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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Alex Newhouse on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Alex Newhouse on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Alex Newhouse on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AlexBNewhouse?source=rss-16f60ae959a------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[I Learned How To Be Spiritual From Stephen Hawking]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AlexBNewhouse/i-learned-how-to-be-spiritual-from-stephen-hawking-b118c3d045fb?source=rss-16f60ae959a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[religion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Newhouse]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Mar 2018 03:58:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-15T03:58:09.724Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I saw a lot of people saying that the thought never crossed their minds that Stephen Hawking might one day die. He seemed immutable and untouchable, a constant in a world of shifting, tumultuous uncertainty. A beacon of compassionate intellectualism in an era of vindictive anti-intellectualism.</p><p>But a curious thing about Hawking was, I don’t even remember the last time I heard him speak. He was one of those people who you always knew was out there, plugging away, bringing us ever microscopically further in the infinite task of understanding the universe. But when he <em>did </em>show up, he was a force to be reckoned with, whether on John Oliver’s show, on <em>The Simpsons</em>, on a Discovery Channel special, or even just through his books.</p><p>I’m no particle physicist or theoretical cosmologist — I have less than no clue how to make sense of most of his academic work. But that man knew how to talk to all who have ever been curious. He saw to the heart of human inquisitiveness and spoke to that. Not to the audience of his academic peers, but to the audience of his human peers.</p><p>As a kid in early elementary school, I felt this subconsciously; hearing his words as my dad read <em>A Brief History of Time </em>and <em>A Universe in a Nutshell</em> left me both shaken to the core and more determined than ever before. Hawking’s genius was in conveying that which scientists know well — the sheer immensity and complexity and yet order of the universe — to those whose lives are focused on the here and now, who rarely if ever think about the fact that the twinkling light from the stars above is millions of years old. The mind-bending concepts of spacetime, subatomic particles, and relativity floored eight-year-old Alex’s brain, opening his eyes to a universe behind, above, below, <em>beyond </em>the narrow universe he had grown accustomed to inhabiting. Of course, eight-year-old Alex had no hope of wrapping his head around relativity any more than just to be able to yell “E=MC²” on the playground and have a vague notion of time dilation (eight-year-old Alex was that kid who talked about the twin paradox in his third-grade-class and had no idea what it meant).</p><p>But that is the beauty of Hawking’s work: he never presumed to expect you to understand all of what he’s saying. He simply wanted to spark your thought and allow it to expand out toward the nebulae and supernovae and colliding black holes that occupy the cosmos.</p><p>When I was in high school, angsty and anxious, I had a “grand awakening” in which I made a whole lot of noise about my “conversion” to atheism. The precipitating work was Richard Dawkins’ <em>The God Delusion, </em>definitely not a work of compassion or subtlety. That’s not to say I don’t respect Dawkins — I do — but he has a knack for being a pretentious jackass, something that high school junior Alex, feeling left out socially and angry at something I couldn’t pinpoint (my anxiety, it turns out), really loved. And thus I became that atheist who sucks to hang out with — constantly challenging friends’ beliefs, bringing up religion as a non-sequitur in basically any situation, ridiculing the beliefs of others that even dare lean toward the supernatural. Yeah, that Alex sucked.</p><p>But when I re-discovered Hawking, I found a teacher in compassionate atheism. He shows it’s good to encourage others to think beyond religion, but you do not have to denigrate them to do so. Nor should you. It is the height of closed-mindedness and anti-intellectualism to reject out-of-hand the very possibility of a creator. It’s probably not true — but you don’t have to be a jerk about it. Hawking helped show me that atheism opens up a new avenue of fulfillment, one that comes from the realization that the beauty of the universe is in that its own supreme being, of a sort. It was existentialism before I knew what existentialism is. And he also gave me a healthy dose of what I’d later know as absurdism, once I’d read Camus and Beckett.</p><p>“There probably is no heaven and no afterlife either,” he wrote. “We have this one life to appreciate the grand design of the universe, and for that I am extremely grateful.” This is the positive conception of atheism that I’d been missing: the reason to be an atheist is not that religion or the religious are awful, but that the universe gives you more contentment and meaning than any holy book or doctrine could. The stunning breadth, depth, and mystery of the cosmos is simultaneously terrifying and liberating. We are this tiny speck of nothing in the middle of a sea of violent fusion, dark matter, and colossal collisions. What better situation could we possibly hope for? We may be meaningless on a cosmic scale, but holy <em>crap </em>there’s a lot to study and learn about. Hawking’s work showed me that that right there is the epitome of spirituality. Feeling small but feeling the opportunity that the smallness brings, the liberation. Fatalism is the death of ambition and curiosity. Hawking helped me see the appeal of the chaotic, the immensity of cosmic existence, and the ultimate reality that my life’s meaning exists only in my mind. And that’s wonderful.</p><p>“God may exist, but science can explain the universe without the need for a creator.”</p><p>“It would not be much of a universe if it wasn’t home to the people you love.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b118c3d045fb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Story of Pirates and Populism]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AlexBNewhouse/a-story-of-pirates-and-populism-6ea9aee2d1c7?source=rss-16f60ae959a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[iceland]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pirate-party]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pcap]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Newhouse]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 May 2017 20:59:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-06-04T05:12:39.211Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 2008, the Icelandic economy collapsed. Years of economic liberalization implemented by the right-wing Independence Party and its coalition partners had created a dangerously over-inflated bubble economy. The three biggest private banks in Iceland, having enticed foreign investment through unusually high interest rates, had grown to be, together, ten times larger than Iceland’s gross domestic product. When the crisis hit, Iceland experienced the worst financial collapse relative to the size of the economy in world history.</p><p>In response to the crisis, citizens organized a political movement, the scale of which was never before seen in Iceland. In the space of less than a year, popular anger compelled the government to dissolve, snap elections were held, and, for the first time in decades, a left-wing coalition assumed power. Over the next nine years, this movement grew and shifted, spawning numerous radical reformist parties. In 2015–16, one party in particular — the Pirate Party — became the de facto symbol of the popular opposition, skyrocketing in public opinion polling until it was by far the most popular party in Iceland. It proceeded to win 10 seats out of 63 in Parliament in the October 2013 elections, becoming the third largest party. Measuring “success” primarily on the metrics of popular opinion and parliamentary seats won, the Icelandic Pirate Party has found more political success than many other populist<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> parties and every other Pirate Party throughout the world.</p><p>This paper explains the character and rise of this Icelandic populist movement and why, in the past three years, it has largely consolidated in support of the Pirate Party. I argue four main points: first, the specific nature of modern Icelandic populism has roots in the historical tension between liberal and conservative individualism in Iceland; second, the transformation of the parties initially into catch-all parties and then into a political cartel created a hegemonic political center; third, the economic crisis of 2008 caused a revolt against the Independence Party and catch-all and cartel politics<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a>; fourth, the Pirate Party emerged as the political leader of the populist movement because Pirate rhetoric, action, and organization specifically oppose the political system and support a radical integrationist form of politics.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/847/1*Zba3pAntIvIbZYYgo56DLA.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>The Origins of Iceland’s Political Divides</strong></p><p>The first permanent settlements in Iceland were founded on the rocky, volcanic, and cold island in about 800–900 A.D. by Vikings traveling from Norway.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> Across the land, these Vikings created farms and small communities led by chieftains. The communities varied in size, but each was its own sovereign entity. During this time, called the Settlement Age, no chieftain consolidated power as a king, and the island remained without a single leader.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a></p><p>Around 930 AD, these chieftains and their constituents realized that, as in any place where multiple bodies politic interact, Iceland needed some sort of cooperation mechanism. To prevent obliteration through war of the fragile settlements that had been scratched out of the volcanic dirt, the early communities had to find a way for peaceful conflict resolution and law enforcement. In this year, at Þingvellir, Icelanders came together for the first general assembly of the chieftains, called the Alþingi. Any free Icelandic man was permitted to attend, and the chieftains relied on winning their support for greater influence in the assembly. The Alþingi retained ultimate legislative and judicial power in Iceland until the Icelanders voluntarily ceded control to the Norwegian monarchy to regain stability during a time of chaotic conflict.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a></p><p>Following the transfer of Iceland from Norway to Denmark in 1380, the Danish crown gradually increased its power over Iceland. Full consolidation occurred in 1662, but until 1800 the Alþingi remained active in some form, albeit with limited power.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a> For Icelanders, the Alþingi was a constant reminder of their deep history of parliamentary self-determination. Yet until the nineteenth century, Icelanders were generally complacent and apathetic subjects to Danish rule, much due to the country’s destitution, low population, and the King’s inability or lack of desire to exert strict control over it.<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a> Icelanders did have a near-universal appreciation for political autonomy, even if this did not manifest in agitation for independence until much later.<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a> At this time, the social order was dominated by the landed elite who governed the peasant class — and they, not surprisingly, wished to retain the status quo and use the “social controls” to keep them on their land and to keep the peasants complacent.<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a></p><p>Two events occurred in close succession, however, that kickstarted the push for independence from the Danish crown. From 1783 to 1784, the Laki fissure erupted and covered the country in ash, subsequently killing upwards of 60 percent of livestock and causing a famine that killed up to 25 percent of the entire population of Iceland.<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a> Danish assistance was paltry and delayed.<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a> Then, in 1800, the Alþingi was finally abolished for the first time since its founding.<a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a> By the 1830s, the large communities of Icelandic academics studying in Denmark, influenced by Romanticism and political radicalism, began formulating ideas of Icelandic sovereignty and national identity. Responding to the precipitous decrease in Icelandic fortunes at the end of the eighteenth century, Icelandic writers and academics experienced an abrupt about-face: where only decades before had many praised the Danish king, in the 1830s the fault was shifted onto the foreign ruler: “World history has clearly proved that every nation has prospered the most when it has taken care of its own government,” nationalist Jón Sigurðsson declared in 1841, criticizing the elimination of the Alþingi in 1800.<a href="#_ftn13">[13]</a></p><p>Representative of the unique nature of the nationalist movement in Iceland, the jockeying for independence rarely, if ever, escalated into verbal attacks, and never manifested in violence. No disruptive, violent revolution appeared in Iceland; what grew instead was a consistent moderate nationalism that came to dominate politics. Even Sigurðsson himself, who became the leader of the movement, declined to endorse political revolt, in stark contrast to other continental European movements of the same time: “Let no one incite you to dishonor your officials, or to show them improper resistance; remember that officials are assigned to uphold the laws, and the one who shows them disrespect when they act in the name of the laws, disrespects the laws, but with laws the land shall be built up and by lawlessness, destroyed.”<a href="#_ftn14">[14]</a> Instead, Icelanders fought through peaceful means: through assembly, organization, and nationalistic writing. Icelandic nationalism advanced not so much as an overthrow of the Danish order but as an “organized retreat” by crown authorities.<a href="#_ftn15">[15]</a> Further, the landed elite often expressed dissatisfaction with Danish absolutism, but nonetheless looked to the state for stability and security, thus also preventing more revolutionary tactics from arising in the country.<a href="#_ftn16">[16]</a></p><p>The peasantry at this time was split between support for the nationalist conservatives on the one hand — the landed elite who wished to keep the social order as it was — and the national liberals, the intelligentsia who advocated for an upheaval of the status quo. As Magnússon explains, although the peasants were denied political power, they were nonetheless “passive participants” who</p><blockquote>followed the debate with interest and the promises it made led them to view their lives in a new light. The instructional and didactic literature that encouraged people to better themselves and represented ‘the normative aspirations’ of society went hand in hand with the political developments and was widely read and thoroughly discussed in the cold, isolated farmsteads of Iceland.<a href="#_ftn17">[17]</a></blockquote><p>This debate is characteristic of Icelandic politics because it rests upon a fundamental respect for the individual character of Iceland about which neither the conservatives nor the liberals disagreed. Both wanted “full and unconditional independence” following the turn of the century, and the solution for issues such as Iceland’s rural poverty was a clean break from the Danish monarchy. But the internal debate over what form this independence should take played a role in preventing the movement from turning radical.<a href="#_ftn18">[18]</a> As a result, it took a century for the movement to succeed, but Iceland eventually received independence in 1944 without blood being shed.</p><p>The nationalistic period in Iceland, coupled with the long-held democratic vision that began in 930 with the founding of the Alþingi, illustrates a duality within Icelandic culture that exists to this day. On the one hand is a strong conservative individualism based largely on the agrarian roots of Icelandic society, linked to skepticism toward radical change and general apathy toward political participation.<a href="#_ftn19">[19]</a> On the other is liberal individualism and the expectation that Icelandic government is, in some way, a reflection of all of the people who live there, and that every Icelander has a say in the shape their government takes. Although there is overlap between the two sides, the schism often appears in Icelandic political discourse, as demonstrated during the nationalistic period. Although both the conservatives and the liberals were pro-independence, to the liberals it was seen as a way to push forward progress on social issues, and to advocate for universal human rights. To conservatives, independence was a means to shore up the foundations of the old order and ensure that feudal ideas of discipline and labor remained. Although they espoused individual liberty, it was in a conservative sense: inherent and universal rights were seen as dangerous and threatening to a stable society.<a href="#_ftn20">[20]</a></p><p>In the twentieth and the first few years of the twenty-first century, this social division appeared strongly within the voting patterns in parliamentary elections. Following the 1944 declaration of independence, the Alþingi became the governing body of the country and was formed as a proportionally representative parliament, meaning that political parties gain seats in parliament roughly relative to the percentage of the vote that they receive. As a result, many different political parties have vied for power in elections. For most of its history, the four major parties have been (in order from right- to left-wing) Independence, Progressive, Social Democratic Alliance, and Socialist/People’s Alliance. However, in spite of the array of parties that run in elections, Independence has dominated for most of the time since 1944, usually holding close to 40 percent of the seats in parliament. Its sustained success reveals the way that the Icelandic populace leans: it has generally had strong support across demographics, including both wealthy businesspeople and poorer, working-class citizens.<a href="#_ftn21">[21]</a> The next-largest party, the Progressive Party, has often formed coalitions with Independence to govern Iceland. The Progressive base has generally been centered in rural communities, and its political ideology is usually centrist or slightly right-wing. Ever since the late twentieth century, Progressives’ share of the electorate has shrunk as electoral rules have shifted to better reflect continuing urbanization. The Progressives subsequently attempted to win over urban voters, partly with an appeal to policies that mirror Independence’s, and in more recent years even shifted toward right-wing populism to differentiate themselves when Independence’s popularity fell.<a href="#_ftn22">[22]</a></p><p><strong>The Hegemony of the Independence Party</strong></p><p>The latent nationalism that pervaded throughout Icelandic culture merged with its tradition of conservatism helped bring about the monolithic strength of Independence. Individualism came to have significant influence over society, as the country’s rapid rise out of poverty following World War II gave people strong senses of their own capabilities. This manifested in both a desire to see Iceland recognized as a legitimate global player, as well as a belief in the power of the individual in the economy. Capitalizing on this fierce individualism, Independence’s conservative-nationalist ideology aimed to preserve the capitalist social order and to prevent turmoil.</p><p>Independence’s rapid transformation into a catch-all party was the determining factor in its ascension to political dominance. Political scientist Otto Kirchheimer first theorized that the shift in Western European political parties beginning in the mid-twentieth century was driven by a shift in strategy and ideology. Before World War II, he argues, there existed myriad parties with inherently limited goals, such as “class-mass” parties that appeal to one particular class, or single-issue parties.<a href="#_ftn23">[23]</a> But in the years immediately preceding and especially those following the war, political leaders happened upon a strategy that greatly increased electoral success: transforming into a generalist, catch-all party meant to capture the widest swath of voters possible. This meant rendering the political goals of the party less ambitious, more limited, and more shallow. Kirchheimer argues,</p><blockquote>Abandonding attempts at the intellectual and moral encadrement of the masses, it is turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success. The narrower political task and the immediate electoral goal differ sharply from the former all-embracing concerns; today the latter are seen as counter-productive since they deter segments of a potential nationwide clientele.<a href="#_ftn24">[24]</a></blockquote><p>Parties transformed as they found that there were ways to appeal to multiple groups who do not exist in direct conflict with one another. A bourgeoisie-capitalist political party and a proletarian-socialist party are, of course, at inherent odds with one another, but the underlying groups — white-collar workers and manual laborers, in this case — might not have impassable differences. “Minor differences between group claims… might be smoothed over by vigorous emphasis on programs which benefit both sections alike, for example, some cushioning the shocks of automation,” Kirchheimer writes.</p><p>In Iceland, electoral evidence from the years preceding the declaration of independence from Denmark show that Independence’s strength relies primarily on an alliance not between manual laborers and capitalists, but between farmers and capitalists. These groups found a shared desire to preserve the class structure and resist the elevation of manual labor. In an attempt to explain this phenomenon, Svanur Kristjánsson suggests, “Perhaps the farmers’ notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘individuality’ predisposed them to take a stand against such ‘impersonal’ and ‘equalizing’ measures [proposed by left-wing parties] as a standard hourly wage or paying the lazy worker as much as the industrious one.”<a href="#_ftn25">[25]</a> The alliance of farmers and capitalists was, to an extent, ideological. But for the party itself, the underlying force that drove growth was its pursuit of electoral success. For example, in 1929, the Liberal Party and Conservative Party merged and assumed the name “Independence” specifically to avoid connotations of partisanship associated with “conservative” and to evoke connections to the independence movement.<a href="#_ftn26">[26]</a> The foundation of the party, in virtually every sense, was designed to appeal to the largest number of voters possible as opposed to standing for a specific ideology. It was often described as a party of “pragmatic politics.”<a href="#_ftn27">[27]</a> Kristjánsson even points out that Independence’s closest European analogues are the Christian Democratic Union in Germany and the Conservative Party in Britain, and Kirchheimer highlights the CDU specifically as a main example of a catch-all party.<a href="#_ftn28">[28]</a></p><p>As Mark Blyth and Richard Katz find, large catch-all parties began transforming again in the latter half of the twentieth century. Due to pressures from globalization and the diminishing returns of the catch-all strategy, these large parties began to “cartelize.” This was marked in particular by the adoption of neoliberalism by these parties, nominally in response to the demands of international trade. As Blyth and Katz reason, these parties found that they needed to rein in policy commitments that had grown far too large as a result of their transformation into catch-all parties. As a result, they found it advantageous to adopt economic liberalism, which offloads the production of certain public goods to the free market:</p><blockquote>The deployment of such a discursive strategy got states ‘off the hook’ for the production of such goods in the first place. While parties of the right with all their traditional distrust of the state had never been too comfortable with the production of public goods on an ever-broadening basis and had simply jumped on the ‘neo-liberal’ bandwagon for ideological reasons, parties of the nominal left needed a justification for doing the same thing. Thus, in order to survive in a post-catch-all environment the rhetoric of globalisation and various ‘third ways’ were employed.<a href="#_ftn29">[29]</a></blockquote><p>In this context, the rise of the Icelandic neoliberal state in the latter half of the twentieth century is not as surprising as it might seem in the face of the growth of Scandinavian social welfare states and Independence’s own expansion of Iceland’s welfare in the years following 1944.<a href="#_ftn30">[30]</a> One of the main differences of a broad, catch-all party as compared with other types of parties is that its political leadership has less power in relation to the “functional powerholders” in society — the elites of the army, bureaucracy, industry, and labor.<a href="#_ftn31">[31]</a> Moreover, due to a catch-all party’s flexibility, it is particularly vulnerable to changing attitudes: “the voters may, by their shifting moods and their apathy, transform the sensitive instrument of the catch-all party into something too blunt to serve as a link with the functional powerholders of society.”<a href="#_ftn32">[32]</a> This included those interest groups that had an outsized “vote” in the form of capital — the wealthiest elite — who became closely associated with the Independence Party leadership. In response to this group’s pressure and Iceland’s own rising economy, alongside an ideological attraction to theories of liberal economics, a group of Independence politicians began implementing neoliberal reforms. Their ideas caught on because they spoke to the conservative individualism of their base and managed to concurrently appease “the Octopus,” a group of hyper-wealthy families in Iceland who had made money by controlling transport routes prior to the economic changes.<a href="#_ftn33">[33]</a></p><p>Between 1991 and 2005, two leaders of the Independence Party — first Davíð Oddsson, then Geir Haarde — pushed forward sweeping changes to the Icelandic economy. Oddsson and Haarde deregulated and privatized large parts of the economy, instituting significant reform in the banking system and allowing banks and individuals both to participate much more heavily in foreign transactions and investment. Oddsson and Independence privatized banks and dramatically decreased loan regulation, which allowed banks to give generous terms on mortgages and loans.<a href="#_ftn34">[34]</a> Oddsson and Haarde’s economic agenda corresponded with several other changes that indicate that Independence and the other large political parties in Iceland were experiencing cartelization. The Progressive Party and the Social-Democratic Alliance, motivated by the successes of Independence, began moving more centrist and adopting into their platforms adherence to a philosophy of economic liberalism. In spite of its agrarian roots, the Progressive Party governed in coalition with Independence from 1995–2007, supporting Independence’s economic policies.<a href="#_ftn35">[35]</a> The Social Democratic Alliance, too, shifted away from its original socialist roots and adopted a platform based on Tony Blair’s neoliberal New Labour policies in the late 90s.<a href="#_ftn36">[36]</a> The SDA and Independence coalition is the best example of the movement to the center that the parties were undergoing; the two parties, so long at odds with one another, formed a “grand coalition” that was dedicated to “unleash[ing] the power of private initiative so that the full potential of expertise and knowhow can be realised in overseas expansion by energy companies.”<a href="#_ftn37">[37]</a> These transformations closely parallel the theory of cartelization laid out by Katz. Over the years, often galvanized by the successes of the liberalization of Iceland’s economy, the Progressives, Independence, and Social-Democratic Alliance came to resemble one another. The policy debates moved to toward the center, and economic policy was replaced by policy on the EU or national security as the main points of contention.<a href="#_ftn38">[38]</a> In a measure of cartelization done by Amir Abedi, Iceland had one of the highest scores of cartelization in Europe and consistently low voting support for anti-establishment parties prior to the turn of the century.<a href="#_ftn39">[39]</a></p><p>By 2008, then, the Icelandic political landscape was composed of a powerful centrist bloc of parties that had cartelized, leading to a parliament dominated by neoliberal politics. Economic liberalism ruled Icelandic politics, and the hegemony of the catch-all Independence Party had been cemented by cartel-like collusion with both the Progressives and the Social Democrats. The Octopus grew stronger, inequality increased and became more apparent, and Iceland’s GDP spiked dramatically.<a href="#_ftn40">[40]</a> If something were to break, Iceland would be fertile ground for a revolt against the elite.</p><p><strong>The 2008 Financial Crash</strong></p><p>In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Iceland experienced a prosperity that took its citizens and the world by surprise. Its stock market performed the best of any Western market from 2001–2005, and its local economy exploded in newfound wealth and new ability to indulge in material comforts. But Icelanders did not find much wrong with appreciating this sudden catapulting growth, even if it was not distributed as equally as they were otherwise accustomed to. As reporter Heather Timmons wrote in the <em>New York Times </em>in April, 2006, “It didn’t take long for the 300,000 residents on this windswept fishing island to adjust to their mini-titan economy, where boutiques now sell Dior cosmetics and Gucci handbags and the flow of international money has been fueling a red-hot housing market and a crop of wealthy entrepreneurs.”<a href="#_ftn41">[41]</a></p><p>Kaupþing, Landsbanki, and Glitnir, the three largest banks in Iceland, galvanized by the neoliberal policies set in place by Independence and the Progressives, began offering high interest rates to foreign investors — significantly higher than their home countries could offer. What followed, then, was a surge in foreign investment into Iceland. Foreign money flowed in at a rate both unbelievable and seemingly unstoppable to Icelanders.<a href="#_ftn42">[42]</a> In perhaps the most overt and ostentatious display of wealth, Björgólfur Guðmundsson, the chairman of Landsbanki and the second Icelandic billionaire businessman (the first being his son), purchased the English football team West Ham United with an Icelandic consortium.<a href="#_ftn43">[43]</a> The Icelandic economy was soaring and gaining international attention, both good and bad. Journalists and analysts began questioning the long-term survivability of the Icelandic economic miracle, with Timmons writing in 2006 that “some hedge funds and other global investors in the last several months have been concerned that the economy has overheated, and so they have withdrawn money from Icelandic markets.”<a href="#_ftn44">[44]</a> But still others — especially in Iceland, where the lucrative business done by the banks suppressed criticism — saw the Icelandic model as one worth exporting elsewhere. And in peak irony, supply-side economist Arthur Laffer declared in an article titled “Overheating Is Not Dangerous,” “Iceland should be a model to the world.”<a href="#_ftn45">[45]</a> The Icesave accounts, as the high-interest accounts with Landsbanki were called, were bringing the country more attention and more money than in its entire history.</p><p>But, as is clear now, Iceland was experiencing a quintessential bubble economy, and it became one of the first victims in the global financial crash of 2008. It is a testament to the heights of the pre-crisis neoliberal economy that Iceland was also the <em>biggest</em> victim of the crash. Not long after New Year’s Day in 2008, foreign investors began wondering if the sky-high interest rates promised by the banks on the Icesave accounts would be paid back. Would the Icelandic banks, which had ballooned to several magnitudes bigger than the entire Icelandic economy, be able to make good on the loans? Due to this uncertainy, the krona started falling — and with it, any confidence in the banks or in the Icelandic government’s ability to keep the vastly oversized economy afloat.<a href="#_ftn46">[46]</a> An economy with a GDP of only $21 billion could not sustain an external debt of $50 billion when investors came calling. Iceland’s government — under the authority of Geir Haarde and the Independence Party, the original chief architects of the liberalization of the economy — had essentially no other choice but to let the banks collapse. “Iceland’s banks were too-big-not-to-fail,” Matt O’Brien writes in <em>The Washington Post</em>.<a href="#_ftn47">[47]</a> This was made possible by Icelandic law, which stipulated that only domestic investment would be protected in the case of bank failure. The banks defaulted on foreign investment, causing a panic in Europe, especially in the United Kingdom. The UK was even forced to implement an anti-terror law that allowed the government to freeze the assets of Landsbanki in an effort to recoup losses from the default on the Icesave accounts.<a href="#_ftn48">[48]</a></p><p>With the banks went the days of surplus wealth, and the economy and currency dropped precipitously. In the course of a few months, Iceland lost its status as a world economic leader and turned inward as the government reversed course and implemented emergency protectionist measures to keep the country afloat. The International Monetary Fund actually had to bail out the government, which had struggled under the weight of assuming the debts and assets of the failed banks. On October 24, 2008, the IMF authorized a $2.1 billion bailout for Iceland. But the crisis would continue for several more years, with capital controls only being lifted in early 2017.<a href="#_ftn49">[49]</a></p><p>Such a dramatic and, for the citizens of Iceland, unexpected turn of fortune shocked the system and shook institutions to their core. A country that had experienced 60 years of relatively peaceful and stable independence now faced the worst economic crisis in world history. The stable conservative bloc that had voted Independence or the Progressives into power for so many years now had to face the disastrous effects of the neoliberal policies implemented by Haarde and his colleagues.</p><p>It was a quesiton that plagued Icelanders and caused them to reassess their country and their identity. As a developed, extremely wealthy country, how does it face years of downturn? How do citizens deal with a crisis that leaves people unable to buy homes and unable to afford the homes they are living in? In March 2009, in the midst of the crisis, Ian Parker of the <em>New Yorker</em> found that Icelanders were asking the simple question, “What happens next?”<a href="#_ftn50">[50]</a></p><p>These were not easy questions to answer. As Smári McCarthy, co-founder of the Pirate Party and a member of Parliament, said in an interview, “Everybody saw [the crisis] coming, yet nobody was completely prepared to face the truth when it happened.”<a href="#_ftn51">[51]</a> The conclusion that many people like McCarthy came to was that there was something fundamentally broken within the Icelandic system that led to this. To these Icelanders, politicians had betrayed the people and sold the country out for quick money. The Independence Party was the symbol of all that was wrong with the country, so they took to the streets.</p><p>For a country with strong democratic institutions and an egalitarian streak, Iceland nonetheless does not have a significant history of political mobilization. As previously explained, the cultural history of the country suggests that political apathy is the norm and mass politics the exception. The most extreme cases of political mobilization that arose during the independence movement did not come close to the disruption or violence of protests that have occurred in most other countries, even advanced democracies. The only significant demonstrations of the post-war era occurred in 1949, when the question of NATO membership sparked controversy. However, in 2009, frustration finally gained critical mass to incite Icelanders to organization and demonstration. It was a revolutionary break from their social past, that corresponded with a catastrophic break from the economic past. As Parker writes,</p><blockquote>Iceland was having a revolutionary moment, if of a sometimes hesitant and self-mocking sort. ‘We’ve never done this before,’ Hildur Margrétardóttir, an artist and protester, said. She was carrying, at the end of a long pole, a papier-mâché model of a bloody horse’s head, which referred to a medieval Icelandic method of upsetting one’s neighbors. ‘We’re not the protesting kind. We’d rather stay at home and have things cozy. We don’t even know how to dress in cold weather. We’re really sofa people.’<a href="#_ftn52">[52]</a></blockquote><p>At first, these protests were little more than small gatherings of protestors expressing dissatisfaction with the state of the country; but as the crisis deepened, and the culprits had not yet been held responsible, more and more people joined in. In January 2009, the energy rushed out in a huge, thousands-strong demonstration with Icelanders pounding on kitchenware. It was a movement defined by its decentralization; although small anarchist groups provided valuable experience for a country that had little protesting experience, no hierarchy ever arose within it. It was entirely a horizontally coordinated movement,<a href="#_ftn53">[53]</a> evoking values similar to both the liberal nationalists who pushed forward the independence movement in the nineteenth century, and the Pirate Party that would arise out of the protests.</p><p>The Pots and Pans Revolution, as it would become known, culminated in the resignation of Haarde (for unrelated health reasons) and the declaration that special elections would be held in the spring of 2009. Within days, the coalition government of Independence and the Social Democratic Party broke down. The last holdout — Davíð Oddsson, the governor of the Central Bank, and the man many held as the architect the neoliberal policies that caused the crisis — finally resigned in February 2009.<a href="#_ftn54">[54]</a></p><p><strong>Elections of 2009</strong></p><p>A full fifty of the sixty-three seats in the Alþingi were occupied by parties with declared neoliberal policies after the elections of 2007; the Left-Green Party was the only left-wing party with representation, occupying nine seats. But when special elections were scheduled for April 2009, it quickly became clear that something was going to change. Independence, which had been in government since 1991, could not sufficiently quell popular resentment and backlash toward its policies that had sent the country’s economy into meltdown.<a href="#_ftn55">[55]</a> Icelanders would not forgive Independence, especially not those associated with Geir Haarde or Davíð Oddsson, and protestors during the Pots and Pans Revolution could even be seen burning effigies of Haarde.<a href="#_ftn56">[56]</a> The Social-Democratic Alliance, Independence’s coalition partner in government, grew concerned that the anger toward IP would turn toward it next. Indeed, as the spring wore on, this worry came true. Public opinion on the SDA plummeted, while it stayed high for the protests. Simultaneously, opinion shifted far to the left, consolidating in part behind the minority Left-Greens.<a href="#_ftn57">[57]</a> Once Haarde resigned, the government dissolved and the SDA created a ruling coalition with the Left-Greens to govern until new elections could take place. Although the new provisional government attempted to pass popular reforms during this period, such as opening the path for a new constitution and establishing a constituent assembly, Independence was still strong enough to block these measures, and the country went to election in April 2009 without meaningful policy change.<a href="#_ftn58">[58]</a></p><p>The election results marked a historic shift in Icelandic society. The Independence Party, which had near-hegemonic control over Icelandic government essentially since its founding, took a massive hit, gaining only 36.6 percent of the vote — the most of any party, but a decrease of 13 percent and a dramatic departure from historical tradition. The SDA increased their vote share by 3 percent, and the Left Greens by 7 percent, capitalizing on anti-right wing sentiment in Iceland. The Progressives, who had ran a new, younger leader in order to embrace some of the anti-establishment fervor, gained 3 percent to win 9 seats in parliament.<a href="#_ftn59">[59]</a></p><p>But the reality is not that the country necessarily swung to the left and that the growth of the SDA and Left-Greens were inevitable results of that. Rather, Iceland experienced a surge in anti-establishment populism specifically, which manifested in a precipitous fall in support for Independence and a corresponding increase in support for non-Independence parties. If Iceland truly had swung left, it would follow that support would probably have solidified even more behind the Left-Greens. Although they had certainly the highest total increase in support, this is likely due mostly to their position as the only “true” outsider party. Electoral data shows that support diffused relatively equally away from the IP; most defected and supported the SDA, but a substantial number also backed the Left-Greens and the Progressives. The Left-Greens gained most from the SDA.<a href="#_ftn60">[60]</a></p><p>Foreshadowing later developments in Icelandic politics, one of the most surprising results of the election was that the Citizens’ Movement won four seats in Parliament. The brand-new political party associated itself directly with the Pots and Pans Revolution, and many of its founding members and supporters participated in the protests. It could claim that it was the only true outsider party in the election, as it was led by newcomers to politics and had never existed before 2009. It supported radical change, and positioned itself in direct opposition to ruling interests and the political elite.<a href="#_ftn61">[61]</a> The Icelandic English-language newspaper, <em>The Grapevine</em>, asked Citizens’ Movement representatives what their platform was before the elections. The party responded simply, “Let’s bring the people to parliament.” And when asked who was at fault for the crisis, they replied, “The system, politicians, and banksters.”<a href="#_ftn62">[62]</a> The four seats won by the Citizens’ Movement were occupied by a film director, an economist, an editor, and a poet. This was the first political experience for the poet, Birgitta Jónsdóttir, who would later become one of the main faces of Icelandic populism as the founder and leader of the Pirate Party.</p><p>To co-opt terminology from Kirchheimer, the Citizens’ Movement is the first example in Iceland of a “radical integrationist” party. Although catch-all parties arose out of a result of attempting to integrate more people into the political process, they did so by exchanging greater breadth for less ideological depth, and thus less commitment.<a href="#_ftn63">[63]</a> This shallowness of ideology remained in Iceland throughout the cartelization of the parties, as well, as shown by the implicit acceptance of neoliberalism among the three centrist parties. The Citizens’ Movement, on the other hand, espoused an <em>ideology </em>of integration, with the end-goal not being electoral success but simply popular representation in government. The party’s declared antagonism toward the political elite — including the system — and its desire to “bring the people to parliament” are narrow political goals marking a deep ideology that is antithetical to the ways of the catch-all party.</p><p>Other indications that this was a <em>populist</em> revolution and not just a left-wing revolution come from public opinion polling and the results of municipal elections that followed. According to data gathered by the Icelandic National Election Study, trust in political officials dropped dramatically. In 2007, 18 percent of respondents expressed trust in only “few” politicians and 3.7 percent expressed trust in “none”, while 77 percent expressed trust in “some” politicians, “many” politicians, or politicians “in general”. In 2009, the number of “few” respondents grew to 33.4 percent, and the number of “none” respondents increased to 7.3 percent. However, the political spectrum of voters only shifted slightly: those who identified left-of-center in 2007 amounted to 24 percent of respondents, which grew to 28.9 in 2009. A “shift left” clearly does not explain the political sentiment of the Icelandic electorate at this time, as the left-wing parties gained a disproportionate number of seats to the percentage of new left-wing voters.<a href="#_ftn64">[64]</a></p><p>By November 2009, another new political party was created as a result of this wave of populism. Jón Gnarr, a well-known actor and comedian, founded the Best Party as a satirical take on perceived corruption and political elitism in Iceland. Gnarr had started the Best Party as a joke, originally not intending to actually run a political party at all. But it started gaining attention and Gnarr decided to run for municipal elections in Reykjavík in 2010, on a platform that was mostly satirical. It advertised it as a ten-point plan (it actually had thirteen points), with policy proposals such as free towels in every spa and cancelling all debt.<a href="#_ftn65">[65]</a> Surprising many in Iceland and generating international headlines such as “The Joker: Jón Gnarr, the Comedian Who Became Mayor” and “Have You Heard the One About Jon Gnarr, the Comedian Who Saved Iceland From Political and Financial Catastrophe?” Gnarr and the Best Party won a plurality of votes, coming in slightly ahead of the IP. They took six of fifteen seats on the city council, and Gnarr became mayor of Reykjavík and thus a third of the entire population of the country. <a href="#_ftn66">[66]</a> It was another massive shock to the previously stable system, and it led Prime Minister Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir to speculate that it was the “beginning of the end” of four party-dominant politics in Iceland.<a href="#_ftn67">[67]</a></p><p>Gnarr’s antics and the Best Party’s motto of “humanity, culture, and peace” marked the beginning of a newfound antiestablishment identity in Icelandic politics. Gnarr himself lit upon a fundamental aspect of this growing populism when he said, at a budget proposal presentation in late 2010, “We [the Best Party] do not share a predetermined, mutual ideology. We are neither left nor right. We are both. We don’t even think it matters… We often say that we aren’t doing what we want to do, but what needs to be done.”<a href="#_ftn68">[68]</a> As the elections of 2009 showed, the Icelandic populist impulse was not inherently leftist in identity, although the politics that came out of it were left-wing. The Best Party seems to have resonated in part because it presented itself as being anti-doctrine and anti-partisan. Gnarr was compelled to actually begin governing, but as Icelandic researchers found, he relied on authenticity instead of ideology to govern — becoming popular as a humanist and egalitarian, supporting LGBTQ rights and enacting policy such as green-lighting the construction of Iceland’s first purpose-built mosque.<a href="#_ftn69">[69]</a> Likely because of Gnarr’s popularity, the Best Party and its later iteration, Bright Future, would have some electoral success at the national level, including forming a coalition government with the Independence and Reform Parties after the 2016 election.</p><p><strong>The Pirate Movement</strong></p><p>What would soon come to overshadow the Best Party and Gnarr’s satirical take on comedy, however, was a movement that took inspiration from Sweden. The Pirate Party of Sweden was founded in 2006 by Rick Falkvinge in direct response to Swedish debate on copyright law, which, in his view, was not getting sufficient attention from politicians. Frustrated with this lack of interest, he started the Pirate Party in order to “bypass the politicians entirely and aim for their power base.”<a href="#_ftn70">[70]</a> Following raids in 2006 on the Pirate Bay, the popular torrenting site, interest in reforming copyright law and the perils of prosecuting internet pirates surged. Falkvinge, as the leader of the Pirate Party — unrelated to the Pirate Bay, but nonetheless in the conversation as an anti-copyright law activist party — was thrust into the spotlight.<a href="#_ftn71">[71]</a> As Icelandic Pirate MP Björn Leví Gunnarsson explained, “The basic policy of the Pirates is [that] you can’t go chasing individual people for downloading copyrighted material, because that will only reach to a breach of privacy. The methods that people use are broad, and they will catch people that are doing legal things in their net as well. On that premise [the Pirate policy is] basically, ‘Sorry, you can’t use these methods that are a breach of privacy.’”<a href="#_ftn72">[72]</a></p><p>Although it did not win any seats in Swedish Parliament in 2007, the Swedish PP remained well known and Falkvinge became an evangelist of sorts for the Pirate movement internationally. Encouraged by the popularity of the party, activists in other European countries set up their own Pirate Parties and began cooperating to compete for seats in the European Parliament. In 2009, capitalizing on the raids on the Pirate Bay, the Swedish Pirates won two seats at the European Parliament. At its height in 2009–10, the party had close to 50,000 members, making it the third-largest party by membership in Sweden. Its youth organization was the largest political youth group in the country.<a href="#_ftn73">[73]</a></p><p>Until 2016, the German Pirate Party had the most successful Pirate branch in terms of representation in government. In the Berlin state parliament elections of 2011, it won nine percent of the vote, securing it fifteen seats. Richard Falkvinge and many Pirates across the world saw this as the beginning of a global Pirate revolution. “It will inspire people with a passion for civil liberties and the right to share and speak, all over the world, to stand up and claim their rights,” he wrote on September 18, 2011.<a href="#_ftn74">[74]</a> The successes came during a time of high dissatisfaction with the political establishment in large part due to its handling of the Eurozone crisis.<a href="#_ftn75">[75]</a> The election of the German Pirates was very much a protest vote; the Pirates were avowedly inexperienced in politics, and in fact positioned their political ignorance as an advantage.<a href="#_ftn76">[76]</a> However, the party was soon after marred by public relations issues, including infighting and disorganization. Its steadfast inclusivity to all political views — a staple of Pirate ideology — ended up harming its reputation, as the leadership refused to prohibit extremist opinions.<a href="#_ftn77">[77]</a> Their public infighting, insistence on focusing on out-of-date topics based on their narrow platform, and continual quirky antics further eroded support for the Pirates.<a href="#_ftn78">[78]</a> In September 2016, the Pirate Party was voted out of Berlin state parliament and member of parliament Gerwald Claus-Brunner killed himself and a colleague, marking a tragic and high-profile conclusion to the party’s collapse.<a href="#_ftn79">[79]</a></p><p>Irrespective of their struggles, early Pirate Parties generally shared a common trait: they arose in political environments dominated by catch-all and cartelized parties that were experiencing a surge in anti-establishment sentiment and were affected by the rapid proliferation of technology and Internet culture. Especially in Sweden and Germany where the Pirates were strongest, but also in Austria, Great Britain, and the Czech Republic, large centrist parties had held power often for decades. The Christian-Democratic Union in Germany, the Social Democratic Party in Sweden, both the Conservative and Labour Parties in Britain, the Social Democratic Party in the Czech Republic, and the Social Democratic and People’s Parties in Austria all exhibit similar characteristics to Iceland’s Independence Party.<a href="#_ftn80">[80]</a> Within this political context, the Pirate movement arose at least in part as a revolt against the cartelization of the hegemonic catch-all parties. Falkvinge’s “Pirate Wheel,” the political bible of sorts for Pirate Parties internationally, is evidence that the movement sets itself up in direct opposition to cartelized party politics. Even the existence of a set of philosophies governing Pirate politics differentiates them from the de-ideoligization and pragmatism found in catch-all and cartelized parties. The Pirate movement is a substantially developed manifestation of radical integration party politics: first and foremost on the Pirate Wheel is the movement’s foundational value — empowerment — described as “Everybody has a voice. Assume Good Faith.” The wheel also lays out transparency, freedom of information, humanism, diversity, and swarm economics<a href="#_ftn81">[81]</a> as principles.<a href="#_ftn82">[82]</a> Cartelization entrenched the dominant political parties into solidified, rarely moved centrist coalitions, one result of which was the rise of neoliberalism. Pirate ideology specifically takes aim at that centralization and at the systems that give rise to it.</p><p>In Iceland in 2012, a group of political activists, computer scientists, and others came together over a common goal: change the political system in Iceland to be more diverse and more democratic. One of the members of this small group was Birgitta Jónsdóttir, MP for the Citizens’ Movement; another was Smári McCarthy, an internet activist with a technical background who had gained attention for formulating technology-based proposals for political participation. Even years after the financial crisis, these activists felt that there had not been enough meaningful change in government. As McCarthy explained, “It was about five years after the collapse, we’d seen a government waddle through — it did a lot of good things, fixed a lot of problems, but also just didn’t really have a particularly coherent vision for what to do.”<a href="#_ftn83">[83]</a></p><p>Although some of them had been associated with antiestablishment parties in the past, they felt that nothing that had come before was sufficient. There needed to be something more, a party working for public representation and personal liberty above everything else — because the group saw these issues as the biggest issues facing Icelanders. Halldóra Morgensen, a current Pirate MP, emphasized the anger at the system that had produced the crash and resisted any meaningful change: “After the collapse happened… it was a little bit of a wakeup call. I just got very angry, and realized that this wasn’t <em>right</em>. Any of this. I just kind of felt like this entire way of life was a little bit fucked up, and so that’s when I really started following politics kind of properly.”<a href="#_ftn84">[84]</a></p><p>These Internet activists and radical decentralists looked across the Atlantic at continental Europe and saw the Pirate Parties gaining traction. They saw a movement dedicated first and foremost to the essential assurance of individual liberty in a world both increasingly digital and cartelized. It was a movement with a lot of potential for them to build upon, but the founders had seen the failures of Pirate Parties elsewhere, especially in Germany. The extremely narrow focus of these other Pirate Parties, combined with their political inexperience and over-the-top antics, eventually harmed their ability to succeed in elections.<a href="#_ftn85">[85]</a> “[We] got together and said, okay, we’ve seen this Pirate Party idea abroad, and insofar as it is a political movement representing the ideologies of the internet, roughly, capturing a lot of the ideologies that one sees in the internet, it’s a good thing,” McCarthy said, “but we also recognize that the big failure of the Pirate Parties elsewhere has been that they don’t practice any kind of political holism.”<a href="#_ftn86">[86]</a> What McCarthy, Jónsdóttir, Morgensen, and the others realized was that an Icelandic Pirate Party needed a specifically Icelandic flavor. It was not enough to simply echo the broad goals of ensuring privacy and liberty:</p><blockquote>They just work on the basis of focusing on privacy and access to information and all these things that I was initially drawn into politics by, but aren’t thinking about things like healthcare, education, natural resource rights, housing. All these things that kind of are really important to the general public in any society, and to a much greater degree than erudite details of copyright law, really hold society together.<a href="#_ftn87">[87]</a></blockquote><p>McCarthy and the founding members of the Pirates realized that for a political party to succeed, it needs to grow its base, appeal to a wider audience, and address specific, local issues. In essence, the party began to broaden its scope while retaining a strong ideological base. The Pirates recognized that it was not enough to be a brand-new, niche party; it also needed a party <em>strategy</em>. In this case, the founders wanted to create something upon which to construct a truly competitive party: “We said we were going to expand the model and instead of just focusing on these issues, we’d say, ‘let’s take that as a basis, create some kind of ideological foundation, and use that to construct a comprehensive philosophy of politics.’”<a href="#_ftn88">[88]</a> In other words, the Pirates asked themselves, “What happens when you take the political philosophy of the internet and apply it to the real world? Does it just create an infinite field full of kittens? Or do you actually get something less cute but more meaningful?”<a href="#_ftn89">[89]</a> Their grand political goal, therefore, was to expand the ideology of the Internet, with its emphasis on decentralization, transparency, and equality, and merge it with Icelandic politics.</p><p>When the elections of 2013 approached, however, the Pirates were trying to break through the noise of a huge number of new parties. On their website from February 2013, the Pirates only had four main points of their platform: transparency, responsibility, privacy, and direct democracy.<a href="#_ftn90">[90]</a> And in the earliest profiles of the Pirate Party, journalists pushed forward an image not of a well-rounded, competitive organization, but of an eclectic band of internet activists with the behavioral traits of computer scientists, not of politicians. For example, in a profile for <em>New Statesman</em>, Laurie Penny writes, “Of these newcomers, the Pirates — a disparate group of hackers, anarchists and digital rights campaigners — are by far the most interesting.”<a href="#_ftn91">[91]</a></p><p>This is a characterization that the Pirates certainly do not shy away from, and in fact embrace to a certain extent still to this day. “For example, the Independence Party, they’re legal nerds, so they’re basically lawyers,” Björn Leví Gunnarsson said. “A couple of business graduates of one sort or another. But basically lawyers. We’re the counter of that. We’re more in the technocrat direction, where our background isn’t law, but programming or other kinds of activism.”<a href="#_ftn92">[92]</a> But there was also a need to rise above the characterization of the Pirate Party as simply Internet pirates. Although the name of the party is attention-grabbing and eccentric, many of the Pirates recognize that it also requires them to prove themselves as legitimate contenders. But this pivot to a broader platform and loftier goals would come after the elections of 2013.</p><p>In 2013, the Pirates gained their first three seats in Parliament — but could only watch as the left-wing coalition collapsed and the Independence Party and Progressive Party took back control over the government. The Icelandic populist impulse diffused too broadly out among the myriad parties that had appeared prior to the election. Sixteen different parties ran in the election. Unfortunately for these parties, Icelandic political tradition caught up: the monolithic voting blocs behind the Progressives and Independence could only decrease so far; the new parties stole from each other and from the center, not from the right-wing.<a href="#_ftn93">[93]</a></p><p>But why were Icelanders so willing to re-elect the same parties that caused the financial crisis? Why did they swing back from such a hard shift to the left? Partly it was due to the nature of the “swing left,” which, as was shown earlier, was not actually a leftist surge but rather a specifically anti-establishment surge that happened to focus on the left-wing. The number of voters identifying as right-of-center did not decrease much between 2007 and 2009. However, it is worth noting that the number of left-of-center votes stayed pretty much consistent between 2009 and 2013 — indicating that not much shifting was happening on the political spectrum.<a href="#_ftn94">[94]</a></p><p>It nonetheless seems incongruous that Icelanders would vote the culprits of the 2008 economic crisis back into power. As Indridi Indridason et al. find, the 2009 election punished the incumbent party as a result of the crisis, as is expected; but the 2013 election — in spite of clearly improving economic conditions — <em>also </em>punished the incumbents. This happened because the opposition parties were able to link the SDA and the Left-Greens to continuing economic struggles while promising better and different actions, which the ruling coalition could not defend against because of their role in government: “In the 2013 election in Iceland the opposition, in particular the Progressive Party, managed to capitalize on and gain credibility by taking position on issues rendered salient by the state of the economy, which the government parties could not credible counter due to their inaction on the issues as incumbents.”<a href="#_ftn95">[95]</a></p><p>In essence, the election of 2013 was <em>also </em>an expression of discontent with the government and the ruling political parties, whom Icelanders saw as unable to sufficiently deal with the massive amount of housing debt owed by citizens.<a href="#_ftn96">[96]</a> This discontent is shown first by the precipitous fall in the opinion polls of Independence, which lost over fifteen percent in the weeks leading up to the election, second by the rise of new parties, which collectively gained 25 percent of the vote — equaling the vote ultimately won by Independence and the Progressives, and third by the total turnout, which was the lowest since Iceland gained its independence.<a href="#_ftn97">[97]</a></p><p>In addition to these markers, Icelanders indicated a continuing high level of distrust of politicians and a belief that the system was not working properly. Data from the National Election Study shows that 54.2 percent of Icelanders believed that corruption was “very widespread” or “quite widespread” among politicians, significantly down from 72.6 percent in 2009, but nonetheless still a majority. Close to thirty percent of Icelanders still trusted few or no politicians in 2013.<a href="#_ftn98">[98]</a> Although the populace clearly did not feel <em>as</em> frustrated or disenchanted with politics as in 2009, the data nonetheless shows that a significant dissatisfaction with the establishment remained. There was room for another Best Party to rise and consolidate antiestablishment sentiment, but that alternative would need to do something more than simply pose as an outsider.</p><p>Following the election, the Pirates, began working within the Alþingi to bring attention to issues of transparency and liberty. Previously, in the years following the financial crash, McCarthy and Jónsdóttir had worked closely with Julian Assange and WikiLeaks to pass strong whistleblower protections and laws upholding journalistic freedom. They managed to create the Iceland Modern Media Initiative, which was passed through Parliament unanimously in 2010 and put in place significant protections for journalists and whistleblowers.<a href="#_ftn99">[99]</a> From the onset, Jonsdótttir and the other Pirate MPs were closely associated with transparency and WikiLeaks — and they continued to push strongly for freedom of information in the new parliamentary term. One of their first high-profile efforts in 2013 was to formulate a plan to grant National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden asylum in Iceland. McCarthy and Jónsdóttir’s statement explaining this action declares, “Whereas IMMI is based in Iceland, and has worked on protections of privacy, furtherance of government transparency, and the protection of whistleblowers, we feel it is our duty to offer to assist and advise Mr. Snowden to the greatest of our ability.”<a href="#_ftn100">[100]</a></p><p>The Pirates fully embraced the fight for implementing a new constitution in Iceland, one that would dramatically restructure the way government works to allow for greater public participation. Proposed in 2010, the new constitution would let coalitions of citizens band together to petition to pull certain laws out of parliament and force a referendum, and it would also allow for “citizens’ initiatives” that let large enough groups submit documents to parliament that MPs must debate.<a href="#_ftn101">[101]</a> But in spite of popular support for a new constitution, it was killed by the Independence-Progressive coalition after the 2013 election. The Pirates, who had run on a platform of decentralizing government, continued to push for dramatic reforms to the political system, even as the best chance for achieving that goal was stifled by the government. In June 2013, Jónsdóttir told <em>Huffington Post</em>, “We have to nationalize the banks. We have to get rid of the government. We need to have access to the internet seen as a human right. We need to have a new Constitution.”<a href="#_ftn102">[102]</a></p><p>For two years, the Pirates had moderate support in the populace, consistently sitting at around ten percent. But toward the end of 2014 and into 2015, something began to shift in public opinion. Both Independence and Progressive began losing support in the latter half of 2014, with the Progressives dramatically decreasing in popularity, from a high of 20 percent in mid-2014 to a low of 5 percent in mid-2015. Most other parties experienced a similar decline, although less significant than the Progressives. The only party to experience a meaningful increase in public opinion was the Pirate Party — and meaningful is an understatement. Polls started trending up in Fall 2014, and then spiked upwards in 2015. In the space of about 8 months, the Pirates had gone from the second-least popular to the most popular party, a surge of 25 percent. In May 2015, they crossed the 30 percent support threshold — meaning that, if elections had been held then, the Pirates would have emerged with by far the most number of seats in parliament. For comparison, Independence was the second-most popular party at this time, with support in the low 20s, one of the few times in Icelandic history that Independence was not the most popular party. Also of note, the Pirates were pulling support from every other party.<a href="#_ftn103">[103]</a></p><p>This abrupt and unexpected surge drove domestic and international attention on the Pirates. Suddenly they were de facto opposition leaders, in spite of only having three MPs in parliament. Popular opposition to the establishment consolidated rapidly behind the Pirates, whereas for years before it had remained diffused throughout the multitude of other parties.<a href="#_ftn104">[104]</a> The Pirates had emerged as the face of Icelandic populism.</p><p><strong>Convergence of the Populist Impulse</strong></p><p>Why did the populist movement so quickly and dramatically gather in support of the Pirate Party? Pirates at the time struggled to explain it. Jónsdóttir said in March 2015, soon after the Pirates had surpassed Independence in the polls, “To be completely honest: I don’t know why we enjoy so much trust, we are all just as surprised, thankful, and take this as a sign of mistrust towards conventional politics.”<a href="#_ftn105">[105]</a></p><p>But for the Pirates to become so popular, something had to have fundamentally changed within at least a large segment of the population. Iceland, as has been shown, is a country that has traditionally modified its institutions slowly, and the populace historically did not widely support revolutionary movements. Even the independence movement was framed as a return to sovereignty and Icelandic institutionalism that had existed before. And, as the elections of 2013 showed, the anger that Icelanders felt after 2009 softened slightly, and many people returned to their old voting habits.</p><p>But the Independence-Progressive coalition made several moves in their policymaking and rhetoric in the years after 2013 that dramatically affected their ability to project legitimacy and trustworthiness to portions of the populace. The first was that the Progressives had embraced a right-wing populist platform, constructing a party identity based on Icelandic isolationist nationalism. In an attempt to consolidate rural support as well as to win over some of the more disillusioned urban voters who perceived Left Green-SDA policy toward repayment of Icesave accounts as tantamount to capitulation, a young, new leadership of the Progressives pushed the party to the right. Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, the leader of the Progressives, began this swing toward nationalist populism with InDefence, an organization dedicated to resisting the anti-terror measures taken by Britain against Icesave accounts and Icelandic banks. As has already been seen, the Progressives and Independence played up this perception of Left Green-SDA weakness toward Britain in order to consolidate support for their own campaigns in the run-up to 2013. In rhetoric evocative of right-wing populism elsewhere, Gunnlaugsson said in 2009 that Prime Minister Jóhanna Sigurðadóttir was “humiliating the nation” by “forcing her nation to pay the Icesave debt burden.”<a href="#_ftn106">[106]</a></p><p>In addition, Gunnlaugsson and the Progressive leaders increased their party’s suspicion and skepticism toward immigration and refugee resettlement, for instance expressing a desire to keep specific track of crime committed by foreigners in an inquiry submitted to the Alþingi.<a href="#_ftn107">[107]</a> Although, as academic Eiríkur Bergmann notes, the Progressives did not go nearly as far in embracing anti-immigrant stances as other right-wing populist parties like the AfD in Germany or the National Front in France, Gunnlaugsson nonetheless refused to condemn anti-Muslim statements made by members of the Progressive Party.<a href="#_ftn108">[108]</a></p><p>This shift toward the right in rhetoric did not change after 2013, when Independence and the Progressives formed a government. More Progressive MPs began expressing anti-Muslim beliefs on Facebook and in interviews, and a few Independence MPs followed suit. However, although they found some support in their voting bases, Independence and the Progressives were harshly criticized for fomenting fear toward immigrants and Muslims.<a href="#_ftn109">[109]</a></p><p>When in government, however, it became clear that the embrace of populism and a critique of perceived Left Green-SDA anti-nationalism led the coalition into a bind. They were voted in by a bloc who felt that they presented a way out of the possibility of Iceland having to repay the Icesave debts and a way to alleviate the massive mortgage burdens that many Icelanders found themselves saddled with following the financial crisis.<a href="#_ftn110">[110]</a> In November 2014, the government presented its plan for significant relief for household debt, which had ballooned due to rapid inflation of the Icelandic króna. It would spend 80 billion ISK from the Treasury, and tax incentives would be put in place to encourage spending of pension funds to pay down the debt. The government claimed that 69,000 homeowners would benefit directly.<a href="#_ftn111">[111]</a></p><p>However, the government’s pre-election promise to forgive household debt was much more sweeping and ambitious, to the extent that it was unclear if it was even possible to fulfill. As <em>Grapevine</em> writer Haukur Helgason wrote, “During the Progressive party’s 2013 campaign, members and supporters of most other parties condemned the proposal as populist and unrealistic, a promise that would either not be fulfilled or drastically upset economic stability and the Treasury.”<a href="#_ftn112">[112]</a> The Progressives, specifically, had talked themselves into a corner: either attempt to forgive most or all of the household debt, as was promised, and risk upending the fragile recovery that the economy was undergoing under the Left Green-SDA coalition; or scale back their promises and anger all of the people with significant debt but who would be ineligible for relief. The Progressives were initially suggesting a 300 billion ISK relief package essentially up to the elections of 2013, but once in government, they were convinced to compromise with Independence, which was much less enthusiastic about a straightforward relief program.<a href="#_ftn113">[113]</a> The compromise shut a lot of people out of relief, including, most significantly, renters and those with student loans. An NPR report from December 2014 with two Icelanders reveals some of the dissatisfaction felt toward the policy. Heiða Jónsdóttir had a mortgage that spiked 30 percent following the crisis, and she was entitled to $12,000. But she nonetheless had mixed feelings, saying that the relief program denied a lot of Icelanders much-needed assistance for other debt besides mortgages. In addition, Baldur Hedinsson expressed discontentment because his own student loans had swollen, but the government was providing no relief to him.<a href="#_ftn114">[114]</a></p><p>The Progressive-Independence coalition most dramatically fueled a political insurgency against it when it dealt with two particularly high-profile issues: constitutional reform and accession into the European Union. The new constitution, the development of which had been undertaken by a constituent assembly of 950 Icelanders chosen by lottery, received over 65 percent support in a new referendum.<a href="#_ftn115">[115]</a> In spite of its popularity, the Left Green-SDA coalition did not move forward with the bill swiftly enough before the 2013 elections, and afterward, the new coalition immediately ended all debate and refused to address a new constitution for the rest of its term.<a href="#_ftn116">[116]</a></p><p>The question of European Union membership has been one of the most controversial issues in Iceland since the post-crisis government filed an application in July 2009. The SDA was the main force of pro-Europeanism in the Alþingi and provided most of the impetus to start negotiations; the Left Greens, Independence, and the Progressives all opposed it. Public opinion was mixed to negative on the question, but a large majority generally supported holding a public referendum and continuing negotiations on EU membership.<a href="#_ftn117">[117]</a> The Pirate Party has managed to capitalize by applying its radical integrationist ideology to discussions about the EU, which allow it to remain both neutral and anti-establishment: it is neither pro- nor anti-EU, but rather pro-referendum. In the campaign leading up to the 2013 elections, Independence and Progressive both promised to hold a referendum on EU membership, indicating the strength of public interest in participation that the two main Eurosceptic parties would pledge to hold a referendum on it. The official platform of the Independence Party even declared, “The people will take the decision on EU accession by public referendum during the election term.”<a href="#_ftn118">[118]</a></p><p>But upon forming a government, the coalition began acting with hesitation and reluctance to move forward with the referendum. In May 2013, soon after becoming Prime Minister, Gunnlaugsson announced that the government had suspended accession talks with the EU.<a href="#_ftn119">[119]</a> Then, in February 2014, the coalition put forth a resolution to parliament to formally withdraw from negotiations. This kickstarted a wave of opposition and activism that centered on the government attempting to withdraw without putting the question to a vote. In February and March, around 4000 people protested in front of the Alþingi, while over 50,000 people signed a petition calling for the government to hold a referendum on EU membership.<a href="#_ftn120">[120]</a> The protests continued for several weeks, even as Independence and Progressive officials began saying that they would not hold a referendum, after all. In early March 2014, while protests carried on outside of the parliament building, Foreign Minister Bragi Sveinsson said that a referendum was “out of the question”<a href="#_ftn121">[121]</a> and Independence Party Chairperson Bjarni Benediktsson called it “unrealistic.”<a href="#_ftn122">[122]</a></p><p>In the most definitive act regarding the EU membership issue, in March 2015 Sveinsson sent a letter to EU leadership declaring that the Icelandic government had withdrawn from negotiations. “The Icelandic Government wishes to clarify further its intentions,” he wrote. “The Government of Iceland has no intentions to resume accession talks. Furthermore, any commitments made by the previous Government in the accession talks are superseded by the present policy.”<a href="#_ftn123">[123]</a> Although Sveinsson and the coalition viewed this as a legitimate and official withdrawal, neither he nor any other coalition representative had notified or conversed with Parliament first. Many in the opposition were deeply upset at this decision and believed that it violated a clause in Iceland’s ministerial law that requires ministers to notify the Alþingi before making major decisions.<a href="#_ftn124">[124]</a> This decision sparked protests that drew 7000 people.<a href="#_ftn125">[125]</a></p><p>The Progressive Party had begun falling in the polls in early 2014, likely due to a result of its failures to make good on all its economic promises. But the letter from Sveinsson roughly equates to the time that the popularity for the Independence Party also began tumbling. At the same time, the Pirates started rising fast. Pirate MP Björn Leví Gunnarsson said in an email in April 2017 that he identified Sveinsson’s letter as the pivotal moment in the Pirates’ rise to prominence, and analysis of Pirate rhetoric about Sveinsson’s letter shows that the Pirates were echoing the deep current of anger toward governmental actions. For example, Birgitta Jónsdóttir declared at the time that this was a surprising break from democratic principles: “This is a huge issue that the government made a decision without any consultation and by disconnecting the parliament… This is the beginning of the end of this government… First, the nation wants to see this process complete. The people want to go to a referendum.”<a href="#_ftn126">[126]</a> In this passage, the roots of Pirate ideology are evident: a supreme focus on promoting the voices of the people, and a distrust of the government. In other words, the Pirate Party was the voice in the Alþingi for the protestors who gathered outside.</p><p>The climax of the Progressives’ political missteps came in March 2016, when a massive trove of financial documents dubbed the “Panama Papers” was published, linking dozens of politicians worldwide to offshore bank accounts. Some of these accounts were legal, others were outright illegal. In Iceland, it was revealed that Prime Minister Gunnlaugsson and his wife kept wealth and shares in a company in an offshore account in the British Virgin Islands. The Panama Papers also showed that his wife’s company had millions of dollars in stock in some of the banks that had failed during the crisis. 22,000 people — around 6 percent of the entire population of the country — came out to protest and demand Gunnlaugsson’s resignation. The Prime Minister, facing a vote of no confidence, attempted to dissolve parliament and call snap elections, but was refused by the President. This caused an even greater loss in confidence, and Gunnlaugsson was forced to resign that spring.<a href="#_ftn127">[127]</a> The Pirates gained even more support as a result of popular backlash against the Progressive Party, and Jónsdóttir hammered home the points that had caused the Pirates to become so popular: “It was so clear at the national meeting. It was so clear how the public wanted to see themselves in the wake of the collapse. What should reflect the nation in its resurrection from a disastrous period are the things most spoken at the meeting: Integrity, transparency, responsibility. Are we seeing this government respond in some way? No.”<a href="#_ftn128">[128]</a></p><p>Much of the Pirates’ rapid rise in the polls owes itself to the governing coalition’s attempts at unilateral withdrawal from the EU. But it was in fact a culmination of factors that led to popular support consolidating behind the Pirates in response to the government’s unpopular decisions.</p><p>First, even though they had only three members of Parliament, the Pirates established themselves early on as the antithesis to the establishment politicians in power. They strongly critiqued the actions of the governing coalition, with Pirate MPs arguing that any sort of assistance program needed to be much more universal to sufficiently deal with the effects of the crash. MP Jón Ólafsson, for example, said that “The expectations they built up could NOT be delivered… 300 billion ISK went down to 80 billion.”<a href="#_ftn129">[129]</a> And Reykjavík municipal city councilman Halldór Svansson stated that it was “Meaningless to talk about how exactly the debt relief will affect the worst off amongst homeowners when the worst off group [of all], renters, are left trapped in poverty.”<a href="#_ftn130">[130]</a> The Pirates wanted it known that, in spite of the populist swell that ushered the Progressives and Independence into power, Icelanders still should not trust the establishment politicians to make these decisions. The Progressives and Independence remained members of a political cartel.</p><p>In line with their radical integrationist philosophies, The Pirates also assumed constitutional reform as one of the most important policy proposals to advocate for, and they had credibility as Jónsdóttir, McCarthy, and several other Pirates strongly supported the constitutional process from the beginning. McCarthy, for instance, wrote in 2011 while the process was still underway, “What’s been made and adopted so far is phenomenal, in my opinion, and shows a very clear progression towards what is probably not the best possible constitution, but very likely the best constitution ever made.” What struck McCarthy as so important about this constitution, moreover, was that it was done by the people — both the randomly-selected, initial brainstorming group, and the council of 25 representatives (who were appointed, but had initially been elected until the Icelandic courts ruled the election results invalid).<a href="#_ftn131">[131]</a></p><p>Moreover, they had acquired credibility by steadfastly assuming a stance of neutrality toward the EU referendum, while every other party leant toward either Euroscepticism or pro-Europeanism. The Pirate Party’s website from 2013 declares, “Pirates stand for transparency and direct democracy, so we think the entire dialogue process should be open and all information should be on the table. The public must then give a well-informed decision in a binding referendum. It is not the role of political parties to agree or oppose membership but, on the contrary, they should be prepared for each outcome.”<a href="#_ftn132">[132]</a> The Pirate Party was neutral, but it was not passive — which gave it a significant advantage in winning over public opinion. Because its ideology is based on decentralization and integration, it was not forced to take a stance in support or opposition of the EU issue. It could, instead, push hard for moving the decision-making authority out of Parliament, fulfilling its campaign promises, further establishing itself in opposition to hegemonic catch-all and cartel politics, and gaining popular goodwill.</p><p>Finally, the Pirates presented a legitimate alternative to traditional politics because they unashamedly expressed their intentions to dramatically change the political dynamic, allow for much greater democratic participation, and eventually to make a centralized, representative parliament unnecessary.<a href="#_ftn133">[133]</a> It is a utopian vision, but one that nonetheless helped the Pirates become the most popular party in Iceland. Birgitta Jónsdóttir described the goal as a “rEvolution” — that is, revolutionary political change through systemic overhaul.<a href="#_ftn134">[134]</a> If this could be achieved, “maybe in the next 50–100 years, we can offload all of the core functions of democracy to the people,” McCarthy said.<a href="#_ftn135">[135]</a> As a result of its integrationist, decentralist ideology, the Pirates became anti-corruption leaders in Iceland almost unintentionally, occupying a niche that no other party could credibly occupy due to their prior associations and platforms. “I think that wasn’t something we were necessarily intending to become,” McCarthy said. “It was more like reality just forced us in that direction because nobody else was picking up that pattern.”<a href="#_ftn136">[136]</a> The Pirates wanted to break the cartelization of the system which had manifested in Iceland having a particularly high level of clientelism in politics.<a href="#_ftn137">[137]</a> Their declared desire to implement direct democratic practices and legislate for greater transparency led them, almost by default, to oppose corruption, because corruption was innate in the system that they wished to upend. “In essence, we’re a system-changing party,” Gunnarsson explained. “[The Pirates] presented that case very strongly and very clearly. And all of the other parties were somehow involved in the process, either before the collapse or then after the collapse. And it was basically only us [outside of it].”<a href="#_ftn138">[138]</a></p><p>Jakob Axelsson, an activist involved in the Pirates’ youth organization, Ungir Píratar, reflected this perception of the party when he was discussing his own personal reasons for joining. His explanation of his attraction to the Pirate Party rests on an appreciation of the party’s uniqueness, its status as an outsider party, and its vision of a different form of Icelandic politics: “Instead of saying whether we should raise or lower taxes, [the Pirates say,] ‘Let’s get things straight. Let’s get the politics to a good start first…’ Why not fix a broken system? Why not fix the system before deciding whether to raise or lower taxes… [I] saw they were regular people and were in no way above me.”<a href="#_ftn139">[139]</a></p><p>The actions of the Pirates in government, their rhetoric in campaigns, and the reasons why people joined them indicate that the party is anti-<em>system</em>, not just anti-<em>establishment</em>. It is the difference between running to try to break the influence of a political elite, and running to try to reform the way that elections are held, the way that parliament is structured, or the level of control that citizens can legally exert over the government. The Pirates fought to undermine the power of the Independence and Progressive parties, but they also called strongly for the overhaul of the perceived issues that, they argued, were inherent in the status quo electoral and democratic system. This is evidenced by the campaign platform for the 2016 elections, which has, as its very first item, constitutional reform: “The Pirate Party will bring power to the people and respond to the requirement for a new social contract which emerged following the economic collapse of 2008. The Pirate Party also wants the provisions that were promised to the people since the foundation of the Republic in 1944, for a new constitution that will take into account changing governance in Iceland.”<a href="#_ftn140">[140]</a> In essence, the more radical, utopian goals of the Pirate Party call for a re-founding of the country based on dramatically increased public participation in government and greater protections against corruption. But many of them recognize that such a utopian system is a long way off and subject to change; Jónsdóttir’s concept of a “rEvolution” — a revolution brought about by systemic change — shows a more moderated version of their goals. McCarthy himself acknowledged that the Pirates attempted too much, too fast regarding the constitutional debate: “What I’m interested in is trying to make iterative improvements, because one of the things that have bit us pretty hard in the whole constitutional debate was this distinction between doing the desirable thing, versus doing the thing that society is ready for.”<a href="#_ftn141">[141]</a></p><p>Nonetheless, the Pirates successfully channeled anti-establishment and anti-system sentiment into public support in 2015–2016, and they took on the role of checking government overreach and being the whistleblower party in Parliament. But it is exceedingly rare for an anti-establishment party to continue to grow after already having representatives elected; as one study of right-wing populist parties found,</p><blockquote>[They] are faced with a particular dilemma in this regard — they highlight themes of grassroots democracy and popular sovereignty. These themes play an important role in attracting and binding members and supporters. At the same time, the success of these parties strongly depends on the personality and skills of their leaders. Thus, democracy-seeking goals are much more part of their populist rhetoric than of their actual behaviour. There is no obvious way out of the tension between populist stances and a highly centralised organisational reality. This is likely to create disappointment and massive internal strife.<a href="#_ftn142">[142]</a></blockquote><p>In addition to the organizational difficulties that anti-political and anti-establishment goals seem to pose for parties, other studies have found that goals of increasing democratic participation and overhauling systems are not as important for winning over voters as goals of simply doing the politician’s job better. The rise of populism over the past few years has given academics a lot of evidence for the fragility of populist rhetoric and the difficulty that parties face balancing personality-driven politics on the one hand with grand promises of change on the other.<a href="#_ftn143">[143]</a> Converting populist interest into consistent gains is something that even the Pirate Parties worldwide have struggled to do. Richard Falkvinge, on the night of the October 2016 Icelandic parliamentary elections, exclaimed that it was a great night for the Pirate movement because, for the first time, Pirates had been reelected — and, in fact, it was the first time that any had dramatically grown their share of seats in a parliament.<a href="#_ftn144">[144]</a></p><p>Icelandic populism has deviated from the trend in other populist movements. Many Icelandic people want something more than just honest politicians: they want a change in the system, and something to break the cycle of Independence-Progressive hegemony that has lasted so long. There is a reason why, as of February 2017, Icelanders are only concerned about healthcare more than corruption in finance and politics.<a href="#_ftn145">[145]</a> They feel not only that the performance of politicians is poor, but also that the system itself is broken. And by establishing itself as a radical integrationist party and by incorporating into its <em>internal </em>structure a desire for greater participation, it contradicts previous studies of populist parties. This partly has to do with the Pirates’ own consistency: their platform calls for instituting direct democracy, and they themselves use direct democratic voting for internal decision-making. They have avoided the tension between high organization and their populist stances by not actually strictly organizing their party; instead, they have embraced decentralization and a plurality of views. As Halldóra Morgensen said, “The Pirates aren’t receptive to anything as a whole.”<a href="#_ftn146">[146]</a> However, that has benefited them more than hurt them, because the Icelandic Pirate Party in particular, as opposed to other Pirate Parties worldwide, has adopted a well-defined ideology based on decentralism. Although McCarthy explained that the core of the party “has been shifting a little” due to a large number of new members joining in recent months, the crowd-determined, decentralist platform in conjunction with its established platform nonetheless provide greater stability and longevity than other populist parties.</p><p>The consolidation of anti-establishment sentiment decreased to a certain extent during the 2016 elections, but the Pirates still won 15 percent of the vote and 10 seats in the Alþingi. The decrease was expected by the Pirates — it was inevitable that some of the fervor and anger directed at the ruling coalition would diffuse and distribute among the other new parties and the Left Greens. By all accounts, it was still a huge win for the Pirates, and they went into the new term in 2017 with a desire to push forward ambitious anti-corruption legislation and to make good on some of the lapsed initiatives, like constitutional reform and the EU referendum.<a href="#_ftn147">[147]</a> In opinion polls done after the election, the Pirates have shown continued consistency in their support base, polling at 13–15 percent.<a href="#_ftn148">[148]</a></p><p>Although the Pirates have enjoyed success in terms of popularity and growth of parliamentary representation, they have not managed to achieve most of their goals yet. The new coalition government is composed of Bright Future — an offshoot of the Best Party — Reform, and Independence, and thus the hegemonic party is in power once again. For the Pirates and their supporters, the primary goal is to somehow break the bloc of voters that has always faithfully voted for Independence. “That’s a change that I want to see,” Young Pirates activist Jakob Axelsson said. “I want people to take informative decisions and [not to] follow a party like a football team. That’s just wrong… You should be open to change and discussion and follow the ones that have the ideas you really agree with.”<a href="#_ftn149">[149]</a></p><p>To achieve this goal, the Pirates are focusing on the issues that they perceive impact people the most and are going under-addressed. For example, they are attempting to push forward potential solutions for the housing crisis, which is caused by a huge buildup of hotels in Reykjavík and a distinct lack of affordable housing. They are also calling for another EU referendum and to restart discussions for the new constitution. Further, Morgensen said that they will be introducing legislation to attempt to force politicians to speak the truth and to disclose important information to the public. “The political landscape right now would make it very difficult for the government not to support it,” she said. “So if they don’t support it, it’s going to be costly.”<a href="#_ftn150">[150]</a></p><p>But while many of the Pirates are surely concerned with the next elections in 2020, others are more focused on simply attempting to start serious conversations about the state of the political system in Iceland and how to improve it. “It’s just about changing the conversation and planting seeds, and whether we carry on or not as a Pirate Party I don’t think matters,” Morgensen said.<a href="#_ftn151">[151]</a> Many voters have taken to the authenticity presented by such declarations, and the Pirate Party finds itself now in a decent position to continue to make gains in the coming years.</p><p>A sharp increase in the popularity of the Left Greens has presented them an opportunity, as well: as the most left-wing party in Iceland, the Left Greens are less establishment than the other major parties, and they appeal to a similar demographic as the Pirates.<a href="#_ftn152">[152]</a> The coalition led by Independence is already facing a precipitous fall in polling numbers. Perhaps the Pirates can find allies in the Left Green Movement and work with them to further their anti-establishment, reformist agenda.</p><p>Even though they did not fulfill expectations in the 2016 parliamentary elections, the Pirate Party nonetheless still remains the voice of anti-corruption in parliament — and as such, it will continue to have power for the foreseeable future. It has successfully built up legitimacy and credibility as a political party through a consistency in its rhetoric and efforts that traces all the way back to the financial crisis. In addition, it practices what it preaches in a way that neither hard right or hard left populist parties can do: as a non-doctrinal party that creates its platforms through crowdsourcing and consensus using direct democracy, the Pirates avoid the pitfalls of other populist parties that must, at some point, sacrifice promises of greater participation for the continuation of the ideology, or vise versa. The Pirates’ ideology <em>is</em> democratic participation. It is avowedly nonpartisan, and rejects labels of left or right (although, if one had to place them, they would certainly be toward the left). As McCarthy wrote in 2012, soon after the founding of the party, “Left and right stop making sense in the networked age. The generation of people engaged in so-called ‘information politics’ come from an ideology which rejects individualism and socialism as opposites, but rather acknowledge that there is no society without individuals, and without a society, the individual is meaningless.”<a href="#_ftn153">[153]</a> The Pirates’ efforts since McCarthy wrote this reflect his belief. They oppose neither the right nor the left, but the hegemonic center that has risen as a result of catch-all and cartel politics. They advance a liberal-individualist platform that might be called individualistic socialism: it calls for protection and expansion of the safety net, opposition to corporate consolidation, encouragement of popular innovation and entrepreneurship, and above all popular control of the government.<a href="#_ftn154">[154]</a></p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The rise of Icelandic populism and the Pirate Party is thus a story of centuries of tension between conservative and liberal individualism. In feudal Iceland, a cleavage emerged between proponents and opponents of the social order. For most of Iceland’s history, the conservatives have dominated society — except for two significant historical moments. First, the liberals successfully secured an egalitarian independence in the early twentieth century; second, the Pots and Pans Revolution after the financial crisis of 2008 toppled the conservative government. During most of the twentieth century, Icelanders valued democratic participation and political autonomy, but cast suspicion on dramatic structural change and revolution. Its historical poverty, isolation, and obsession with world events created a culture of fierce individualism, a desire to see Iceland succeed, but also a fear of turmoil.</p><p>The one example of Icelandic agitation comes from the independence movement of the nineteenth century, wherein Icelanders were faced with obvious shortcomings of the Danish regime in its responses to Icelandic crises. Coupled with increased Danish hegemony, this helped Icelandic intelligentsia convince Icelanders that political autonomy was in their best interest, and independence was the only way to regain full autonomy. They were placed in a situation where everyone’s individualism — both personal and national — was under threat, and so it superseded the conservative impulse.</p><p>The next time that this sort of activism was meaningfully engaged for a long period of time was 2008 when decades of Independence Party power and political cartelization had created a powerful center which helped institute a full suite of neoliberal policies in the 1990s and early 2000s. At first, these policies gave Iceland almost miraculous riches, then the bubble burst and sent the country into a massive tailspin. The economic crisis of 2008 awakened a resistance in Icelandic society. Although the special elections of 2009 brought left-wing parties to power, leftism did not suddenly mobilize. Rather, a nonpartisan, and in many cases non-ideological populism emerged that was based first and foremost on holding the cartel system, and especially Independence, accountable. The elections of several MPs of the Citizens’ Movement and councilpeople of the Best Party, both running on platforms of radical change rather than detailed policy proposals, showed the nature of the vehement frustration of Iceland: they wanted sincerity and change, but most of all, they wanted to register their overwhelming anger toward a system that let politicians institute policies that brought about the crash.</p><p>The Pirate Party is a focused, defined, and developed product of this initial anger after the crisis. It is a radical integrationist party that rose to prominence because Iceland’s populism was at its core a revolt against a system that resulted in political hegemony. The Pirate Party came to represent radical change with a specific, directed purpose: to institute democratic reforms to bring the individual voice into power. When Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson and the Progressive-Independence coalition killed constitutional reform and then unilaterally withdrew from EU accession talks from 2013–2015, it was the final proof that many Icelanders needed that the system was rotten, and it needed to go. But all other parties were somehow connected, either historically or by proxy. Only the Pirate Party had the credibility as a true anti-establishment, anti-center party. It was the only party espousing the kind of hegemony of the individual over the political that many Icelanders craved. And so, in 2015–2016, the Pirate Party became the most popular party in Iceland, and in October 2016 it won ten seats in Parliament, more than tripling its previous total.</p><p>It remains to be seen whether the Pirates can continue to gain influence in Iceland and eventually implement their goals, or whether they will remain as a minority party, vocal but relatively powerless. In any case, the Pirate Party remains as a unique example of a relatively successful populist party, one that did not rely on any ideology except that of decentralization and individualism. The Pirates set out to apply the philosophy of the Internet to politics, but they found success by expanding to reflecting the spirit of the Internet, such as egalitarianism and equality of opportunity. Whereas other Pirate Parties faltered due to political incoherence and inexperience, the Icelandic Pirate Party grew and survived because it centered its platform on a utopian vision of decentralized government coupled with a more grounded form of liberal individualism and incremental systemic change.</p><p>Iceland’s Pirate Party stands in stark contrast to the strong, hard-right movements posing significant challenges to the establishment in other European countries. Further study might focus on the resistance of Iceland’s culture and political system to right-wing nativist populism. Although the Progressives adopted some nativist rhetoric in the 2013 campaign, they nonetheless stopped short of transforming into a right-wing populist party like Germany’s AfD or France’s National Front. A hard-right nationalist party, the Icelandic National Front, was founded in 2016 specifically to support Christian culture and oppose greater immigration. However, the party failed to make much of an impact in the 2016 elections, as it was not able to get on the ballot in four electoral regions. Further research might investigate whether Iceland is vulnerable to a consolidated, nativist movement in the future, as Smári McCarthy believes it is: “I think we dodged a bullet this time, and I don’t see them coming back any time soon. But the next populist in the deceptive and mean way, we might not dodge them.”<a href="#_ftn155">[155]</a> Ultimately, Iceland’s populist impulse found a much different outlet in the liberal individualism and radical decentralism of the Pirate Party. Time will tell if it will remain that way.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> I use a broad conception of populism in this paper, one that includes both left- and right-wing populist parties, loosely based on Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell’s definition: “an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice.” From “The Sceptre and the Spectre,” <em>Twenty-First Century Populism</em>, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> I use Otto Kirchheimer’s definition of “catch-all party” as one that “abandon[s] attempts at the intellectual and moral encadrement of the masses… [and] turn[s] more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success.” From Otto Kirchheimer, “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems,” <em>Political Parties and Political Development</em>, ed. Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. I further use Richard Katz’s definition of cartel parties: “The cartel party thesis holds that political parties increasingly function like cartels, employing the resources of the state to limit political com petition and ensure their own electoral success.” From Richard Katz and Peter Mair, “The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement,” <em>Perspectives on Politics</em>, 7(4), December 2009, 753.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> <em>The Árni Magnússon Institute for Icelandic Studies</em></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Sigurður Gylfi Magnússon, <em>Wasteland with Words</em>, London: Reaktion Books, 2010,<em> </em>154</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Magnússon 155</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Guðmundur Hálfdanarson, <em>Old Provinces, Modern Nations</em>, Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1991, 88.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Hálfdanarson., 89; Magnússon 48</p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> Magnússon 36</p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Ibid., 37</p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> Erik Klemetti, “Local and Global Impacts of the 1783–84 Laki Eruption in Iceland, <em>Wired</em>, June 7, 2013.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> Tom de Castella, “The Eruption that Changed Iceland Forever,” <em>BBC</em>, April 16, 2010.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> Hálfdanarson, 91</p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> Ibid., 90–91.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[14]</a> Hálfdanarson., 94.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[15]</a> Ibid., 95.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[16]</a> Ibid., 97.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[17]</a> Magnússon, 38</p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[18]</a> Ibid., 39</p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[19]</a> Önnudottir, “The Pots and Pans Protests and Requirements for Responsiveness of the Authorities,” <em>Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration </em>12(2), 2016,<em> </em>196.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref20">[20]</a> Magnússon, 39</p><p><a href="#_ftnref21">[21]</a> Indriði Indriðason, “Re-electing the Culprits of the Crisis?” <em>Scandinavian Political Studies</em>, September 2016, 8.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref22">[22]</a> Indriðason, 11; Guðmundur Oddsson, “Neoliberal Globalization and Heightened Perceptions of Class Division in Iceland,” <em>The Sociological Quarterly</em>, 57, 2016,<em> </em>469.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref23">[23]</a> Kirchheimer, 183–184.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref24">[24]</a> Ibid., 184–185.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref25">[25]</a> Svanur Kristjánsson, “The Electoral Basis of the Icelandic Independence Party, 1929–1944,” <em>Scandinavian Political Studies</em>, 1979.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref26">[26]</a> Ibid.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref27">[27]</a> Kristjánsson.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref28">[28]</a> Ibid.; Kirchheimer, 187.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref29">[29]</a> Mark Blyth and Richard Katz, “From Catch-all Politics to Cartelisation: The Political Economy of the Cartel Party,” <em>West European Politics</em> 28(1), January 2005, 42.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref30">[30]</a> Richard Tomasson, <em>Iceland: The First New Society</em>, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980, 42.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref31">[31]</a> Kirchheimer, 199.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref32">[32]</a> Ibid., 200.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref33">[33]</a> Robert Wade and Silla Sigurgeirsdóttir, “Iceland’s Rise, Fall, Stabilisation and Beyond,” <em>Cambridge Journal of Economics</em>, 36(1), 2013, 132–133; Roger Boyes, <em>Meltdown Iceland</em>, London: Bloomsbury, 2009.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref34">[34]</a> Wade, 135.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref35">[35]</a> Martin Hart-Landsberg, “Lessons from Iceland,” <em>Monthly Review</em>, 65(5), October 2013.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref36">[36]</a> Guðni Jóhannesson, <em>The History of Iceland</em>, Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 2013, 143.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref37">[37]</a> “Policy Statement of the Government of the Independence Party and the Social Democratic 2007,” <em>Government Offices of Iceland</em>, May 23, 2007.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref38">[38]</a> Torbjörn Bergman, <em>Europeanization and Icelandic Political Parties</em>, May 2007.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref39">[39]</a> Amir Abedi, <em>Anti-political Establishment Parties: A Comparative Analysis</em>, New York: Routledge, 2004,<em> </em>30–99.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref40">[40]</a> Wade, 135.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref41">[41]</a> Heather Timmons, “Iceland’s Fizzy Economy Faces a Test,” <em>The New York Times</em>, April 18, 2006.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref42">[42]</a> Matt O’Brien, “The Miraculous Story of Iceland,” <em>The Washington Post</em>, June 17, 2015.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref43">[43]</a> “West Ham Accept £85m Takeover Bid,” <em>BBC</em>, November 21, 2006.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref44">[44]</a> Timmons, <em>New York Times</em>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref45">[45]</a> Wade, 128.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref46">[46]</a> Mark Lander, “Iceland, a Tiny Dynamo, Loses Steam,” <em>New York Times</em>, April 18, 2008.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref47">[47]</a> Matt O’Brien, “The Miraculous Story of Iceland,” <em>The Washington Post</em>, June 17, 2008.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref48">[48]</a> Ibid.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref49">[49]</a> Liz Alderman, “Iceland, Symbol of Financial Crisis, Finally Lifts Capital Controls,” <em>The New York Times</em>, March 14, 2017.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref50">[50]</a> Ian Parker, “Lost,” <em>New Yorker</em>, March 9, 2009.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref51">[51]</a> Smári McCarthy, interview with author, recording, Reykjavík, Iceland, February 7, 2017.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref52">[52]</a> Parker, <em>New Yorker</em>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref53">[53]</a> Donatella Della Porta et al., <em>Late Neoliberalism and Its Discontents in the Economic Crisis</em>, Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 47</p><p><a href="#_ftnref54">[54]</a> Parker, <em>New Yorker</em>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref55">[55]</a> Ólafur Harðarson, “The Parliamentary Election in Iceland, April 2009,” <em>Electoral Studies </em>29(3), September 2010, 523.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref56">[56]</a> Valur Gunnarsson, “Icelandic PM Becomes World’s First Leader to Step Down Over Banking System Crisis,” <em>The Guardian</em>, January 26, 2009.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref57">[57]</a> Harðarson, 523.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref58">[58]</a> Ibid., 525.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref59">[59]</a> Harðarson, 526.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref60">[60]</a> Ibid., 527.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref61">[61]</a> Harðarson, 526.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref62">[62]</a> Haukur Magnússon, “The Citizen Movement,” <em>The Grapevine</em>, April 3, 2009.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref63">[63]</a> Kirchheimer, 190–195.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref64">[64]</a> Icelandic National Election Survey (ICENES), <em>The Social Science Research Institute</em>, 2007–9.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref65">[65]</a> Dominic Boyer, “Simply the best: Parody and political sincerity in Iceland,” <em>American Ethnologist</em> 40(2), 2013, 278.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref66">[66]</a> Boyer., 280.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref67">[67]</a> Ibid., 280.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref68">[68]</a> Ibid., 281.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref69">[69]</a> John Rentoul, “Have You Heard the One About Jon Gnarr, the Comedian Who Saved Iceland From Political and Financial Catastrophe?” <em>The Independent</em>, September 13, 2014; Chris Irvine, “Reykjavik Mayor Proposes Cutting Ties With Moscow Over Gay Law,” <em>The Telegraph</em>, July 15, 2013.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref70">[70]</a> Nate Anderson, “Political Pirates: A History of Sweden’s Piratpartiet,” <em>ArsTechnica</em>, February 26, 2009.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref71">[71]</a> Ibid.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref72">[72]</a> Björn Leví Gunnarsson, interview with author, recording, Reykjavík, Iceland, February 10, 2017.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref73">[73]</a> “Gratisgenerationen ger sig in i politiken,” <em>Dagens Nyheter</em>, June 7, 2009.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref74">[74]</a> Richard Falkvinge, “Pirate Party of Berlin Wins, Enters Parliament,” <em>falkvinge.net</em>, September 18, 2011.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref75">[75]</a> Kate Connolly, “German General Election 2013: An Open Race in an Open Field,” <em>The Guardian</em>, September 20, 2012.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref76">[76]</a> Eric Westervelt, “A Party on the Rise, Germany’s Pirates Come Ashore,” <em>NPR</em>, June 6, 2012.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref77">[77]</a> Josephine Huetlin, “The Rise and Fall of the Pirate Party,” <em>New Republic</em>, September 29, 2016.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref78">[78]</a> Annett Meiritz and Fabian Reinbold, “Germany’s Struggling Pirate Party,” <em>Spiegel Online</em>, September 19, 2013.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref79">[79]</a> Philip Oltermann, “German Pirate Party Politician ‘Confessed to Murder Before Suicide,’” <em>The Guardian</em>, September 22, 2016.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref80">[80]</a> Wolfram Nordsieck, <em>Parties and Elections Database</em>, <a href="http://www.parties-and-elections.eu./">http://www.parties-and-elections.eu.</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref81">[81]</a> Swarm economics is a decentralized economic theory that the Pirate Wheel defines as “Citizens, not corporations, mak[ing] the economy. Volunteer work is valued.” It is an anti-corporatocratic, post-industrial form of economics that Falkvinge envisions as ushering in the end of fixed work times and workplaces and the growth of laborers holding five to ten paid jobs at once. Such an economy requires Universal Basic Income to work. Richard Falkvinge, “More Thoughts on the Coming Swarm Economy,” <em>Falkvinge on Liberty</em>, August 31, 2013.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref82">[82]</a> Richard Falkvinge, “Philosophies and Policies of the Pirate Wheel,” <em>Falkvinge on Liberty</em>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref83">[83]</a> McCarthy, interview with author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref84">[84]</a> Halldóra Morgensen, interview with author, recording, Reykjavík, Iceland, February 7, 2017.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref85">[85]</a> Huetlin, <em>The New Republic</em>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref86">[86]</a> McCarthy, interview with author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref87">[87]</a> Ibid.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref88">[88]</a> McCarthy, interview with author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref89">[89]</a> Ibid.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref90">[90]</a> Piratar.is, February 2013, accessed using Wayback Machine.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref91">[91]</a> Laurie Penny, “Laurie Penny on Iceland’s Elections: A Shattered Fairy Tale,”<em> New Statesman</em>, May 8, 2013.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref92">[92]</a> Gunnarsson, interview with author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref93">[93]</a> “Right Back,” <em>The Economist</em>, May 4, 2013; Tom Peck, “Vote for Us — the Politicians Who Bankrupted Iceland!” <em>Independent</em>, April 26, 2013.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref94">[94]</a> ICENES, 2007, 2009, 2013</p><p><a href="#_ftnref95">[95]</a> Indridi Indridason, “Re-Electing the Culprits of the Crisis? Elections in the Aftermath of a Recession,” <em>Scandinavian Political Studies</em>, September 2016, 24.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref96">[96]</a> Ibid.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref97">[97]</a> “Lokatölur og Þingmenn,” <em>RÚV</em>, April 28, 2013. <a href="http://www.ruv.is/frett/lokatolur-og-thingmenn">http://www.ruv.is/frett/lokatolur-og-thingmenn</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref98">[98]</a> ICENES 2013.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref99">[99]</a> “Iceland to Become International Transparency Haven,” <em>International Modern Media Institute</em>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref100">[100]</a> Andy Greenberg, “Icelandic Legislator: I’m Ready to Help NSA Whistleblower Edward Snowden Seek Asylum,” <em>Forbes</em>, June 9, 2013.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref101">[101]</a> McCarthy, interview with author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref102">[102]</a> C. Robert Gibson, “5 Ways the U.S. Can Have an Icelandic Revolution,” <em>Huffington Post</em>, June 5, 2013.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref103">[103]</a> Public opinion polling graph from: “Iceland Parliamentary Election, 2016,” <em>Wikipedia</em>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref104">[104]</a> Wikipedia tabulation of public opinion polls from <em>Gallup</em>, <em>University of Iceland</em>, <em>MMR</em>, <em>Fréttablaðið</em>;</p><p><a href="#_ftnref105">[105]</a> The Pirate Party Is Now Measured as the Biggest Political Party in Iceland,” <em>Vísir</em>, March 19, 2015.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref106">[106]</a> Eiríkur Bergmann, “Populism in Iceland: Has the Progressive Party Turned Populist?” I<em>celandic Review of Politics and Administration </em>11(1), June 2015, 45–46.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref107">[107]</a> Alþingi website, 2011.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref108">[108]</a> Bergmann, 49.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref109">[109]</a> Ibid., 50.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref110">[110]</a> Indridason, 23–24.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref111">[111]</a> Haukur Már Helgason, “This Is the Correction,” <em>Reykjavík Grapevine</em>, November 11, 2014.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref112">[112]</a> Ibid.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref113">[113]</a> Olafur Margeirsson, “The Icelandic Debt Relief,” <em>Icelandic Economics</em>, December 2, 2013.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref114">[114]</a> David Kestenbaum, “Iceland Experiments With A Jubilee Of Debt Forgiveness,” <em>NPR</em>, December 11, 2014.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref115">[115]</a> Robert Robertsson, “Voters in Iceland Back New Constitution, More Resource Control,” <em>Reuters</em>, October 21, 2012.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref116">[116]</a> Leo Mirani, “Iceland’s Experiment With Crowd-Sourcing Its Constitution Just Died,” <em>Quartz</em>, March 29, 2013.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref117">[117]</a> Wikipedia tabulation of public opinion polls from <em>Gallup</em>, <em>University of Iceland</em>, <em>MMR</em>, <em>Fréttablaðið</em>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref118">[118]</a> Paul Fontaine, “Nearly 40,000 Sign Petition On EU Referendum, <em>Reykjavík Grapevine</em>, February 28, 2014.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref119">[119]</a> Richard Milne, “Iceland’s New Coalition Government Suspends EU Accession Talks,” <em>Financial Times</em>, May 22, 2013.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref120">[120]</a> Fontaine, February 28, 2014.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref121">[121]</a> Paul Fontaine, “Overwhelming Majority Want Referendum, Foreign Minister Says ‘Out of the Question’,” <em>Reykjavík Grapevine</em>, March 3, 2014.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref122">[122]</a> Paul Fontaine, “Conservative Chair: Referendum ‘Unrealistic’,”<em> Reykjavík Grapevine</em>, March 5, 2014.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref123">[123]</a> “Við teljum að þessu máli sé lokið,” <em>RÚV</em>, March 12, 2015.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref124">[124]</a> Nanna Árnadottir, “Foreign Minister Drops Iceland EU Bid, Doesn’t Run It Past Parliament First,” <em>Reykjavík Grapevine</em>, March 13, 2015.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref125">[125]</a> Jón Benediktsson, “In Pictures: 7,000 Protest Breaking EU Talks,” <em>Reykjavík Grapevine</em>, March 15, 2015.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref126">[126]</a> “The Beginning of the End of the Government,” <em>RUV</em>, March 12, 2015.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref127">[127]</a> Thorgils Jonsson, “Arctic Mutiny,” <em>Foreign Affairs</em>, April 11, 2016.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref128">[128]</a> Birgitta Jónsdóttir, Speech to Alþingi, April 8, 2016.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref129">[129]</a> José Tirado, “Pirates Causing Trouble in Iceland,” <em>Counter Punch</em>, May 19, 2015.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref130">[130]</a> Paul Fontaine, “What About the Renters?” <em>Reykjavík Grapevine</em>, November 10, 2014.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref131">[131]</a> Smári McCarthy, “The Constitution So Far,” <em>Smári McCarthy</em>, June 13, 2011.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref132">[132]</a> Piratar.is.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref133">[133]</a> Smári McCarthy, “The Pirates of Enlightenment,” <em>Smári McCarthy</em>, June 6, 2012;</p><p><a href="#_ftnref134">[134]</a> Steve Rushton, “Anarchist and Parliamentarian, Iceland’s Birgitta Jónsdóttir Talks Big E-Revolution,” <em>Occupy</em>, April 1, 2014.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref135">[135]</a> McCarthy, interview with author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref136">[136]</a> Ibid.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref137">[137]</a> Bergmann, 2007.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref138">[138]</a> Gunnarsson, interview with author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref139">[139]</a> Jakob Axelsson, interview with author, recording, Reykjavík, Iceland, February 6, 2017.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref140">[140]</a> Icelandic: “Píratar vilja færa valdið til fólksins og verða við kröfunni um nýjan samfélagssáttmála, sem fram kom í kjölfar efnahagshrunsins 2008. Þar með vilja Píratar einnig efna það loforð sem þjóðinni hefur verið gefið allt frá lýðveldisstofnun árið 1944, um nýja stjórnarskrá sem tekur mið af breyttum stjórnarháttum á Íslandi.” From <a href="http://www.piratar.is./">www.piratar.is.</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref141">[141]</a> McCarthy, interview with author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref142">[142]</a> Amir Abedi and Thomas Lundberg, “Doomed to Failure?” <em>Parliamentary Affairs</em>, 62(1), October 3, 2008, 72–87.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref143">[143]</a> Nick Clarke et al., “Anti-Politics and the Left,” <em>Renewal: A Journal of Labour Politics</em>, 2016.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref144">[144]</a> Richard Falkvinge, “Reykjavik: Icelandic Pirates Triple Result, But Not Largest Party,” <em>Falkvinge on Liberty</em>, October 30, 2016.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref145">[145]</a> Paul Fontaine, “Icelanders Nearly As Concerned About Corruption As They Are About Health Care,” <em>Reykjavík Grapevine</em>, February 15, 2017.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref146">[146]</a> Morgensen, interview with author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref147">[147]</a> “General Elections 2016 in Iceland,” <em>Iceland Monitor</em>, October 30, 2016; Nanna Árnadóttir, “Pirate Party Want Referendum to Restart EU Talks,” <em>Grapevine</em>, March 30, 2017.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref148">[148]</a> “Stuðningur við Ríkisstjórnina,” <em>MMR</em>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref149">[149]</a> Axelsson, interview with author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref150">[150]</a> Morgensen, interview with author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref151">[151]</a> Morgensen, interview with author.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref152">[152]</a> “Support for Center Right Coalition Crumbles, Large Shift to Left in Latest Poll,” <em>Iceland Magazine</em>, March 23, 2017.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref153">[153]</a> Smári McCarthy, “The Pirates of Enlightenment,” <em>Smári McCarthy</em>, June 26, 2012.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref154">[154]</a> McCarthy, interview with author; piratar.is.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref155">[155]</a> McCarthy, interview with author.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6ea9aee2d1c7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ísland 2/6]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AlexBNewhouse/%C3%ADsland-2-6-bfa7460b12a9?source=rss-16f60ae959a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bfa7460b12a9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iceland]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[reykjavik]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Newhouse]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Feb 2017 03:04:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-16T03:04:36.408Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At long last the first day winds to its close, the sun sinking away, only showing for a short time, I am long awake in the night</p><p>for that single moment the clouds cleared as the sun made its slow unearthly slow ascent</p><p>hint of rose on the horizon washing together with dozens of shades of night blue.</p><p>The plateau, the great hulking beast, covered and veiled with snow, gullies of that black-brown lava rock turned crystalline.</p><p>I am long awake. Hours pass. The rain falls. Corrugated roofs funnel water down onto multilingual tourists struggling against the subarctic.</p><p>Now. the bitter taste of local beer; the flicker of candlelight; comfort in wood paneling, the soft eclectic music in the background, the local tending bar. Money, language, all different. But still comfort as exhaustion stays away; I write by firelight.</p><p>Clinking glass and the lilting music of a frontier language that withstands time like the people have. The bitter-but-sweet of pale ale, brewed locally by Americans. The omnipresent American complaining about prices and the near-perfect Icelandic accent in response, humoring the útlendingur.</p><p>Stranger in a strange land but in spite of that, it feels comfortable. Frontier blood become lively in frontier land. As much as a large metro area can be “frontier”; as much as a suburbanite can be “frontier”. Still. Land-open, windswept, rugged — invisible but felt. The plateau rising in the distance, above the fishing boats and harbors. The feeling that we are naught but visitors.</p><p>The land of ice and deep, long-held memories. The land of a people who exist as a living history. Iceland the land that is nothing like I expected, but holds an inescapable influence over me. I cannot resist this volcanic country, this land of Geysir and Oðin and Reykjavík.</p><p>So I sit, in a Reykjavík pub, Icelandic filtering in from around me. A saga of my own.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bfa7460b12a9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Reykjavík, Ísland]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AlexBNewhouse/reykjav%C3%ADk-%C3%ADsland-62aada63655b?source=rss-16f60ae959a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/62aada63655b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iceland]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[travel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[reykjavik]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Newhouse]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 Feb 2017 18:51:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-09T18:51:25.839Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There’s a spot on Laugavegur where the road forks, to the right a slanted road scythes off up a hill up toward a massive, unearthly gray cathedral cutting up into the sky, a monument to Nordic modernism more imposing, awe-inspiring, than the Catholic cathedrals, at once unsettling and beautiful; Hallgrímskirkja rises high no matter what time of day, a beacon and signal above the rest of Reykjavík, a symbol where the dual identities are shown out like a lighthouse of national symbolism —</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZPdghI4ypsANDJenxIurWQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>And down to the left, from that same spot on Laugavegur, you look at the harbor, the fjord with its constant stream of activity, fishing and industrial and trade, the vividness of ship colors warring with the deep maroon-burgundy of metal rusted in the relentless Icelandic wind; left on this corner, you can choose one of two paths: to go down to the water, to gaze out at Mt. Esja — carved by glaciers and the unstoppable passage of time — to look out upon the identity of Iceland the Island; or you can walk up to the concrete spear and climb to the top, standing on top of that mark of the identity of Iceland the country that grew from Viking hinterland to progressive, high-tech Nordic utopia.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*STNAjYIBPbd6Tzw0fLhiHg.jpeg" /></figure><p>But the scars of that progress cannot be hidden, and in Reykjavík, this city on the sea, the wounds left by reckless prosperity-crash-(possibly still reckless) prosperity oft dominate sightlines more than the nature that gave this country its character in the first place. You will never hear more languages in a half-mile stretch than on the streets of Reykjavík — in fact, you’ll never hear more languages than when you’re simply waiting in line for one of the world-famous hot dogs at Bæjarins Betzu Pylsur (visited by one William Clinton): Russian, German, British English, American English, Danish, and Icelandic from the poor guy working the stand whose worn face brightens when a local Icelander tolerates the long line of útlendingur and actually orders in <em>Icelandic</em>, the lilting, musical language somehow unexpected in line at this nondescript, tiny hot-dog stand in the middle of the most expensive district in the city.</p><p>And indeed, even here the scars cannot be hidden. Locals remember not so long ago when you could grab a pylsa (with everything, obviously) for a few hundred króna and look out to the North at the harbor. Now, you stand in the unmemorable Bæjarins Betzu Pylsur parking lot at one of the few tables and eat your (<em>still really damn good</em>) hot dog in the shadow of two massive hotel developments. And then you start seeing the developments everywhere. In a city of 200,000, a city where the skyline once consisted of Hallgrímskirkja and dozens of brightly-colored houses, the towering monoliths of tourist excess have begun their slow march to domination. Follow the tower cranes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EPyf5aWLWOxLze0XTsq-JA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Not much you can do but watch and lament for the Reykjavík that once was, and note that you, yourself are part of the problem. “It got to the point where it wasn’t worth writing the menu items in Icelandic anymore,” one barista at the Stofan Kaffihús tells me. So it goes.</p><p>But of course, Reykjavík is no San Francisco and never will be. It is a different city, one that acts much larger than it is, but still, at its heart, remains the small center of fishing, industry, and service, that most northern of all country capitals. And the character remains, subtle but there. In its designation as a UNESCO World City of Literature. In the perfect preservation of a house that claims fame from a failed meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s that nonetheless is a source of pride for Icelanders. Höfði House is surrounded by tech offices and shopping centers and bordered by the busiest road in the city, but nonetheless its site is a place of calmness and space and symbolism, a reminder that Iceland, as small as it is, remains a facilitator of reconciliation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iWiI-rXSyA8UahJcNLsEVw.jpeg" /></figure><p>And Reykjavík proper is found in the street art, the graffiti-turned-murals that decorate many of the shops and restaurants and apartment blocks. Here you see the Icelandic pathos in full effect: beautiful expressions of an artistic impulse that has pervaded through the generations, from the times that Vikings first set foot on the island, making it one of the most prolific countries in literature, music, painting. The street art seems how they keep the city Icelandic. It is decoration incongruous with the rapidly accelerating march of consumer tourism and the Icelandic Mythos that has firmly implanted itself in the minds of hyper-liberal, outdoors-inclined millennials from across the world — the same mythos that drew me here. A 30-foot mural facing down some of the tallest buildings in Iceland, buildings that didn’t exist 3 years ago and today are ridiculed because inside their walls live the Itinerant Gap-Year Traveler and the Upper Middle Class Élite, while Icelanders leave because they cannot find a place to live. These murals are not exactly an explicit resistance, but I see these nonetheless as providing an outlet of Icelandic identity and a longing for balance. There’s very little nativism here. Icelanders are under no illusions about the dependence on tourists. But perhaps not all of these hotels are needed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zZC9b_XnIvZvurqA7LipxA.jpeg" /></figure><p>There’s a reason why I cannot be anything but eternally entranced by this tiny volcanic rock, perilously close to the Arctic. I cannot break away from the pull of a country that manages to survive its identity past the tourists that outnumber citizens 10:1. I cannot help but admire a country that seeks not a role as a superpower, or even Icelandic exceptionalism, but rather simply the opportunity to show the world a different way of being, one that focuses on the experimental and weird and comical. Almost in spite of itself, in spite of years of stuffy and conservative ideals, Iceland has become a laboratory of progressivism and alternativism. How can you not love it? And so the hotels go up, but underneath nonetheless there still holds on a core of culture.</p><p>Look for it on the walls, in the alleys, off the fork on Laugavegur.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=62aada63655b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dreaming of Zero: Realpolitik and Anarchism in Thomas Pynchon’s “Gravity’s Rainbow”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AlexBNewhouse/dreaming-of-zero-realpolitik-and-anarchism-in-thomas-pynchons-gravity-s-rainbow-26520707e802?source=rss-16f60ae959a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/26520707e802</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[anarchism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[postmodernism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[literature]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gravitys-rainbow]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Alex Newhouse]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Dec 2016 15:26:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-12-02T15:26:48.846Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<blockquote>There is a Hand to turn the time,</blockquote><blockquote>Though thy Glass today be run,</blockquote><blockquote>Till the Light that hath brought the Towers low</blockquote><blockquote>Find the last poor Pret’rite one…</blockquote><blockquote>Till the Riders sleep by ev’ry road,</blockquote><blockquote>All through our crippl’d Zone,</blockquote><blockquote>With a face on ev’ry mountainside,</blockquote><blockquote>And a Soul in ev’ry stone….</blockquote><blockquote>Now everybody —</blockquote><p>While Thomas Pynchon was working on his novel <em>Gravity’s Rainbow </em>in the 1960s and early 1970s, the United States was experiencing profound social, economic, and political change. The tremors started by the Civil Rights Movement swept across the breadth of the country, the Vietnam War incited massive protests and civil unrest while costing billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of lives, and the revolution in American culture subverted traditions that were seemingly immutable before. <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em>, first published in 1973, touches upon all of these conflicts in turn. It aligns itself with the antiestablishment, countercultural movement that questioned the very foundation of politics. It is an expression of the American anarchist impulse, and its characters and thematic elements often point toward anarchy as the utopian ideal of human society. It argues that, after exhausting itself on pointless, arbitrary political jockeying and war, society may transcend political structures and reach an antiauthoritarian state based on communalism and cooperation.</p><p>But <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> does not simply propose anarchy as an alternative. In addition to suggesting that anarchy could present a means of freedom from institutional oppression, the novel also specifically tears down the assumptions about politics that dominate contemporary culture. The political theory developed by Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli created the foundation of <em>realpolitik</em>, or the school of thought that, put simply, emphasizes that countries should pursue national security and power as a means to achieve security above all else.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> This theory helped solidify the primacy of several political norms, such as a determination to avoid political disorder and the state of nature at all costs. <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em>, however, challenges these pillars of politics by directly subverting <em>realpolitik</em>. The novel conveys traditional government as a brutal and amoral institution, warped and cruel, hell-bent on preserving the security of the State at all costs.</p><p>In spite of his anarchic sentiments, Pynchon certainly is not an idealist. <em>Gravity’s Rainbow </em>addresses the fact that the dismantlement of government would leave behind a dangerous power vacuum — one that could just as easily resurrect the power structures that oppress the populace and lead to violence. In response, the novel presents the dreams of Squalidozzi and the submarine anarchists as something of a utopian vision of the world as it could be, while acknowledging that not any one anarchist commune is likely to triumph in a post-State world. In this consideration of anarchy, Pynchon writes as a contemporary of poststructuralists like Michel Foucault who first conceptualized society as composed of networks of interactions, socializations, and associations, rather than of discrete entities. Although Pynchon does not fit perfectly into the poststructuralist mold, his critique of the realist framework and tentative endorsement of anarchy fit more with the tradition of Foucault and post-anarchists rather than traditional anarchist theorists.</p><p><strong>Section I. Hobbes, Machiavelli, and <em>Realpolitik</em></strong></p><p><em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> does not fit neatly into a theoretical framework. It is famous in part because it resists the attribution of any one label. Its meandering, nonlinear story seems to propose different, and sometimes contradictory, conclusions at every turn. But it is important to note that the novel still is doing <em>something</em>; its tracking of protagonist Tyrone Slothrop through a war-torn Europe still has weight and consequence. While there is no one way to make sense of all of Pynchon’s mysterious and enigmatic characters and plot, the fact that the novel is unorthodox to the point of chaos and disorder gives readers a foundation from which to build an understanding of Slothrop, the post-war “Zone” that arises in Germany after World War II, and the ever-present V2, the Rocket that leads both to ruin and salvation. The novel’s tumultuous structure is, in fact, the most obvious hint that Pynchon aims to not just critique, but upend convention, both in style and in content. To Pynchon, politics represents one such facet of society that has repeatedly failed the people and led to exploitation. <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> does not just criticize contemporary politics in general, but it also takes on the pillars of political tradition that are based on Machiavellianism and Hobbesianism.</p><p><em>Machiavelli</em></p><p>Thomas Pynchon knew about Niccolo Machiavelli and was familiar with his works, especially <em>The Prince</em>. The 16th century Italian statesman and philosopher acts as an antithesis, both direct and indirect, throughout much of Pynchon’s novels. He references the philosopher several times by name in his short story “Under the Rose” and his 1963 debut novel <em>V</em>, both of which critique the Machiavellian conceptions of <em>virtu </em>and <em>fortuna</em> (Rossi 106–107). <em>Gravity’s Rainbow </em>does not call out the philosopher by name, but the political considerations presented by Pynchon in the novel nonetheless clearly target the Machiavellian foundations of modern politics.</p><p>Machiavelli’s theory was informed by his experience working in the government of Florence during the early 16th century. As Anthony Grafton wrote in his introduction to <em>The Prince</em>, “Machiavelli’s political life… began and ended in invasion and revolution. No wonder that he saw the political order as so fragile, and insisted that its preservation must take precedence over the scruples of tender, traditionalist minds” (Machiavelli, <em>Prince </em>xx). Throughout <em>The Prince</em>, Machiavelli makes continual invocations of “<em>virtú</em>” to discuss the correct actions of princes. But whereas virtue to a citizen may mean good and moral action, Machiavelli constructs princely virtue as the pursuit of whatever makes the principality more powerful. Hinting at the security dilemmas facing national leaders, a theory later refined by Hobbes, he argues that “virtuous” action as conceived traditionally leads people to be exploited by those who are not constrained by such moral considerations: “The fact is that a man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous. Therefore if a prince wants to maintain his rule he must be prepared not to be virtuous, and to make use of this or not according to need” (Machiavelli, <em>Prince </em>50). Machiavelli suggests that the necessities of running a principality thus allow for infringement upon people’s rights as understood in relation to morality. Sometimes, a leader must kill for the good of the state. Moreover, Machiavelli believes that a stable political order is the end goal of politics, and authority must do what it can to prevent society from descending into disorder.</p><p>This presents a tension that can become a problem for a prince. People expect their leaders to act good and truthfully, adhering to the norms of morality that common citizens must follow. This presents the leader with a paradox with which he must deal to best rule the state. Machiavelli writes, “A man who neglects what is actually done for what should be done moves towards self-destruction rather than self-preservation” (50). This contradiction between pragmatism and morality becomes a central tenant in both Thomas Hobbes’ theory and the decision-making of countless politicians later, and it forces a leader to sometimes betray his own personal virtues for princely <em>virtú</em> if it means ensuring survival of the state.</p><p><em>The Prince </em>also deals centrally with the necessity of a leader to establish popular legitimacy. Although undoubtedly authoritarian, Machiavelli nonetheless recognizes that a new ruler can have no power unless the people accept his rule. <em>The Prince </em>is filled with examples of leaders who fell to ruin due to mismanagement and inciting the ire of their subjects. For example, he points to the Roman emperor Maximinus, who was deposed soon after acceding to rule because “there was a universal upsurge of indignation against him because of his mean birth, and an upsurge of hatred caused by fear of his ferocity” (66–67). Not much can be done about “mean birth,” but Machiavelli does detail actions that can quell hatred and encourage obedience. For example, a leader must work as hard as possible to neutralize opposition upon acquisition of new territory by catering specifically to its inhabitants. If that does not work, and the territory is “accustomed to freedom,” then the prince can “expect to be destroyed” unless he “wipe[s] them out” to eliminate their “memory of ancient liberty” (18–19). In addition, a prince can deflect dissatisfaction by presenting a façade of virtuousness while nonetheless acting pragmatically. Machiavelli argues that if a prince always adheres to good behavior, such as keeping one’s word, “he will find [such virtuous qualities] harmful; if he only appears to have them they will render him service. He should appear to be compassionate, faithful to his word, kind, guileless, and devout. And indeed he should be so. But his disposition should be such that, if he needs to be the opposite, he knows how” (57). As such, a prince should use strategic deception to make the public think that he is working for moral good, when in fact he is working for the social good.</p><p>This also means that if a prince cannot secure the love of his people, he must inspire within them fear of retribution for disloyalty. In Machiavelli’s view (and later Hobbes’), people are:</p><blockquote>Ungrateful, fickle, liars, and deceivers, they shun danger and are greedy for profit; while you treat them well, they are yours… Men worry less about doing an injury to one who makes himself loved than to one who makes himself feared. For love is secured by a bond of gratitude which men, wretched creatures that they are, break when it is to their advantage to do so; but fear is strengthened by a dread of punishment which is always effective. (54)</blockquote><p>A prince should then focus on establishing respect through fear, because that is the only certain way that he can ensure that his people will serve, fight, and die for him. This passage also emphasizes the underlying force pushing forward Machiavelli’s theory of princely <em>virtú</em>: that people are inherently “fickle” and cannot be trusted to act well. Thus, a good prince must “rely on what he controls” (56) to establish loyalty, which, in this case, is the people’s fear of him. This authoritarian strategy becomes important in <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em>, as the State in the novel attempts to expand its power and wield paranoia as a means of control.</p><p>In his book <em>The Machiavellian Moment</em>, J.G.A. Pocock points out that Machiavelli does not address in depth the nature of kings and other long-ruling leaders. As Pocock states, “An absolute monarch… was defined by his relation to a body of law which was part of the complex scheme of his own legitimation; the ‘new prince’ lacked legitimacy altogether and consequently was not what we mean by a king” (159). <em>The Prince </em>deals with innovative leaders: those with newly acquired power who are attempting to consolidate and ensure the security of their state. Machiavelli investigates how a prince should operate to gain power and legitimacy from people who are already accustomed to living under a ruler. To do this, the prince must act ruthlessly, without qualms. He or she must fill the gap left by the deposed ruler. Disorder, after all, is the downfall of states and the great danger to life.</p><p>Machiavelli’s discussion in <em>The Prince </em>gives vital context to the way that Pynchon illustrates the creation of the Zone and post-war governance. In <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em>, the opportunity afforded to rulers in the midst of the German power vacuum after World War II is the same situation that the new princes face in Machiavelli’s work. Further, the rulers use this opportunity to grow their power through Machiavellian means: eliminating the opposition, inciting fear, and doing what they perceive as what must be done rather than what should be done.</p><p><em>Hobbes</em></p><p>Although Pynchon’s works directly incorporate Machiavelli more than Thomas Hobbes, the seventeenth-century political theorist still figures into discussions of politics in <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em>. Pynchon himself even puns on Hobbes’ most famous line from <em>Leviathan</em>, when he refers to the undoubtedly realist Lyle Bland’s lawyers as “Salitieri, Poore, Nash, De Brutus and Short” (Pynchon 601). It is important to analyze Hobbesian political theory because of the ways that it builds upon and enhances Machiavelli’s work, and because of the fact that it establishes assumptions that contemporary politics still rely upon.</p><p>One of the largest parts of this received wisdom from Hobbes is a fundamental anxiety toward the state of nature. To Hobbes, the “state of nature,” or human society pre-government, poses a visceral threat to the well-being of all people and an insurmountable obstacle to the pursuit of good life. The assumption he makes is that the state of nature needs something more to tie people together and prevent action on the basest of instincts. Thus, government must arise to fill the void.</p><p>Such is the main argument put forth in <em>Leviathan</em>. The monumental work of political philosophy attempts to formulate a theory both for why governments arise and why they are necessary. To do this, Hobbes imagines an anarchic world without authority, where every person is free to operate in whatever way he or she sees fit. In other words, lacking government, people have the liberty to commit acts that infringe upon the personal rights of others. This creates a world that is unforgiving and cruel:</p><blockquote>In such a condition [of war], there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. (Hobbes 186)</blockquote><p>The famous last line of this passage underscores the motivating factor in Hobbes’ treatise: that without some way of controlling the people, quality of life will plummet and render existence “solitary,” “nasty,” and “short.” But the previous parts of the passage also give an important illustration of what Hobbes believes constitutes a good life: culture, trade, construction, arts, and “Society.” In short, all of those human activities that require some sort of communal interaction necessitate a level of cooperation that, in Hobbes’s view, is impossible without governmental regulation.</p><p>This argument builds upon another assumption that underlies the entire text. According to Hobbes, people inherently do not act according to “natural law” in the state of nature. People take advantage of the pure liberty of the anarchic order to cause chaos and harm, which leads them to distrust each other and take up arms against each other. Hobbes presents the instinct to secure belongings and protect oneself even in a society <em>with </em>laws as evidence of this pernicious part of nature:</p><blockquote>Let him therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his house he locks his chests … Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse mans nature in it. The Desires, and other Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin. (Hobbes 187)</blockquote><p>Hobbes thus concludes that humans inherently turn to crime and violence to protect themselves, because it is the nature of people to distrust others’ intentions and protect themselves above all else. This includes by taking advantage of someone if it would mean an increase in one’s own personal security. As a result, “During the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man” (Hobbes 185).</p><p>Hobbes argues that people come together to form governments so that their right to life is protected above all else. They agree to give up some claim to personal autonomy in exchange for greater security provided by the authority. The “Leviathan,” then, ultimately exists to prevent the state of nature from returning, to impose order and structure on society, and to give a legitimate, peaceful path to conflict resolution: “The final Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves… is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby” (223). The Hobbesian state exists as the constructor of certain conceptions of morality and the assurer of limits upon the exertions of one’s will against another. As Noel Malcolm describes it, “moral terms, at [the state of nature] stage, are merely the expressions of personal preferences” (Malcolm 433). The Leviathan checks the excesses of human nature and arises when people realize that, in order to survive, they must sacrifice their personal preferences for the preference of the state. The state of nature is not devoid of morality; natural law still provides an objective set of guidelines for reasoning people to follow. Thus, the Leviathan is not the sole arbiter of morality. However, the complicating factor is that the ultimate goal of humans, according to Hobbes, is self-preservation, and thus people can only rationally follow natural law as long as it does not decrease their own personal security (Malcolm 438). As a result, people — and, it follows, states — must act in the state of nature without regard to morality unless their safety is first secured.</p><p>The vital importance that security has in Hobbes’ conception of politics causes the actual structure of the Leviathan to seem shockingly authoritarian to contemporary audiences, but the strength Hobbes vests in the state builds upon the anxiety toward chaos and disorder. The Hobbesian conception of power is a near-perfect analogue to the cruel and evil “They” in <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em>: “The only way to erect such a Common Power… is to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will… and to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgment” (Hobbes 227). In the state of nature, every person is an individual actor, completely independent and solely focused on him or herself. Thus people must undertake any possible actions to preserve themselves, even if that means harming another person. In stark contrast to contemporary and postmodern visions of society, Hobbes seems to desire uniformity — the Leviathan must suppress individual impulses and supplant “all their Wills… [with] one Will.” <em>Gravity’s Rainbow </em>critiques Hobbes’ argument that society must move toward connectedness and sacrifice of autonomy to authority as a horrifyingly misguided and destructive theory.</p><p>Machiavelli and Hobbes together contributed to a school of political thought that is now referred to as <em>realpolitik</em>: the belief that pragmatism, and not morals, should drive political decision-making. Underlying this belief are the assumptions that people act in their own self interest, and this inevitably brings them into conflict with others; that life without authority is inherently violent due to the security dilemmas that occur; and that the point of a governmental entity should be to seize opportunities to consolidate power and ensure security.</p><p>Machiavelli and Hobbes’s theories became particularly relevant during the Cold War as <em>realpolitik</em> came to dominate the political calculus between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was especially true during the Richard Nixon administration (1969–1974), as Henry Kissinger formalized the concept of <em>realpolitik</em> in American foreign policy and his actions are still perceived as manifestations of the doctrine (Kaplan). But the perception that the US treated foreign relations with a heavy-handed Machiavellianism increased dramatically after the onset of the Vietnam War. Public opinion shifted against President Lyndon Johnson’s decision to invade the nation based on what many perceived as flimsy justification. In general, the American public viewed Vietnam as a relatively inconsequential nation in the greater battle against Communism, and sending thousands of American troops there under the pretext of containing Soviet influence seemed a dubious <em>casus belli</em>. Further, the American government’s decision to continue conscripting men for the war effort galvanized the anti-war protests, as many were sent off to Vietnam to fight a war in which they didn’t believe. Governmental obfuscation of civilian deaths caused by American and South Vietnamese forces also encouraged opposition efforts (Barringer). The common thread among all of the reasons for protest, however, was a perception that the United States’ conduct in the Vietnam War breached norms of morality and legality in an attempt to block Soviet expansionism and to solidify American influence. As the Harvard <em>Crimson</em> put it in 1965, discussing the nature of anti-war protestors,</p><p>Morality has an important place in politics. It is not, however, easy to say what that place is. Johnson, too, wants the war to end… But Johnson, like De Gaulle, like Churchill, like Machiavelli, proceeds on different assumptions about what peace and morality require. Hopefully the marchers, when they reach the White House, in that spirit of togetherness and certainty that every march inspires, will not be too contemptuous of the man inside. (Lerner)</p><p>Michael Lerner here pinpoints the paradox facing American politicians: The American people demand ethics in international relations, but the actual fabric of those relations seems to demand ruthlessness. Although couched nominally in ideological terms — that is, bringing the fight to North Vietnamese Communists — the Vietnam War was nothing more or less than a proxy battle of dueling superpowers, and it has a long list of historical precedents.</p><p>So, too, was Kissinger and Nixon’s policy of <em>détente</em> with China an exhibition of <em>realpolitik </em>at work. Disregarding the ideological and moral divide between Maoist China and the United States, the two unfroze relations specifically to give the US more of a foothold in Asia — and to counterbalance better against the Soviet Union (Suri).</p><p>These events surely were on the mind of Thomas Pynchon as he worked throughout the 1960s on <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em>. They, and the other elements of social strain, saturated American society and gave rise to social movements, widespread protests, riots, and assassinations of public figures. Although Pynchon is notoriously solitary and little is known about him, we know that he criticized the Vietnam War on moral grounds and pledged to avoid paying income taxes on the premise that those taxes might go to the war effort (Weisenburger 45).</p><p>Even more notably, Pynchon worked at a Boeing factory during the early 1960s when the Kennedy administration was accelerating the arms race with the Soviet Union and emphasizing the ideological conflict with Communism. He wrote technical essays for the aerospace company, a task which gave him the knowledge necessary to include in <em>Gravity’s Rainbow </em>perfect descriptions of the physics and engineering of the V2 rocket. But it also imparted a cynicism toward the American military-industrial complex, as he worked alongside engineers who were creating missiles to be used in the proxy wars and deterrence strategies of the Cold War. Pynchon acquired a sense that, in order to carry out its wars, the government must flatten and produce “numbed moral sensibilities” in its employees (Weisenburger 46). In other words, while Pynchon was writing <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em>, he had also acquired a deep frustration with a system that valued conformity and complicity over morality and individuality.</p><p>Pynchon weaves this disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the state of American and global politics throughout <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em>. Although Machiavelli is never explicitly referred to in this novel, Pynchon nonetheless clearly attempts to tear down Machiavellianism and, by extension, Hobbesianism. He also proposes an alternative model of politics after attempting to break down the entrenched pillars of <em>realpolitik</em>: that of anarchy, arising out of the ashes of the inevitable apocalypse of power politics.</p><p><strong>Section II. Gravity’s Rainbow and the Machiavellian “They”</strong></p><p>Nothing occurs in <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> without the presence of paranoia. Extreme anxiety, uncertainty, and suspicion plague every character in the book to varying degrees, with Tyrone Slothrop the nexus of paranoid, irrational fear. Pynchon leads us to think that Slothrop has lost his ability to reason and his grasp on reality, likely through psychological trauma during the war. However, the novel never truly delegitimizes Slothrop’s fears. Immense, powerful, pseudolegal, and amoral institutions do exist, after all. The capitalized “They” eternally operates in the periphery, pulling the strings and attempting to exert its will upon the world. The fact that They actually do act like puppeteers, steering the actions of seemingly everyone in the novel, serves to confirm many of Slothrop’s wildest anxieties. For example, the episode with the octopus attacking Katje was seemingly orchestrated by the Allied psychological operations division PISCES and the Special Operations Executive (Pynchon 191), and Slothrop himself was conditioned by those same institutions at a very young age to experience sexual arousal by the launch of a rocket (86). PISCES undertakes revolting, dehumanizing, exploitative, and bizarre experiments at its headquarters called “The White Visitation,” all ostensibly directed at the mission of protecting the Allies and achieving victory by locating, eliminating, and acquiring the technology of the Rocket. Moreover, this shadowy institution is undoubtedly Machiavellian — an exhibition of strength and security prized over virtue, taken to such an extent that its influence cannot be escaped.</p><p>Thus, throughout <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em>, by confirming Slothrop’s paranoia, Pynchon provides a sharp critique of the means by which “They” operate. As the minor but consequential character Father Rapier argues, “Once the technical means of control have reached a certain size, a certain degree of <em>being connected</em> one to another, the chances for freedom are over for good” (548). Pynchon suggests that the <em>breadth</em> of institutional activity matters, and that the end result of such a growth is ultimate paralysis, oppression, and annihilation. He puts PISCES and other such organizations at odds with freedom, because of the fact that these organizations adhere to the guidelines set both Hobbes and Machiavelli. This especially parallels the Hobbesian conception of the government as needing to be the only force within a nation. “Once the technical means of control have reached a certain size” follows closely Hobbes assertion that to ensure safety, people must grant the authority power to reduce the individual will in favor of the state’s will (Hobbes 227).</p><p>The heart of Pynchon’s criticism comes when Father Rapier moves to consider the role of death in power dynamics. This passage presents a paramount fear of what an elite institution will do to keep control: “I think that there is a terrible possibility now, in the World… It is possible that They will not die. That it is now within the state of Their art to go on forever — though we, of course, will keep dying as we always have. Death has been the source of Their power” (Pynchon 548). Libertarian thought clearly influences this passage, which presents the possibility that the ruling elite have become entrenched — that their power is so absolute as to make it “within the state of Their art to go on forever.” Indeed, in Machiavelli’s reasoning, this pinpoints the driving goal of government: to exist as long as possible, indeed forever, so that it can protect its citizens. To the characters in <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em>, however, this presents a unique horror, wherein death is made a tool to be used by the rulers: “We have to carry on under the possibility that we die only because They want us to: because They need our terror for Their survival. We are their harvests” (548). In <em>The Prince</em>, such utilization of human life composes part of princely <em>virtú</em>. Machiavelli believes not only that leaders often are cruel, but he also argues that sometimes they <em>must</em> be cruel. “Their survival” is inextricably linked to the State’s survival, and the State must survive so that the public can live. This is why Machiavelli proposes that leaders incite terror to encourage respect; otherwise, the “fickle” populace will rise up and pose a threat to state security (Machiavelli 56). Pynchon here presents the opposing viewpoint. To Father Rapier, that motivation to control and promote the greater good — authoritarian utilitarianism, in a sense — destroys the ability to have any sort of agency. The fatalism of Rapier’s statement, “We have to carry on under the possibility that we die only because They want us to,” adds to the greater argument in the novel that such authoritarianism is born from <em>realpolitik</em> and is antithetical to the good life of the individual.</p><p><em>Gravity’s Rainbow </em>also links war itself to the insidious effect of <em>realpolitik</em>. It is not just the cold, calculating military that is at fault, but also the ignorant and detached elite running the government. In the profile of Pökler, a Nazi rocket engineer who gradually realizes the horror of the German war effort, Pynchon provides a glimpse at a larger critique of power dynamics as a concept. If Father Rapier is used to critique the methods of a Machiavellian prince, then Pökler’s recollection of the construction of the rockets attempts to subvert the prince as an institution at all:</p><blockquote>Plutocratic nations to the west, communists to the east. Spaces, models, game-strategies. Not much passion or ideology. Practical men. While the military wallowed in victories not yet won, the rocket engineers had to think non-fanatically, about German reverses, German defeat… But others had the money, others gave the orders — trying to superimpose their lusts and bickerings on something that had its own vitality, on a <em>technologique</em> they’d never understand. (408)</blockquote><p>Pynchon’s attack on the pillars of the realist political framework appears again in this scene, as the military and political elites make decisions based either on cold, rational calculations — “Practical men” — or “lusts and bickerings.” Significantly, Pökler feels dissatisfied with both groups. His view of the commanders underscores a contempt for the execution of <em>realpolitik</em>, as it reduces humanity, communities, and war to “spaces, models, game-strategies.” In the minds of the military strategists, the world encompasses exactly two entities: the home country in need of protection, and the others in the form of plutocratic and communist states. To Machiavelli, this would constitute the German leadership exhibiting virtue, as the strategists and engineers take every precaution and plan for every eventuality in their quest for security and power. To Pökler, however, this viewpoint lacks “passion,” as they are “practical men.” In other words, there is something almost inhuman about the way that they detach war from its human, emotional consequences.</p><p>His perception of the other side — the political elites — provide just as much of a critique, except in this case Pynchon addresses the underlying assumption of Hobbes and Machiavelli that a leader strives for power for the protection of the state. The political leadership here certainly wants to exert its will, but not for any sort of altruistic push for security. Rather, they attempt to “superimpose their lusts and bickerings.” While Hobbes might be able to reconcile the chance of tyranny with the necessity of an authoritarian state, Pynchon leaves readers with a broken government striving arbitrarily and misguidedly to weaponize. Further, in addition to saying that the pursuit of national security is flawed even if conducted correctly, he also presents the reality that government officials are often too corrupt to be perfectly pragmatic.</p><p>Pynchon does not stop simply at criticizing the West and Nazi Germany’s obsession with technological progress and wartime achievement. The Soviet Union is portrayed similarly harshly, although it appears more oligarchical and incompetent than its British and American counterparts. Tchitcherine, the Soviet operative tasked with eliminating Enzian and the Schwarzkommando, represents the absurd excesses of the Soviet bureaucratic machine as it, too, attempts to destroy threats and seize territory. As his thoughts reveal, the motivation behind his mission certainly is not to improve the quality of life for the ordinary citizens:</p><blockquote>His orders mention technical intelligence. But his real mission in the Zone is private, obsessive, and not — so his superiors have let him know, in a number of delicate ways — in the people’s interest. Tchitcherine guesses that this, taken literally, may be true enough. But he is not sure about the interests of those who warned him. They could have their own reasons for wanting Enzian liquidated in spite of what they say. (342)</blockquote><p>Tchitcherine’s “private, obsessive” orders are to track down and destroy the crew attempting to piece the Rocket back together; this mission goes beyond simple execution and has become an all-consuming motivation in the operative’s life. And the man recognizes that this is “not… in the people’s interest,” instead ostensibly only Tchitcherine’s twisted desires would be satiated by completion of the mission. But here, too, Tchitcherine is consumed by the same paranoia as Slothrop and Pökler. He suspects that the Soviet command “could have their own reasons for wanting Enzian liquidated,” telling him that it is against the greater good seemingly as reverse psychology to make him <em>want</em> to complete the mission even more. Pynchon never delegitimizes paranoia — and Tchitcherine’s is no exception. If the Soviets are exploiting the private obsessions of Tchitcherine to achieve other goals, then that is undeniably Machiavellian — and the Soviets, too, are part of the network of shadowy, nefarious institutions that control everything in the novel.</p><p>As Tchitcherine finds out himself, the true character of these institutions and the people involved with them only come out in the aftermath of World War II, which leaves Germany a destroyed and broken shell of a nation. Following the events of history, in <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> Germany is divided into “zones” of occupation: the United States, Britain, and France control one half of the country, and the Soviet Union controls the other half. The Zone in the novel represents the recreation of civilization following the cataclysmic events of the war but under the thumb of superpowers attempting to build their own Rocket. The Zone comes into existence in the vacuum left behind by the collapse of the Third Reich, and this vacuum gives rise to the warped and cruel personalities in the novel. Tchitcherine can actually carve out a space, a “State”, to help facilitate his obsessive desire: “The little State he is building in the German vacuum is founded on a compulsive need he has given up trying to understand, a need to annihilate the Schwarzkommando and his mythical half-brother, Enzian” (343). In this, Pynchon does not directly criticize political realism as he does elsewhere; rather, he illustrates this pseudo-state as a product of the Soviet operative’s own twisted fantasies and motives. But as even Tchitcherine cannot escape the influence of “Them,” and in essence is specifically a voluntary assistant for them, this created “State” is, in effect, little more than the expression of the brutality and absurdity of Machiavellian politics on an individual level. It is also an example of the overwhelming urge to create the power structures of oppression even within a vacuum — in Tchitcherine’s case, he finds that making a pseudostate allows him some sort of control and power. But it is just as warped as the others, as it is ideologically linked to the destruction of Enzian.</p><p>But much of the Zone also exists in a sort of anarchic daze, reeling from the destruction wrought during the war and yet to have fully rebuilt. Although “They” have begun moving into the Zone to claim it and divide it, early post-war scenes in the novel give an almost sympathetic tone to the area. In the words of critic Steven Weisenburger, the Zone becomes co-opted by “Romantics” who wish for an anarchic paradise (50). Indeed, some descriptions of the Zone illustrate the potential for the growth of individual sovereignty and the dismantlement of the Leviathan:</p><blockquote>The Zone is in full summer: souls are found quiescent behind pieces of wall, fast asleep down curled in shell-craters, out screwing under the culverts with gray shirttails hoisted, adrift dreaming in the middles of fields. Dreaming of food, oblivion, alternate histories. The silences here are retreats of sound, like the retreat of the surf before a tidal wave: sound draining away, down slopes of acoustic passage, to gather, someplace else, to a great surge of noise. (Pynchon 342)</blockquote><p>The survivors of the war live in the Zone with little in the way of concrete reasons to hold onto society or reason, as shown in the descriptions of their lives. They live integrated with the scars of cataclysm, falling asleep in craters, “quiescent behind pieces of wall,” and “screwing under the culverts.” These people also are “adrift dreaming in the middles of fields,” which shows that the structures that before kept them grounded are now gone.</p><p>Slothrop’s own hopes reflect this anarchic utopianism, especially when he thinks about the Zone. In his eyes, post-war Germany is the perfect laboratory for trying out authority-less governance — because, for at least a moment, nothing is left by the collapse of the Nazi regime. He believes that America chose the wrong path through history, and yet there may still “be a route back”:</p><blockquote>Maybe that anarchist he met in Zürich was right, maybe for a little while all the fences are down, one road as good as another, the whole space of the Zone cleared, depolarized, and somewhere inside the waste of it a single set of coordinates from which to proceed, without elect, without preterite, without even nationality to fuck it up. (566)</blockquote><p>Perhaps, one day, society can cast aside the structures that lead it into ruin, and tear down the “fences” and “nationality” that make <em>realpolitik</em> even a valid method of action in the first place. But first, the Zone must be “cleared” and a center found from which they can proceed.</p><p>Unfortunately for Slothrop, that does not happen in the post-war environment. Instead, the State fills the void. The security state that produces “The White Visitation,” the Rocket, and Tchitcherine’s mandate to exterminate the Schwarzkommando ensures that anarchic utopia cannot arise in this case. Hobbes explains that people naturally come together to escape the state of nature, while Machiavelli argues that princes <em>should</em> invade and occupy to bolster their own security. Both phenomena hold true in the Zone. But just because these events occur does not mean that they should occur, Pynchon counters. In the debris of Nazi Germany, the “Rocket-cartel” emerges (mentioned alongside an in-text figure of a hand with its middle finger extended). It is a “structure cutting across every agency human and paper that ever touched it… a State begins to take form in the stateless German night, a State that spans oceans and surface politics, sovereign as the International or the Church of Rome, and the Rocket is its soul” (576). The Rocket, the symbol of instantaneous and arbitrary death, unites the superpowers that jockey for position in the post-war world. The Rocket symbolizes the perverted excesses of <em>realpolitik</em>. In this passage, Pynchon presents those excesses in the integration of all of these confrontational foes — “Even to Russia,” he writes (576) — as the inevitable result of the security apparatus. Political vacuums are not filled with utopias; they are occupied by the immense forces driven by <em>realpolitik</em> that began the war in the first place.</p><p>But the Zone is nonetheless post-society, at least for a moment. It is simultaneously freeing and horrifying, and people dwell on those things that might either keep them living or free them fully: oblivion, food, alternate histories. But even here Pynchon hints at something coming: The Zone is in silence because sound “gather[s], someplace else, to a great surge of noise” (342). Slothrop recognizes hope within the poststructural Zone for a new order, or rather, a new orderless society, and this hope does not simply disappear with the oppression of the Zone by American, British, and Soviet forces. This hints at the building pressure of <em>true</em> cataclysm: the apocalyptic force toward which society perpetually drifts.</p><p><strong>Section III: The Rocket</strong></p><p>“The basic problem, he proposes, has always been getting other people to die for you” (Pynchon 715). The realist paradox, Pynchon argues, manifests when an organization actually has to implement its <em>realpolitik</em>. Couched in rhetoric of security above all, of the ultimate value of the nation, such a government must execute on its promise to always protect the nation from threats. As a result, it must wield military might to neutralize its enemies — and therein lies the issue. To secure the nation, a government needs manpower. And leading these men into battle means going to war against the instinct for survival, something that Pynchon proposes has always limited such realist calculations.</p><p>As the Father Rapier passages showed, Pynchon is aware of the paradox facing countries in their pursuit of security. <em>Realpolitik</em> prescribes sidelining morality in favor of what is pragmatically the best for neutralizing threats, but this creates the problem of security dilemmas in international politics: in order to prevent another country from taking advantage of a weakness, a politician must improve its own defensive and offensive capabilities in perpetuity, thus creating an arms race and continual escalation. A realist politician can never trust a rival country to not exploit a vulnerability. In <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em>, Pynchon presents the V2 rocket as an expression of the security dilemma facing Germany. Pökler’s consideration of the German rocket construction efforts evokes this, when he remarks that the engineers had to think “non-fanatically, about German reverses, German defeat” (408). Using this and other characterizations of the Rocket, Pynchon draws clear parallels to the convoluted deterrence calculations designed by American military thinkers in their realist approaches to confronting the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The intercontinental ballistic missile in 1960s geopolitics played a similar role as the V2 and the mythical Rocket #00000 in <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> — the latter of which is nearly identical to an ICBM in its legendary destructive force and the compulsion among states to acquire it. The weapons are expressions of worst-case scenario calculations; arms that should not have been created, but were thought up after imagining extreme situations.</p><p>The opening of the novel hints at the scathing indictment and critique of the Rocket as a product of an institution playing into security dilemmas. In these first lines, Pynchon begins his deconstruction of the concept of those dilemmas. At the center of all of this criticism — and in the novel, at the center of every moment — is the Rocket, the ultimate symbol of <em>realpolitik</em> as the final, desperate gasp of a losing side to wreak havoc upon its enemies:</p><blockquote>A screaming comes across the sky. It has happened before, but there is nothing to compare it to now… He’s afraid of the way the glass will fall — soon — it will be a spectacle: the fall of a crystal palace. But coming down in total blackout, without one glint of light, only great invisible crashing. (3)</blockquote><p>In these opening pages, Pynchon keeps the Rocket itself hidden, but its presence is clear. The evacuees know it through its screaming, and so the seeming doom flying at this bunker comes in the form of a personified weapon of mass destruction. Whereas weapons might otherwise receive associations of coldness, death, destruction, and detachment, Pynchon places the humanity of this rocket immediately in the foreground. The Rocket becomes not so much a tool but an extension of those who use it. Its scream carries with it desperation, anguish, and anger.</p><p>Pynchon returns to this idea at the very end of the novel, when the mysterious Rocket #00000 is finally prepped for launch. Here, Pynchon blatantly humanizes the rocket by literally placing a person inside it. Gottfried, whose own agency and humanity were long since stripped away by the brutality of Captain Blicero — “Lord Death” — underscores Pynchon’s belief that the pursuit of security and triumph leads to the perversion of basic human decency: “The soft smell of Imipolex, wrapping him absolutely, is a smell he knows. It doesn’t frighten him. It was in the room when he fell asleep so long ago, so deep in sweet paralyzed childhood… it was there as he began to dream. Now it is time to wake, into the breath of what was always real. Come, wake. All is well” (769). Throughout the novel, Imipolex appears as one of the main results of a society that has descended into excess. Technological progress for the sake of progress has produced a new, mysterious plastic that the rocket engineers use in the development of the V2 and Rocket #00000. In this case, Gottfried is surrounded by the plastic, kept in a cocoon of it within the cavity inside the rocket. Blicero’s use of it seems especially insidious because it lulls Gottfried into a state of calm, even as he hurtles toward death. The symbolism is clear: the drift toward “center” and integration with the forces of progress, as represented by Gottfried’s imprisonment in the rocket, leads to society’s unraveling. This is one of the most profound, disturbing passages in the novel because of the way it combines the antitheses of cruelty and innocence, and rebirth and annihilation into the Rocket hurtling toward its target with Gottfried entombed inside. The womblike nature of the Rocket underscores its dual use: Pynchon presents <em>this </em>Rocket, #00000, as the pinnacle of V2 technology. It is the ultimate symbol of cataclysmic reset, which fulfills Blicero’s twisted desire for death but also brings about a possible resurrection of humanity.</p><p>However, this image of the Rocket starkly contrasts with the more conventional view held by the state actors who desire it. For the Nazis who invent the V2, the Rocket represents little but the next step in an unstoppable march forward in protecting the German homeland. As their strategy extends Machiavellian realism, the Nazis assume that the Rocket is imperative because it allows them to balance with the Allies to a certain extent. This is seen during Pökler’s discussion of the coldly rational, logical calculations of the German military leaders who decide how to deploy the V2 (408). In <em>The Prince</em>, Machiavelli focuses on the centrality of countermeasures like this as essential for the survival of weak states: “If a prince has fortified his town well… then an enemy will be very circumspect in attacking him. Men always dislike enterprises where the snags are evident, and it is obviously not easy to assault a town which has been made into a bastion” (36). Although offensive in capability, the Germans position the Rocket as the tool to create such a bastion to make it costlier for the Allies to invade and win the war. And yet, if the intent was to defend, the Rocket nevertheless represents the spiraling security dilemmas that realism sparks. <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> illustrates the irony of the weapon being a product of security considerations, because it ultimately leads to consequences like Blicero’s perverted weapon-devotion. As critic Kachig Tölölyan argues in reference to Blicero, who leads the V2 project to culmination with the #00000 Rocket, “It is [this] mystical worship of the perfectibility of the inanimate that is the real enemy” (64). <em>Realpolitik</em> can lead nowhere but this mystical worship, because the paradox of realism is that the only way to truly ensure one’s own safety is to have the ability to completely annihilate one’s enemies.</p><p>The people responsible for the creation of the Rocket are not, entirely, unaware of the absurdity of an apocalyptic weapon being created for the purpose of ensuring national security. Just as Pynchon felt discomfort and disillusionment while working at Boeing during one of the high points of the Cold War arms race, so too do some of the Rocket engineers, launch teams, and those responsible for defending against it experience a sort of assault on their identity as a result of their work. But they find ways to cope with this and to reduce the Rocket’s immensity to comprehensible terms. In one instance, they simply break it down into calculations and numbers: “So was the Rocket’s terrible passage reduced, literally, to bourgeois terms, terms of an equation such as that elegant blend of philosophy and hardware, abstract change and hinged pivots of real metals which describes motion under the aspect of yaw control” (Pynchon 242). This manner of thinking is “bourgeois” because of its detachment from the effect of the Rocket — they are able, as a result of their privileged understanding of it, to disassociate themselves from the weapon and distance themselves from facing its destruction. This becomes part of Pynchon’s central critique of <em>realpolitik</em>. These political strategies require the elimination of personal identity because otherwise the people would not be able to stomach it:</p><blockquote>If any of the young engineers saw correspondence between the deep conservatism of Feedback and the kinds of lives they were coming to lead <em>in the very process </em>of embracing it, it got lost, or disguised — none of them made the connection, at least not while alive: it took death to show it to Roland Feldspath, death with its very good chances for being Too Late, and a host of other souls feeling themselves, even now, Rocketlike, driving out toward the stone-blue lights of the Vacuum under a Control they cannot quite name… (242)</blockquote><p>Machiavelli tells us that to ensure state survival, a prince must “not flinch from being blamed for vices which are necessary for safeguarding the state” (51). Pynchon argues here that the corollary of Machiavelli’s position is that the State simply finds a way to avoid being blamed altogether by using those vices to eliminate the ability of the people to oppose the state. In this case, the engineers’ lives are warped by their work on the Rocket and their coping mechanism of breaking it down into equations. Only the most final of consequences — death — shows these people that they are being exploited by the “Control” and leading to the “Vacuum”, or anarchy brought about by cataclysm.</p><p>At the same time, while the <em>creation </em>and <em>use </em>of the Rocket are products of corrupted, paradoxical <em>realpolitik</em>, Pynchon does not necessarily condemn the actual effects of the Rocket’s launch. In fact, the weapon may represent a sort of cleanse or release of the collective gathering at the “center” that is described throughout the novel. In other words, the use of the Rocket creates something more than the Zone left behind after the end of World War II. The apocalyptic potential of the Rocket incites in characters a masochistic desire; they seem to hope for the release from the collective anxiety and from the spiraling, cyclical institutional suppression that the weapon may bring. Pökler, the Rocket engineer, provides a good example of this feeling:</p><blockquote>Something was out to get him, something there, among the paper. The fear of extinction named Pökler knew it was the Rocket, beckoning him in. If he also knew that in something like this extinction he could be free of his loneliness and his failure, still he wasn’t quite convinced… So he hunted, as a servo valve with a noisy input will, across the Zero, between two desires, personal identity and impersonal salvation… Pökler would have to find his own way to his zero signal, his true course. (Pynchon 412)</blockquote><p>In this passage, Pökler gives voice to the contradictory wishes felt by many of the characters in the novel. He simultaneously hopes for “personal identity and impersonal salvation.” The Rocket represents that salvation: it produces a clean slate and an elimination of Pökler’s feelings of isolation. Moreover, the “zero signal” represents the onset of the ultimate cataclysm, whether that be the Rocket’s explosion (marked by the launch of the Rocket at zero) or personal resurrection. However, Pynchon never makes clear whether the second is possible without the first. The Rocket produces obsessiveness in characters such as Pökler, Tchitcherine, and Slothrop because of the twisted fascination with its ability to reset humanity, that is, to bring it to the “zero.” In the Rocket is the potential to return truly to the state of nature. But whereas Hobbes viewed “nature” as a temporary, dangerous state that people will inevitably organize to get out of, Pynchon suggests that there is potential in the state of nature for “impersonal salvation.” That salvation, <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> suggests, possibly comes through the implementation of anarchy.</p><p><strong>Section IV. Anarchy as an Alternative</strong></p><p>Pynchon argues that at a fundamental level people desire an escape from power dynamics, social constructs, and the perpetual conflicts of national interest. In fact, this same desire binds everyone together. Every individual actor not a willing agent of the State’s machinations in the novel has this same want to varying degrees, and they all recognize the Rocket as the means to achieve it. They all hope to return to something primitive and human without the structures of society around them; they crave something like the state of nature. When Slothrop ends up in Austria, his consideration of the café he frequents conveys the unifying force of the desire for the essential experience of being human:</p><blockquote>Lenin, Trotsky, James Joyce, Dr. Einstein all sat out at these tables. Whatever it was <em>they </em>all had in common… perhaps it had to do with the people somehow, with pedestrian mortality, restless crisscrossing of needs or desperations in one fateful piece of street… dialectics, matrices, archetypes all need to connect, once in a while, back to some of that proletarian blood, to body odors and senseless screaming across a table, to cheating and last hopes, or else all is dusty Dracularity, the West’s ancient curse… (266)</blockquote><p>Slothrop concludes that these four examples of revolutionary genius, from the political to the literary to the scientific, share a common trait in that they all look upon the public with some degree of envy. The structures of their work — “dialectics, matrices, archetypes” — take them away from the “proletarian blood,” the essence of humanity, and they occasionally feel the need to resurrect that blood. By unifying the four geniuses, Pynchon argues that the motivation to return to a connected humanity is a common trait among everyone, and thus something that everyone strives for. The “body odours and senseless screaming across a table” and the “last hopes,” although messy, nonetheless define the experience of being human. This passage moreover parallels the discussions of the experience of engineers who work on the Rocket, who obfuscate the nature of their creation by reducing it to equations and calculations. It reiterates the argument that finding theoretical explanations for parts of life detach one from life itself.</p><p>Here, Pynchon demonstrates again his fundamental opposition to the realist perspective. Hobbes argues that this same state of nature of “body odours and senseless screaming across a table” must be restrained by some sort of power. For Pynchon, though, that power is antithetical not only to satisfaction in life but also to ultimate survival. The restraining of nature brings about the apocalypse by requiring that people turn away from morality and forget about the very human factors of something like the Rocket. Hence, Pynchon personifies the Rocket to not-so-subtly remind his readers that a weapon of mass destruction cannot be abstracted away by equations.</p><p>And so the Rocket becomes the hope for a true reset of the world. The vacuum of Germany turns into the Zone, which is merely the perversion of true anarchy by the forces of <em>realpolitik</em> set upon it from the outside. The structures of power are intact even after the war’s end. The Rocket is the inevitable culmination of the paradoxical nature of the power structures. Underlying all of this, though, is also a strain of apocalyptic millenarianism that suggests that the inevitable collapse of the world political order at its own hands <em>must</em> occur to achieve a true reset of society. The characters simultaneously fear and crave this reset the occurs after reaching the Zero point. Slothrop’s experience while deep inside a tunnel at the Dora-Mittelwerk rocket assembly plant gives an exaggerated hint at the post-political world that Pynchon envisions:</p><blockquote>For a minute or two nobody in here can see. There is only the hurtling on, through amazing perfect whiteness. Whiteness without heat, and blind inertia: Slothrop feels a terrible familiarity here, a center he has been skirting, avoiding as long as he can remember — never has he been as close as now to the true momentum of his time: faces and facts that have crowded his indenture to the Rocket, camouflage and distraction fall away for the white moment, the vain and blind tugging at his sleeves <em>it’s important… please… look at us</em>… (316)</blockquote><p>Devoid of his sense of sight, Slothrop feels the Zero point come closer. Here, the Zero represents a multitude of different realities: it is the point at which the building centralization of power brings about oblivion, destruction, deconstruction, and anarchy. The world that Pynchon foresees existing after the Rocket breaks down normal conceptions of identity and individuality, which is why the whiteness envelops Slothrop and forces him away from understanding himself to be a discrete entity. All of the distractions — individual, unique things like faces and facts — “fall away for the white moment,” letting Slothrop get a sense of what the Rocket actually does. The Rocket destroys the structures of existence. It only emphasizes this significance that Slothrop’s experience comes while hurtling through the tunnels at a concentration camp dedicated to the production of V2 rockets. Such a morbidly ironic union is, in a sense, a microcosmic version of the endpoint of the political: humanity, harnessed and driven toward extinction, forced to build the tools of even greater destruction. Slothrop “has been skirting” the “terrible center” that is the reality of human life: that to move beyond the horrors and ethical corruption that led to the use of concentration camps to produce weapons of mass destruction, there may need to be a widespread apocalyptic reset.</p><p>Critic Graham Benton argues that Pynchon proposes an alternative system to take the place of the institutional if this reset comes to pass — a system that may come, or be resurrected, by way of destruction. Benton suggests that within <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em>, anarchism presents a return to the past, or a completion of a cycle of history. Benton’s proposal is based primarily on the anarchist submariner that appears in the novel, Francisco Squalidozzi. Having stolen a German U-Boat to flee to Germany, Squalidozzi reminisces on the “national tragedy” of Argentina:</p><blockquote>In the days of the gauchos, my country was a blank piece of paper. The pampas stretched as far as men could imagine, inexhaustible, fenceless. Wherever the gaucho could ride, that place belonged to him. But Buenos Aires sought hegemony over the provinces. All the neuroses about property gathered strength, and began to infect the countryside. Fences went up, and the gaucho became less free. It is our national tragedy. (Pynchon 267–268)</blockquote><p>As Squalidozzi remarks later, human society inevitably coalesces to the “center” lacking any strong impulse to change it (Pynchon 268). This center point here represents the increase in bureaucratic power that Father Rapier called the “technical means of control reach[ing] a certain size” where “the chances of freedom are over for good” (548) — in a more dramatic sense, the center is the cataclysmic, apocalyptic nexus of governmental consolidation. Benton thus argues that Squalidozzi’s desired anarchy depends on the destruction wrought by war. A cataclysm must occur in a society for unfettered freedom to return (Benton 157). Benton’s reasoning is solid, and Squalidozzi’s anarchism presents a valid alternative to the PISCES-driven Machiavellianism found saturated throughout the novel. Benton and critic Kachig Tölölyan, who Benton often draws upon, argue, in essence, that “war… inevitably opens up, for a brief historical moment, vistas of a world where there really are no secret networks of power and class, no barriers, no political boundaries and artificial discontinuities” (Tölölyan 60). But this fails to go far enough to sufficiently respond to the problem raised by Father Rapier’s declarations. When the elite use death as a means of control, then nothing short of annihilation will free the people from their oppression — and the destruction of World War II did not go far enough. After the war, the greatest disaster in human history, the “vistas of a world where there really are no secret networks of power and class,” similar to the “vistas of thought” that Slothrop dwells on (Pynchon 566), do not end up coalescing in the chaos left behind by the fall of the Third Reich. Rather, more paranoia, more fear, and more SOE-led control come to inhabit the void. The post-war Zone does not look like an anarchist paradise, but rather a partitioned, authoritarian place where the Rocket-Cartel comes to rule (576).</p><p>And yet, in that Zone nonetheless exists some measure of hope and potential. Although Slothrop’s “vistas of thought” come to nothing but unfulfilled desires and the anarchy that he and Squalidozzi daydream of eludes them, even still disparate and diverse groups begin to make their homes and restart. During the time after the war in the novel, before the warped security state can crack down universally across the Zone, these groups come together around shared ideology and goals. And although many — such as a community of brutally violent dogs that spurn every visitor — do not necessarily represent successful anarchic societies, one shows more promise. Graciela Imago Portales, a member of one of these new villages, remarks that her frequent lover and the apparent leader of the village, Belaustegui, has dedicated himself wholeheartedly to the survival of the village — the “anarchist experiment” (Pynchon 624). It is risky — Portales recognizes, “What will the military government think of a community like this in the middle of their garrison state?” — but at the same time, the members are optimistic (624). Benton argues that “it is this experiment that Pynchon holds dear” (Benton 164) and indeed, throughout his descriptions of the new communities that form, Pynchon reveals sympathy for the experimenters. These experiments provide some semblance of hope for the downtrodden and oppressed: “Often at night [Portales will] break through a fine membrane of alcohol and optimism to see really how much she needs the others, how little use, unsupported, she could ever be” (Pynchon 624). Those marginalized by the State <em>need</em> these anarchist experiments to provide them some semblance of a future, a way to function and survive with recognition of one’s own individualism. The communalism here is both dangerous, in that if it collapses, people like Portales will have nothing, but also hopeful, because such bonds lead to a strong community. Overall, Pynchon does not wish to prescribe a set formula for replacing the oppressive State, hence the variety of strange and eclectic groups organizing societies not governed by the authorities. Nor does he wish to say definitively that this is how life should be lived to be successful. The dog community, after all, is subjected to the same scrutiny from PISCES that Slothrop is (625–626). But it is a valid alternative, and one that allows for some semblance of belonging and liberation.</p><p><strong>Section V: Anarchism, Post-anarchism, and Pynchon</strong></p><p>The anarchy that Pynchon proposes appears unlike much else in political philosophy. It is pessimistic, ushered in only in the void left behind by disaster. It is also based on a shared communalism and <em>not</em> an overriding sense of individualism. But Pynchon still responds to the thinking of his time, and so to fully understand his conception of an authority-less world, it is useful to contextualize <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> in relation to the dominant philosophical currents of the mid-20th century.</p><p>During the 1960s, while the novel was being written, anarchism came into conflict with poststructuralism. Out of this philosophical tension came post-anarchism, which is, in short, the result of the integration of poststructuralism with radical antiauthoritarianism. It is a rejection of the strict ideologies and the conception of political structures that traditional anarchism relies upon, but also a reaffirmation of the desire to escape from the oppression of authority.</p><p>Leading poststructuralist theorist Michel Foucault expressed the underlying tensions between anarchism and poststructuralism best in an interview with Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino in 1977. In a discussion of the traditional perception of power dynamics as being the idea that authority emanates from a singular locus and there is “a fundamental, immutable gulf between those who exercise power and those who undergo it” (121), Foucault argues that power should be thought of more as a diffuse network than a discrete, unilateral relationship:</p><blockquote>Sovereign, law and prohibition formed a system of representation of power which was extended during the subsequent era by the theories of right: political theory has never ceased to be obsessed with the person of the sovereign… What we need, however, is a political philosophy that isn’t erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the King’s head: in political theory that has still to be done. (121)</blockquote><p>The idea of the “sovereign”, then, is the fundamental problem of classical political theory, as it restricts the conceptualization of political progress into discussions of authoritative entities, even if the end goal is something like anarchy. To get to the truth of power relations and, even more importantly, how to respond to those relations, theorists must “cut off the King’s head.” In other words, to Foucault and poststructuralists, traditional anarchism relies upon a clear binary in power relations: the people vs. authority. To be an anarchist means to pit oneself directly against the singular point from which power emanates. The traditional idea of a state works well with this theory: anarchists can battle against the obviously powerful that control politics.</p><p>Post-anarchism, an offshoot of Foucaultian theory, rejects this binary. To post-anarchists, the traditional anarchists’ structural view of politics is inherently limiting and prevents its widespread acceptance. Moreover, traditional anarchism’s dogma leaves it vulnerable to producing oppression in its own right. Foucault himself described the problem as, “How does one keep from being a fascist, even (especially) when one believes oneself to be a revolutionary militant?” (Deleuze xv). Retaining even the doctrinal acceptance that power structures exist leaves open the possibility of oppression returning, and so humanity must “ferret out the fascism that is ingrained in our behavior” (xv). As such, Foucault proposes that one of the essential parts of everyday life is “free political action from all unitary and totalizing paranoia” (xv). He proposes that theoretical frameworks create that unitary, totalizing paranoia by locking people into certain channels of thought. To escape from authority, then, it is not enough to struggle against it on principle. We must also fight against the urge to base our struggle on a set principle at all, working to adapt and respond to the saturation and diffusion of power in all forms.</p><p>Post-anarchism theorist Saul Newman argues that the result of this philosophy is a model of politics that is anti-authoritarian but also radically flexible and inclusive. Whereas the traditional anarchists had to still deal with the inevitable issue of “taking over,” so to speak, from the authority that they overthrow, post-anarchists propose that society after authority is not restricted to such an anarchic plan of action, but rather open to ideals defined during the anarchist resistance. Further, the post-anarchist critique of <em>realpolitik</em> centers on the perversion and corrupting influence of political structures. Newman argues, “National sovereignty blurs into global security while at the same time reifying and fetishizing existing borders, and mobilizing new ones everywhere” (<em>Postanarchism: a Politics of Anti-Politics </em>319). The extraordinary growth of political authority under the guise of respecting the sovereign has led to the expansion of surveillance, policing, and monitoring while also unifying into a “global security” that is nothing but the highest manifestation of domination.</p><p>Pynchon was likely writing <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> before post-anarchism became well established as a philosophical tradition, but he surely was aware of the revolution in France in 1968 that led to the development of poststructuralism and post-anarchism. Authority in <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> is not entirely diffused, and the State — whether that be the US, British, or Soviet government — very clearly still holds unilateral and oppressive power and wields it through institutions like PISCES. In this way, Pynchon adheres to the premises of traditional anarchism, in that resistance, if there is any in the novel, is directed at the uncertain but nonetheless centralized “They.” Father Rapier’s statement on the “technical means of control” is the best illustration of this (Pynchon 548). The authority is singular, and the implication is that the institutions of authority must be overthrown.</p><p>However, Pynchon’s novel also parallels the thinking of Newman and the post-anarchists in that identity is malleable and the idea of domination not fixed. Whereas the State is clearly the authoritative antagonist, the post-State world is chaotic and antithetical to defined identity, as Pökler expresses with the conflict between impersonal salvation and personal identity (Pynchon 412). Characters in <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> have extremely limited agency, and, in fact, limited identity — which lends itself to post-structuralism even more. The suggestion made by this combination of factors — that Slothrop is simultaneously underdeveloped and oppressed, for example — is that without the “They,” and without the paranoia, Slothrop would be as post-anarchic theory argues anarchy itself should be: in the words of Newman, “open to a number of different articulations” (<em>Politics of Postanarchism</em>) based upon the nature of the world into which they emerge. The “impersonality” of the ultimate end in the novel suggests the same poststructural theory that the traditional conception of the individual is not sufficient, and that the apocalypse does not just sweep aside political structures, but also identity structures. The “State” as an institution also appears more in line with the interconnected “global security” apparatus that Newman criticizes than the traditional monarchs or dictators that classical anarchists resist.</p><p>In addition, the very nature of how Pynchon proposes anarchy would be ushered in is not anarchic in its essence. The characters in <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> do not possess particularly revolutionary impulses, and in fact, as critic Joanna Freer points out in “Thomas Pynchon and the Black Panther Party,” even the novel’s one resistance group, the “Counterforce,” is more of a failed resistance than a meaningful opposition force. Further, the group’s failure is linked to its inability to adopt the poststructural mode. The characters in the Counterforce, including Roger Mexico, Milton Gloaming, and Osbie Feel, literally adopt the structures of power which they call a “We-system.” Mexico even points out, “You’re playing Their game, then” (Pynchon 651). As critic Jeff Baker argues, this can be read as a “wry post-mortem of [1960s and 70s] failed resistance efforts… In the Counterforce’s failure to create an effective alternative (and oppositional) We-system, Roger Mexico’s crew must adopt Their “rationalist” methodology and are thus co-opted by the very system they would overthrow” (139). The inability for the Counterforce to mount any meaningful resistance or achieve any meaningful progress effectively undermines the traditional anarchist system. To use the words of Foucault, the characters cannot “ferret out the fascism” innate within them.</p><p>Applying the post-anarchic lens to <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> is thus useful because it gives a more defined and delineated, albeit somewhat flawed, theory of how anarchism is presented. Acknowledging the poststructural impulse within Pynchon’s work allows for a deeper picture of the failure for any character to achieve meaningful liberation. The characters recognize that the State is constantly expanding its oppression and control. Why, then, can they never cause that system to change? Applying post-anarchist theory as opposed to traditional anarchism shows that this is because of Slothrop, Mexico, and the Counterforce’s inability to break away from the entrenched rationalism of the State — the pragmatism and the binary that result, as it happens, from the unchallenged assumptions of the political theory of Machiavelli and Hobbes. The only hope for achieving those “vistas of thought” about a post-government world, then, lies in the annihilation of those assumptions and structures.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p><em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> is inherently political simply because of the time during which it was written. Composed during the 1960s, the novel reflects many of the same social and political anxieties that erupted in violence and war in that era, and although based on World War II, it thematically reflects the Cold War and the Vietnam War. Pynchon’s employment at Boeing in the early 1960s brought him into contact with the worst excesses of the American military industrial complex: he had to contribute to the nuclear arms race and the arbitrary, seemingly absurd justification for a country to possess enough weapons to destroy the world many times over.</p><p><em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em>, as a result, is linked deeply with the antiestablishment, antiauthoritarian strain of thought that came to dominate the radical left during this time. But Pynchon does more in <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> than simply market the anarchist fad of the 60s. Familiar with Machiavelli, Hobbes, and political realism, Pynchon systematically deconstructs the assumptions that <em>realpolitik</em> is based on as exercises in futility and excess. In his view, the <em>realpolitik </em>founded by Machiavelli and Hobbes and extended by President Johnson and Henry Kissinger is inherently flawed, as it incites spirals into escalation that send society hurtling toward cataclysm.</p><p>But perhaps the most profound element of <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> is that the apocalypse is not <em>necessarily</em> a bad end. Humanity’s anxiety about destruction and regression so strongly influences thought and action in every aspect of life that it seems completely unthinkable that we should do anything else but avoid it at all costs. However, this exactly is the resounding political argument in the novel: that anxiety of the end and of the state of nature is what causes politicians to build V2s or ICBMs and leads to corrupted, power-hungry political machinations. The extension to this argument posits further that as a result of being built on an existential fear, the people are complicit in their own oppression. Pynchon felt disillusioned by his time at Boeing for the same reason that Pökler criticizes the Rocket engineers for abstracting their task to avoid its ramifications. In the novel, the structures of power are so entrenched, and PISCES and other governments orchestrate so completely the details of world events, that characters rarely resist in any significant manner. Rather, they masochistically hope for a global reset, in other words a return to Zero. The Rocket represents the way toward a life without political structure so that Squalidozzi’s past paradise of Argentina can return and Slothrop’s dreams of a “depolarized” Zone can come to pass.</p><p>This all means that <em>Gravity’s Rainbow</em> does not present the classically anarchic story of a heroic band of rebels resisting the imposition of power from abroad. Instead, it proposes that the security state is so<em> </em>entrenched, and the structures of domination so pervasive, that the world cannot be free from it without a cataclysmic return to the state of nature. Although power emanates from the State, the State itself has dissolved into an immense network of international corporations and politicians determined to industrialize death and war. The characters in the novel never definitively discover how to resist something so decentralized — but they do recognize the Rocket as a means for achieving a different reality.</p><p>Thus, at the end of the novel, readers are left with a fragment of an idea of where to go next, represented literally by a half-sentence. “Now everybody — ” (Pynchon 776) is both a recognition of the doom that hangs over humanity, but also a call to action for everybody to join in on the experience of that doom — so that, after the fall of the security apparatus, the anarchic utopia dreamed up by Squalidozzi and Slothrop may arise.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <em>Realpolitik</em> was coined in the 19th century by German politician Ludwig von Rochau, who argued for the primacy of power in state politics, and that past political theorists had neglected to take into account power dynamics sufficiently (Menzel 22–23). There is a difference between <em>realpolitik</em>, which is a strategy for politicians to follow, and political realism, which is a theoretical framework based on the premise that the fundamental force driving international relations is either the pursuit of power (classical realism, demonstrated by Greek historian Thucydides [Whyte]) or the pursuit of security (neorealism, demonstrated by political scientist Kenneth Waltz). For the purposes of this paper, I use <em>realpolitik</em> to describe political methods, and realism to describe the nature of the political order.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=26520707e802" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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