Should India Keep Buying Russian Oil?
Amid the buzz around an India–US trade agreement and contested claims from Donald Trump, India’s oil decisions will decide much more than its energy policy.
India’s purchase of Russian oil has been under scrutiny since the outbreak of war in Ukraine. However, at the start of this month, US President Donald Trump publicly claimed that an India–US trade agreement had been finalized, but what attracted eyeballs was his claim, or rather proclamation, that India would stop buying Russian crude and shift to American and also Vietnamese resources for its needs. This created a buzz, especially as it went against India’s claims that its energy decisions were not subject to external negotiation.
New Delhi, however, has distanced itself from such claims. Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal made it clear that India’s energy purchases were driven by commercial and energy-security considerations and were not dictated by trade agreements. Shortly thereafter, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri reiterated that India’s energy sourcing would continue to be guided solely by national interest. In general, they avoided acknowledging Trump’s declaration in a non-confrontational tone, seeking to protect the refreshed ties with America after a period of uncertainty.
The real question before India, however, remains intact. The debate over Russian oil is not a proxy war over Ukraine, nor simply a transactional issue within the India–US trade relationship. It is a test of whether India should recalibrate a decades-long strategic partnership with Russia in return for short-term geopolitical reassurance from an external power whose political trajectory remains uncertain and, at times, overtly reactionary.
The time-tested partnership
India’s relationship with Russia is not a by-product of the Ukraine war; it is the outcome of over seven decades of strategic partnership forged during moments of existential pressure. From repeated Soviet vetoes at the UN Security Council on Jammu and Kashmir, including during crises when Western powers, including the U.S., leaned decisively towards Pakistan, to Moscow’s diplomatic and military support during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, Russia functioned as a strategic stabilizer for India at critical junctures. The 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was not merely symbolic; it overcame external intervention, constrained US influence in South Asia, and altered the regional balance of power in India’s favour. Beyond diplomacy, the Soviet Union’s role in building India’s heavy industrial base and transferring defense technology, especially at times when Western partners denied support.
The post-Cold War period did not erase this interdependence. Even after India’s economic liberalization in 1991 and the broadening of partnerships with the United States, Europe, and East Asia, Russia remained deeply embedded in India’s defense architecture. A substantial portion of India’s frontline military platforms, across air, land, and sea, continue to be of Russian origin, requiring sustained coordination for spares, upgrades, and operational readiness.
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What is at stake, therefore, is not just sentiment but strategic reliance. Long-standing partnerships like that between Russia and India generate significant inter-dependence through military doctrine, officer training requirements, intelligence coordination, and crisis-management mechanisms that cannot be dismantled without suffering significant loss. Abruptly abandoning Russian oil purchases under external political pressure would not enhance India’s autonomy; it would undermine it, signalling that India’s strategic choices are contingent on Western approval, something it has, so far, proudly denied.
The Undeniable Influence
None of this negates the reality of American influence over global trade and diplomacy. In future-facing domains such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, critical minerals, digital governance, and defense innovation, Washington occupies a position that Moscow no longer can. This reality shapes the boundaries of India’s policy options and establishes why ignoring the U.S. for long was not a viable option.
At the same time, the compromise, if it has been made, must not be mistaken for subordination. Washington recognizes India’s role as a critical Indo-Pacific actor, values its stabilizing presence vis-à-vis China, and understands the domestic economic and political constraints within which Indian policymakers operate. Americans cannot ignore the importance of India in the sub-continent and its growing economy. For such reasons, an FTA shall be taken as a mutual agreement rather than an influenced compromise.
Strategic autonomy does not lie in resisting America altogether, which is neither possible nor desirable, but in managing that influence without allowing it to override core economic and security calculations. The best part of India’s diplomacy in the past few years has been its ability to separately deal with partners having conflicting interests. To do otherwise, now, would weaken India’s negotiating leverage and growing global reputation as the leader of the Global South.
India’s Oil Strategy
India imports over 80 per cent of its crude oil, placing energy pricing and supply resilience within the domain of macroeconomic management. Since the oil shocks of the 1970s, India’s petroleum strategy has steadily evolved from dependence on a narrow set of West Asian suppliers to a deliberate emphasis on diversification, spot-market flexibility, and refinery optimization. This approach was reinforced after the 1991 balance-of-payments crisis and institutionalized through the expansion of strategic petroleum reserves, the deregulation of fuel pricing, and the rise of globally competitive private refiners. The post-2022 surge in Russian oil imports must be understood within this longer arc. It was driven by two material factors: significant discounts on Urals crude following Western sanctions, and the technical compatibility of Russian grades with India’s complex refineries, which are designed to process heavier and discounted crudes efficiently. As a result, Russia’s share in India’s oil basket rose sharply from marginal levels before the Ukraine war to roughly a quarter, and at times close to a third, of total imports, before moderating as discounts narrowed and logistical frictions increased.
Crucially, these purchases were not the result of political directives. India’s oil imports are negotiated by a mix of public-sector and private refiners, including Indian Oil Corporation, Bharat Petroleum, Hindustan Petroleum, alongside private players such as Reliance Industries and Nayara Energy. These firms operate within an energy-security framework that prioritizes price competitiveness, supply reliability, and refinery yield, often sourcing crude on the spot market rather than through rigid long-term contracts. Recent adjustments by large corporate groups, including refiners linked to the Adani Group, curtailing exposure to certain Russian cargos amid tighter financial scrutiny, reflect commercial risk assessments rather than a shift in state policy. The state’s role is to ensure supply continuity and price stability, not to micromanage specific deals.
Legally, India enforces only sanctions authorized by the UN Security Council, not unilateral sanctions imposed by individual countries or blocs. This principle has been consistently upheld across governments and is central to India’s conception of strategic autonomy.
Conlusion
If Indian importers continue purchasing Russian oil, it should be understood neither as an endorsement of Moscow’s actions in Ukraine nor as a rejection of the West.
From a diplomatic standpoint, losing Russia for marginal and potentially short-lived reassurance from Washington would be strategically unsound. External pressure, particularly when amplified by a U.S. President, whose tenure may be uncertain and whose approach to international commitments has often been reactionary and unpredictable, cannot form the basis of India’s long-term foreign policy choices. Strategic autonomy is not exercised by choosing sides, seeking short-term gains; it is preserved by resisting that compulsion and making decisions anchored in India’s long-term interests, and India’s interest, here, is best served through effective communication with Moscow, even if India chooses to assert to Trump’s claim.
