The myth of literal meaning…
..and the inescapability of ijtihad
26 February 2025
People often crave certainty. Ambiguity and uncertainty can feel unsettling, especially when it comes to matters of faith. For many religious believers, sacred texts seem to offer a refuge from uncertainty — an oasis of clarity in an otherwise confusing world..
This desire for certainty appears in different ways across religious traditions. In Protestantism, the doctrine of the clarity of Scripture teaches that the Bible is fundamentally clear and accessible to ordinary believers. In Twelver Shi’ism, by contrast, believers who are not experts in Islamic law are required to follow the rulings of highly educated scholars (taqlid). At first glance, both doctrines seem to remove the burden of interpretation — either by asserting that the text itself is straightforward or by delegating interpretation to specialists.
In reality, things are not quite so simple. The way to heaven is, as Ophelia reminds us, always steep and thorny. There are no shortcuts. This essay argues that no one is exempt from the hard work of interpretation. Understanding any religious text demands effort, intelligence, and learning to understand. Every believer has a moral duty to engage with their sacred texts actively, rather than passively relying on the illusory clarity of first impressions or on the ambiguous authority of others. Ultimately, each believer is accountable for their own interpretation and must take personal responsibility for it.
Biblical literalism
When some Christians insist that the Bible must be understood “literally,” they generally mean that its words should be taken at face value, as straightforward statements of fact, rather than as allegory, metaphor, or symbolism — unless the text itself clearly indicates otherwise. However, “literal” interpretation can vary depending on the theological tradition and approach.
According to the view known as Strict Literalism, every word of the Bible is historically and scientifically accurate. Those who subscribe to this view might, for example, believe that the world was created in six 24-hour days, that Adam and Eve were historical individuals, and that the Great Flood covered the entire planet.
A slightly more complex view is Grammatical-Historical Interpretation, which recognises that the Bible includes different literary genres (e.g., poetry, prophecy, parables) and insists that passages should be read in their proper historical and cultural context. This is still regarded by most Christian scholars as a kind of literalism. Jesus’ parables, for example, are not understood as descriptions of real events, but they are nonetheless still seen as conveying literal truths. Likewise, Jesus’ command to “pluck out your eye” if it causes you to sin (Matthew 5:29) is widely understood, even by most literalists, as hyperbole rather than an injunction to self harm.
Even more expansively, some Christians take a generally literal approach but acknowledge that certain passages use figurative language. For instance, when Jesus says, “I am the door” (John 10:9), they don’t believe he is a physical door, but interpret the statement as a metaphor with a literal underlying meaning (i.e., he is the only way to salvation).
What all these forms of literalism have in common is a general opposition to “liberal” interpretation. Some Christians use “literal” to distinguish their approach from theological liberalism, which often sees much of the Bible as myth, legend, or culturally conditioned human writings rather than divinely inspired truth.
The changing meanings of literal
The word literal traces its origins to the Late Latin literalis, meaning “of or pertaining to letters or literature.” This, in turn, derives from the Latin littera (or litera), meaning “letter” in the sense of a written character. Initially, the term referred to something that adhered strictly to the exact wording of a text, without embellishment or figurative interpretation. Over time, however, literal evolved to mean “taking words in their usual or most basic sense, without metaphor or allegory.” This linguistic shift reflects a growing distinction between literal and figurative meanings, a concept that has played a significant role in literary and philosophical thought.
By the Middle English period (c. 14th century), literal was commonly used in contrast with allegorical, particularly in theological discussions concerning biblical interpretation. Medieval Christian scholars, influenced by figures such as Augustine, recognized multiple layers of meaning in Scripture: the literal, the allegorical, the moral, and the anagogical (spiritual or eschatological). Although the literal sense was often regarded as foundational, it was not necessarily equated with a purely historical or scientific reading. Instead, it was understood as the meaning intended by the author, which could itself accommodate symbolic or deeper theological dimensions.
The modern use of literal to mean “strictly factual, without exaggeration” became more common in the 17th and 18th centuries, coinciding with the rise of rationalist and empiricist thought. As scientific reasoning gained prominence, the idea of a precise, unembellished meaning took on greater significance in contrast to metaphorical or poetic language.
Ironically, in contemporary usage, literal is often employed in a way that contradicts its strict definition. Expressions such as “I’m literally dying” — when one is not actually dying — illustrate how language evolves, sometimes undermining its own purported stability. This phenomenon underscores the fluid and dynamic nature of meaning, revealing that even words meant to denote precision are subject to shifts and reinterpretations over time. Unfortunately, this etymology is not very helpful in establishing the literal meaning of literal.
Literally confusing
The claim that a text has a single, stable “literal meaning” distinct from all other forms of meaning is often assumed to be self-evident, especially in religious and legal discourse. Nowhere is this more apparent than in biblical literalism, where the idea of a fixed, authoritative interpretation is presented as the foundation of faith. Yet, upon closer scrutiny, the very concept of “literal meaning” proves to be far more unstable than its defenders assume. By interrogating the meaning of the word “literal” itself, we find that it resists the kind of fixity it is supposed to guarantee. If the term literal cannot sustain a stable, unambiguous meaning, then the claim that any text possesses a uniquely “literal sense” collapses, taking with it the assumption that this sense is the privileged foundation of interpretation.
At first glance, the word “literal” appears straightforward — it is commonly understood to mean “not figurative” or “not metaphorical.” Yet this seemingly clear distinction quickly dissolves when we examine how the term functions across different contexts. Historically, the notion of “literal meaning” has evolved significantly. In medieval theological hermeneutics, the literal meaning of a biblical passage was often taken to include allegorical or symbolic dimensions if those were thought to be “intended” by the author. In modern parlance, “literal” sometimes refers to factual accuracy (as in “a literal historical event”), while in casual speech, it is frequently used non-literally (as in “I was literally starving” when one merely means “very hungry”). If a term that is meant to denote stability is itself subject to such fluidity, then it becomes difficult to argue that “literal meaning” can provide the kind of fixed interpretive foundation that its proponents claim.
Coins which have lost their pictures
For “literal meaning” to function as a stable concept, it must be clearly distinguishable from figurative language. However, this distinction is far more porous than it first appears. Consider idiomatic expressions such as “kick the bucket.” If taken literally, it describes a physical action, yet in common usage, it means “to die.” But what, then, is the literal meaning of “die”? Does a corporation “die” in the same way a person does? Even words that seem unambiguously literal rely on contextual interpretation.
Moreover, many concepts that are treated as literal today originated as metaphors. The word “comprehend,” for instance, originally meant “to seize” or “grasp” something physically, yet its “literal” meaning has now shifted to “understand.” Even in scientific discourse, which is often held up as a model of literal precision, metaphor is unavoidable: we speak of “genetic codes,” “black holes,” and “force fields” — all terms that rely on figurative language. If there is no strict boundary between the literal and the figurative, then the claim that a text has a uniquely literal meaning becomes untenable.
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In his essay On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense (1873), Nietzsche uses the metaphor of worn-out coins to illustrate how concepts that were originally metaphorical become treated as literal truths over time. He writes:
What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding: truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions, they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.
Nietzsche’s point is that what we call “truth” is really just a set of linguistic and conceptual conventions that have been repeated so often that we forget their metaphorical origins. And many concepts we take as “literal” were once metaphorical but have become so naturalised that we no longer recognise their figurative origins.
Meaning is always contested and constructed
If literal means “the true or primary meaning of a word or text,” then we must ask: how do we determine what is “primary”? Is it historical precedent? Common usage? Authorial intention? If different authorities disagree on the “literal” meaning of a passage, who adjudicates? The assumption that the literal sense exists independently of interpretation is self-defeating, for any claim about what a text “literally” means already presupposes an act of interpretation.
Even more problematically, the very concept of literal meaning must itself be defined, which means it too is subject to interpretation. If literal must be interpreted in order to be understood, then there is no purely literal way to define literal. The attempt to secure a foundational, context-independent meaning leads to paradox, revealing the concept’s inherent instability.
If every attempt to define literal leads to contradiction, infinite regress, or ambiguity, then the notion of “literal meaning” as a stable foundation collapses. This does not mean that texts have no meaning — rather, it means that meaning is always mediated, contested, and constructed. The privileging of the “literal sense” is not a neutral hermeneutical stance but an ideological move designed to suppress interpretive pluralism. The assumption that the “literal meaning” of a text must be the primary or authoritative meaning is not a linguistic necessity but a strategic claim, often used to reinforce institutional authority and resist challenges to traditional interpretations.
What’s really going on?
The insistence that the “literal sense” of the Bible, or any text, is privileged or foundational is not merely a linguistic or hermeneutical stance — it is deeply entangled with broader psychological, social, and ideological concerns. Many people, especially in religious contexts, seek clear, stable foundations for their beliefs. A literal reading of Scripture offers what seems like objective, unambiguous truth, shielding adherents from the ambiguities and relativism of interpretation. The rejection of multiple or figurative meanings can be a defense against the anxiety that comes with interpretive openness. If meaning is fluid, then authority becomes unstable.
Religious institutions and leaders often rely on the idea that Scripture has a fixed, literal meaning to maintain doctrinal consistency and enforce orthodoxy. If the Bible is open to multiple interpretations, then theological authority shifts from institutions — churches, clerics, traditions — to individuals, which can be seen as threatening. Insisting on a literal reading helps reinforce hierarchical structures, where certain people, such as pastors and theologians, are positioned as the arbiters of “true” meaning.
The rise of historical-critical methods, scientific discoveries such as evolution and geology, and postmodern theories of interpretation have challenged traditional religious beliefs. Biblical literalism often emerges as a defensive reaction against these threats, offering a way to resist the perceived erosion of divine authority by secular or academic forces. In this sense, literalism is not just a method of reading but a cultural and ideological position — a stand against relativism, skepticism, and modernity.
The claim that the “literal sense” is the real meaning appeals to the modern desire for objectivity. It suggests that interpretation can be neutral, bypassing human subjectivity. However, as philosophers like Gadamer and Derrida have pointed out, there is no “purely objective” reading of a text — every reading is shaped by context, language, and prior assumptions.
Literalism often serves as a tool in ideological battles. Conservative religious movements frequently rely on a “plain reading” of Scripture to justify positions on gender, sexuality, creationism, or social order. By claiming that their interpretation is simply “what the Bible says,” rather than a theological or cultural reading, they strengthen their authority while discrediting alternative views as distortions.
Complex theological and interpretive traditions require deep study, historical knowledge, and intellectual effort. Literalism, by contrast, offers an accessible, straightforward framework that can be easily taught and enforced. It allows for mass religious participation without requiring expertise in ancient languages, cultural contexts, or philosophical hermeneutics.
The privileging of the “literal sense” is not just about textual interpretation — it’s about authority, stability, and resistance to change. It functions as a bulwark against theological uncertainty, secular critique, and interpretive pluralism. Beneath the surface, it often masks deeper ideological and psychological motivations: a desire for control, a need for certainty, and a reaction against perceived cultural decline.
By demonstrating that the word “literal” itself lacks a single, stable, unambiguous meaning, we expose the fragility of any claim that a text’s “literal sense” is foundational. Rather than providing a bedrock of objective meaning, the appeal to literalism functions as a means of controlling interpretation, enforcing dogma, and resisting intellectual complexity. If meaning is always shaped by context, history, and the act of reading itself, then the search for an unassailable “literal sense” is not only misguided but ultimately impossible. Any interpretive framework that insists on the primacy of literal meaning must reckon with the paradox that the concept of literal meaning is itself anything but literal.
The inescapability of ijtihad
Based on everything we’ve discussed so far in this conversation, we could construct a parallel argument about the inescapability of ijtihad, on the grounds that even the most “mindless” forms of taqlid require one to make a choice regarding which precedent one will follow. In Islamic legal thought, ijtihad (Arabic: اجتهاد ) is often contrasted with taqlid: while the former refers to independent reasoning by an expert in Islamic law, or the thorough exertion of a jurist’s mental faculty in finding a solution to a legal question, the latter designates imitation or conformity to legal precedent. Ijtihad is considered to be a religious duty for those qualified to perform it. An Islamic scholar who is qualified to perform ijtihad is called a mujtahid.
The argument for the inescapability of ijtihad rests on the recognition that even the most unthinking forms of taqlid require an implicit act of choice. When a Muslim elects to follow a particular precedent, he or she is not merely abdicating responsibility by deferring to tradition; rather, this decision itself entails a subtle exercise of independent reasoning. Just as in the case of biblical literalism — where insisting on a fixed, unambiguous interpretation overlooks the inherent act of interpretation — so too, in Islamic legal thought, the very act of following precedent necessitates making a choice about which interpretation or ruling to adopt. This means that no Muslim can completely evade the duty to engage in independent thought, and consequently, each individual retains a measure of responsibility for his or her actions.
In classical Sunni theory, ijtihad refers to the rigorous exertion of a jurist’s intellectual faculties in resolving legal questions, drawing upon expertise in the Arabic language, theology, the Qur’an, hadith, and the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh). While ijtihad is ideally exercised when texts are ambiguous or when there is no clear scholarly consensus (ijma), even the practice of taqlid — where one adheres to established legal rulings — requires the selection of a particular scholarly tradition over another. This selection, though it might appear to be a mindless following of authority, is in reality an act of judgment and interpretation. This recalls the existentialist notion that individuals must ultimately accept responsibility for their choices, as there is no escaping the fact that every decision, even one made by imitating others, reflects a commitment to a particular line of reasoning.
Historically, ijtihad was central to Islamic jurisprudence for the first several centuries following the hijra, and debates over its scope began to emerge by the sixth century AH. Although some later scholars argued that the main legal questions had been settled — giving rise to claims of a “closed gate of ijtihad” — modern scholarship has shown that independent reasoning in the form of ijtihad has never fully ceased. Disagreements among jurists (fuqaha) about the continuity of ijtihad and the legitimacy of contemporary mujtahids underscore that even in periods dominated by taqlid, independent reasoning was always at play. The persistent reliance on precedent, rather than negating ijtihad, merely highlights that every legal decision involves a choice among competing interpretations, thereby holding each Muslim accountable for the path they follow.
In this way, the very structure of Islamic legal methodology ensures that independent reasoning remains an inescapable duty for every Muslim. Whether one is consciously engaged in ijtihad or simply following an established tradition, the act of choosing a precedent implicates the individual in the interpretive process. Consequently, just as existentialist thought demands that individuals bear responsibility for their choices, so too does Islamic jurisprudence imply that a Muslim can never fully absolve themselves of responsibility by claiming to merely imitate others. The inevitability of choice — and therefore of responsibility — runs deep in both the theory of textual interpretation and the practice of legal reasoning in Islam.
The idea that certain privileged meanings — those called “literal” — can spring forth directly from a text independently of any act of interpretation is, at best, a comforting illusion, and at worst, plain nonsense. In reality, what is considered “literal” is itself subject to interpretation. Meaning always emerges from an interaction between text and reader, and this is always shaped by historical, cultural, and ideological forces. Far from providing a stable foundation, the appeal to “literal meaning” often serves as a rhetorical strategy to assert authority and foreclose debate. Recognising this does not render interpretation arbitrary or meaningless, but it does demand intellectual humility — the willingness to engage with texts critically, to acknowledge the inevitability of interpretation, and to remain open to the possibility that meaning is always, in some sense, in flux.
