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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Abdulrahman Ali on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Abdulrahman Ali on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@Abdox11?source=rss-b1aee1d3cb47------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Abdulrahman Ali on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Abdox11?source=rss-b1aee1d3cb47------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[From Misconfigured Virtual Host Routing to Internal Source Code Disclosure]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Abdox11/from-misconfigured-virtual-host-routing-to-internal-source-code-disclosure-8ef3e7c86788?source=rss-b1aee1d3cb47------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[nginx]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[misconfiguration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[host-header]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[original-ips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdulrahman Ali]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 13:46:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-26T13:46:02.798Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At the beginning, I opened the application and spent some time exploring it. Before working on any bug bounty program, I usually try to understand the application’s functionality and the services it provides in order to gain a better understanding of the underlying business logic.</p><p>The target turned out to be a scooter rental platform. Interestingly, there was no login page on the website itself. Instead, the application primarily encouraged users to download the mobile app through a “<strong>Get The App</strong>” button.</p><p>After that, I moved on to some basic reconnaissance. I started by collecting subdomains and publicly available URLs related to the company. After spending almost an entire day reviewing the discovered assets, I couldn’t find anything particularly interesting. Everything appeared normal, with no obvious vulnerabilities or unusual behavior worth investigating further.</p><p>Most of the discovered subdomains exposed only a limited attack surface, and none of them led to anything promising. Since I still had no valuable findings, I decided to continue digging deeper and revisit the collected data from a different perspective.</p><p>Eventually, I came across a subdomain that caught my attention. Based on its naming, it appeared to be related to an internal or administrative service. However, every attempt to access it was blocked before reaching the backend application.</p><p>After some investigation, I confirmed that the target was protected by Cloudflare. I tried several bypass techniques that I was familiar with, but none of them produced any useful results.</p><p>At that point, I stepped away from the screen for a short break and started reviewing the information I had already collected. While doing so, a different approach came to mind:</p><p><strong>What if I focused on identifying the origin IP address behind the protected subdomain?</strong></p><p>I wasn’t certain that the effort would lead anywhere, but it seemed worth investigating. Even if it failed, it would simply be another unsuccessful lead among many that are encountered during bug hunting.</p><p>From that moment, my focus shifted entirely toward uncovering the infrastructure behind the target and determining whether the original server could be reached directly.</p><h3>Finding the Origin</h3><p>The first step was attempting to identify the origin IP address behind the target.</p><p>I initially decided to use the uncover tool and ran the following command:</p><pre>uncover -q &quot;target.com&quot; -e shodan,censys,fofa,quake,hunter,zoomeye,netlas| httpx</pre><p>The command returned multiple IP addresses. However, after inspecting them, most of them turned out to belong to CDN providers such as Cloudflare.</p><p>So I decided to try a different .</p><p>This time, I used massdns with the following command:</p><pre>massdns -r resolvers.txt -t A subs.txt -o S -w resolved_ips.txt</pre><p>The goal was to identify the IP addresses associated with each subdomain and look for anything outside the expected Cloudflare ranges.</p><p>After reviewing the output, nearly all resolved addresses pointed to Cloudflare infrastructure except for a single IP address that stood out from the rest.</p><p>To investigate it further, I searched for the IP using <strong>DNSlytics </strong>and found that it belonged to</p><ul><li><strong>Google LLC</strong></li></ul><p>I then checked the same IP on Shodan and noticed that it was associated with one of the target’s subdomains hosted on Google Cloud infrastructure.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/908/1*UagvccFYe0ubhjDJqgQ50g.png" /></figure><p>At that point, the result became more interesting. The IP appeared to be directly associated with the target infrastructure rather than a generic CDN edge node.</p><p>Although the IP was tied to a different subdomain, there was still a possibility that the same server was handling additional virtual hosts related to the target.</p><p>Instead of making assumptions too early, I decided to continue testing the server behavior directly using Burp Suite.</p><h3>Misconfigured Routing</h3><p>At this point, my goal was fairly straightforward.</p><p>Earlier during reconnaissance, I had discovered a subdomain that appeared to be related to an internal service. However, the application was protected behind Cloudflare, which meant I could not interact with the backend server directly.</p><p>That was the reason I shifted my focus toward identifying the origin IP address behind the target infrastructure.</p><p>After finding a potential origin IP, the next step was to verify whether the protected subdomain was actually being served by that same backend server. If it was, then I might be able to interact with the application directly without having to go through Cloudflare.</p><p>To test this, I opened Burp Repeater and started modifying the Host header while sending requests directly to the discovered IP address.</p><p>The idea was simple: if the backend server was configured to handle that protected subdomain on the same IP, changing the Host header to the target subdomain should cause the request to be routed accordingly.</p><p>That was the original objective.</p><p>However, the behavior I encountered next turned out to be very different from what I initially expected.</p><p>The server responded successfully, which suggested that the request was being routed somewhere instead of being rejected immediately.</p><p>At first glance, the response looked almost identical to the small HTML page returned by the legitimate application. However, after comparing the responses more carefully, I noticed one important difference.</p><p>The page title had changed.</p><p>The original response contained:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*DWRk6i5sTLjUSxsHwhHhkg.png" /></figure><p>But after modifying the Host header, the response became:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*NEt1nMjozYg6fP1XHStx7A.png" /></figure><p>At that moment, I thought I had finally managed to reach the protected subdomain through the backend server directly.</p><p>But before assuming that, I wanted to verify whether the behavior was actually tied to that specific subdomain or if the server was handling unexpected Host values in a different way.</p><p>So I sent the request to Intruder and started testing other Host header values using the subdomains I had already collected during reconnaissance.</p><p>What I noticed was strange.</p><p>The server kept returning the same HTML page containing:</p><pre>&lt;title&gt; Checklists &lt;/title&gt;</pre><p>From the name alone, it looked more like an internal page than part of the public application.</p><p>To verify this further, I changed the Host header to completely random values such as:</p><blockquote>abdox2</blockquote><p>The server still returned the same page.</p><p>However, when I switched the Host header back to the original subdomain associated with the server, the normal application response immediately returned again:</p><pre>&lt;title&gt; Example &lt;/title&gt;</pre><p>At this point, it became clear that the server was not handling Host headers as expected.</p><p>After reviewing the responses and headers more closely, I noticed that the server was running on <strong>Nginx</strong>. Regardless of the value supplied in the Host header, the request was consistently routed to the same internal-looking application.</p><p>Even completely random Host values produced the same result, which indicated that the server was accepting requests for hosts that were not explicitly configured.</p><p>One possible explanation was that Nginx was routing unmatched Host headers to a default virtual host instead of rejecting them. In some deployments, this can happen when a fallback server block is configured to serve an internal application or project that was never intended to be exposed publicly.</p><p>That would explain why arbitrary Host values consistently returned the same page instead of an error response or the expected public application.</p><p>This was not what I had originally set out to find. However, it was clear that this behavior deserved a closer look.</p><p>Since the application appeared to be accessible through an unintended routing path, I wanted to understand what else might be exposed.</p><p>I sent the request to Intruder and started fuzzing for common files and directories.</p><p>It didn’t take long before I discovered two endpoints:</p><blockquote><em>/files<br>/logs</em></blockquote><p>At first glance, they looked like ordinary directories. However, after reviewing their contents, it became clear that they exposed a considerable amount of internal information.</p><p><strong>The disclosed data included:</strong></p><ul><li>Backend source code files</li><li>Frontend source code</li><li>Database-related backend code</li><li>A Slack webhook URL</li><li>An administrative email address</li><li>A Google Spreadsheet ID</li></ul><p><strong>Alongside database schema and migration details such as:</strong></p><ul><li>Table names</li><li>Column names</li><li>Table relationships</li></ul><p><strong>As well as infrastructure and operational information, including:</strong></p><ul><li>Internal server ports</li><li>Backend runtime logs</li><li>Service logs</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/776/1*JpGvTAx5ol9bdONi0E_ehA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/780/1*j2ikKrDx0-ZtvRCPY-vlsg.png" /></figure><p>After confirming the impact, I reported the vulnerability.</p><p>A few days later…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/857/1*cjHAHC2igRsDq26sgjmpfw.png" /></figure><p><strong>I hope you found this writeup useful </strong>ʕ•ᴥ•ʔ</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8ef3e7c86788" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Intigriti Challenge 1125 — Writeup]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Abdox11/intigriti-challenge-1125-writeup-1d27c57a15a0?source=rss-b1aee1d3cb47------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdulrahman Ali]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 24 Nov 2025 10:24:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-24T10:24:52.697Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Intigriti Challenge 1125 — Writeup</h3><h3>Introduction</h3><p>This writeup covers my solution for <strong>Intigriti Challenge 1125</strong>, which involved discovering and exploiting multiple vulnerabilities including <strong>JWT manipulation</strong> and <strong>Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)</strong>. The goal was ultimately to gain access to the server’s filesystem and extract the hidden flag.</p><h3>1. Initial Setup</h3><p>I began by examining the platform, which appeared to be a small e‑commerce application.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*r51hf7-AvIEXNxG7sP_ABg.png" /></figure><p>I explored most of the available functions and user flows but did not initially find any actionable issues. At that point, I decided to inspect how the application handled JWTs and test whether privilege escalation through token manipulation was possible.</p><h3>2. JWT Analysis &amp; Privilege Escalation</h3><p>While reviewing how the application handled authentication, I noticed that the <strong>role</strong> was fully controlled inside the JWT payload. I attempted modifying the token to escalate my privileges.</p><p>During testing, I discovered a critical issue: <strong>the system did not verify the JWT signature</strong>. This allowed me to freely modify the token and reassign my role.</p><p>During the modification process, I also altered the JWT header by replacing the signing algorithm:</p><pre>{<br>&quot;alg&quot;: &quot;HS256&quot;,<br>&quot;typ&quot;: &quot;JWT&quot;<br>}</pre><p>I changed it to:</p><pre>{<br>&quot;alg&quot;: &quot;none&quot;,<br>&quot;typ&quot;: &quot;JWT&quot;<br>}</pre><p>This effectively disabled signature verification.</p><p>Next, I edited the payload. The original token contained fields such as:</p><pre>{<br>&quot;user_id&quot;: 58,<br>&quot;username&quot;: &quot;abdo&quot;,<br>&quot;role&quot;: &quot;user&quot;,<br>&quot;exp&quot;: 1764065271<br>}</pre><p>I modified them to escalate privileges:</p><pre>{<br>&quot;user_id&quot;: 1,<br>&quot;username&quot;: &quot;admin&quot;,<br>&quot;role&quot;: &quot;admin&quot;,<br>&quot;exp&quot;: 1764065271<br>}</pre><p>After updating the token and sending it back to the server, I successfully accessed the <strong>admin panel</strong>.</p><p>Inside the admin interface, I navigated to the profile page. It contained two input fields:</p><ul><li><strong>Current Display Name</strong> (output)</li><li><strong>Display Name</strong> (input)</li></ul><p>Anything entered in <strong>Display Name</strong> appeared as processed content inside <strong>Current Display Name</strong>. I tested with a simple payload:</p><pre>{{4*5}}</pre><p>The output returned <strong>20</strong>, confirming the presence of <strong>Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)</strong>.</p><h3>4. Attempting Command Execution</h3><p>I tested multiple SSTI payloads. The environment seemed to be using a Python-based templating engine, so I attempted OS command execution.</p><p>The following payload successfully executed ls on the server:</p><pre>{{ self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__(&#39;os&#39;).popen(&#39;ls&#39;).read() }}</pre><p>This allowed me to enumerate server files and directories.</p><h3>5. Directory Enumeration &amp; Hidden Folder Discovery</h3><p>From the root directory, several folders were inaccessible (possibly restricted by the challenge environment). However, one accessible directory was:</p><pre>/app</pre><p>Running ls there showed no interesting files, but using a more detailed command:</p><pre>ls -lah</pre><p>I discovered a <strong>hidden folder</strong>:</p><pre>/.aquacommerce</pre><p>Inside it, I found a text file: 019a82cf.txt.</p><h3>6. Extracting the Flag</h3><p>Using the following payload, I executed a cat command to read the file:</p><pre>{{ self.__init__.__globals__.__builtins__.__import__(&#39;os&#39;).popen(&#39;cat /app/.aquacommerce/019a82cf.txt&#39;).read() }}</pre><p>This returned the final challenge flag:</p><p><strong>FLAG: INTIGRITI{019a82cf-ca32–716f-8291–2d0ef30bea32}</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jYS3La4vdiwxI930sSDoiw.png" /><figcaption>Intigriti Challenge 1125</figcaption></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>The challenge combined two major weaknesses:</p><ol><li><strong>Unsigned JWT</strong>, enabling privilege escalation.</li><li><strong>SSTI</strong>, allowing full command execution.</li></ol><p>By chaining both vulnerabilities, I escalated to admin, executed OS commands, navigated the server, and finally extracted the hidden flag.</p><p>This was a well-designed challenge demonstrating the impact of insecure JWT handling and template injection vulnerabilities.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1d27c57a15a0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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