How Brazil Changed Their Crossing Angles Against Japan

Going into half-time, the Japanese had put Brazil’s World Cup campaign in jeopardy. Kaishu Sano transitioned off the Brazilian transition, picking up Danilo’s loose pass, sprinting around Casemiro and firing a low shot past Alisson Becker. Japan had limited offensive threat, but their out-of-possession work restrained the Brazilians in three areas:

1. Japan could leave a +1 in the defensive line, whilst the first line of the press could easily angle Brazil onto one side. Ayase Ueda man-marked the pivot zone/Casemiro and Daizen Maeda/Junya Ito were effective in forcing quick distribution from the centre-backs (in fact, the buildup to the goal stems from Marquinhos aiming a direct pass towards Rayan and Shogo Taniguchi picking up the loose ball).
2. 5–2–3/5–4–1 low block established a lot of compactness between the lines. Brazil could only perform bounce/wall passes from inside the block, going out. Positional rotations led to players outside of the block and limited dynamics from the Brazil team, most notably on the left, where Lucas Paquetá dropped into the fullback space, Douglas Santos pushed high and Vinícius Júnior was isolated in the halfspace pocket.
3. A strategic counterpress was effective for Japan to squeeze the pitch up on Brazil, moving out of the low-to-medium block into a man-to-man arrangement, one which Brazil struggled to play through.

Paquetá would be taken off after limping at the end of the first half. Endrick took his place and this signified a few changes from Ancelotti. On the left, Vinícius was a lot wider, which ignited his dribbling abilities. The stats are evident: in the first half, zero dribbles; in the second half, three out of six completed. This caused more doubling up with Junya Ito and Ritsu Doan, took Takehiro Tomiyasu away from occupying the Real Madrid winger and opened the halfspace zone for Gabriel to deliver crosses into the penalty area.

47th minute: As Vinícius started to get dribbles against the Japanese low block, it was clear that Brazil could gain better territory with Santos overlapping, Doan and Ito doubling up on the winger and crosses becoming much more accessible for Brazil.

The most vulnerable part of Japan’s low block is the relationship between centre-midfielders, Sano and Daichi Kamada. In the game against the Netherlands, and with the ball located at the centre of the first line, Reijnders was gaining just a little more space on Sano as Kamada would be higher than his teammate, for the short diagonal pass to be shown. Brazil’s buildup mechanics were limited and still going outwards, but with better territory, they could put balls into the box.

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In the process, their best aerial targets were Bruno Guimarães or Casemiro box crashing. Five minutes into the second half, Brazil generated two excellent chances from crosses coming in on the right. On both occasions, as Kamada moved forward/outward, Sano allowed Guimarães or Casemiro the chance to move into the box ahead of the midfielder. Guimarães forced a fine save out of the first attempt; the second saw Santos head the ball back into the danger zone and Cunha was, somehow, denied on the line via a block from Tomiyasu and Zion Suzuki.

51st minute: Guimarães chance. As Kamada stepped outward to cover Rayan, Sano allowed Guimarães to move into the box for the cross. With Cunha and Endrick occupying two centre-backs, Guimarães appeared between the two to meet the cross from Danilo.

The Brazilian equaliser stemmed from a combination of these elements. With both wing-back and wide forward on Vinícius, Gabriel was free to move into the halfspace and pick out a cross onto the back post. At the back post, Hiroki Ito was occupied by both Cunha and Casemiro, whilst keeping the midfielder onside and goal side to score from close range.

Brazil did not lose momentum from this point. Japan’s out-of-possession structure had made them one of the toughest teams to break down in the tournament, but its risk-aversion can come as a double-edged sword. Without Takefusa Kubo or Kaoru Mitoma, the ability to spark transitional moments through mazey dribbles is lost without their best forwards fit. Nevertheless, a neat abundance of counter-attacking players struggles to produce on this front (aside from a golden opportunity after they countered on the goal-line clearance, only for Keito Nakamura to completely clear the crowd on this cross).

Additionally, by dropping so deep, it is difficult for low blocks to start breaking out and offering a threat. This meant that Brazil could double down on the passive dominance, still limited in its routes, but twenty-eight crosses in the second half (twelve in the first) indicate the difference in territory that Brazil were getting. Substitute Gabriel Martinelli would win the game in stoppage time, Danilo counterpressed Ao Tanaka, and Guimarães slid the Arsenal attacker through inside the box.

This Brazil team remains dysfunctional, more evident in its out-of-possession phase. On the ball, Ancelotti had found some relief by pushing Guimarães forward after the first game, although this team still needs its floor raised with a better structure in place. Nevertheless, Ancelotti is one of the kings of “going brr” within the football world, and Brazil still possesses a handful of players that can produce something out of very little. Yet again, they remain a difficult case to call.

(See you space cowboy…)