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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Mohamed Fares on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Mohamed Fares on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Mohamed Fares on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Full Organization Account Takeover (ATO) by Changing One Parameter]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@2os5/full-organization-account-takeover-ato-by-changing-one-parameter-9f67472d3138?source=rss-c742b1746249------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[ato]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hackerone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed Fares]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Feb 2026 03:48:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-23T09:57:02.210Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sometimes, hacking is not about complex payloads.</p><p>Sometimes… it’s about changing <strong>one ID</strong>.</p><p>In this write-up, I’ll explain step by step how I discovered a <strong>critical Broken Access Control vulnerability</strong> that allowed a normal user to take over the <strong>Owner account</strong> of an entire organization.</p><p>And I’ll explain it so simply that even someone new to security can understand it.</p><h3>The Setup: Understanding the Roles</h3><p>The application had two main roles:</p><ul><li><strong>Owner</strong> → The highest privilege. Full control.</li><li><strong>Full Access User (Non-owner)</strong> → High privilege, but not the Owner.</li></ul><p>In the UI, everything looked secure.</p><p>When you go to the <strong>Admin Accounts page</strong>:</p><ul><li>You cannot edit other users.</li><li>Even the Owner cannot edit others.</li><li>The only visible option is <strong>“Show Sessions”</strong>.</li></ul><p>So at first glance, it looks safe.</p><p>No “Edit User” button.<br> No “Change Password” option.<br> Nothing dangerous.</p><p>But here’s the important lesson:</p><blockquote><em>If the UI blocks it, that does NOT mean the backend blocks it.</em></blockquote><p>The UI is just the front door.<br> The backend is the real security guard.</p><h3>Step 1: Clicking “Show Sessions”</h3><p>As a Full Access user, I clicked:</p><blockquote><em>“Show Sessions” for the Owner account.</em></blockquote><p>I intercepted the request using Burp Suite.</p><p>And there it was.</p><p>A parameter called:</p><pre>admin_id</pre><p>This was the unique identifier of the Owner account.</p><p>That means:</p><blockquote><em>I now had the internal ID of the Owner.</em></blockquote><p>This ID is not supposed to be dangerous by itself.</p><p>But what if the backend trusts it too much?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/935/1*XiGgK1Lg8O0kLFVE0WYDQw.png" /></figure><h3>Step 2: Editing My Own Profile</h3><p>Next, I edited <strong>my own profile</strong>.</p><p>This action sent a request to:</p><pre>POST /admin/usersManage.php</pre><p>The request looked like this:</p><pre>POST /admin/usersManage.php</pre><p>Inside the body, I saw:</p><pre>admin_id=MY_ID</pre><p>Now think like a hacker.</p><p>The backend is saying:</p><blockquote><em>“Who do you want to edit? Tell me their admin_id.”</em></blockquote><p>And I already know the Owner’s admin_id.</p><p>So what happens if I replace:</p><pre>admin_id=MY_ID</pre><p>with:</p><pre>admin_id=OWNER_ID</pre><p>And then add:</p><pre>admin_password_new=HACKER_PASSWORD</pre><p>Let’s try.</p><h3>Step 3: Changing One Line</h3><p>Here’s the modified request:</p><pre>POST /admin/usersManage.php HTTP/2<br>Host: target.com<br>Cookie: &lt;full-access-user-session&gt;</pre><pre>faction=edituser&amp;<br>admin_id=OWNER_ADMIN_ID&amp;<br>save=1&amp;<br>admin_password_new=HACKER_PASSWORD&amp;<br>admin_name=farestestd&amp;<br>admin_email=33333%40belgianairways.com&amp;<br>admin_phone=&amp;<br>admin_signature=%3Cp%3Efares%3C%2Fp%3E</pre><p>I sent it.</p><p>And the server said:✅ Success.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RVOS_GlcR-eBjXvvHr-fKA.png" /></figure><p>No error.<br> No permission check.<br> No “you are not allowed”.</p><p>The Owner’s password was changed.</p><h3>Step 4: Logging in as the Owner</h3><p>I logged out.</p><p>Then I logged in as:<br>owner email with the new password I set. And I was inside.</p><p>Full Owner access.</p><p>Full organization control.</p><p>No phishing.<br> No brute force.<br> No malware.</p><p>Just changing one ID.</p><blockquote><em>Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)</em></blockquote><p>The backend trusted a parameter sent by the user (admin_id)<br> without checking:</p><ul><li>Who is making the request?</li><li>Are they allowed to modify this target?</li><li>Is the role hierarchy respected?</li></ul><p>The system assumed:</p><blockquote><em>“If you know the ID, you must be allowed.”</em></blockquote><p>That assumption destroyed the entire security model.</p><p>Contact Me:<br><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mohamed-fares-208008229/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/mohamed-fares-208008229/</a></p><p><a href="https://x.com/_2os5">https://x.com/_2os5</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9f67472d3138" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Account Takeover on Dell Inc]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@2os5/easy-account-takeover-on-dell-subdomain-6297460741fd?source=rss-c742b1746249------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[bugs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed Fares]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 05 Feb 2023 21:03:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-08-10T13:53:26.297Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته</p><p>My name is Mohamed fares and this is my first write up</p><p>this account takeover took 3 hours to find it</p><p>I started collecting subdomains and then filtering them</p><p>I found a subdomain that has sign-up and login page</p><p>I made two accounts and started testing</p><p>I tested every function there but nothing was found, and the last thing I was testing is resetting the password I tried everything I know, and I was going to give up</p><p>while testing I found that the two emails received the same reset token!!!</p><p>how did I do that?? I did not know how I did that!</p><p>then I tried what did I do and I figured out that the request was not protected from rate limits like (capatche) or token</p><p>anyway here is the steps</p><p>1-hacker account trying to reset his password using forget password function</p><p>2- write the email in the reset field and intercept the request</p><p>3- hold that request and do not forward it</p><p>4- send the request to the repeater and in the repeater change the email to (victim email)</p><p>5- now you have two requests (one in intercept on) and (one on repeater)</p><p>6- send the two requests in the same time and you will get the same reset password token in the victim email and hacker email</p><p>AND YEAH I CHANGED THE VICTIM’S PASSWORD USING THAT RESET PASSWORD</p><p>Thanks for reading</p><h4>My Twitter : _2os5</h4><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6297460741fd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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