Extremism vs. Liberal Democracy: An Inevitable Clash?
Before thinking about the effect that extremism has on democracy, we must first ask what political extremism is trying to achieve: is it about ends and reaching radical goals, means; intolerance, absolutism, or coercion, or about epistemology; regarding certainty and moral infallibility. Extremism is often immediately viewed as self-evidently anti-democratic and a threat to political stability- though we should acknowledge that democracy itself had emerged from making radical changes and challenges to the system. The whole theory of liberal democracy relies on pluralism, disagreement and legitimacy, which is in direct contrast with extremism as it seems to reject compromise and moral uncertainty. In this essay I will challenge the view that extremism is hostile by nature and that only in certain forms should it be regarded as a threat to proper societal functioning and democracy as a whole.
There are extremely conflicting views within political spheres of thinking about what extremism actually is. Isaiah Berlin believed in value pluralism; multiple values e.g. beauty, justice, freedom etc are equally valid and fundamental, but often conflicting. In one of the last essays written by him he remarked that “Monism […] is a form of pathological extremism which can lead, and has led, to unimaginable horrors, and is totally incompatible with the kind of pluralism that I have attempted to describe.” (Berlin 1998). His view is that extremism directly conflicts with pluralism — a tenet of liberal democracy — as it often assumes one true answer, showing extremism as a direct threat to liberal democracy. On the other hand, Hanna Arendt views extremism as ideological thinking that explains everything, demonstrated when she says “An ideology is quite literally what its name indicates: the logic of an idea” (Arendt 1953). Her views reduce political extremism to a single logic, eliminating debate about whether they are ‘inherently hostile’, opposing Berlin’s negative view and offering a more open view of ideological extremism. Overall, extremism is less about the intensity of ideology and radical action that may be taken from acting on those views, and more about intolerance of alternatives and close-mindedness to other ideas.
Before judging extremism, however, we must first examine what liberal democracy actually depends on. The key idea of liberal democracy that comes to mind is free and fair elections; in reality it is more a moral and institutional commitment to pluralism, opposition, and restraint. Pluralism is the central belief that people of different beliefs, backgrounds, and lifestyles can coexist in the same society and participate equally in the political process. It assumes that this means that people will make decisions in the common interest/good of the people and benefit liberal democracy. However it also recognises the tyranny of the majority in decision making and works towards the integration of minority groups and protection of rights through laws. John Rawls in particular believes in reasonable pluralism, claiming that “a democratic society is characterised by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (Sarangi 1994). Rawls demonstrates here how extremism, by definition, often treats opposition as unreasonable; democracy assumes citizens accept disagreement as a legitimate form of disagreement, rather than a threat. On the other hand, Karl Popper believes in the paradox of tolerance which is saying that in order for a society to remain a tolerant society, it must be intolerant of intolerant views. Should you allow these views to spread, society will eventually crumble because of the spread and growth of this intolerance: “unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance” (Popper 2013), raising the question of whether democracy must limit extremism in order to survive or if it can function alongside it- especially given that the nature of ideological extremism is to deny the legitimacy of disagreement- making it much harder to ever coexist with liberal democracy.
The argument that extremism is inherently hostile is a valid one, this is because extremism rejects pluralism, compromise, and moral uncertainty. The whole idea itself that ideological extremism is viewed by society as dangerous and disruptive is immediately prevalent when you look at the legislature’s definition of terrorism; the government’s website stating that “Terrorists do not merely dabble with extremist ideology — they immerse themselves in it.” and “ideology is not peripheral to terrorism — it’s central.” (GOV.UK 2025), clearly showing the negative view of extremist ideology and the detrimental effects it has on modern liberal democracy. Hannah Arendt viewed the growth of totalitarianism as directly stemming from the ideological certainty that comes with extremism. She also holds the view that extremism erases individuality and therefore is anti-democratic, with liberal democracy allowing individuals to have the freedom to be unique and express their true selves, as shown in one of her essays when she says that “total domination attempts to organise the infinite plurality of human beings as if all humanity were just one individual” (Arendt 1945). By saying this, Arendt really shows how ideological certainty eliminates the need or want for debate, rather than engaging in it, disrupting the democratic principles and posing a threat to liberal democracy as it eliminates open-ended disagreement. Carl Schmitt also views extremism as inherently hostile with him saying that “The political enemy is the other, the stranger.” (Schmitt 2005) aligning with his concept of the political or the ‘friend-enemy distinction’ — defining “the political” as the eternal propensity of people to identify each other as “enemies”, which pose a real, potentially violent threat to another group’s way of life. His view was that extremism turns democratic opponents into existential threats; not only posing a threat to the politics of the individual, but a threat to a functioning liberal democracy as their views are so strong that it completely undermines the subtleties of debate in democratic form and takes over the political spheres with its rhetoric. However, looking at all these separate views it is clear that it is not ideological extremism’s content that undermines the functioning of liberal democracy, but rather its structure — with its structural intolerance suggesting that extremism is fundamentally anti-democratic, separate to its policy.
Although the structure of ideological extremism is usually a fundamental threat to liberal democracy, it is important to acknowledge that this is an extremely generalised argument and is a broad, sweeping statement that certainly does not apply to all ‘extremist’ ideologies. To argue against this generalisation, we must question whether all cases of extremism inherently reject democracy, or whether, historically, some have expanded it. Some historical examples include abolitionism; famous figures like John Brown who believed slavery must end by any means necessary, turning to violence when peaceful protest failed, the suffragette movement; using bombs, and defacing property and art to gain the vote for women, and anti-colonial activists using any means possible to fight against the ‘liberal democracy’ of that time which was oppressing their individual rights and freedoms. The question we are now faced with is whether we classify these movements as ‘extremist’ by prevailing standards of their time. By labelling them extremist it creates a problem for the “inherently hostile” claim; yes they were violent and perhaps dangerous, but they were fighting injustices that if allowed to continue, would have gone on limiting freedom and civil rights. John Stuart Mill believed in the importance of individuality and held the view that radical dissent can strengthen liberty, saying “That so few now dare to be eccentric marks the chief danger of the time” (Mill 1985), showing that it could be potentially democratic rather than destructive. Moreover, Rawls also makes the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable doctrines, acknowledging that some radical views may still accept democratic procedures and pluralism. This undoubtedly shows that even with radical goals and extremist ideologies, if it is done through democratic means it is not inherently anti-democratic.
From both these arguments, it is clear that extremism is sometimes democratic and sometimes destructive. Extremism becomes inherently hostile to liberal democracy when it denies pluralism, rejects procedural legitimacy, or is unwilling to have debates or acknowledge disagreement, but it is important to remember that not all radicalism does this and furthermore moderation in itself is not inherently democratic. Berlin warned that monism is a dangerous illusion that leads to totalitarianism, arguing the case for less extremist, pluralist politics, which becomes less hostile when it doesn’t deny the legitimacy of alternate values. Popper’s ‘Paradox of Tolerance’ says that if you allow extremism to exist without restraint, you risk the collapse of society. The danger there, being if liberal democracy adopts those extremist methods itself. However, in all of these cases it is clear that extremism is situationally, not inherently, hostile. It carries a structural temptation towards anti-democratic thinking, showing that a liberal democracy must balance pluralism with self-preservation in order to function. The question of whether liberal democracy can defend itself without adopting extremist methods and ideologies of its own, remains undecided.
References
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Arendt, Hannah. 1945. On the Nature of Totalitarianism: An Essay in Understanding. https://www.academia.edu/33478143/Arendt_On_the_Nature_of_Totalitarianism_An_Essay_in_Understanding_1954_.
Arendt, Hannah. 1953. “Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government.” The Review of Politics Vol. 15 (№3): 303–327. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1405171.
Berlin, Isaiah. n.d. “Isaiah Berlin on pluralism.” New York Review of Books Vol. 45 (8). https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~vl/notes/berlin.html.
GOV.UK. n.d. “Understanding Ideology’s Role in Terrorism and Extremism.” Commission for Countering Extremism- GOV.UK. https://extremismcommission.blog.gov.uk/2025/03/20/understanding-ideologys-role-in-terrorism-and-extremism/.
Mill, John S. 1985. On Liberty. N.p.: Penguin Books Limited.
Popper, Karl R. 2013. The Open Society and Its Enemies: New One-Volume Edition. N.p.: Princeton University Press.
Sarangi, Prakash. 1994. “Review: From Metaphysical to Political: John Rawls’ Revised Version of Liberalism.” Economic and Political Weekly (29 edition), June 4, 1994, 1396–1398. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4401299.
Schmitt, Carl. 2005. Political theology: four chapters on the concept of sovereignty. N.p.: University of Chicago Press.
