lesson 20. Kant and Pure Reason
20.01. Kant’s Complex
20.02. Kant’s Ambition
20.03. Kant’s Strategy
20.04. Receptivity
20.05. Conceptivity
20.06. Principles of Cognition
20.07. Transcendental Visions
20.08. from Cognition to Practice
20.09. Moral Obligation
20.10. Postulation of Practical Reason
20.11. The Third Critique
“How come the long face, Professor?”
Today’s lecture is about Kant.
“Why? He is famous, isn’t he?”
But he is a stumbling block for philosophy.
“What do you mean?”
He was too pedantic, so many lose philosophy in his labyrinth.
“Ah, those who think they’re doing philosophy just by bigging up Kant.”
And yet they don’t understand him.
“But we can’t get anywhere if avoiding Kant. And besides, I love mazes.”
20.01. Kant’s Complex
Once you enter his labyrinth full of traps, you get caught up in the details and lose its whole figure. His overuse of jargon makes us perplexed. In the first place, Kant himself often lost his way in the labyrinth he made. Therefore, let us first consider Kant from his outside.
“From outside?”
His hometown, Königsberg was on the far eastern outland of Europe, an invading colony of the Teutonic Knights and their successor, the Duchy of Prussia. Once flourished with the Baltic trade, but at his time the court had moved to Berlin, so the little old town at most with 40 thousand dwellers was filled with pride and defeat.
“A bit touchy town.”
Kant was the son of a poor craftsman and, although he had barely graduated the Königsberg University, he could not get an academic position, so he had to make a living as a tutor.
“His life was hard.”
At that time in Britain and France, the Royal Society and the Académie Française were at the forefront of collecting and inventing large amounts of cultural treasures and advanced technologies from around the world, and the Industrial Revolution and Capitalism were taking root.
“They were the so-called Encyclopedism.”
On the other hand, Königsberg was occupied by Russia during the Seven Years’ War (1756–63), and after that, Prussia retook the town and turned it into a frontline military fort. In 1770, Kant finally became a professor at the university at the age of 46 but was required to teach 16 classes a week. He had never been out of his hometown, so even the standard Western German was foreign to him, moreover, Kant was so good at neither universal Latin nor popular English and French, that he had not read even the original of Descartes and Hume.
“That’s probably at most what a university on the outland at that time was like.”
Nevertheless, following Newton, he attempted a major philosophical reversal and spent more than ten years writing his major work, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. It was at last published in 1781 when he was 57 years old.
“What on earth was written on it?”
20.02. Kant’s Ambition
He denied Empiricism with Rationalism and Rationalism with Empiricism. First, with Hume’s Razor, he was scornful of knowledge gathering and technological development in Britain and France as just empirical and uncertain, so not of the job of an academic. On the other hand, he criticized the dogmatic Metaphysics of ancient Greece and medieval Scholasticism. Those are delusions beyond human intelligence, so it is arrogant for scholars to get involved in them.
“Then, what should we seek?”
Apriori Synthetic Cognition, like 7+5=12.
“What? In the first place, what are Apriori and Synthetic?”
Apriori means ‘by the former’ namely, based on the premise. The opposite is aposteriori, ‘by the latter,’ only verified with the facts later. Synthetic is the opposite of analytic, a new production of information not included in either element. In this case, neither 7 nor 5 contains the concept of 12, but by the calculating rule, it tells us that 7+5 is 12, without any actual verification.
“In short, did he aim for non-empirical knowledge like Plato?”
Neither. He rejected fancy myths like Idea Theory as non-empirical.
“So, what is left?”
Pure Reason or Logic of Intelligence including foundations of Mathematics and Natural Sciences before any experiment. He believed that it is absolutely certain and that it is the very Metaphysics. With the demonstration, he wanted to be a Newton in Philosophy.
“However, Newton’s PRINCIPIA was empirically based on many resources, observation, and experiments.”
The ideal absolute theory system at that time was rather the Euclidean. Actually, before Kant, Spinoza published ETHICS through a Euclidean deductive demonstration.
“Indeed, such a deductive demonstration from the definition might be able even on a desk in the outland, but it is at most a dogmatic worldview, isn’t it?”
Therefore, Kant’s demonstration had to be inductive.
“Induction without any empirical roots? That seems more dubious.”
20.03. Kant’s Strategy
He called his strategy Copernican Inversion. If all stars go round in the same way, then not the stars but the Earth turns around. Similarly, if all things follow some rules, then the rules are not of things, but of our recognition. So, if we want to know the absolute Apriori Syntheses, we should examine not things but our Intelligence.
“It was just the science of human knowledge, not Metaphysics of reality, isn’t it?”
Exactly. However, Kant said that our reality is a world of phenomena for us and that we never know the world of things themselves (Ding an sich).
“Locke said something similar before.”
So, the demonstration of Logic is reduced to show that every right phenomenon follows Logic. Therefore, he argued that only the phenomenon that follows Logic is right. If so, Logic has universal validity for our reality. However, irrational people use Logic irrationally, so even wrong phenomena may creep in. In fact, his theory only makes sense to decent Intelligence which he assumed as the ideal.
“That is just a circular reasoning.”
Anyway, to analyze our Intelligence, he divided it into three functions: Receptivity (Sinnlichkeit), Conceptivity (Verstand), and Detectivity (Vernunft). We catch phenomena from the outside world, unify and predicate them, and infer new knowledge from these experiences.
20.04. Receptivity
“First, how does the Receptivity counter wrong phenomena?”
The phenomena for us are various, so they may be the real ones of the outside world but may be our inside dreams, illusions, and misunderstandings. The index to tell real phenomena from delusions is whether they have explicit time and place. We accept and approve only phenomena with the times and the places as real by our Receptivity.
“Ah, certainly, if the phenomena are real, we can define ‘when and where’ of them.”
However, the times and the places are not independent objects but just phenomena we experience simultaneously with some objects. It means the times and the places are not real but rather some position in the Space of our Receptivity. Therefore, Kant thought Time-Place Space is the subjective pure Logic, the comprehensive (transcendental) Forms of our Receptivity.
“‘Ago’ and ‘later’ or ‘here’ and ‘there’ are not of objective common time and place, but subjective references centered on the self.”
Every real phenomenon follows the Logic of Receptivity, Time-Place Space, because if not so, it is not real. Thus, the universal validity of the Logic of Receptivity is proved.
“That is just an analytic deduction from the definition.”
20.05. Conceptivity
Conceptivity is the function of our Intelligence to unify and predicate our various phenomena. According to Kant, it works in four Aspects: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Reliability. We have prepared beforehand these apriori Aspects as the Logic of Conceptivity.
“Are these four enough? Hume used seven Categories to associate our phenomena and Aristotle even listed as many as ten.”
He borrowed these from Scholastics Logic. Besides, his four Aspects contain respectively three sub-categories, so the sum of them is twelve: All, Some, Particular; Affirmed, Denied, Complemented; Belonged, Hypothetical, Disjunctive; and Perhaps, Really, Necessarily.
“Are these collectively exhaustive?”
He said so. Anyway, while the Categories of Hume and Aristotle are mutually exclusive, Aspects of Kant are applied simultaneously and multiplexly to phenomena to unify and predicate as our single experience. In addition, Kant’s Aspects are not of phenomena, but, so far, just our subjective attitude toward phenomena.
“What does your reservation of ‘so far’ mean?”
Even if we apply these Aspects to phenomena, that may be just our arbitral operation and, if so, our predicated experience is not necessarily right. Therefore, Kant needed proof that our applying Aspects is always right, namely the universal validity of the Aspects. He called it ‘right issues’ against ‘fact issues’ and developed here Transcendental Deduction.
“It is not just to show that we always do it, but to prove that we are right to do it, right?”
Kant’s solution was the same way as the universal validity of Receptivity. Conceptivity is also universally valid for every phenomenon because we get a phenomenon only through Conceptivity. What is given for Receptivity is, in fact, nothing more than a flooding mess of momentary impressions. When some of it is retained, represented, and recognized by Conceptivity, it is formed as a phenomenon. Therefore, Conceptivity is called also Productive Insight (Einbildungskraft).
“Does Conceptivity retain and represent impressions?”
No, Conceptivity can only recognize it. As long as the impressions are retained and represented, there should be another function that transcends time. He called it Apperception, in simple terms: consciousness. For the moment, he regarded it as the same as the apriori Time-Space of Receptivity. Conceptivity reads out the integration of impressions in Time-Space as Quantity, the strength as Quality, the order as Relation, and the chance as Reliability and unifies it as a single Phenomenon. Kant called the Time-Space working as figurative and logical mediators Schema.
“Then, is consciousness the same as Receptivity?”
Our consciousness can involve not only recognition of the outside world but also our inside feelings and wills. Therefore, Kant reconsidered the Apperception in the second edition in 1787 and that opened up a new perspective for him. But we’ll talk about it later.
20.06. Principles of Cognition
“So, after all, what is the principle of the Apriori Synthetic Cognition? It supports all of our cognition like Newton’s PRINCIPIA, doesn’t it?”
It is derived analytically from our apriori Aspects of Conceptivity. First, the Axiom of Phenomenon that every Phenomenon has a volume is said from the Aspect of Quantity. Axiom is the definitive premise of our object rather than the rule of things. So, it means we accept only a thing with volume in the Time-Place Space as our object of experience or phenomenon.
“This is the variation of Descartes’ Extension-World. Conversely, it means here things without volume like feelings and wills are not our object of experience.”
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Second, the Expectation of Perception that existing things should be perceived strongly is led from the Aspect of Quality. But, needless to say, some things exist even though we do not perceive them like air. Therefore, this rule is at most the expectation of our side when we check whether something exists.
“It is similar to Hume’s Epistemology to confirm the existence of something by the strength of the impression.”
Kant called these ‘Mathematical Principles’ of our Cognition and, according to him, these guarantee that Mathematics is valid not only in Mathematics but also in Natural Sciences, and furthermore in our Cognition in general.
“Did Kant think that it would be possible to understand even imaginary numbers and vacuum in such a manner?”
The remaining two are even worse. Third, Kant derived the Analogy of Experience from the Aspect of Relation. It is divided into three by its subcategories: Belonged, Hypothetical, and Disjunctive. The Analogy of Substance is that a persisting thing should have some substance. The Analogy of Causality is that if B follows A but A does not follow B, then A should be the cause, and B should be the result. The Analogy of Mutuality is that simultaneously existing things should influence each other.
“Wow, did Kant really say that? A river may be the same, but the water is not the same. Even if it rains after someone prays for rain, and even if when it rains no one prays for rain, it does not mean that the prayer called the rain. When we roll two dice, both are quite independent. Those would have been said many times even up to him.”
The last is the Postulate of Empirical Thought. While Axiom defines the domain of the objects to consider, Postulate declares the usage of some term. According to the Aspect of Reliability, if something can fit our form of experience, we call it ‘Probably,’ when it fits our form, then ‘Really,’ and if it cannot be without fitting our form, then ‘Necessarily.’ He named the Analogy of Experience and the Postulate of Empirical Thought ‘Dynamic Principles.’
“Whether it fits us or not, what happens will happen. His usages are different from our usual meaning.”
Therefore, Kant had to add here Refutation of Idealism in the second edition. He admitted his argument is limited to our inside world and not concerned with the outside world. However, while Descartes thought both worlds are disconnected, Kant insisted Phenomena happen only by some outside stimulation. Moreover, according to Kant, even consciousness as the Time Space depends on the constant existence of the outside world by the Analogy of Causality.
“I hear when people are locked in a windowless room, they lose sense of time.”
20.07. Transcendental Visions
Following the Apriori Logic, we get experiences. We also have a higher ability of Intelligence, Detectivity, to infer new information from experiences. Inference of Detectivity is, in fact, the application of the Aspect of Relation to our experiences, so it is divided into three: Belonged (categorical) Inference, Hypothetical Inference, and Disjunctive Inference.
“Is the Difference between Conceptivity and Detectivity just whether the objects are phenomena or experiences?”
Conceptivity passively works to unify the empirically given impressions and phenomena while Detectivity positively explores the inductive higher knowledge. But when it seeks infinitely higher knowledge by Dialectic, it creates rather new Transcendental Visions (Idee). However, Kant did not understand the Calculus of Newton and Leibniz, so his argument was confusing.
“Ah, Kant questioned Aristotelian infinite inferences.”
First, when we apply the Belonged Inference infinitely, it comes that our consciousness is the extreme substance that belongs to every experience. So, we are tempted to think consciousness really exists as a Soul. However, as mentioned, our consciousness is, in fact, just an empty Time Space. A Soul is a Transcendental Vision. He called this wrong inference Transcendental Paralogism, namely, excessive argument.
“Consciousness is like a vacuum: it can contain anything, yet it is nothing.”
Second, in Hypothetical Inference, Kant fell into the same confusion again. When we apply the apriori Aspects infinitely, we come to two mutually contradictory conclusions, Antinomies. In the Aspect of Quantity, if we infinitely seek a bigger, we arrive at an infinite volume, but then, we can say neither that there is a further bigger volume nor that there is no further bigger. Likewise, in the Aspect of Quality, we do not know whether there is a further stronger than the infinite stronger.
“Those are the variations of Zeno’s Paradoxes of Achilles and the Tortoise. Kant did not know how to solve an infinite integral.”
With Aspects of Relation and Reliability, we infer the ultimate cause and necessity, but simultaneously we can ask for the further ultimate cause and necessity, so these conclusions are contradictive. However, Kant thought these are just conclusions within our limited Intelligence, so we cannot know which is right in the outside world. The world image we get with inference is at most a Transcendental Vision.
“The world can be anything regardless of what we think about the world.”
Third, Kant also sought the ultimate in Disjunctive Inference. What contains everything and cannot be a part of a higher disjunction is nothing but God. God may contain even the existency, but we have no experience of God to confirm the existence. So, it is also a Transcendental Vision for us. This is the same even if saying it is the ultimate cause or purpose. However, he called the Vision the Ideal of Pure Reason and regarded it as the object of worship, even though not the object of experience.
“After all, our Inference of Detectivity comes to dead ends everywhere.”
Yeah, a Soul, the World, and God are useful for leading our Intelligence but cannot be objects for our experience and argument. Thus, Kant rejected the conventional delusional Metaphysics about those. This was the point of his critique for our Reasonability.
20.08. from Cognition to Practice
His CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON was dismally received. His attempt at Copernican Inversion to position Mathematics and Natural Sciences within the subjectivity was interesting but quite nonsense. In the first place, he was obviously not versed in Mathematics and Natural Sciences at the time. However, when some criticized it, Kant furiously hit back against them. Thus, the book became a focus of dispute in German academics.
“It was the so-called Flame War, wasn’t it?”
Kant rewrote it as the second edition and tried to catch up even with the latest Moral Philosophy in Britain. However, since he was good at neither English nor Latin, he misunderstood the term ‘moral.’ Although it means in Latin just the customs of the people and Moral Philosophy studied it as objective Social Science, Kant regarded it in German as good manners, moreover, human obligation. Worse still, he tried to solve the moral problem apriori again without any social observation.
“In his Cartesian dualistic worldview, he could not understand the social adjustment like Hume and Adam Smith. It would be the practical Solipsism and Dogmatism.”
Nevertheless, the sequel, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (1788), became a drastic game changer of philosophy. While British Moralists based Morality on sentimental Humanism over cool-headed Rationality, Kant, as an extreme Pietist, derived Morality from Rationality and rejected human feeling. Thus, until then, philosophy had explored what things are, but after this book, the question shifted to what we should do about things, the world, and ourselves.
“Again, Copernican Inversion? But, as long as practice depends on the situation of the outside world, how could we argue what we should do only with Rationality?”
We humans are influenced by the outside world and may act by the desire for something outside. However, according to Kant, such an action cannot be called ‘good’ even if it makes oneself or others better. He said only actions by the right will are ‘good,’ regardless of their actual consequences.
“Wow, he was too forcible. That would make Flame War again.”
20.09. Moral Obligation
Thus, Kant limited the domain of argument to the problem of our wills. In addition, he began by regarding it as a fact that our wills are charged some Moral Obligation (moralishes Gesetz). Having obligations means that we can act differently. Moral Obligation is the reason to recognize our Freedom and our Freedom is the reason to follow Moral Obligation.
“It became useful here that he had said that Hypothetical Inference about cause and necessity might not be contradictory in our outside world.”
If our will pursues something, that is Desire. Likewise, if our will decides on a way of action for our own happiness, it is at most a Personal Principle (Maxime). These are hypothetical wills because these are valid only when we want them, or only for those who believe that the way brings them happiness. In contrast, Moral Obligation should be an absolute order (kategorisher Imperativ) for our wills regardless of our wishes. As long as it is valid universally for everyone everywhere, it must not contain any concrete objects.
“What’s it?”
According to him, it is the order that we should set our Personal Principles with universal validity. In other words, we have to be our own lawmakers. It is a rule two levels above Desires and Personal Principles.
“What does it mean actually?”
This Moral Obligation is used to judge whether one’s will is right or not. The will is acceptable for the time being when it has no problem even if everyone will do so everywhere. However, for example, when we want to break some promise, we should realize that, if someone would break a promise somewhere, a promise could not consist. We can derive hence the rule that we should keep a promise, and by the Moral Obligation, we understand that everyone should respectively make the rule to keep a promise one’s Personal Principle. So, we should keep also the promise in question.
“Ah, with universality, other people finally came into Kant’s theory.”
Exactly. So, he derived another apriori variation of the Moral Obligation that we should not want to use others as means. Because, even if someone would want to use others as his means, no one would support his Personal Principle. Therefore, the third variation is that we should realize that we are members of the social legislature.
“But sometimes a person comes along who says ‘I am the very nation’ and people obey him without any questions. Kant did not know Napoleon yet at that time.”
20.10. Postulation of Practical Reason
Conceptivity cognitively confirms our experiences while it practically builds our wills. When we recognize we are in some situation, we set something not yet existing as our object and think how to get it. Thus, we conceive a will to do some actions. The will is okay for the time being if it makes no problem as universal legislation, even though it may not be particularly ‘good,’ on the contrary, ‘bad.’
“Yeah, after work, we go to a bar, buy lotteries, and drink beer till late. Even if it is a waste of time, even if we don’t win, far from that, even if it is harmful, those are our freedoms.”
However, we simultaneously feel emptiness in such a life. So, our Detectivity practically seeks the higher worth to live through the Dialectic. Although the ultimate object we want might be Happiness, it is a problem in our outside world, so it is uncertain whether we can get it and, even if we get it, how long it lasts. Therefore, even if we strive for Happiness, the effort is also empty.
“Kant was pessimistic.”
On the contrary, even if we luckily get momentary wealth and fame, is it our true Happiness? Kant said the ultimate goodness should contain not only the goodness of the outside world, Happiness as the end, but also our own goodness, Virtue as the beginning.
“Certainly, gaining wealth or fame by doing bad cannot be called the ultimate goodness. But what is Kant’s Virtue?”
It is the will never to ask for one’s own Happiness, but only to pursuit Moral Obligation.
“It would be just a human least condition to follow obligation. In the first place, only with a will, the person actually has done nothing yet, has he?”
Nay, Kant’s Virtue is not just negative fitting Moral Obligation but positive making Moral Obligation our motive. Namely, Moral Obligation should be the very reason to live in the outside world and we should take action to realize Moral Obligation. For example, according to Kant, concluding a peace treaty and completely abolishing armaments would be the realization of Moral Obligation.
“Was he covertly stoking a political movement, a democratic revolution?”
That’s not far from the fact. Anyway, the right action has no end, so we cannot help to assume not only our Freedom or Spontaneity in the outside world but also the Immortality of our Soul or Spirit of social movements, moreover the existence of God who makes our efforts come true and gives us Happiness. Thus, a Soul, the World, and God, although which were rejected as Transcendental Visions in Cognitive Intelligence, are recovered in Practical Intelligence.
“People say God helps those who help themselves. Believing in God, we step to a leap to the darkness.”
20.11. The Third Critique
After the publication of his second book, the revolution actually took place in France in 1789. It might be an expression of freedom, but it had brought nothing but chaos and carnage. Kant tried to get at least a glimpse of what we should do with our Intelligence, so he further wrote the CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT in 1790. Decision (Urteil) bridges from the situation understanding that ‘it is XX’ in Cognitive Conceptivity to the action inference that ‘I should do YY’ in Practical Detectivity.
“Does the ability of Decisions also belong to our Intelligence?”
Of course. It is our legislative power and is therefore also called Productive Insight (Einbildungskraft). As Kant had already mentioned in the first book, it would be the function of our Apperception (consciousness). However, before the explanation of its bridging from Cognitive Conceptivity to Practical Detectivity, he considered the legislative function in general of Decision at length, so this made the point of the third book hard to understand.
“Even without that, Kant was a poor writer.”
In fact, also in the first book, he examined only the pure form of our recognition and did not argue how we get the actual concepts of things. Although in Transcendental Deduction in the first book, Kant regarded Productive Insight as the collaboration of Conceptivity in Receptivity, here he redefined it as an independent broad function of Apperception. Getting a Phenomenon from a mess of impressions was just a scene where Apperception works following the Aspects of Conceptivity as the Confirming Insight. When Apperception functions in Conceptivity as the Reflecting Insight, collating with various actual Phenomena, it produces newly a concrete concept of things.
“Certainly, Apperception is the legislator of our Intelligence.”
However, after that, Kant spent a lot of pages for analysis of special apriori concepts or Visions (Idee): beauty and sublime. According to him, beauty is the apriori Vision that fits our ability of recognition, so it gives us comfort universally and necessarily regardless of whether things that the concept applies to actually exist or not, therefore, regardless of practical usefulness. As it were, beauty is purpose (Zweck<zwich=pinch up), the beginning and the end, in itself. On the other hand, sublime is the apriori Vision for what exceeds our ability of Cognition mathematically or dynamically.
“What was Kant trying to insist after all?”
These two are just preludes. Kant thought the outside world is sublime for us but should be a beauty.
“For whom? God?”
Probably. That’s the Providence of God. Kant supposed the old analogy between Microcosmos and Macrocosmos, namely humans and the world, through the same Reason. We often find in Nature that some parts contribute to something bigger. Therefore, as per our Vision of Insight, the whole of Nature seems like a huge living thing with Intelligence even though we can never know the ultimate purpose of causality or the will of Nature.
“A-ha, that would be the transcendental Vision of the world that was referred to in the former books.”
Indeed, in our limited Intelligence, we have free will, but our real existence is, in fact, just a part of the outside world. In short, we ourselves are the cutout (Urteil) of the world. The Moral Obligation as a fact of our Intelligence is the Natural Causality that we are charged with. Therefore, when we take actions only to realize Moral Obligation in the outside world, the action would be good and that should bring us Happiness, so Kant thought.
“Now we finally have a complete picture of Kant’s labyrinth.”
However, the idea that the world has a will for beauty later created a new labyrinth called German Idealism. But that’s all for today.
