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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ainsley Sutherland on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Ainsley Sutherland on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@AAAinsley?source=rss-cbf79704e465------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Ainsley Sutherland on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AAAinsley?source=rss-cbf79704e465------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 05:25:07 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Delegation:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/derivadex/delegation-e053715c4f04?source=rss-cbf79704e465------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e053715c4f04</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[governance-and-tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[delegation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web3]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ainsley Sutherland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Mar 2023 16:09:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-10T16:09:54.548Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong>An important tool for DAO-based governance</strong></h4><p><em>This article explains how delegation works on DerivaDEX. Delegation is a common practice across many DAO-based organizations.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VcjgoNjC0QBtP-sMhD7GfQ.png" /><figcaption>DAO governance doesn’t need to be fantastically complex.</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>What is delegation?</strong></h4><p>Delegation assigns your “voting power” to another person.</p><p>DDX holders have the right to participate in on-chain votes with their DDX, with each DDX corresponding to one vote. This is known as “token-weighted voting”, and is a common model for token-based governance. <em>(Alternatives include quadratic voting or one-vote-one-person voting, but we will not discuss these here as they are not currently implemented on DerivaDEX.)</em></p><p>“Voter apathy” is a problem for DAOs. Governance models often require a minimum vote participation (a quorum) in order for a proposal to be successful. On DerivaDEX, that number is currently approximately 2 million DDX. The reasoning behind this is to ensure that a large portion of the community is supportive of any passed proposal, mitigate risks of large holders co-opting governance, and to reduce spam governance proposals.</p><p>However, voter apathy can make achieving quorum difficult. So many protocols turn to a version of “representative democracy”… also known as delegation!</p><p>Delegation enables activist community members, who have a trustworthy track record (even if they themselves have smaller amounts of DDX / voting power) to make proposals and improve the vote participation levels.</p><h4><strong>How do I delegate?</strong></h4><p>There are several ways to delegate on DerivaDEX currently.</p><ol><li>Interacting directly with the DerivaDEX contract. DerivaDEX uses the Diamond Standard, (<a href="https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2535">ERC-2535</a>). Technically experienced users can call contract functions using the tool of their choice, such as Remix.</li><li>Using the governance.derivadex.com UI, where one-step delegation is available.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/764/1*cuinQbk3iDqKClnq47UjFA.png" /><figcaption>On governance.derivadex.com, after you’ve connected your wallet you will be able to select “change delegation” in the left-hand side of the application.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PnfSxvuxpsqjPgmq2Uek_w.png" /><figcaption>A pop-up form enables you to enter the address of your desired delegate. You can also use this tool to stop delegating (delegate voting power back to yourself).</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>How do I become a delegate?</strong></h4><p>This is done entirely with off-chain social coordination. Currently, both forum.derivadex.com and the Discord are convenient ways to present a case for yourself as a reliable and trustworthy delegate.</p><h4><strong>When do I need to delegate DDX?</strong></h4><p>Any time prior to a proposal where you want your delegate to vote with your voting power. A DDX voting-power snapshot is taken and used at the time of proposal submission.</p><h4><strong>Does delegation “lock” my DDX?:</strong></h4><p>Currently there is no lock period for voting. For a perspective on the benefits of lock-up periods, see <a href="https://jumpcrypto.com/token-delegation-with-lockups/">this article from Jump Crypto.</a></p><h4><strong>What can I do if I disagree with my delegate’s position?</strong></h4><p>Simply undelegate. If you undelegate before the proposal is submitted, the delegate will not have your voting power for that proposal. If you want to undelegate after the proposal has been submitted, they will be able to vote with your vote power for that proposal but not moving forward.</p><h4><strong>Is delegation safe?</strong></h4><p>The delegate can <strong>not</strong> spend or send your tokens. They can only use the “voting power”, and only as long as you do not undelegate these tokens.</p><h4>What happens to my voting power if I transfer/sell tokens?</h4><p>If the recipient has already specified a delegate, then the tokens will automatically and immediately be delegated to that delegate. If not, then the recipient will retain voting power.</p><h4>Do I need to delegate?</h4><p>No! By default, you control your own voting power. It is always possible to vote with your own tokens. Delegation is just one tool available to you.</p><h3>Get Involved!</h3><p>DerivaDEX is still in open beta, and is always available for testing and feedback and other contributions at <a href="https://beta.derivadex.io/">beta.derivadex.io</a>.</p><p>For governance discussion and proposals, the forum (<a href="http://forum.derivadex.com/">forum.derivadex.com</a>) is ideal for long-form conversations.</p><p>To get testnet tokens and learn more about how to test the exchange and provide feedback, or to participate in the DerivaDAO, check out the <a href="http://discord.gg/y2kk3yx">Discord</a>.</p><p>Finally — follow <a href="https://twitter.com/DDX_Official">@DDX_Official on Twitter</a> for the latest updates!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e053715c4f04" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/derivadex/delegation-e053715c4f04">Delegation:</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/derivadex">DerivaDEX</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Beta Update]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/derivadex/beta-update-4af999d2724c?source=rss-cbf79704e465------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4af999d2724c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives-exchange]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives-trading]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ainsley Sutherland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jan 2023 20:00:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-17T20:00:09.603Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>DEX Labs maintains beta.derivadex.io, which reflects the latest stable release of a potential DerivaDEX exchange. This update reviews the current status of beta and outlines next steps.</h4><h3><strong>Checkpointing, Upgrades, and Stability</strong></h3><p>The current deployment has attained 6977 checkpoints, which occur roughly every 10 minutes. A checkpoint indicates that consensus about the state of the exchange has been shared among operators. When withdrawals are initiated, checkpoints are committed on-chain to Ethereum.</p><p>This is the longest ever deployment with a continuous state.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fZ3JVCfMollPMvhiRsYLfw.png" /></figure><p>The current deployment has been upgraded with no downtime several times. The upgrades include:</p><ul><li>two separate upgrades to new code versions with small bug fixes</li><li>an exchange resumption after an out-of-space error on the test servers</li></ul><p>As a reminder, in a main-net deployment, all upgrades require a standard, public governance procedure. The purpose of testnet upgrades is to verify the upgrade procedure is robust, that state is preserved across versions, and that infrastructure requirements for upgrades are in place.</p><p>This version of the exchange utilizes three operators, who achieve local consensus and periodically commit that state to Ethereum. Upgrading the exchange logic in this architecture involves:</p><ul><li>Transitioning the code version expected by the smart contracts via governance</li><li>Indicating the epoch at which the operator cluster is expected to transition</li><li>A new operator cluster with updated code version starts up and runs all exchange logic, matching the state of the previous operator cluster</li><li>At the indicated epoch, smart contracts begin accepting checkpoints ONLY from the updated operator cluster.</li></ul><p><strong>This procedure is critical for exchange stability, and has been a core focus of testing for the DEX Labs team in recent months. </strong>An exchange with multiple operators is functionally more decentralized and more robust, both from a technical standpoint and from a security perspective.</p><p>While upgrades are (intentionally) seamless from a user perspective, user testing of the exchange has been extremely useful. It has enabled the exchange to catch UI bugs, iron out confusing UX states, and test the functionality of the exchange in a cross-device context.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NgJFa19WpKWz0p5pYpSneg.png" /><figcaption>beta.derivadex.io/stats shows the state of the network in realtime. This screenshot was taken when the test servers had run out of space, before a successful resumption took place.</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ccPbhIZyYcymH3ymXXbOXw.png" /><figcaption>Normal network status reflected at beta.derivadex.io/stats</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>From Upgrades to Infrastructure</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jBaRzumYyC5TJ464xiThnA.png" /></figure><p>In the coming days, exchange testing will shift from exchange logic, operator networking, and upgradeability to focus on <strong>production infrastructure reliability and robustness.</strong></p><p>DEX Labs will share an announcement when the testnet environment for this focus is ready. External dependencies here involve hardware procurement and data center availability.</p><p><strong>Infrastructure is the final piece in the puzzle of technical requirements for the exchange.</strong></p><p>Key user testing of this component will be performed largely by operator candidates and market maker candidates, to ensure that a production-ready infrastructure of the exchange meets requirements as expected. However, front-end and API testing by traders remains critically important, and is the best way to contribute to building an exchange that is usable and bug-free.</p><h3>Get Involved!</h3><p>DerivaDEX is still in open beta, and is always available for testing and feedback and other contributions at <a href="https://beta.derivadex.io/">beta.derivadex.io</a>.</p><p>For governance discussion and proposals, the forum (forum.derivadex.com) is ideal for long-form conversations.</p><p>To get testnet tokens and learn more about how to test the exchange and provide feedback, or to participate in the DerivaDAO, check out the <a href="http://discord.gg/y2kk3yx">Discord</a>.</p><p>Finally — follow <a href="https://twitter.com/DDX_Official">@DDX_Official on Twitter</a> for the latest updates!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4af999d2724c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/derivadex/beta-update-4af999d2724c">Beta Update</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/derivadex">DerivaDEX</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Beyond Reserves and Liabilities:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/derivadex/beyond-reserves-and-liabilities-dc9d53f0e1b7?source=rss-cbf79704e465------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dc9d53f0e1b7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives-exchange]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dex]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[perpetual-contracts]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ainsley Sutherland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 08 Dec 2022 22:48:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-08T22:48:22.112Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Proving Exchange State for DEXes</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RWTF2he8Tvg8NcOv-nAsJQ.png" /></figure><p>Following the recent exchange insolvency crisis, many centralized exchanges are publishing proof of reserves to reestablish user trust. Additionally, some are also releasing “proof of liabilities”.</p><p>For decentralized finance applications, proof of reserves and liabilities is necessary but <strong>not</strong> sufficient for exchanges that utilize off-chain components, or for exchanges that utilize upgradeable smart contracts or contracts with admin control.</p><p>For DEXes where the exchange state is modified off-chain, the exchange should have a way to prove that <em>all accounts are held to the same liquidation rules</em>. On FTX, <a href="https://decrypt.co/114941/god-mode-sbf-alameda-secret-exemptions-ftx-liquidation">privileged accounts were exempt from this</a>, bringing systemic risk into the exchange so exchange-affiliated parties could profit unfairly.</p><p>While users may assume that funds being present in on-chain contracts prevents re-hypothecation or other abuse of deposited funds, this is not necessarily the case. Funds held on-chain are at risk in the following scenarios:</p><ul><li><strong>Admin risk. </strong>If a contract has admin control over the deposit contract, then the deposits are not secure while a single person or persons can modify the contracts.</li><li><strong>Off-chain state risk. </strong>If contracts accept state from an off-chain exchange in order to determine user allocations, that state must not be controlled by a single entity or be otherwise manipulated by exchange operators.</li></ul><p>At DEX Labs, we believe DEXes must provide <strong><em>proof of state</em> </strong>to make statements about reserves and liabilities meaningful. Without this, the on-chain deposit contracts of a DEX provide only minor advantages over wholly centralized exchanges.</p><p>DerivaDEX provides provable, transparent exchange state at all times, as well as a strict use of governance for all code updates and parameter changes.</p><p>First, some background:</p><h3>Proof of Reserves and Liabilities for CeFi</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XJ39r2I3tsrMt4_0-NgpUw.png" /></figure><p>In short, the biggest problem for proving the solvency of centralized exchanges lies in effective <strong>“proof of liabilities”</strong>, because even on-chain assets apparently controlled by the exchange may have claims on them due to off-chain agreements.</p><p><em>This article by Nic Carter provides an overview of which exchanges are currently providing proof of reserves / liabilities, and the methodologies they use: </em><a href="https://niccarter.info/proof-of-reserves/"><em>https://niccarter.info/proof-of-reserves/</em></a></p><h3>Proof of reserves and liabilities in DeFi</h3><p>DerivaDEX is a decentralized derivatives exchange. Proof of reserves for decentralized exchanges like DerivaDEX is simple. Deposits and withdrawals are on-chain. In the case of DerivaDEX, these deposits and withdrawals take place on Ethereum.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sF9-08_zhwwxcYUHJeqKZg.png" /><figcaption>The DerivaDEX<a href="https://beta.derivadex.io/stats/balance_sheet"> balance shee</a>t displays the exact status of all funds processed to the exchange</figcaption></figure><p>For other exchanges, deposits may take place on another blockchain, or via deposits to an L2 contract. In any case, users can examine the funds held in the contract to confirm that collateral is present.</p><h3>This is not enough.</h3><p>Funds appearing on-chain does not guarantee that user funds are safe and that re-hypothecation or other abuses have not occurred. Users still need to ensure that the contract holding funds will use correct logic to disburse funds. This is particularly relevant for DEXes that combine on- and off-chain components.</p><p><strong>If the smart contract looks to the off-chain exchange logic to see user balances, but a single entity is able to manually change balances or apply different standards to different users on the exchange, then this smart contract transparency means very little.</strong></p><p><strong>Additionally, if the smart contracts can be modified by admins or another entity, then this is another area of solvency risk.</strong></p><p>How can this be solved in a way that creates meaningful proof of reserves and liabilities for DEXes?</p><h3>Proof of State</h3><p>The entire state of the DerivaDEX exchange is visible at any time to users streaming the exchange transaction log with the DerivaDEX Auditor tool. Users are able to confirm that the exchange logic implemented by the auditor matches that of the exchange every time there is an on-chain checkpoint by comparing a hash of the exchange state produced by the auditor to that submitted by the operators.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*W0QNM2-ifkp1NofGS4_-2Q.png" /><figcaption>Sneak peek at the logs from DerivaDEX Auditor, and a marketmaker bot</figcaption></figure><p>Additionally, public governance is the only mechanism by which any DerivaDEX contracts can be changed or updated.</p><h3>Reserves, Liabilities, and State for DEXes</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vl3Iy45Gq3Np_CBTyhc_fA.png" /></figure><h3>Beyond Reserves and Liabilities</h3><p>DerivaDEX substantiates the on-chain transparency of reserves and liabilities through transparency and verifiability of the <strong>exchange state.</strong></p><p>Reserves and liabilities should be under the umbrella of transparency for DEXes. Beyond exchange solvency and correctness, what users should care about with DEXes includes answers to questions like:</p><ul><li>What is the current state of the exchange?</li><li>What is the size of the insurance fund?</li><li>What is the risk of auto de-leveraging, and how leveraged are users on the exchange?</li></ul><p>A DEX that is decentralized in name only does not provide any of the assurances laid out above. Users should ask of each DEX:</p><ul><li>What are the risks of a 51% attack, either on the base chain or via application governance? What safeguards are in place?</li><li>Who controls the state of the exchange, and how can I verify this? Users of centralized exchanges have few protections that prove they are not being countertraded by exchange operators.</li></ul><p>Most decentralized derivatives exchanges must uniquely account for user deposits in a way that spot exchanges (i.e., Uniswap) do not need to. Therefore, establishing proof of reserves and liabilities is also important for DEXes that have deposits and withdrawals.</p><p>However, unlike centralized exchanges, DEXes:</p><ul><li>Have more straightforward, trustless means to prove reserves and liabilities</li><li>Can also provide “Proof of state” and transparency on governance risks</li></ul><p><strong>The second bullet point here is critical: without proactive transparency, DEXes can suffer unexpected catastrophic events, despite a convincing rhetoric of verifiable reserves and liabilities.</strong></p><p>Users who trade on a DEX where the exchange state can be manipulated by exchange operators, for example, do not truly have the means to withdraw assets at any time. It is critical that all DEX protocols ensure that their off-chain components are as trustless as their on-chain components.</p><p>DerivaDEX achieves this through a layered approach of hardware security, economic incentives, and on-chain checkpointing and governance.</p><p><strong>For a demonstration of the DerivaDEX Auditor, a tool which enables any user to monitor and verify correctness of the exchange business logic in real-time, </strong><a href="https://discord.gg/bBv5yF2q?event=1049748430081237082"><strong>join us for a live demonstration and workshop next Wednesday</strong></a><strong>.</strong></p><h3>Get Involved!</h3><p>DerivaDEX is currently in open beta, and you can try it out at <a href="https://beta.derivadex.io/">beta.derivadex.io</a>.</p><p>To get testnet tokens and learn more about how to test the exchange and provide feedback, or to participate in the DerivaDAO, check out the <a href="http://discord.gg/y2kk3yx">Discord</a> or use the <a href="https://twitter.com/DerivaDEXfaucet">Twitter faucet</a> for testnet tokens.</p><p>Finally — follow <a href="https://twitter.com/DDX_Official">@DDX_Official on Twitter</a> for the latest updates!</p><p><em>Ainsley Sutherland is the product lead at DEX Labs, an R&amp;D technical contributor to </em><a href="https://derivadex.com/"><em>DerivaDEX</em></a><em>, a decentralized derivatives exchange.</em></p><p><em>Many thanks to </em><a href="https://medium.com/u/b7b7c70688fb"><em>Tom Schmidt</em></a><em> for early structural feedback and suggestions, as well as </em><a href="https://medium.com/u/560392e3b1dc"><em>Aditya Palepu</em></a><em> and </em><a href="http://cewh1te/"><em>Cody White</em></a><em> for their feedback on early drafts. Also thanks to </em><a href="https://medium.com/u/a063100e6515"><em>Nic Carter</em></a><em>, whose work </em><a href="https://niccarter.info/proof-of-reserves/"><em>documenting and proposing proof of reserves/liabilities for centralized exchanges</em></a><em> has been critical.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dc9d53f0e1b7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/derivadex/beyond-reserves-and-liabilities-dc9d53f0e1b7">Beyond Reserves and Liabilities:</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/derivadex">DerivaDEX</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Speed is the Future for DEX Liquidity]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/derivadex/speed-is-the-future-for-dex-liquidity-e44a8f50b2d6?source=rss-cbf79704e465------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e44a8f50b2d6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[web3]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dex]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ainsley Sutherland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 Oct 2022 12:50:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-10-13T12:50:06.573Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Execution speed is critical for liquidity, and can support a wide range of trading pairs</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oAuyZ4BiAmVh5kAtIAaHsg.png" /></figure><h4>DerivaDEX is a new type of decentralized exchange, competing directly with centralized exchanges on performance, fairness, and transparency.</h4><h4><strong>Performance: Matching and Execution</strong></h4><p>When you submit an order on DerivaDEX, the matching engine reviews the orderbook to find resting orders that can fill your order. This process is called “matching,” and can happen very quickly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/636/1*w-ViI2tgnynGejpyjFlAOg.png" /><figcaption>A view of the DerivaDEX (testnet) orderbook. Check it out yourself at https://beta.derivadex.io</figcaption></figure><p>Execution is the process by which orders that match are then “executed”. A host of updates to the state of the exchange must be processed. Execution on DerivaDEX includes:</p><ul><li>changing your liquidation price</li><li>updating your position/collateral balances and those of your counterparty</li><li>updating any other metrics affected by the state change.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/644/1*PscUEl_pVYOUyw3voS8DaQ.png" /><figcaption>Here are some of the strategy balances that are updated each time state is updated</figcaption></figure><p>State updates on spot DEXes are simple: fees are paid, balances are adjusted, and both sides of the trade can see the result updated on-chain.</p><p><strong>For derivatives exchanges, like DerivaDEX, a state update is more complex.</strong></p><p>That is because users maintain “positions” over time and liquidation risk must be continuously assessed. You “open” a position, i.e., a long position on ETHPERP, and then you can keep that position “open” for as long as you like. For the exchange to function correctly, it must track a host of information about each trader, and each position.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0osCjCBym9Wc5K9sPf3VCw.png" /><figcaption>This trader has an open ETHPERP position of size 10.</figcaption></figure><p>This is a challenge for on-chain storage, because the amount of information that must be stored in the state, and updated each time the state is changed, is quite large. This is why derivatives DEXes must utilize one of two approaches:</p><ol><li>Order books, and a solution for off-chain execution, and on-chain settlement. This either involves a rollup, a custom L2 solution, or potentially an “appchain”. <strong>This is the approach taken by DerivaDEX, DyDx, and Vega protocol.</strong></li><li>An automated market-maker (AMM), or some variant thereof, and on-chain execution. <strong>This is the approach taken by Perp Protocol, GMX, and Futureswap.</strong></li></ol><p>DerivaDEX’s unique solution for satisfies rigorous performance requirements, without sacrificing on decentralization.</p><p>But why is performance *so* important for traders?</p><h4><strong>Speed and Liquidity</strong></h4><p>Due to the design of DerivaDEX, traders enjoy matching and execution speeds that rival centralized exchanges, without compromising on the security of a DEX. DEX Labs has recently completed performance optimizations for the matching and execution engine: In recent benchmarking tests, matching orders on DerivaDEX are filled by the execution engine in under 2 milliseconds (down from 43 milliseconds in earlier versions).</p><p>While this benchmark isn’t a whole “round trip” between a user’s machine and the operators, it represents a large percentage of that total time. This is competitive with leading centralized venues — stay tuned for some more extensive “round trip” benchmarking comparisons!</p><h4><strong>Why does this matter?</strong></h4><p>An average trader probably doesn’t care much if an order is filled in 2, or 200 milliseconds. <strong>Institutional market makers, however, do.</strong></p><p>A key feature of DerivaDEX is that the exchange uses a <em>central limit order book</em>. That means liquidity is provided on DerivaDEX by market makers– who are free to run their most advanced liquidity provisioning strategies. In contrast to automatic market makers (the AMMs referenced above as option 1) that spot DEX traders are familiar with, conventional market making is an industry standard on all centralized exchanges.</p><p>While this may not be evident from the canonical trading pairs like BTCPERP and ETHPERP, where liquidity is deep on AMMs and orderbook exchanges, liquidity that can be capital efficient and provisioned by modern market makers can make a huge difference in more illiquid trading pairs. Enabling this kind of liquidity ensures that DerivaDEX is capable of growing quickly into an exchange supporting a wide number of trading products.</p><p>There’s plenty more to unpack about what sets DerivaDEX apart, but the TLDR on performance is:</p><ol><li>Derivatives require complex state management, which is expensive (impossible?) to do on-chain with open order books. So, exchanges have two options: hybrid architecture or using an automated market maker.</li><li>Open order books are necessary for capital efficient, modern market making. Speed is also required for efficient market making.</li><li>Efficient, modern market making is important for all trading pairs, but *especially* for lower volume or less popular products.</li></ol><p>One factor that drives the appeal of AMM spot exchanges like Uniswap or Sushiswap is the long tail of supported trading pairs: anyone can create a market. Bringing liquidity and volume to that market however, is a different question.</p><p>DerivaDEX is poised to provide a decentralized analogue to this for derivatives, with groundbreaking execution speed bringing improved capital efficiency and liquidity.</p><h4>Get Involved!</h4><p>DerivaDEX is currently in open beta, and you can try it out at <a href="https://beta.derivadex.io/">beta.derivadex.io</a>.</p><p>To get testnet tokens and learn more about how to test the exchange and provide feedback, or to participate in the DerivaDAO, check out the <a href="http://discord.gg/y2kk3yx">Discord</a>.</p><p>Finally — follow <a href="https://twitter.com/DDX_Official">@DDX_Official on Twitter</a> for the latest updates!</p><p><em>Ainsley Sutherland is the product lead at DEX Labs, an R&amp;D technical contributor to </em><a href="https://derivadex.com/"><em>DerivaDEX</em></a><em>, a decentralized derivatives exchange.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e44a8f50b2d6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/derivadex/speed-is-the-future-for-dex-liquidity-e44a8f50b2d6">Speed is the Future for DEX Liquidity</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/derivadex">DerivaDEX</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[GMX vs DerivaDEX]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/derivadex/gmx-vs-derivadex-302884d3c37c?source=rss-cbf79704e465------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/302884d3c37c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[perpetual-contracts]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralized-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ainsley Sutherland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 20 Sep 2022 21:14:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-20T21:14:49.425Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Slippage, smart liquidity and yield</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wgqqOIejaEtFFaQGDYl78w.png" /></figure><p>This past weekend, someone (or group) was able to utilize the zero-slippage mechanism design on GMX to arbitrage between the GMX price and the price on reference exchanges (exchanges where the price feed is used as the source of truth for the GMX price oracle).</p><h3>GMX 🫐 on Twitter: &quot;We were notified of price manipulation of AVAX/USD on reference exchanges by monitoring systems and community members.While we review the occurrence, open-interest for AVAX has been capped at $2m long / $1m short.GLP and GMX trading markets continue to operate normally. / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>We were notified of price manipulation of AVAX/USD on reference exchanges by monitoring systems and community members.While we review the occurrence, open-interest for AVAX has been capped at $2m long / $1m short.GLP and GMX trading markets continue to operate normally.</p><p>DEX trading suffers from significant usability problems due to low liquidity on automated market makers (AMMs), a problem which GMX addresses via the GLP program. DerivaDEX takes a different approach: enabling modern market-making identical to what users enjoy on centralized exchanges.</p><h3>Joshua Lim on Twitter: &quot;1/ quick thread on the GMX &quot;exploit&quot; last nighthaving sat on crypto dealing desks for many years, I know that offering liquidity to savvy traders is a painful but necessary part of the gameGLP holders learned that same lesson last night! pic.twitter.com/fGm866BRCJ / Twitter&quot;</h3><p>1/ quick thread on the GMX &quot;exploit&quot; last nighthaving sat on crypto dealing desks for many years, I know that offering liquidity to savvy traders is a painful but necessary part of the gameGLP holders learned that same lesson last night! pic.twitter.com/fGm866BRCJ</p><h4><strong>Liquidity and slippage: A key usability challenge for DEXes</strong></h4><p>A “zero-price-impact” design is appealing for DEX users, because so many crypto trading pairs have limited liquidity. For most DEXes, liquidity provider (LP) programs enable users to help support liquidity with otherwise non-productive capital using automated market makers (AMMs).</p><p>Slippage is the biggest usability blocker for AMM-based trading (and DEX trading generally). Rather than an AMM (i.e., on Uniswap), where illiquid assets result in a very high slippage percentage, GMX utilizes the “GLP” program to enable a zero price impact feature. In this model, users stake a basket of assets to the protocol and receive GLP in return. GLP is subject to <a href="https://gmxio.gitbook.io/gmx/glp#rebalancing">variable mint/burn fees</a>, which encourage suitable rebalancing of assets. GLP is thus used to absorb slippage and provide zero-price-impact trading. Price is then set by a price feed from reference exchanges, and not influenced by on-exchange trading. This is the mechanism which was exploited in last weekend’s incident to the detriment of GLP holders.</p><p>DerivaDEX’s approach to this quandary is to enable an industry-standard central limit order book — rather than an AMM, or other form of staked liquidity — so that market makers can employ advanced, modern liquidity management. This means that slippage on DerivaDEX, while not zero, will likely be closer to what you may see on a centralized exchange. Market-making like this isn’t possible or efficient on-chain, which is why DerivaDEX implements a network of off-chain operators, secured by trusted execution and accountable to on-chain checkpointing/settlement.</p><h4><strong>Pricing</strong></h4><p>Prices reflect slippage, and move algorithmically on a curve with AMMs. On GMX, prices are fixed to the input from a reference exchange, and variance is absorbed by GLP providers– So how does DerivaDEX establish a mark price? The DerivaDEX mark price is drawn from reference exchanges (identified via governance) and the order book. The <a href="https://docs.derivadex.io/trading/price-feed">mark price</a> that governs exchange-based safeties (i.e., leverage limits) and the funding rate is a moving average with these inputs.</p><p>The funding rate is used to apply pressure when on-exchange prices don’t align with the reference exchange prices. This reflects best practices on centralized exchanges as well.</p><h4><strong>The question of yield</strong></h4><p>While AMMs and other on-chain mechanisms have developed a lot in the past few years, there are still many gameable opportunities. DerivaDEX looks to centralized exchange UX and mechanism design, uniquely enabled in a DEX by the exchange’s particular architecture.</p><p>Users are motivated by yield to provide liquidity to AMMs, GLP, and other liquidity mining programs, despite their risks. However, the majority of this expected value is founded on the expectation that value from an app token will contribute to that passive yield. In market making specifically, where the yield is driven by an efficient spread, AMMs and other passive liquidity models are at a disadvantage to traditional market makers, who are able to iterate and develop liquidity strategies in real-time.</p><p>DerivaDEX is designed for traditional, efficient market making. The key DerivaDEX user is a trader, not a passive liquidity provider. <strong>Triangulating motivations of LPs, traders, and the protocol is difficult, as all these users have competing interests, which is illustrated when savvy traders exploit a mechanism for price-setting to engage in cross-exchange arbitrage that is costly to liquidity providers.</strong> On DerivaDEX, <em>trade mining</em> replaces liquidity providing, and slippage is mitigated by efficient, modern market-making.</p><p>DerivaDEX takes advantage of the learnings and strengths of centralized exchanges, while leveraging the strengths of decentralized applications for security, governance, and transparency.</p><p>At DEX Labs we’re excited to be building in this space, and also supportive of the work of other innovative decentralized exchanges. <strong>The purpose of this analysis is not to be critical of work in new mechanism designs (i.e., GLP), but to illustrate the differences and tradeoffs in each exchange’s design– be that an AMM, GLP, or DerivaDEX’s off-chain trusted execution order book model.</strong></p><p><em>Ainsley Sutherland is the product lead at DEX Labs, building DerivaDEX and other tools for decentralized finance.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=302884d3c37c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/derivadex/gmx-vs-derivadex-302884d3c37c">GMX vs DerivaDEX</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/derivadex">DerivaDEX</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[DerivaDEX and Volatility:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/derivadex/derivadex-and-volatility-515feea7261f?source=rss-cbf79704e465------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/515feea7261f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dex]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[perpetual-contracts]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web3]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ainsley Sutherland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 24 May 2022 19:08:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-24T19:08:43.724Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A LUNAPERP Case Study</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HHYtNFdRm5W1Ve0n8cTxkg.png" /></figure><p>How would DerivaDEX have managed under the market volatility seen in the past couple of weeks? How would DerivaDEX have managed had some of the affected assets been directly used by the exchange– for example, had a LUNAPERP product been available, or UST been accepted as collateral?</p><p>Understanding the answer to this question can help you better understand exactly how DerivaDEX works, so let’s dig in. <strong>This article will cover the (theoretical!) listing and delisting of LUNAPERP</strong>, and a future article will look at the different case of UST collateral (multi-collateral likely being farther off as a supported feature of the exchange).</p><h4>In this article, you can learn</h4><ul><li>How assets are listed and delisted from DerivaDEX</li><li>What happens if the insurance fund runs out</li><li>How cross-margin affects liquidations and volatility on DerivaDEX</li></ul><h3>Listing trading pairs: Governance and Risk</h3><p>The most important feature at play here is whether LUNAPERP, or UST, are in use by the exchange at all. This is a question that is left entirely to the community.</p><p>DerivaDEX is solely managed by the DerivaDAO, a decentralized governance community made up of DDX token holders. No trading pair can be listed without going through the successful proposal and voting process. Likewise, no new collateral types can be added without going through this process as well.</p><p>Some important elements the DerivaDAO community should consider when building a process for trading product proposals are</p><ul><li>What is the expected trading volume? Expected fee revenue?</li><li>Is the product likely to experience high volatility? Why?</li><li>What key indicators should be met to trigger a delisting proposal?</li></ul><h3>Listing LUNAPERP</h3><p>Using a theoretical LUNAPERP trading product as an example, this exercise takes a look at what happens when a trading product on the exchange trades rapidly towards zero. While the specifics always depend on the open interest, size of the insurance fund, open positions, and other variables, this post walks through a general outline of what could happen.</p><h3>Phase 1: Volatility and Liquidity</h3><p>At first, speculators are eager to bid on both sides of the book while the outcome is very unclear. This is an excellent scenario for DerivaDEX, because volatility with good liquidity results in fees from trading as well as positive liquidations all accruing to the insurance fund. From February 21 to May 8, LUNA ranged from an open of about $50 to highs close to $120.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*z5kTmuEgD0RIjNjk" /><figcaption><em>From Binance, this chart snapshot shows the daily chart of LUNA for about 3 months.</em></figcaption></figure><p>Price volatility results in liquidations, but good liquidity means that liquidated positions are easily sold to counterparties, before they hit their bankruptcy price. These <strong>positive liquidations</strong> add value to the insurance fund, and traders who are on the right side of the price movement are able to close their positions easily.</p><p>Recall– on DerivaDEX, PnL for open positions is settled regularly (approximately every 8 hours).</p><h3>Phase 2: Volatility, reduced liquidity</h3><p>UST began to drift off its peg on May 9th. Because of the relationship between these two assets, (which we will NOT get into here) the price of LUNA went from about $64 to $30 in one day. On the second day, LUNA lost more than 90% of its value from recent highs. Liquidity providers may have started withdrawing or reducing their exposure in order to protect themselves from this directional movement.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*CMHvTskdUg-N1q-i" /><figcaption><em>From Coinmarketcap. UST starts to depart from the peg on May 7th and 8th, before losing it completely over the next week.</em></figcaption></figure><p>At this point, the exchange governance should be observing LUNAPERP and considering what thresholds must be passed for delisting.</p><p>However, there are still users with active, open positions, and users trying to trade the asset. The liquidation engine will still be hard at work, but it becomes more likely that liquidations will now result in <a href="https://medium.com/derivadex/what-is-an-insurance-fund-49410775d41e"><strong>negative liquidations</strong>, where positions are traded at a loss (i.e., beyond their bankruptcy price).</a></p><p>To protect winning traders, the normal course of action here is for the exchange to draw from the <strong>insurance fund</strong> to pay winning traders, because the counterparty does not have enough collateral to cover what they owe.</p><p>By default, the entirety of the organic insurance fund (capitalized through fees and positive liquidations) is available to cover liquidations in any trading pair. It will be the decision of the DerivaDAO whether to restrict the size of the active insurance fund, and how to hold in reserve any excess.</p><h4><strong>A note on cross-margin:</strong></h4><p>Because DerivaDEX uses cross-margining for collateral, volatility in one trading pair can also affect liquidations in other trading pairs.</p><p>For example, a trader with an open BTCPERP position may be liquidated due to losses in their LUNAPERP position. While it is likely that BTCPERP has better sustained liquidity, and that position can be liquidated in a positive liquidation, overall volatility can increase — often actually resulting in promising trading opportunities.</p><h4><strong>What happens when the insurance fund runs out?</strong></h4><p>If the insurance fund is depleted to zero through negative liquidations, the exchange smoothly switches to “auto de-leveraging” (ADL) protocols.</p><p>This means that if the insurance fund is totally depleted, all traders <strong>— including those with no direct exposure to LUNAPERP</strong> — will now be subject to ADL if their counterparty experiences a <strong>negative liquidation.</strong></p><h4><strong>How does ADL work?</strong></h4><p><strong>Under ADL, the worst-case scenario is that winning traders have otherwise-profitable positions automatically closed.</strong> Their position size will automatically be reduced when their counterparty is liquidated (in a negative liquidation only).</p><p>For example, a trader could have an open short position of 1000 units of LUNAPERP, for an PnL of $10,000. At the time their counterparty is liquidated, their counterparty’s position cannot be liquidated for that value (the bankruptcy price of the position). Instead, a speculator is willing to purchase this position for $1,000.</p><p>The winning trader cannot receive more than this $1,000 in profit, because that value of LUNAPERP changed so dramatically, and the insurance fund was fully depleted. When the liquidation engine sells the position to the speculator, the size of the trader’s open position will be reduced (ADL’d) such that it reflects this maximum profit of $1,000.</p><h3>Phase 3: Limited volume, delisting</h3><p>At this point, the insurance fund may or may not be fully depleted, depending on how much exposure traders had to the LUNAPERP asset. While normal trading in other assets should continue to capitalize the insurance fund via fees and positive liquidations, a low-liquidity, volatile coin is likely to continue to result in low demand and negative liquidations.</p><p>Additionally, traders will have difficulty closing open positions, because there is no interest from other traders. If the orderbook is empty, open positions cannot be closed. The best a trader will be able to do is withdraw the maximum collateral after a PnL settlement event, which is everything except for the collateral required to maintain the open position.</p><h4><strong>Delisting</strong></h4><p>In this case, the asset shows little sign of recovery, and may be a candidate for delisting. Including these zombie assets on the exchange exposes the insurance fund, and the exchange itself, to greater risk (with little reward in the form of positive liquidations and trading fees).</p><p>Delisting occurs via a governance process. Once governance passes a delisting event proposal, a “wind-down” feature will close all open positions at the mark price at the point of the delisting event, and all open orders will be canceled. From that point forward, the asset will not be tradeable on the exchange unless it is re-listed via governance.</p><h3>Stay in touch!</h3><p>The exchange is currently in a bug hunt trading session. For more info, make sure you fill out the form at <a href="http://register.derivadex.io/">register.derivadex.io</a> and then head over to <a href="http://beta.derivadex.io/">beta.derivadex.io</a> for testing!</p><p>Make sure you don’t miss the next post — <a href="https://derivadex.com/">sign up for the mailing list</a>!</p><ul><li>Join the <a href="https://discord.gg/y2kk3yx">Discord</a> to learn about upcoming opportunities and to join the DerivaDEX community!</li><li>Follow on <a href="https://twitter.com/DDX_Official">Twitter!</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=515feea7261f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/derivadex/derivadex-and-volatility-515feea7261f">DerivaDEX and Volatility:</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/derivadex">DerivaDEX</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cambrian: Bug hunt]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/derivadex/cambrian-bug-hunt-64b83a418824?source=rss-cbf79704e465------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/64b83a418824</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web3]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ainsley Sutherland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 May 2022 19:42:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-17T19:42:58.291Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Building continues, rain or shine!</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AqqVOiPaC9NE2dnTr3kkYg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Today, a new session (Session 5!) is kicking off for the DerivaDEX Cambrian testnet.</strong></p><p><em>As a reminder, Cambrian is a series of testnet releases that ensure the exchange is robustly, and publicly, tested prior to a mainnet proposal release candidate.</em></p><p>The previous testing session (session 4) ran for about 10 days, and resulted in some good front-end performance testing. As a result of this, the Experiences team (which focuses on front-end development for the exchange) have implemented some significant performance improvements for Session 5.</p><p>As the DerivaDEX exchange approaches mainnet readiness, this trading session is focused on surfacing any and all user-reported bugs.</p><h3>Are there prizes?</h3><p>Yes! Users who submit high-quality and actionable bug reports will be at an advantage in the next “competition session”.</p><p>While there are no explicit PnL or trade mining prizes in this session, if you discover a bug related to these you should report it!</p><p>In order to create different scenarios, the market-making bots will be ON and OFF periodically during this session. As the PnL / trade mining is not competition-based, new USDC will be distributed to registrants approximately once every 3 days for this session. So you should have plenty to go around, and there are no deposit or withdrawal limitations.</p><h3>How do I report a bug?</h3><p>Please use <a href="https://asutherland.aidaform.com/cambrian-bug-report">this form</a> and be as descriptive as possible!</p><h3>When mainnet?</h3><p>While no one is more eager for a mainnet candidate than the team at DEX Labs, security and correct performance under all market conditions is paramount. At this point, smart contract development is essentially complete (pending audit revisions), and remaining mainnet feature development is very advanced.</p><h3>Update on testing and releases</h3><p>In the past quarter as the engineering velocity has increased and the exchange approaches mainnet, reliability and security have become paramount. To this end, DEX Labs has been improving and implementing a few new testing processes for the exchange (on top of existing integration and unit tests throughout!)</p><h4>The Fuzzer</h4><p>The team has spent considerable engineering effort developing a robust automated testing system (we call it the “fuzzer”) that puts each release candidate through significant testing. As this system was implemented several weeks before the kickoff of the Cambrian trading sessions, the forward stability of each release candidate has been significantly improved.</p><h4>The Auditor</h4><p>Another form of testing (that also provides total transparency into exchange operations) that you can try out for yourself is called the “DerivaDEX auditor”. This is a python implementation of all the exchange logic, exactly as it is executed within the operators (off-chain nodes, selected via governance, that run the exchange logic).</p><p>The DerivaDEX auditor provides anyone with total transparency into the real-time transaction log of the exchange. If you’re interested in checking this system out, hop in the discord and ask for support in the #API channel!</p><h3>How to participate?</h3><p>If you have registered with the new form (found at register.derivadex.io!) you should have USDC for the current release in your wallet already.</p><p>If you need to register for Session 5, (and all upcoming sessions), please <a href="http://register.derivadex.io/">submit this form.</a></p><h3>Other updates:</h3><p>Want to hear about the next session before it happens? Make join the <a href="https://discord.gg/a54BWuG">Discord </a>and follow on <a href="https://twitter.com/DDX_Official">Twitter</a> to learn more about upcoming products and early access opportunities.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=64b83a418824" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/derivadex/cambrian-bug-hunt-64b83a418824">Cambrian: Bug hunt</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/derivadex">DerivaDEX</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Session 4 is Live!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/derivadex/session-4-is-live-5c8ac74df70f?source=rss-cbf79704e465------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5c8ac74df70f</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ainsley Sutherland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 May 2022 19:30:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-06T19:33:02.490Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>DerivaDEX Competition and Engineering Update</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_SxQr2TgPx0RnmwtDETlkQ.png" /></figure><p>Hey traders and the DerivaDAO community,</p><p>The first phase of the Cambrian testnet competition has concluded, but Session 4, a non-competition session, is starting today!.</p><h3>A quick recap–</h3><p>The Cambrian trading competition is divided into trading sessions. In each of the first competition sessions, traders received 100K USDC on the Kovan testnet to deposit at beta.derivadex.io. So far, there have been 3 sessions.</p><p>Winners from each session will receive a % of the trade mining (or PnL) prize based on the length of the session, proportional to the total competition phase. In this group of sessions, traders competed for a PnL prize of 2,000 DDX and a trade mining prize of 8,000 DDX.</p><p>For a more specific breakdown by session:</p><ul><li>Session 1: 25%</li><li>Session 2: 50%</li><li>Session 3: 25%</li></ul><p>Winners of past competition sessions will be contacted via email shortly, and the list of top PnL accounts will be published next week as well. Stay posted!</p><h3>Session 4 — What’s next?</h3><p>As the exchange nears mainnet readiness, the public Cambrian testnet competitions will continue. Up next is <strong>Session 4</strong>, a <strong>“non-competition” </strong>session.</p><p>Session 4 will still have some special prizes — that may give traders an advantage in the next competition session!</p><p><em>Please note: marketmaking bots will be turned on, and OFF, periodically for this non-competition session. The goal is to stress test the system in a variety of liquidity and volume scenarios. If you want to make sure you can keep playing, reserve some portion of your USDC (i.e, do not deposit the full 100,000) or make sure to close positions often.</em></p><p><a href="https://docs.derivadex.io/trading/leverage"><strong>Why is this? → learn more about cross-margin leverage.</strong></a></p><h4>What’s new in Session 4?</h4><ul><li>Withdrawals are enabled! Go ahead, give it a spin. Feedback or questions? Tag a team member in the Discord.</li><li>New error alerts, which should be more clear and enable better troubleshooting</li></ul><h4>How to participate?</h4><p>If you participated in past sessions, you should have USDC for the current release in your wallet already.</p><p>If you need to register for Session 4, (and all upcoming sessions), please <a href="http://register.derivadex.io/">submit this form.</a></p><p><strong>Please note — in upcoming <em>competition sessions</em>, ALL traders will need to confirm participation via this form, *regardless* of prior registration status.</strong></p><h3>Other updates:</h3><p>Last month’s community call was a great success, and one of the most well-attended virtual events yet. If you want to <a href="https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1jBZhoVg31w6owiFGn8ydJc4x4BOMxLfVFdXXRGlq0KA/edit?usp=sharing">check out the slides we went through, they’re open to comment and questions here</a>.</p><p>Want to hear about the next one before it happens? Make join the <a href="https://discord.gg/a54BWuG">Discord </a>and follow on <a href="https://twitter.com/DDX_Official">Twitter</a> to learn more about upcoming products and early access opportunities.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5c8ac74df70f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/derivadex/session-4-is-live-5c8ac74df70f">Session 4 is Live!</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/derivadex">DerivaDEX</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Data on DerivaDEX]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/derivadex/data-on-derivadex-bf73f23aae04?source=rss-cbf79704e465------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bf73f23aae04</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dex]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hft]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ainsley Sutherland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Apr 2022 19:39:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-04-05T19:44:36.114Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vaorKjsoSqNn0vQx8EHVRQ.png" /></figure><h4>Data for traders, Data for the DAO!</h4><p><strong>DerivaDEX has a completely transparent orderbook and execution flow.</strong> Everyone has access to the same data, at the same time: exchange operator nodes, liquidity providers, traders, and the DAO.</p><p>If you are interested in doing your own data analysis, you can run the auditor at <a href="https://apidocs.derivadex.io/">apidocs.derivadex.io</a> and get started. DerivaDEX combines the transparency of on-chain trading with the speed and efficiency of centralized exchanges. <strong>Do you have ideas for new analysis or charts after reading this article? Hop in the </strong><a href="https://discord.gg/a54BWuG"><strong>Discord</strong></a><strong> and ask!</strong></p><p>📊 Data on DerivaDEX can enable:</p><ul><li>Shadow-trading of 🐋 whale accounts (all trade data is publicly available)</li><li>Real-time transparency into all open positions on the exchange</li><li>Total transparency of the insurance fund capitalization and drawdowns in real-time so users can evaluate ADL* risk.</li><li>Visibility into total capital inflows and outflows from the exchange</li></ul><p><em>Reminder: ADL stands for “automatic de-leveraging”, where a positive position is forced to close (de-leverage) because the liquidated counter-party does not have the capital to pay the winning trader what she is owed.</em></p><p>🙋 All users can answer data-driven questions like:</p><ul><li>How does market-maker behavior change under positive and negative funding rates?</li><li>Is shadow-trading a whale or suite of whales profitable across different time intervals?</li><li>Do changes in the funding rate attract large capital inflows or cause outflows to the TVL of the exchange?</li></ul><p>Normally, data at this level of detail is not available to traders using centralized exchanges. Users of on-chain exchanges, such as AMMs, have used this level of data transparency to create DEX-specific strategies (like MEV). <strong>While MEV is mitigated on DerivaDEX due to order encryption, new strategies that make use of this level of data transparency will likely emerge.</strong></p><p>⬇️ After about two weeks of trading, this article takes an initial look at some of the data from the exchange. ⬇️</p><h3>✅ Session 2: Quick totals</h3><ul><li>Number of traders — 921</li><li>Overall volume — $10,738,208,247.16</li><li>Insurance fund capitalization — &gt;$16mm</li><li>Checkpoints — &gt;1,737</li></ul><h3>💰 <strong>Insurance fund</strong></h3><p>The <a href="https://medium.com/derivadex/what-is-an-insurance-fund-49410775d41e">insurance fund is capitalized</a> through <strong>trading fees</strong> and <strong>positive liquidations</strong>. A positive liquidation occurs when a trader’s position is closed after the liquidation point is crossed, but before the bankruptcy price is met. This requires a swift liquidation engine and deep liquidity.</p><p>In Session 2, you can see one very large drawdown event that was handled smoothly. In Session 1, market making bots had reduced liquidity, so the system saw (<strong>and handled correctly!</strong>) significantly more liquidation events.</p><p>Combined, both sessions give strong evidence that the system is robust to price volatility and liquidation cascades, and demonstrate the performance of the insurance fund capitalization mechanism.</p><h4>Insurance fund capitalization</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*6gN33C5n5meyMAVI" /></figure><h4>Insurance fund drawdown</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*YQ6_ZMtBRDL_vo0N" /></figure><p>You can see a significant liquidation event at around 1 million requests (the huge vertical line). Under ideal liquidity conditions (market makers with a lot of money), the insurance fund had completely re-capitalized post-loss within half a million requests. Pretty neat!</p><p><strong>The DAO will need to decide what size the insurance fund should be.</strong> Too large, and the capital could be better used elsewhere. Too small, and ADL risk is higher. The DAO can use data like this, as well as information about the exchange’s current liquidity and volume, to determine the ideal size of an insurance fund. In this scenario, the maximum drawdown was -1.5 million USD.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*42NOGLaQnU_hHWNa" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8NP7Gc2DXdxv2Xhr" /></figure><p>These fill charts show another view of the liquidation event, and demonstrate liquidation clustering (large liquidations often happen alongside, or exacerbate, dramatic price movement on an exchange, causing a liquidation cascade).</p><h4>Why should traders care about this data?</h4><ul><li>Traders can understand their risk of an ADL, and overall systemic risk based on the capitalization of the insurance fund</li><li>Traders can take advantage of secondary effects of major liquidation cascades such as: a change in the funding rate, beneficial wick trades, expected reversion to mean or trend lines.</li></ul><h4>Why should the DerivaDAO care about this data?</h4><ul><li>The DAO can manage the size of the insurance fund based on observed behavior and drawdowns in different liquidity conditions</li><li>The DAO can make decisions about product listings (and access of certain trading pairs to the insurance fund) based on data about drawdowns and liquidity.</li></ul><p>The DAO is in charge of new product listings on DerivaDEX, so ensuring that products on balance benefit the insurance fund (and at least don’t expose it to undue risk) is an important calculation that the DAO must make when undertaking listing decisions.</p><h3>📈 <strong>Position information</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*CFNzwZBkoAKWMVR2" /></figure><p>Over time, we see a wider spread of notional positions in both ETHPERP and BTCPERP, with ETHPERP significantly outpacing BTCPERP. In the testnet environment, all users start with the same deposit size, but the size divergence between ETHPERP and BTCPERP is interesting.</p><h4>Why should traders care about this data?</h4><ul><li>Is the overall size of open positions in a trading product spread across many traders, or just by one or two whales?</li></ul><h4>Why should the DAO care about this data?</h4><p>This data can drive profitable and interesting experimental questions like:</p><ul><li>Is ETHPERP participation higher because it is the default product on the exchange, or because it is a more desirable product?</li><li>Is this affected by relative liquidity on ETHPERP versus BTCPERP?</li></ul><h3>⚖️ <strong>Funding rates</strong></h3><p>The funding rate charts aren’t super interesting in Session 2 because of the deep liquidity the bots are providing. On main-net, liquidity will likely ebb and flow based on other parameters, and the funding rate will come into play more often. In Session 1, the funding rate was much more dynamic.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*JOWtM8kaQilfLkan" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*9g5fDplECrYx6BVX" /></figure><p>As you can see, there was one interval where the funding rate diverged from 0 in ETHPERP and one in BTCPERP. In trading sessions with less liquidity, we can expect this to move. <strong>Noticeably, the major liquidation event that is visible in the insurance fund chart is not associated here with a change to the funding rate, meaning the mark price was consistently tracking the price feed of the underlying.</strong> This is what we expect to see in a market with efficient and liquid market makers.</p><h4>Why do traders care?</h4><ul><li>Funding rates can provide very profitable opportunities for getting yield on a market-neutral position.</li><li>Funding rates can affect your bottom line if you’re holding an open position, especially if you hold that position across multiple funding rate intervals (a fee is assessed or a payment is distributed every 8 hours)</li></ul><h4>Why does the DAO care?</h4><ul><li>A funding rate that varies too widely can negatively affect trader experience on the exchange</li><li>The DAO may wish to explore productizing funding rate yield opportunities, and observing this data over time and understanding what factors influence it can help evaluate this opportunity.</li></ul><h3>🔍 Data and Derivatives</h3><p>Data transparency is a necessary step in the evolution of derivatives markets. Right now, this level of transparency is new, and has many unexplored implications. In the future, we at DEX Labs believe that this model will be demanded by all users.</p><p>Expect more DerivaDEX Data posts moving forward, and if you’d like some support getting started or putting together your own analysis, feel free to reach out.</p><h3>Join the DerivaDAO!</h3><p>Join the <a href="https://discord.gg/a54BWuG">Discord </a>and <a href="http://derivadex.com/subscribe">email list</a> to learn more about upcoming products and early access opportunities.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/u/cbf79704e465">Ainsley Sutherland</a> is the Product Lead at <a href="https://dexlabs.xyz/">DEX Labs</a>, lead R&amp;D contributors to <a href="https://derivadex.com/">DerivaDEX</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bf73f23aae04" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/derivadex/data-on-derivadex-bf73f23aae04">Data on DerivaDEX</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/derivadex">DerivaDEX</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is an insurance fund?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/derivadex/what-is-an-insurance-fund-49410775d41e?source=rss-cbf79704e465------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/49410775d41e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trading]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[derivatives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ainsley Sutherland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2020 19:29:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-02-14T16:50:06.335Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><em>Introducing DerivaDEX</em></h4><p><em>The </em><strong><em>Introducing DerivaDEX </em></strong><em>series covers relevant topics about DerivaDEX. It includes both educational articles, as well as articles that reveal unique features of DerivaDEX.</em></p><p><em>Stay in the loop: sign up for </em><a href="https://derivadex.com/"><em>email updates</em></a><em> or join on </em><a href="https://discord.gg/y2kk3yx"><em>Discord</em></a><em> for early access links, new opportunities, and updates on these channels.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/991/0*wq85i1Z_TPvTESqy" /><figcaption>A solid insurance fund is integral to trader experience</figcaption></figure><p>The <strong>insurance fund</strong> is a key part of any exchange that allows leveraged trading. It plays a large role in cryptocurrency derivatives exchanges, both centralized and decentralized. An exchange with a large insurance fund means traders can expect a smooth trading experience, even when markets are illiquid or experiencing extreme volatility.</p><p><strong><em>DerivaDEX is breaking new ground in how insurance funds are defined. We’ll reveal more specifics in coming days!</em></strong></p><p>At the end of this article, you will understand:</p><ul><li>Why do exchanges need insurance funds?</li><li>How are insurance funds capitalized?</li></ul><p>Insurance funds are primarily funded over time by users. This isn’t widely known information!</p><h3></h3><p>When an exchange says they can cover a hack with $ from an insurance fund, do you know where that $ comes from? #kucoinhack</p><h4>Definition: An insurance fund is a basket of money that exchanges use to limit downside losses, and ensure profitable traders receive their profits.</h4><h3>Leverage and Liquidation</h3><p>To understand the need for an insurance fund, we need to talk about <em>leveraged trading</em>. Leverage enables you to trade with more money than you really have: your initial money is called “collateral”. When traders make <em>leveraged trades</em>, they trade <em>notional</em> amounts that can be much higher than the value of the collateral they’ve deposited.</p><p>For example, imagine Bob deposits 10,000 USDT as collateral. USDT is “Tether”, a popular stablecoin that is pegged to the US dollar. If he chooses to use 4x leverage, Bob could take out a long (or a short) position worth $40,000, despite having only $10,000 deposited.</p><p>The flip side of this “added trading power”, or “leverage”, is that if Bob is long and the price goes down, he can lose his collateral sooner than he otherwise would have. This is referred to as being “liquidated”. Leveraged trading amplifies gains, as well as losses. Some exchanges offer up to 100x leverage.</p><p>On an orderbook-based exchange (as compared to say, an automated market-maker exchange), there is always a counterparty to Bob’s trade. For the sake of this example, let’s say that Alice is short and the price went down. In this scenario, Alice makes money, and Bob loses it.</p><p>There are three important numbers we should keep in mind to understand why leveraged trading requires an insurance fund.</p><ul><li>The <strong>liquidation price:</strong> This is the price at which Bob’s position will trigger a liquidation.</li><li>The <strong>bankruptcy price</strong>: This is the price at which Bob’s position has incurred losses exactly equal to his collateral.</li><li>The <strong>closing price:</strong> This is the price at which Bob’s position can be actually closed. In a liquid market, this should be close to the liquidation price. In an illiquid market, this could be even below the bankruptcy price.</li></ul><p>To fully understand the relationship of these concepts, let’s continue with an example from our good friend Leverage Bob.</p><p>Bob sees the price of Bitcoin is $10,000, and decides that he would like to open a long BTC position, and that he wants to use <a href="https://medium.com/derivadex/what-are-perpetual-swaps-130236587df2">perpetual swaps</a> to gain leverage. Bob deposits $10,000 of collateral onto the exchange, and purchases 4 BTC/USD perpetual swap contracts, which is $40,000 of notional (4x leveraged).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0m9lMav7L_PtZHcypQP6sA.png" /><figcaption>Bob’s going long!</figcaption></figure><p>If BTC/USD goes up in price to say, $15,000, Bob will have made a profit of $20,000 (This would be 4x more than he would have made had he purchased spot Bitcoin on Coinbase, for example). But what would happen to Bob’s collateral if the price went down instead?</p><p>On a normal spot exchange, BTC/USD would have to drop to $0 for Bob to lose all of his $10,000 collateral. However, due to his leveraged position in this scenario, BTC/USD would only have to drop to $7,500 for his position to become worthless (this is his bankruptcy price).</p><p>Before Bob’s position is worthless, it will hit his “liquidation price”. In reality, this number can vary and is a function of something called the “maintenance margin requirement”, but for simplicity’s sake let’s assume it’s $7,510. In a perfectly efficient, super liquid market, the exchange will find another trader to take over Bob’s position at exactly this price. However, more realistically there will be some deviation — maybe Bob’s position will actually be closed at $7,505, or $7,501, or maybe even something much lower (this is his closing price).</p><p>So, to recap: Bob’s position is worthless at his <strong>bankruptcy price</strong>. His position can be liquidated by the exchange when the price of BTC/USD reaches Bob’s <strong>liquidation price</strong>. The price at which the exchange is actually able to sell the position is his <strong>closing price</strong>.</p><p>Cryptocurrency markets are volatile, often illiquid, and may have slow or delayed price feeds. All these factors can cause positions to be closed below bankruptcy price. If that happens, traders like Bob can end up in a situation where they owe more than they have deposited as collateral.</p><p>For example, what if Bob’s earlier position couldn’t be closed until BTC/USD $7450?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*936trABf-tDVNQDao-t9PQ.png" /><figcaption>Bob owes $200 more than he has!</figcaption></figure><p>Bob now owes $10,200, but has only deposited $10,000. Unlike some traditional markets, most cryptocurrency exchanges provide <em>limited downside</em>. That means, no one is coming after Bob looking for that $200. <strong>The collateral Bob deposited is the most he can possibly lose.</strong></p><p>However, this outcome isn’t fair to Alice, the trader who went short where Bob went long, and who should be up $200. In this case, the insurance fund pays Alice the $200 she is owed, and the position is closed fairly.</p><h3>Where does the money come from?</h3><p>So how are insurance funds capitalized? In a healthy market, with many buyers and sellers, and low slippage, Bob’s position will be liquidated before it passes his “bankruptcy” price, and his position will be sold below his liquidation price, but above his bankruptcy price. <strong>The insurance fund receives the difference between the closing price (what Bob’s position is actually sold at) and his bankruptcy price.</strong></p><p>When Bob’s position is closed above its bankruptcy price, the insurance fund grows by closing_price — bankruptcy_price .</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HZ_bfPbPcI1Ji3Ozqvtf_A.png" /><figcaption>The insurance fund gains capital on<strong> liquidated longs </strong>when closing price &gt; bankruptcy price. For liquidated shorts, it would be the opposite.</figcaption></figure><p>In illiquid or volatile markets, Bob’s position could be sold below his bankruptcy price, as in the example we gave above with Bob and Alice. In this case, the insurance fund loses money in order to pay Alice. You can see what this looks like in the following diagram. The “spread” is the difference between the lowest sell order and the highest buy order.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sW8kqQlX3qP70YmbGCCnkg.png" /><figcaption>The insurance fund loses capital traders when the closing_price &lt; bankruptcy_price (for <strong>liquidated longs</strong>). The opposite holds true for liquidated shorts.</figcaption></figure><p>In a sense, capitalizing the insurance fund is a shared cost for all traders who experience liquidations. In return, traders have the peace of mind knowing that they will always be able to receive their deserved profits, even in the wild world of leveraged cryptocurrency trading!</p><p>The main concepts to remember from this are:</p><ul><li>An insurance fund is usually capitalized by liquidated traders, using the difference between their <strong>closing price</strong> and <strong>bankruptcy price</strong></li><li>When a market is illiquid, the position may be closed <strong>below</strong> the bankruptcy price. This is when the insurance fund <strong>pays winning traders</strong>.</li><li>A liquid market and an accurate price feed are key to limiting insurance fund payouts.</li></ul><p><strong>DerivaDEX is building a new kind of insurance fund. Our approach has some key innovations that will change the way insurance funds are thought of.</strong></p><p>Many thanks to <a href="https://twitter.com/codyewhite">Cody White</a> for helping us fine-tune this article!</p><h3>Stay in touch!</h3><p>We’ll reveal more about the unique design of DerivaDEX in coming days.</p><ul><li>Make sure you don’t miss the next post in this series, <a href="https://derivadex.com/">sign up for the mailing list</a>.</li><li>Join the <a href="https://discord.gg/y2kk3yx">Discord</a> to learn about upcoming opportunities and to join the DerivaDEX community!</li><li>Follow us on <a href="https://twitter.com/DDX_Official">Twitter!</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=49410775d41e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/derivadex/what-is-an-insurance-fund-49410775d41e">What is an insurance fund?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/derivadex">DerivaDEX</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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