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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Alasdair Roberts on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Alasdair Roberts on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Alasdair Roberts on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AlasdairRoberts?source=rss-46cc38c581a9------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Australia’s ‘great surprise’ for the United States: Negotiating the 2002 Security of Information…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AlasdairRoberts/australias-great-surprise-for-the-united-states-negotiating-the-2002-security-of-information-616562ea7d22?source=rss-46cc38c581a9------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[australia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[freedom-of-information]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alasdair Roberts]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Dec 2018 12:57:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-14T14:11:07.047Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Australia’s ‘great surprise’ for the United States: Negotiating the 2002 Security of Information Agreement</h3><p>This article originally appeared with this title in <em>Freedom of Information Review </em>106 (August 2003), pages 50–51.</p><p>In June 2002 Australia’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Alexander Downer, announced that he had signed a new agreement on the exchange of classified information with the United States. In a public statement, Downer implied that the agreement was needed to account for “advances in information technology” since the signing of an earlier US-Australian pact in 1962.<a href="/service/applewebdata://CCD4E8D0-2285-4F41-9C4D-8DCA36713C14#_edn1">[1]</a> However, internal documents released by the US Department of Defense show that the new agreement was prompted by very different concerns.</p><p>The US-Australia pact is one of over fifty bilateral security of information (SOI) agreements that have been negotiated by the US Department of Defense over the last half-century. Under an SOI agreement, governments agree to take a variety of measures to control the handling of sensitive information received from the United States. The US practice of negotiating SOI agreements was formalized in National Security Decision Memorandum 119 (NSDM 119), issued by the Nixon administration in June 1971, which prohibits the sharing of classified military information with a foreign government that has not signed a legally binding SOI agreement.</p><p>These SOI agreements can have important implications for citizens. For example, security clearance procedures that are needed to comply with the requirements of an SOI agreement could affect the ability of Australian citizens to hold government employment. (In the 1950s and 1960s, NATO SOI rules effectively barred homosexuals from key government positions.)</p><p>SOI agreements can also collide with national right-to-information policies. The US-Australia agreement absolutely bars the disclosure of shared classified information to non-governmental actors without the consent of the originating government — a flat prohibition on disclosure that clashes with the harm-based approach to disclosure upon which right-to-information laws are often based. The agreement also states that disagreements about the disclosure of shared information “shall not be referred to a national court, to an international tribunal, or to any other person or entity for settlement.”<a href="/service/applewebdata://CCD4E8D0-2285-4F41-9C4D-8DCA36713C14#_edn2">[2]</a> This could conflict with appeal provisions in Part VI of Australia’s Freedom of Information Act.</p><p>Few Australians would have known about the 1962 SOI agreement, which was itself a classified document. This was standard practice at the time. The US-UK SOI agreement, signed in April 1961, was only declassified and publicly acknowledged in March 2001. Canada denied the existence of its agreement with the United States until it was declassified in response to a request from the US government in November 2002.</p><p>In Australia, the classified status of its SOI agreement with the United States created distinctive problems. In August 1999 — almost forty years after its signing — the Australian Defence Department told the US Department of Defense (US DOD) that it did not view the 1962 agreement as legally binding under international law. According to documents released by the US DOD, the Australian government said that it had never undertaken the internal procedures necessary to make the agreement legally binding, and regarded the agreements as “morally and politically binding only.”<a href="/service/applewebdata://CCD4E8D0-2285-4F41-9C4D-8DCA36713C14#_edn3">[3]</a> Australian officials told the US DOD that the classified status of the 1962 pact had complicated the process of making it legally binding — perhaps because some officials lacked the clearance needed to approve the document.</p><p>This caused serious concern within the US DOD. In November 1999, a US DOD official told US Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre that the Australian message “came as a great surprise to us, since all U.S. international agreements concerning security of information have always been done on a legally binding basis. It is also of great concern to us, since these agreements establish the fundamental commitment to protect classified information of the other government. DoD shares a great deal of highly classified information with Australia.”</p><p>Australia was the only country whose SOI agreement with the US was not legally binding. “It is imperative,” the official said, that a legally binding agreement be established as soon as possible.</p><p>Deputy Secretary Hamre was advised to use an upcoming visit with Australian officials to “urge [them] to negotiate and conclude the replacement agreement quickly.” In the meantime, US DOD staff planned to evaluate “disclosures of classified information to Australia program by program” to ensure that stopgap measures were in place to provide legally binding assurances before disclosures were made.</p><p>The US DOD also had other bureaucratic difficulties. The 1962 agreement covered the exchange of <em>all </em>classified information, but NSDM 119 only required a legally binding agreement for the exchange of classified <em>military</em>information. The State Department has insisted since the mid-1980s that new SOI agreements be limited to the military sphere alone, and in November 1999 it was expected to resist the US DOD’s request to negotiate a new agreement equal in scope to the 1962 agreement. In the end, however, the State Department did not block US DOD’s plan. As a result, the new US-Australia agreement is actually broader than required by NSDM 119.</p><p>However, there may have been other complications in talks about a replacement agreement. A July 2000 memorandum from US DOD said that formal negotiations for the new agreement would “take place in Canberra during the week of 17 July 2000.”<a href="/service/applewebdata://CCD4E8D0-2285-4F41-9C4D-8DCA36713C14#_edn4">[4]</a> This proved to be a highly optimistic forecast. In fact, negotiations went on for nearly two years until the new agreement was signed in June 2002. US DOD memoranda do not provide an explanation for the protracted discussions.</p><p>That the new SOI agreement is publicly accessible — unlike its 1962 predecessor — is a small step forward. Nonetheless, greater transparency about the negotiation of such agreements is clearly required. As defence and intelligence services collaborate more closely, these agreements will grow in number, and the constraints which they impose on national right-to-information policies may become tighter. This is an area that has been wholly neglected by academics and activists interested in governmental openness. One first step might be an inquiry through Australia’s Freedom of Information Act about the Australian view of negotiations over the 2002 SOI agreement. There are other opportunities for study as well. Since 1996, Australia has negotiated at least four other SOI agreements — with South Africa, Canada, Singapore and Denmark.</p><p><a href="/service/applewebdata://CCD4E8D0-2285-4F41-9C4D-8DCA36713C14#_ednref1">[1]</a>Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2002. Media Release: Australia-US Sign Pact on Classified Information. Canberra: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. June 25, 2002. <a href="http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2002/fa093_02.html.">http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2002/fa093_02.html.</a> Accessed September 2, 2003.</p><p><a href="/service/applewebdata://CCD4E8D0-2285-4F41-9C4D-8DCA36713C14#_ednref2">[2]</a>Article 18 of the 2002 United States-Australia Security of Information Agreement. The text of the agreement can be read at <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2002/25.html.">http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/2002/25.html.</a> Accessed September 2, 2003.</p><p><a href="/service/applewebdata://CCD4E8D0-2285-4F41-9C4D-8DCA36713C14#_ednref3">[3]</a>This and following quotations are drawn from the following source: Memorandum from Director, International Security Program,s to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, on the Australia General Security of Information Agreement, November 16, 1999. Memorandum I-99/014889-IS. The memorandum and other documents released in response to US DOD FOIA request03-F-0108 (April 8, 2003) can be downloaded from the author’s website, <a href="http://www.foi.net./">http://www.foi.net.</a></p><p><a href="/service/applewebdata://CCD4E8D0-2285-4F41-9C4D-8DCA36713C14#_ednref4">[4]</a>Information Paper on U.S./Australia General Security of Military Information Agreement prepared by Mr. P.R. Batten, US DOD International Security Programs, July 6, 2000.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=616562ea7d22" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Speaking up for Liberal Democracy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AlasdairRoberts/speaking-up-for-liberal-democracy-ad93c2a2c806?source=rss-46cc38c581a9------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[public-administration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[human-rights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alasdair Roberts]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Dec 2018 14:23:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-13T14:28:00.370Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iTT7hKUyutfwDJv1AzmauQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Adolf Hitler announces the occupation of the Rhineland in the Kroll Opera House, Berlin, in March 1936. Three months later, Louis Brownlow, chair of President Roosevelt’s Committee on Administrative Management, gave a speech from the same spot. Scherl/Süddeutsche Zeitung Photo.</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Speaking up for liberal democracy</strong></h3><p><em>This is an excerpt from “Shaking Hands with Hitler: The Politics-Administration Dichotomy and Engagement with Fascism,” published in November 2018 by </em>Public Administration Review<em>. This excerpt is reproduced with permission. </em><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/puar.13009"><em>Read the full article here</em></a><em>. Free access until January 31, 2019.</em></p><p>Brownlow and his colleagues always believed in democracy and freedom. For several years, though, they hesitated to talk about their commitment to these values, especially when abroad. They tried to ignore grand politics and focus on administration alone. Maybe they hoped that the three-way struggle of the 1930s — between liberal democracy, fascism, and communism — would work out favorably on its own. Eventually, though, it became clear to them that it was necessary to take a stand in defense of democratic values. We might be at a similar crossroads today.</p><p>Overseas engagement by American scholars in public administration is more extensive now that in the 1930s. It increased rapidly in the 1990s and early 2000s — so much that it became commonplace to talk about the “globalization of public administration” (Farazmand 1999; Walker 2011). American specialists went abroad more frequently to attend conferences, teach and conduct research, and advise governments. At the same time, American journals rebranded themselves as international journals. The American Society of Public Administration (ASPA) claimed a place “at the forefront of the international public administration community” (Guy 1997). The U.S. accrediting body, the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA), announced that it would set a “global standard” and accredit degree programs around the world (Knott 2013, 4).</p><p>Debates on questions of grand politics were often avoided by specialists in public administration at this time. Some scholars tacitly applied Wilson’s formula, believing that it was possible to talk about problems of administration — or public management, to use the more fashionable phrase — without addressing stark differences in political values. In addition, Western specialists may have believed that divergences in political values would eventually disappear, so that it was unnecessary to address them directly. At the time, the whole world seemed to be converging toward liberal democracy. Francis Fukuyama had declared its “unabashed victory” over fascism and communism (Fukuyama 1989). Democracy, the Clinton administration said in 2000, was “triumphant”(U.S. Department of State 2000, 2). The George W. Bush administration celebrated free-market democracy as the “single sustainable model for national success” (Executive Office of the President 2002, iv). Even China seemed likely to experience political liberalization within a few years (Gilboy and Heginbotham 2001, 37–38).</p><p>Perhaps because the arc of history seemed to favor democratic values, some important documents produced in this era said little about them. For example, NASPAA’s accreditation standards emphasize the importance of “public service values,” but its description of these values makes no references to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. (Nor do the standards make reference to the concept of academic freedom.) The code of ethics of the American Society of Public Administration, meanwhile, appears to focus exclusively on the conduct of ASPA members within the United States alone (ASPA 2013). The code offers no explicit guidance about the obligation of ASPA members to promote democracy, the rule of law, and human rights while working abroad.</p><p>Unfortunately, we can no longer take for granted that time will work in favor of democracy and human rights. Around the world, democracy appears to be in retreat, and some worry that it is close to collapse (Kurlantzick 2013; Luce 2017, Chapter 3). Many countries have witnessed a resurgence of authoritarian populism (Mounk 2018). And in China, authoritarian rule is being consolidated (BBC News 2017; The Economist 2018). This includes tighter control of universities, which are expected to “adhere to correct political orientation . . . [and]party leadership” (Phillips 2016). Many Chinese policymakers and intellectuals are forthright about the virtues of their approach to governance. Western governance is seen to have “deep-seated problems” (Zhang 2012, 152).</p><p>No major state today behaves as terribly as Nazi Germany did. Still, there are similarities between this historical moment and the 1930s. Democracy is being challenged, and its survival cannot be taken for granted. Around the world, governments are more brazen about neglecting the rule of law and human rights. As a result, scholars and practitioners in public administration confront an intellectual predicament much like that faced by their predecessors in the 1930s. Do they have an obligation to address questions of grand politics, and speak up for democracy and human rights — or can they focus narrowly on problems of administration and management? And there are practical questions too, just as in the 1930s. For example, is it appropriate to attend a conference in a country whose government does not respect democracy and human rights? Is there a point at which it would wrong to collaborate with practitioners or academics, or to accredit a degree program, in such countries? And how should journal editors respond to submissions from countries where academic freedom is not respected?</p><p>These are hard questions, but it is increasingly difficult to avoid them. In 2014, for example, the International Studies Association moved a conference from Thailand to protest violations of human rights (International Studies Association 2014). In 2016, the International Political Science Association moved a conference from Turkey, and the Public Management Research Association moved a conference from North Carolina, for similar reasons (Fishman 2016; Public Management Research Association 2016). In 2017, many scholars called for a break with universities in Myanmar in response to the persecution of Rohingya Muslims (Bothwell 2017). And some have demanded an academic boycott of Israel institutions in response to Israeli policies toward Palestine (Salaita 2016). The American Association of University Professors questions whether systematic boycotts of institutions in other countries are ever justified (AAUP 2006). Still, it recognizes the need to think carefully about the complexities of international engagement.</p><p>This is the task that confronts scholars and practitioners in public administration today. To be clear, the debate is not just about conference boycotts. The challenge is to develop a framework for thinking systematically about the role of scholars in advocating for democracy and human rights around the world, and about the boundaries of engagement abroad. Until 1936, Brownlow and his colleagues refused to think deliberately about this subject. They thought that they could sidestep awkward conversations about grand politics. In Berlin and Warsaw, they finally realized the folly of this position, and acknowledged their obligation to speak up for democracy and human rights.</p><p><em>This is an excerpt from “Shaking Hands with Hitler: The Politics-Administration Dichotomy and Engagement with Fascism,” published in November 2018 by </em>Public Administration Review<em>. This excerpt is reproduced with permission. </em><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/puar.13009"><em>Read the full article here</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ad93c2a2c806" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Teaching for turbulence]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AlasdairRoberts/teaching-for-turbulence-c7ad24816b6b?source=rss-46cc38c581a9------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-administration]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alasdair Roberts]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Aug 2018 19:37:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-10-01T19:45:49.399Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This draft note is prepared as background for a panel discussion on “preparing leaders for a turbulent world” to be held as NASPAA’s conference in October 2018. </em><a href="https://aroberts.us/2018/08/08/naspaa-panel-preparing-leaders-for-a-turbulent-world/"><em>Details about the panel here</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>Programs in public affairs (PA) can learn something from programs in international relations (IR) about preparing students for a turbulent world.</p><p>Both types of programs offer a professional education for public service. But they take different approaches. IR programs often start with an overview of theories of international relations. (<a href="https://msfs.georgetown.edu/academics/curriculum">Example</a>. <a href="http://bulletin.columbia.edu/sipa/programs/mia/#requirementstext">Example</a>.) Students learn about the state system, its dynamics, and strategies for advancing vital interests abroad. The approach is long-term and comparative. And it takes turbulence for granted. It assumes that national strategies are fragile and that the system is constantly evolving.</p><p>Few PA programs begin with a similar overview. Many focus on meso- and micro-level questions of policy design and management. Granted, some programs examine the “political and constitutional context” of policymaking. But they usually do not survey the large forces that drive policy or the strategies by which leaders govern within national borders. When it is offered, the big picture is likely to lack a long-term perspective, and a sense of fragility and dynamism. It is usually focused on the United States alone.</p><p>PA programs need an introductory course that matches the overview course in IR. It should set the scene at a high level: explaining the state system, the main goals of leaders at home and abroad, the forces that constrain their actions, and the strategies they use to advance their goals.</p><p>Is this too abstract for a professional education? Many IR programs do not think so. In the realm of domestic affairs, public servants also need to know something about overall strategies for governing. Reaganism, Clintonism, and now Trumpism — each of these philosophies have defined the boundaries of the possible for public servants at all levels of government.</p><p>Such a course should also be comparative. The age of liberal-democratic triumphalism is over. Governance strategies of major states are diverging sharply once again, and PA students should understand the variations — Xi Jingping Thought, Putinism, Modi-ism and so on. A big-picture introductory class, in the IR style, could achieve that goal too.</p><p><em>Alasdair Roberts is a professor of political science and public policy at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c7ad24816b6b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Question the system]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AlasdairRoberts/question-the-system-f5d48d5ab558?source=rss-46cc38c581a9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f5d48d5ab558</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[open-access]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alasdair Roberts]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jun 2018 12:43:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-07-15T13:35:26.494Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0o0c0vhXP5QoMrwcjIuIQg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Mario Savio being arrested at Berkeley, 1964. Savio told students to “put your bodies upon the gears.” Photo by Robert W. Klein, Associated Press.</figcaption></figure><p><em>This is a work-in-progress, written to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Minnowbrook conference in public administration, held in upstate New York in September 1968. Comments welcomed.</em></p><p>The twenty years following World War II were wonderful for people in authority. Writers had to invent a new vocabulary to describe this golden age. It was era of the Establishment (<a href="https://archive.org/details/americanestablis001909mbp">Rovere</a>) and the power elite (<a href="https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/the-power-elite-9780195133547?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;">Mills</a>), the administrative state (<a href="https://archive.org/details/administrativest030066mbp">Waldo</a>), the technostructure (<a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_New_Industrial_State.html?id=8l2G-C8H8IoC">Galbraith</a>) and the organization man (<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/13/arts/william-h-whyte-organization-man-author-and-urbanologist-is-dead-at-81.html">Whyte</a>). It was the age of centrism and consensus politics (<a href="https://archive.org/details/TheVitalCenter">Schlesinger</a>, <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/973677">Lindblom</a>); the end of ideology and the end of sectionalism too (<a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_End_of_Ideology.html?id=N3yRfamyZFcC">Bell</a>, <a href="https://archive.org/details/politicalmansoci00inlips">Lipset</a>).</p><p>By 1968 all this had changed. Throughout the western world, the Establishment was under attack. Consensus and deference were history. In the United States and Europe, young people were bucking the system. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=L5KSBAAAQBAJ&amp;lpg=PA272&amp;ots=ZCtJb5mRC1&amp;dq=to%20destroy%20&#39;The%20Man&#39;%2C%20%22their%20term%20for%20the%20present%20system%20of%20government%22&amp;pg=PA271#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false">They were fighting the Man</a>. They were taking it to the streets. They were demanding power to the people.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*LlfmNnctEpYJLmm29g8H9g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Defense Secretary Robert McNamara tried to construct “<a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/514591/the-dictatorship-of-data/">a dictatorship of data</a>”: MIT Technology Review.</figcaption></figure><p>The technostructure, once admired for rationality and efficiency, was out of favor in 1968. Now the power structure was perceived to be amoral and repressive. Decisionmakers <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/514591/the-dictatorship-of-data/">fetishized data</a> but lacked vision. Ordinary people were trapped in routines that punished creative expression. People were alienated, caught up in the rat race, imprisoned in an <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iron_cage">iron cage</a> of production and consumption. The response, Herbert Marcuse said, should be a “<a href="http://www.marcuse.org/herbert/pubs/64onedim/odm3.html">great refusal</a>” of the status quo.</p><p>The rebellious mood was so strong that it penetrated into the conservative bones of public administration. In September 1968, thirty-four young scholars gathered at the Minnowbrook Conference Center in upstate New York to judge their field. <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=kTdK6SUAd8QC&amp;lpg=PP1&amp;dq=minnowbrook%20perspective&amp;pg=PA3#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false">The meeting was raucous</a>. People refused to follow the program. There were interventions and confrontations. One participant praised <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=jVEWAAAAIAAJ&amp;dq=marini+toward+a+new+public+administration&amp;focus=searchwithinvolume&amp;q=mario+savio">Mario Savio</a>, the activist who urged Berkeley students to shut down the educational-corporate machine by throwing their “bodies on the gears.”</p><p>Not everyone at Minnowbrook was ready to go that far. But most agreed that the Establishment should be challenged in some way. Frank Marini said that one of the main themes of the conference was <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=jVEWAAAAIAAJ&amp;dq=marini+toward+a+new+public+administration&amp;focus=searchwithinvolume&amp;q=anti-bureaucratic+philosophy">anti-bureaucratism</a>. Orion White called on scholars to confront the lack of <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=jVEWAAAAIAAJ&amp;dq=marini+toward+a+new+public+administration&amp;focus=searchwithinvolume&amp;q=honesty+and+openness">honesty and openness</a> in major institutions. The “spirit of rebellion” surfaced again at the 1970 conference of the American Society for Public Administration, where “young-minded administrators” challenged the old guard and boycotted the official program.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SiHO2LCnajVWJO3Su9F2sA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Leaders of a revolt at the 1970 ASPA conference celebrated their victories with “four-letter barnyard expletives”: Federal Times, April 22, 1970.</figcaption></figure><p>Minnowbrook, <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/40961913?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">it has been said</a>, “is a spirit of questioning authority.” Is that spirit alive today? We should hope so, because the power of the educational-corporate machine has not weakened over the last fifty years. On the contrary, it has increased. Young scholars are caught in a system that imposes tighter restrictions on their work. The rat race of the 1960s has accelerated. The iron cage is more confining.</p><p>Over decades, the field of public administration has been marketized, rationalized and corporatized. There is more competition among graduate programs, more concern for compliance with external standards, and more anxiety about the <a href="https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-public-affairs-schools?int=abc409"><em>US News and World Report </em>ranking</a>. The market for academic labor is tougher as well. Because of austerity and <a href="https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-to-Fix-the-Adjunct-Crisis/243535">adjunctification</a>, it is hard for new scholars to find jobs. Schools perceive that highly productive faculty are essential for a high ranking, and they define productivity more narrowly. Faculty are expected to maintain a steady flow of articles in high-status journals. The status of journals is dictated by impact-factor ranking, as reported by <a href="https://clarivate.com/products/journal-citation-reports/">Clarivate Analytics</a>, a multinational corporation. The business of running journals also been rationalized. Today, all top journals are owned or run by multinational corporations. <a href="https://www.wiley.com/en-us/investors">Just one of these multinationals</a> owns or manages most of the top ten journals in public administration.</p><p>In many ways, the system that binds young scholars today is exactly what the generation of 1968 sought to avoid. Here are seven reasons why it deserves to be challenged:</p><p>— <em>The whole system is less rational than it looks</em>. Students who rely on the <em>US News </em>ranking to choose graduate programs believe that they are making careful, well-informed decisions. They do not know how the ranking is calculated or the shakiness of its foundation. Their decisionmaking has the appearance of rationality but not the substance of it. Similarly, hiring and P&amp;T committees assume that the Clarivate ranking of a journal says something meaningful about the worth of articles published within it. This is also a questionable assumption. Among other difficulties, Clarivate rankings are distorted by patterns of self-citation within small groups of scholars.</p><p>— <em>The system is exploitative</em>. Journal publishing is a profitable business. It is profitable because new scholars are forced to surrender their property without compensation to publishers. This gives publishers the power to extract rents from university libraries. These rents bear no clear relationship to the value that is added by publishers to the published work. Publishers also take advantage of the voluntary labor of editors and reviewers. At the same time, authors and reviewers give up personal and professional information as they comply with the ever-increasing demands of manuscript management systems.</p><p>— <em>The system is secretive. </em>In the last quarter-century, academics have written volumes about the virtues of transparency. We are big boosters of transparency. And we live with transparency too: salaries for public sector academics are routinely disclosed, and many scholars advocate for more disclosure of data and methods. When it comes to the business of scholarly publishing, however, there is awkward silence. Exactly how much rent do journal publishers collect for each of their journals? How much of this rent is shared with academic organizations? What do publishers do with the data harvested by manuscript management systems?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*gValr7myHikO30gQEZ6V4A.jpeg" /><figcaption>A <a href="https://www.volckeralliance.org/publications/tenure-and-promotion-schools-public-affairs">2017 report on promotion and tenure by the Volcker Alliance</a> described incentives to “do quick hits and focus on small questions with a great number of articles.”</figcaption></figure><p>— <em>The system encourages </em><a href="http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S1517-97022014000200003&amp;script=sci_arttext&amp;tlng=en"><em>productivism</em></a><em>. </em>That is, production for its own sake<em>. </em><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/dec/06/peter-higgs-boson-academic-system">Scholars are expected to make or beat the quota</a>. The unit of production is defined narrowly: 10,000-word (roughly) articles published in the right places. We do not count false starts and dead ends. Between 2007 and 2016, the number of articles published in Clarivate-ranked journals in public administration doubled. Does this equate to a doubling of understanding? <a href="https://www.chronicle.com/article/We-Must-Stop-the-Avalanche-of/65890">Not necessarily</a>. Many of these articles will never be referenced by another author. Some were safe bets, produced to make quota. They made small adjustments to existing knowledge. What we may have lost, in the drive to increase production, is the original thought that comes out of reflection, experimentation and failure.</p><p>— <em>The system discourages creativity</em>. In some programs, new faculty are required to publish in journals at the very top of the Clarivate ranking. As a result, the choice of topics and methods is constrained by the preferences of those journals. Scholars who have doubts about these topics and methods are told that they can address those doubts after they gain tenure. This is a fib, because institutional and market pressures remain strong even then. In any case, habits of scholarly production are ingrained by that point.</p><p>— <em>The system is geographically biased</em>. Top journals in public administration are dominated by scholars from a small handful of developed countries, and in particularly from the United States and United Kingdom. The governance agenda that is described in these journals does not include some of the most serious problems facing most people in the world. The same complaint can be made about major conferences in the field.</p><p>— <em>The system is inflexible</em>. The machine is good at producing certain kinds of knowledge —mainly, the kind that was useful for the developed West at the time the machine was designed in the 1970s to 1990s. But circumstances change. The system of scholarly production is so rigid that it has trouble adapting to new realities. It is like the auto industry in Detroit in the 1970s and 1980s, with the critical difference that the Anglo-American scholarly production system does not yet face significant foreign competition. It can continue manufacturing ill-suited products for a lot longer.</p><p>There are several things that we can do to challenge this system. We could stop using unreliable, commercially-generated rating schemes. We could set up non-profit, open access journals — and promise young scholars that they will not be penalized for turning to them. We could demand transparency from journal owners about finances and the use of harvested information. We could insist that editorial teams and conferences have adequate representation from outside the Anglosphere and northwest Europe. We could create space for scholars to write more freely about big ideas. We could encourage the writing of shorter works and longer works. We could stop penalizing false starts and dead ends. At annual conferences, we could routinize the practice of pausing to question the conventional wisdom. We could create our own disciplinary <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/142533/20130301_red_teaming_ed2.pdf">red teams</a>.</p><p>We <em>could</em> do all this. But will we? Some of us do well by the status quo. And some young scholars live so precariously that it would be rash to challenge the status quo. Maybe this is the real test of whether the Minnowbrook spirit is still alive. No one has to throw their body upon the machine. We just need to pull together, commit to meaningful change, and follow through.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f5d48d5ab558" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Seven tips on writing journal articles]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AlasdairRoberts/seven-tips-on-writing-journal-articles-bb5f6da2a8fb?source=rss-46cc38c581a9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bb5f6da2a8fb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[journal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[academia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[writing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alasdair Roberts]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Apr 2018 13:12:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-01T13:12:28.855Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>I wrote this column while serving as co-editor of the journal </em>Governance<em> from 2009 to 2017. It was revised for an editor’s panel at the research conference of the Public Management Research Association in Minneapolis, MN on June 13, 2015. The general advice on writing a journal article still holds, but any references to the editorial preferences of </em>Governance<em> may not be accurate. Contact the current editorial team for advice on that topic.</em></p><p><em>Governance </em>welcomes scholarship on public policy, institutions and administration that is timely and relevant to its readership, which is comprised of scholars and professionals around the world. Here are seven pieces of advice to authors interested in submitting manuscripts to the journal:</p><p><em>1. Understand the aims of the journal.</em> <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291468-0491/homepage/ProductInformation.html">Look at recent issues</a>. And <a href="http://visitor.r20.constantcontact.com/manage/optin?v=001kkqO0FxDKZR_D4t72Z9LgN3wCwS7jtyDeuroIef2rk-yO6HUvtCK8IzI1WpGMjN_P06WPXrbacm_lyhMzGDSI7n5U5uyWlmJAHdy9FgUHAA%3D">subscribe to our monthly newsletter</a>. Consider whether your manuscript fits with the interests of our readers. For example, we don’t publish articles on corporate governance.</p><p><em>2. Make your case directly</em>. This might be the most important piece of advice! Many papers fail in the review process simply because it is not clear what the author is trying to say. Successful manuscripts capture the attention of editors and reviewers. They do this by developing a claim or finding that is novel and important, and presenting that claim clearly and directly. Authors have three opportunities to present their claim within the first three pages of their manuscript:</p><ul><li>The title should signal, so far as possible within twelve words, what the main claim or finding is.</li><li>The same is true of the abstract. Make sure that the main claim is stated at the start of the abstract, not at the end.</li><li>The whole argument should be outlined once again within the introduction to the paper, which generally should not be longer than two pages. Never finish an introduction by saying that “conclusions will be discussed in a final section of this paper.” Tell the reader what the conclusions are, and why they matter. A strong introduction conveys the main claim or finding at its start, not its end.</li></ul><p><em>3. Remember that journal writing is a form of technical or business writing</em>. Journal articles are different than books. There is no room for circumlocution or ornamental prose. Use plain language, and excise any words or passages that are not immediately relevant to the argument. (See George Orwell’s <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2013/07/george-orwell-writing">six rules for writing</a>.) In each section of the paper, begin by telling readers what you intend to argue in that section. Never exceed the overall limit of 9,000 words, including all elements of the paper.</p><p><em>4. Understand the editorial constraints.</em> <em>Governance</em> publishes twenty-four research articles a year. If too many articles are accepted for publication, then the delay in publishing articles grows longer. At the moment, the delay for print publication is about fourteen months. We don’t want the queue of accepted papers to get longer. That means that we must think carefully about the number of submissions that are sent out for review. <em>Governance</em> receives almost three hundred submissions a year. About seventy percent are not sent out for review. Many of these papers fit with the journal’s interests, but are not as compelling as others that have been sent to us. Today, we return submissions that would have been accepted for review a few years ago. We make decisions on whether to send submissions out for review within two or three days of their receipt. Otherwise, it usually takes about eight weeks to obtain reviews for a manuscript, although there is substantial variation in review time.</p><p><em>5. Recognize the effect of globalization</em>. There is an acronym often used by defense and intelligence agencies that can be used in our work as well: AUSCANZUKUS. It stands for Australia-Canada-New Zealand-United Kingdom-United States. These countries, along with western European nations, account for a disproportionate number of articles published in <em>Governance</em> and other journals. By contrast, there are a number of populous countries (such as China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and the Philippines, which together account for half of the global population) whose immense governance challenges have not received adequate attention in the pages of our journal. Like other journals, <em>Governance </em>is trying to address this imbalance. This has an important implication for western European and AUSCANZUKUS authors. It means that there is less space for articles that deal narrowly with governance questions in those regions. Where possible, the broader relevance of arguments must be established. And the standards for judging the importance of articles have also been raised. All other considerations being equal, an article that examines an incremental reform within an high-performing public service in Europe or America must be given lower priority than a paper addressing more fundamental problems of governance within a larger developing country.</p><p><em>6. Topics to avoid</em>. With experience, it is possible to identify some subjects that rarely do well in the review process:</p><ul><li>Papers that propose a new framework, theory or paradigm, without an empirical component demonstrating the superiority of that framework over existing models. Similarly, papers whose main purpose is to raise questions for further research, rather than answering one of those questions.</li><li>Papers whose main conclusion is that the implementation of reforms is complex and influenced by many political and bureaucratic considerations. Or papers whose main finding is that the diffusion or transfer of policies is complicated by domestic political and institutional factors. This is well-traveled territory. Something more must be shown than the fact of complication itself.</li><li>Econometric fishing expeditions. These are papers that conduct statistical analyses on a newly discovered dataset until significant findings are produced. The proper approach is to begin with a theory and then test it.</li><li>Papers that attempt to conduct statistical analyses using country-level governance indicators and other country-level measures as the dependent and independent variables. Reviewers usually raise concerns about the reliability of these indicators, and worry that the theories on which such high-level analyses are built are too simplistic.</li></ul><p><em>7. Handle rejection elegantly</em>. Editors and reviewers are well-intentioned scholars who have taken time to consider your work. If your manuscript is not accepted for review or publication, don’t take it as a personal affront. Don’t respond immediately to an email notifying you about an unfavorable decision. Take a day before you reply. Never question the good faith or competence of a reviewer. You can ask the editors to elaborate on their reasons for rejecting your submission. But also ask yourself why well-intentioned readers could not see the power of your argument.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bb5f6da2a8fb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The age of superstates]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AlasdairRoberts/the-age-of-superstates-4b89b651c217?source=rss-46cc38c581a9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4b89b651c217</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[international-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-administration]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alasdair Roberts]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Dec 2017 13:07:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-19T13:23:04.910Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0zIimDDDhQ1_pMrnvnXg9Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Imagine a single country as big as the whole world. What would it be like to govern that sort of superstate?</figcaption></figure><p>Imagine a single country as big as the whole world. Crowd the entire population of the planet within the borders of one state. Next, press them into cities. Teach them to read and explain their rights. Force them out of old forms of production and survival and into the marketplace. Give them technologies to move quickly and communicate instantly. Imagine the restless multitude that will have been created: always on the move, constantly colliding, bargaining, and fighting, perpetually shedding old ideas and inventing new ones, a murmuration of people on an unprecedented scale.</p><p>What would it be like to govern that sort of superstate? How would its leaders perform the most basic tasks — keeping the peace, promoting steady and equitable economic growth, assuring the rule of law? Indeed, could they perform these tasks at all? It is difficult to say: no one has experience in governing at such scale. The British Empire, the most expansive in history, ruled only a few hundred million people — and most of those were illiterate, trapped in small villages that were spread across great distances. Moreover, the Empire’s rulers did not have the same ambitions as those of a modern state. Their desire to know and control territory was more modest. They relied on proxies to uphold the status quo, and did little to help most of the people they governed. Famines and rebellions on the edges of empire did not threaten the survival of rulers in London.</p><p>A superstate is new because it involves the collision of two phenomenon. One is a change in the character of the governed population. Not only are there many more people: they are also more restless, as a result of urbanization, education, marketization, and technological change. The second phenomenon is a change in understandings about the role of the state. The modern state is expected to know and regulate its territory more rigorously than ever before, and to pursue a more ambitious set of goals, including the advancement of human rights. In short, the leaders of superstates face tougher conditions, as well as a higher standard of performance.</p><p>Superstates might not be exactly as big as the whole world, but they come close. In 2016, China had a population of 1.4 billion people — roughly the total world population in the late nineteenth century, and more than three times the population of the British Empire at its peak. In 2015, for the first time in history, most Chinese were urban dwellers: in fact, there are more in China today than there were in the entire world in 1950. Four out of five Chinese were illiterate in 1950, but today almost all can read and write — again, more literate adults than in the whole world in 1960. And they have access to much more advanced information and communication technologies. In the 1990s, before the advent of cellphones, there were roughly one billion fixed telephone subscriptions in the whole world: in 2016, there were 1.4 billion cellular phone subscriptions in China alone. The number of plane trips during China’s new year celebration equals the number taken in the whole world in an average month in 1984. The Chinese population is large, urbanized, marketized, connected, and mobile.</p><p>Small wonder that China’s leaders are obsessed with the risks of political and social instability. They are wrestling with the challenges of governing a superstate — and they are not alone. By 2050, the most populous country in the world will be India, not China: it will be home to more people (1.7 billion) than lived on the planet in the 1910s. Everything we have just said about China could be said about India too. Further behind will be Nigeria, the United States, and Indonesia, each with a third of a billion people, roughly equal to the British Empire at its peak. In 2050, more than forty percent of the world’s population will live in these five states, while sixty percent live in the other 190. Again, though, it is not simply the number of bodies that matters. It is also the extent of social activation. People will be jostling in cities, bargaining in markets, and moving, talking, and writing more than ever before. Population plus activation will create new headaches for the leaders of all these countries.</p><p>The United States might be an unusual case. It was the prototype superstate. In 1920 it was not the most populous country in the West — that was Russia. But the American population was literate, urbanized, marketized, and connected. This period of American history is remembered as one of unusual ferment and instability. Critics said that the country was adrift and at risk of collapse. In the two decades that followed World War II, American leaders thought they had it all sorted out. They felt that they were in charge of public affairs. But this feeling of control broke down after the 1970s. Today, American leaders are again struggling to achieve mastery, just as they did a century ago. The American people are wired, in both senses of the term: tightly connected and edgy. There is a sense that societal cohesion is breaking down, that the economy is too mercurial to be regulated in the public interest. At a basic level, American leaders still struggle to understand exactly what is going on within a population of one-third of a billion people.</p><p>This will be the predicament of all superstates for the rest of this century. Leaders will try to understand and influence social and economic systems of unprecedented scale, complexity, and dynamism. They confront severe internal strains — divisions between sections, classes, faiths, regions, and nations. Leaders will face choices: Should they centralize or devolve authority? Celebrate diversity or demand uniformity? Tolerate or crack down on resistance? Grant freedoms or undertake intensive, technology-driven surveillance? We already see leaders of the five superstates wrestling with these choices.</p><p>The emergence of superstates will also change international politics. It not just the old game of great power politics, but with new players. Superstates behave differently. Their relations with other states are shaped by the distinctive character of their internal affairs. Because each superstate is, in a sense, a world unto itself, it may be more tempting to shut out the rest of the planet with a policy of isolationism. Or leaders may stoke international conflict as they try to build internal unity on the basis of “civilizational” distinctiveness. More generally, we should expect that the foreign policy of superstates will be driven, to an unusual degree, by the need to counter the entropic tendencies of internal affairs.</p><p>The international order is constantly mutating. Little more than a century has passed since the end of the age of imperialism. Then came decolonization and the golden age of sovereign states. In the 1990s, however, states no longer seemed to be the building blocks of international politics. We talked about post-Westphalianism, neo-medievalism, global governance, and the borderless world. But reports of the death of the state, and of the post-World War II state-system, were premature. In fact, we are entering the age of superstates. It is impossible to say how long it will last. In 1900, it seemed as though the great European empires would endure forever, but they were gone within two generations. Superstates might collapse just as quickly, if their leaders do not invent strategies for coping with extraordinary new realities.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4b89b651c217" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Four challenges to the open society]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AlasdairRoberts/four-challenges-to-the-open-society-92ae38489408?source=rss-46cc38c581a9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/92ae38489408</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[transparency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alasdair Roberts]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Sep 2017 21:16:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-19T21:18:39.922Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yHycYWW652Hd6TSK28ww1Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>States are heading into a long period of rough weather. This will make leaders more hostile to policies that are essential for open societies to thrive.</figcaption></figure><p><em>Text for a </em><a href="https://icic2017open.org/agenda/"><em>keynote address at the International Conference of Information Commissioners</em></a><em>, Manchester, September 20, 2017</em></p><p>It’s a pleasure to speak to this, the fifteenth International Conference of Information Commissioners. I also had the honor of addressing the fifth conference in Wellington, New Zealand in November 2007. This caused me to look back at the news in November 2007:</p><p>The Federal Reserve promised that there would be “no recession in the United States in the foreseeable future.” Central bankers said that “the U.S. economy had proved quite resilient” and predicted the effects of a recent downturn in the housing sector would be “modest.”</p><p>All was calm in politics as well. The Gallup Poll reported that Hilary Clinton was likely to win the Democratic nomination for president and defeat the Republican candidate, Rudy Giuliani, in the 2008 presidential election.</p><p>Meanwhile in Britain, a writer for the Guardian suggested that Britain’s new prime minister, Gordon Brown, would win an unprecedented fourth consecutive term for the Labour government. His predecessor, Tony Blair, was “heavyweight favorite” to become the first full-time president of the European Council, after the just-signed Lisbon Treaty went into effect in January 2009.</p><p>It was still possible to be upbeat about democracy and transparency in the autumn of 2007. Political scientists reported that the number of democratic states had tripled since the 1970s. Experts predicted that China would also move toward democracy within one or two decades.</p><p>In fact, China has just published a national freedom of information regulation in 2007. Thirty-five other countries also adopted national FOI rules over the preceding decade. In 2007, most of the world’s population lived in countries with national FOI rules.</p><p>In Britain, the FOI law was less than two years old. Prime Minister Brown described it as “landmark legislation” and promised to provide “the freest possible flow of information between government and the people.”</p><p>This quick trip down memory lane reminds us about how quickly the world can change, and also how much the world actually has changed over the last decade. I want to talk about the nature of those changes, and changes likely to come, and the implications for people who care about information rights.</p><p>As I’ve already noted, there was great progress on governmental openness in the 1990s and early 2000s. In retrospect, though, people who cared about openness had the advantage of very favorable conditions:</p><ul><li>The world was largely at peace. The cold war had ended. Some people thought that competition between great powers was a thing of the past. In the advanced democracies, crime rates were declining. The number of terror attacks was dropping as well.</li><li>The world was also prospering. After years of stagnation and confusion in the 1970s and 1980s, growth revived in much of the world in the 1990s. China and India set themselves on the path toward free markets and rapid growth.</li><li>As I’ve already noted, this was also a good time for democracy and human rights. Some scholars even wrote about the “triumph of Western liberalism.”</li><li>Finally: we seemed to be living in an era of open borders. The flow of goods, money and people between countries increased dramatically. Some people suggested that the era of the nation-state was over, that national governments simply did not matter much anymore.</li></ul><p>Under such conditions, it was relatively easy for national leaders to be generous in adopting laws that favored openness. They could afford to be relaxed. Leaders did not see any major threats to the safety or prosperity of their states.</p><p>Clearly, circumstances changed after 2008. The world found itself more difficult and dangerous terrain. Indeed, there are some people who have been deeply alarmed by this. They worry that the centuries-long project of advancing democracy and human rights is in great jeopardy.</p><p>I take a more temperate position. We are not facing the end of the world. We need to recognize that the period of the late 1990s and early 2000s was unusual by historical standards. Now we are returning to a period that is difficult but not unprecedented. We are returning to an era of politics as usual.</p><p>That is a kind of politics in which policymakers worry constantly about threats to security and prosperity. As a result, they are skeptical about many policies that are critical to the health of an open society. This means we must be prepared be fight vigorously in defense of openness in coming years.</p><p>I will be reckless and make a prediction about four major threats that policymakers will be preoccupied with in the next few decades.</p><p>The first is terrorism. Some people say that we are in the midst of an unprecedented global epidemic of terrorism. This is not quite right. There were two similar surges in international terrorism in the twentieth century. And it is not exactly an epidemic. In the US and western Europe, the number of terror attacks is still lower than in the 1970s.</p><p>Having said this, terror attacks pose an obvious threat to openness. One aim of such attacks is to provoke an over-reaction. Too often, politicians take the bait: by declaring states of emergency or all-out wars against terrorism, unduly increasing the power of security agencies, expanding surveillance, tightening border controls, and casting suspicion on minority groups.</p><p>The second challenge is the revival of competition between great powers. Recent news has emphasized growing tensions between the United States and Russia or North Korea. This is a distraction from the bigger problem, which is rising tensions between the United States and China. The Chinese economy is already ten times larger than Russia’s. Chinese leaders are using their new-found wealth to expand their military and global influence, just as the United States itself did a century ago.</p><p>The revival of great power tensions could threaten openness in several ways. We have already seen signs of a revival the “garrison mentality” that shaped American policy in the early years of the Cold War. This means a renewed military buildup, fears about the infiltration and subversion of American institutions, and a drive to tighten controls over the flows of people, goods and money between countries.</p><p>The third challenge is economic inequality that is driven by automation and the advent of jobless economic growth. We could handle this challenge by a reinvention of policies on work, income and social benefits. But there are skeptics who worry that we will follow a darker path, by accepting inequality as a reality and building walls between the rich and poor. This would be a world of gated communities, zero-tolerance policing, and restricted public services. In this world, democratic institutions would be curtailed so that the poor cannot demand their fair share.</p><p>The fourth and final challenge is climate change. As the headlines already show, we are heading into an era of extreme weather events, rising sea levels, conflict over access to fresh water, pandemics, and forced migrations.</p><p>Again, the question is how we shall handle this. We could avoid the worst effects by planning ahead. Pessimists think that we will lapse into a pattern of crisis government. Power would be concentrated within the executive branch as leaders stumble from one disaster to another. Police and military forces would be built up to maintain internal peace. Rich countries would tighten border controls to block migration and the spread of disease. And as international order breaks down, rich countries would engage more frequently in military action abroad to preserve access to oil and other resources.</p><p>You will see a common thread. We have four challenges that could provoke similar responses, if handled badly. These responses include the buildup of executive power, stronger and more autonomous security agencies, more pervasive surveillance and social control, restriction of civil liberties and social opportunities, reinforcement of borders and internal walls, and cultivation of mutual suspicion and distrust.</p><p>It is also important to recognize that we will be dealing with these four challenges <em>at the same time</em>. As a result, there will a temptation to handle all four problems in similar ways. A government that talks tough about one of these problems is more likely to talk tough about the others as well. There is a risk that we will see the emergence of a new conventional wisdom, a new zeitgeist, that is preoccupied with order and social control.</p><p>This new zeitgeist could do real damage to the ideal of the open society. The possible responses that I have described are generally hostile to the free flow of people and ideas, and to movements that challenge the status quo. These are also responses that reinforce the power of the state. I doubt that anyone will write another book about the death of the nation-state in the next twenty years.</p><p>It is not inevitable that politics should unfold in this way. Leaders and citizens can choose to go one way or another. We are going to be engaged in a long battle over big ideas, and the outcome of that battle will determine the shape of laws and institutions. Advocates of openness need to make the case for policies that preserve the ideal of the open society.</p><p>We will want to make three critical points. The first is the need to respect human rights. Of course, national security and public order are important. But we should not surrender those conditions that make life worth living.</p><p>The second point is that tradeoffs between security and openness are often avoidable. It is possible to maintain societies that are secure <em>and </em>open through careful planning, and policies that are measured and deliberate. Without planning, leaders are more likely to engage in impulsive and extreme policies.</p><p>The third point appeals to the self-interest of political leaders. In an important sense, openness is essential to security. We want to build societies that are resilient and in the long-run, that have the capacity to adjust fluidly to rapidly changing circumstances. This kind of long-run adaptability is only possible if we encourage the flow of people and the interchange of ideas. Closed societies, societies that concentrate power, build walls, and cultivate distrust, are stable in the short run but brittle in the long run.</p><p>Now let me perform my obligation, as a Canadian, of forcing some Canadian content into this talk. 2017 is a year of anniversaries. It is the 150th anniversary of the founding of two countries, Canada and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The question in 1867: which one would survive? The smart money was on Austria-Hungary. Why? Because the emperor was strong enough to maintain order, while the Canadian central government was weak. Obviously, the pundits were wrong in the long-run. One system was flexible enough to survive, while the other was not. We can draw a similar lesson from the Soviet Union, which would have celebrated its 100th anniversary this October, had it not collapsed after a desperate grasp for glasnost and perestroika.</p><p>All of this might seem abstract. There is a temptation to focus on the details of laws and regulations and how they are implemented. But the success or failure of policies often depends on the larger public mood. We already see many intellectuals and politicians making the argument that our societies have become too open, that we actually suffer from too much transparency. This campaign against openness is likely to intensify in coming years. We must be prepared for this. We will need to explain how openness is essential, not just to advance human welfare, but to assure the long-term resilience of states themselves.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=92ae38489408" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Time for a new approach to PA]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AlasdairRoberts/time-for-a-new-approach-to-pa-39c0ac874c46?source=rss-46cc38c581a9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/39c0ac874c46</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-administration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alasdair Roberts]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 23 Jul 2017 15:45:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-07-23T15:45:58.407Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is the draft preface for </em>Statecrafting: A New Approach to Public Administration<em>, under contract with Cornell University Press.</em></p><p>The academic discipline known as Public Administration is about one hundred years old in the United States. People sometimes say that it is older, pointing to an essay on the study of administration published by Woodrow Wilson in 1887, but that is not quite right. The first self-styled school of Public Administration was established in 1922 and the first textbook in Public Administration, written by Leonard White of the University of Chicago, was published in 1926. Wilson’s essay did not get much attention until the 1930s, when professors invented a history for their new field that conveniently included a contribution from a well-regarded two-term president.</p><p>The first generation of scholars and practitioners in Public Administration was closely tied to a movement in American politics known as Progressivism, which coalesced in the 1890s and gained strength over the next two decades. American society was convulsed in many ways during these years: by the emergence of big industries and cities, rising inequality and labor unrest, changes in the volume and pattern of immigration, extraordinary technological advances, and shifts in the international balance of power. American politics was colored by hope and fear: by the belief that great social progress was possible, but also the worry that events would spiral out of control. Government institutions that were designed for a simpler time did not seem equal to the new realities. Progress, it was argued, depended upon a complete reconstruction of the old order.</p><p>The Progressive movement faltered in the 1920s, as the United States enjoyed a short period of peace and prosperity. But the Progressive philosophy gained new strength in the 1930s and 1940s, as the global economy crashed, the European peace of 1919 collapsed, and the Cold War with the Soviet Union began. American democracy was tested severely in competition with fascist and communist rivals. Again, survival seemed to hinge on an overhaul of the “antique machinery” of American government.</p><p>The field of Public Administration was invented to help with this overhaul. Scholars viewed themselves as architects of a renewed American state. They defined their responsibilities broadly. Researchers looked at the overall structure of the executive branch, as well as the management of individual offices within it; at military as well as civilian agencies; and all three branches of government — legislative and judicial as well as executive. Their work was imbued with a sense of history. They believed that they had joined in a long-running project: “a process of continual creation, an unceasing invention of forms to meet constantly changing needs.” And they were acutely aware of what could happen if they stumbled: social chaos, military defeat, and the end of the American experiment in self-rule. “The stakes are beyond price,” Leonard White warned in the 1939 edition of his influential textbook on Public Administration. If democratic government failed, “an autocratic alternative may await the opportunity to seize power.”</p><p>That was eighty years ago. Three generations of scholars have worked in the field of Public Administration since then. The boundaries and priorities of the field have changed significantly — because of changing societal conditions, fashions within the scholarly community, and the seizure of terrain by other disciplines. For the last forty years, the tendency within the field of Public Administration has been to focus more narrowly on problems of management within public agencies. For example, researchers examine the challenges of defining agency goals, implementing policies efficiently, motivating staff, coordinating among agencies, and measuring results. This is sometimes called the “Public Management approach.” It is so popular that some people think it has supplanted Public Administration entirely. Today, many scholars identify themselves as experts in Public Management instead.</p><p>The rise of the Public Management approach makes sense as a response to societal conditions in the United States and other advanced democracies in the last three decades of the twentieth century. This was the era of the “welfare state” and the “regulatory state.” (Definitions of these two concepts are provided in the appendix.) Governments provided more benefits to citizens and intruded more extensively in social and economic affairs. The cost of government increased substantially. But the experts who designed these programs were too optimistic about their effectiveness. Many programs failed to produce the expected results. Meanwhile, citizens balked at higher taxes. Liberals who did not want to abandon these new initiatives had to find ways of making them “work better and cost less.”<a href="#_edn4">[iv]</a> This was the problem that the Public Management approach was intended to solve.</p><p>The Public Management approach has blind spots. There are subjects once examined by researchers in Public Administration that are largely overlooked by researchers in Public Management. For example, Public Management scholars do not pay much attention to parts of government that are engaged in international diplomacy, defense and intelligence, and law enforcement. They are less interested in top-level planning, organization, and control — what used to be known as “overall executive management.” Government-wide systems for managing people, money and other resources tend to be neglected. So, too, are problems in the running of elections, the management of legislatures, and the administration of courts.</p><p>To put it another way, Public Management scholars take certain fundamental features of government for granted. They assume the existence of an infrastructure that maintains public order and protects government officials from assault; generates laws that are regarded by the public as legitimate; collects taxes and distributes the proceeds to agencies; prevents corruption and nepotism in the bureaucracy; and enforces the commands that are made by agencies. Because this infrastructure exists, and disposes of all the basic problems of agency life, Public Management scholars can focus on more advanced problems, such as performance measurement and employee motivation.</p><p>There are other ways in which the Public Management approach differs from the approach that dominated Public Administration in its early years. Public Management scholars tend not to take a long or broad view of the field. Research is construed as a search for definitive solutions to technical problems of agency management, rather than an exploration of the long-running and never-completed task of renovating institutions to suit new societal conditions. At the same time, the feeling of peril and fragility has dissipated. The stakes are not perceived to be “beyond price,” as Leonard White said in 1939. The worst consequences that are imagined in the Public Management approach are the death of agencies, not societal disorder and collapse.</p><p>Certainly, there are advantages to the Public Management approach. Smaller problems are easier to study. And at the time — that is, the in the waning years of the twentieth century — there was a clear demand for advice on how to make public agencies work better and cost less. But the approach also has weaknesses. For example, the tendency to neglect the security sector of government (defense, intelligence, counterintelligence, and public order) is odd, especially at the highest level of American government, where security-related agencies employ two-thirds of the workforce. Security concerns have dominated the debate over the role of government in the United States since the terror attacks of 2001.</p><p>A larger difficulty is the inability of scholars to explain why governmental responsibilities are changing, and how they are likely to change in the future. This can be done well only by studying larger societal trends and understanding how they influence the role and design of government. Without this sort of knowledge, history unfolds as a series of surprises — a sequence of unexpected crises that compel an ad hoc response by government leaders and bureaucrats. By stepping back, by taking the long and broad view, scholars, can see patterns in history. They are less likely to be caught entirely off-guard by events like the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the financial crisis of 2008, or the droughts of 2012–2015. They can draw on experience from previous crises to inform their response to current events. And they make predictions about the kinds of shocks that are likely to be experienced in the future.</p><p>A third difficulty is in inability of scholars in Public Administration to make useful contributions to public debate at those moments when the conventional wisdom about the role of government is being reconsidered. These moments of “paradigm shift” seem to arrive about every thirty or forty years. In fact, the discipline of Public Administration could be construed as the product of one of these moments, the Progressive era. There was another shift toward the “neoliberal state” in the 1970s. (See appendix for a definition.) And there is another paradigm shift underway today. The central question in these transformational moments is what the role of government ought to be. But there are important adjunct questions: what <em>can</em> government do competently, and how should it be organized to perform new tasks? These big questions about the role and structure of government once fell squarely in the domain of Public Administration. They were shunted to the side in the era of Public Management.</p><p>Yet another difficulty relates to the neglect of the infrastructure of government — those bedrock institutions and systems that are largely taken for granted in the United States and other wealthy democracies. There are many other countries in which this administrative infrastructure is not taken for granted. These are sometimes referred to as “fragile states.” (See appendix for a definition.) There are several indices of state fragility, which show that most of the world’s states are fragile. Stable systems like the United States are the exception, not the rule. This implies that the Public Management approach also has little to say about main governance problems of most countries. It relevance is bounded because of the things it takes for granted. This was not true of the field of Public Administration in the United States in its first two decades. At that time, scholars viewed the United States itself as a fragile state. The problems that concerned American experts in the 1930s were essentially the same as confronting war-torn and post-colonial countries in the late 1940s and 1950s.</p><p>There is reason to question whether it is wise to take this infrastructure for granted in the United States and other wealthy democracies. In the United States, there are many signs that the infrastructure decaying. Experts complain about the decline in respect for public institutions, gridlock in the legislative process, the breakdown of anti-corruption laws, and even about the breakdown of public order. In 2017 the Fund for Peace, which publishes the influential Fragile States Index, observed a worrying decline in social and political cohesion in the United States and a few other advanced democracies. Can public institutions be overhauled to counter this trend? This was precisely the question that Public Administration scholars sought to answer in the 1930s and 1940s. But is not a question that is either posed or answered in the Public Management approach.</p><p>Time moves on and circumstances change. The approach to research that dominated the field of Public Administration in the late twentieth century does not fit well with societal conditions of the early twenty-first century. We need a new approach, a new way of thinking about the domain of Public Administration. The new approach ought to be useful in identifying the larger trends that drive the evolution of government, so that scholars can avoid surprises and see recurrent patterns in the development of public institutions. This new approach ought to useful in analyzing fundamental questions about the role and design of government — those questions that once seemed settled, but which are moving to the foreground once again. Ideally, the approach should also be expansive enough to accommodate the realities of poor as well as rich countries. It should be useful in thinking about state fragility — the common condition of most countries in the world — and how it can be reduced.</p><p>The purpose of this short book is to outline a new approach to Public Administration which achieves these objectives. In some ways, it revives concepts that were familiar to the first generation of Public Administration scholars. It also borrows concepts from other disciplines — political science, law, history, and sociology — in which scholars address similar questions, sometimes adapting those concepts to meet the needs of researchers in Public Administration. At a few points, some new ideas are proposed to mortar together concepts that have been revived, borrowed and adapted. The aim is not to provide an exhaustive review of all the scholarly literature that might be connected to the proposed new approach. This would be an impossible task, and the final product would be unreadable. The aim, instead, is to provide a useful sketch of a new framework, and to show how it shines light on previously neglected questions.</p><p>This new approach is not intended as a substitute for the Public Management approach. Rather, it is a complement to existing frameworks and methods. In the discipline of Economics, there is a generally accepted distinction between research on systemic questions (macroeconomics) and research on smaller questions about the activity of firms and households (microeconomics). In Political Science, scholars make a similar distinction between research on regimes and research on political behavior; in History, between research on the long-term development of social structures and the short-term unfolding of events. We could go on. Many fields recognize the need for tools that allow them to address big questions as well as small questions about human activity. At the moment, Public Administration lacks a comparable facility. It is good at addressing small questions but not big ones. This book is a first step toward fixing that defect.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=39c0ac874c46" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[100 days: A dangerous benchmark]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/statecrafting-journal/lets-end-the-hundred-days-2d74edee509?source=rss-46cc38c581a9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2d74edee509</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[2016-election]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-administration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trump-presidency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alasdair Roberts]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 20 Apr 2017 00:53:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-04-23T21:45:43.883Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*O3icOg4rb4RYDpYqnnCf8Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>“The first hundred days” is an arbitrary and dangerous way of judging presidential performance.</figcaption></figure><p><em>Alasdair Roberts</em></p><p>April 29th marks the one hundredth day of the Trump presidency. The media will be deluged with assessments about what Donald Trump accomplished — or didn’t — during his first one hundred days. But this an outmoded and dangerous way to think about presidential performance.</p><p>Today, the 100-day benchmark is deeply embedded in American political culture. During the presidential race, both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton made grandiose promises about what they would accomplish in their first hundred days in office. (Clinton promised the biggest jobs program since World War II.) The media has kept a steady watch on triumphs and setbacks as well. Cable news networks have used “first 100 days” chyrons and countdown clocks for the last several weeks.</p><p>Blame for setting this benchmark is usually put on Franklin Delano Roosevelt. At his inauguration in March 1933, FDR promised bold action to address the “national emergency” of the Great Depression. FDR himself didn’t say anything about 100 days. By the end of June, however, his allies were boasting about the administration’s accomplishments. Senator Clarence Dill bragged that “these first 100 days of Roosevelt will be known in history as the greatest peaceful revolution in the annals of organized government.”</p><p>Still, that wasn’t enough to fix “100 days” in America’s political consciousness. For the next quarter century, it didn’t matter much at all. The Truman administration tried to recreate the urgency of 1933 without success. Most people recognized that FDR had been given unusual leeway because he faced an extraordinary crisis. Dwight Eisenhower also faced a few “100 days” appraisals in 1953. But pundits still refused to get on the bandwagon. “It’s just a relic of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration,” one wrote. “Actually 100 days is too little time in which to size up any administration.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aKnocO5BDNAn3A1pcVEezg.png" /><figcaption>Google Ngram charting showing frequency of usage of “first hundred days” in its corpus of works in American English.</figcaption></figure><p>The 100-day benchmark really gained traction after 1959, when the Harvard historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. published the second volume of his history of the FDR years. The book converted the first months of FDR’s presidency into a myth. Schlesinger called that period “The Hundred Days” — a time of “intense drama and prodigious legislation.” Schlesinger was a key advisor to John F. Kennedy, whose campaign seized on the idea of recreating FDR’s moment of glory. One veteran of the Kennedy administration recalled the prevailing mood after JFK’s election: “We’ve got to make the first hundred days impressive. We’ve got to do a lot of things fast and differently.”</p><p>The political scientist Richard Neustadt, who had worked for Truman, warned Kennedy against setting unreasonable expectations. But the effort was futile. The benchmark became fixed in everyday conversation about national politics. “The Hundred Days,” one columnist explained in 1961, “are any President’s grand opportunity to create the atmosphere for himself to establish leadership.” Over the next half-century, presidents wrestled with the 100-day standard. If they did not adopt it themselves, others imposed it on them.</p><p>However, there are good reasons to be skeptical about the 100-day benchmark. FDR faced truly extraordinary conditions. He won the 1932 election in a landslide, while Democrats won solid majorities in both house of Congress. People were desperate for strong leadership. Some even played with the idea of dictatorship. Few disagreed when Roosevelt compared the economic emergency to a state of war. Under those circumstances, people weren’t fussy about whether the content of federal policies was exactly right. They were happy to see the government do anything. “The country demands bold experimentation,” Roosevelt said during the campaign. “Above all, try something.”</p><p>No president after FDR has faced similar conditions. As a matter of practical politics, no later president has enjoyed such an immense political mandate, or led a nation that was so hungry for strong leadership. And as a matter of policy, no later president has faced such a simple playing field. FDR wasn’t worried about overhauling established policies and bureaucracies. He had a blank slate, and anything he might do seemed better than doing nothing at all.</p><p>The world is different today. Both politics and policies are more complex. And yet we persist in revering the myth of The Hundred Days. This isn’t just unfortunate: it’s dangerous. It causes presidents and legislators to overload the short-term agenda, and leads them into debacles like the attempt to repeal and replace Obamacare. President Trump should have allowed more time for an overhaul of the complicated healthcare law. But Trump had already added this to his extensive list of 100-day promises. The rush — and eventual failure — has aggravated the public’s disillusionment and its perception that Washington is thoroughly dysfunctional.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/738/1*tV5IQ-yDLkpU97UAYNG_FA.png" /><figcaption><a href="http://www.gallup.com/poll/208640/majority-no-longer-thinks-trump-keeps-promises.aspx?g_source=Politics&amp;g_medium=newsfeed&amp;g_campaign=tiles">Gallup Poll data</a> on perceptions of President Trump’s performance.</figcaption></figure><p>We ought to be especially wary about the 100-day benchmark today. In an era of political polarization, rushing to action is a bad idea. Not only is it unlikely to be successful. As we have seen since November, it also stokes anxiety within the large bloc of voters who happen to be on the losing side of an election. It heightens their fear that everything they care about is in immediate danger.</p><p>In 1787, the drafters of the Constitution debated how long the President’s term should be. They settled on four years for good reason. As Alexander Hamilton explained, presidents need time to make and execute well-crafted plans. The 100-day benchmark undermines that logic. Maybe it made sense at one special moment in history, when rapid action was key to national recovery. Today, the 100-day marker doesn’t bring the country together. It drives the nation apart.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2d74edee509" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/statecrafting-journal/lets-end-the-hundred-days-2d74edee509">100 days: A dangerous benchmark</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/statecrafting-journal">Statecrafting online</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Roosevelt’s “dictatorship plan”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/statecrafting-journal/roosevelts-dictatorship-plan-7b7092c1d8b5?source=rss-46cc38c581a9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7b7092c1d8b5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[supreme-court]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alasdair Roberts]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Jan 2017 21:21:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-02T21:43:08.198Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*x9z_VM3ePbn5bsDbciGHfw.jpeg" /><figcaption>“President Roosevelt asked congress today for almost unlimited power to give the executive branch of the federal government the most complete reorganization since its founding — the right to mold 100 different agencies into 12 major departments under direct control of the White House.” — United Press, January 12, 1937.</figcaption></figure><h3>FDR’s “dictatorship plan”</h3><p><em>Alasdair Roberts</em></p><p>In January 1937, Franklin D. Roosevelt was beginning his fifth year as U.S. president. His first term had been grueling, as the administration improvised a response to the country’s unprecedented “national emergency.”<br>He had been assailed by critics for trampling on rights and creating an unmanageable sprawl of new federal agencies. But now, three months after an election that he took as vindication, the president’s mood lightened. He told friends that he had earned some political capital, and he was going to spend it.</p><p>On January 12, 1937, Roosevelt stunned Washington by announcing a sweeping plan to reorganize the executive branch. He wanted to create two new departments for social welfare and public works; merge all the existing independent regulatory agencies into the executive departments; weaken the General Accounting Office; abolish the Civil Service Commission; give himself the power to move bureaus among departments; and expand the White House staff.</p><p>This was a carefully calculated play for enhanced executive power. A team of specialists had worked for months on the scheme, huddled in a suite a few blocks from the White House. They were warned to say nothing about their work before the election. The plan hinged on the claim that the framers of the Constitution wanted “a single responsible Chief Executive” running the federal bureaucracy. For years, Roosevelt’s supporters complained, presidential authority had been “nibbled away” by Congress.</p><p>For many Democrats on Capitol Hill, though, it was the foulest medicine that Roosevelt had ever asked them to swallow. And three weeks later, on Feb. 6, it got worse. Roosevelt asked Congress to approve a bill prepared in “deepest secrecy” by Justice Department lawyers. It would allow Roosevelt to expand the Supreme Court from nine to 15 justices, if the sitting ones refused to resign at age 70. This was a direct assault on an aging court that had repeatedly stymied New Deal polices during Roosevelt’s first term.</p><p>Louis Brownlow, the University of Chicago-based adviser who spearheaded the reorganization plan, feared that it would provoke the “dictatorship school of critics.” He was right. Opponents of the president, led by Frank Gannett’s National Committee to Uphold Constitutional Government and the Rev. Charles Coughlin, the radio priest, organized a broad campaign against the proposals. They called it a plan for “one-man rule” and “authoritarian government.” Virginia Senator Harry F. Byrd was one of many Democrats aghast at the president’s attack on the constitutional order. Editorialists across the country railed against Roosevelt’s “Dictatorship Plan.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*e3o5oIOWt1VUfPy5TEE9Wg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Albany News, March 1, 1937</figcaption></figure><p>FDR, stunned by the attacks, issued an extraordinary statement from his retreat at Warm Springs, Georgia. “I have no inclination to be a dictator,” he told reporters. “I have none of the qualifications which would make me a successful dictator.” Congress was skeptical. The court-packing scheme was rejected in August 1937, while the reorganization plan died eight months later.</p><p>Historian William Leuchtenburg says it was the worst rebuff from Congress that Roosevelt suffered in 12 years as president. Scarcely two years after his triumph in the 1936 election, Roosevelt’s political capital was substantially diminished. The Democrats lost six Senate seats and 71 House seats in the 1938 midterm elections.</p><p>This was a historic moment, signaling a return to normalcy after five years of crisis. “The New Deal has been halted,” said the New York Times’ Arthur Krock after the elections. “The average taxpayers of the country — the group which, for want of a better name, is called the `middle class’ — have restored the country’s two-party system.”</p><p><em>A version of this column was originally published by Bloomberg View in 2012.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7b7092c1d8b5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/statecrafting-journal/roosevelts-dictatorship-plan-7b7092c1d8b5">Roosevelt’s “dictatorship plan”</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/statecrafting-journal">Statecrafting online</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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