] The present age owes the greater portion of its mental life to the principle of evolution; an idea which has become the very atmosphere of all enquiry in the domain of art, of science and of religion. In the popular consciousness it is accepted without dissent that the principle first appeared in its application by Darwin to the facts of biology, and that its extension to the sphere of mental life was an after–thought. As a matter of fact, however, the systematic and more pregnant application of the principle in the domain of history, of art, of philosophy, and of religion had been made by Hegel almost half a century before the time of Darwin … [12] A more sympathetic appreciation is gradually coming to see in the different systems which history presents, the progressive effort on the part of the human spirit to reach a more adequate conception of the world as rational. An earnest study of these systems but strengthens our faith in the spiritual nature and ultimate destiny of man … [13] Twice only in the history of Western thought has philosophy reached the high–tide: First, in the embodiment by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle of the essential truth in the rich and complex life of the period in which they lived; and second, the modern development in Germany which sprang up within the bosom of Christian education, begun by Kant, and which was carried to its completion, and therein its most adequate expression, by Hegel. The outcome of both developments gives us a deeper faith in the essential rationality of the actual world, and more clearly emphasizes the primacy of thought … As Professor James says, we need to be ever reminded afresh that no philosophy can ever be more than an hypothesis. It is a slavish submission to the letter of any doctrine or system that kills. Life is widening; it is becoming a fuller and a richer thing, and human experience will ever prove too strong for any system. Nor was Hegel one who would expect, much less who would crave our indulgence. Doubtless, as Professor Green once said of the system, “it will all have to be done over again.” Nevertheless, so comprehensive [14] a system as that of Hegel, however we regard it as an achievement, was at least splendid as an endeavor; and the due meed of which is our grateful admiration … [15] The task of philosophy, as Hegel conceived it, is to trace in nature, in the human mind, in social institutions, in history, and in religion, an immanent Reason …[19] Uniting as he did the idea of development with his idealism, it will be at once apparent what is Hegel’s conception of the institutional life of the human race … It is this universal principle of reason which, in the development of the human race, has been the immanent and informing life of all individual and social activity … [20] Nature and society as systems of relations are organic to the individual as intelligence and will through the emergence in him of the universal Reason. It is in this environment of intelligence and of social institutions that man is to find fulfilment for his will and assert his freedom. Thus man, by identifying himself with the established laws, virtues and institutions — although he may not at first be aware of the import of his action — is identifying his good with the common good; and his rights and his duties arise in proportion as he becomes identified with the social system … [22] The preceding chapter may serve to indicate the general standpoint from which this essay on Hegel’s doctrine of the will in its application to the institutional life of the race has been undertaken. The system of Hegel, like thought itself, is essentially an organism, and only when viewed as such can we hope to understand and appreciate the various phases or members of the whole … [30] Abstraction was the essential error of pre–Kantian philosophy; and even Kant, as will be noted in what follows, was never able to entirely free himself, much less his system, from the conditions of his time. Matter was set over against mind, the individual against society, the universal reign of law in the natural world against God, freedom and immortality. The fundamental enquiry of the great idealistic movement begun by Kant and carried to its completion by Hegel, was to find a principle sufficiently comprehensive to give impartial recognition to the claims of the scientific, ethical and religious consciousness of man. In other words, to show that [31] man, natural, intelligent, moral, social and religious, is a being all of one piece, and that he came from and goes to God. Such was the problem of idealism, a revolution as rich in results for philosophy as that which Copernicus effected for astronomy. An outline of the development from Kant to Hegel remains to be given … [38] Logic, then, is the study of the pure thought–forms (pure in the sense that they are ideally separated for purposes of examination) which are embodied in nature and spirit, whose animating principles they are. Hegel attempts to prove in the Logic that the ultimate unity of the world is spiritual by showing how the various categories, through which we are accustomed to explain the world — being, measure, essence, force, substance — hypostatized aspects of reality, and as “interlocked moments” passing into each other through their own immanent dialectic, resolve themselves into that of self–consciousness or spirit. There is no positive without a [39] negative, and only through this antithesis is advance made to a higher synthesis. It is affirmation, through negation to reaffirmation with enriched content. “Through death to life,” is the fundamental conception of the Hegelian Logic, as we shall find it to be also the vital and informing principle of his Ethics. “An immanent negativity” is the “ground of advance, the very soul of the world–march.” The Logic leads up to the Absolute Idea which is the perfect form of that relation we are conscious of as existing between subject and object, between a knower and his knowledge … [46] The Scientist and the Idealist are one in their abiding faith that the world is rational at the core. From this standpoint it is clearly erroneous to speak of the conscious rational being as such, in spite of the necessary relation it bears to influences of environment, as in any absolute sense determined from without. Such an idealistic theory of the internal and external world enables us to see their essential unity, and recognize the relative nature of any distinction between self–determination and determination through environment. Since this environment or the external world is the manifestation of reason, it thus, though at first presenting itself under the form of contingency and as a hindrance, comes to be recognized as the very condition under which the development of the individual conscious spirit is accomplished. Thought then, Hegel would say, is an eternal process of self–manifestation and self–realization, which in its necessary evolution reveals itself as force, and manifests itself in the various forms of existence and laws of phenomena, natural and spiritual. So that the history of a [47] conscious spirit, in its relations with the environment, physical, ethical, religious, into which it is born, is not a struggle between two independent and unrelated forces, but, as Professor Edward Caird expresses it, “the evolution by antagonism of a spiritual principle.” Thus it is seen that ultimately it is for the creation of the Person that environment exists. Man has within him a principle which, finding itself at home in nature, erects him above nature, and in turn enables him to recognize his oneness with the Eternal and Absolute Subject, the Infinite Spirit for whom both nature and the individual spirit exist … [Hegel] would not deny the existence of matter; yet he would insist on a clear understanding of what is meant by it. If the external world in space and time exist only for a self–conscious subject, consciousness can no longer be regarded as a product of that world. Materialism formerly asserted that matter was the creative condition of force; now it asserts that force is the creative condition of matter. Idealism accepts this, seeing in force nothing but a function of spirit, since force is in a conditioned relation to space and time, which are themselves spiritual functions. The kingdoms of nature and spirit are organically one and inseparable … [51] we find the general planetary life of the nature–governed mind specialized into divisions in accordance with the nature of the geographical continents, thereby producing the varieties of race …
[65] A few remarks may here be made on Kant’s doctrine, which may perhaps serve to bring into clearer light the standpoint of Hegel … [66] For Hegel the will is the self. In all desire it is the self seeking its expression — its realization; and self–realization cannot be accomplished through the annihilation of an integral part of its own nature, feeling and desire … [Kant] was always building wiser than he knew, and was in reality basing his doctrine on a deeper truth which could be fully brought to light by those who had regard to the spirit rather than to the letter of his moral theory. Kant shows us (Aristotle had caught sight of the same distinction) that to act from the consciousness of law is a thing quite different from acting as subject to law. To act from a consciousness of law is to will, that is, to be free. Yet man is a unit, an organic unity, and in his desires, inclinations, impulses, must be found the material of the ideals and laws which reason proposes. It was Hegel who first clearly perceived the unity and continuity of mind. Kant presents us with two great forms, or principles of action, in accordance with which we may seek the fulfilment of our [67] rational nature, (1) “Treat humanity always as an end, never as a means,” Thus Kant conceives man as a person endowed with a will through which he may seek self–realization. The conception is still abstract if the self be separated from all particular desires. (2) The second amounts to this, “Whatever the special courses of conduct be in which you seek the fulfilment of your rational nature, these must be the same for all men.” Here Kant approaches Hegel’s point of view, the idea, namely, of humanity as a self–conscious organism, the individual members of which are at once ends and means — the truth of the universal and the particular; and man in submitting himself to the universal law of reason is in reality unfolding his own rational nature. The idea of a social organism, however, remained for Kant merely an ideal, and the conception of such an organism must ever remain a mere idea if man is a being in whom there is an irreconcilable dualism of reason and desire.
The initial difficulty with Kant is his conception that all desire is for pleasure. For Hegel, as Professor Dewey remarks in another connection, “the spiritualizing of the impulse is organizing it so that it becomes one factor in action.”² The law is the law of the desires themselves: Through it they are harmonized and made instrumental to the realization of the self which has them. Kant tells us to act as though members of a social organism. But such an organism does not exist. For Kant morality is not, nor will it ever be, realized in the community. Man must seek to realize himself not in any existing community, or any that ever will exist, but, as Professor Watson says, “in an intelligible world which exists for him only as an unrealizable ideal.”³
32. Herein Hegel’s doctrine is the direct antithesis of Kant’s. The end of action or the good for Hegel is the [68] realized will, that is, the developed self; “the satisfaction of desires according to law,” that is, the universal element which refection reveals. Morality has been ever realizing itself in the world — this is the conception of Hegel. The rational is in some sense the real. Instead of following Kant’s dualism of the abstract universal law or Imperative and the actual world, Hegel maintains that the moral law has become incarnated in the ethical life of humanity. “The Word has become flesh and dwells among us.” The City of God must be found in the everlasting Real. The state so far is not completely rational, it is true; yet the ideal, the completely rational, must be realized in part. It may be far from “the parliament of man” and “the federation of the world”; yet this can come, according to Hegel, only by transforming, not supplanting, that which already exists — the further spiritualization of what we already possess. Human institutions are thus, in Schleiermacher’s phrase, “an ethical heritage”; and man’s education is simply a growing conformity of his reason — of his conscience — with the reason — the conscience of his environment. His environment is the concrete realization by humanity of its idea of the good … [83] In conforming to the life of the family, of society, and of the state, the individual in reality lives over the life of his people and of the human race, and thus gradually rises to conscious [84] participation in a common good which is being realized in the lives of men …[87] The asceticism of the Middle Ages needs only to be mentioned — an asceticism which hung like a body of death to the system of Kant … [97] Rights and duties belong to man only because “he is by nature a social being.” The individualism of modern society received its practical refutation in the French Revolution. For Hegel, will, not force, is the basis of the state. Rights and duties, than which nothing in the state are more real, have their ultimate justification in self–consciousness. The true view of society as an organism is that which regards the individual life as the social life … [97] The true view of society as an organism is that which regards the individual life as the social life …[98] there is no conflict between Individualism and Socialism, Progress in society can only mean progress in the individuals composing it …[100] Man’s life implies the natural and spiritual life of the race. Yet, if we are to speak of development in a sense other than that of mere aimless change, we must admit that what has been developed must in some way have been immanent in, indeed, the informing life of the process … [101] The individual is at first apparently immersed in nature. His end is self–realization; to become a free, self–conscious spirit is “the last of life for which the first was made.” He is from the first a self–determining being. The will is the activity of consciousness as self–reflecting and self–objectifying. The life process is the realization of the “ self” through environment. “Spirituality,” says Professor Royce, “ lives by self–differentiation into mutually opposing forces, and by victory in and over these oppositions.” To trace this realization of the “self” was the object of the remaining chapters. And Hegel teaches that self–realization can come only through self–renunciation. Not that for the realization of the moral life, the natural life is to be renounced, as with Kant. This natural life is rather to be transformed, spiritualized, and made the worthy setting for the higher life of the spirit. To be human, means to live a life of natural [102] wants, sympathies, and desires. Yet on these natural “appetites” of the merely individual self, there supervenes man’s spiritual endowment — his essential self — reason, consciousness, the immanent life of which is that universal reason which has given rise to and still vitalizes and informs the spiritual environment in which the individual is to be realized. Self–consciousness is universal consciousness. “Spirituality is the community of spirits.” For man to seek his good — the realization of himself — apart from the common good embodied in the life of the family, of the church and of the state, is to lose it. The individual good is the social good; the individual life, the social life. And, to conclude this essay with the closing words of Hegel’s Philosophy of History, “That the history of the world, with all the changing, scenes which its annals present, is this process of the development and actualization of Spirit — this is the true theodicy, the justification of God in history. Only this insight can reconcile the human spirit with the course of universal history — namely, that what has happened and is happening each day is not only not without God, but that it is essentially His work.”
WORKS CITED
1. John Angus MacVannel (1871–1915), Hegel’s Doctrine of the Will, Ph.D. dissertation, New York, Columbia University, 1896, v–102.
See: “[Kant] was always building wiser than he knew, and was in reality basing his doctrine on a deeper truth which could be fully brought to light by those who had regard to the spirit rather than to the letter of his moral theory.”
John Angus MacVannel, Hegel’s Doctrine of the Will, Ph.D. dissertation, New York, Columbia University, 1896, 66. [Italics added]
Hegelians like John MacVannel, who seek a new (Kantio–Hegelian) basis for their idealism, are unsuccessful because they rely very heavily upon impure Hegelianism in their modern European conception of Western civilization: In America, the endeavour to advance a Kantio–Hegelian basis for American Idealism in the world historical rise of Global civilization and American Liberty as Americanism, and also avoid the political and economic irrationalism of the modern European unreason of pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism, is unsuccessful. In America, the greatest idealists of the 20th century follow in the footsteps of 19th century American Idealism, forged in the flames of the Civil War: The American Idealism of the Constitution of the United States of America, is strengthened and invigorated in the 19th and 20th centuries, and uplifted to a higher level of Spiritual freedom in the world, as the supremacy of American Liberty.
According to MacVannel, who is profoundly enchanted by the influence of British Kantio–Hegelianism imported from continental Europe by the modern European irrationalists, the philosophy of Hegel is but a splendid hypothesis:
“No philosophy can ever be more than an hypothesis … so comprehensive a system as that of Hegel, however we regard it as an achievement, was at least splendid.” MacVannel, Ibidem, 13–14. [Italics added]
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No philosophy can ever be more than an hypothesis: This can also be an hypothesis, like hypothetical distinctions between what can be, what is and what will be?
“No philosophy can ever be more than an hypothesis … Life is widening; it is becoming a fuller and a richer thing, and human experience will ever prove too strong for any system.” MacVannel, Ibidem, 13. [Italics added]
Life is widening, is becoming fuller and richer, yet the rational conception of American Liberty in the world is no mere hypothesis of the American mind, — especially in the White House, Washington and Wall Street. Wherefore? “The teaching of the concept is the inescapable lesson of history,” — Hegel.
2. John Dewey, Elements of Ethics, 24.
3. Watson, Comte, Mill and Spencer, 230.
4. No reference is provided in the text.
See: “[v] It is probably useless to profess complete consistency of standpoint in a collection of papers which deal with such different subjects and refer to such different periods in the history of Philosophy. But the one common feature which runs through them is intended to be a vindication of the Kantian standpoint, as against popular English Philosophy on the one side, and later German Metaphysics on the other … The central object of the [188] Hegelian system is by no means mystical or repellent, and lies sufficiently close to men’s interests to demand careful inquiry. For it is nothing else than an attempt to show that all thought is, on its human side, a gradual approximation to God, and on its Divine side, a gradual revelation of His own nature. And the means by which the result is sought to be obtained is nothing else than an unfailing belief in Reason, and in its power to correct the imperfect notions of logic and science, in its power to construct and justify ideas of its own, in its irrefragable and absolute authority.”
William Leonard Courtney (1850–1928), Studies in Philosophy: Ancient and Modern, London, Rivingtons, 1882, 187–188. [Italics added]
See finally: “It is now known that unlike Kant, Hegel was despised by the Nazis.”
Yitzhak Y. Melamed and Peter Thielke, “Hegelianism,” New Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Game Theory to Lysenkoism, vol. 3, Maryanne Cline Horowitz, editor in chief, New York, 2005, 977.
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Charles W. Mills, “Kant’s Untermenschen,” Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy, Andrew Valls, editor, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 2005, 169–193.
Robert Bernasconi, editor, “Who Invented the Concept of Race: Kant’s Role in the Enlightenment Construction of Race,” Race, Malden, MA, Blackwell, 2001: 11–36.
Bernard R. Boxill and Thomas E. Hill Jr., “Kant and Race,” Race and Racism,Bernard R. Boxill, editor, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, 448–471.
Robert Bernasconi, “Kant As An Unfamiliar Source of Racism,” Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays, Julie K. Ward & Tommy L. Lott, editors, Malden, MA, Blackwell, 2002, 145–166.
