When the Function Ends… the Promise Falls
Dr. Nakeeb Saadoon
Political Researcher & Strategic Expert
01/22/2026
A Deep Political Reading of the Shift in the U.S. Position on the SDF and the Redrawing of Interests
What happened with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) was neither a sudden event nor an emotional decision, as some attempt to frame it under the labels of “a stab in the back” or “American betrayal.” Rather, it was the natural outcome of a long trajectory of strategic calculations that govern U.S. behavior in conflict zones. International politics is not managed through permanent friendships or abstract moral commitments, but through a clear equation: function, feasibility, and sustainability. When the function ends—or when feasibility declines—the promise falls, regardless of its size or duration.
Since the formation of the international coalition against ISIS, the SDF constituted an effective field instrument for Washington. Over a full decade, the United States invested heavily in the force militarily, financially, and politically—through training, arming, air support, and salary payments. This support, however, was never rooted in an ideological embrace of the SDF’s political project, nor in a commitment to establishing a permanent entity in northern Syria. It was tied to a clear and limited objective: defeating ISIS and preventing a total collapse of the Syrian–Iraqi geography. That objective was largely achieved—and at that moment, the real transformation began.
From Functional Alliance to Strategic Repositioning
Once the major battle against ISIS concluded, Washington began asking a cold but decisive question: What comes next?
The SDF failed to provide a convincing answer. A force that proved militarily effective was unable to evolve into a disciplined political project capable of surviving without direct American cover. Over time, the SDF shifted from being a useful tool into a political and security burden—particularly due to its persistent organic or undeclared ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). This linkage became the central dilemma in its relationship with Turkey, a strategic U.S. ally and NATO member.
The United States attempted, at various stages, to manage this contradiction—first by turning a blind eye, then by demanding organizational and political separation between the SDF and the PKK. Yet field realities demonstrated that this separation remained largely symbolic rather than real. As Turkish pressure intensified and regional complexities deepened, maintaining this equation became more costly than beneficial.
The Paris Agreement: A Pivotal Moment
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Within this context, the Paris agreement marked a critical turning point. It was not a mere political understanding, but a strategic signal. Damascus provided indirect security assurances that reassured Israel—whether regarding the southern front or the future balance in Syria. In American political logic, when Israel is reassured, veto lines recede, and Washington gains greater freedom to rearrange its priorities.
The United States no longer saw value in sustaining an internationally unrecognized armed entity when a political track could achieve a minimum level of stability without additional military cost. The decision to scale back was therefore not a sign of weakness, but a calculated act of strategic repositioning.
Gaza: The Unspoken Variable
The American shift cannot be understood without a serious examination of Gaza. Developments there were not isolated from the Syrian theater, but part of an interconnected web of interests. Turkey played a pivotal role in pushing Hamas toward a hostage deal and opening discussions on the future of arms—an outcome regarded as a political success for the U.S. administration amid mounting internal and external pressure.
This role reaffirmed Turkey’s status as an indispensable regional actor—not only in Gaza, but also in Syria, and potentially in broader files involving Iran, the Black Sea, and NATO. From Washington’s perspective, the choice was clear: a heavyweight regional state capable of enforcing long-term commitments, or a local force with limited political reach.
The Logic of States and the Logic of Tools
Here emerges a fundamental rule of international politics:
States negotiate; non-state actors are used, then reassessed.
This is not a moral judgment, but a realistic description of the international system. States possess institutions, armies, economies, and legal legitimacy. Armed entities outside state frameworks, no matter how powerful, remain inherently temporary instruments.
Despite its sacrifices and military role, the SDF failed to transition from the mentality of armed force to that of a viable political project. It was unable to construct a regional or international umbrella capable of protecting it once American priorities shifted. With the PKK dilemma unresolved, defending the SDF became politically costly—and even risked direct confrontation with Turkey, a scenario entirely misaligned with U.S. interests.
The Erbil Message: An Organized Exit
Against this backdrop, the Erbil meetings formalized the final decision. The message delivered was unequivocal: Stop the fighting and preserve lives; the United States will not enter any new confrontation. This was not a sudden abandonment, but a clear declaration of the end of military cover.
In this phase, Mazloum Abdi’s decision to pursue withdrawal and restraint deserves acknowledgment. He recognized that any forthcoming confrontation would unfold without international protection and at an unbearable human and political cost—one that would serve neither the Kurdish cause nor regional stability.
Conditional Promises and the Collapse of Illusions
The promises extended to the SDF were not morally deceptive; they were conditional, functional, and time-bound. This reality was misunderstood—or ignored—by many. The United States never pledged permanent protection nor signed an enduring alliance, but provided support linked to a defined mission and a defined timeframe.
When time expired, the promise fell.
Not because Washington is treacherous, but because this has always been the logic of international politics.
A Recurrent Lesson.
This lesson is neither new to Kurdish history nor to the region at large. It has repeated itself across multiple moments—from 1975 to Afghanistan, from Iraq to Syria. Each time, the same question resurfaces: do we continue betting on external promises, or do we shift toward building a realistic political project grounded in domestic and regional balances?
The coming phase does not require a discourse of victimhood, but a sober reading of reality—a genuine transition from the mentality of the tool to the mentality of the state, from the logic of arms to the logic of politics. Those who fail to make this transition will remain the first to be discarded at every strategic crossroads.
