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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by AML Crypto on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by AML Crypto on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@AMLCrypto?source=rss-306393cd9e2f------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by AML Crypto on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AMLCrypto?source=rss-306393cd9e2f------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 22:46:48 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Binance Suspended Withdrawals. Why Didn’t That Stop the $6.34 Billion Theft?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AMLCrypto/binance-suspended-withdrawals-why-didnt-that-stop-the-6-34-billion-theft-20114aedf753?source=rss-306393cd9e2f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/20114aedf753</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[binance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[AML Crypto]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 19:47:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-11T19:47:17.437Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When billions start leaving an exchange, the obvious response is to shut down withdrawals.</p><p>But what if the attacker already has a way to move assets outside that system?</p><p>That is what makes the October 29, 2026 Binance breach particularly revealing. Here is what emerged after the initial reports, and what AML Crypto found while tracing the attack’s on-chain preparation.</p><p><em>Updated November 11, 2026. The investigation remains ongoing.</em></p><h3>It started with a job interview</h3><p>According to Binance’s preliminary report, an employee was approached for a job interview in September. After speaking with people posing as a recruiter and a company executive, the employee downloaded a malicious coding assignment onto a work computer.</p><p>The attackers subsequently used the compromised device and an internal AI tool to expand their access. Stolen credentials helped them reach wallet-signing infrastructure. This is Binance’s account of the incident, not a final independent forensic conclusion. <a href="https://www.binance.com/en/square/post/384328127385979">Binance’s preliminary report</a>.</p><p>Most take-home assignments cost a candidate a few hours. This one became part of an attack on a major cryptocurrency exchange.</p><p>The AI tool alone is not the story. The chain of access is: an employee device, internal systems, deployment permissions, and ultimately a service capable of signing asset transfers.</p><h3>Before the billions came the small transfers</h3><p>At AML Crypto, we started with the preparation activity on Ethereum.</p><p>Our graph shows six withdrawals from Tornado Cash pools on October 28–29, totaling approximately 1.48 ETH across a group of connected addresses. One address stood out: 0x7c86…5ca0, which received approximately 1.3763 ETH directly and through an intermediary.</p><p>Small amounts, but enough to fund the addresses involved in subsequent operations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*VWs-35mVaHbX53V4" /><figcaption><em>Preparatory transfers on October 28–29: funding connected Ethereum addresses. Analysis by AML Crypto, visualized in Bholder.</em></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://bholder.amlcrypto.io/shared/52ebbccdf2814a8b9642e3e753fc89e1">Explore the interactive graph</a>.</p><p>Then we found something more substantial than a suggestive arrangement of arrows. The reconstructed code of the asset-sweeping contract named that same address as its authorized operator.</p><p><strong>The address appeared in both the funding trail and the contract’s access-control logic.</strong></p><p>Another branch shows small token transfers followed by funds being consolidated again. That pattern resembles testing, but the graph alone cannot establish intent. Blockchains record transactions. They are less helpful with reading minds.</p><h3>Same wallet. Different execution rules.</h3><p>On Ethereum, the attackers used EIP-7702, a mechanism that allows an ordinary account to delegate code execution to a smart contract.</p><p>Think of a vault that stays in the same place but starts following instructions from someone else’s control system.</p><p>The transaction we examined contained 50 authorizations for Binance 14, using consecutive nonce values. A nonce is an account counter. <strong>This was not password guessing, and knowing the counter did not unlock the wallet.</strong> A valid authorization still required a valid cryptographic signature.</p><p>Once delegation was established, the sweeping code could execute in the context of the Binance wallet itself.</p><h3>Why the off switch wasn’t enough</h3><p>Binance explained that the malicious EIP-7702 authorizations were already active on-chain and operated independently of its normal withdrawal infrastructure. Revoking them required additional blockchain transactions.</p><p>According to the exchange, the final unauthorized transaction was confirmed at 23:56 UTC on October 29. Binance 14’s delegation was removed at 00:10 UTC on October 30. <a href="https://www.binance.com/en/square/post/384336744180903">Binance’s official timeline</a>.</p><p>That makes “it was all over in twenty minutes” an oversimplification. The initial wave of large transfers happened quickly. Fully containing the unauthorized movements took longer.</p><p>EIP-7702 also explains only part of the incident. Assets moved on other networks where this mechanism does not exist.</p><h3>Frozen, replenished, recovered: three different things</h3><p>Binance’s preliminary report put the affected assets at approximately $6.34 billion, with around $2.85 billion frozen or intercepted. <a href="https://www.binance.com/en/square/post/384328127385979">Source</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*54CB4xAaVRdch8Pt" /></figure><p><em>Addresses identified in AML Crypto’s initial analysis as subject to Tether or Circle freezes, highlighted in blue. This graph reflects the investigation stage documented in the original publication.</em></p><p>Separately, Binance reported on November 4 that it had replenished approximately 98% of the affected assets, including through market and over-the-counter purchases. <a href="https://www.binance.com/es-LA/support/announcement/detail/c6ba9aa726974fc6b9332a2c8f63b405">Binance Recovery Update #7</a>.</p><p><strong>That does not mean 98% of the stolen funds had been recovered from the attackers.</strong> Replenishing exchange reserves, freezing tokens, and returning stolen assets to their owner are different outcomes.</p><p>The FBI officially attributed the attack to North Korea’s TraderTraitor activity and urged cryptocurrency service providers to block transactions involving the identified addresses and funds derived from them. <a href="https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/alerts/2026/north-korea-responsible-for-6-billion-binance-attack/layout_view">FBI statement, October 31</a>.</p><h3>What businesses should take from this</h3><p>The incident exposes a critical distinction between stopping a service and revoking on-chain authority. Shutting down the former does not automatically disable the latter.</p><p>For investigators, it also shows why the trail begins before the headline transaction. A small funding transfer can connect an operator to a contract that later moves billions.</p><p>In <a href="https://amlcrypto.io/blog/binance-hack-2026">AML Crypto’s full investigation</a>, we examine the addresses, code, and timeline behind that connection. If your business needs to trace stolen assets and establish what can be done next, <a href="https://amlcrypto.io/products/investigating_stolen_of_cryptoassets">AML Crypto’s blockchain investigation team</a> supports that process.</p><p>Finding where the money went is not the same as getting it back. But without a verifiable transaction trail, recovery efforts often have little to work with.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=20114aedf753" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[You Checked the Crypto Wallet. But Did You Check the Payment?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AMLCrypto/you-checked-the-crypto-wallet-but-did-you-check-the-payment-e0608515a652?source=rss-306393cd9e2f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e0608515a652</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[aml]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[AML Crypto]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 13:29:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-04T13:29:53.509Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You’re about to receive crypto. You screen the sender’s address, see a low risk score, and agree to the deal.</p><p>The payment arrives. A closer look at the transaction raises questions.</p><p>Hang on. Didn’t you already check?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WxIC1TxlGFumI8wLURa8qw.png" /></figure><p><strong>AML address screening and transaction screening answer different questions.</strong> One examines an address’s known history and connections. The other focuses on a particular transfer. Both may display a reassuring percentage, which makes them surprisingly easy to confuse.</p><p>It’s like checking a supplier’s reputation but never looking at the invoice. Useful preparation. Still room for an expensive surprise.</p><h3>What a crypto wallet check actually tells you</h3><p>A “wallet check” usually means screening <strong>a specific blockchain address on a particular network</strong>.</p><p>The provider examines the data available to it: labels, counterparties, incoming and outgoing transfers, and exposure to risky sources. That helps you decide whether to proceed or ask more questions.</p><p>But an address is not a person. One person may control dozens of addresses, while an exchange’s hot wallet processes withdrawals for thousands of customers.</p><p>Checking that shared wallet won’t reveal the full history of the customer paying you. Knowing which bank someone uses is not quite the same as knowing who you’re dealing with.</p><h3>Why a low-risk address can send a higher-risk payment</h3><p>Consider a hypothetical Bitcoin address that receives regular payments from ordinary counterparties. One incoming transfer is linked to stolen assets, but it represents only a small share of the address’s overall activity.</p><p>Depending on the provider’s methodology, the address may still receive a relatively low risk score. Yet if the payment sent to you spends the output linked to those stolen assets, <strong>the transaction may warrant a very different assessment</strong>.</p><p>The reverse can happen too. An address has a concerning historical connection, but a new incoming payment has a clearly documented source. That old connection matters. It does not automatically make every subsequent payment illicit.</p><p>Different scores aren’t necessarily a contradiction. You may be looking at different things.</p><p>Choosing whichever report has the nicer number is about as useful as choosing a medical diagnosis because you prefer the font.</p><h3>USDT doesn’t come with individual serial numbers</h3><p>Here’s where the blockchain itself matters.</p><p>Bitcoin transactions spend <strong>unspent transaction outputs, or UTXOs</strong>, from earlier transactions. Those inputs can have different histories. Analysis needs to distinguish the inputs, the recipient’s payment, and any change returned to the sender.</p><p>Ethereum and TRON work differently: assets are recorded as balances.</p><p>Suppose an address receives 9,000 USDT from ordinary counterparties and 1,000 USDT from a risky source. It then sends you 1,000 USDT.</p><p>The matching amount does not prove that you received precisely the same “bad” tokens. Individual USDT units don’t have serial numbers that let you follow them like marked banknotes.</p><p>The risky inflow still matters. An AML provider evaluates the amounts, timing, and connections using its methodology. But <strong>a USDT AML check cannot produce an infallible biography of every token</strong>.</p><p>Even in Bitcoin, a risk percentage is an analytical conclusion. It isn’t written into the blockchain next to the transaction amount.</p><h3>The right transaction hash can still lead to the wrong conclusion</h3><p>Transaction screening typically starts with a <strong>transaction hash, also called a TXID</strong>.</p><p>That identifies the blockchain transaction. It doesn’t always identify one payment.</p><p>An exchange can batch withdrawals to several Bitcoin recipients into a single transaction. On other networks, one transaction can also contain multiple token transfers.</p><p>Check the network, asset, recipient address, and amount. You may have found the correct payroll sheet and still be reading someone else’s line.</p><h3>What to check before and after a transfer</h3><p>You don’t need every possible report for every payment. Start with the decision you need to make:</p><ul><li><strong>Sending crypto to a new counterparty?</strong> Screen the receiving address before you send.</li><li><strong>Expecting a significant payment?</strong> Check the sender’s address beforehand if it’s available. Once the transaction appears on-chain, examine the actual transfer.</li><li><strong>Already received the funds?</strong> Find the TXID and identify your specific receipt: network, asset, recipient address, and amount.</li><li><strong>Moving your own crypto to an exchange?</strong> Review your address history and the incoming payments behind the balance you’re sending.</li></ul><p>For exchange withdrawals, the sender may not know the exchange’s sending address in advance. Match the actual transaction to the withdrawal confirmation. Don’t attribute the shared wallet’s entire history to one customer.</p><p>And check the network. The same address string can have different activity on Ethereum and BNB Chain. A report for the wrong chain can be perfectly genuine and completely irrelevant to your payment.</p><h3>A useful report explains the risk</h3><p>If a score raises questions, look for the reason. Is it a label attached to the address itself? A particular inflow? Direct exposure, or a connection several transactions away?</p><p>Look at the amount, date, direction, and intermediaries involved.</p><p><strong>A high score is not proof of wrongdoing. A low score is not a guarantee that an exchange will accept the funds.</strong> Platforms apply their own policies and may have different information.</p><p>For a significant payment with an unclear history, ask the screening provider for an explanation or seek a deeper investigation. A counterparty’s old screenshot is no substitute for a current check. New information can change the assessment of an old transaction.</p><p>For an initial address check, <a href="https://btrace.amlcrypto.io/">Btrace by AML Crypto</a> lets you review the risk score, contributing factors, and breakdown of incoming and outgoing funds. Keep the current report alongside your transaction records. If you’re still getting comfortable with addresses and transaction histories, our <a href="https://amlcrypto.io/blog/your_cryptocurrency_address">guide to using a blockchain explorer</a> covers the basics.</p><p>Before your next transfer, ask yourself: <strong>am I assessing an address, or investigating a particular payment?</strong></p><p>Sometimes you need both. Either way, the point is to understand the money you’re dealing with, not collect a reassuring green screenshot.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e0608515a652" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[You Sold Your USDT. The Money Arrived. So Why Is There a Problem?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AMLCrypto/you-sold-your-usdt-the-money-arrived-so-why-is-there-a-problem-2c53868d2577?source=rss-306393cd9e2f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2c53868d2577</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aml-crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[p2p]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[AML Crypto]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 14:35:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-03T14:35:22.546Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The buyer had a solid rating. The payment landed. You released the crypto and moved on.</p><p>Then you discovered that the person who paid you had never intended to buy your USDT.</p><p>How did you end up in the middle? You checked the amount, but not who sent it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y1WPQy_54hQ6AsHUUBhoaA.png" /></figure><p>A P2P trade has three separate parts: the counterparty, the fiat payment, and the crypto’s transaction history. A good rating does not establish where the money came from. An AML report does not prove the buyer is honest. And a payment screenshot may prove little more than someone’s ability to edit an image.</p><h3>“Someone else will pay for me”</h3><p>Consider a hypothetical setup. You are selling USDT. Your buyer is also scamming someone elsewhere and gives that person your bank details as payment instructions.</p><p>The money reaches your account. You release the crypto to the buyer. Later, the actual sender realizes they have been deceived and contacts their bank.</p><p>Your name appears as the recipient of their money.</p><p>That is why checking the amount is not enough. Compare the payer’s name with the buyer’s verified details in the order. A third-party payment, or multiple payments from unfamiliar people, needs to be resolved through the platform’s support process <strong>before you release the crypto</strong>.</p><p>If you are buying, use the payment details specified in the order and follow the platform’s rules. “Please pay my business partner instead” is a reason to pause, not a minor administrative detail.</p><p>If a disputed payment has already arrived, do not send a refund to a different account supplied in the chat. Coordinate the return with the platform and your payment provider. Otherwise, one unexplained transfer can become two.</p><h3>A receipt is not a payment</h3><p>Check your own bank account or payment app.</p><p>A convincing receipt, a “paid” status, and a message saying “the bank is just slow” are not substitutes for receiving the funds. Even a genuine credit does not, by itself, establish the payment’s legitimacy or rule out a later dispute.</p><p>If you have already paid for a purchase and the seller asks you to cancel the order and open another one, contact support first. Do not cancel a paid order simply because the seller tells you to.</p><p>Unexpected changes deserve attention: new payment details, a request to move the conversation to a messenger, or an offer to settle outside the platform. Especially when they come with “Hurry up, the price is moving.”</p><p>The price probably is moving. That does not verify the person receiving your money.</p><h3>Where an AML check actually helps</h3><p>First, establish how the crypto will reach you.</p><p>If a P2P purchase is credited <strong>to your exchange balance</strong>, you may not have access to a separate blockchain address belonging to the seller. In that case, focus on the counterparty’s profile, the order, and the payment. A later withdrawal from the exchange to your personal wallet is a separate transaction.</p><p>Checking the exchange’s shared wallet does not establish the seller’s personal transaction history. That would be like checking an airport’s security record to decide whether you trust someone you met at the departure gate.</p><p>If the trade involves <strong>a direct transfer between external wallets</strong>, there is another useful check: screening the sender’s or recipient’s address before proceeding.</p><p>An AML service can identify known links to scams, stolen assets, sanctioned entities, and other sources of risk.</p><p>For a USDT AML check, select the correct network. The address and network you screen must match the planned transfer.</p><p>Run the check yourself, close to the time of the trade. A report supplied by the other party could be outdated, altered, or associated with a different address. If the actual sender changes, the earlier result does not cover the new address.</p><h3>A green report does not answer every question</h3><p>A low AML risk score means that the provider did not identify sufficient grounds for a higher rating based on the information available at the time.</p><p>That is useful. It is not a character reference.</p><p>A new address may have very little history. Information about a recent theft may not yet have reached the provider’s database. Look beyond the headline score at the known sources of funds, identified risk connections, and any unattributed portion.</p><p>Our service, <a href="https://btrace.amlcrypto.io/">Btrace</a>, lets you screen a crypto address and examine the factors behind its risk assessment. A favorable result does not establish that a fiat payment is legitimate or guarantee that a bank or exchange will accept the transaction without further checks.</p><p>A small test transfer has limits, too. It can help confirm that a transfer works, but the main payment may come from a different address or involve different sources of funds.</p><h3>Keep a record you can actually explain</h3><p>Save the order number, trade terms, in-platform conversation, and payment confirmation. For an on-chain transfer, also retain the network, addresses, transaction hash, and dated AML report.</p><p>Together, those records should explain <strong>who paid, what the payment was for, which order it belonged to, and what crypto you received or released</strong>.</p><p>Your bank statement does not contain the whole P2P trade. It shows a payment between accounts. The context has to come from somewhere else.</p><p>AML Crypto’s <a href="https://amlcrypto.io/ru/blog/proverka-kriptovalyuty-pered-p2p">step-by-step P2P verification guide</a> covers the checks for both buying and selling crypto. The linked guide is currently in Russian.</p><p>You do not need to turn every P2P trade into a forensic investigation. But when an attractive rate comes with a third-party payment, changing account details, and a request to “stop overcomplicating things,” a few more questions are warranted.</p><p>Missing a good rate is inconvenient. Trying to reconstruct who actually paid you is considerably worse.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2c53868d2577" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Inside the $6.3]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AMLCrypto/inside-the-6-3-80fe26291760?source=rss-306393cd9e2f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/80fe26291760</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[aml-crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[binance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[AML Crypto]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 20:46:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-02T20:46:09.961Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Inside the $6.3 Billion Binance Hack: Small Transfers Before the Attack, 865 Transactions an Hour After</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*VxwVpUougLQirwEY.jpg" /></figure><p>Most headlines about a crypto theft leave readers with one number. For Binance, it was approximately $6.3 billion.</p><p>For investigators, a much smaller figure can matter just as much: the 1.3763 ETH sent to an address before the attack, for example. Transfers like these can connect the infrastructure used to prepare an operation with the contracts later used to drain funds.</p><p>AML Crypto examined the preparatory transactions on Ethereum, then worked with researcher @officer_secret to trace funds on TRON. Here is what we found, and what the evidence does not yet establish.</p><h3>Billions moved in twenty minutes. The preparation started earlier.</h3><p>On October 29, 2026, approximately <strong>$6.3 billion in crypto assets</strong> was drained from Binance’s hot wallets, according to preliminary estimates. Most of the transfers took place within twenty minutes, across multiple blockchains.</p><p>The transactions under investigation included movements of approximately <strong>18,270 BTC</strong>, <strong>965,000 SOL</strong>, and <strong>185 million XRP</strong>. On TRON, the figures were around <strong>612.7 million USDT and 46.4 million TRX</strong>. On Ethereum, approximately <strong>167,500 ETH, 1.615 billion USDT</strong>, and other tokens were withdrawn from the wallet labeled Binance 14.</p><p>These figures form part of a preliminary reconstruction of asset movements. They are not a calculation of the exchange’s final losses.</p><p>Our analysis began with much smaller amounts. On October 28–29, the group of addresses we examined received approximately <strong>1.48 ETH</strong> through Tornado Cash pools. One wallet received about <strong>1.3763 ETH</strong>, both directly and through an intermediary address.</p><p>We then found a significant connection: that same wallet appeared in the reconstructed contract code as the only authorized caller of the withdrawal functions.</p><p>This was more than two addresses appearing somewhere in the same transaction history. The funding trail and control of the withdrawal contract converged on the same wallet.</p><p>A neighboring branch of the graph showed small transfers of ETH, USDT, and USDC, followed by the consolidation of some tokens. The pattern resembles a test of transaction routes, but calling it a confirmed rehearsal for the exploit would go beyond the evidence. The blockchain records actions. Intent does not come attached to a transaction.</p><h3>The wallet stayed the same. The code it could execute changed.</h3><p>On Ethereum, the attackers used <strong>EIP-7702</strong>, a mechanism that allows an externally owned account to delegate code execution to a smart contract.</p><p>The account retains its address and balance but gains the ability to execute the delegated code. In this case, that code included a function called sweep(), designed to move assets out.</p><p>It is tempting to reduce this to a simple story: someone found an Ethereum loophole, entered a Binance address, and took the money.</p><p>That is not how it works. <strong>Delegation requires a valid cryptographic signature from the account granting it.</strong></p><p>The transaction we examined contained <strong>50 EIP-7702 authorizations</strong>. According to the signature reconstruction, they all related to Binance 14, rather than fifty different wallets. The consecutive nonce values, which are public account counters, neither replace a signature nor function as a secret password.</p><p>How the attackers obtained the ability to authorize these operations remains a separate question. Our initial analysis considered the possibility that a DevOps engineer’s device and related internal services had been compromised. That remained a preliminary hypothesis.</p><p>EIP-7702 also cannot explain withdrawals on Bitcoin, TRON, Solana, or XRP Ledger. Transactions on those networks require their own signing authority. We therefore considered a possible compromise of the broader infrastructure used to manage hot wallets.</p><p>The transactions, contract analysis, and funding graph are available in <a href="https://amlcrypto.io/blog/binance-hack-2026">Part 1 of AML Crypto’s investigation</a>.</p><h3>Once the assets were drained, another race began</h3><p>Stealing assets and retaining control of them are different challenges.</p><p>After the attack, funds were distributed across addresses, swapped, and consolidated into new wallets. Meanwhile, centralized stablecoin issuers began freezing assets.</p><p>At the time of our initial analysis, the preliminary estimate for frozen USDT and USDC was approximately <strong>$2.7 billion</strong>. Our graph also identified two Binance addresses affected by Tether and Circle freezes.</p><p>That does not mean the entire amount had been returned to its owners. Freezing restricts token movements; recovery requires further steps.</p><p>The transaction graph alone cannot establish why the freezes included the exchange’s addresses or how Binance’s internal security procedures operated at that moment.</p><h3>What we found on TRON</h3><p>Together with @officer_secret, we examined fund movements on TRON during the reporting window from <strong>October 29 at 20:44 to October 30 at 12:44</strong>.</p><p>The dataset contained:</p><ul><li><strong>2,831 outgoing transactions from 284 addresses</strong> associated with the attacker;</li><li>an average interval of <strong>20.35 seconds</strong> between transactions, with a median of <strong>3 seconds</strong>;</li><li><strong>1,099 consecutive transaction pairs</strong> with identical timestamps to the second.</li></ul><p>Activity peaked on <strong>October 30 between 06:00 and 06:59 UTC</strong>, with <strong>865 transactions in one hour</strong>, or approximately one every <strong>4.2 seconds</strong>.</p><p>That pace, combined with the repeated use of addresses across different routes, suggests automation. Timestamps alone, however, do not establish which software the attackers used.</p><p>The routes under investigation included interactions with <strong>Bitget Wallet, LayerZero, Symbiosis Finance, NEAR Intents, Meson, Allbridge, and ChangeHero</strong>. Other addresses remained unattributed.</p><p>A service appearing in a transaction route does not imply its involvement in the theft. The investigative task is to establish the nature of each interaction and determine where further checks, assistance, or restrictions on fund movements may still be possible.</p><h3>Why trace thousands of transfers?</h3><p>An impressive graph does not recover money by itself.</p><p>The practical purpose of tracing is to identify associated addresses, document the routes, and provide actionable information to parties capable of responding. A centralized exchange, a swap service, and a decentralized protocol have different technical capabilities. There is no universal “stop everything” button.</p><p>We called on ChangeHero, NEAR Intents, and Binance to review the identified addresses and, where technically feasible, block transactions associated with the attacker. AML Crypto is ready to provide those parties with intelligence on this incident at no cost, including newly identified wallets.</p><p>The detailed findings and investigation graph are available in <a href="https://amlcrypto.io/blog/binance-hack-tron-investigation">Part 2: tracing the funds on TRON</a>.</p><p>For businesses, the incident illustrates why a response plan needs to exist before a theft occurs: who preserves the evidence, who tracks the transfers, and who contacts the relevant services while the assets are still moving.</p><p><a href="https://amlcrypto.io/products/investigating_stolen_of_cryptoassets">AML Crypto investigates crypto asset theft</a> and assists companies facing these situations. The prospects for recovery depend on the facts of the case, not on the size of a contractor’s promises.</p><p>Twenty minutes can be enough to move billions. Reconstructing the trail and pursuing recovery take considerably longer.</p><p><em>This article brings together our initial analysis of the attack and findings from the TRON investigation covering October 29–30, 2026. The investigation is ongoing; estimates and address attributions may be revised.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=80fe26291760" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Tether Freezes USDT — and What walletinquiries@willkie.com Has to Do With It]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AMLCrypto/why-tether-freezes-usdt-and-what-walletinquiries-willkie-com-has-to-do-with-it-3ace69961786?source=rss-306393cd9e2f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3ace69961786</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[usdt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[AML Crypto]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 19:30:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-08T19:30:47.395Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What Happens When USDT Is Frozen, Why Tether Refers Users to Willkie Farr &amp; Gallagher, and How Stablecoin Freezes Actually Work</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/592/0*rNZAVvHxCU8a7lGe" /></figure><p>We break down only confirmed facts, real cases, and the new compliance reality of the crypto market.</p><p>In recent months, the topic of blocked — or frozen — stablecoins has suddenly moved beyond niche discussions among AML specialists and victims of such freezes, becoming almost a standalone crypto genre. On Twitter, Telegram, and in crypto media, people have been discussing Tether emails, frozen addresses, NFT notices, and the previously obscure email address <a href="/service/mailto:walletinquiries@willkie.com">walletinquiries@willkie.com</a> far more actively.</p><p>The problem is that this story quickly became surrounded by a huge amount of speculation. Some authors openly dramatize the situation, others present assumptions as facts, and in some places it almost feels as if Tether has already turned into a hybrid of an intelligence agency, a bank, and a legal department.</p><p>That is why in this article we decided to take a different route. No conspiracy theories, no “sensational exposés,” and no attempts to invent what has not been confirmed. Only what can actually be supported by public statements, the technical mechanics of USDT, real cases, and the practice that the AML Crypto team has already encountered.</p><p>And practice shows that communication through <a href="/service/mailto:walletinquiries@willkie.com">walletinquiries@willkie.com</a> does indeed exist. Moreover, in a number of cases, after such communication, users were actually able to pass the review process and have their funds unfrozen.</p><p>This is exactly what makes the situation so interesting. For the first time, the crypto market is facing, at scale, a reality in which certain intermediaries have suddenly appeared between users and their USDT: compliance procedures, legal review, questions about the source of funds, and so on.</p><p>For an industry that spent years selling the idea of “financial freedom without intermediaries,” this is a fairly symbolic turn of events.</p><h4>What Is Actually Happening With USDT Freezes</h4><p>If we strip away the emotion, the fact that Tether can freeze USDT has never been a secret. This function has long been built into the token’s smart contract.</p><p>Technically, it is fairly straightforward: a specific address is added to a blacklist, after which USDT transactions from that address become impossible. The tokens themselves do not disappear. They still appear in the wallet and on the blockchain, but they can no longer be transferred.</p><p>That is why users often describe the situation like this:</p><blockquote>“The money is sitting in my wallet, but I cannot use it.”</blockquote><p>Previously, most market participants perceived freezing as something distant and almost abstract — something that happened to “hackers,” sanctioned addresses, or large-scale exploit cases. But as more real international money, OTC liquidity, and corporate settlements began moving through USDT, stablecoins increasingly transformed from a “crypto-native tool” into a full-fledged part of global financial infrastructure. And as practice shows, that infrastructure has a strong appetite for AML, compliance, and people asking uncomfortable questions about the origin of funds.</p><blockquote>Why <a href="/service/mailto:walletinquiries@willkie.com">walletinquiries@willkie.com</a> Appeared</blockquote><p>The most discussed part of the whole story is not even the freeze itself, but the fact that users are being referred to lawyers. In a number of cases, owners of frozen addresses received a response from Tether asking them to continue communication via:</p><p><a href="/service/mailto:walletinquiries@willkie.com">walletinquiries@willkie.com</a></p><p>Here it is important not to slide into fantasies about some “secret scheme.” As of today, there is no confirmation that Willkie’s lawyers independently decide which addresses to freeze or somehow control USDT. Neither Tether nor the law firm itself has made any public statements to that effect.</p><p>However, there are confirmed cases where further compliance and legal procedures did take place through this channel. And if you think about it, the logic is fairly clear.</p><p>When the matter involves:</p><ul><li>disputed ownership;</li><li>investigations;</li><li>potential money laundering;</li><li>hacks;</li><li>or disputed transactions,</li></ul><p>a regular “support ticket” is no longer enough. At this point, the crypto market starts operating much like the traditional financial system. Lawyers appear, documents are reviewed, the source of funds is analyzed, and legal review begins. In other words, the industry is gradually arriving at a very adult realization:</p><p>when billions of dollars flow through a system, lawyers eventually enter the room.</p><h4>Who Are Willkie Farr &amp; Gallagher?</h4><p>Willkie Farr &amp; Gallagher is a major international law firm based in the United States, with practices covering financial law, investigations, regulatory disputes, sanctions compliance, and corporate disputes. This is not some random Gmail address, but a serious institution that works on international cases.</p><p>At the same time, it is important to understand that the involvement of a law firm in the process does not automatically mean that the user is “guilty” or that there is a criminal story behind the funds. In many cases, this is precisely a compliance procedure — an attempt to establish:</p><ul><li>who owns the assets;</li><li>where the funds came from;</li><li>whether they are connected to activity under investigation.</li></ul><p>For an ordinary user, of course, all this looks rather unfamiliar. People come to crypto for the feeling of direct control over their assets, only to suddenly find themselves inside a process that, in places, starts to look suspiciously similar to banking compliance.</p><p>Except instead of a letter from the bank, they receive a USDT freeze on the blockchain.</p><h4><strong>NFT Notices: The Strangest Part of the New Reality</strong></h4><p>NFT notices deserve special attention. They are what made this story go viral. Some users began receiving NFTs containing legal notices sent directly to their addresses. In a crypto market where NFT spam has long become part of the background noise, the first reaction was usually: “Just another scam.”</p><p>But in a number of cases, these notices really did turn out to be part of legal communication. And this is where the industry unexpectedly reached a rather surreal point: court and compliance notices began being delivered directly through the blockchain.</p><p>If someone had described this mechanism back in 2019, the crypto community would probably have decided that the author had spent too much time at Web3 conferences. Today, however, this is already a real practice discussed by lawyers, investigators, and compliance teams.</p><h4>Why This Situation Is So Controversial</h4><p>The main conflict around USDT freezes is not technical, but ideological.</p><p>On the one hand, without freeze mechanisms, stablecoins would be unlikely to become part of the global financial system. Banks, regulators, and institutional investors are simply not ready to work with an asset that cannot be stopped even after a major hack or sanctions-related investigation.</p><p>On the other hand, for the crypto market, this is a painful shift. Many people are realizing for the first time that:</p><p>control over a private key and control over an asset are not always the same thing.</p><p>This is especially true when it comes to centralized stablecoins. That is why searches like “USDT frozen,” “USDT freeze,” and “how to unfreeze USDT” have become noticeably more common over the past year.</p><p>The market is gradually moving out of the romantic stage of a “Wild West without rules” and starting to live by the rules of infrastructure through which not millions, but hundreds of billions of dollars now flow.</p><h4>What Happens After You Contact Them</h4><p>If a user really does face a freeze, the next stage is usually no longer technical, but compliance-driven. Depending on the situation, the user may be asked to provide:</p><ul><li>documents;</li><li>proof of identity;</li><li>an explanation of the source of funds;</li><li>transaction history;</li><li>proof of ownership of the address.</li></ul><p>Here it is very important to understand one thing: the fact that such information is requested does not automatically mean that the user is suspected of committing a crime. In many cases, the compliance team’s task is simply to understand the origin of the assets and make sure the funds are not linked to a hack, sanctions-related activity, money laundering, or fraud.</p><p>The problem lies elsewhere: for an ordinary user, the whole process looks highly opaque and unexpected. Especially for those who were previously convinced that blockchain is a system where “no one can interfere.” As practice shows — particularly in 2026 — interference is in fact possible.</p><h4>What This Changes for the Crypto Market</h4><p>The main takeaway from this story is much broader than the freezing of individual addresses.</p><p>Stablecoins are gradually ceasing to be a “crypto experiment” and are becoming a full-fledged part of regulated finance. Along with that, the importance of AML and the history of funds’ origin is growing.</p><p>And if we look at the situation honestly, the market itself arrived here. It is impossible to simultaneously:</p><ul><li>integrate with banks;</li><li>work with institutions;</li><li>process international settlements;</li><li>and remain completely outside legal and compliance infrastructure.</li></ul><p>So the question today is no longer simply whether this is “good” or “bad.” Rather, the market is trying to understand:</p><p>how to preserve a balance between compliance and the very sense of financial freedom for which crypto emerged in the first place.</p><h4>What to Do If Your USDT Has Been Frozen</h4><p>First: do not panic and do not look for “unfreezing specialists” on Telegram. As soon as a user publicly says that their USDT has been frozen, dozens of people almost immediately appear offering to “solve the issue for a percentage.”</p><p>The effectiveness of such characters is usually somewhere between crypto astrology and reading BTC candles.</p><p>If a freeze has actually happened, it is better to:</p><ul><li>save transaction hashes;</li><li>save addresses and correspondence with counterparties;</li><li>prepare documents confirming the source of funds;</li><li>avoid deleting any data;</li><li>and carefully go through the official compliance process.</li></ul><p>Attempts to “bypass the system” through dubious services usually only make the situation worse and create additional risks — although people still often try to take that route.</p><h4>Where to Turn If the Freeze Is Linked to a Scam or an Investigation</h4><p>A separate category of cases involves situations where the freeze is connected to cryptocurrency theft or fraud. In such cases, it is important first to understand the actual movement of funds:</p><ul><li>which addresses the funds passed through;</li><li>whether exchanges were involved;</li><li>whether there is any possibility of identifying the recipients;</li><li>whether there are still points for further investigation.</li></ul><p>AML Crypto investigates cryptocurrency incidents, analyzes the movement of assets, prepares materials for exchanges and law enforcement agencies, and helps increase the chances of recovering stolen crypto assets.</p><p><strong>Learn more: </strong><a href="https://amlcrypto.io/products/investigating_stolen_of_cryptoassets">https://amlcrypto.io/products/investigating_stolen_of_cryptoassets</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3ace69961786" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Detailed examples of cryptocurrency theft incidents and descriptions of services for tracking…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AMLCrypto/detailed-examples-of-cryptocurrency-theft-incidents-and-descriptions-of-services-for-tracking-9075055b401a?source=rss-306393cd9e2f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9075055b401a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[aml-crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aml]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[AML Crypto]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 06 Nov 2025 12:15:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-06T12:15:49.217Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Detailed examples of cryptocurrency theft incidents and descriptions of services for tracking stolen funds</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vpg0WXJQRlAlRl5ZB6p13w.jpeg" /></figure><p>Investigating incidents related to the theft or unlawful movement of cryptocurrency assets is a complex process that requires the use of a wide range of tools and methodologies. Unlike traditional financial systems, where fund movements are tracked centrally, information in the blockchain is public but anonymous — which simultaneously simplifies and complicates the investigator’s work.</p><p>Effective analysis requires an understanding of <strong>blockchain architecture</strong>, the principles of <strong>transaction chain construction</strong>, and the use of <strong>analytical platforms</strong> capable of linking addresses through various indicators.</p><p>The examples presented below illustrate <strong>real-world investigation scenarios</strong> — from simple cases involving transfers to centralized exchanges to complex schemes employing <strong>cross-chain bridges</strong>, <strong>peel chain patterns</strong>, and <strong>mixers</strong>. Each incident demonstrates a specific analytical technique and highlights the importance of combining tools — from standard <strong>blockchain explorers</strong> (Etherscan, Tronscan, Polygonscan) to advanced analytical solutions such as <strong>Arkham</strong>, <strong>Btrace</strong>, <strong>Metasleuth</strong>, and <strong>Bholder</strong>.</p><p>Thus, the purpose of this section is to show how various services assist in gradually reconstructing fund movements and identifying the final destinations of stolen assets, as well as to demonstrate a systematic analytical approach to blockchain data analysis.</p><h3>Incident 1: simple transfer of funds to a centralized service</h3><p><strong>Input data:</strong> the victim’s address and the attacker’s address are known. The theft of funds was carried out within a single transaction from the victim’s address to the attacker’s address.</p><p><strong>Tools used:</strong> <a href="https://tronscan.org/">Tronscan</a>, <a href="https://intel.arkm.com/">Arkham</a>, <a href="https://btrace.amlcrypto.io/">Btrace</a>, <a href="https://amlcrypto.io/products/bholder">Bholder</a></p><p><strong>Result:</strong> the funds were withdrawn through one intermediary (transit) address to the services HitBTC and n.exchange.</p><p><strong>Graph of connections:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*UZlG1sR-Q_LRx_mj" /></figure><ol><li>The starting point is to identify the initial attacker address. In our incident, the victim’s address was compromised and funds were withdrawn — the victim had withdrawn funds from their exchange account to their compromised address. Therefore, we will consider the victim’s address to be the attacker address, since the attacker had access to that address. At the start of the investigation it is also necessary to know the amount to track. In our case this is <strong>63,000 TRX</strong> in a single transaction.</li><li>The second step is to trace to which address the funds were withdrawn from the attacker address. To verify the flow of funds we used the official TRON network explorer — <a href="https://tronscan.org/">Tronscan</a>.</li><li>When tracing the flow of funds, you should use services that provide labeling/tagging of crypto addresses. This is necessary to understand at which point the investigation should stop. For label verification we used <a href="https://intel.arkm.com/">Arkham</a> and <a href="https://btrace.amlcrypto.io/">Btrace</a>.<br><em>📌 </em><strong><em>Important</em></strong><em>: use the services collectively. Sometimes a single address-labeling service may not have information about an address’s ownership.</em></li><li>For graphical visualization, the <a href="https://amlcrypto.io/products/bholder">Bholder</a> tool was used. While visualization is not mandatory, it significantly simplifies both the understanding of the incident and further interaction with law enforcement agencies and exchanges identified during the investigation.</li></ol><h3>Incident 2: a large number of the attacker’s intermediary (transit) addresses</h3><p><strong>Input data:</strong> the victim’s address and the attacker’s address are known. The theft of funds was carried out through multiple transactions from the victim’s address to the attacker’s address.</p><p><strong>Tools used:</strong> <a href="https://etherscan.io/">Etherscan</a>, <a href="https://metasleuth.io/">Metasleuth</a>, <a href="https://intel.arkm.com/">Arkham</a>, <a href="https://btrace.amlcrypto.io/">Btrace</a>, <a href="https://amlcrypto.io/products/bholder">Bholder</a></p><p><strong>Result:</strong> the funds were withdrawn through multiple intermediary (transit) addresses to the services <strong>OKX</strong>, <strong>Coinhacko</strong>, <strong>HTX</strong>, <strong>MaskEx</strong>, and <strong>Binance</strong>.</p><p><strong>Graph of connections:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*UN8oyK4kSb-tcrYN" /></figure><p><strong>How the investigation was conducted:</strong></p><ol><li>The starting point is to identify the scammer’s address. In our incident, the victim sent funds to the same scammer’s address from multiple exchanges. Therefore, we need to trace where the scammer transferred all the funds in each transaction. At the first stage, we can see that all funds were sent to the same address, from which the distribution of funds began.</li><li>The scammer’s address, which distributes funds across multiple branches, should be analyzed using the LIFO (Last In, First Out) method.<br><strong>1. What is LIFO?<br></strong>LIFO (Last In, First Out) is an accounting principle meaning <em>“the last to come in is the first to go out.”<br></em>In cryptocurrency, LIFO means that when funds are spent, we assume the most recently received tokens are spent first.<br>For comparison:<br>With physical money (banknotes), you can literally say, “this specific bill with this serial number was spent.”<br>In cryptocurrency, tokens have no serial numbers — they are just a balance entry on an address.<br><strong>2. How this looks on the blockchain<br></strong>On the blockchain, we might see:<br>An address receives several incoming transactions (for example, 10 BTC stolen, then another 5 BTC). Later, that address sends out 7 BTC.<br>The question arises:<br>Was that 7 BTC from the first 10 BTC or the later 5 BTC? Technically, the blockchain doesn’t distinguish — it’s just a total balance.<br>This is where LIFO comes in.<br>We assume that the most recent incoming funds (the ones “on top” of the balance) are spent first.<br>This is useful for tracing laundering patterns, since the latest “dirty” batch of funds is usually moved immediately.<br><strong>3. Why LIFO is more convenient for investigations than FIFO<br>- No unique token identifiers</strong>. Unlike dollars with serial numbers, Bitcoin or Ethereum tokens are <em>fungible</em>. That means it’s impossible to prove whether the “first” or “last” coins were spent.<br>- <strong>Any outgoing transaction may involve stolen funds</strong>. If a wallet contains even a portion of “dirty” tokens, any transfer from it can be treated as laundering.<br>- <strong>LIFO makes laundering chains clearer</strong>.<br>Criminals often move the newest inflows with “fresh” transactions to quickly hide the trail.<br>Therefore, it’s logical to assume the latest stolen funds are moved first.<br>This helps investigators link transactions and prove connections in court.<br>📌 <strong>Key idea</strong>: Under the LIFO principle, every new outgoing transaction from a suspicious wallet can be directly associated with the most recently stolen funds — even if the wallet also holds older, “clean” assets.<br>4. <strong>Analogy for understanding</strong><br>Imagine a thief hides stolen gold bars in a chest that already contains his “clean” gold:<br>- Later, when he takes out a few bars to sell, no one can tell which exact bars were removed.<br>- But investigators assume he’s selling the stolen ones first (LIFO).<br>- This makes sense — the thief’s goal is to get rid of the stolen gold as quickly as possible.</li><li>To apply the LIFO method, you need to use a blockchain explorer. In our case, the network is Ethereum, so we’ll use <a href="https://etherscan.io/">Etherscan</a>. Example of calculating fund flows using the LIFO method:</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qAUarWCOXkNL6A5m" /><figcaption>We are tracking a transfer of 29,855 USDT (it’s at the bottom of the transaction list). After that, another 380,000 USDT arrived at the address, but under the LIFO method (the most recent inflows are spent first) that later amount is not relevant to us. We continue to look specifically for the spending of our 29,855 USDT. In the transaction list we see: — Line 3 — a transfer of 800 USDT. That is part of our funds, so we track the recipient address. — Line 2 — a transfer in a different token, so it’s unrelated to this case. — Line 1 — a large transaction of 402,000 USDT, which includes the remaining portion of our funds. As a result, our 29,855 USDT were split between two addresses: the recipient from line 3 and the recipient from line 1. This same analysis must be repeated at every new address, until the stolen funds reach centralized services (exchanges, swap services, etc.) where they might be possible to freeze.</figcaption></figure><p>4. When tracing funds, each new address must be checked for existing labels or tags using services such as <a href="https://btrace.amlcrypto.io/">Btrace</a>, <a href="https://intel.arkm.com/">Arkham</a>, <a href="https://metasleuth.io/">Metasleuth</a>.</p><h3>Incident 3: Transfer of Funds via Bridges</h3><p><strong>Input data:</strong> the victim’s address is known, the attacker’s address is known. The theft was carried out via multiple transactions from the victim’s address to the attacker’s address.</p><p><strong>Tools used:</strong> <a href="https://polygonscan.com/">Polygonscan</a>, <a href="https://tronscan.org/#/">Tronscan</a>, <a href="https://explorer.bridgers.xyz/#/">Bridgers explorer</a>, <a href="https://explorer.allchainbridge.com/?__cf_chl_rt_tk=nuDw5tYwLLmpUI9zttd3chCzKqBQkUcYr22TlzW8Oow-1761924207-1.0.1.1-4hpJMOCNCQ3_3axR7KgsX64LlOnTTqU0dKvmlsJCscM">Allchain explorer</a>, <a href="https://metasleuth.io/">Metasleuth</a>, <a href="https://intel.arkm.com/">Arkham</a>, <a href="https://btrace.amlcrypto.io/">Btrace</a>, <a href="https://amlcrypto.io/products/bholder">Bholder</a></p><p><strong>Result:</strong> the funds left the original network and were distributed across multiple centralized services</p><p><strong>Graph of connections:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*mW6VDRlXkgNS_uNt" /></figure><p><strong>How the investigation was conducted:</strong></p><ol><li>The starting point is to identify the scammer’s address. In this incident, the victim sent funds to the same scammer’s address. This slightly simplifies the tracking process at the initial stage. To obtain information about all transactions associated with the attacker’s address, the <a href="https://polygonscan.com/">Polygonscan</a> service was used.</li><li>Using the <strong>LIFO tracking method</strong>, an analysis of fund flows was performed up to the addresses of decentralized services. Information about address ownership was obtained from <a href="https://polygonscan.com/">Polygonscan</a>, <a href="https://metasleuth.io/">Metasleuth</a>, <a href="https://intel.arkm.com/">Arkham</a>, and <a href="https://btrace.amlcrypto.io/">Btrace</a>. With the help of these tools, it was determined that the funds were transferred to <strong>Bitkeep Wallet</strong> and <strong>Bridgers</strong> services.</li><li>Using <a href="https://explorer.bridgers.xyz/#/">Bridgers Explorer</a> and <a href="https://www.notion.so/25debe269e6b806bb350c03059d23219?pvs=21">Allchain Explorer</a>, information was obtained showing that the funds were moved <strong>from the Polygon network to the Tron network</strong>.</li><li>Once the funds entered the <strong>Tron network</strong>, the transaction tracking process continued using the Tron network explorer — <a href="https://www.notion.so/1c3ebe269e6b80c48d84ed8f41f58aaa?pvs=21">Tronscan</a>. Alongside building the connection graph, all new addresses presumably associated with the scammer were checked through <a href="https://metasleuth.io/">Metasleuth</a>, <a href="https://intel.arkm.com/">Arkham</a>, and <a href="https://btrace.amlcrypto.io/">Btrace</a>.</li></ol><h3>Incident 4: Peel Chain Services</h3><p><strong>Input data:</strong> the victim’s address is known, the attacker’s address is known. The theft was carried out via several transactions from the victim’s address to the attacker’s address.</p><p><strong>Tools used:</strong> <a href="https://tronscan.org/#/">Tronscan</a>, <a href="https://metasleuth.io/">Metasleuth</a>, <a href="https://intel.arkm.com/">Arkham</a>, <a href="https://btrace.amlcrypto.io/">Btrace</a>, <a href="https://amlcrypto.io/products/bholder">Bholder</a></p><p><strong>Result:</strong> the funds were sent to peel chain services (services for mixing and fragmenting funds)</p><p><strong>Graph of connections:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8ftlZ3a-LnfpdsC0" /></figure><p><strong>How the investigation was conducted:</strong></p><ol><li>The starting point is to identify the scammer’s addresses. In this incident the victim sent funds to <strong>four different attacker addresses</strong>. Therefore, the subsequent fund flow must be traced along <strong>four distinct paths</strong>.</li><li>Using the <strong>LIFO</strong> tracking method, an analysis was performed to follow the funds to addresses exhibiting atypical behavior. During the analysis an address was identified: TVUBnNk9D6NtVkrUMQN6ZfxvorYetnk9o, whose activity significantly differs from the patterns characteristic of addresses controlled by the attacker. This address executed <strong>9,271 transactions</strong> with an average amount of about <strong>10 USDT</strong> each. Such an activity model is typical for schemes associated with so-called <strong>peel chain patterns</strong> — automated systems that split incoming funds into a large number of small transactions. The primary purpose of this behavior is to <strong>obfuscate the trail and conceal the true source of funds</strong>.</li></ol><p>Unfortunately, given the limited time and human resources allocated to the investigation, performing manual tracing across a multitude of tiny transactions is extremely difficult. In cases like this, <strong>automated investigative algorithms</strong> based on <strong>machine learning (ML)</strong> methods are used.</p><p>Such algorithms enable:</p><ul><li><strong>automatic computation of probable fund movement routes</strong> based on historical data and common criminal behavior patterns;</li><li><strong>grouping transactions by similarity features</strong>, including sending time, transfer amount, and recurring recipient addresses;</li><li><strong>matching volumes and time intervals of inflows</strong> to the same services to determine whether they correspond to the sums of stolen funds;</li><li><strong>estimating the probability of address linkage</strong> when addresses display synchronous or mirrored activity.</li></ul><p>Thus, the algorithm does more than record a transaction sequence — it <strong>computes a probabilistic model of fund flows</strong>, helping investigators focus on the most likely leakage paths. This substantially reduces analysis time and increases accuracy in identifying the end addresses where stolen assets may end up.</p><h3>Incident 5: Mixers</h3><p><strong>Input data:</strong> the victim’s address is known, the attacker’s address is known. The theft was carried out through multiple transactions from the victim’s address to the attacker’s address.</p><p><strong>Tools used:</strong> <a href="https://etherscan.io/">Etherscan</a>, <a href="https://btrace.amlcrypto.io/">Btrace</a>, <a href="https://amlcrypto.io/products/bholder">Bholder</a></p><p><strong>Result:</strong> the funds were transferred to <strong>Tornado Cash (a mixer)</strong>, and further fund movement was identified using <strong>heuristic analysis</strong>.</p><p><strong>Graph of connections:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Nw3sHAK3tGYHaDlW" /></figure><p><strong>How the investigation was conducted:</strong></p><ol><li>The starting point is to identify the scammer’s addresses. In this incident, the victim sent funds to <strong>three different attacker addresses</strong>. Therefore, the subsequent tracing had to follow <strong>three separate paths</strong>.</li><li>Using the <strong>LIFO</strong> tracking method, the flow of funds was analyzed and led to an address associated with the mixer <strong>Tornado Cash</strong>. At this stage the investigation could have stopped, but further analysis revealed <strong>repeating withdrawal patterns</strong> characteristic of this service.</li></ol><ul><li>Approximately 24 hours after the initial transaction, <strong>Tornado Cash</strong> began distributing funds to multiple different addresses with very short time intervals between transfers.</li><li>Notably, the total volume of these withdrawals equaled <strong>100 ETH</strong> — a sum identical to the amount stolen.</li><li>Given the matching volumes and timing, it was hypothesized that the same attacker had executed these operations to quickly <strong>cash out the stolen assets</strong> and obscure their origin.</li></ul><p>As the investigation continued, new addresses tied to the suspected attacker were tracked. The analysis showed that all of these addresses exhibited the <strong>same behavioral pattern</strong>.</p><p>Each address received funds from <strong>Tornado Cash</strong>, then routed them into trading pairs with a <strong>fake token</strong> — presumably created by the attacker. The scheme proceeded as follows:</p><ol><li>Real funds received from Tornado Cash were deposited into a <strong>fake liquidity pool</strong> (for example, on decentralized exchanges).</li><li>The attacker, controlling the address that created this pool, performed <strong>sham swaps</strong> between its own tokens (“shell tokens”).</li><li>After several cycles of such transactions, the attacker executed a <strong>rug pull</strong> — abruptly removing liquidity and thereby “cashing out” the assets while giving them a <strong>cleaner transaction history</strong>.</li></ol><p>From a technical perspective, after this operation it becomes extremely difficult to trace the original source of funds. Most analytics tools will see the assets as coming from a <strong>legitimate liquidity pool</strong> (e.g., on a DEX like Uniswap) rather than directly from Tornado Cash.</p><p>As a result, the attacker obtained cryptocurrency that appeared free of direct ties to the original theft and transferred it to the centralized exchange <strong>OKX</strong> for conversion. It is notable that this attacker had previously been observed attempting withdrawals via the same platform.</p><p><strong>Visualization of the laundering scheme via Tornado Cash:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*f81Uz_Rni4A0kmFS" /></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The presented incidents clearly demonstrate that <strong>successful blockchain investigations</strong> are possible only through a comprehensive approach combining <strong>technical transaction analysis</strong>, <strong>address identification using labeling services</strong>, and a <strong>deep understanding of fund movement logic</strong>.</p><p>Even the most complex schemes — involving <strong>cross-chain bridges</strong>, <strong>peel chain services</strong>, or <strong>mixers such as Tornado Cash</strong> — leave digital traces that can be reconstructed using modern analytical tools and algorithms. In this process, a key role is played by the <strong>LIFO (Last In, First Out)</strong> methodology, which allows investigators to determine precisely which funds were spent first and to trace their subsequent movement.</p><p>The use of platforms such as <strong>Arkham</strong>, <strong>Btrace</strong>, <strong>Metasleuth</strong>, and <strong>Bholder</strong> enables the creation of transparent relationship graphs, the identification of centralized services where assets have been deposited, and the formation of an evidentiary foundation for cooperation with law enforcement agencies and exchanges.</p><p>Ultimately, the combination of <strong>sound analytics</strong>, <strong>technological tools</strong>, and <strong>an understanding of criminal behavioral patterns</strong> allows not only for the reconstruction of the stolen asset flow but also significantly increases the likelihood of asset recovery or freezing at their final destinations.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9075055b401a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[We will tell you exactly which services and tools are used for investigation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AMLCrypto/we-will-tell-you-exactly-which-services-and-tools-are-used-for-investigation-739d949d874a?source=rss-306393cd9e2f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/739d949d874a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aml-crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aml]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[AML Crypto]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Nov 2025 11:45:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-04T11:45:07.720Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OukCdcblpja_QcK7eQJhGQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>With each passing year, the cryptocurrency ecosystem becomes increasingly complex and multi-layered. The growing number of users, transactions, and decentralized applications leads not only to technological advancement but also to a rise in incidents involving theft and fraud. In this context, tools that enable <strong>digital investigations</strong> and facilitate the analysis of fund movements on the blockchain are gaining particular importance.</p><p>One of the key tools available to analysts working with cryptocurrencies is the <strong>blockchain explorer</strong> — a specialized web service that provides transparent access to data on transactions, blocks, and addresses within public networks. These tools make it possible not only to trace the movement of assets but also to identify relationships between participants, analyze wallet activity, and even determine exit points where funds are transferred to centralized platforms such as exchanges or gambling sites.</p><p>Using explorers is a fundamental step in any cryptocurrency-related investigation. They allow analysts to reconstruct the chain of stolen funds’ movements, determine the exact destinations of the assets, and identify the stage at which the trail becomes opaque. However, proper interpretation of explorer data requires not only technical expertise but also a deep understanding of the specific network — whether it is <strong>Ethereum</strong>, with its smart contracts and ERC-20 tokens, or <strong>Bitcoin</strong>, where each transaction represents a system of inputs and outputs (UTXO).</p><p>This article explores the practical application of blockchain explorers in investigations related to cryptocurrency theft. It provides a step-by-step overview of how to analyze transactions, trace the flow of funds, and identify final withdrawal points. Additionally, it examines the use of supplementary tools that help clarify <strong>address labeling</strong> and determine associations with known services.</p><h3>Blockchain Explorers</h3><p>When investigating incidents involving cryptocurrencies, it is impossible to proceed without tools that enable transaction tracking and fund movement analysis. A key instrument in the analyst’s toolkit is the <strong>blockchain explorer</strong> — a web-based service that provides access to data on blocks, transactions, and addresses across various networks.</p><p>Explorers allow users to:</p><ul><li>view the transaction history of a specific address;</li><li>identify the source and recipient of funds;</li><li>track the time, amount, and hash of each operation;</li><li>detect potential connections between addresses;</li><li>export data for further analysis.</li></ul><p>Examples of popular blockchain explorers include:</p><ul><li><strong>Ethereum:</strong> <a href="https://etherscan.io/">https://etherscan.io/</a> — one of the most feature-rich explorers, offering detailed information about smart contracts, ERC-20 tokens, and address activity.</li><li><strong>Bitcoin:</strong> <a href="https://www.blockchain.com/explorer">https://www.blockchain.com/explorer</a> — a classic tool for viewing transactions and analyzing fund movements within the Bitcoin network.</li></ul><p>At the beginning of any investigation, it is crucial to identify the <strong>address</strong> from which the funds were stolen, as well as the <strong>transaction</strong> that confirms the theft. Once this information is established, the analysis of data in the corresponding network’s explorer can begin.</p><p>Example addresses for demonstrating the use of these tools:</p><ul><li><strong>Address in Ethereum network: </strong>0x573243A8477fBB7050280d1E20AD32a8E67a1Ecc</li><li><strong>Address in</strong> <strong>Bitcoin network: </strong>bc1qy3pgxle306ss5nawvvr83xp2nyxw0ujr3tjyhn</li></ul><h4>Working with Etherscan (Ethereum Network):</h4><ol><li>Go to the website <a href="https://etherscan.io/">https://etherscan.io/</a> and enter the address from which the funds were stolen into the search field: 0x573243A8477fBB7050280d1E20AD32a8E67a1Ecc</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*JIpB1nG8mCjH_s-c" /><figcaption><a href="https://etherscan.io/">https://etherscan.io/</a></figcaption></figure><p>2. You will be directed to the address page, where you can view all transactions associated with the address, its balance, and the dates of activity:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*diZZK99Y1XwK7027" /><figcaption><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x573243A8477fBB7050280d1E20AD32a8E67a1Ecc">https://etherscan.io/address/0x573243A8477fBB7050280d1E20AD32a8E67a1Ecc</a></figcaption></figure><p>3. If the theft transaction involved tokens other than ETH, the list of all transfers can be found in the Token Transfers <strong>(ERC-20)</strong> section. If the stolen asset was in ETH, the list of all transactions can be found in the <strong>Transactions</strong> section.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IZSQRNzOVWyPa4fC" /></figure><p>4. In our incident, let us assume the funds were stolen in the transaction with hash<br>0xd67a77ec97e2bc9b9afdaed3db9f2c65acc2b6c825f8ac3112063e671e2ec906. In that transaction the perpetrator withdrew USDT tokens from our (investigated) address. To find this transaction, go to the <strong>Token Transfers (ERC-20)</strong> section and locate the theft transaction.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*OG2xa3Wi56mxH28g" /><figcaption><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x573243A8477fBB7050280d1E20AD32a8E67a1Ecc#tokentxns">https://etherscan.io/address/0x573243A8477fBB7050280d1E20AD32a8E67a1Ecc#tokentxns</a></figcaption></figure><p>5. After locating the transaction, we need to see where the funds were sent. In our case, an amount of <strong>1017 USDT</strong> was transferred from the investigated address to the presumed attacker address: 0xe5A7C8E816f0aa386528a2D3982aA27741ef2a12. For further tracking, we should find the same transaction on the attacker’s address page.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*t5i9_IAi7WXelUbW.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://etherscan.io/tokentxns?a=0xe5a7c8e816f0aa386528a2d3982aa27741ef2a12&amp;p=5">https://etherscan.io/tokentxns?a=0xe5a7c8e816f0aa386528a2d3982aa27741ef2a12&amp;p=5</a></figcaption></figure><p>6. While viewing the full transaction list on the attacker’s address page, we identified the transaction in which they received funds from our investigated address. The next step is to identify the transaction in which the attacker spent the stolen <strong>1017 USDT</strong>. To track such a transaction, inspect all subsequent outbound transfers from that address. It is important to follow the same token — <strong>USDT</strong> (the stolen token) — and the specific amount. As soon as we observe that the attacker has spent the stolen <strong>1017 USDT</strong>, we will be able to see the address to which the funds were forwarded. This tracking methodology is known as <strong>LIFO</strong> and is used in most cryptocurrency theft investigations. In our incident, we observe the expenditure of the stolen funds in the following transaction:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TZ0LR4EqIRaZW-U6.png" /></figure><p>7. In the transaction that forwarded the stolen funds, we can see that the funds were sent to an address labeled <a href="https://stake.com/"><strong>Stake.com</strong></a>. “Stake.com” is a tag that the blockchain explorer assigns to that address. Behind the label Stake.com is the address<br>0x974CaA59e49682CdA0AD2bbe82983419A2ECC400, which is affiliated with the gambling company Stake.com.</p><p>At this stage, the investigation within the Ethereum network can be considered complete. This is because the stolen funds were transferred to a <strong>centralized service</strong>. Once assets reach such platforms (for example, exchanges or gambling sites), further tracking of cryptocurrency movements on the blockchain becomes impossible. Unlike an open blockchain network, a centralized service maintains its own internal accounting systems and can convert the received funds into fiat currency. Therefore, this point is regarded as the <strong>exit point of the attacker </strong>and marks the end of the transparent part of the investigation.</p><h4><strong>Working with Bitcoin (Bitcoin Network):</strong></h4><ol><li>Go to the website <a href="https://www.blockchain.com/explorer/"><strong>https://www.blockchain.com/explorer/</strong></a> and enter the address from which the funds were stolen into the search field: bc1qv3pgxle306ss5nawvrv83xp2nyxw0ujr3txjhn</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/911/0*FHEMMXaihy4s2Jos.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.blockchain.com/explorer/"><strong>https://www.blockchain.com/explorer/</strong></a></figcaption></figure><p>2. You will be taken to the address page, where you can view all transactions associated with the address, its balance, and the dates of activity:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*F0GlH77To3BJ4no8.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.blockchain.com/explorer/addresses/btc/bc1qv3pgxle306ss5nawvrv83xp2nyxw0ujr3txjhn"><strong>https://www.blockchain.com/explorer/addresses/btc/bc1qv3pgxle306ss5nawvrv83xp2nyxw0ujr3txjhn</strong></a></figcaption></figure><p>3. The Bitcoin network does not support the use of any tokens other than its native currency — <strong>BTC</strong>. As a result, there is no <strong>Token Transfers</strong> tab available. In our case, the theft occurred through the following transaction:<br>7d83686deabef95d3e2b409f7e3a13d2bd589d81a790a3661ea5ef7aa3dbc800</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/965/0*uk8c4WaV-c21gC2z.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.blockchain.com/explorer/addresses/btc/bc1qv3pgxle306ss5nawvrv83xp2nyxw0ujr3txjhn"><strong>https://www.blockchain.com/explorer/addresses/btc/bc1qv3pgxle306ss5nawvrv83xp2nyxw0ujr3txjhn</strong></a></figcaption></figure><p>4. Transactions on the Bitcoin network are significantly more complex to interpret than those on Ethereum. Bitcoin transactions reflect changes in balances rather than a direct one-to-one movement of assets from one address to another.</p><p>In the theft transaction we observe two senders (both inputs originate from our investigated victim address) and two recipients (two addresses that may not be affiliated). In that transaction our address spent 4.00000221 BTC, while one of the recipient addresses received 4 BTC.</p><p>Therefore, we can reasonably assume that the address bc1qkp8tgu8smychs780w6nzqh9rvjamduapn9qm5rt5xnc9auf8qm3sxg85l9 is the attacker who received the stolen funds. The next step is to visit the attacker’s address page and locate the receiving transaction:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*fNujO2QGWmEaviAz.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.blockchain.com/ru/explorer/addresses/btc/bc1qkp8tgu8smychs780w6nzqh9rvjamduapn9qm5rt5xnc9auf8qm3sxg85l9"><strong>https://www.blockchain.com/ru/explorer/addresses/btc/bc1qkp8tgu8smychs780w6nzqh9rvjamduapn9qm5rt5xnc9auf8qm3sxg85l9</strong></a></figcaption></figure><p>5. We can see that within the following transaction, the funds were fully withdrawn, and among the two recipients of the stolen funds, there is one address — <br>bc1quhruqrghgcca950rvhtrg7cpd7u8k6svpzgzmrjy8xyukacl5lkq0r8l2d<br> — which received almost the entire amount. We consider this address to be the next one through which the stolen funds were transferred.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*80O-2ebLdAIPMRDp.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.blockchain.com/ru/explorer/addresses/btc/bc1qkp8tgu8smychs780w6nzqh9rvjamduapn9qm5rt5xnc9auf8qm3sxg85l9"><strong>https://www.blockchain.com/ru/explorer/addresses/btc/bc1qkp8tgu8smychs780w6nzqh9rvjamduapn9qm5rt5xnc9auf8qm3sxg85l9</strong></a></figcaption></figure><p>6. Upon examining the address, we can see that it holds a significant amount of BTC and has conducted a large number of transactions. This indicates that we are dealing with the address of a centralized service, and at this stage, our investigation is concluded:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*AEO7FODhJOBqj-o-.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.blockchain.com/ru/explorer/addresses/BTC/bc1quhruqrghgcca950rvhtrg7cpd7u8k6svpzgzmrjy8xyukacl5lkq0r8l2d"><strong>https://www.blockchain.com/ru/explorer/addresses/BTC/bc1quhruqrghgcca950rvhtrg7cpd7u8k6svpzgzmrjy8xyukacl5lkq0r8l2d</strong></a></figcaption></figure><p>7. As a final step, we need to determine which centralized service the address bc1quhruqrghgcca950rvhtrg7cpd7u8k6svpzgzmrjy8xyukacl5lkq0r8l2d<strong> </strong>belongs to. For this purpose, we used the<strong> </strong><a href="https://intel.arkm.com/"><strong>Arkham</strong></a> platform, which provides labeling information for various addresses, including those on the Bitcoin network.</p><p>According to data from Arkham, this address is identified as a <strong>hot wallet of the OKX exchange</strong>. At this stage, the investigation within the Bitcoin network can be considered complete.</p><h3>Tools for Address Label Verification</h3><p>There are several ways to verify <strong>address labeling</strong> on the blockchain — that is, to determine which service or type of user a particular address belongs to.</p><p>The first and most straightforward tool for this is <strong>blockchain explorers</strong>.</p><p>In this article, we have already seen how <strong>Etherscan</strong> automatically labels certain addresses. For example, the address</p><p>0x974cAa59e49682CdA8D2bbe829834149A2ECC400 was marked as belonging to the service <a href="http://stake.com/"><strong>Stake.com</strong></a>.</p><p>Most public explorers indeed include basic labeling and sometimes make it possible to identify whether an address belongs to an exchange, a DeFi platform, or another type of service. However, this information is usually insufficient for conducting a full investigation. To gain deeper analytics and extended insights into the relationships between addresses, specialists rely on dedicated analytical platforms such as <strong>Btrace</strong>, <strong>Arkham</strong>, and others.</p><p>Below is an example of how different services visualize and display address labeling using the address:<br>bc1quhruqrghgcca950rvhtrg7cpd7u8k6svpzgzmrjy8xyukacl5lkq0r8l2d.</p><h4><strong>Btrace:</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*EQ5jZdyv4yN6HupF.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Arkham:</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_Ymmz5AwRa2-4iid.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Metasleuth:</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*vHBcM35eKHKnYN7_.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>Blockchain explorers are the primary tools in the arsenal of specialists investigating cryptocurrency-related incidents. They enable detailed tracking of asset movements, identification of fund transfer routes, and detection of addresses associated with suspicious activity.</p><p>As demonstrated in the examples of the <strong>Ethereum</strong> and <strong>Bitcoin</strong> networks, despite differences in their architectures and transaction formats, the overall investigation principle remains the same: from identifying the source address and theft transaction to determining the final destination of the withdrawn assets.</p><p>However, the capabilities of explorers are limited to publicly available data. Once the funds reach centralized services — such as exchanges or gambling platforms — further tracing becomes impossible without cooperation from these organizations. In such cases, additional analytical tools and labeling services like <strong>Btrace</strong>, <strong>Arkham</strong>, and other investigative platforms are used for deeper analysis.</p><p>Thus, the competent use of blockchain explorers, combined with specialized analytical solutions, allows not only for the reconstruction of the stolen asset flow but also for the formation of an evidentiary foundation necessary for subsequent legal and technical actions.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=739d949d874a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[We explain how cryptocurrency theft investigations are conducted]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AMLCrypto/we-explain-how-cryptocurrency-theft-investigations-are-conducted-3acb5d436b51?source=rss-306393cd9e2f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3acb5d436b51</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[aml-crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aml]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[AML Crypto]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 03 Nov 2025 15:29:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-03T15:29:30.203Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fLQeTxzO4emQc29dicuCQQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>An investigation of cryptocurrency incidents is the process of analyzing the movement of digital assets after thefts, hacks, or fraud schemes. Unlike the traditional financial system — where transactions pass through banks and regulated institutions — the blockchain provides full transparency: every operation is permanently recorded in a distributed ledger. However, this very “transparent anonymity” is what makes investigations both possible and challenging.</p><p>The main goal of such an investigation is to understand how stolen or unlawfully obtained funds move through the network:</p><ul><li>how perpetrators try to “launder” money using mixing services, bridges, or DeFi protocols;</li><li>which centralized exchanges (CEXs) the assets ultimately reach for fiat withdrawal or conversion into more liquid tokens.</li></ul><p>Essentially, an investigation is a search for the “financial trail” that criminals try to obscure. Special blockchain analysis tools and methodologies come to the rescue here, enabling the tracking of transaction chains, the identification of links between wallets, and, ultimately, bringing investigators closer to the real suspects.</p><p>When attackers attempt to hide the traces of stolen cryptocurrency, they use various laundering schemes. Most often the goal is the same — to break the direct link between the original wallet and the final cash-out. To achieve this, they use bridges and cross-chain transfers, mixers and swaps on DEXs, fragmentation into many addresses, conversion into stablecoins or privacy coins. The use of Layer 2 solutions and the combination of several methods in sequence is also becoming increasingly common.</p><h3>Main money-laundering schemes</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*6pi0wfu7OE1arWLG.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Bridges</strong> — transferring assets from one network or blockchain to another to make tracking more difficult.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*6eha7CfTdupGlx1x" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Mixers (mixers / tumblers)</strong> — combining funds with other users’ transactions to break the link between sender and receiver.</li><li><strong>DEX swaps</strong> — exchanging for other tokens via decentralized exchanges (Uniswap, PancakeSwap, etc.).</li><li><strong>Peel chain (peel chain)</strong> — gradually splitting and distributing funds in small amounts across many addresses.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*PY1oJEfZv_FZcnJy" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Chain hopping</strong> — sequential swaps through bridges and DEXs across different blockchains.</li><li><strong>Use of stablecoins</strong> — converting to USDT, USDC, or DAI to simplify withdrawal or storage.</li><li><strong>Privacy coins</strong> — converting to Monero (XMR), Zcash, or Dash, where anonymity is higher.</li><li><strong>Layer 2 / Rollups</strong> — using second-layer solutions (such as Arbitrum or Optimism) to “dissolve” transactions and obscure their origins.</li></ul><h3>Methods for tracking addresses on the blockchain</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*d43FPJu6pj1nmTHJ" /></figure><p>Within an investigation, one of the key tasks is establishing a reliable link between addresses controlled by suspected perpetrators and centralized services (CEX). A set of analytical methods used in international blockchain-forensics practice is applied for this. The main approaches are presented below.</p><h4>1. Deterministic Tracing</h4><p>This method is used when funds move directly and continuously from the subject’s address to wallets of centralized platforms. It is effective under the following conditions:</p><ul><li>transactions follow one another without significant involvement of third-party addresses;</li><li>there are no mixing operations or network changes (for example, TRON → TRON);</li><li>the route can be fully reconstructed using blockchain explorers (Tronscan, BSCscan, etc.).</li></ul><p>Confirmation of a link in this case is based on an unbroken sequence of transaction hashes and timestamps.</p><h4>2. Clustering &amp; Behavioral Analysis</h4><p>Used to identify groups of addresses that are very likely controlled by a single actor. Grounds for grouping include:</p><ul><li>matching sources or recipients of funds;</li><li>synchronous activity;</li><li>recurring patterns of asset distribution;</li><li>shared technical indicators (for example, IPs or devices, if data from a CEX are available).</li></ul><p>This approach allows one to demonstrably link a large number of intermediate addresses into a single cluster, and therefore to establish that the assets belong to one operator.</p><h4>3. Taint Analysis / Coin Flow Scoring</h4><p>This methodology aims to assess the degree of “taint” of addresses that have come into contact with unlawfully obtained funds. With it you can determine:</p><ul><li>the percentage of stolen assets present on final wallets;</li><li>the share of assets that reached exchanges even after being mixed with “clean” funds;</li><li>the likelihood that an address participated in laundering operations.</li></ul><p>Taint analysis is indispensable in complex schemes involving mixers, bridges, or P2P exchanges.</p><h4>4. Temporal &amp; Volume Correlation</h4><p>This method is based on correlating transactional activity by time and volume. It includes:</p><ul><li>identifying coincidences between the time funds are received and their subsequent cash-outs;</li><li>analyzing similar transfer amounts;</li><li>evaluating time gaps between transactions.</li></ul><p>Applying this approach increases confidence that addresses belong to the same transactional chain.</p><h4>5. CEX Deposit Attribution (Analysis of Final Addresses)</h4><p>This method is used to confirm that funds arrived at specific centralized services. Main sources of confirmation are:</p><ul><li>databases of known deposit addresses (both public and private);</li><li>official information from exchanges;</li><li>address signatures (memo, tag, chain id).</li></ul><p>This analysis is necessary to document a legally meaningful “stop point” for assets — the moment they enter a centralized platform.</p><p>Using the methods above in combination enables analysts to logically and empirically confirm the origin of assets, reconstruct their route, and determine their final disposition.</p><h3>Freezing of Funds and the Ultimate Goal of the Investigation</h3><p>A key stage of any blockchain-forensics investigation is the <strong>identification of the actual controller of the stolen assets</strong> and the <strong>documentation of fund movements up to the point they reach a controlled platform</strong> (primarily a centralized exchange).</p><p>The freezing of assets on an exchange serves two strategic purposes:</p><ol><li><strong>Preventive</strong> — to stop further movement and laundering of the stolen funds;</li><li><strong>Evidentiary</strong> — to preserve data that can confirm the link between a transaction and a specific user.</li></ol><p>It is important to understand that freezing itself is <strong>not the end of the investigation</strong>, but rather a tool for <strong>keeping assets within a legally accessible domain</strong> until the perpetrator’s identity is established and a legal decision is made.</p><h4>The Ultimate Goal of a Blockchain Investigation</h4><p>Despite its technical focus, a blockchain investigation ultimately serves a <strong>legal and procedural purpose</strong> — the <strong>identification of the individual responsible for the theft</strong>.</p><p>It is through the identification of wallet controllers and the collection of evidence linking them to criminal activity that the investigation transitions from a purely <strong>technical domain</strong> into the <strong>legal sphere of accountability</strong>.</p><p>The blockchain provides full transparency of transactions but does not reveal <strong>who exactly</strong> is behind specific addresses. Therefore, at the final stage of the investigation, <strong>centralized services (CEXs)</strong> play a decisive role, as they:</p><ul><li>conduct user verification (KYC/AML);</li><li>store login logs, IP addresses, and device information;</li><li>record internal identifiers and fund movements between accounts.</li></ul><p>Through this data, investigators can identify the <strong>real owner or user of the account</strong> that received the stolen assets.</p><h4>Completion of the Investigation</h4><p>Once the perpetrator’s identity has been established, several possible scenarios may follow:</p><ol><li><strong>Judicial Proceedings</strong> — initiation of a criminal case, filing of charges, and subsequent court proceedings, including motions for asset confiscation.</li><li><strong>Negotiations with the Perpetrator</strong> — in some cases, particularly in cyber incidents without an organized structure, a pre-trial settlement or voluntary return of funds may occur through mutual agreement (sometimes with the mediation of an exchange or law enforcement authorities).</li><li><strong>International Cooperation</strong> — if the suspect or the exchange is located outside the jurisdiction, the investigation continues through intergovernmental procedures (MLA requests, INTERPOL cooperation, Egmont Group channels, etc.).</li></ol><p>Thus, <strong>a blockchain investigation is not merely a transactional analysis, but a comprehensive process of identifying the perpetrator</strong>, freezing assets, and bringing the case to a procedural outcome — either a court decision or the recovery of stolen funds.</p><h3>List of Sources</h3><p><strong>Blockchain Explorers:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bd1RdFBLedUynx5XnYOtEA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Services for obtaining labels/annotations for cryptocurrency addresses:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zeMCmaw6Ctw30oKJmQumKQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Explorers for major decentralized bridges:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mDvEkuOwb_InnNjyGnkR8g.png" /></figure><p><strong>Smart contract visualizers:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l5ulQ3axQvjg6qVvZn8ojg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Working with Big Data:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qGLzXXKyb2nBCy2Cra5F5Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Creation of relationship graphs:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zpj1J0Im4w0Uov1HuW-nRQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Blockchain address tracking:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*R1IfZP2vDu8J7O__mAU9xg.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3acb5d436b51" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[⚖️ Legal aspects of protecting the rights of crypto investors in cases of asset theft]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AMLCrypto/%EF%B8%8F-legal-aspects-of-protecting-the-rights-of-crypto-investors-in-cases-of-asset-theft-deee6843db31?source=rss-306393cd9e2f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/deee6843db31</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aml-crypto]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[AML Crypto]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Sep 2025 17:05:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-09T17:05:42.667Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*08lLsPWF7PMzHb4C.jpg" /></figure><p>Recently, at <a href="https://amlcrypto.io/"><strong>AML Crypto</strong></a>, we have been receiving an increasing number of requests from victims of cryptocurrency-related crimes. Most often, these are citizens of Russia and other post-Soviet countries. The victims usually have little understanding of which legal mechanisms actually work and how assets can be recovered.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*6Riw4Pe87jp9mMIt.jpg" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>📌 Importantly</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>Even in the absence of well-established case law regarding crypto assets, the protection of rights is still possible. We recommend adopting a proactive approach, including filing applications simultaneously in multiple jurisdictions. In a number of cases, this significantly increases the chances of asset recovery and elicits a response from exchanges.</em></blockquote><h3>The Status of Cryptocurrency in the Russian Federation</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Go5lpVykaeDDewsa.jpg" /></figure><p>At present, the Civil Code of the Russian Federation does not directly define the place of cryptocurrency among objects of civil rights. A special law, Federal Law №259-FZ of July 31, 2020 (“On Digital Financial Assets…”), introduced the category of <strong>“digital currency”</strong> and established restrictions on its use. Formally, digital currency is recognized as property only in certain branches of law (for example, in tax law, anti-money laundering legislation, bankruptcy, and enforcement proceedings).</p><blockquote><em>📄 In August 2025, a new version of the draft law was published, which </em><strong><em>recognizes digital currency as property for the purposes of criminal and criminal procedure law</em></strong><em> and introduces procedures for its seizure and confiscation.</em></blockquote><p>Despite the fragmented regulation of cryptocurrencies in Russia, judicial practice has long proceeded from the recognition of cryptocurrency as property and provides legal protection of the corresponding rights. As early as 2018−2019, courts began including crypto assets in the bankruptcy estate of debtors and considering claims involving cryptocurrency under the general norms of civil law. In the criminal law sphere, questions remained until recently due to the absence of an explicit recognition of cryptocurrency as property. However, the practical need to protect victims compelled law enforcement and courts to apply analogies with traditional objects of property.</p><h3>📜 Criminal classification of cryptocurrency theft</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*dDWAv2PkrER4IpXQ.jpg" /></figure><p>Previously, some courts expressed doubts as to whether cryptocurrency could be considered the subject of theft. A well-known example is the judgment of the Petrogradsky District Court of St. Petersburg of June 30, 2020, in case №1−95/2020, which <a href="https://sankt-peterburgsky--spb.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=sud_delo&amp;srv_num=1&amp;name_op=doc&amp;number=43236760&amp;delo_id=4&amp;new=4&amp;text_number=1">excluded</a> from the charges episodes related to the robbery of cryptocurrency, stating that <strong>cryptocurrency did not constitute “property”</strong> within the meaning of the criminal law. However, this decision was later <a href="https://3kas.sudrf.ru/modules.php?delo_id=2450001&amp;name=sud_delo&amp;name_op=doc&amp;new=2450001&amp;number=5943246&amp;srv_num=1&amp;text_number=1">overturned</a> by a higher court, and current practice has since converged toward a unified approach. Theft of crypto assets is now classified by <strong>analogy with crimes involving other types of property</strong>, under various provisions of the Russian Criminal Code. Below are the possible criminal offenses and examples of court decisions.</p><blockquote><strong><em>📜 Article 158 of the Russian Criminal Code — THEFT</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>There is not yet widespread practice of applying Article 158 of the Criminal Code to cases of cryptocurrency theft. Publicly available sources confirm only one such case — </em><a href="https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/14284007"><em>a 2022 case</em></a><em> involving the theft of 7,000 ETH, of which more than 4,000 ETH remained by the time of the investigation. The charges were brought under Part 2 of Article 272 of the Criminal Code (unauthorized access to computer information) and Paragraph “b” of Part 4 of Article 158 (theft on an especially large scale).</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The court recognized cryptocurrency as </em><strong><em>“other property”</em></strong><em> on the basis of the note to Article 158, which for the first time made it possible to impose seizure on crypto assets. This precedent effectively established the possibility of treating cryptocurrency theft as theft in the full legal sense, with all resulting consequences.</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>📜 Article 159 of the Russian Criminal Code — FRAUD</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://mos-gorsud.ru/rs/presnenskij/news/stolichnyj-sud-provozglasil-prigovor-valerii-fedyakinoj-bolee-izvestnoj-pod-psevdonimom-bitmama"><em>The judgment</em></a><em> of the Presnensky District Court of Moscow of June 24, 2025, in the case of Valeria Fedyakina (known as “Bitmama”) became a landmark example of qualifying a pseudo-investment scheme involving cryptocurrency as fraud. Fedyakina offered investors opportunities to invest in cryptocurrency under guarantees of high returns, but in reality misappropriated the funds.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The court found her guilty under Part 4 of Article 159 of the Criminal Code (fraud on an especially large scale). The total damages were estimated at approximately 2.2 billion rubles, and in order to secure compensation, the court seized the defendant’s accounts and assets.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>This case confirms that </em><strong><em>fraudulent schemes involving crypto investments</em></strong><em> are prosecuted on the same basis as traditional financial pyramids.</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>📜 Article 159.6 of the Russian Criminal Code — FRAUD IN THE SPHERE OF COMPUTER INFORMATION</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>This provision applies where deception is connected with IT infrastructure. For example, in 2024 the Dorogomilovsky District Court of Moscow </em><a href="https://moscow.sledcom.ru/news/item/1892067/"><em>delivered a judgment</em></a><em> in a case involving phishing “crypto exchanges.” The perpetrators created fake exchange websites, stole logins and access keys, and then withdrew cryptocurrency from the victims’ accounts.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The criminal acts were classified under Article 159.6 of the Criminal Code (fraud in the sphere of computer information), in conjunction with Article 272 (unauthorized access to computer information) and Article 273 (creation and use of malicious software).</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Such judgments demonstrate the courts’ readiness to apply </em><strong><em>specialized cybercrime provisions to the theft of crypto assets</em></strong><em>, where the scheme involves hacking or phishing.</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>📜 Article 160 of the Russian Criminal Code — MISAPPROPRIATION OR EMBEZZLEMENT</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>In 2023, the Meshchansky District Court of Moscow considered the </em><a href="https://rg.ru/2023/09/21/reg-cfo/soosnovatel-kriptobirzhi-wex-osuzhden-na-35-goda-kolonii-za-rastratu.html"><em>case of Alexey Ivanov</em></a><em> (Bilyuchenko), one of the administrators of the WEX exchange. Together with accomplices, he misappropriated clients’ cryptocurrency assets worth more than 3 billion rubles by blocking access to their wallets and effectively stealing investors’ funds.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>The court classified Ivanov’s actions under Part 4 of Article 160 of the Criminal Code — misappropriation on an especially large scale. He was sentenced to 3.5 years of imprisonment and fined 3.1 billion rubles, corresponding to the amount of damages suffered by investors.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>This was the first final criminal conviction in Russia for the misappropriation of cryptocurrency on such a scale.</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>📜 Articles 161−163 of the Russian Criminal Code — ROBBERY, ARMED ROBBERY, AND EXTORTION</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>Judicial practice in qualifying the theft of cryptocurrency shows that the decisive factors are the moment of acquisition and the nature of the threats involved. If property is taken immediately after the use of violence or threats, the act is classified as robbery (Article 161) or armed robbery (Article 162, if the threats are dangerous to life or health). If, however, the demand concerns the transfer of assets in the future, the crime is treated as extortion (Article 163).</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>A notable example is the previously discussed case №1−95/2020 in St. Petersburg: the trial court initially classified the actions as extortion, but the appellate and cassation courts reclassified them as robbery, noting that the violence was used as a means of immediate seizure of cash. The episode involving cryptocurrency was excluded at the time, as digital currency was not then recognized as an object of theft.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>In 2023, the Leninsky District Court of Omsk considered a “mixed” case: for several months the defendant threatened the victim with demands to transfer bitcoins, and later, together with accomplices, broke into his home armed with stun guns. The court </em><a href="https://rg.ru/2023/03/01/reg-sibfo/v-omske-vynesli-prigovor-vymogateliam-kriptovaliuty.html"><em>classified the actions</em></a><em> simultaneously under Paragraph “b” of Part 4 of Article 162 (armed robbery on an especially large scale) and Paragraph “a” of Part 3 of Article 163 (extortion involving violence), imposing a lengthy prison sentence.</em></blockquote><p>These cases clearly demonstrate that violent methods of seizing cryptocurrency are treated in the same way as attacks on other types of property and entail equally severe criminal liability.</p><h3>💸 Procedure for the Seizure and Confiscation of Crypto Assets in Criminal Proceedings</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*kDyWActC3Lzroy5C.jpg" /></figure><h4>📌<strong> Current practice</strong></h4><p>Once a criminal case is initiated, the investigator petitions the court to impose an attachment on digital assets (Article 115 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure). Only the court may order the seizure of property, and the petition must be reviewed within 24 hours of submission (Part 3 of Article 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). In practice, <strong>courts recognize cryptocurrency as property</strong> and, where necessary, classify it as physical evidence (Article 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). If investigators gain access to the defendant’s crypto wallet, the assets are transferred to a specially created wallet under law enforcement control. If access is unavailable or the defendant refuses to cooperate, devices (computers, phones, hardware wallets) are seized, after which specialists attempt to restore access (e.g., by breaking a password or obtaining keys) and transfer the funds to a controlled address. There is currently no direct procedural regulation of these steps-the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure on seizure and attachment of property are applied.</p><p>Challenges. The difficulty with the current procedure is that cryptocurrency is a decentralized asset, and there is no single authority capable of freezing or seizing funds without access to private keys. Much therefore depends on the speed of response: promptly freezing accounts on exchanges or wallets, before criminals can “split” or cash out the assets, is critically important. Nevertheless, enforcement practice is gradually developing approaches, and even in the absence of special regulations, investigators generally <strong>manage to identify, secure, and seize crypto assets during investigations</strong>-with the assistance of technical experts and through international requests to cryptocurrency exchanges.</p><h4>📌<strong> What Will Change After Amendments to the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure</strong></h4><p>Under the <a href="https://regulation.gov.ru/projects/159661">draft law</a> published in August 2025, digital currency will be explicitly recognized as property for the purposes of criminal and criminal procedure law. The draft also introduces a clear procedural mechanism for the seizure of crypto assets. In particular, it is envisaged that, upon the investigator’s request, the court will impose an attachment on cryptocurrency, after which the transfer of assets will be recorded to a special address-identifier designated by the competent authority.</p><p>The draft law further establishes rules for the storage of cryptocurrency, its status as physical evidence, and its subsequent confiscation following a conviction. In this way, the proposed amendments effectively codify techniques already in use (such as transfers to controlled wallets, seizure of hardware wallets, etc.) and create a uniform, transparent procedure for the entire law enforcement system.</p><h3>🙋 Civil Law Remedies</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*uswrH4QCFP0DAqeY.jpg" /></figure><p>Regardless of criminal prosecution, a victim has the right to initiate a <strong>civil claim</strong> against the perpetrator in order to recover lost assets. Two main options are available:</p><blockquote><strong><em>📄 Claim for Unjust Enrichment (Article 1102 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation)</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>This applies if crypto assets were voluntarily transferred to the wrongdoer under certain promises (e.g., investment with guaranteed returns) that were not fulfilled. Since the counter-performance did not occur, the enrichment is deemed unjustified, and the victim may demand restitution. To succeed, it is sufficient to prove the transfer of crypto assets to the defendant and the absence of any legal grounds for retaining them. A key advantage is that the plaintiff does not need to prove the defendant’s fault-only the fact of unjust enrichment.</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>📄 Claim for Damages (Article 1064 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation)</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>This applies if the assets were unlawfully taken (theft, fraud, etc.). Here, the plaintiff refers to the pecuniary damage caused by the crime and seeks compensation equivalent to the stolen cryptocurrency. To succeed, the plaintiff must prove the unlawful act, the defendant’s fault, and the amount of damages. In addition to direct losses, the plaintiff may also claim </em><strong><em>lost profits</em></strong><em>. For example, if it can be substantiated that the value of the cryptocurrency increased during the period of deprivation, the difference may be claimed as lost profit. Of course, courts treat hypothetical earnings with skepticism, so such claims are satisfied only with a convincing evidentiary basis.</em></blockquote><p>In practice, <strong>both grounds are often stated alternatively in the claim</strong>. The plaintiff requests the court to recover the amount either as unjust enrichment or as damages-at the court’s discretion. This increases the likelihood that the claim will be granted under at least one of the grounds. Courts, after reviewing the case materials, themselves determine which norm is more applicable. For instance, if the fact of a crime is not proven (important for Article 1064), but it is evident that the funds were transferred without any counter-performance, the court may order recovery under unjust enrichment. Thus, <strong>civil law mechanisms</strong> allow victims to recover lost crypto assets even in cases where criminal proceedings are delayed or do not result in actual compensation.</p><p>In 2024, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation <a href="https://legalacts.ru/sud/opredelenie-sudebnoi-kollegii-po-grazhdanskim-delam-verkhovnogo-suda-rf-ot-16042024-n-69-kg24-3-k7/">emphasized</a> that, when resolving disputes concerning the return of cryptocurrency, the court must establish to whom the relevant wallet belongs; failure to do so renders the judicial act unlawful. In practice, proof of ownership is established through correspondence, notarial inspection protocols, data from applications or exchanges, and blockchain analytics.</p><h3>🌏 Regulation in Post-Soviet Countries</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TQRm6R00OV20xfP8.jpg" /></figure><p>In most former USSR states, the approaches to criminal offenses involving crypto assets are largely similar, despite differences in legislation. The theft of cryptocurrency is typically qualified under general provisions of the criminal code (theft, fraud, embezzlement, robbery, etc.), often in combination with articles relating to cybercrime. For civil law protection, the same two mechanisms described above are used-either a claim for unjust enrichment in cases of voluntary transfer without counter-performance, or a claim for damages.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Belarus</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>Belarus has a special legal regime in the High-Tech Park (HTP), established by Presidential Decree №8 “On the Development of the Digital Economy” of December 21, 2017. Within this regime, the circulation of tokens has been legalized, creating a normative basis for recognizing cryptocurrency as property and applying general rules on seizure and confiscation. Criminal cases involving cryptocurrency theft are classified under standard provisions-theft, fraud, robbery, extortion.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>A striking </em><a href="https://www.court.gov.by/ru/minskij/gorodskoj/sud/press_sluzhba/soobscheniya/press_sluzhbi/15b3c330151445cd.html"><em>recent case</em></a><em> involved the robbery and extortion of 5,750 BTC from an IT specialist in Minsk. The perpetrators, posing as electricians, broke into the victim’s apartment, tortured him with a stun gun, and demanded the transfer of 5,750 bitcoins. Ultimately, one of the attackers was arrested and sentenced to 13 years in a high-security colony. Public sources mention a conviction and a substantial fine, though there is no information regarding civil compensation for the victim. Nevertheless, the very existence of such a case confirms that Belarusian courts recognize crypto assets as property and that law enforcement agencies are capable of investigating and prosecuting crypto-related crimes on par with traditional ones.</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Armenia</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>On July 4, 2025, the Law of the Republic of Armenia HO-159-N “On Crypto Assets” entered into force, establishing the country’s first comprehensive legal framework for the cryptocurrency market. The law directly regulates the public offering of crypto assets, the activities of service providers, and introduces the licensing of such companies through the Central Bank. This regime has given law enforcement specific points of entry: authorities may now submit requests to the regulator and licensed exchanges to block or seize assets in the course of investigations.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>In 2023, the first </em><a href="https://www.investigative.am/en/news/theft-of-crypto-currency-in-the-amount-of-over-88-million-amd-committed-by-means-of-computer-for-the-first-time-in-armenia-a-case-on-theft-of-crypto-currency-sent-to-court"><em>criminal case</em></a><em> involving the theft of 129 ETH was investigated-remarkably, the defendant fully compensated the victim for the damages during the investigation.</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Georgia</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>Cryptocurrency is not officially recognized as legal tender in Georgia; however, the crypto services market is regulated. On July 1, 2023, the Rules for the Registration, Deregistration, and Regulation of Virtual Asset Service Providers (Order of the President of the National Bank of Georgia №94/04 of June 13, 2023) came into effect. All local crypto exchanges and exchangers are now required to register with the NBG, creating a transparent supervisory mechanism. This regime provides law enforcement with a clear channel for cooperation: registered providers can be promptly requested to provide information and block suspicious accounts.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>In 2025, Georgian courts classified the actions of a fund manager who misappropriated a large amount of cryptocurrency-more than 8,000 BTC-as both a property crime and money laundering. In August 2025, the Tbilisi Court of Appeal </em><a href="https://pog.gov.ge/news/prokuraturis-mier-tsardgenili-mtkitsebulebebis-safudzvelze-saapelatsio-sasamartlom-dzalashi-datova-tbilisis-saqalaqo-sasamartlos-ganacheni-da-didi-odenobit-kriptovalutis-martlsatsinaaghmdego-mitvisebisa-da-ukanono-shemosavlis-legalizatsiis-faqtebze-braldebuli-damnashaved-tsno-4946?lng=geo"><em>upheld the conviction</em></a><em>. Although the theft itself occurred back in 2015−2017, the new regulatory framework enabled cryptocurrency to be treated as property and as the subject of a crime, thereby solidifying its legal status in criminal proceedings.</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Kyrgyzstan</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>In the Kyrgyz Republic, Law №12 of January 21, 2022, introduced the concept of “virtual assets” and established a licensing regime for operators of such assets. The creation of this formal perimeter allowed regulators to lawfully oversee the activities of crypto companies and cooperate with them during investigations.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>A telling case is the scandal surrounding the cryptocurrency pyramid scheme </em><a href="https://24.kg/obschestvo/319483_skandal_sMCN_Coin_postradavshim_vernuli_17_milliona/"><em>MCN Coin</em></a><em>. In early 2024, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the financial intelligence unit discovered that MCN Coin had been operating without registration and had solicited funds from thousands of citizens. A criminal case for fraud was initiated, and the organizers were detained. During the investigation, approximately USD 1.7 million-nearly half of the invested funds-was returned to victims. These funds were recovered through financial supervision: once the unregistered asset scheme was identified, the FIU transferred the materials to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and joint efforts allowed assets to be frozen and partially returned.</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>Kazakhstan</em></strong></blockquote><blockquote><em>The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan №193-VII ZRK “On Digital Assets in the Republic of Kazakhstan” of February 6, 2023, established a model under which the trading and custody of unsecured digital assets are permitted only on licensed platforms of the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), under the supervision of the regulator. Outside the AIFC perimeter, exchanges and exchangers are illegal; thus, the AIFC infrastructure serves as the primary legal channel for law enforcement requests and asset freezes.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>In 2024, the Financial Monitoring Agency traced and recovered crypto assets from the </em><a href="https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/finpiramida-eolus-kazahstan-vernul-iz-za-rubeja-543433/"><em>Eolus pyramid scheme</em></a><em>: approximately USD 520,000 was transferred to the agency’s special account for victim compensation, and the court additionally confiscated 408,000 USDT. This demonstrated that under the current model, not only are seizure and confiscation possible, but asset recovery for victims is also effectively ensured.</em></blockquote><h3>✍️ Conclusions and Recommendations</h3><p>If you have lost your crypto assets as a result of unlawful actions, <strong>do not waste time</strong>. Prompt measures significantly increase the chances of recovering your property. The first steps to take are:</p><p><strong>Gather all available data</strong><em><br>Record the addresses of the wallets involved, transaction hashes, links to the perpetrators’ social media profiles, correspondence with them, details of transfers on exchanges, etc. The more information you collect, the easier it will be for investigators to trace the flow of funds.</em></p><p><strong>Contact the police immediately<br></strong><em>File a report requesting the initiation of criminal proceedings for the theft of your crypto assets. Attach all the evidence you have collected-screenshots, blockchain extracts, copies of correspondence. If possible, indicate the applicable articles of the Criminal Code (e.g., fraud, theft, extortion). Even if the legal qualification later changes, the critical point is to officially record the crime.</em></p><p><strong>Reach out to exchanges and services<br></strong><em>Conduct or commission blockchain analytics. If your assets may have ended up on a cryptocurrency exchange or other service, contact their support team and request a freeze of the funds that belong to you. Attach a copy of your police report or reference the case number-this increases the likelihood that the exchange will cooperate. Time is critical: the sooner the exchange learns of the theft, the higher the chance of freezing the assets before they are withdrawn.</em></p><p><strong>File a civil claim<br></strong><em>In parallel (or after the initiation of criminal proceedings), file a civil lawsuit against those involved in the theft. Demand compensation for damages or the return of unjust enrichment. This creates additional pressure on the wrongdoers. If the criminal case is delayed, you will still have the option of obtaining a civil judgment and seeking its enforcement (e.g., against the defendant’s other property).</em></p><h4><strong><em>⚠️ Remember:</em></strong></h4><blockquote><em>In crypto-related crimes, the speed of response is crucial. The sooner the investigation begins and blocking measures are applied, the easier it will be to recover the assets themselves.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Our lawyers and crypto-crime investigation experts are ready to provide qualified assistance. We will advise you on all legal matters, help gather the necessary documentation, and establish effective cooperation with law enforcement and exchanges. Do not allow the situation to escalate — </em><strong><em>act quickly and professionally to recover your crypto assets and restore justice</em></strong><em>.</em></blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=deee6843db31" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[MEMO in Blockchain: How to Avoid Fraud]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AMLCrypto/memo-in-blockchain-how-to-avoid-fraud-2e958913be55?source=rss-306393cd9e2f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2e958913be55</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[memo-in-blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[memoir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aml-crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aml]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[AML Crypto]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 25 Apr 2025 10:20:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-04-25T10:20:57.174Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*p2KmPHjyiGTEX8YcJksg5Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>Imagine you’re transferring cryptocurrency to an exchange address, just like you’ve done dozens of times before. You enter the amount, copy the details, confirm the transaction. Everything seems routine — but the funds never arrive. The support team tells you the transaction was successful, but the money went to someone else. What went wrong?</p><p>It turns out, not all blockchains work the same way. On some of them — such as <strong>EOS</strong>, <strong>TLOS</strong>, and <strong>WAX</strong> — you need to include more than just the recipient’s address. There’s an extra field called <strong>MEMO</strong>. This is a string that specifies exactly who the funds are meant for within the platform. Make a mistake — and your money could end up in someone else’s wallet. And if that MEMO was given to you by a scammer, it goes straight into their hands.</p><p>This mechanism has become the foundation of numerous scam schemes where funds are not stolen through hacking or phishing, but voluntarily sent by the user — simply because they followed false instructions. In this article, we explain how the MEMO system works, why it can be a security vulnerability, and share real-life cases where money was misdirected — and how we helped uncover what really happened.</p><h3>How MEMO Works in Blockchain — and Why It Matters for Secure Crypto Transfers</h3><p>In account-based blockchain networks like <strong>EOS</strong>, <strong>TLOS</strong>, and <strong>WAX</strong>, cryptocurrency is not sent to unique wallet addresses like in <strong>Bitcoin</strong> or <strong>Ethereum</strong>. Instead, transfers are made between accounts with readable names. This means the same platform — such as a crypto exchange — can use a single receiving address for all incoming transactions. To ensure the system assigns the funds to the correct user, the transaction must include an additional field — the <strong>MEMO</strong>.</p><p>Below, you can see how the withdrawal form differs on Bybit when sending crypto via the Bitcoin network versus the EOS network — in the latter case, the MEMO field is mandatory.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/762/0*SliI4vMIBzdeaEjE.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/763/0*dhR4PnouYCP4JoUh.png" /></figure><h4><strong>What Is a MEMO in Cryptocurrency Transactions?</strong></h4><p>A <strong>MEMO</strong> is a text string embedded in a transaction protocol that acts as an internal recipient identifier on a platform. Imagine an office that receives hundreds of packages every day, all addressed to the same location. To ensure each package reaches the right person, the label includes a room number or employee name. In blockchain transfers, that “room number” is the MEMO. If it’s missing or incorrect, the package ends up in the wrong hands — or lost entirely. The same applies to cryptocurrencies: without a correct MEMO, funds may be credited to the wrong user or become irretrievable.</p><blockquote>For example, when transferring tokens to an exchange, the MEMO is your unique user code. Without it, the platform won’t recognize that the transaction was meant for you, and your funds may be lost or stuck in a general holding account.</blockquote><p>On a technical level, a <strong>MEMO</strong> is simply an open text field that you manually fill in when sending a transaction. The blockchain doesn’t verify what you’ve entered, doesn’t tell you if the MEMO is correct, and doesn’t fix your mistakes. It’s all up to the user. That’s exactly why MEMO has become a tool for scammers — they exploit users’ limited understanding of how the system works and easily mislead them. The vulnerability lies not in the technology, but in the lack of knowledge and experience.</p><h3>How MEMO Is Used in Scam Schemes</h3><p>One of the main reasons users lose their tokens is a lack of understanding of how MEMO technology works in blockchain systems. At first glance, the transaction process looks familiar: an address, an amount, and a send button. But in certain blockchain networks, a single recipient address can be shared by many users. To distinguish who the transfer is actually meant for, an additional parameter is used — the <strong>MEMO</strong>. It becomes part of the transaction itself and serves as an internal identifier for the recipient within the system.</p><p>Scammers actively exploit this mechanism. Typically, they pose as representatives of a crypto exchange, investment platform, or fund recovery service. The pretext varies — identity verification, refund processing, account recovery, or participation in a promotion. But the scenario is always the same: the victim is instructed to send cryptocurrency to a specific address, accompanied by a mandatory MEMO code.</p><p>It’s important to understand that the recipient address often doesn’t raise suspicion — it might belong to a well-known exchange or service. However, the MEMO provided directs the funds not to the user’s account, but straight to the scammer. As a result, the user willingly — and without any external hack — sends their funds to a third party.</p><p>What makes this scheme particularly deceptive is that the transaction technically succeeds. There are no errors. From the blockchain’s point of view, everything is valid. So when the user contacts wallet or exchange support, they receive the standard response: “The funds were sent successfully. Refund is not possible.”</p><p>These scams remain popular precisely because they don’t appear fraudulent at first glance. The user confirms the transaction, enters the MEMO themselves, and the system simply executes the instructions. Recovering funds in such cases is extremely difficult — especially without technical or legal support.</p><blockquote><strong>✅ Example 1: How It Should Work — A Proper Transfer with MEMO</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>Scenario:</strong> A user wants to deposit TLOS cryptocurrency to their exchange account.</blockquote><blockquote>1.The user logs into their account on the exchange and selects “Deposit TLOS.”<br>2.The exchange provides:</blockquote><blockquote><strong>Address:</strong> binancetelos</blockquote><blockquote><strong>MEMO:</strong> 7628391</blockquote><blockquote>3.The user copies and pastes both the address and the MEMO into their wallet.<br>4.They send, for example, <strong>20 TLOS</strong> to the provided address with the specified MEMO.<br>5.The exchange automatically recognizes the transaction and credits the funds to the user’s account.</blockquote><blockquote>📌 <strong>Result:</strong> The transfer is successful, and the funds are received. The MEMO allows the system to identify that this specific transaction belongs to that particular user.</blockquote><blockquote><strong>⛔️ Example 2: How a Scam Scheme Works — Transfer with a “Fake” MEMO</strong></blockquote><blockquote><strong>Scenario:</strong> A person receives a message on Telegram from someone claiming to be customer support for their crypto wallet.</blockquote><blockquote>1.The scammer says the user’s account has been “blocked” and to unblock it, they must transfer 20 EOS to a “secure” address.<br>2.The scammer provides:</blockquote><blockquote><strong>Address:</strong> coinbaseeos1 <em>(a real address belonging to a major exchange)</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong>MEMO:</strong> client_874562 <em>(actually the scammer’s own account identifier)</em></blockquote><blockquote>3.Trusting the “support agent,” the user sends the funds without suspicion.<br>4.The transaction goes through — the system considers it valid.<br>5.The user waits for results, but nothing happens. The real platform’s support responds that the funds were sent using the wrong MEMO and cannot be recovered.</blockquote><blockquote>📌 <strong>Result:</strong> The funds were sent to the scammer. Everything looked legitimate, but the MEMO pointed not to the victim’s account, but to the fraudster’s.</blockquote><h3>Real Case: A Scam Involving a Fake Trading Platform and MEMO Use</h3><p>A person contacted our company who later became our client. In the initial stage, we conducted a detailed interview, during which we found that he had been drawn into a scam scheme through personal communication with a previously unknown individual. This new “acquaintance” actively encouraged him to participate in what was presented as a reliable and profitable investment platform for cryptocurrency trading.</p><p>The platform offered appealing features: a user-friendly interface, supposedly guaranteed returns, and “personal assistance” from specialists who provided guidance on every trade. Everything looked convincing. Seeing the activity and “results,” our client decided to give it a try.</p><p>To participate in trading, he was instructed to create a blockchain wallet on the TLOS (Telos) network and transfer funds to it from his exchange account (in this case — Bybit). All transfers required a MEMO — allegedly to link the funds to his profile on the platform. After funding his “trading account,” simulated trading began, showing steady growth and apparent profit.</p><p>A few days later, the client decided to withdraw part of the funds. The withdrawal was processed successfully — the funds were returned to the same TLOS wallet. This further reinforced his belief that the platform was legitimate.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*DgquzqG3NHCIXIXB.png" /><figcaption><em>The graph illustrates how funds moved from Bybit [1] to the victim [2], then to the fake trading platform [3], back to the victim’s wallet [4], and finally an attempt to cash out through Bybit [5].</em></figcaption></figure><p>Problems began later, when the client tried to transfer the earned funds back to the exchange in order to convert them into fiat. All attempts to deposit the tokens into his Bybit account failed. The funds were not credited, and error messages appeared. Gradually, the client realized he had been trapped: he was sending real tokens, but receiving fake ones in return — tokens that legitimate exchanges would not accept.</p><p>Realizing he had been scammed, the client turned to <strong>AML Crypto</strong> for assistance.</p><h4>What Actually Happened: A Technical Breakdown of the Incident</h4><p>After receiving the request, <strong>AML Crypto</strong> specialists conducted a technical analysis of all transactions and activities related to the scheme. It was discovered that when the client was funding his account on the so-called “trading platform,” he was given a specific MEMO to use for the transfer. This MEMO was crafted in such a way that the funds were <strong>not sent to the platform</strong>, but directly to an account controlled by the scammers.</p><p>It was the use of a correctly formatted MEMO that made the transaction appear legitimate on the blockchain level — but in reality, the true recipient was a malicious actor.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*O1SP8bnh26AFon5g.png" /><figcaption><em>Bholder connection graph illustrating the actual flow of funds — after withdrawal from Bybit, the victim transferred cryptocurrency not to the platform [3], but directly to the scammer [4], who then cashed out the received assets.</em></figcaption></figure><p>The client’s subsequent actions — trading on the platform, recording profits, and withdrawing funds — were no longer taking place on the actual blockchain. All the “transactions” within the platform were carried out using fake tokens that didn’t exist on the blockchain. These tokens were created by the scammers solely within the website interface and had no real value. They merely simulated movement and balance updates, giving the illusion of real trading activity.</p><p>Meanwhile, the client’s real tokens had been received by the scammers and were eventually <strong>cashed out</strong>.</p><p><strong>Outcome:</strong> Following an investigation conducted by <strong>AML Crypto</strong> specialists, the fraudulent scheme was confirmed and the full chain of fund movements was reconstructed. We were able to determine that the client’s cryptocurrency had been liquidated through a specific crypto exchange, and the funds had passed through identifiable accounts. Transaction analysis and digital footprint correlation allowed us not only to trace the token path but also to identify the ultimate recipient.</p><p>Importantly, during the investigation, it was established that the scammer was located in the same country as the victim. This significantly simplified the legal outlook and enabled a transition from a technical investigation to a full-fledged legal process. All collected materials were documented and handed over to the relevant government authorities for further judicial proceedings.</p><h4>Scam Example: Using a Fake MEMO Masquerading as a Cross-Chain Address</h4><p>In the second case of MEMO-related fraud, our client was deceived while attempting to withdraw EOS from his Bybit exchange account. He intended to transfer the assets to the BNB Smart Chain network for use with a decentralized wallet. However, he didn’t fully understand the technical process of cross-chain transfers and decided to look up instructions online. His search led him to a forum that visually resembled Bybit’s official support page, where a “correct” procedure was being discussed. Shortly afterward, he was contacted via Telegram by someone claiming to be a support agent.</p><p>The scammer confidently stated that in order to transfer EOS from the exchange to an external BNB wallet, the client needed to use the “official system deposit address” — bybitdeposit. He explained that all cross-chain transfers are accepted at this address and then automatically rerouted based on the MEMO. This seemed plausible, since the client had previously seen the bybitdeposit address in Bybit’s interface, and he wasn’t entirely familiar with how MEMO works. As a result, the client was fully convinced that he was following a standard withdrawal process.</p><p>He proceeded with the transaction: selected EOS as the coin, entered bybitdeposit as the recipient address (as advised), and pasted a BNB address into the MEMO field — the one that, according to the “specialist,” would identify his wallet for receiving funds on the other network. In reality, this address (0x…) had been pre-registered by the scammers in the Bybit system as an identifier for <strong>their own</strong> account.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/785/0*9yTxQ-XFHDFz7w_9.png" /><figcaption><em>EOS withdrawal interface on Bybit. The MEMO is obscured — in the actual incident, it contained a cross-chain address supplied by the scammer.</em></figcaption></figure><p>After the transaction was confirmed, the funds were indeed sent to the specified address, and from the blockchain’s perspective, everything appeared valid. However, Bybit’s system credited the assets not to the client’s account, but to another account — one that had been pre-registered by the scammers using the same MEMO (formatted as a BNB address). As a result, the user unknowingly sent funds to the fraudsters — without violating any of the technical withdrawal rules.</p><p>When the client realized that the funds never arrived in his BNB wallet, he contacted Bybit’s support team. He was informed that the transaction had been completed successfully and that a refund was not possible. Realizing he had been scammed, the user reached out to <strong>AML Crypto</strong> for <strong>technical analysis, evidence collection, and assistance with the investigation</strong>.</p><p><strong>Figure:</strong> The graph shows how the Bybit client, following a false set of instructions, enters a valid recipient address (bybitdeposit) but an incorrect MEMO — a BNB wallet address provided by the scammer. As a result, the funds are sent not to the expected external BNB wallet, but to an internal account controlled by the scammer, registered with that specific MEMO.</p><p><strong>The graph highlights the discrepancy between the intended transfer route (Bybit → victim’s BNB wallet) and the actual route taken (Bybit → scammer’s internal account).</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*G2T-ChDcSzRc0OEE.png" /><figcaption><em>Bholder connection graph illustrating the flow of cryptocurrency in the described incident.</em></figcaption></figure><h3>How to Protect Yourself from These Schemes</h3><p>Scam tactics involving MEMO are becoming increasingly sophisticated, and their true power lies not in technical tricks, but in the fact that many users simply don’t understand how the system works. To avoid becoming a victim, it’s important not only to stay vigilant, but also to understand the basic principles of crypto transfers. Here are a few key rules to help you stay safe:</p><ul><li><strong>Understand how transfers work and what MEMO means.</strong> If you use exchanges, blockchain wallets, or send crypto, it’s essential to know which parameters affect the transaction. MEMO is not a random field — it’s a critical component. Spend 10 minutes learning how your specific network works — it could significantly reduce your risk.</li><li><strong>Verify your sources of information.</strong> Don’t trust messages in Telegram, WhatsApp, or social media, even if they appear to be from customer support. Legitimate exchange representatives will never message you first via messengers.</li><li><strong>Always double-check the address and MEMO manually.</strong> Only copy them directly from the official interface of your exchange or wallet. Never use details from emails, chats, or third-party websites.</li><li><strong>Avoid sending funds to platforms lacking transparency.</strong> If a project has no legal information, clear terms of use, or reliable customer support — that’s a red flag. Real companies don’t hide their identity.</li><li><strong>Be extra cautious with investment offers.</strong> If someone promises guaranteed returns, entry bonuses, or refund guarantees — it’s likely a scam. In the crypto world, there’s no such thing as easy or risk-free money.</li></ul><p>❗️<strong>If you suspect you’ve been scammed, don’t wait.</strong> Time is critical. The sooner you act, the better the chances of tracing transactions and taking appropriate action.</p><p>Reach out to the experts at <strong>AML Crypto</strong> — our team provides professional assistance in tracing lost funds, identifying transaction trails, and preparing documentation that can be used in legal proceedings.</p><p><strong>You can contact us:</strong></p><ul><li>On Telegram: <a href="https://t.me/AMLCrypto"><strong>https://t.me/AMLCrypto</strong></a></li><li>Via email: <a href="/service/mailto:info@amlcrypto.io"><strong>info@amlcrypto.io</strong></a></li></ul><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>The MEMO field is just a simple string within a transaction — but it’s the key element that determines who receives the funds. In account-based blockchains like EOS, TLOS, and WAX, MEMO is a required component. Not understanding its purpose, trusting “support” messages in chat apps, or copying instructions from unreliable sources can easily lead to a complete loss of crypto assets.</p><p>Scammers don’t hack wallets or spoof addresses — they exploit users’ lack of knowledge. And because such transactions are technically valid, exchanges and wallets typically bear no responsibility for the consequences.</p><p>If you’ve already fallen into one of these traps, it’s important not to delay the investigation. The sooner a technical analysis begins, the higher the chance of tracing the assets, securing digital evidence, and forwarding the case to the proper authorities in time.</p><p><strong>AML Crypto</strong> offers assistance in these situations — from analyzing blockchain transactions to compiling evidence and preparing documentation for legal proceedings.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2e958913be55" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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