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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by 0xKepler on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by 0xKepler on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@0xKepler?source=rss-1cd01a80cbd7------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by 0xKepler on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@0xKepler?source=rss-1cd01a80cbd7------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Improving Point Airdrops]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/improving-point-airdrops-via-milestone-based-vesting-7fe88e4a3624?source=rss-1cd01a80cbd7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7fe88e4a3624</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tokenomics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[airdrop]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralized-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web3]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xKepler]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Dec 2023 09:03:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-12T09:03:59.760Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Increasing retention by moving from singleplayer to multiplayer</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*EzrVM-b09I8OnJrC" /></figure><p>Point airdrops have been making headlines, positively and negatively. As always, the perceived fairness of such systems depends on how teams utilize them. I still believe point airdrops have distinct advantages over previous models such as liquidity mining or one-time airdrops. In an <a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/a-framework-for-airdrops-d585a2fae8f7">article last year</a>, I described so-called “airdrops in chunks”. Now, after seeing them in action in the form of point airdrops, I’d like to share some learnings and introduce a new idea — <strong>vesting points into tokens based on protocol milestones</strong>.</p><h3>Gib Points — An Analysis of Point Farming Mechanics</h3><p>Instead of receiving a token airdrop, users get airdropped points. Often, this is done in seasons. In that case, point airdrops can be seen as a versatile replacement for liquidity mining, fostering flexibility and a broader design space.</p><h4>Advantages</h4><p><strong>Incentives before token launch</strong></p><p>Setting the right incentives at the right times is crucial for projects. However, there might be a mismatch between when incentives are needed and when a token is ready to be launched. Token launches require the product and the token design to be developed enough to create demand.</p><p>Point airdrops fix this dilemma. Teams can incentivize usage while still building out the product and tokenomics. As a result, tokens can be “emitted” as points without needing to have token demand ready at the same time. Points can create network effects while the token only becomes tradable at a later point once the long-term impact is visible, creating demand.</p><p>From my previous article ‘<a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/a-framework-for-airdrops-d585a2fae8f7">A Framework for Airdrops</a>’</p><blockquote><em>Bootstrapping networks (e.g. liquidity) is often the first bottleneck new services face. For example, the AirBnB founders went around NYC personally to make apartment owners sign up. Crypto networks provide us with a new way of incentivizing the supply side — tokens.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>When a product benefits from network effects, it’s sensible to let early users take part in the network value they helped create. Normally, early adopters take on more risk but extract the same value from the network as latecomers. For example, the first buyers of a telephone made an expensive investment without much value at first (not many people to call). Over time, costs to acquire a telephone decreased and new users came in. At some point, everyone owned a telephone. People now had an efficient form of communication, everyone in a group could call each other. Everyone has the same value, while early adopters took the initial step and therefore the bigger risk. Tokens help to re-distribute the network value on a risk-adjusted basis. An issue arises when the first users only help to bootstrap the network for monetary gains and can easily leave after extracting value, thereby destroying the built-up network value.</em></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/876/0*tNHEISeZePDeiXZN" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://insights.deribit.com/market-research/why-i-have-changed-my-mind-on-tokens/">https://insights.deribit.com/market-research/why-i-have-changed-my-mind-on-tokens/</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Retroactive rewards</strong></p><p>Tokens are airdropped based on the points users accumulated. This provides teams with more flexibility than distributing tokens in the form of liquidity mining rewards.</p><p>If not communicated beforehand, teams can retroactively determine the amount of tokens to be distributed depending on the performance of the points campaign, ensuring good ROI. Of course, user perception has to be kept in mind as well. The amount of rewards has to feel fair.</p><p>The rate at which different user actions are rewarded with points, aka how actions are weighted against each other, still needs to be decided beforehand. But, the total amount of tokens distributed can be chosen later, taking into consideration real-world data. Having no points and just doing retroactive token airdrops from time to time would provide more flexibility. However, points keep people engaged. They’re the carrot on the stick that ensures the upcoming airdrop stays top of mind.</p><p><strong>Speculation drives engagement</strong></p><p>Speculation on the size of the inevitable token distribution can fuel attention. Additional speculative mechanics like awarding loot boxes with mysterious amounts of tokens further boost engagement. It’s an attention economy after all.</p><p><strong>Seasons &gt; continuous rewards</strong></p><p>Another advantage of running point airdrop seasons, for example compared to continuous liquidity mining programs, is that changes can be made and communicated more easily. For instance, the amount of tokens distributed can be adjusted, points received for different actions can be rebalanced, or rewarded actions can be changed completely to switch up the meta, keep things fresh, and introduce new features.</p><h4>Tradeoffs</h4><p>The flexibility point systems offer teams on the flipside mean uncertainty for users. Instead of receiving tokens that can be turned into money immediately, users receive points and compete for an allocation of a token airdrop, often with an unknown date and amount.</p><p>This reduces exploitability by mercenary farmers and can help acquire the right users via self-selection. On the other hand, it becomes unattractive to users.</p><p>In the end, the various token emission logics only distribute risks (stemming from factors such as network effects not materializing or pressure from competing protocols) differently across the protocol and its users.</p><p>While not a single predictor of success for token reward campaigns, we can generally assume that less attractive rewards mean less attention. Especially in the bull market, direct token rewards may capture the narrative again, taking attention away from teams utilizing more balanced approaches to emissions such as point systems or OLM. Therefore, I expect point campaigns to be most effective for projects with a strong brand. On the other hand, less attention may not be the worst as long as it comes from the right audience segment.</p><h4>Challenges</h4><p>A challenge remaining is long-term retention and alignment. What comes after an airdrop? The next airdrop? Moreover, point farming so far has been a singleplayer effort. Aside from usage, we also want to incentivize multiplayer activities like word-of-mouth and social coordination in governance. We want to reward users with tokens so they become stakeholders who care about the protocol’s health.</p><h3>Creating Multiple Incentive Layers through Milestone-based Point-to-Token Conversion</h3><p>Essentially, milestone-based vesting means that points users accumulated are not converted into tokens at a set date. Instead, only a part of the tokens becomes available at day 0, while the rest is unlocked based on predetermined milestones of the protocol. These milestones can, for example, be TVL, trading volume, amount of users, or fees generated.</p><h4>Advantages</h4><p><strong>Stronger incentives</strong></p><p>The multi-layered incentive mechanics provide strong retention potential throughout the reward lifecycle.</p><ul><li>In Phase 1, users farm points as usual.</li><li>In Phase 2, a share of their points is immediately converted into tokens for instant gratification to anchor the point farming to positive feelings and make it something that people want to repeat. The rest of their points are unlocked based on protocol-wide milestones. That establishes two layers of incentives: Users not only keep using the platform to accrue more points (in the next season) but also to unlock their existing points. The latter enhances users’ motivation to reach the milestones as otherwise their previous time/capital invested to farm points would become worthless (sunk cost fallacy). Points are used to slowly build up users’ investment into the ecosystem to create “skin in the game” while milestones provide clear goals and rewards for continuous investment.</li><li>In Phase 3, the protocol can slowly fade out incentives by successively reducing point rewards to zero until only milestone-based unlocks remain.</li></ul><p><strong>Align stakeholders with protocol success</strong></p><p>As mentioned previously, point farming is a lonely effort. Users farm airdrops for themselves for speculative purposes, hoping that others won’t dilute their yield.</p><p>The described system here makes use of this. Speculation drives people to farm points in their “singleplayer mission” but a large part of points only gets converted into tradeable tokens when protocol-wide milestones are reached (“multiplayer mission”). Users are therefore incentivized to care about the “multiplayer mission” to reap the full rewards of their “singleplayer mission” (sunk cost). By doing so, it might be possible to turn some of them from egoist farmers into aligned contributors who care about the health of the protocol (determined by milestones), participate in governance, and support marketing to drive user adoption to reach milestones.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*ZDtnygoT_Vhs1ifa" /></figure><p>Coming back to our discussion about network effects (Figure 1), milestone-based point vesting allows us to set KPIs that measure the results of network effects. Like before, early adopters are rewarded for helping to create the network effects and for taking risks while doing so but now only receive tokens after the network effects have measurably materialized which, given sound token utility, should lead to demand for the token. This hopefully helps to approach more demand-based emissions while still using incentives to bootstrap the network before demand can build up. As token supply better matches the demand in the market, death spirals become less likely. These vicious cycles happen when farmers dump their rewards, devaluing future incentives in the eyes of users. As farming becomes unattractive, users leave before network effects can be established.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*yQI4xEIXUZyjzHWg" /></figure><p>In comparison to time-based airdrops to point holders, milestone-based vesting shifts execution risk partly to stakeholders. This can feel unfair as stakeholders may only have limited control over the product as opposed to the team. Of course, that depends on how far governance and product development have been decentralized. In general, it’s recommended to only have a part of tokens vested based on milestones. A mix could look something like this:</p><blockquote><em>⅓ unlocked without milestones (can be vested over time)</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>⅔ unlocked with milestones</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The milestone-based unlocks could also feature an alternative path based on direct singleplayer contributions to the multiplayer mission. For example, users get awarded points for LPing, as TVL is needed to bring in traders. Points are converted into tokens when traders come in that use the liquidity (and pay fees to the protocol) based on predetermined milestones for trading volume. Point holders can also have personal contribution goals like directly referring traders to the platform which a) helps reach overarching milestones, unlocking tokens for everyone, and b) can be rewarded with special unlocks for the referrers. While that can only be done for activities that are easily trackable, it provides users with more agency and directly incentivizes contributions.</em></blockquote><p><strong>Clear calculation &amp; communications</strong></p><p>With milestone-based vesting, teams are clearly communicating goals to their stakeholders upfront for when tokens will be unlocked. On the flip side, they lose flexibility.</p><p>Token amounts and milestones can be designed in a way that token emissions are correlated with fees earned, providing teams with clarity.</p><p><strong>New shiny thing</strong></p><p>Hasn’t been done before = captures attention. As projects are competing for mindshare with token incentives, providing something new can help to stick out from the rest. Additionally, teams can provide a large airdrop allocation, aka a shinier prize pool, as tokens only unlock slowly over time based on milestones whose successful reach leads to token demand in the best case.</p><h3>Tradeoffs</h3><p>Similar tradeoffs apply here as discussed for traditional point reward systems. But, milestone-based vesting brings more clarity for users. On the other hand, it provides teams with less flexibility.</p><h3>Future improvements</h3><p>This article aimed to explain the pros and cons of point systems and introduce an extension to the mechanic, so-called milestone-based vesting. The goal is to create stronger, more long-term incentives for users to increase retention, better alignment of stakeholders with the protocol, and more clarity for point farmers.</p><p>I’d be happy to see more discussions around the topic. Interesting points for debate include:</p><ul><li>After reaching a milestone, does the whole batch of tokens unlock at once or over time?</li><li>Should there be a deadline for milestones after which points can no longer be converted into tokens?</li><li>How to further gamify unlocks? For example, by introducing teams that compete for unlocks</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7fe88e4a3624" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/improving-point-airdrops-via-milestone-based-vesting-7fe88e4a3624">Improving Point Airdrops</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao">Deus Ex DAO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Governance Guide #1: How to Decentralize Governance?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/governance-guide-1-how-to-decentralize-governance-32e9a642bc8b?source=rss-1cd01a80cbd7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/32e9a642bc8b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[web3]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xKepler]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 Nov 2023 12:29:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-11-08T12:29:21.444Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qskykQPxomuZekSY" /></figure><p>Governance is the power to organize (at least some of the) economic resources in social systems. Therefore, governance is intrinsically valuable.For example, governance can set the incentive policy of token economies, thereby determining who gets rewarded. The policy has ripple effects throughout the system, influencing the individual decisions of stakeholders, from which the macro behavior of the system emerges.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/502/1*4T6hogVKr49TrYlBsGNSTA.png" /></figure><p>Other governance responsibilities can include decisions on which products to develop and where to “tax” value creation (fee switch).</p><p>Overall, governance plays a key role in socio-economic systems such as crypto, as it touches multiple areas like tokenomics, the product, or the business model.</p><p><strong>The question now becomes: How to organize governance so it serves the protocol’s mission?</strong></p><h3>Pros and Cons of Decentralizing Governance</h3><p>In crypto, we tend to have a bias towards decentralization. While we generally see this as a positive since it helps build more resilient and equitable processes, we also have to consider the challenges. By showing the limitations of decentralized governance, we can better set our expectations — the desired end state (the point on the decentralization spectrum) — and derive a workable path toward our end goal.</p><p><strong>Pros</strong></p><ul><li>Gives power to the people. Empowered community members are incentivized to contribute to the success of the product, for example by acting as evangelists.</li><li>Governance gives utility (intrinsic value) to the token</li><li>Considering the perspectives of multiple, diverse stakeholders who are motivated to provide valuable input can lead to better outcomes (task-dependent).</li><li>Not having to rely on a core team decreases the regulatory attack surface. However, if not set up well, DAO contributors might be legally liable as well. It’s important to not only decentralize socially, but also technologically. For instance, governance votes should be implemented automatically, not get pushed live manually by one person.</li></ul><p><strong>Cons</strong></p><ul><li>Slows down decision-making, which is especially negative for projects in their early stages and within a dynamic industry like crypto.</li><li>Governance opens up new attack vectors for others to extract value. For example, transparent governance processes may provide competitors with detailed insights into finances, future products, partnerships, etc. In the worst case, a competitor might be able to acquire the majority of voting power.</li><li>Requires a lot of effort to do right, including initial planning, setting up processes and resources, educating community members, moderating discussions, setting goals and tasks for contributors to work on, actively bridging information between team and community, refining processes, all while progressing towards the desired decentralization state.</li></ul><h3>Progressive Decentralization</h3><p>As the previous section shows, decentralizing governance is a delicate task that requires a good amount of resources. Additionally, only one mistake might cause long-lasting damages, meaning the value at risk is high for every major decision.</p><p>Therefore, many teams follow the concept of progressive decentralization.</p><blockquote><em>With progressive decentralization, the core team transitions from being the visible hand to the invisible hand over time.</em></blockquote><p>Progressive decentralization is a slow process where the team initially remains a critical piece in decision-making, acting as a guide to the community. This power has to be handled well. Even though the team may remain the final decision-maker, others can still be empowered to step up and significantly influence results. For example, the team shouldn’t drive governance discussions early on but let the broader community explore different viewpoints first. Studies have shown that discussions end up with different outcomes depending on where they started. Group thinking reduces decision quality and should be minimized as much as possible. The core team with its social status can easily influence others.</p><blockquote><em>It’s as much about when and how the team exerts its power, as it is about how much power they hold.</em></blockquote><p>The goal of progressive decentralization is to reduce the value at risk at the beginning and expand community empowerment to more critical decisions as everyone learns along the way. Progressive decentralization also aligns with the idea that centralized decision-making is faster, which is more important at the beginning of a project, while it can get slower over time.</p><p>With progressive decentralization, governance becomes more valuable over time. At first, only people who identify with the company’s mission will contribute as there’s not much value to extract. This helps create an aligned community. A mission-driven community culture is needed to reduce self-serving behavior once governance progresses, the contributor community scales and more value can be extracted.</p><blockquote><em>We have written about </em><a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/growing-crypto-communities-74b15f26dc29"><em>community building</em></a><em> before.</em></blockquote><p>The main challenge of progressive decentralization is that humans are generally unwilling to give up power once they have it. Hence, a (autonomous) predetermined process should be in place to dilute power over time.</p><h4><strong>What could progressive decentralization look like?</strong></h4><p>Step 1️⃣: Take feedback from the community and set aside a certain percentage of the team’s resources to work on implementing it. Leave some tasks open for the community to work on, for example in the form of bounties. These tasks should be non-critical, such as content marketing.</p><p>Step 2️⃣: Broaden the range of tasks for the community. This may require building working groups where contributors work together to provide structured feedback on more complex topics or take on multifaceted tasks.</p><p>Step 3️⃣: Open up governance proposals and voting to the community. The team might still hold most of the governance power at the start but gets diluted over time. Execution is still done manually by the team, which effectively gives them a veto right.</p><p>Step 4️⃣: Automatic on-chain execution of proposals. Development is driven by the community.</p><h3>Decentralized governance doesn’t mean everyone gets to participate in everything</h3><p>While some topics benefit from as many perspectives as possible, others might require a niche skill set. One goal of governance is to organize the efforts of the community in the most effective ways. For example, one might make use of working groups for complex topics, while opening up non-critical bounties to everyone. To account for the decentralization logic, transparency, open-source code, delegate voting, and other tools should be employed to balance effectiveness, efficiency, and resilience.</p><p>Crowdsourcing theory can provide us with input on where a broad engagement of the community makes sense — and where it doesn’t. The more hidden knowledge and the simpler the problem, the more suitable is crowdsourcing.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/518/0*9JzmlMpl_Azwt7l3" /></figure><blockquote>Hidden knowledge: If it’s not known where the knowledge to solve a problem is, opening it up to everyone to self-select and bring in their know-how is the way to go. But it’s important to incentivize the right people to reveal themselves.</blockquote><blockquote>Simple, well-structured problems: Allow autonomous actors to use their knowledge to individually evaluate choices. No coordination is needed. Complex problems on the other hand have interdependencies, meaning small shifts can lead to big changes in outcomes, therefore requiring theory-based understanding of complex interactions.</blockquote><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Governance plays a pivotal role in shaping socio-economic systems. It influences incentive policies, product development decisions, and the overall business model, making it a critical element in achieving a project’s mission.</p><p>Decentralizing governance has its own set of pros and cons, with progressive decentralization emerging as a viable approach to balance decision-making efficiency and community involvement. By gradually transitioning from centralized control to community empowerment, teams can reduce risks and foster an aligned, mission-driven community culture. The key challenge lies in diluting power over time while ensuring effective organization of knowledge and problem-solving methods to achieve better outcomes.</p><blockquote><em>Setting up governance is a broad task, if you are looking for help setting up a DAO, governance or decentralize work through your community, please reach out to us here at Deus Ex DAO and our advisors would be happy to help you with any governance related questions.</em></blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=32e9a642bc8b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/governance-guide-1-how-to-decentralize-governance-32e9a642bc8b">Governance Guide #1: How to Decentralize Governance?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao">Deus Ex DAO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Designing Death in Game Economies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@0xKepler/designing-death-in-game-economies-75fe2eb46d5a?source=rss-1cd01a80cbd7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/75fe2eb46d5a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[game-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tokenomics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web3-gaming-crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economic-design]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xKepler]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 06 Sep 2023 14:51:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-09-06T14:55:19.362Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Recurring Economic Resets as a Design Space</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lmZYY2NkshIER_z9xr1olw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The idea for this article came to me after publishing this <a href="https://twitter.com/0xKepler/status/1673703487304269825">initial tweet</a>, introducing the idea of designing game economies with their non-permanence in mind. Even the best games die after a couple of years, so why plan a forever economy? By freeing us from some of the shackles of traditional economics, game economists open up their design space. This is especially important since we are facing other additional constraints compared to the physical world. There, people have to participate in the economy, they don’t have a choice. But players just leave games if they aren’t fun (whatever that means) or don’t feel fair (I won’t define this term either here). Result: Lifetime Value decreases.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*wTwvVqZPDBS05aeG" /></figure><p>There are 2 reasons why I think this matters more for crypto games than their Web2 counterparts:</p><ul><li>Open economies are 10x harder to balance than closed economies</li><li>Blockchains add permanence and financial value to assets. That means their death has meaning. And only if death is possible, permanence is meaningful.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/510/0*KI-qMY-eM_o6zo31" /></figure><h3>Heaven and Hell of Economic Resets</h3><p>First, let’s quickly define economic resets as <em>server-wide natural forces that have the potential of setting back players’ progress and destroying (parts of) their assets.</em></p><p>As with all game design decisions, designing for economic resets comes with pros and cons. Throughout the article, I’ll also provide pointers on how to manage the downsides of the approach.</p><h3>Heaven</h3><p><strong>Economic sustainability</strong></p><p>Economies work in cycles. These cycles are formed through an overlay of multiple factors that naturally develop in waves: Kondratiev waves (ironically also called supercycles), Kitchin cycles, Juglar cycles, and Kuznets cycles.</p><p>While these waves are not deterministic, unlike Bitcoin halvings, we can observe that even though history doesn’t repeat itself, it often rhymes.</p><p><em>“There will be no next recession” = “There will be no next cycle”</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/675/0*GOwCEij3Shze2oLm" /></figure><p>Challenges arise when the amplitudes of waves leave certain ranges. It then becomes difficult to bring them back in a controlled manner. Amplitudes tend to increase over time, making economic crises more likely as the game goes on. That’s where planned resets come in to decrease the risk that waves go out-of-bounds.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*9CrcMSAbEUY44XIu" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*ngZbyjaqmzoRXuWS" /></figure><p><strong>Economic fairness</strong></p><p>We won’t go into what fairness is as I’m not writing a philosophy paper (and wouldn’t be able to). So let’s just say:</p><ol><li>Players have a subjective opinion of what they deem fair</li><li>They’ll leave when they think they’re being treated unfairly</li><li>Perceptions between players differ</li></ol><p>It’s a balancing act between giving everyone a chance and making them feel like they can make a comeback versus taking away progress from leading players.</p><p>Coming back to our cycles, we can observe that economic developments are usually path-dependent. For example, the rich get richer. Resets are a way to tackle that increasing inequality.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*6qkI6rVG1Oc-yzY9" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*kJqCoW2yNlEXLbqp" /></figure><p><strong>Preventing staleness</strong></p><p>Even when economies do not end up breaking, they tend to converge towards an equilibrium, a state of boredom with limited changes. For example, in 4x MMOs, this happens when alliances have formed and reached peace agreements with each other.</p><p>A reset breathes new life in the economy and represents the perfect occasion to mix up the metagame.</p><p><strong>Meaningful Metalayer</strong></p><p>Having rules and conditions for resets determined at the start allows players to incorporate them into their decision-making. This can, for instance, lead to emergent social gameplay or strategic risk management. Reset conditions are a vast design space, which we’ll partly explore with some examples later.</p><p>What’s sure is that players have something to lose, making economic resets a meaningful mechanic in the player psychology.</p><p><strong>Capping the ROI of assets</strong></p><p>Economic resets can mean that (some) assets die. It’s a design choice. Having unlimited value accrual in NFTs or other in-game assets is challenging as it means infinite extraction for a one-time cost. This invites speculation which can crowd out real player motivations, as seen with in-game land.</p><p>Recurring sinks can help but are mostly just a tax on earnings. And when they are related to item upgrades instead of repairs, meaning they boost earnings, the issue of runaway inflation becomes a real threat to the economy.</p><p>Putting a cap on ROIs can act as a balancing tool that hinders speculation from going overboard.</p><p><strong>Room for Experimentation</strong></p><p>The truth is: No one will know what’s going to happen. Definitely, I don’t. We can model economies based on different assumptions and scenarios but will always be surprised by the actual results once our game is live.</p><p>As we are unlikely to get it right the first time, allowing ourselves to learn and make changes based on new information sounds like a good idea. For instance, seasons are one way of implementing such a system.</p><h3>Hell</h3><p><strong>Disturbing player progression</strong></p><p>As mentioned above, player progress gets at least partly reset. Players have to accept that and not perceive it as unfair.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*jISD6JM6GN1XyWgN" /><figcaption><em>Referencing “Inferno” from Dante Alighieri’s “Divine Comedy” so people think I’m smart even though I never read the book nor played the game</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Limited opportunity for value accrual</strong></p><p>Destroying assets is bad for their value accrual. As games likely want to add a form of long-term utility to some of their assets, they have to design economic resets in a way that allows for it without negatively impacting economic balance too much. Not all assets need to die. Some may keep their unique potential and only have their current path-dependent realization of that potential reset. Teams may opt to destroy consumables while keeping productive assets alive.</p><h3>Design Considerations for Economic Resets</h3><p>There are 2 key levers economists have when thinking about economic resets: Trigger conditions and reset intensity.</p><h3>Trigger Conditions</h3><p>This answers the question of <strong>when</strong> an economic reset should take place. On one hand, we want it to happen before the economy leaves the acceptable range. On the other hand, the economy should have enough room to support player autonomy — the feeling that decisions matter, have consequences, and that different players can have divergent results. It also gives more time for meta gameplay to emerge. tl;dr: not too frequent, not too late.</p><p>Teams can utilize various trigger conditions. I would group these into 3 categories but there may be more.</p><ul><li>Time: Reset progress after a certain period. These are basically pre-determined seasons. Easy to plan ahead for players; No room for surprise.</li><li>Macroeconomic indicators: Monitors the health of the economy, especially player behavior that is seen as negative (e.g. resource hoarding). When the indicator gets close to the upper or lower bound of the acceptable range, an economic reset is triggered. As the behavior of players is the trigger here, it opens up the possibility of emergent social meta gameplay.</li><li>External indicators: For example, ETH TWAP. Brings in an additional element foreign to the game — can be an exciting new gameplay layer but hard to plan for and may not be related to economic health. As a result, this mechanic is more suitable for smaller but more frequent resets to minimize the risk of resets coming either too late or being too strong based on an outside indicator showing a tail risk event.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*SUYGNVs_t3dIyCl2" /></figure><p>In all cases, players must accept the reset</p><ul><li>When players think they could have saved their progress, they may be more likely to tolerate the outcome. This requires a quasi-predictable source of chaos, like the ETH price</li><li>When the metagame adds so much enjoyment that it cancels out the destruction of progress. For example, the social metagame that emerges from it. Or turn the reset into a big event that brings players together.</li><li>Being clear about the rules from the start and setting player expectations early</li><li>Organic integration of reset mechanics into the world (e.g. climate, natural disaster)</li></ul><blockquote><em>A genre that fits well with economic resets is looplikes. Here, resets are part of the game and do not represent failure, in contrast to roguelikes.</em></blockquote><h3>Reset Intensity</h3><p>This answers the question of <strong>how much</strong> of the players’ progress gets reset. Intensity has two dimensions, the macro and the micro level. The macro level describes how many assets get sucked out of the game economy in total. The micro level looks at differences between players — redistribution. While everyone loses progress, some players may lose more than others to increase “fairness”.</p><p>The intensity of resets should be informed by your progression system and the reset frequency.</p><h3>Examples of Economic Resets</h3><h3>Welcome to NOR</h3><p>NOR was the first team I came in contact with that pushed for economic resets and motivated me to think more deeply about the topic.</p><p>NOR divides its tournaments into seasons. Each “Eternal Return” can fit multiple seasons into it, with a cataclysm happening at the end of it</p><ul><li>All assets are reduced to their value in FATE (NOR’s platform token). Players can protect their assets by placing them in a vault</li><li>In NOR, land parcels are “placed” to indicate their closeness to the different games featured on the platform, which influences the flow of FATE. Placements are reset with every cataclysm. This is a great example of retaining the potential value of assets through resets but resetting their existing realization of that value.</li><li>Any FATE that exists outside the platform is irrevocably destroyed</li><li>Players can reinvest into assets for the next “Eternal Return”</li><li>Economic adjustments are made. For example, if there’s more player demand, the FATE pool will increase</li></ul><h3>Doomsday</h3><p>Doomsday is an onchain survival game/war of attrition game that revolves around the concept of economic destruction. Players mint and reinforce settlements while disasters rage until only one settlement remains that wins the prize pool.</p><p><strong>Phase 1 — Renaissance</strong></p><p>During this phase, players can only mint settlements. The duration of the “Renaissance ‘’ is determined by players’ minting behavior (macroeconomic indicator). The timer is extended when someone mints a settlement but by a decreasing amount every time. When the timer reaches zero, the world enters phase 2 — the “Dark Age”</p><p><strong>Phase 2: Dark Age</strong></p><p>Every 75 blocks (time-based event), 1 one 4 possible disasters will hit a part of the map. Players can reinforce their settlements (for each disaster type) which means they can survive one disaster of that type. Players can also abandon their settlement to receive a small portion of the prize pool relative to how long their settlement survived.</p><h3>Mithraeum</h3><p>To combat inflation, Mithraeum uses an autonomous mechanic called<a href="https://medium.com/mithraeum/the-fight-against-inflation-in-p2e-games-ed2f14d5aebe"> Wipe Threat</a>. When too many players hoard resources rather than utilizing them (macroeconomic indicator), they get punished by a wipe, destroying valuable resources.</p><p>The wipe threat also leads to new emerging social gameplay:</p><blockquote><em>Players, eager to keep their progress as long as possible, will unite in larger structures and try to fairly distribute the tasks of burning the resources among themselves and punishing those guilty of “hoarding” as well as those who do not want to take on such obligations.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Players who are lagging behind in development can try to interfere with the players from the first point by active actions, trying to bring the wipe closer, which will equalize the chances for everyone</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The reaction of the market to the possible outcome of such wars will be funny. Depending on the intensity of the struggle, the price of game resources (tokens) will either soar, in anticipation of the next phase of the war of attrition, or fall sharply in fear of the prospect of a wipe, because then these tokens are guaranteed to depreciate</em></blockquote><h3>Café Cosmos</h3><p>The game features smaller, frequent resets based on an external factor — ETH price.</p><p>The ETH TWAP price affects the weather conditions in the game. Bad weather can destroy resources. This introduces a non-random deflation mechanism. Players can’t predict what will happen to the ETH price but speculate around it which adds a fun gameplay element that is deeply rooted in the crypto-native audience.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Economic resets offer a broad design space and can add new gameplay layers, provide tools for economic sustainability, and leave room for economic experimentation. In this article, I tried to give some pointers on how to design such systems.</p><p>The first blockchain games are making use of economic resets, such as NOR, Mithraeum, Doomsday, and Café Cosmos.</p><p>There are other ways to implement asset deflation or to redistribute assets, for example voluntary individual resets like prestiging. But economic resets present an elegant mechanic that does both while adding to the game experience, thereby increasing the acceptance from players. This is especially important in open economies where players trade real world value.</p><p>I’m always happy to chat about these concepts more so please reach out! My <a href="https://twitter.com/0xKepler">Twitter DMs</a> are open.</p><p><em>A big shoutout to </em><a href="https://twitter.com/ProofOfDork"><em>Arto</em></a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/MetzlerGames"><em>Nick</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://twitter.com/HedgeEconomist"><em>Heimdall</em></a><em>, and </em><a href="https://twitter.com/bl0ckchainsane"><em>blockchainsane</em></a><em> for their feedback. Follow these four big brains to learn about game economies.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=75fe2eb46d5a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[From DeFi’s Heartbeat to its Credit Hub: The Evolution of IPOR Labs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/from-defis-heartbeat-to-its-credit-hub-the-evolution-of-ipor-labs-c9271f582b37?source=rss-1cd01a80cbd7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c9271f582b37</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ipor-labs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xKepler]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 19 May 2023 10:25:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-19T03:41:38.342Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*hmo4_-Netgbx8mWY.jpeg" /></figure><p>Deus Ex DAO (DED) began working with IPOR Labs late 2022, before their token generation event. We learned the team was sharp, constantly shipping and had a strong view on DeFi (Decentralized Finance) and how IPOR can contribute to it. Here’s a summary of the past 10 months, and a look into the future of IPOR.</p><h3>A short history lesson</h3><p>In August 2022, IPOR launched with the ambitious goal of bridging the gap between traditional finance (TradFi) and DeFi by introducing interest rate derivatives to the DeFi ecosystem. This move aimed to tap into TradFi’s massive market worth 450 trillion dollars.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/312/0*uFHLWwKGcLnXQWoP.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy2205.pdf">https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy2205.pdf</a></figcaption></figure><p>By launching IPOR V1 with its interest rate indices and interest rate swaps, and subsequently introducing power tokens as a new tokenomics template in January 2023, IPOR demonstrated its commitment to innovating and expanding the DeFi landscape. These developments provided users with valuable tools for managing interest rate exposure, contributing to the overall growth and adoption of DeFi.</p><p>After 10 months of operating on mainnet, IPOR gained invaluable insights and experiences that paved the way for the development of IPOR V2. This new version will bring the following upgrades</p><ul><li>improved pricing mechanism</li><li>RWA and LSD integration</li><li>simplified yield products to make DeFi more accessible to a broader audience</li></ul><p><strong>IPOR index</strong></p><p>IPOR V1 introduced the IPOR index, the interest rate benchmark for DeFi. It provides the volume weighted interest rate for assets such as USDC, USDT and DAI from DeFi’s most adopted credit markets, Aave and Compound. The IPOR index serves as the foundation for interest rate derivatives by tracking the underlying market-wide rates, transparently.</p><p>In TradFi, the most commonly used interest rates benchmark is the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR, previously known as LIBOR) and provides the base rates upon which most lending and borrowing agreements are anchored. These indices equip users with valuable insights into the overall market trends and allow them to make informed investment decisions. Now crypto can embrace those too. This IPOR primitive is an open-source public good and can be built upon by other teams.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*lLEeCleWL-i8hjbq.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://app.ipor.io/ipor-index-statistics">https://app.ipor.io/ipor-index-statistics</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Interest Rate Swaps</strong></p><p>IPOR introduced Interest Rate Swaps (IRS), implemented here as cancellable swaps with a maturity of 28 days. An IRS allows traders to go long or short interest rates. Reasons to trade these could be a desire to hedge a variable lend or borrow rate at a credit market, or speculating on the direction of rates. The cancellability makes this an appealing product to newer rate traders. On the other hand, the cancellability adds flexibility/optionality, which requires more complex pricing and risk considerations for the market maker. Hence, cancellability is uncommon in TradFi markets. IPOR addressed this by pricing in a premium for the optionality. We’ll later get to the challenges of such a model, and how IPOR V2 tackles these.</p><p>IPOR facilitated a total volume of $3.75B in interest rate swaps.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*gNGbYkjP6_Y2nA8W.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://tokenterminal.com/terminal/projects/ipor-protocol">https://tokenterminal.com/terminal/projects/ipor-protocol</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Power Tokens</strong></p><p>In January 2023, IPOR made further advancements by introducing a new tokenomics model known as <a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/power-tokens-a-new-tokenomics-template-part-1-5fa4c1daf938">Power</a> Tokens, together with a liquidity mining program. This resulted in a peak TVL of ~$43m and established a core holder base of approximately 1000 members. The goal of the initial airdrop and liquidity mining period was to decentralize the ownership over IPOR. DED has assisted with architecting the DAO framework and infrastructure, which launched in March and is now being adopted by the community.</p><p>A terrific group of community contributors has emerged (the Iporians) who, as an initial project, have audited IPOR’s original liquidity mining phase and collaborated with IPOR Labs on <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/liquidity-mining-changes-approved-ipor-emission-reduction-and-boosting-curve-update-e593673a68fb">optimizations for the next period</a>. To reduce unnecessary emissions and reward farmers who are aligned with the protocol, emissions have been cut by 30% and LPs now need to hold at least 5% of their LP positions in pwIPOR to qualify.</p><h3>Key learnings</h3><h4>Rate manipulation and extreme volatility events since launch</h4><p>Traders tried to beat IPOR’s AMM by manipulating the underlying credit markets through market action. The first time they succeeded and made a small profit, but IPOR stepped in quickly using a guardian angel function. Any later manipulation attempts resulted in losses for the attackers.</p><p>A second event was the USDC instability following the SVB bankruptcy, where all rate markets in TradFi and DeFi became unstable. The USDC peg was tested and USDT IPOR swaps had to be paused altogether by the team.</p><p>These events underline the sensitivity of a peer-to-pool model that automatically prices interest rate swaps based on variables as complex as credit market liquidity and interest rate curves. Even at mainnet levels of liquidity, these can be gamed, especially in bear markets. Volatility increased the spread of the AMM and resulted in exploitable offers. We’re happy the IPOR Labs team intervened quickly and that the community is understanding of that role in these nascent stages of IPOR. But it has also shown that the AMM pricing model has to be updated.</p><h4>Improved AMM needed</h4><p>IPOR announced their V2 AMM which includes significant upgrades such as tighter spreads, dynamic leverage caps and increased swap tenors. To achieve this, the cancellability of swaps has to be removed. IPOR started with this rather unconventional design for the V1 to make it more friendly to novice traders. On the other hand, this optional callability is terribly hard to price effectively — and thus requires a thicker margin for the AMM to remain profitable. Wider spreads and safer pricing (for AMM LPs) resulted in fewer attractive trading opportunities for more sophisticated traders. The V2 AMM will become a better experience for crypto traders, guiding them to the world of professional interest rates trading. Consequently this improvement should drive more fees towards LPs.</p><h4>Mainnet is expensive… wen L2?</h4><p>Despite IPOR’s gas-optimized smart contracts, recent mainnet activity has resulted in high base gas prices. Doing any business on mainnet is expensive. Users have been asking “when L2?” for a long time. But one must realize it’s not that simple!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*njvXyananVBAJ9Q4.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://dune.com/kroeger0x/gas-prices">https://dune.com/kroeger0x/gas-prices</a></figcaption></figure><p>The IPOR indices source and volume weight their inputs from credit markets. As you just read, even on mainnet these could be manipulated. But L2 credit market liquidity is even thinner comparatively.</p><blockquote><em>USDC market on Aave V3 on mainnet: $535m TVL</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>USDC market on Aave V3 on Arbitrum: $61m TVL</em></blockquote><p>Therefore, those markets are even more susceptible to manipulation. This risk is especially high when utilization is around the “kink” of the borrow rate curve. A relatively small amount is enough to sway interest rates. Creating an Arbitrum interest rate index therefore isn’t so appealing. However, what could be possible is publishing the IPOR indices on Arbitrum based on mainnet pricing. This would require a deployment on such a L2 however and managing the possible presence of liquidity mining and pwIPOR management there.</p><h4>Ethereum staking as DeFi’s risk free rate</h4><p>The same way Grayscale and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) try to bring DeFi toTradFi via ETFs and standardized futures, IPOR V1 was the first iteration of bringing interest rates derivatives to DeFi.</p><p>Nevertheless, with the success of of the largest crypto ecosystem upgrade in April, Ethereum’s Shanghai, the ETH staking yield can be considered the base interest rate against which all yields must compete, the same way US Treasury yields are the benchmark for all yield curve and bond issuances in the world. IPOR’s indices can be expanded to include non-stablecoin assets — and ETH (Liquid) Staking Yield seems to be the prime candidate as it is seeing increasing adoption.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*eIuOMJPUDix2sCdO.png" /><figcaption><em>Source: Defillama, 1st May 2023</em></figcaption></figure><h4>Bridging traditional finance rates</h4><p>Some of you will have noticed the persistent discrepancy between DeFi and TradFi interest rates on money (or pegged assets). There are multiple reasons for it:</p><ul><li>First, DeFi does not have convenient access to the safest yielding products such as US Treasury Bills, which now stand at 500 basis points (100 basis points = 1%).</li><li>Second, DeFi’s variable credit rates are mainly driven by leverage, which there’s less demand for in bear markets.</li><li>Third, Circle, the issuer of USDC, potentially earns a return against the USD holdings backing USDC emission, through a combination of cash and short-term, high-quality assets, including U.S. Treasuries and other similar instruments. But these returns are not transferred to USDC holders.</li></ul><p>A variety of projects such as <a href="https://ondo.finance/">Ondo</a>, <a href="https://www.open-trade.io/">OpenTrade</a>, <a href="https://openeden.com/">OpenEden</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/FWDX_Official">FWDX</a> and Maple’s recent <a href="https://www.maple.finance/news/maple-cash-management-pool/">treasury pool</a> are working on solving some of these issues through securities tokenization or bridging term structures.</p><p>IPOR sees an increase in utility through those developments being a yield bridge for any type of DeFi or TradFi fixed income product. We could envision a customization of the user risk profile (floating or fixed rate, extending or reducing duration, change of underlying cryptocurrency of your investment or liability) through a single “Zap” or a one-click action.</p><h4>Vault strategies</h4><p>Trading interest rate derivatives comes with a steep learning curve, especially when coming from a more crypto-native product like perpetuals. While TVL has seen a significant uptrend, swap volumes couldn’t keep up, leading to lower fees for LPs. The initial hurdle of understanding interest rate swaps has shown to hinder adoption.</p><p>To make it easier for users to earn yield, for example through rate strategies or yield arbitrage, and keep markets more efficient, the V2 will come with vaults. These are pre-defined strategies with different risk profiles that users can passively deploy capital into. For IPOR, it means increased usage.</p><h3>IPOR: Credit hub of DeFi</h3><p>The IPOR contributors have crystallized these learnings into a strong vision of becoming the Credit Hub of DeFi. A foundation upon which projects can build and integrate.</p><p>Deus Ex DAO is captivated by the possibilities envisioned by IPOR to be part of a fully developed capital market on-chain. Imagine the power of having on-chain products that gain utility through their ability to be combined in unique ways, catering to the tailored needs of both individuals and institutions.</p><p>Let’s dive into an example for a moment:</p><blockquote><em>Tokenized Treasury Bills or Bonds denominated in ETH with floating rate exposure. Suppose I can buy a tokenized T-bill using a stablecoin like USDC, with a specific maturity in mind, let’s say the last business day of June. In this envisioned market, I should be able to swap my initial cash flow in and out of USDC, then convert it into another token (e.g., ETH) that represents the interest rate paid by the bill. Furthermore, I would like the option to use an ETH interest rate swap to convert my fixed-rate exposure in ETH into a floating rate. This way, I can tailor my tokenized T-bill into an ETH floating rate bill. The needs are infinite, the combinations should be too.</em></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/976/0*Tr_Uy-fdbAZJ-hC-.png" /><figcaption><em>User workflow for Tokenized Treasury Bills or Bonds denominated in ETH with floating rate exposure</em></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ZjHWJlnU63TtMefM.png" /><figcaption><em>Potential 1-click solution by IPOR</em></figcaption></figure><p>Such a market would thrive as investors and liability hedgers grow in tandem.</p><p>By embracing this vision, IPOR can democratize access to financial instruments traditionally available only through the opaque OTC market.</p><p>This vision should lead to further developments from the IPOR team, and no doubt they can deliver.</p><p>First, we need a DeFi yield curve with term structure, showing the connection between interest rates and maturities. Leverage is what drives our modern economies and markets. To use leverage at scale, sophisticated parties must be able to use derivatives to hedge their rate exposure and use leverage in a precise way. With that infrastructure in place, these sophisticated players on their part can abstract away and offer simple products to end users, such as fixed rate loans for different maturities.</p><p>IPOR V2 is tackling the challenges faced by the V1, for example by upgrading the risk engine to prevent price manipulation and to offer righter spreads. Moreover, since the foundational pieces have been built, the team is expanding its vision to other categories.</p><p>This vision could include 1-click fixed-rate borrowing or lending solutions through predefined vaults for predetermined terms, being a back end to Tradfi. For instance, for swapping tokenized securities.</p><p>Leverage as a key driver of activity could be introduced via increased utility of the IPOR LP tokens (ipUSDC, ipUSDT, ipDAI and any other ipToken that IPOR could be indexing) in the lending/borrowing market. For example, borrowing against LP tokens</p><p>As mentioned at the start, interest rate derivatives are a $450T market. Classic Interest rate swaps are only one part of that. Additional derivative instruments can increase the flexibility for users and allow teams to use the tools to abstract away more complexity for end users. Other derivatives can include:</p><ul><li>Spread trades (intra and inter crypto-currencies)</li><li>Swaps on futures dates</li><li>Swaptions (or options on the level of IPOR swap at a future date)</li></ul><p>IPOR is a specialized platform that could act as a lego builder, offering diverse components for custom products. Users combine lego-like pieces to design transparent structured products.</p><blockquote>This is how IPOR plans to move from being “the heartbeat of DeFi” to “the credit hub of DeFi” — the place users interact with (directly or indirectly) for all things related to credit and interest rates</blockquote><p><em>If you liked this piece, please consider supporting us by liking, retweeting, and commenting. You can also follow us, </em><a href="https://twitter.com/TradingAlpinist"><em>Trading Alpinist</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://twitter.com/0xKepler"><em>0xKepler</em></a><em>, and subscribe to the </em><a href="https://deusexdao.substack.com/"><em>Deus Ex DAO newsletter</em></a><em> for more such content.</em></p><p><em>We, </em><a href="https://www.deusexdao.com/"><em>Deus Ex DAO</em></a><em>, invite teams and builders to reach out to us when they are seeking expertise, guidance and assistance regarding their fundraising, business development, product building or marketing. Deus Ex DAO wants to hear from you. We are a group of critical DeFi users with a broad network. View our services and reach out through our </em><a href="https://www.deusexdao.com/"><em>website</em></a><em> or </em><a href="https://twitter.com/deusexdao"><em>Twitter</em></a><em> if you think we may be a fit.</em></p><p><em>(Any views expressed in the below are my personal views and the product of our own research, it should not form the basis for making investment decisions, nor be construed as a recommendation or advice to engage in investment transactions. Do your own research.)</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c9271f582b37" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/from-defis-heartbeat-to-its-credit-hub-the-evolution-of-ipor-labs-c9271f582b37">From DeFi’s Heartbeat to its Credit Hub: The Evolution of IPOR Labs</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao">Deus Ex DAO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Power Tokens — A new Tokenomics Template [Part 2]]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/power-tokens-a-new-tokenomics-template-part-2-758a7e989298?source=rss-1cd01a80cbd7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/758a7e989298</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tokenomics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ipor-labs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xKepler]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Jan 2023 15:53:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-24T06:51:44.949Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Power Tokens — A new Tokenomics Template [Part 2]</h3><h4>I got the power</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*UVSFi4-O3_XzITX0.png" /></figure><p>This is Part 2 of our series on Power Tokens. Before continuing, make sure to <a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/power-tokens-a-new-tokenomics-template-part-1-5fa4c1daf938">read Part 1</a>.</p><h3>Power Tokens Deep Dive</h3><h4>Goal #1: Alignment of LPs, stakers and the protocol</h4><p>The first step to alignment is getting LPs to care about the protocol and governance. This can be done via a retroactive airdrop or liquidity mining. How effective this initial distribution is in onboarding the right people depends on the design of the chosen mechanic. We recommend unannounced retroactive airdrops, as these allow projects to test product-market-fit without a live-token, increases the chances of onboarding non-mercenary community members) and optimize the token distribution based on historical data. A retroactive airdrop should be followed by other means of distributing tokens, as otherwise new community members may be hesitant to join due to feeling like they missed out. People entering the community later can become valuable members as well. Therefore, they should be motivated to contribute and be given governance power too.</p><p>For example, one can run a liquidity mining program after the airdrop. At Deus Ex DAO, we also like the idea of doing multiple retroactive airdrops over time, given the mercenary capital liquidity mining programs attract. Inclusion criteria can be broader than simply provided capital, for instance by targeting important governance or community participants.</p><p>Liquidity mining programs can be optimized to reduce the “harm” done by mercenary capital. Teams may want to give stakers a multiplier on LP rewards, boosting returns for LPs that haven’t sold their (airdropped) tokens.. This is only advisable when the airdrop distribution has been broad enough (as such a multiplier concentrates supply among existing holders) and filtered most bad actors.</p><p>Aside from token distribution, communication is essential in conveying a long-term mission to the community they want to contribute to, and aligning stakeholders. Financial engineering can only influence people’s motivations to a certain degree.</p><p>So, while power tokens themselves do not automatically lead to long-term alignment, they have great potential as airdrops, liquidity mining programs and governance can be designed flexibly on top. Ve-tokens fix the staking, liquidity mining and governance logic. Power tokens are more like a blank canvas. They allow teams to add their own ideas to optimize for different goals.</p><p>IPOR brings some neat ideas about what a potential future could look like. LPs are rewarded directly with power tokens instead of unstaked tokens. First, as power tokens have a 14 day withdrawal period, this essentially adds reward vesting. It also eliminates longer duration lock-ups, as has been popularized by ve-tokens. Moreover, it introduces LPs to staking, reducing the steps (and transactions) required to earn an LP reward multiplier, thereby showing people the value of the token which potentially reduces sell pressure.</p><p>An open question remains how aligned the onboarded governance participants and LPs will be. This will depend on the governance and reward modules built on top of power tokens. Power tokens themselves provide a neutral foundation. As they don’t come with a mandatory lock-up, the issues of meta governance and governance halt described for ve-tokens do not apply.</p><h4>Goal #2: Natural price discovery</h4><p>With no token lock-up and short withdrawal periods (e.g. 14 days in IPOR’s case), tokens can be repriced consistently may have larger trading liquidity than the boom-and-bust cycles caused by large, sudden supply shocks (sharp increase or decrease of circulating token supply) as seen with ve-tokens.</p><p>IPOR further allows stakers to exit before the cool-off period ends for a small penalty which is distributed to remaining stakers. While rewarding loyal stakers, this could result in sudden sell pressure in case of negatively interpreted news, for example. The balance sought is between:</p><ol><li>Treating stakers as first class citizens. Stakers use tokens as intended by the protocol. They shouldn’t have a big disadvantage compared to token holders. This also means allowing them to exit when they want.</li><li>Decreasing price volatility. While consistent repricing in the market is preferable to long periods of ineffective markets, there’s also merit in managing price shocks, as exemplified by circuit breakers in stock trading. This is especially the case for new information whose impact is hard to evaluate at first. Supply reduction (like in buyback-and-burn) can also be an effective tool to support price.</li></ol><h4>Goal #3: Broader token distribution</h4><p>A wide base of token holders brings the following advantages</p><ul><li>More community members which are incentivized to contribute. For complex tasks, teams have a higher chance of finding a fitting contributor among a larger group. For easy tasks which require no specialized skills, such as providing feedback, projects can query more voices, which improves chances of getting significant results.</li><li>Token price is less reliant on a few actors, which can potentially make or break a project. Broader distribution of tokens means less concentration in the hands of whales.</li><li>More decentralized governance. Better resilience against governance attacks, higher participation rates as small holders can make a difference, and better representation of users within governance.</li></ul><p>IPOR introduces a logarithmic multiplier curve to its liquidity mining module. The logic is the following: The more pwIPOR tokens a user delegates to a pool they provide liquidity for, the higher the rewards. But, the additional rewards a user can earn this way decreases the more tokens are delegated, given a fixed amount of liquidity provided in the pool. In essence, the reward curve depends on the ratio of delegated tokens compared to the provided liquidity.</p><p>That changes the tradeoff calculation of stakers. In a linear liquidity mining model, every token staked adds an equal amount of future tokens as rewards. In the logarithmic model, the last staked token receives less future tokens then the tokens staked before. As a result, selling some tokens becomes more attractive as the utility of additional tokens decreases.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*ps_RZ6Zo_HErW4s2hBqo8g.png" /></figure><p>We expect this results in token hoarding at the beginning of liquidity mining, followed by selling by a concentrated holder base, to be less of an issue. How it could play out is LPs selling tokens more consistently, distributing sell pressure over time, and allowing newcomers to scoop up tokens at a fair price. We could see LPs selling token rewards and adding them as liquidity to maximize their rewards, while boosting TVL.</p><p>As tokens move from users with a high stake-to-LP ratio to users with a lower stake-to-LP ratio, the token multiplier (can also be seen as the token utility or productivity) across stakers increases. If the total amount of liquidity mining rewards per epoch is set beforehand (and therefore capped), which usually is the case, the overall token utility across stakers is set from the start and cannot change. What changes is how the rewards are split among stakers. In a linear model, a staker would lose APR proportional to the amount unstaked, while the buyer of the tokens would win an equal amount of APR (measured as token rewards per LP). A logarithmic curve reinforces the changes, meaning the seller loses more and the buyer wins more APR, leading to closer APRs between stakers.</p><p>In contrast to a linear model where a staker’s APR depends on the total amount of tokens staked, it also plays a role <strong>who</strong> the other stakers are (their staking-to-LP ratios), in the logarithmic model. The more stakers with a high staking-to-LP ratio sell and the more stakers with a low staking-to-LP ratio buy and stake, the lower the APR of a hoarder becomes. Therefore, the incentive to sell some tokens increases over time.</p><p>When the price of the token changes, it affects the calculations to maximize returns. If the token price increases, a staker can trade more other tokens (for example, stablecoins) for them. Providing these other tokens as liquidity (for example, adding liquidity to the USDC pool on IPOR) now has a stronger impact on the received liquidity mining rewards, making such a decision more attractive. If token price decreases, buying tokens becomes more attractive. The APR arbitrage between liquidity provided and tokens staked can be seen as a price balancing mechanic.</p><p><em>Note: Assumes that stakers are indifferent between various tokens, for example IPOR and stablecoins, and are only looking to maximize future returns and do not speculate on token prices.</em></p><blockquote><a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/ipor_intern">Ipor intern</a> created a <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1L6SmcZexZiQZFr7_fNUpYpdGz6rO5IJdXVmLxVW8jd0/edit#gid=0">spreadsheet</a> to make designing a staking strategy for liquidity mining easier.</blockquote><h3>Comparison with other token models</h3><p>Let’s compare power tokens to ve-tokens to tokens which use a time boost mechanic, such as GMX. There, stakers accrue multiplier points over time and the maximum multiplier is capped.</p><p>How’s the lock-in incentivized?</p><ul><li>For ve-tokens, there’s a strict logic embedded into the protocol which doesn’t allow for unstaking during the lock-up period. Moreover, longer locks are incentivized with higher rewards.</li><li>In GMX’ implementation of time boosted staking, there’s a soft incentive for stakers to stay staked. When a user unstakes, they have the opportunity costs of losing their multiplier on future rewards. Additionally, their accumulated token incentives must be vested over time to become liquidly tradable. Stakers who initiate vesting will no longer earn rewards on the tokens deposited for vesting, adding another opportunity cost. Users must stake sufficient non-escrowed GMX to allow for vesting of the esGMX they intend to vest over 12 months. They can unstake early, but then forego accumulated token incentives (again, opportunity costs). A user can re-purchase and stake GMX on the open market to resume vesting of their esGMX however.</li><li>In IPOR’s implementation of power tokens, the primary incentive to remain staked is to boost one’s LP rewards. There’s a brief redemption period of 14 days to unlock, with a 50% penalty to unlock early. There are no vested rewards and thus the incentive to stake is positive (increase rewards) instead of negative (lose escrowed tokens). Thanks to its modular design, teams can experiment with the power token model, and, for example, add reward vesting.</li></ul><p>Since power tokens don’t make use of opportunity cost mechanics, they do not favor early stakers as much. Time boosted models give benefits (APR boosts) to long-time stakers, which can deter new capital and users.</p><p>Power tokens as a token template do not come with an embedded governance logic, meaning projects have to add their own governance module and make changes to other modules (e.g. add vesting to the rewards module) to align voters with the protocol and its stakeholders. Without a lockup period, the governance power associated with power tokens can easily transfer to new token holders, in contrast to ve-token models where they may be locked for years.</p><h3>Future considerations</h3><p>In the end, the actual effects of power tokens depend on the case-specific implementation. Due to its modularity, we can expect different designs, catering to different products, business goals, and token utilities. The design space is broader than for ve-tokens.</p><p>For instance, a team may want to increase the multiplier given by staking. This impacts the trade-off decisions users have to make. As the same staking-to-LP ratio now gives a higher multiplier, it becomes attractive to hold more of the token as it has higher utility compared to the template model. This may result in a higher holder concentration.</p><p>The effectiveness of changes, reflected in the shape of the multiplier curve, will depend on how much people care about token utility (maximizing APR) versus speculating on token price. It will be interesting to see how the market will react to the power token model.</p><p>Like ve-tokens, the power token model must be enhanced with utility by teams and their communities. Maximizing liquidity mining rewards won’t be sufficient. Providing governance power, a share of profits or social standing may increase a token’s usefulness. The benefit of the power token template: It can be expanded over time due to its modularity. For example, IPOR’s power tokens’ first utility is to broadly distribute their token by boosting rewards of LPs. Over time, we expect additional utility to come via governance, and so on.</p><p>Lastly, we are looking forward to teams using the logarithmic multiplier curve on liquidity mining of non-stable assets. This changes the user’s decision-making as now both the staked and LPed tokens have a variable price. A fun financial game that we envision being adopted by many future projects to add balanced token utility.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Power tokens are a new tokenomics template which bring flexibility to projects who can optimize their token model according to their goals. As a template, power tokens are not opinionated on topics (e.g. governance), but rather give a blank canvas that teams have to fill.</p><p>The logarithmic multiplier curve for reward distribution introduced with power tokens is an exciting new primitive which drives broader token distribution. This promotes participation and decentralization of a protocol. Power tokens are a new primitive that can enhance the functionality and scalability of various decentralized projects. We look forward to seeing how this tokenomic model is adapted across the community and which iterations will spawn.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=758a7e989298" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/power-tokens-a-new-tokenomics-template-part-2-758a7e989298">Power Tokens — A new Tokenomics Template [Part 2]</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao">Deus Ex DAO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Power Tokens — A new Tokenomics Template [Part 1]]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/power-tokens-a-new-tokenomics-template-part-1-5fa4c1daf938?source=rss-1cd01a80cbd7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5fa4c1daf938</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tokenomics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ipor-labs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xKepler]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Jan 2023 15:26:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-20T15:26:49.032Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Power Tokens — A new Tokenomics Template [Part 1]</h3><h4>From ve-tokens to pw-tokens?</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*rTvqru1BoE9zaFRo.png" /></figure><p>It is not often that we witness the release of a new tokenomics model in crypto. Therefore, <a href="https://twitter.com/ipor_io">IPOR</a> sparked our (and others’) attention when they published <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/power-tokens-incentives-done-better-e9e88e38208b">their article on power tokens</a>.</p><p>In DeFi, three major tokenomics standards have existed so far:</p><ul><li><strong>Simple staking model:</strong> A user stakes tokens and can withdraw anytime. Tokens are translated 1-to-1 into staked tokens.</li><li><strong>Vote escrowed (“<em>ve</em>”) tokens:</strong> Invented by Curve Finance. A user locks tokens for a selected amount of time. The tokens cannot be withdrawn before the chosen staking period ends. The conversion rate from tokens to staked ve-tokens is dependent on the lock-up period a user chooses: The longer the lock-up period, the more ve-tokens they receive. Here, The assumption is that the longer a user locks up their tokens, the more aligned they are with the protocol, and the more weight they should have in governance and revenue sharing. The ve(3,3) model popularized by Andre Cronje with Solidly intended to improve on this, by adding 1) tradable veNFTs as a representation of a user’s staked balance to counteract centralizing forces by protocols like Convex, 2) non-dilution of stakers, and 3) stakers only receiving rewards from pools they voted for with the goal of aligning governance and economic incentives.</li><li><strong>Time-based multipliers:</strong> A user stakes tokens and can withdraw anytime. Tokens are translated 1-to-1 into staked tokens. A user linearly accrues multiplier points over time which makes them eligible for a larger share of rewards. The maximum multiplier is usually capped to prevent early entrants from dominating new stakers, which would make the token unattractive for non-holders to buy into.</li></ul><p>Teams also experimented with additional properties like reward vesting, withdrawal delays, (early) withdrawal fees, etc.</p><p>The vote escrowed token model has been the most copied token design in the last two years. Teams saw its success, copied the idea for their own projects and received positive feedback from the market (who saw it work for Curve, and thought it would too for the project at hand). So it worked! Or did it?</p><p>The goal of ve-token design is to better align incentives between the protocol and its token holders. Over time, its own problems came to light, <a href="https://medium.com/@0xKepler/tokenomics-musings-ve-tokens-and-alternatives-43402e781661">as we covered before</a>.</p><p>The questions now become: Can power tokens solve the issues of ve-tokens? And what challenges do we have to look out for?</p><h3>What is a Tokenomics Template?</h3><p>Before diving deeper into the actual tokenomics, let’s take a look at why we call power tokens a potential tokenomics template in this article’s title.</p><p>A template must allow others to easily use and adapt it to their own needs.</p><p>Curve’s ve-token design made it difficult for teams to fork as it was closely intertwined with the Curve protocol and its massive adoption, which allows offsetting its large emissions.</p><p>IPOR takes a modular approach to its token system design, abstracting the logic of power tokens from the rest. This enables other teams to copy and adjust the open-source code of power tokens to make it fit with their project and token. In the ve-token model, one key hurdle is that a user’s ve-token balance is decided by the conversion logic (where longer lock-up leads to more ve-tokens), with this ve-token balance then being used for governance, liquidity incentives etc.</p><p>In the power token model, each token staked translates to one power token. Then, each module built on top, for example liquidity incentives, can interpret power tokens with their own logic. IPOR employs a logarithmic curve for liquidity mining, meaning marginal benefits (token rewards) diminish with an increasing ratio of power tokens to liquidity provided. This is done to incentivize broad distribution of the power tokens and avoid early and large LPs to be able to hog all the boosting benefits. To make it flexible for other builders, this curve can be changed, without requiring any revisions of the staking mechanic.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*bCLao-QPMAto37-6" /></figure><h3>The need for a new Token Design</h3><p>A token is a complex puzzle piece to add to a protocol ecosystem and can take on several functions, from bootstrapping a network, incentivizing key activities from participants, making a system more resilient by decentralizing ownership, or creating a community that provides marketing, business development, even software development.</p><p>It is impossible for a token to fulfill all potential goals. Some objectives are contradictory in nature. For example, while a token can help fundraise more easily because of its liquidity compared to equity, a large investor allocation is usually detrimental to creating an incentivised community and decentralizing governance. A token can only be optimized towards a limited set of key variables. Therefore, we advise teams to first get a clear view of their business goals, then test product-market fit with an MVP and a couple of iterations, and only afterward release a token to support the product and achieve the overall business goals. The goals of token design follow from the business goals. For instance, a product intended to benefit from (defensible) network effects should have a tokenomic design that incentivizes kickstarting such network effects.</p><blockquote><em>To learn more about our tokenomics philosophy, check out our tokenomics series. Our first article covers </em><a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/tokenomics-guide-1-do-i-need-a-token-afcb47c46bfa"><em>how to decide whether a project needs a token</em></a><em>.</em></blockquote><blockquote>Good teams manage their token and its design responsibly. The opportunity lies in what the token can achieve for the project, not in the token itself. The value has to outweigh the costs of added complexity of processes (e.g. governance), management of the additional layer on top of the product (e.g. token allocation, liquidity, token value accrual), and noise as a result of having 24/7 evaluation and sentiment management based on the token price.</blockquote><p>Over time, the market surfaced several challenges of existing token designs.</p><h4><strong>Failure to create aligned, active governance participants</strong></h4><p>The assumption behind ve-tokens that governance participants which lock up their tokens for multiple years are incentivized to vote in favor of the long-term health of the protocol has proven itself to be false.</p><p>Reality pain(t)s the following picture: <a href="https://dune.com/queries/1203127">While governance participation may be higher</a>, it’s mostly because of short-term financial incentives (bribes) rather than actual alignment. The issue occurring here is that bribes do not overlap with revenue to the protocol, only to token holders. For example, governance participants direct token incentives to the liquidity pools with the highest bribes. These pools tend to have low trading volumes (otherwise they wouldn’t need such extensive bribes as LPs would earn more fees) and as a result, low fees for the protocol. This is what Solidly attempted to resolve by only allowing voters to share in fees from the pools they’d voted for.</p><p>Protocols not only see low revenue from governance decisions. They also vastly overpay in token incentives for the little they make. While bribers can boast “every dollar in bribes unlocks $3 in token incentives for us”, let’s look at this statement from the side of the emitting protocol and its token holders. Token holders get diluted 3$ for every dollar in bribes they make. The protocol makes a couple of cents in revenue for incentivized low-volume trading pairs.</p><p>Bribing allows token holders to make short-term profit. “Who knows what the tokens will be worth in 4 years. Better to take with me as much as I can now“. Long-term governance becomes an externality that others are supposed to take care of. Over time, more and more voters see they get the short end of the stick by voting with a long-term vision instead of taking bribes like the rest. With a decreasing price because of others dumping their liquidity mining incentives, the long-term vision fades into the background and bribes become the main utility for the locked tokens.</p><h4><strong>Boom-and-bust cycles intensifying</strong></h4><p>ve-locking takes tokens out of circulation for long periods. The remaining liquidity is insufficient to serve the market, especially as ve-token systems usually involve high token emissions.</p><p>In the beginning, locking quickly takes tokens out of circulation while attention attracts buyers, driving prices up. Then token emissions start, leading to selling pressure from emission recipients. While stakers can’t dump their principal because it’s locked, new buyers might also not be willing to step in as they are not comfortable locking up their tokens for years (which comes with huge opportunity costs) and otherwise would only get diluted over time. The DeFi whale playbook has been to be an early investor or liquidity provider, to capture the majority of early liquidity mining rewards, potentially locking, but definitely selling a lot of the yield on new entrants.</p><p>The people who get rekt in the end are stakers which lock their tokens for the maximum period of time, the voters the protocol actually wants.</p><h4><strong>Destructive meta-layers (like CVX, Hidden Hand)</strong></h4><p>For stakers, it makes sense to go through the meta governance protocol as it gives them short-term liquidity for their vote-escrowed position, like cvxCRV for CRV (we’ll use this as an example for simplification purposes, but it’s similar for all). The meta governance protocol accumulates ve-tokens which are controlled by their own native-token (e.g. vlCVX). If owning 1 vlCVX (or bribing vlCVX holders) becomes more effective for DAOs than owning/bribing CRV holders, token demand and bribes are flowing to it rather than CRV.</p><p>Another issue of meta governance protocols is the liquidity of the tradable token representing the vote-escrowed, original token, like cvxCRV. To be fair, liquidity is better than zero, as it’s the case with locked tokens during their lockup period. However, while ve-tokens unlock at some point, their wrapped counterpart never will. It’s a one way street from CRV to cvxCRV. The only way to leave is through the cvxCRV/CRV liquidity pool.</p><p>Everyone is locking their token through the meta-governance protocol as it’s the game-theoretically optimal solution. Part of the cvxCRV holders want to leave at some point. Now, the only way is to go through the cvxCRV/CRV liquidity pool. The more holders cash out, the more imbalanced towards cvxCRV the pool becomes. Meaning the later you sell, the less CRV you get for your cxvCRV. As a consequence, since you are looking to cash out, you get less USDC/ETH in the end.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/988/0*8YZlXI2y3ZwBYbKD" /></figure><p>The only way for sellers to get a better price again at some point is if others buy cvxCRV “at a discount” to CRV. The problem here is there is no discount. cvxCRV is not pegged to CRV and there’s no redemption mechanism. There’s no additional arbitrage mechanism.</p><p>Essentially, by staking with the meta-governance protocols, people trade long-term liquidity (by having to go through the CRV/cvxCRV pool) for short-term liquidity (by receiving cvxCRV for their locked CRV). Projects like Convex and Hidden Hand are logical evolutions to increase the utility and “wars” for ownership of projects that employ ve-Token designs. However they have substantial downsides, and we must demand better as users. They are bolt-ons to solve an innovative but flawed tokenomic design.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/488/0*shmS_ZQmJfy7wrjR" /></figure><blockquote><em>For more information about the downsides of ve-tokens, check out these articles:</em></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://medium.com/@0xKepler/tokenomics-musings-ve-tokens-and-alternatives-43402e781661"><em>Tokenomics Musings: ve-tokens and alternatives</em></a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://outlierventures.io/vegood-vebad-and-veugly/"><em>veGood, veBad, and veUgly</em></a></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://outlierventures.io/vev2-five-strategies-for-bringing-back-vote-escrow/"><em>Vev2: 5 Strategies for bringing back vote escrow</em></a></blockquote><h3>Power Token Overview</h3><p>The Power token design has the following goals</p><ul><li>Alignment of LPs and stakers</li><li>Price discovery without locking stakers</li><li>Broad distribution of tokens to increase decentralization</li></ul><p>Holders can stake the native-token to receive power tokens 1-to-1. There is no lock-up (!!) but protocols may add a withdrawal period. For IPOR, the first protocol using power tokens, there’s a 14 days withdrawal period.</p><p>Compared to the ve-token model where the amount of ve-tokens a user receives is based on their lockup period, there’s no logic embedded into the staking contract. This makes power tokens more flexible as each additional module can have custom logic.</p><p>For example, IPOR uses a liquidity mining module with a logarithmic multiplier curve. Therefore, stakers have diminishing marginal returns on power tokens when keeping the liquidity provided constant. The more tokens someone stakes without increasing liquidity (so the higher the ratio of power tokens/LP tokens), the less additional rewards they earn. The reward multiplier still increases, but in a slower manner.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*2FXjxQrgpLT5fGLM" /></figure><p>Stakers further have to decide which pools to apply their boost to. Depending on the liquidity provided to a particular asset pool and the staker’s ratio as an LP in it, their potential part of the delegated power tokens, as well as the amount of liquidity mining rewards per pool, a power token staker should seek a game theoretical optimum across asset pools..</p><p>Other modules can flexibly be built on top of power tokens, such as a governance module or a profit sharing module.</p><blockquote>That’s it for today! In Part 2, we will dive deeper into the mechanics of Power Tokens.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5fa4c1daf938" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/power-tokens-a-new-tokenomics-template-part-1-5fa4c1daf938">Power Tokens — A new Tokenomics Template [Part 1]</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao">Deus Ex DAO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tokenomics Guide #2 — Real yield: How to distribute profits to token holders?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/tokenomics-guide-2-real-yield-how-to-distribute-profits-to-token-holders-5f5c46e5d2f?source=rss-1cd01a80cbd7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5f5c46e5d2f</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xKepler]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Jan 2023 15:20:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-11T15:20:30.360Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Tokenomics Guide #2 — Real yield: How to distribute profits to token holders?</h3><h4>Analyzing buyback-and-burn, buyback-and-distribute and co</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*SNlFRzn3ZKKJk7xn.png" /></figure><p>In the <a href="https://deusexdao.substack.com/p/tokenomics-guide-1-do-i-need-a-token">first article of our ongoing series about tokenomics</a>, we provided a checklist to help you improve your decision-making whether to add a token to your product or not.</p><p>We have identified ways in which your token could add value and capture (some) of the value it creates. In this article, we will look at the various mechanisms that exist to distribute part of the captured value back to token holders.</p><h3>Why share profits with token holders?</h3><p>In traditional companies, share buybacks and dividend payouts are mostly seen as a way to make your stock more attractive for investors when your business doesn’t expect high growth in the future. The reinvestment of generated cash flows back into the operations is expected to only yield low returns (limited productivity of cash), so little that distributing it to shareholders is seen as a better use for it.</p><p>While this is important to keep in mind for crypto builders, crypto projects distinctly differ from legacy companies: They use blockchains to streamline processes and grow faster, which allows more people to participate. Projects are often reliant on a network of contributors, users, partners, etc. This changes the math of “value created by reinvesting” versus “value created by distributing profits”. First, there is no longer a clear line between the two. Distributing profits can be seen as a reinvestment into the community. The more is going to productive members of the community, the closer it is to re-investing. Second, token holders can add a lot more value to crypto projects, for example, organized in a DAO, compared to centralized companies. As a result, we expect profit-sharing to make sense for crypto companies way earlier than it does for traditional companies. Teams have to evaluate the different choices of how they can use profits to add value and select the ones with the highest expected value.</p><p>The value add of profit-sharing can include:</p><ul><li>Generating attention to stand out amongst the thousands of projects</li><li>Creating evangelists that take on important business functions (marketing, business development, product feedback, building complementary products etc.), almost like a second core team</li><li>Active governance participation where needed</li></ul><blockquote><em>Protocols would rather loot their treasury by giving out grants to fund low-value initiatives than distribute some of their profits to token holders.</em></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/498/0*eNNc5aXv_WYy6Oyt" /></figure><h3>Analyzing profit-sharing mechanisms</h3><p>There are three main profit-sharing models projects can utilize:</p><ul><li><strong>Buyback-and-Burn</strong>: Using (part of the) profits to buy the project’s native token and sending it to the null address, thereby “burning” it which reduces the token supply.</li><li><strong>Buyback-and-Distribute</strong>: Using (part of the) profits to buy the project’s native token and distribute it to stakeholders, for example, stakers.</li><li><strong>Distribute</strong>: Using (part of the) profits and directly distributing them to stakeholders, for example, stakers. Usually a non-native token, such as ETH or USDC.</li></ul><p>While buyback-and-Burn is similar to a stock buyback, the latter two resemble dividends, but in different denominators (native token vs non-native token). Diving deeper however reveals more fundamental differences between the two.</p><p>We can evaluate the (potential) effects of the three distinct profit-sharing mechanisms on different variables, namely tax effect, impact on the token price and value accrual, and equality in the distribution of rewards.</p><p>Keep in mind that any form of profit-sharing can lead to a token being seen as an unregistered security. Therefore, make sure to consult a legal advisor.</p><h3>Tax Effect</h3><p>Just a quick mention because a) we are no tax experts, and b) there are different tax regimes across the world, but generally, <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/active-trading/073015/dividend-versus-buyback-which-better.asp">stock buybacks provide more flexibility for shareholders</a>, which can help minimize the tax burden. This factor speaks for a buyback-and-burn model.</p><p>For the two mechanisms involving profit distribution, the yield might be seen as a dividend or income from work depending on the tax regime. Token holders have to report these income streams correctly. If they have to realize the profits into fiat for accounting purposes or paying taxes, this would result in selling pressure for the token in the Buyback-and-Distribute regime.</p><h3>Token Price and Value Accrual</h3><p>It’s helpful to make a distinction between the (short-term) token price and (long-term) value accrual to separate fundamentals and noise.</p><h4><strong>Token price</strong></h4><p>Both systems which are using buybacks make the token price go up = holders are happy!</p><p>Their default mode is selling profits to buy more tokens, thereby automatically “compounding” profits for token holders. Both times, token holders increased their share in the project, either because the supply decreased (Buyback-and-Burn”) or because they received more tokens (Buyback-and-Distribute).</p><p>The Distribute model’s default mode isn’t impacting the token price. Dividend receivers need to actively buy the native token with their profit shares. Therefore, it’s safe to assume that buyback models will have a bigger impact on the short-term token price than the Distribute model. At worst, even if all recipients sell the native token to lock in their rewards, the price will revert to the level prior to the buyback, the same price the Distribute model will result in (no price impact).</p><p><em>*Assuming no sandwich attack on the buyback or LPs pulling liquidity in the time between buyback and profit lock-in by token holders.</em></p><p>Note: Both buyback models only have a direct impact on token price if they are done on the open market.</p><h4><strong>Value accrual</strong></h4><p>Profit-sharing mechanisms only decide <em>how</em> captured value gets distributed. The profit generation takes place somewhere else. Consequently, the distribution doesn’t have a direct effect on the fundamental valuation in itself, but rather the subjective interpretation of it, which can result in deviating behaviors by token holders, and therefore, different outcomes, at least in the short-term.</p><p>The price-to-earnings ratio (P/E ratio) is commonly used as an indicator of fundamental value. In the Distribute model, the token price doesn’t change in the default situation. Therefore, all earnings help improve (lower) the P/E ratio, making the business more attractive this way. In both buyback models, earnings are used to increase the token price, making the P/E ratio worse off (higher). However, most crypto investors only look at the token price, meaning it’s often of benefit to pump the token so new buyers pump it even more. That works until it doesn’t.</p><p>The overall effect on price and P/E ratio ultimately depends on the market participants. For example, in a market full of P/E ratio enjoyoooors, the Distribute model would result in buy pressure by “value investors”, which results in a higher price, and in turn a higher P/E ratio. On a long enough timeframe, no matter the profit-sharing method, valuation will fluctuate around and then converge towards an equilibrium. What differs is the variance, influenced by the market participants’ mental models. In the crypto market where most people only look at prices, especially in a bull market, reflexivity is high, leading to more variance (stronger boom-and-bust cycles).</p><p>In the end, the profit distribution logic doesn’t affect the value captured by a business. It does however determine how stakeholders can capture that value (profit) themselves, as the next section discusses.</p><h3>Equality and fairness of profit-sharing</h3><p>Both buyback models have the issue that locking-in profits becomes competitive between stakeholders, resulting in inequality. The first people to sell after a buyback enjoy higher profits than the rest as they get to sell at higher prices (excluding any potential additional demand). That leads to vast discrepancies in the APRs (measured in dollar terms) that individuals earn. Value can even be extracted by non-holders if teams aren’t cautious with their buybacks. MEV bots can sandwich attack buybacks to make the team buy at a higher price and immediately sell to the liquidity pool afterwards to realize a profit, which brings the price down to its previous level. To mitigate this, buybacks can be done at random times, from different addresses, through private relayers, or via OTC deals.</p><p>Looking at it from a token distribution perspective, the Buyback-and-Burn model increases every holder’s share equally by decreasing the total supply. The “buyback-and-distribute” model is more flexible and allows for a targeted approach to profit-sharing. For example, profits could only be distributed to stakers, which is usually the case. It’s also possible to use the model to incentivize good behavior, for instance by requiring recipients to be active governance participants. By distributing profits to value-adding stakeholders, the Buyback-and-Distribute model can be seen as more fair, depending on your definition of the term.</p><p>Another problem of the Buyback-and-Burn model is that it takes tokens out of circulation, so they can no longer be used to incentivize the community, pay for services, etc.</p><p>The Distribute model appears to be the most recommendable.</p><ul><li>All recipients receive an equal profit share (if rewards are paid in stablecoins or a highly liquid token like ETH)</li><li>Everyone keeps their existing share of the protocol measured as the percentage of the total supply</li><li>Distribution can target specific users</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/0*uu336amUgc1i3dq-" /></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The popular Buyback-and-Burn mostly acts as a value signaling tool (some would call it price manipulation), but ultimately seems inferior to the Buyback-and-Distribute, and especially the Distribute model in most cases.</p><p>While a Buyback-and-Distribute system adds the flexibility of sharing profits to specific, valuable stakeholders, the Distribute system seems more equal and fairer by not making profit lock-in competitive between stakeholders and not sending short-term price signals to the market via buybacks.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5f5c46e5d2f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/tokenomics-guide-2-real-yield-how-to-distribute-profits-to-token-holders-5f5c46e5d2f">Tokenomics Guide #2 — Real yield: How to distribute profits to token holders?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao">Deus Ex DAO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Onwards]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@0xKepler/onwards-cc3b9a038833?source=rss-1cd01a80cbd7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cc3b9a038833</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xKepler]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 13 Nov 2022 17:12:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-13T17:12:03.900Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>After the FTX Collapse</h4><blockquote>This is not like the other articles of mine but rather me just trying to capture my stream of consciousness as an attempt to vent in a productive way.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cm7wRY94TRg9FDxsxnW6UA.png" /></figure><p>This has been my hardest week in crypto so far. While not being directly affected, seeing the ultimate carnage that has destroyed the industry and people around me, and seeing believers question the future of crypto, took a toll and made me reflect the current state of crypto, what went wrong so we ended up here, and what we can learn from it.</p><p>I’m an optimist and want to provide people a positive outlook without making unrealistic promises.</p><h3><strong>Emotions</strong></h3><p>Yes, things will get better. Time heals all wounds.<br>No, that doesn’t mean all you have to do is stay in crypto and you’ll automatically be rewarded with new portfolio ATHs.<br>But, that’s not the end goal, isn’t it?</p><p>If you need a break, take it. Don’t feel pressured to stay active because that’s what seems to be needed to “make it”. Better to take care of your health, family and friends, day-to-day finances, whatever else is important to you first, and then come back stronger. With new energy. New ideas. New skills.</p><p>When you are emotional, you are vulnerable. People will try to exploit that. Prioritize time away from the screen. Heal. Don’t doomscroll on Twitter. It’s more important than ever now to do an information diet. High signal, low noise.</p><p>“Just stay in there and wagmi” is survivorship bias. You don’t hear of the waves of OGs who stayed for years and failed. It takes effort. That doesn’t mean you need to make it by trading. Find something that suits your skill set and interests. (This applies to VCs too btw. Maybe you have another calling).</p><blockquote>I would recommend finding a core group of people to work with or joining a project. People who do this, and get a bit lucky, will get rewarded. And if they don’t get lucky, they learned something valuable and made connections to leverage from and try again.</blockquote><h3>To Thought Leaders</h3><p>Some thought leaders have come out after SBF’s downfall, sharing their negative experiences with him. Before, we have mostly seen praise, even worship, for SBF. I understand its difficult to voice unpopular opinions due to the size of the industry and how the incentives work. Better to keep your mouth shut and get dealflow then be left out. It can be extremely scary even for other reasons. Not blaming anyone, I understand it. But I still think we can do better. We should do better. By working together on exposing bad actors we can make it easier to come forward, not putting too much pressure on the shoulders of a few. If you have an idea how, I’m happy to contribute.</p><h3>To Effective Altruists</h3><p>With all your extreme utilitarianism, consider both sides to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y8kEiL81_R4">how much a dollar cost</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cc3b9a038833" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Look at IPOR]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/a-look-at-ipor-60fb6f60ce59?source=rss-1cd01a80cbd7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/60fb6f60ce59</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[interest-rate-swap]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralized-finance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xKepler]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 08 Nov 2022 17:18:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-08T17:18:52.539Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Bringing Interest Rate Derivatives to DeFi</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ZAZZIOGEsbSZylxX.png" /></figure><p>As DeFi matures, we will see an increasing number of models and products make their way over from TradFi. While some concepts won’t be compatible with the permissionless nature and ethos of crypto, others can be adapted, made more transparent, and ultimately benefit users and move the space forward. One of these concepts is interest rate derivatives (IRDs).</p><h3>The Market for Interest Rate Derivatives</h3><p><a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1v1aBfjgUigXXYI2Svx_TXPlqJWs9XPos/view">With $450 trillion</a>, IRDs are one of the largest markets in TradFi. IRDs such as interest rate swaps allow market participants to hedge risks of changes in market interest rates, or to take directional bets on interest rates.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/312/0*QnWzMdiy9BAORVdm" /><figcaption><em>Source: </em><a href="https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy2205.pdf"><em>https://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy2205.pdf</em></a></figcaption></figure><p>IRDs allow splitting of the risks associated with a financial instrument. For example, they allow the hedging of the risk free rate component of corporate bonds, leaving traders only with the credit risk and associated yield. By making interest rates easily tradable, IRDs improve the management of risk within markets and thus allow broader participation and more precise trade expression.</p><p>IRDs are, for example, used by companies to manage their floating-rate debt liabilities. Using interest rate swaps, they can pay a fixed rate and receive a floating rate (going long) which matches their floating-rate debt to effectively lock in their fixed rate. As we’ll learn later, interest rate swaps can offer high leverage (multiplier of a couple of hundred to thousands) at moderate risk, making the described example incredibly capital-efficient.</p><p>There are a variety of interest rate derivative instruments, such as swaps, caps, floors, collars and futures. However, interest rate swaps (IRS) are the most popular.</p><h3>IPOR Interest Rate Swaps</h3><h4>How do interest rate swaps work?</h4><p>Interest rate swaps allow users to exchange the cash flows of a fixed interest rate for a floating interest rate and vice versa.</p><p>That means there are two bets one can take:</p><ul><li>Short: Bet on a decreasing interest rate by paying the floating rate and receiving the fixed rate (make positive cash flow if interest rates go down)</li><li>Long: Bet on an increasing interest rate by paying fixed and receiving floating</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/335/0*Ea-bMGTfjWKF8Ueh" /></figure><p>The positions are settled by the losing party paying out the difference between the floating and fixed interest rate to the winner. In contrast to traditional perps and options which exist in DeFi, the Profit-and-Loss (PnL) of interest rate swaps slowly accrues over time. Interest rates have a time component — they set the interest (cash flow) to be paid or received over the span of a year.</p><blockquote>Example:</blockquote><blockquote>User A is willing to pay a fixed rate of 1.5% and will receive the floating rate. User B takes the other side of the trade. User A is long, User B is short interest rates. The notional amount of the swap is $1,000 (the notional amount is the predetermined currency amount, or principal, on which the exchanged interest payments are based on).</blockquote><blockquote>Day 1: The floating rate is 1.7%</blockquote><blockquote>The difference to the fixed interest rate is 0.2%.</blockquote><blockquote>User A accrues a profit of 0.2% * $1,000 * (1/365) = ~ $0,00548</blockquote><blockquote>Day 2: The floating rate is 1.4%</blockquote><blockquote>The difference to the fixed interest rate is -0.1%.</blockquote><blockquote>User A accrues a loss of -0.1% * $1,000 * (1/365) = ~ $(0,00274)</blockquote><blockquote>The total PnL of user one over the 2 days is ~ $0,00274</blockquote><p>As the example shows, the PnL of traders only changes slightly every day. The total PnL is the sum of the daily PnLs. Interest rate swaps work over a period of time (for example, IPOR currently offers a maturity of 28 days), versus options and perps which take the price at one time to settle the contracts. This also means that even if interest rates spike for one or a couple of days, it’s unlikely to immediately get liquidated (low tail-end risk) .</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TtxLBieC8mLV2ZPJ" /></figure><h4>Designing a Request-For-Quote AMM for interest rate swaps</h4><p>IPOR uses a peer-to-pool model for their interest rate swaps. Liquidity providers (LPs) put tokens into pools (one for each supported asset, e.g. DAI, USDC, USDT). Traders can then long or short the interest rate of an asset with LPs automatically taking the other side of the trade. This concept of automated market makers is often used in DeFi as it helps to bootstrap liquidity and allows for composability. But, IPOR’s request-for-quote AMM has distinct differences compared to, for example, AMM DEXs:</p><ul><li>Actively sets spreads (vs passively/actively pricing assets) based on external data to keep LPs with neutral exposure</li><li>Single-sided LPing, so no impermanent loss (IL)</li><li>PnL of interest rate swaps slowly accrues over time, reducing (tail-end) risk</li></ul><p>In IPOR IRS the main lever market makers of interest rate swaps have to manage risk is the spread. The spread is the difference between the floating rate and the fixed rate. IPOR determines the spread based on market conditions, including volatility, recent changes, trend, maturity, and sudden jumps.</p><p>IPOR’s quant team built their AMM based on 3 TradFi models: Hull-White, Jump Diffusion, and Longstaff-Schwartz pricing (<a href="https://ipor-labs.notion.site/e592feae2660418a90c35434849f0c0b?v=d35d84b479204c26bc1bb30d2b8ace4a">read more here</a>). The team iterated different models via <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/development-update-road-to-mainnet-681bd503c897">backtesting</a> to discover a working AMM model. In conversations with the team, they mentioned the main difficulty was to express the theories in “simple” formulas to be able to affordably execute them on-chain.</p><p>The AMM is designed to be only slightly profitable, generally winning as often as losing. This ensures LPs will make money from fees (+ yield on underlying assets) while being fair to traders, which is essential to drive trading volume.</p><p>At the time of writing, the model has been shown to perform as expected during the first two months on mainnet. LPing has so far been profitable as indicated by the LP profitability graph on <a href="https://app.ipor.io/statistics">IPOR’s statistics page</a>.</p><h4>IPOR Use Cases</h4><p>As mentioned, there are two parties to IPOR, traders and LPs.</p><p><strong>Traders</strong></p><p>Traders can go long or short interest rates for USDC, USDT or DAI to:</p><ul><li>Hedge their interest rate exposure (e.g. lock in a fixed rate for borrowing by longing the interest rate on IPOR (pay fixed, receive floating) or lock in a fixed rate for lending by shorting the interest rate (pay floating, receive fixed))</li><li>Arbitrage inefficiencies between stablecoins or money markets</li><li>Take directional bets (speculate)</li></ul><p>Traders pay an opening fee of $10 + 1% of collateral and have to make a $25 liquidation deposit which is refunded if they don’t get liquidated. When traders close their position, 10% of the profit (from the trader or LP) goes towards the treasury as an income fee.</p><p>The great thing about interest rate swaps is that they are incredibly capital efficient (IPOR allows up to 1000x leverage). As a result, one can hedge a large notional amount (e.g. the borrowed amount of stablecoins you want to hedge) with a fraction in collateral, which one can reasonably do since rates have low volatility (compared to directional tokens) and PnL accrues over time. It’s highly unlikely one would experience the type of instant liquidations seen when leverage trading perpetuals, which express opposite characteristics: volatile asset prices and instant settlement. Furthermore, traders are exposed to a maximum loss limited to the size of their collateral.</p><p>IPOR has a simple swap UI aimed at beginners and an advanced UI with all details for experienced traders.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/689/0*3Dfse1kcyebvCjHC" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/716/0*Twsw2NLfuGEu9I1r" /></figure><p>Using IPOR for hedging is cheaper than getting a fixed-rate loan from money markets. Money markets so far have optimized for liquidity, not pricing.</p><p>As of November 5th 2022, the variable borrow rate for USDC on Aave is 2.12%, while the fixed rate is 10.57%. The fixed rate on IPOR (28 day maturity) is 1.58%</p><p>IPOR has a hedging calculator on their site to determine the cost of locking in a fixed rate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*hwCUTJLBzu1R845r" /></figure><p><strong>Liquidity Providers (LPs)</strong></p><p>LPs act as the counterparty to all trades. Their revenue consists of:</p><ul><li>Fees paid by traders to open a trade (1% of collateral).</li><li>Inverse PnL of all traders, which IPOR calls <a href="https://docs.ipor.io/automated-market-maker/soap#what-is-soap">S.O.A.P (Sum Of All Payoffs)</a>. When traders lose, LPs win.</li><li>Leveraged yield on assets: Idle assets in the LP pools and collateral deposited by traders is lent out on money markets (Aave and Compound at the start).</li></ul><p>Compared to AMM LPing, LPs have isolated risks. They are only exposed to assets they want to be exposed to (e.g. one stablecoin and not multiple like as Curve LPs) and thus do not suffer impermanent loss. As revenue is expected to mainly come from fees, LPs earn real yield at low risk which isn’t subject to betting on the right direction, such as the revenue that, for example, option vaults generate.</p><p>The interface shows LPs where the yield is coming from. Please note that asset management (yield on assets) went live later and therefore is underrepresented in the chart.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/368/0*tBqfIBXNp6TePo4U" /></figure><p><a href="https://app.ipor.io/statistics">Under the statistics tab</a>, one can view the LP performance over time. A risk is the AMMs ability to correctly price spreads. But, there’s also the selection of the asset you LP for. The current stables included show different behaviors. An ETH market will be added sometime in the future too.</p><p>In analyzing the stats, one can discover interesting dynamics, such as how the DAI rate dropped when ETH recently pumped (likely because of increased ability to borrow Dai, since ETH’s USD value increased). Or that USDT’s rates seem to increase during bullishness, since it’s the primary asset used for taking on leverage at CEXes. We’d love to hear what trade ideas you can come up with.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/692/0*xlTzDRLj6l-NnOZf" /></figure><p>Due to its real yield and low risk profile, we believe IPOR is an interesting protocol for <a href="https://blog.ipor.io/fixed-income-in-defi-risk-management-for-dao-treasuries-part-1-5842d8e29f04">DAOs or institutions looking to earn yield on their stablecoins</a>. Other likely users will be yield aggregation projects, or those facilitating delta neutral strategies or structured products. These can use IPOR to lock-in their borrowing rates.</p><h3>The IPOR Index</h3><p>In TradFi, you may have heard of benchmark interest rates such as LIBOR, EURIBOR and SOFR. These are used as points of reference for many debt instruments, such as mortgage rates and corporate loans. We are missing such an instrument in DeFi, and IPOR has created the best implementation that we’ve seen so far.</p><p>IPOR’s interest rate swaps are built on top of the IPOR index. The IPOR index aims to be the risk-free, real-market interest rate of DeFi. At the moment, the index is the blended, volume-weighted rate (moving average) from Aave and Compound. There’s one index each for USDC, USDT and DAI.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/695/0*NkthZKTrPMQem3Lu" /><figcaption><em>You can check the IPOR index for all supported assets on ipor.io</em></figcaption></figure><p>As the index includes interest rates from multiple money markets weighted by their volume, each market’s weight increases and decreases over time, and with it their impact on the IPOR benchmark rate. This allows the IPOR index to capture the true interest rate in the market. Additionally, the IPOR index rates as a weighted average of the rates of isolated credit protocols are less volatile, decreasing the risks for traders and LPs.</p><p>This is in contrast to other implementations of interest rate derivatives, like Voltz, which allows trading against isolated assets and markets (e.g. trade USDC on Aave). The downside to this approach is that it doesn’t result in a convergence of rates, which will result in a less volatile and more efficient money and DeFi market as a whole.</p><p>In TradFi, the LIBOR was the benchmark rate which was <a href="https://twitter.com/ipor_io/status/1578029431767322624">retired due to manipulation</a>. Therefore, the IPOR team stresses the importance of decentralizing governance for the index (hint, hint). The IPOR index is a public good anyone can build on top of. As the foundation for IRD products, it’s essential that the index is being determined transparently. The DAO will decide on which assets to add indexes for, which money markets to include, which chains to add etc. A key prerequisite for assets, money markets and chains to get an index is the native lending volume. This volume prerequisite is also why they’re currently only deployed on Ethereum Mainnet, as no other chains have significant money market activity.</p><p>We think many protocols will want a say in how such an index is composed. For example, a (stablecoin) issuer will benefit from a deep interest rate derivative market for its asset, since it will allow people to mint/lend/borrow the asset at larger scale with lower risk. Smart teams may want to have a seat at the table to encourage adoption (and maintain the neutrality) of the index.</p><p>In the long run, it’s not unlikely that an economy around the IPOR index publication will develop, similar to decentralized oracle networks.</p><p>If IPOR can pull off their vision of a transparent, decentralized benchmark interest rate for DeFi, that would be a big win over TradFi, which had to retire the LIBOR.</p><h3>What’s next for IPOR?</h3><p>The next milestones on the roadmap are:</p><ul><li>An IPOR Index for ETH</li><li>Interest rate swaps with longer maturity. Currently only 28 days are available. Longer periods allow for easier hedging.</li><li>V2 of the request-for-quote AMM, which prices portfolio exposure into its spreads</li><li>Capital efficiency boost by allowing for a utilization of &gt; 100% of the liquidity provided for an asset. Right now, only 40% of liquidity can be used for longs or shorts each. Subject to governance change, this could be increased to over 100% utilization as longs and shorts balance each other out. Result: more fees &amp; more leveraged yield from traders’ collateral.</li></ul><p>Aside from interest rate swaps, other IRDs can be built on top of the IPOR Index as a benchmark rate, for example volatility indices, forwards, futures.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>IPOR addresses the huge market of IRDs, taking the approach of building the required infrastructure (IPOR index) first. Based on crypto’s ethos, the IPOR index is a public good.</p><p>Interest rate swaps are live on the Ethereum, audited and ready for use. So far, they have shown the potential to provide above-market risk-adjusted yield on stablecoins for LPs and capital efficient hedging for traders.</p><p>In our personal conversations with the team we were convinced of their expertise and passion. IPOR Labs is a team of 16 people with extensive quant and TradFi experience.</p><p>Disclaimer: Deus Ex DAO is happy to work with the IPOR Labs team as advisors.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=60fb6f60ce59" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/a-look-at-ipor-60fb6f60ce59">A Look at IPOR</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao">Deus Ex DAO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Framework for Airdrops]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/a-framework-for-airdrops-d585a2fae8f7?source=rss-1cd01a80cbd7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d585a2fae8f7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[airdrop]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web3]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xKepler]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Sep 2022 19:21:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-27T19:21:49.107Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>How to distribute Tokens</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*a1F28WlsJfYeWqnX" /></figure><p>Airdrops have been a constant companion in crypto since <a href="https://academy.moralis.io/blog/what-are-crypto-airdrops-and-how-do-they-work">Auracoin in 2014</a>. The hype surrounding them and the expectations in teams have been increasing, especially after the CRV and the UNI airdrops.</p><p>On the other hand, there are many examples of airdrops which didn’t meet the expectations of teams and/or users. Issues range from non-existent governance contribution, low motivation due to inferior price performance, to dissatisfied users because of (in their view) restrictive airdrop conditions.</p><p>While focusing on price for moon math reasons is likely not advisable, it can be an indicator that something went wrong with the airdrop, or the context in which the airdrop took place in. For example, maybe the airdrop didn’t end up in the right hands. Or the tokenomics are unable to create demand for the token. Unfortunately, this seems to be a common issue, with <a href="https://twitter.com/cptn3mox/status/1539897086937706496">74% of projects trading below their Day 1</a> after 100 days. People don’t seem to want to hold their airdropped responsibility.</p><p>The tokenomics example shows: Airdrops have to be designed as part of a broader system, taking into consideration project goals, revenue models, and tokenomics, among other factors. An airdrop isn’t the almighty savior for a project. It can lead to short-term attention but will ultimately enhance the underlying strengths or weaknesses of a project by adding financial incentives, opening processes up to the community, and making it all visible via the price of a liquid token trading on the open market. An airdrop marks the start, not the end. It requires other systems to be in place to achieve its goals. For example, if the main goal is to decentralize governance, the basic governance processes, documents and tools should be in place already, and the foundational community culture should be established, as otherwise it’s unreasonable to expect participation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/486/0*AxMyEKRYgWenjEJ7" /></figure><h3>Setting Goals for the Airdrop</h3><p>There’s a multitude of potential goals for an airdrop, encompassing front funnel to back funnel objectives:</p><ul><li>Awareness</li><li>User acquisition (airdrop as CAC)</li><li>User retention (reward the community)</li><li>Bootstrapping network effects</li><li>Decentralizing governance</li><li>Aligning communities (e.g. when expanding to a new chain)</li></ul><p>The goals should be set in context with overall business goals. Doing so allows teams to also be aware of other actions to plan. For example, governance systems may need to be set up. Or, a team decides to use the created awareness for a community fundraiser (like Cowswap did).</p><p>Based on the determined goals, teams can then start designing the airdrop:</p><ul><li>Who gets the airdrop?</li><li>Which metrics are used for calculation? What are the restrictions?</li><li>What does the distribution curve look like?</li><li>Are rewards vested?</li><li>How big is the airdrop (in % of total supply)</li><li>How is the airdrop designed over time? Is it a one-time event or distributed over multiple occasions? For example, Optimism is doing a multi-stage airdrop to incentivize recurring participation.</li><li>How is the airdrop communicated to the outside?</li></ul><h3>Who to airdrop to &amp; based on which metrics?</h3><p>First, teams need to decide who to reward with an airdrop to achieve the goals stated in step 1, as well as the overall business goals. Afterwards, one can think about the appropriate metrics the airdrop should be based on.</p><h4>Who</h4><p>In general, the following groups exist:</p><p><strong>Supply-side users</strong></p><p>Basically all markets have two (or more) sides. Sometimes the line between them is clear (e.g. lenders on money markets are supply side), other times it is more blurred (e.g. LPs on DEXs, options writers). In the latter case, it depends on how a product’s value proposition is defined. For instance, a DEX can be framed as “an avenue providing traders with liquidity” (LPs as the supply side, e.g. Uniswap) or “self-rebalancing crypto ETFs” (LPs as the demand side, e.g. Balancer).</p><p>Two simple rules of thumb are generally applicable:</p><ul><li>The supply side reacts to the demand side and is therefore usually more passive (e.g. LPs on a DEX fill the orders of traders). There are different degrees of passiveness (JIT LPs &lt; Uni v3 LPs &lt; Uni v2 LPs) but all of them have in common that they react to traders’ requests.</li><li>The side bringing revenue is the demand side (e.g. option buyers pay premium and a fee)</li></ul><p>Bootstrapping networks (e.g. liquidity) is often the first bottleneck new services face. For example, the AirBnB founders went around NYC personally to make apartment owners sign up. Crypto networks provide us with a new way of incentivizing the supply side — tokens.</p><p>When a product benefits from network effects, it’s sensible to let early users take part in the network value they helped create. Normally, early adopters take on more risk but extract the same value from the network as latecomers. For example, the first buyers of a telephone made an expensive investment without much value at first (not many people to call). Over time, costs to acquire a telephone decreased and new users came in. At some point, everyone owned a telephone. People now had an efficient form of communication, everyone in a group could call each other. Everyone has the same value, while early adopters took the initial step and therefore the bigger risk. Tokens help to re-distribute the network value on a risk-adjusted basis. An issue arises when the first users only help to bootstrap the network for monetary gains and can easily leave after extracting value, thereby destroying the built-up network value.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/876/0*zPWa7tWMtCqvurMJ" /><figcaption><em>Source: </em><a href="https://insights.deribit.com/market-research/why-i-have-changed-my-mind-on-tokens/"><em>https://insights.deribit.com/market-research/why-i-have-changed-my-mind-on-tokens/</em></a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Demand-side users</strong></p><p>Tokens can also be used to create attention and acquire users on the demand side. Issues arise when the product has no actual product-market-fit (PMF). Airdrops or yield farming incentives distort market signals and revenue expectations (remember, we defined the demand side as the one bringing in the revenue). Mercenary capital exploits the system as long as the incentives &gt; costs. As protocol revenue is just a part of the costs for demand-side users (e.g. protocol fee on the borrowing rate), teams only get back cents on every $ spent.</p><p>Incentivizing the demand side can still be worthwhile if there’s a user lock-in resulting in Protocol Revenue &gt; CAC. A special case is if there are demand-side network effects at play. For example, higher trading volume on Cowswap increases its value proposition for all traders as it becomes more likely to match traders directly, leading to better pricing for all.</p><p>Overall, demand-side incentives should be used more cautionary than supply-side rewards.</p><ul><li>They can give teams the wrong signals</li><li>If a product has PMF, attention from other airdrops (e.g. to the supply-side) may be enough to also acquire demand-side users</li><li>Combining supply- and demand-side can lead to exploitative strategies like recursive lending</li></ul><p>While airdrops have unpredictable rewards and are therefore less exploitable than yield farming rewards, the challenges stated above still apply. Especially as airdrops may be expected, so teams might need to proactively communicate and get people away from the idea that demand-side usage will be rewarded generously.</p><blockquote>We recommend launching a liquidity mining program only after a product has found initial traction without it. Ideally, a product gains the first superusers because it solves their pain points.</blockquote><p><strong>Users of other protocols</strong></p><p>Airdrops can also be used to get the attention from users of similar or complementary protocols. Such an airdrop becomes more effective with action-based vesting. For instance, a user gets 20% unlocked after the first transaction, another 20% after 100k in trading volume and so on. This motivates people to try out the product and keeps costs related to user acquisition effectiveness. Furthermore, by making users come back, they might form a new habit of using the product regularly. The last point is more relevant for products with high-frequency usage.</p><p>Just airdropping a random token to people’s addresses doesn’t work, which is why teams need to ensure that the airdrop gets talked about. One option is to make the airdrop too valuable to ignore. Vesting is a great tool here as well: The potential airdrop can be big but is tied to per-user and total KPIs. The latter can, for example, be total trading volume on the platform, meaning users are incentivized to tell others to get a bigger airdrop themselves.</p><p><strong>Governance participants of other protocols</strong></p><p>If the goal is to have token holders as active governance protocols, teams may choose to include governance participants of other protocols.</p><p>The good thing: These people have shown to be interested in governance. That’s already a signal.</p><p>The bad thing: This doesn’t mean they are interested in YOUR governance.</p><p>Teams can approach this by being more selective. There’s a better chance people are interested in your governance if there’s already some relation between the protocols. Teams can even post proposals on the other protocol’s forum/snapshot to check if there’s engagement. Or go even further and retroactively airdrop to everyone who voted on that proposal. Problems arise if one group from another protocol holds a significant amount of votes in your protocol as well, as conflicts of interest may come up. Consequently, teams will likely need to include a number of different protocols on their airdrop list.</p><p>Teams also need to evaluate the holder distribution of other protocols, and between protocols.</p><p><strong>Community value-addoooors</strong><br>The logic behind rewarding engaged community members is that these people already showed interest, so chances are high they will contribute to governance and help drive a project forward. This seems logical but requires the correct execution to ensure that tokens end up in the right hands. Nowadays, every imaginable gameable metric gets automated and gamed by bots. Instead of focusing on the number of Discord messages, we need to focus on value and actions which require human effort. This requires manual work from community managers, which is difficult to scale. However, that work is worth it: Community members are putting in effort to contribute, so teams should be willing to put in effort to identify and reward them. As we strive for progressive decentralization, it’s fine to scale the number of governance contributors slowly. The early community acts as the foundation for the future community, so building a strong and aligned base is key.</p><p>A positive side effect of such a non-scalable system is that it automatically leads to airdrops in chunks over a longer timeframe, making rewards more equitable across time. While early contributors are the basis, community members who join later can also add value and therefore should be onboarded as governance participants. Projects require different skill sets along their path, so they should remain flexible to onboard new members. For example, managing an organization of 10 is vastly different from trying to align 500 people divided into 10 sub-groups to work on a common goal. However, projects may want to apply a reward multiplier for early contributors, as they take more risks (higher opportunity costs), similarly to how founders and early employees hold more company equity than later employees.</p><p>Alternatively, projects could set aside a portion of the tokenomics supply for Community Development, of which a portion can be assigned to contributors. Public knowledge of a project’s willingness and available funding to compensate community contributions is a great reason for people to get involved.</p><p><em>One thing to keep in mind is that these groups shouldn’t be looked at separately. An airdrop will likely include several groups (broad), or a Venn diagram between groups (narrow), based on its goals. As a general rule, it’s better to have a close community that cares rather than too many users who don’t.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Ka4BeBVk_rox5PJB" /></figure><h4>Metrics</h4><p>Two general rules of thumb apply:</p><ul><li>Reward people based on added value to your specified goals. Measure this quantitatively and qualitatively. This can be providing liquidity, dApp use and generation of protocol fees/volume, participation in community calls and Discord discussions, helping in Business Development or many other ways.</li><li>Focus on metrics that are hard to game and require human effort.</li></ul><h3>Airdrop distribution curve</h3><p>Teams have to make two decisions</p><h4><strong>Metric thresholds</strong></h4><p>The minimum criteria a user has to fulfill to receive an airdrop.</p><p>The main reason is to not spread the token distribution too thin and to remove sybil attackers from the distribution. On the other hand, an airdrop that is perceived as too restrictive can lead to negative sentiment within the community. The challenge for teams is to identify if the feedback is coming from the “real” community or people that engaged in sybilling and got disappointed. Transparency and communication with the community is important here. Hop Protocol took an interesting approach, <a href="https://twitter.com/HopProtocol/status/1522284555159416833">incentivizing their community to filter out sybil attackers</a>. Another approach to prevent bad blood from the community is to keep minimum requirements low and manually remove sybillers (even though they fulfill the criteria), rather than setting the minimum requirements high for everyone.</p><h4><strong>Spread of rewards</strong></h4><p>How much do the amounts of rewards differ between recipients?</p><p>For most metrics (e.g. TVL), we believe that identifying a good target group based on the goals for the airdrop and distributing tokens relatively equally among recipients helps to build an aligned community and reasonably decentralized governance system. For metrics that require more human effort (e.g. contributing to the community), a bigger spread in rewards between contributors is warranted.</p><h3>Airdrops in chunks</h3><p>While each airdrop has different goals, the overarching purpose is to find aligned parties that can add value. It’s not to give dividends to users.</p><p>Community members can and will have to add value over long time frames for a project to be successful. A continuous process of rewarding contributors with airdrops is helpful for that. Airdrops become more like continuous liquidity mining, but dynamic (not set from the start), flexible (include value-add apart from LPing) and discretionary (manual process). Another analogy is an open grant system, but with a focus on a “career path” for contributors rather than one-time jobs.</p><p>While a one-time airdrop may discourage new contributors to join as they feel like they missed out and are too late, continuous incentives adequately reward newcomers, who can add just as much value as early community members. This allows to effectively scale the contributor base, and with it, the project.</p><p>Again, transparency is key. People need to know how they can contribute, and what the main individual and overall KPIs are to evaluate their value-add. We advise teams to also keep a share of tokens without pre-determined distribution to remain flexible. A purely KPI-driven token distribution may turn out to be difficult, as some tasks are better judged on qualitative factors. When decisions are made by the team or a committee, they have to be mindful of their ethics and ensure processes are in place to prevent misuse (for example, favoring some users over others).</p><h3>Vesting and Vouchers</h3><h4>Vesting</h4><p>Vesting adds a long-term horizon and spreads out sell pressure over time. Instead of a one-time event, it keeps people engaged for a longer time. However, only a small subset of people is willing to stick to a project for longer, increasing token holder centralization. But it may be worth it when the remaining participants become high-value contributors.</p><p>Vesting can either be:</p><ul><li>time-based, which has the risk of being arbitrary</li><li>action-based, meaning a user unlocks tokens based on their actions over time, measured by metrics such as their trading volume</li><li>KPI-based, meaning airdrops unlock based on overall goals, such as TVL</li></ul><p>We recommend teams to make use of action-based vesting for the most part. The actions should lead to outcomes which add value, which can’t be controlled in time-based vesting. As a result, the airdrop efficiently controls expenses (in tokens) in relation to value received. Action-based vesting also gives people a sense of control and autonomy. In KPI-based vesting, people have to rely on others and factors that are outside of their control, which can result in frustration. Used sparsely, for example as a bonus on the airdrop, can however create a sense of belonging and motivate community members to work together.</p><h4>Vouchers and Public Investment Round</h4><p>Instead of giving away tokens for free, vouchers provide people with a discount on a token. The goal is to let people self-select. Only who values the token will make use of the voucher. For this to work, direct arbitrage with the market price has to be prevented, for example by introducing vesting. Vouchers can also come in the form of options and have been used by protocols such as Keep3r Network and hold resemblance to OHM bonding.</p><p>The main question is why contributors should spend money after they have already added value? Therefore, vouchers are more applicable to lower effort-levels of contribution, such as providing liquidity.</p><p>Another alternative is tying an airdrop to a fundraising round, where teamsyou may set aside a portion of the round for investment by the community. Cowswap did such an initiative, where a party’s airdrop allocation resulted in a whitelist for the community fundraise, which was done at a similar valuation and vesting terms as the private round. We think this is a great way to further distribute the token supply into a broad base of holders with high odds of remaining engaged and holding your token.</p><p>Making the token non-tradable at first can also drive self-selection, with tokens ending up in the hands of strong contributors.</p><h3>Airdrop size</h3><p>How big should the airdrop allocation be as % of total token supply? There’s no generally applicable answer to this question. Whatever added how much value informs the size. For continuous airdrops, teams should reserve a larger quantity of tokens for rewards.</p><h3>Further considerations</h3><p>Aside from the questions posed in the article, there are also tech-related decisions to make. For example, it’s better to have people claim the airdrop instead of distributing it.</p><ul><li>It brings people to your website and you can use the attention to educate them.</li><li>You can burn unclaimed tokens.</li></ul><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>While being thoughtful of the different mechanics of an airdrop and their effects is important, the context in which the airdrop is taking place ultimately decides the outcome and the fate of a project. An airdrop has a part in the user and contributor funnel, but for it to be effective, the rest of the funnel needs to be reasonably developed. That means, the product, tokenomics and governance systems need to be in place.</p><p><strong>Planning your airdrop and found this helpful? Or are you working on your tokenomics? Deus Ex DAO provides advisory services and would be happy to discuss your ideas and needs. You can find us on </strong><a href="https://twitter.com/deusexdao"><strong>Twitter</strong></a><strong> or on </strong><a href="https://www.deusexdao.com/contact"><strong>our website</strong></a><strong>!</strong></p><blockquote>Authors: <a href="https://twitter.com/0xKepler">0xKepler</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/ape_rture">Ape/rture</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/cryptobrucey">Brucey0x</a></blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d585a2fae8f7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao/a-framework-for-airdrops-d585a2fae8f7">A Framework for Airdrops</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/deus-ex-dao">Deus Ex DAO</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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