In Defense of Cultural Atheism

9 min readJul 29, 2026

Richard Rorty arrived in Tehran in 2004 to deliver a lecture on “Democracy and Philosophy.” The lecture emphasized the human rights as culture and importance of philosophy in resisting authoritarianism. Rorty’s central aim was not to demonstrate how the separation of religion from the public sphere and its privatization serve as safeguards against authoritarian rule but secular democracies are contingent and pragmatically relative establishments. Any metaphysically ambitious pursuit of “truth,” he argued, compels society to reduce the functioning of the social order to a single, overarching framework. Such reductionism undermines political culture and hinders the democratization of the public sphere. Without culture that was built upon solidarity and hope however, there can be no effective resistance to authoritarianism because these practical engagements can teach citizens to form constructive criticism. This is why Rorty advocated a secular society grounded in pragmatic inquiry and open to continual change. A society like this, he maintained, is only possible through liberal democratic institutions composed of individuals capable of adopting an “ironic” stance toward their own ways of thinking.

In different regions of the world and across different historical periods — particularly after the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution — liberal democracy came to be pejoratively labeled as “Westernization” in many non-Western societies. Moreover, this characterization evolved into a technique for constructing a counter-consciousness and into a propaganda mechanism in support of authoritarianism. Why, then, has liberal democracy — one of the Enlightenment’s most significant achievements, founded upon the separation of powers — struggled so profoundly to overcome authoritarian ideologies? This question undoubtedly exposes one of the defining problems of our time: the role of ideology, in conjunction with metaphysics, in the institutionalization of authoritarianism.

It should first be noted that the lecture took place during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, at a moment of relative political and cultural openness in the Islamic Republic. The event attracted hundreds of attendees. The auditorium was filled to capacity, and Rorty encountered a level of interest he had not anticipated. Most participants were young intellectuals and university students. Ramin Jahanbegloo was able to organize the event thanks to the cultural liberalization brought about by the reformist administration. In doing so, Rorty also embodied the practical dimension of his own philosophical approach. Rather than confining philosophy to the academy, he employed it as a method of social transformation. His willingness to travel beyond the United States and speak at a philosophical conference in Iran — a theocratic regime — on the significance of secularism should therefore be recognized as an important intellectual and political undertaking. Indeed, this reflects the essence of Rorty’s notion of the “post-philosophy.” Philosophy, in his view, should no longer aspire to construct grand theories explaining everything; instead, it should contribute to the enrichment of cultural and social life. Such enrichment cannot be separated from the democratizing practices of public intellectuals and philosophers within society.

Of course, large-scale social transformation cannot be achieved solely through conferences attended by educated audiences. It also requires a media and press environment in which such ideas can be freely debated and critically evaluated. Indeed, Rorty’s lecture on democracy and philosophy was aggressively denounced by supporters of conservative political factions. Nearly two years later, in March 2006, Jahanbegloo was arrested and accused — under duress, as he later maintained — of having cooperated with Western diplomats to foment a “velvet revolution” against the regime; he was held for several months before his release amid international pressure. Whether or not the charge was pretextual, the episode signaled that the intellectual opening which had made the lecture series possible was closing, and further events of this kind became increasingly difficult to organize. This episode remains one of the clearest illustrations of the enduring tension between philosophy and social order. Whenever our modes of thinking and the questions we choose to problematize fail to conform to prevailing expectations, they become subject to repression. Such repression seeks to channel intellectual inquiry into forms of questioning and research that remain compatible with the regime. After all, the very act of thinking critically about the ideology that underpins a political system already establishes a critical distance from it, making philosophical reflection itself an inherently anti-authoritarian gesture.

As an alternative, authoritarian regimes encourage forms of intellectualism that reinforce their own ideological foundations. The case of Heidegger is particularly revealing in this regard. Whereas Rorty interpreted Heidegger primarily as a poetic thinker whose significance lay beyond metaphysics, the intensive debates over “truth” within Iranian society and Islamic theology have often intersected with Heideggerian themes of rootedness, nationhood, and metaphysical belonging. This illustrates how the intellectual sphere itself can become instrumentalized in the service of authoritarianism. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy pursued similar strategies of intellectual mobilization. Even contemporary Putinist Russia draws upon the anti-liberal and anti-nihilist conservative thought of Ivan Ilyin. Whatever their differences, these narratives mobilize aggression within the political sphere by cultivating profound emotional attachments based on a distinction between “us” and “them.” It is for this reason that Rorty regarded both the concept of “truth” and forms of utopianism with suspicion: each is constructed around a narrative of irreversible correctness. Such narratives are sustained through a complex relationship between authoritarian power and intense emotional attachment.

The identification of certain truths as fixed and universally binding can give rise to forms of social organization that derive their legitimacy from those very definitions. Within such a system, the role of philosophy is reduced to interpreting and reinforcing the logic of indoctrination. One of the Enlightenment’s most enduring lessons, however, is the conviction that every form of authority can be subjected to critical scrutiny. The crucial transformation, therefore, lies in shifting the discussion away from the question of what truth is toward the question of how truth functions and the consequences that follow from the ways in which it operates. Such a transformation is possible only through a pragmatic form of self-awareness, in which individuals reflect on the effects that the religious or legal norms they follow have upon their own lives.

It is at this point that the concept of cultural atheism becomes relevant. It is shaped through the political presuppositions shared by the individuals who constitute society. Unlike secularism, which primarily concerns the worldly administration of religion within the bureaucracy and the public sphere, cultural atheism requires that even believers recognize their own systems of belief as contingent and socially constructed. This distinction is close to Rorty’s later preference for describing himself as anti-clerical rather than simply atheist. The issue was less the truth or falsity of religious belief than the political authority claimed by religious institutions.

This does not entail rejecting the concept of God by reducing it to an empirically unverifiable proposition, nor does it claim that religions are nothing more than false narratives. There are, after all, sophisticated neurological and cognitive explanations for why human beings are inclined to embrace religious narratives and the idea of God. The essential point, however, is to support arguments that reveal religion as a cultural formation rather than an unquestionable foundation of reality. Such a perspective requires an anti-authoritarian epistemic framework. Within this framework, God and religion can be understood as ideas and individualized forms of life rather than as authoritative principles governing the social order.

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One concern that immediately arises is what becomes of the collective forms of belonging that make religions meaningful and enable the formation of personal and communal identities. Cultural atheism offers an alternative by transforming religion from an aggressive, militant, and reductive mechanism of identity-based opposition into a compassionate community of consolation characterized by solidarity, altruism, and resistance to domination — one capable of contributing positively to democratic society. It is in this sense that even communist and atheist philosophers such as Slavoj Žižek have, on occasion, expressed respect for the papacy. A religious leader or tradition can sometimes cultivate democratic virtues and reinforce positive civic emotions within the public sphere. It can also remind citizens why societies have struggled to overthrow dictatorships and establish democratic institutions. Forms of social organization are shaped not only by material needs but also by moral and existential ones.

My concern, however, extends beyond questions of political and legal philosophy. It is not confined to the legacies of the Enlightenment or to secularism alone, but seeks to cultivate a public sphere that is simultaneously more emotionally refined and more rationally resilient. This requires the articulation of certain normative axioms for democratic societies. The first of these is the recognition that believers cannot legitimately transform their own faith into the dominant public narrative. Rather than relying on the familiar rhetoric of pluralism, it is necessary to demonstrate how religion’s role in political and cultural life can be institutionally reconfigured. This does not require excluding religion altogether; instead, it involves strengthening those aspects of religious traditions that promote equality, cultural coexistence, and social solidarity.

In The Future of Religion, Gianni Vattimo argues, alongside Richard Rorty, that Christianity has gradually become a religion marked by secularization and a form of “weak thought’’ (il pensiero debole). Broadly speaking, this involves an analysis that rejects the metaphysical foundation of religion and argues that interpretation is the primary influence on the text. This is why it is not entirely separate from the traditions of humanist thought and practice.

One reason for this is Christianity’s historical capacity to cultivate ideals of nonviolence and reconciliation. The emergence of democratic institutions in the West owes much to the ways in which Christianity itself underwent processes of reform. As religion becomes more open to reform, it creates greater space for dialogue, interpretation, and empathy. This constitutes one of the strongest arguments against dogmatism within social systems. A secularization rooted in literature, art, and culture is therefore likely to prove far more effective and enduring than the militant materialist atheism (a metaphysical approach) exemplified by the Soviet model.

As I suggested at the beginning of this essay, this is precisely why Rorty’s approach remains worthy of serious consideration. Following the Iranian Islamic Revolution, promises of social equality and justice were fused with a religious discourse that offered hope and collective redemption. Yet these promises ultimately gave way to a system of repression sustained by the tyranny of the Basij and the clerical establishment. Likewise, across the Middle East and North Africa, movements that initially articulated democratic demands and criticized economic inequality and authoritarian rule gradually resulted in the emergence of regimes that were often even more repressive and economically impoverished. Over time, these economic conditions further consolidated authoritarian power. As in post-Soviet Russia and several of its neighboring states, society increasingly became divided between ruling elites who monopolized bureaucratic and economic resources and lower classes deprived of meaningful political and social rights. Under such conditions, culture itself became increasingly dependent upon the authority of the state.

Against this background, cultural atheism emerges as a necessary condition for sustaining constitutional liberalism. If authoritarian movements that achieve mass political support are to be effectively contained, and if individual rights are to be expanded, citizens must come to understand that cultures are socially constructed constellations of concepts and practices rather than fixed or inherently authoritative systems. Such an understanding is indispensable not only for guaranteeing access to high-quality and progressive education, but also for enabling individuals to satisfy both their basic and more complex needs and to establish a more meaningful and humane relationship with the political community to which they belong. A social order built upon these principles requires citizens who are capable of critically examining the institutions to which they are attached, recognizing and employing political concepts responsibly, embracing the non-negotiable principles of democratic constitutionalism, and developing a non-hierarchical civic consciousness oriented toward improving the conditions of society for everyone.

Such a political culture discourages the sacralization of intelligence agencies, the military, the bureaucracy, politicians, or other institutions of state authority. Instead, it cultivates what is perhaps the defining human capacity: the ability to coordinate reason and emotion in reflective judgment. At the same time, rather than allowing existential anxiety or the search for metaphysical meaning to dominate public life, it encourages the pursuit of a more harmonious social order for all living beings while remaining attentive to the realities of political conflict. As Rorty envisioned, dispositions characterized by anti-cruelty, empathy, democratic deliberation, and solidarity can only be cultivated under such conditions. Cultural atheism functions as the normative and cultural cement that makes this form of democratic life possible.

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