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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by AdaLink on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by AdaLink on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by AdaLink on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AdaLink_io?source=rss-2adea030c05b------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Stakepool Pledge Influence in Stake Rewards Distribution]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AdaLink_io/stakepool-pledge-influence-in-stake-rewards-distribution-44a630c8479d?source=rss-2adea030c05b------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[proof-of-stake]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cardano]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[exchange]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[AdaLink]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 Aug 2022 16:31:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-08-18T17:32:57.722Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XsIgGZO9y16RYDyfccs9cA.png" /></figure><h3>Abstract</h3><p>A breakdown of the current equation used to calculate the optimal rewards for a pool [1] is discussed. The main focus of this <a href="https://github.com/ADA-Link/Papers/blob/main/Stakepool%20Pledge%20Influence%20in%20Stake%20Rewards%20Distribution.pdf"><strong>draft paper</strong></a> is to understand the parameter a₀ and study possible scenarios that lead to more rewards for single pools against multiple pools to further push decentralization of the network and reduce ADA amounts in centralized exchanges.</p><p>CIP-50 [2] has already discussed the shortcomings of the current reward equation in giving k and a₀ their supposed effect. Similar to CIP-50, this paper will first understand the current reward equation. Next, it shows off the deficiencies regarding fairness among stakepools. Then, a simple yet elegant modification is proposed. A different approach is taken compared to CIP-50.</p><p>The research in this paper is far from complete. Nonetheless, it discusses the basic pillars that cannot be ignored or compromised in a PoS ecosystem. More research and analysis will be carried out in the future.</p><h3>Motivation</h3><p>Ouroborus has been studied and tested rigorously in the past years. Cardano’s proof of stake is, with no doubt, a very robust system and shines amongst other used protocols in the crypto industry. Nonetheless, many honest SPOs are constantly fighting big players and hardly surviving the long term game.</p><p>The formula of optimal rewards for a pool [1] will be referred to as “The Reward Equation” hereafter in this paper. In it, the effect of a₀ will be studied and several suggestions to tip the scale toward SPOs against multi &amp; exchange pools are made at the end of the paper.</p><h3>Centralized Exchanges (CEX) Staking Strategy</h3><p>Many CEXs users keep their crypto inside their exchange accounts rather than withdraw them to native wallets. Reasons vary for this, there are two main viewpoints for it. First, the amount/value of the bought coins is not high to incentivize the user to go through the process of withdrawing the coins and holding them in a native wallet. Second, some users do not feel confident enough to be in charge of their assets, and feel safer by knowing they can go back to some sort of authority if they lose access to their account, which defeats the main purpose of cryptocurrency.</p><p>Regardless, CEXs make use of this phenomenon by carefully staking any asset that can be staked and maximize their profit from it. This does not mean real owners are getting their fair share of the staking rewards. In fact, most users do not get any rewards at all.</p><p>In a nutshell, CEXs own all the assets in their platform “not your keys not your crypto’’ and hence in the case of ADA they spin up stake pools and delegate all the ADA they have in the exchange. Counting on the assumption that most users do not ask for their staking rewards, CEXs can offer slightly higher APY% range than the normal staking yields to their users who want to stake their ADA on the platform. To make sure not everyone “delegates” they add fictitious constraints, namely, locking periods and an upper limit ADA amount that can be staked by a user.</p><p>To make sure their platform is as liquid as possible, a common factor for stake pools that are run by exchanges is a low pledge amount, i.e as low as 2 ADA![3].</p><h3>Stake Pool Pledge and Centralized Exchanges</h3><p>A stake pool operator is asked to “pledge” an amount of ADA when they create the stake pool. The main purpose for “pledge” is to outcome Sybil Attacks [4]. But in a more general sense, It can be thought of as the operator’s way to show confidence in their willingness to maintain the pool running with highest possible performance. This amount should be kept pledged as long as the pool is operating, and hence, we can say it can be thought of as a locked amount.</p><p>The last point is crucial and can be used to distinguish single pools from centralized exchange pools. As discussed in the previous section, CEXs prefer to keep their pledge to a minimum. Up to this point in time, the effect of staked pledge is barely noticeable in the protocol.</p><h3>Pledge, Stake and a₀ Parameter</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MiQ990Iq6BcshXQGav9Row.png" /></figure><h3>Examining Previous Findings and Apply it to Current Network State</h3><p>The general outcome of staking performance can be deduced from equations (2) and (6). In this section two scenarios are examined. First, is a comparison between two current pools, one is an SPO and the other is for an exchange. Different a₀ values are tested. Naturally, one would expect a₀ to tip the scales in favor toward players who value decentralization and willing to “share the cake” so to speak.</p><h4>Case Study 1:</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Tz_srHrRwR9PZTca8BGkyg.png" /></figure><h4>Case Study 2:</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3C-AjCIuMmpitSyspRA5iw.png" /></figure><h3>Remarks</h3><p>The effect of a₀ is not as one would expect. While is does reduce ( )₁ effect on the overall stake rewards, it does not increase ( )₂ term in same rate (mathematically this is due to the raised powers on ₛ’). Even at high a₀ values, the amount of “depreciation” felt in ( )₁ is orders of magnitude larger than the increased influence of ( )₂. Therefore, pledge influence is merely present at low to medium a₀ values. Mathematically, it would make sense to pledge as little as possible, i.e. 2 ADA, and put the rest of the other stake as delegation, which is the approach currently adopted by exchanges.</p><p>In the next section a modification on the “reward equation (1)” is suggested to further incentivize decentralization.</p><h3>Suggestion</h3><p>The general concept of comparing the stake of one pool to the overall available stake in the network is the core concept that guarantees the security of the network. This concept can be reused in handling pledge amounts. Namely, the pledge of a stake pool gets compared to the overall pledged amount in the network.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ANb1SDT8ki2wvShp75hE0g.png" /></figure><p>Now, the a₀ presence will be a lot more present in reward calculations. In (8) stake pool operators are incentivized to increase their live pledge as their pool increases to maximize profit, yet not doing so, will still not punish the pool compared to the current state of the blockchain. In other words, ( )₁ term is the same in both (1) and (8).</p><p>Previously, (1) reduced ()₁ as a₀ increased at a faster rate than increasing ()₂. Therefore, regardless of the pledge amount, currently, any stakepool would see a reduction in rewards as a₀ increases (Check case studies in previous section). What (8) proposes is to balance the reduction in ()₁ by increasing ()₂ at a similar rate. Hence, any stakepool with relatively large pledge, compared to the average pledge amount in the network, would benefit from increasing a₀. This is a vital key point to punish CEX pools, since their pledge to total stake ratio is as low as it can be.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sB1UWaqcUOoG7EQoGRfM4w.png" /></figure><p>What is most interesting in (8) is that to maximize the performance of a stakepool, its live pledge should increase as its total stake does. This shows that the bigger the pool, the bigger the pledge should be. CEX pools configuration, i.e. high stake with low pledge, will become the least efficient to extract rewards.</p><p>Equation (8) rewards honest/serious players in the game. Replacing (1) with (8) while keeping a₀ will not result in any reduction of rewards to any pool. On the other hand, rewards would increase for pools who have higher pledge.</p><p>Second point is increasing a₀ using (8). As seen in the last derivation, stakepools who have their pledge less than 6% of their total stake would feel a negative net effect on rewards as a₀ increases. However, this decrease is again proportional to how little pledge there is in the pool, and hence CEX and multiple pool operators would suffer the most.</p><p>As a comparison to the case study in the previous section, the same cases will be compared using equation (8).</p><h4>Case Study 1:</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HCrgZ50z2bTjtlKlxEzY5A.png" /></figure><h4>Case Study 2:</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*k2MEFHq3g48hJ1UHGIaTWw.png" /></figure><h3>Remarks</h3><p>Equation (8) gives a better influence for pledge and a₀ parameter compared to (1) while still conserving main objectives. Namely, the upper bound of total rewards in an epoch, and the prevention of Sybil attacks.</p><p>One could argue (8) is more fair toward parties and give an edge to those willing to show confidence by increasing their pledge amount.</p><p>It should be noted that (8) can be modified to make the “tipping point” of 6% lower so SPOs can start benefiting from a₀ with less pledge value. More on this point will be investigated in future studies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DgTtTAqDNclFA75JkWgpgg.png" /></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>This draft paper shed light on a₀ and the influence of pledge amount on reward calculations. It proposed a modification on the reward equation to punish stakepool that most resemble CEX pools. It makes sense from the fairness point of view to reward pools with high pledge relative to their total stake. It shows that big pools do not necessarily have the biggest influence if their pledge does not compare to their stake. Additionally, the proposed equation naturally introduces a saturation limit “<em>Z</em>₀ . <em>P</em>” after which the pledge will not have any additional influence. Last point is important to incentivize SPOs to get delegations from other wallets, since it wont give any advantage to pledge all the stake, and therefore, delegations from user wallets are still strongly incentivized as well.</p><h3>References</h3><p>[1] Philipp Kant, et al., April 11, 2019, “Engineering Design Specification for Delegation and Incentives in Cardano–Shelley” (<a href="https://hydra.iohk.io/build/790053/download/1/delegation_design_spec.pdf">https://hydra.iohk.io/build/790053/download/1/delegation_design_spec.pdf</a>)</p><p>[2] Michael Liesenfelt, April 5, 2022, “CIP-50: Shelleys Voltaire decentralization update” (<a href="https://github.com/cardano-foundation/CIPs/pull/242">https://github.com/cardano-foundation/CIPs/pull/242</a>)</p><p>[3] Binance Steak Pools Group Data: (<a href="https://adapools.org/groups/binance-20">https://adapools.org/groups/binance-20</a>)</p><p>[4] Lars Brünjes, October 29, 2018, “Preventing Sybil attacks” (<a href="https://iohk.io/en/blog/posts/2018/10/29/preventing-sybil-attacks/">https://iohk.io/en/blog/posts/2018/10/29/preventing-sybil-attacks/</a>)</p><p>You can download “Stakepool Pledge Influence in Stake Rewards Distribution: An ADA Link Paper by Mahmoud Nimer” PDF <a href="https://github.com/ADA-Link/Papers/blob/main/Stakepool%20Pledge%20Influence%20in%20Stake%20Rewards%20Distribution.pdf"><strong>here</strong></a><strong>.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=44a630c8479d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[SPOxNFTs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AdaLink_io/spoxnfts-23e15943c6a7?source=rss-2adea030c05b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/23e15943c6a7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cardano]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dapps]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nft]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[AdaLink]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 11 Aug 2022 16:29:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-08-24T04:27:50.363Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>ADA LINK: A Decentralization Tool</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*d-i6hhrYS3Aqu0pNRuthAA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Anyone that’s done their due diligence investigating Cardano knows that this Blockchain is built differently. With the benefit of hindsight of what others in their field have done right and wrong, and the determination to make decisions based on scientific research, Cardano has become the perfect home for what we could call “Neo Cypherpunks”. A group of people that understand that blockchain technology has to keep up with the needs of the real world in order to bring mass adoption but are not willing to sacrifice the values of decentralization.</p><p>Thanks to Cardano’s great Proof-of-Stake (PoS) design “Ouroboros Protocol” we enjoy many perks like, extremely low transaction fees, no minimum amount of ADA to become a Stake Pool Operator (SPO), delegators don’t have to give up custody of their ADA, and neither have to face lock-up periods nor risk slashing and losing their funds.</p><p><strong>Pillars of decentralization</strong></p><p>SPOs are chosen by the protocol to validate the transactions in the blockchain based on, among other things, the amount of ADA delegated to their stake pool by other ADA holders. This means that the most famous operators will probably have more delegation and, with that, more chances to validate transactions and receive the rewards.</p><p>All ADA Holders can participate in the decentralization of the network and receive rewards by delegating to a stake pool but with this comes great responsibility, they need to be conscious about not staking with multi-pools (companies or operators that run more than one stake pool) as this compromises the decentralization and security of the network.</p><p>Now that we’ve had enough time to see the real world implications of these design choices, we know that in order for Cardano’s decentralization to have steady growth, the community has to be actively educating fellow holders about the importance of staying away from multi-pools. And SPOs need exposure to be able to compete with the Goliaths of multi-pools.</p><p><strong>NFT creators: The Publishers of Web 3</strong></p><p>We need to adapt to human behavior and take advantage of what we’ve learned from web 2, that is, if we need to bring traffic to a site -or exposure to an SPO- we might as well utilize publishers (artists, content creators, influencers, etc.) for the task. After all, their job is to generate and capitalize on engagement as their only source of revenue are subscriptions, product or merch sales and advertising. This was the inspiration that led us to develop ADA Link.</p><p>We will build ADA Link to leverage NFT projects’ ability to rally the masses by making it easy for them to: find SPOs, create alliances with them, and share SPO margin rewards as commission rewards. Our platform will help users identify the exact amount of delegation coming from the promotional efforts of each SPO ally by tracking NFT policy IDs linked to their accounts.</p><p>We are confident our platform will generate a positive impact on the decentralization of the network, as affiliate marketing is a tried-and-tested advertising model that represents a 12 billion dollar industry. We are only adapting this to benefit the pillars of decentralization in our ecosystem by utilizing web 3 publisher’s favorite tool, NFTs.</p><p>You can help us build this platform by voting for our Project Catalyst Fund 9 proposal in August of 2022. Let’s turn Cardano into the first Blockchain to actively use NFTs as a decentralization tool and continue our journey towards becoming the most consistently decentralized Blockchain.</p><p>Want to know more about ADA Link? Check out the video below:</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.vimeo.com%2Fvideo%2F741626657%3Fh%3D09a6eb6605%26app_id%3D122963&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Vimeo&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fvimeo.com%2F741626657&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.vimeocdn.com%2Fvideo%2F1492332327-73a1ec9049ee32382f9621533da470f52e6034742e5a72f54b9091466db71b02-d_1280&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=vimeo" width="1920" height="1080" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/6578a350c4df8c5c83d5dd41fb988a6b/href">https://medium.com/media/6578a350c4df8c5c83d5dd41fb988a6b/href</a></iframe><p><a href="https://cardano.ideascale.com/c/idea/422018"><strong>Here</strong></a><strong> </strong>is the link to our Project Catalyst Fund 9 proposal called SPOxNFTs: A Decentralization Tool.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=23e15943c6a7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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