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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Altacit Global on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Altacit Global on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Altacit Global on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AltacitGlobal?source=rss-36f6eb28c85a------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 23:31:51 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Animated GUIs as Registrable Designs: Examining India’s Draft GUI and Icon Design Guidelines, 2026]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AltacitGlobal/animated-guis-as-registrable-designs-examining-indias-draft-gui-and-icon-design-guidelines-2026-75fb610e0cc4?source=rss-36f6eb28c85a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/75fb610e0cc4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[design-protection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ip-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gui-design]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intellectual-property]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[design-law]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Altacit Global]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 10:27:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-18T10:27:32.736Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Ashita</p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>On 1 October 2026, the Indian Designs Office published the <em>Draft Guidelines for Registration of Designs Relating to GUI &amp; ICON etc.</em>, inviting comments from stakeholders within thirty days. The draft seeks to bring greater consistency and predictability to the examination of applications relating to Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs), icons and graphic symbols.</p><p>While the proposed guidelines are a welcome development, their treatment of animated interfaces raises an important question: where an animation represents a single creative design, should each frame be treated as a separate design for registration purposes? This issue requires consideration, particularly because the creative contribution in an animation may lie not merely in its individual frames, but in the transition between them.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xPgqsgdt1jL_y7TFwdSt7A.png" /></figure><p><strong>2. Background</strong></p><p>The draft guidelines are administrative guidance and do not amend the Designs Act, 2000 or the Designs Rules, 2001. Their purpose is to promote uniformity in examination practices while operating within the existing statutory framework. In the event of any inconsistency, the Act and the Rules will prevail.</p><p>Previously, applications for GUIs were often refused on the ground that an interface is visible only when a device is switched on and, therefore, could not qualify as an “article” under Section 2(a) of the Designs Act. However, examination practices were inconsistent, with certain GUIs also being registered under Class 14–04 or Class 14–99.</p><p>This position was addressed by the Calcutta High Court in <em>NEC Corporation v. Controller of Patents</em>, decided on 9 March 2026. The Court observed that the Designs Act does not impose a requirement of permanence and that GUIs cannot be excluded from registration merely because they are digital. Instead, such applications must be examined on a case-by-case basis.</p><p>Following this development, the draft guidelines seek to clarify the treatment of GUIs, icons and animated interfaces. They recognise that a GUI or icon cannot be claimed in isolation and that the application must identify the article on which the interface appears. Examples include a “Mobile Phone with GUI”, “Computer Monitor with GUI” and “Smart Watch with GUI”.</p><p><strong>3. Issues</strong></p><p>The principal concern in the draft guidelines relates to the treatment of animated and transitional GUIs. The guidelines recognise dynamic, animated, sequential and transitional interfaces as potentially registrable, subject to the submission of separate representations of each relevant frame.</p><p>However, this requirement may not adequately capture the creative contribution underlying an animation. For instance, consider a button that expands into a circular menu through a 24-frame animation. The initial button and the final menu may each appear ordinary when viewed independently. The distinctive design element may instead lie in the transition through which one state develops into the other.</p><p>The draft does not expressly state that twenty-four separate applications would be required in such a situation. Its illustration refers only to two frames. Nevertheless, the requirement to submit separate representations creates uncertainty regarding the number of representations or applications that may be necessary. It also leaves examiners without a clear basis for determining whether the animation should be assessed as a whole or through its individual frames.</p><p>The issue is therefore not merely the number of representations required, but also the appropriate subject matter of design protection. If every frame is examined only as a static image, the distinctive visual character of the animation may not receive adequate consideration.</p><p>The article also draws attention to the approach followed in other jurisdictions. Under the common practice of European offices, a sequence of snapshots may be used to represent a single animated design, provided the views are visually related. Further, from 1 July 2026, the EU system permits up to ten static views or a single animated representation for each design. This approach recognises that an animation may constitute one design represented through multiple views.</p><p><strong>4. Court Analysis</strong></p><p>In <em>NEC Corporation v. Controller of Patents</em>, the Calcutta High Court clarified that the mere fact that a GUI is digital or visible only when a device is switched on does not make it ineligible for design registration. The Court observed that the Designs Act does not prescribe a requirement of permanence and cautioned against an interpretation that would effectively exclude GUIs, icons and animations from registration.</p><p>The Court directed that the applications be reconsidered on a case-by-case basis. This decision provides the judicial context for the draft guidelines and supports the recognition of digital interfaces within the existing design law framework.</p><p>However, the treatment of animated GUIs under the draft guidelines requires further clarity. The Designs Rules, 2001, particularly Rules 11 and 14, already contemplate multiple representations of a design. These provisions could be used to accommodate a sequence of frames representing one coherent animated design.</p><p>Accordingly, the guidelines could clarify that multiple frames may form part of a single design where they collectively represent a continuous visual concept. Applicants could be required to identify the article on which the GUI appears, submit representative key frames, explain the sequence or transformation, and specify the visual features claimed as novel. They could also distinguish functional features from aesthetic elements and provide additional frames wherever necessary.</p><p>Separate applications may remain appropriate where individual frames demonstrate independent novelty or represent materially different designs.</p><p>The guidelines could further adopt a continuous visual concept test. Where the frames arise from a single user interaction and maintain visual continuity in aspects such as colour, geometry and styling, they may be considered part of one design. Where a frame introduces an independent functional state or an unrelated visual theme, separate applications may be warranted.</p><p>Additionally, applicants should be permitted to identify the novelty specifically in the transition or sequence, while disclaiming ordinary static elements. This would help examiners understand which features are being claimed and assessed against the prior art.</p><p>Finally, examination practices should move beyond searches limited to static screenshots. A combination of metadata-based keyword searches using descriptions of dynamic features and checks of open-source digital repositories could help identify earlier animated designs that might otherwise be overlooked.</p><p><strong>5. Conclusion</strong></p><p>The Draft GUI and Icon Design Guidelines, 2026, represent an important step towards recognising GUIs and digital interfaces as registrable designs, subject to the statutory requirements. However, the proposed treatment of animations requires further clarification.</p><p>The objective should not merely be to make animated GUIs eligible for registration, but to ensure that the filing and examination process reflects the nature of an animated design. An animation should not automatically be viewed as a collection of unrelated static frames when its creative contribution may lie in the movement and transition between successive visual states.</p><p>A clearer framework recognising a continuous sequence as a single design, where appropriate, would help protect the designer’s actual creation while maintaining clarity and reliability in the public register.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=75fb610e0cc4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[One Rupee and the Limits of Trademark Litigation: Niva Bupa before the Delhi High Court]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AltacitGlobal/one-rupee-and-the-limits-of-trademark-litigation-niva-bupa-before-the-delhi-high-court-fbcd92042969?source=rss-36f6eb28c85a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fbcd92042969</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[niva-bupa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[delhi-high-court]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal-insights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intellectual-property]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trademark-litigation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Altacit Global]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 11:16:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-17T11:16:09.604Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Mrudula Manappatt</p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>The Delhi High Court recently ordered Niva Bupa and its advocate to pay notional costs of one rupee, describing the suit as a “misuse” of the Intellectual Property Division’s special jurisdiction. The plaintiffs had sued an influencer for trademark infringement under Sections 29(4)© and 29(8) of the Trade Marks Act, over social-media posts about regulatory orders passed against the insurer. The Court held that the suit could not be<br>heard by the IPD. The influencer had no connection with the insurance business, and a critical reference to a mark does not amount to use “in the course of trade.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G6SvikoqMO7T_6WPOfXH1A.png" /></figure><p>The outcome is correct. Indian courts have long treated criticism and infringement as separate things, and decisions such as Tata Sons v. Greenpeace (2011) and San Nutrition v. Arpit Mangal (2025) confirm that a mark used as the subject of commentary, without commercial appropriation, falls outside Section 29. Even so, the Court’s reasoning feels incomplete. It never fully addressed the provision the plaintiffs expressly<br>relied upon, and it did not ask whether the influencer’s own activity took place “in the course of trade.”</p><p>The finding of misuse is more troubling, because it appears to rest on a partial reading of the IPD Rules, 2022. Rule 2(i)(ii) expressly brings “matters relating to disparagement” within the subject-matter of IPR disputes, and Rule 2(l) extends the Division’s jurisdiction to suits involving such claims under statute or common law. A failed Section 29 claim therefore does not automatically remove the IPD’s competence where an independent cause of action for commercial disparagement has been<br>properly pleaded. On the facts recorded, however, no such commercial nexus was shown, so the dispute may well have fallen outside the Division’s remit. That conclusion should have come from a careful application of Rule 2, not from the failure of the trademark pleading alone.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>An unsuccessful claim is not, by itself, an abuse of process. By calling the suit a “misuse” while imposing only notional costs, the Court has left unclear where a weak pleading ends and vexatious forum-shopping begins. Courts hearing similar cases in future would do well to explain, with the Rules in hand, why a particular grievance does or does not belong before the IPD. Trademark rights exist to protect commercial goodwill, not to silence public criticism.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fbcd92042969" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Jurisprudence of Trademark Assignment Without Goodwill]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AltacitGlobal/the-jurisprudence-of-trademark-assignment-without-goodwill-65ac542a046a?source=rss-36f6eb28c85a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/65ac542a046a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trademarkassignment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ip-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal-insights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intellectual-property]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[altacitglobal]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Altacit Global]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 08:55:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-17T08:55:52.614Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Shironika Selvaraj</p><p>Introduction</p><p>The relationship between a trademark and the goodwill associated with the business in which it is used has long presented an important question in intellectual property jurisprudence. A trademark is not merely a sign capable of distinguishing one trader’s goods or services from those of another. Its commercial significance develops through use, consumer recognition and the reputation accumulated in the marketplace.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0f32ugLMd_zTNlmLVSv06w.png" /></figure><p>When the law permits the transfer of a trademark independently of the goodwill associated with the business, it raises a fundamental issue concerning the nature and extent of trademark proprietorship:</p><ul><li>Can the exclusive right in a mark be transferred without transferring the commercial reputation that gives the mark its significance?</li></ul><p>The Trademarks Act, 1999 expressly recognises this possibility. <strong>Sections 38 and 39</strong> permit registered and unregistered trademarks, respectively, to be assigned or transmitted with or without the goodwill of the business concerned. This legislative recognition is significant because it treats trademark proprietorship as an assignable proprietary interest, capable of being transferred independently of the undertaking in which the mark has been used. However, the statutory permission does not eliminate the legal significance of goodwill. Rather, it requires the relationship between the transferred right, the underlying business and the interests of consumers to be examined separately.</p><p>Traditionally, the common law approach to trademarks placed considerable emphasis on the connection between a mark and the goodwill of the business it represented. The concern underlying the traditional reluctance towards assignments in gross was that a mark transferred independently of its business reputation could be used in a manner that misrepresented the commercial origin or character of the goods. The Indian legislature has adopted a more permissive statutory position by expressly recognising assignments without goodwill. Nevertheless, the conditions and restrictions accompanying that recognition demonstrate that trademark ownership cannot be considered entirely detached from the commercial function it performs.</p><p>The distinction between trademark proprietorship and business goodwill is therefore central to understanding the statutory scheme. <strong>Goodwill is not merely an incidental commercial benefit attached to a registered mark. It represents the reputation and customer association generated through the conduct of business</strong>. A proprietor may possess a registered trademark as a statutory right, while the goodwill associated with its use may have developed through the activities of a particular undertaking. The possibility of transferring the former without the latter does not necessarily mean that the assignee acquires every commercial interest or reputation previously associated with the assignor.</p><p><strong>Section 42</strong> of the Act reflects the legislature’s recognition of the potential consequences of such separation. Where a trademark, whether registered or unregistered, is assigned otherwise than in connection with the goodwill of the business in which it has been or is used, the assignment shall not take effect unless the assignee applies to the Registrar within six months, or within an extended period not exceeding three months in the aggregate as the Registrar may allow, for directions concerning advertisement of the assignment and complies with the directions issued. The provision is significant not merely as a procedural requirement, but as a statutory acknowledgement that an assignment detached from business goodwill warrants public disclosure. The Explanation to <strong>Section 42</strong> also clarifies that certain transfers involving specified goods or services, accompanied by the goodwill relating to those goods or services, are not treated as assignments without goodwill for this purpose.</p><p>The statutory recognition of assignment without goodwill must also be understood alongside <strong>Section 27(2),</strong> which preserves the common law remedy of passing off. The significance of this provision is that the rights arising from goodwill and the protection against misrepresentation do not depend exclusively upon registration. Consequently, an assignment of a registered trademark cannot automatically extinguish independent rights arising from prior use or the goodwill generated by another trader. The distinction between the statutory right acquired through assignment and the common law rights associated with established commercial reputation remains legally important.</p><p>The Supreme Court’s decision in <em>S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai</em>, (2016) 2 SCC 683, is particularly relevant to this principle. The dispute concerned competing claims over the mark associated with the sale of <strong>Iruttukadai Halwa</strong>. In examining the relationship between registration and passing off, the Court reaffirmed that the rights arising from prior use and goodwill operate independently of statutory registration. It recognised that the statutory rights of a registered proprietor remain subject to the protection afforded to prior users under the Act. The judgment is important to the present discussion because it demonstrates that registration, even where validly obtained, does not necessarily confer an unqualified right to disregard the commercial reputation established by another trader. Although the decision did not concern an assignment without goodwill under <strong>Section 42,</strong> its reasoning is relevant to understanding the limits of proprietary entitlement in trademark law.</p><p>This becomes particularly significant where a proprietor assigns a trademark but retains the business in which it was originally used. The assignee may acquire the rights transferred under the assignment, subject to the statutory requirements and restrictions. However, the transfer does not, by itself, resolve every question concerning the assignor’s continuing commercial activities, prior use or independent rights in goodwill. Equally, the retention of the business by the assignor does not automatically invalidate an assignment expressly permitted by the Act. The legal position must be determined by examining the scope of the assignment, the rights actually transferred and the possibility of misrepresentation or confusion arising from subsequent use.</p><p>The restrictions contained in <strong>Sections 40 and 41</strong> further demonstrate that the legislature has not treated assignment as an unrestricted exercise of proprietary autonomy. These provisions regulate assignments that may create conflicting exclusive rights in identical or deceptively similar marks, particularly where concurrent use is likely to cause confusion. <strong>Section 44 </strong>also restricts the separate assignment of associated trademarks. Such limitations reflect the underlying principle that the division of trademark rights must not undermine the ability of consumers to distinguish the commercial origin of goods and services. The proprietary freedom recognised under <strong>Sections 38 and 39</strong> must therefore operate within the broader statutory framework governing the integrity of trademark rights.</p><p>The jurisprudence of trademark assignment without goodwill ultimately reveals an important distinction between the transferability of a legal right and the commercial reputation associated with its exercise. <strong>The Trademarks Act, 1999</strong> permits the former to take place independently of the latter, but it does not render goodwill legally irrelevant. The continued protection of prior users, the availability of passing off remedies and the restrictions on conflicting assignments demonstrate that trademark ownership remains subject to principles extending beyond registration and contractual entitlement.</p><p>The law, therefore, does not insist upon an inseparable relationship between a trademark and the goodwill of the business concerned. It recognises that commercial transactions may legitimately require the independent transfer of trademark rights. However, such recognition must not be mistaken for the proposition that goodwill can be disregarded when determining the legal consequences of ownership and use. The enduring principle is that while a trademark may change proprietorship through assignment, the rights generated by commercial reputation and prior use remain governed by their own legal foundations. It is this distinction that defines the relationship between proprietary entitlement and consumer protection under Indian trademark law.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=65ac542a046a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Protecting Brand Identity Without Monopolising Common Words]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AltacitGlobal/protecting-brand-identity-without-monopolising-common-words-2b1a8badec00?source=rss-36f6eb28c85a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2b1a8badec00</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[indianiplaw]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trademark-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brand-protection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trademark-registration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intellectual-property]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Altacit Global]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 09:37:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-12T09:37:00.000Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Devvyaani Jaishankar</p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>A brand name plays an important role in how a business is recognised in the among the public in the market. Customers often begin to associate a name with a particular company through its products and the reputation it builds over time. But the situation becomes complicated when that name contains a common word which is being used in the day to day language. Can a business claim exclusive rights over such a word simply because it has used it extensively in its branding? And where should the law draw the line between using common words as the brand identity?</p><p>The Trade Marks Act, 1999, protects registered trademarks while making sure other businesses are not unfairly prevented from using words that form part of everyday language. A common word may acquire a distinctive identity through its use in the market, particularly when consumers begin to associate it with a particular business. However, this does not mean the business can prevent other traders from using the same word. The circumstances under which it is used and the likelihood of consumer and the public having their confusion remain important.</p><p>The question of when company uses the same word across several trademarks becomes more difficult to answer, because the repeated use may lead customers to recognise a common element through different products and associate them with the same business or the company. This raises another question: can a company rely on this branding pattern to claim protection against others who use the same word? While the family of marks doctrine may offer protection in such circumstances, the extent of such a protection requires careful consideration.</p><p>The Delhi High Court considered these issues in <strong><em>WOW Momo Foods Private Limited v. WOW Burger</em>.</strong> The dispute concerned WOW Momo’s attempt to prevent WOW Burger from using the word “WOW” in connection with its food products. The case highlights the difficulty of protecting a business’s established brand identity when it is built around a common word. It also raises a broader question about the extent to which trademark law should protect a business without restricting the legitimate use of ordinary language by others.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yBVId-0jpd9Bz2KExS82Mg.png" /></figure><p><strong>The Legal Framework: Distinctiveness and the Scope of Trademark Rights</strong></p><p>Indian trademark law is primarily governed by the act, Trade Marks Act, 1999. This law protects the rights of someone who registers a trademark, but it also ensures those rights aren’t stretched beyond what’s fair.</p><p>Two provisions are particularly relevant to this discussion: Sections 17 and 29.</p><p>Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, addresses what happens when a trademark comprises several different parts. Usually, if you register a complex trademark, you get elements. It generally provides that registration of a composite trademark confers exclusive rights to the trademark, but it does not automatically give you exclusive rights to that part unless you’ve taken special procedures or there’s a specific rule. This matters because a company can protect its full brand name or logo, but that doesn’t always mean it owns every single word element.</p><p>Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, deals with trademark infringement. Under Section 29(2)(b), infringement may arise where a registered trademark is used in relation to identical or similar goods or services and the similarity between the marks is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public or create an association with the registered trademark. The provision therefore recognizes that consumer confusion may arise not only from identical marks but also from similarities that lead consumers to believe that two businesses are commercially connected.</p><p>The mere fact that the same word is employed in two trademarks does not in itself indicate that there is infringement; the marks have to be considered in the context of their use, with attention given to how similar they are, the nature of the goods or services that the company or the business deals with, and the possibility that consumers or the general public might be confused or believe that there is a connection between the two businesses. Even though trademark law protects the goodwill that a business has built up, it should not prevent people from using common words if such use is not causing confusion to the customers and the public.</p><p>The situation grows more complex if a company has a number of trademarks based on the same word or prefix. If a common element is used in connection with different products, consumers may start to see it as a characteristic linked with that particular business. In these circumstances, the issue is no longer merely whether the two individual marks are similar in appearance or sound, but whether the use of a new mark might cause consumers to think that it belongs to the same business or is part of its range of products.</p><p>This brings us to the <em>family of marks</em> doctrine. It recognises that a group of trademarks sharing a common element may develop an identity of their own in the minds of consumers. However, simply registering several marks containing the same word should not be enough to establish such a family. There must be a basis for believing that consumers recognise the shared element as identifying a particular business. Without this, the doctrine could give businesses an overly broad claim over common words merely because they appear in multiple registrations.</p><p>The real challenge is to protect a brand’s identity without allowing that protection to extend too far. A business should be able to prevent others from creating a misleading impression of association, but it should not be able to restrict the use of a common word without sufficient justification. This balance lies at the heart of the dispute between WOW Momo Foods Private Limited and WOW Burger.</p><p><strong>The Dispute and the Delhi High Court’s Decision</strong></p><p>The dispute between WOW Momo Foods Private Limited and WOW Burger provides an important illustration of the challenges involved in protecting a trademark built around a common English word. WOW Momo had registered several trademarks incorporating the word “WOW”, including WOW MOMO, WOW DIMSUMS and WOW MOMO INSTANT. However, it did not hold a standalone registration for the word “WOW” or “WOW!” that would, by itself, establish exclusive rights over the word in all commercial contexts.</p><p>The dispute arose when WOW Burger adopted a mark incorporating the same word in connection with food products. WOW Momo objected to this use, contending that the similarity could lead consumers to believe that WOW Burger was associated with its established business or formed part of its existing range of products.</p><p>The Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, in an order dated 12 September 2025, declined to grant an interim injunction. The reasoning placed emphasis on the ordinary meaning of the word “WOW” and the limits of claiming exclusivity over a common expression. The decision represented a fundamental principle pertaining to trademark law: the registration of a composite mark does not automatically confer an unrestricted monopoly over each individual element within it.</p><p>On appeal, however, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court adopted a different approach. In its judgment dated 16 October 2025, the Court examined the dispute not simply as a question of whether WOW Momo could claim exclusive rights over the word “WOW”, but also as a question of whether its registered marks collectively formed a recognisable family of trademarks.</p><p>The Division Bench distinguished between claiming exclusive ownership of a common word in isolation and protecting the commercial identity developed through a series of marks sharing that word. It recognised that WOW Momo’s registered marks contained a recurring initial element and that this pattern could acquire distinctiveness in the context of the proprietor’s range of products. The Court considered whether the use of WOW BURGER was likely to create an association with WOW Momo’s existing business, particularly given the connection between the parties’ marks and the food sector.</p><p>The Court ultimately held that the circumstances supported protection against the use of WOW BURGER and reversed the Single Judge’s decision, granting an interim injunction pending the disposal of the suit. Its reasoning demonstrates that the absence of a standalone registration for a common word does not necessarily prevent a proprietor from establishing infringement where the later mark creates a likelihood of confusion as well as commercial association with a protected family of marks.</p><p>Importantly, the judgment did not establish that every use of the word “WOW” in a food-related trademark would necessarily amount to infringement. Rather, the decision turned on the registered marks, their common element, the commercial context and the likelihood of association. Given that the proceedings concerned interim relief, the decision must also be understood in that procedural setting rather than treated as a final determination of every issue in the underlying infringement dispute.</p><p><strong>The Family of Marks Doctrine: Protection or Indirect Monopoly?</strong></p><p>It is not always simple to decide whether a business can obtain protection for a common word since it is used in a number of its registered trademarks. The doctrine of a family of marks holds that consumers can tell one business apart from another on the basis of a common word or prefix applied to different products; if customers keep seeing the same element in a company’s branding, they may start to link it with that specific business rather than regard it as just an ordinary word.</p><p>It by no means follows that simply by registering a number of trademarks which include the same word a business should be granted exclusive rights over that word. Although trademark law is designed to protect the identity and goodwill that a business has established, it also has to permit other traders to use common words if they have a valid reason for doing so. The important point is whether or not consumers have come to regard the common element as indicating a specific commercial source.</p><p>The case of the word “WOW” is particularly important. It is a well-known expression in English which businesses might decide to use since it is simple, attractive and promotional. If a business were able to prevent others from using it just by having it registered in several trademarks, the protection it obtained would go well beyond what was intended. A common word could in that way become the exclusive property of a single business, even if other traders would like to use it on their own.</p><p>At the same time, it is not necessary for a word to be invented or uncommon in order to obtain trademark protection; an ordinary word may develop a distinct identity as a result of continuous use and consumer recognition. This is commonly known as secondary meaning. In these situations, the issue is whether or not consumers have come to identify the word in connection with certain goods or services with a particular business.</p><p>In the case of the WOW Momo dispute, the Division Bench did not limit its consideration to the word ‘WOW’ by itself. It looked at the common element in the registered marks of WOW Momo and whether consumers might regard WOW BURGER as coming from the same business. This point is important since consumers and the general public do not always examine trademarks in great detail; at times it is sufficient for them to see a familiar word or naming pattern to assume that the two products are connected.</p><p>Yet this method also leads to questions regarding how far such protection should go. A company ought not to be able to assert control over a word which is commonly used in everyday language just because it appears in a number of registrations. The fact that it has a certain number of trademarks on its own does not mean that consumers associate the word exclusively with that business. The courts should also take into account the business’s market position, the degree of recognition its marks have achieved, the nature of the goods concerned, and whether the competing mark is likely to cause confusion or give the impression of a commercial association.</p><p>The doctrine concerning the family of marks must be applied with care since it ought to safeguard a true brand identity which consumers have come to recognise rather than allowing a business an unfair edge over those who want to use ordinary language. The problem is to protect existing goodwill without imposing unnecessary restrictions on competition; although a business can gain recognition from the way it uses a word, that does not mean it should be regarded as the owner of the word itself.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The battle between WOW Momo Foods Private Limited and WOW Burger is a case in point as to how hard it can be to work out where the boundaries of trademark protection lie when the mark in question is a generic term. Companies are entitled to protection against the unauthorised use of their marks but that protection shouldn’t be so extensive as to give them total control over a word that others may also wish to use. The real issue is when does a word become sufficiently linked to a business to merit protection in a particular commercial context?</p><p>The Delhi High Court ruling highlights that trademarks cannot be examined in isolation. Where a business has used the same element in a number of its marks, the consumer will begin to associate that element with the business as a whole. It is therefore possible that the use of a similar mark by another trader could lead to the perception that the two businesses are in some way linked, even if the marks are not identical. The existence of a family of marks should not in itself be sufficient to entitle the business to exclusive rights in the common word.</p><p>The real issue is that trademark protection is meant to do a job. The courts have to consider how distinctive the mark is, how it’s being used in the marketplace and whether there’s a likelihood of confusion or a commercial relationship being assumed. Protecting a business’s reputation is of course important, but so is not in any way unduly restricting other traders from using perfectly ordinary words.</p><p>Ultimately the whole point of this is where the law draws the line between protecting a brand and restricting the use of ordinary language. A business can certainly build up a good identity around a particular word, but that doesn’t necessarily mean the word itself is the property of that business. The law should protect the goodwill of the business, not turn that into ownership of the word itself.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2b1a8badec00" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Beyond the Sound: What NISE vs. NICE Teaches Us About Trademark Protection]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AltacitGlobal/beyond-the-sound-what-nise-vs-nice-teaches-us-about-trademark-protection-61b75a75227f?source=rss-36f6eb28c85a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/61b75a75227f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trademark-protection]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[iplitigation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intellectual-property]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trademark-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal-updates]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Altacit Global]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 05:22:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-11T05:31:30.219Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>By Rithika S S</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1hyb2fVm2N7SK8qrwjfxsg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Introduction:</strong></p><p>Dr.Reddy’s Laboratories Limited <em>(hereinafter referred to as “Appellant”) </em>appealed against the registration of the mark “nice” in Class 10 by Nice Neotech Medical Systems Pvt. Ltd. <em>(hereinafter referred to as “Respondent”)</em>, contending that the same being deceptively similar to its registered mark “NISE” in Class 5, among other grounds. The Hon’ble Madras High Court, in CMA (TM) №31 of 2025 vide Order dated 26.10.2026, held that the mark “nice” which is used in respect of neonatal intensive care equipment is phonetically similar to the mark “NISE” which is used in respect of pharmaceutical preparations. Both mark consists of four letters and the substitution of the letter “C” for “S” is not significant to prevent phonetic similarity between the marks.</p><p>However, the Court upheld the registration of the mark “nice” and consequently, Dr.Reddy’s appeal was dismissed.</p><p>The Hon’ble High Court assessed this trademark dispute under the seven factors laid down in the case of Cadila Health Care v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals, (2001) 5 SCC 73, to determine deceptive similarity and observed that <em>“phonetic similarity alone is not enough”</em>. Apart from the immense degree of resemblance in pronunciation between the rival marks, the following significant factors were discussed in the present trademark dispute:</p><p><strong>Nature of goods</strong></p><p>The Appellant’s mark “NISE” is used in respect of pharmaceutical preparations such as medicines for pain and inflammatory conditions. On the other hand, the Respondent’s mark “nice” is used in respect of specialized NICU equipment such as incubators, radiant warmers, phototherapy units, ventilators and respiratory-care apparatus. The Court held that the goods of the rival marks are different in nature, purpose and function and that a common sector(healthcare) does not, by itself, result in confusion or association.</p><p><strong>Purchasers and mode of purchase</strong></p><p>Medicines under the mark “NISE” are bought by patients and general public, frequntly on a prescription from doctors. NICU equipment under the mark “nice” is procured by hospitals and institutions, where doctors, biomedical engineers and procurement personnel evaluate specifications, safety, performance and price before placing an order. In the words of the Court, the greater care and attention before placing an order weighs against confusion.</p><p><strong>Honest adoption</strong></p><p>Similarity in sound, without proof of deliberate copying, was not enough for the Court to infer bad faith. The Respondent’s incorporation documents, product catalogue and other business records supported its explanation of independent adoption. In addition this evidence, the mark also forms part of its corporate name.</p><p><strong>Well-known mark and passing off</strong></p><p>The Court acknowledged the Appellant’s domestic reputation in pharmaceutical preparations, but reputation alone does not satisfy Section 11(2) of the Act. This Judgment does not mean that cross-class protection is unavailable. Where a mark is proved to be well-known and the later adoption is a deliberate attempt to ride on its reputation, courts have granted protection against unrelated goods, as in <em>Daimler Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Hybo Hindustan, AIR 1994 DEL 239. </em>The difference lies in the evidence. In the present case, the Appellant could not show well-known status in India, unfair advantage or detriment or any real commecial connection in the eyes of the relevant purchaser.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Sharing a sector (healthcare) does not by itself make confusion likely. The argument that pharmaceuticals and neonatal medical equipment are allied goods did not succeed, because the Appellant could not establish a likelihood of association on the facts. Unless appealed against, this judgment serves as a quiet reminder that oppositions across classes should be built on evidence on real trade connections (overlapping purchasers, channels, or a documented expansion plan) and not on phonetic closeness and shared sector alone.</p><p>💬 <strong>What do you think? Should two trademarks be considered similar merely because they sound alike? Share your thoughts in the comments!</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=61b75a75227f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Foreign Party Involved?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AltacitGlobal/foreign-party-involved-dd880ea4bd70?source=rss-36f6eb28c85a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dd880ea4bd70</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dispute-resolutions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internationallitigation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[supreme-court-of-india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crossborderdisputes]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Altacit Global]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 10:46:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-05T10:46:47.157Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Foreign Party Involved? Why You May Need to Skip the High Court and Go Straight to the Supreme Court</strong></h3><p>By Pushpalatha Devaraj</p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>Picture this: your company signs a contract with a counterparty incorporated in Singapore, or with an individual who has lived in Dubai for the past decade. A dispute arises, the arbitration clause is silent on a few procedural points, and you need to approach a court to get an arbitrator appointed. Naturally, your lawyers draft a petition for the High Court with jurisdiction over the contract. There is just one problem — they may be approaching the wrong forum entirely. Under Indian arbitration law, the moment a foreign element enters the picture, the rules on which court you approach change significantly, and getting this wrong can cost you valuable time at the very start of your dispute.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-t0P0Z969TGOrOG4y6vKOQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>What Makes a Dispute an “International Commercial Arbitration</strong></p><p>Section 2(1)(f) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 defines an International Commercial Arbitration (ICA) as an arbitration relating to disputes arising out of a legal relationship considered commercial under Indian law, where at least one of the parties is:</p><ul><li>An individual who is a national of, or habitually resident in, any country other than India;</li><li>A body corporate incorporated in any country other than India;</li><li>An association or body of individuals whose central management and control is exercised in any country other than India; or</li><li>The Government of a foreign country.</li></ul><p>This classification does not depend on where the arbitration is seated, or even on the nationality of the individuals negotiating the contract on behalf of a company. What matters is the nationality, habitual residence, place of incorporation, or place of central management and control of the party itself. A wholly domestic transaction can still qualify as an ICA simply because the counterparty is a foreign-incorporated entity, even if all performance and assets are located in India.</p><p><strong>Why the Forum Changes: Section 11 and the Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction</strong></p><p>The practical consequence of this classification arises most sharply under Section 11 of the Act, which governs the appointment of arbitrators when parties fail to agree on one, or when the agreed procedure breaks down. For a purely domestic arbitration, a party approaches the High Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute — in Chennai, for instance, that would ordinarily be the Madras High Court.</p><p>However, Section 11(12)(a) carves out a specific exception for international commercial arbitrations: where the arbitration qualifies as an ICA, the power to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(4), (5) or (6) vests in the Supreme Court of India, or a person or institution designated by the Supreme Court, rather than in the High Court. This is a jurisdictional bar, not a matter of convenience or choice. A party that mistakenly files a Section 11 petition before a High Court in an ICA matter risks the petition being dismissed for want of jurisdiction, losing valuable time while the limitation clock continues to run.</p><p>In practice, the Supreme Court has, through its Arbitration Rules, designated arbitral institutions to assist with this function, so the process does not always mean a judge of the Supreme Court personally deciding every appointment application. Even so, the correct starting point for the petition remains the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, not the relevant High Court.</p><p><strong>How to Determine the Correct Forum: A Quick Checklist</strong></p><ol><li>Identify every party to the arbitration agreement, not just the party you are dealing with directly — guarantors, parent companies, or assignees may also be relevant.</li><li>Check the nationality or habitual residence of any individual party, and the place of incorporation and central management and control of any corporate party.</li><li>If any single party meets the foreign-element test under Section 2(1)(f), the arbitration is an ICA, regardless of how many other parties are Indian.</li><li>For appointment of an arbitrator in an ICA, file the Section 11 application before the Supreme Court (or its designated institution), not the jurisdictional High Court.</li><li>For other reliefs — such as interim measures under Section 9, or setting aside an award under Section 34 — continue to check the applicable provision separately, as the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction under Section 11(12)(a) does not automatically extend to every stage of the arbitration.</li></ol><p><strong>A Point of Nuance: Not Every Application Goes to the Supreme Court</strong></p><p>It is a common and costly misconception to assume that because a dispute is an ICA, every court application connected with it must go to the Supreme Court. That is incorrect. Section 11(12)(a) is specifically confined to the appointment of arbitrators under Section 11. Applications for interim relief under Section 9, or petitions to set aside an award under Section 34, continue to lie before the relevant High Court (or, in some cases, a Commercial Court), depending on where the contract is to be performed, where the parties are located, or where assets are situated, applying ordinary principles of jurisdiction. Businesses should not assume that “ICA status” automatically centralises their entire dispute before the Supreme Court.</p><p><strong>Common Mistakes and Pitfalls</strong></p><ul><li><strong>Filing the Section 11 petition in the wrong court: </strong>the single most frequent and avoidable error, usually arising because in-house teams assume the ordinary High Court rule applies regardless of the foreign element.</li><li><strong>Overlooking an indirect foreign element: </strong>a dispute can qualify as an ICA even where the foreign party is not the principal signatory, such as a foreign parent company that is also a party to the arbitration agreement.</li><li><strong>Assuming the seat of arbitration determines the classification: </strong>an arbitration seated in India between an Indian company and a foreign-incorporated counterparty is still an ICA; the seat does not override the nationality and incorporation test.</li><li><strong>Treating all applications as centralised at the Supreme Court: </strong>as noted above, interim relief and award-setting-aside applications generally remain with the High Court or Commercial Court, not the Supreme Court.</li><li><strong>Delaying the jurisdictional analysis: </strong>by the time a wrongly filed petition is dismissed and refiled in the correct forum, businesses can lose weeks or months — a real cost when interim relief or an urgent appointment is needed.</li></ul><p><strong>Strategic Recommendations</strong></p><ul><li>Conduct a jurisdictional assessment under Section 2(1)(f) at the very outset of any dispute involving a cross-border contract, before drafting or filing any court application.</li><li>Build this check into your standard dispute-response protocol for all commercial contracts with foreign counterparties, joint venture partners, or foreign-funded group entities.</li><li>When drafting arbitration clauses in cross-border contracts, consider naming the appointing authority or institution expressly, to reduce the need for Section 11 intervention altogether.</li><li>Keep track of evolving Supreme Court designations and rules on institutions empowered to assist with ICA appointments, as these can affect the practical procedure for filing.</li><li>Engage counsel experienced in cross-border arbitration early, given how easily the correct forum can be missed by teams more familiar with domestic litigation and arbitration practice.</li></ul><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The presence of a foreign party in a commercial dispute is not a minor technical detail — it fundamentally changes the procedural map for resolving that dispute under Indian arbitration law. For the appointment of an arbitrator, the High Court is simply not the right forum once a dispute qualifies as an International Commercial Arbitration; that application belongs before the Supreme Court. Getting this right from the outset avoids wasted time, wasted costs, and the real risk of a dismissed petition at the very stage when speed often matters most.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dd880ea4bd70" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Who Owns Your Identity in the Age of AI?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AltacitGlobal/who-owns-your-identity-in-the-age-of-ai-924772149aba?source=rss-36f6eb28c85a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/924772149aba</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[aideepfake]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intellectual-property]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[personality-right]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal-insights]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Altacit Global]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 06:45:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-03T06:45:48.185Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Who Owns Your Identity in the Age of AI? Samantha Ruth Prabhu’s Fight Against Deepfakes and Misappropriation</h3><p>By Ashita</p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>In a significant legal development concerning intellectual property and digital rights in India, the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Commercial Division) delivered an interim order in <em>Samantha Ruth Prabhu v. John Doe (Ashok Kumar) &amp; Ors. </em>(Interim Application (L) №29905 of 2026 in Commercial IP Suit №346 of 2026). Presided over by Justice Madhav J. Jamdar on October 1, 2026, the Hon’ble Court granted comprehensive ad-interim injunctive relief to protect the prominent Indian actress’s “Persona Indicia” and personality rights against unauthorized. AI-generated content, deepfakes, chatbots, and commercial exploitation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JuP9BxfLNQWZWoAjv2m73A.png" /></figure><h3>Facts of the Case</h3><p>The Plaintiff, Ms. Samantha Ruth Prabhu, is an internationally recognized Indian film actress with a distinguished 15-year career across Hindi, Telugu, and Tamil cinema. She possesses immense public goodwill and brand value, maintaining a social media presence of roughly 38 million Instagram followers, 17 million X followers, and over 1 million YouTube subscribers.</p><p>In July 2026, the Plaintiff discovered widespread and systematic violations of her personality and moral rights. The infringements were categorized under five main heads:</p><ol><li><strong>Pornographic &amp; Obscene Platforms</strong></li><li><strong>Online Content Portals</strong>.</li><li><strong>Generative-AI Platforms &amp; Chatbots</strong></li><li><strong>Unauthorized E-Commerce &amp; Soundboards</strong></li><li><strong>Anonymous Infringers</strong></li></ol><p>The Union of India (MeitY and DoT) was arrayed as Defendants 14 and 15 (proforma defendants) to enable the blocking and takedown of non-compliant URLs.</p><h3>Issues Before the Court</h3><ol><li>Whether the Plaintiff’s “Persona Indicia” — including her name, image, voice, signature, distinctive screen persona, and mannerisms — warrant protection against unauthorized AI manipulation, passing off, and commercial misappropriation.</li><li>Whether the creation and dissemination of deepfake, morphed, and obscene AI content infringe upon the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights to privacy and dignity, as well as her statutory moral rights as a performer.</li><li>Whether ad-interim injunctive relief and dynamic takedown orders should be issued against named defendants, social media intermediaries (Meta, Google), e-commerce platforms, and unknown <em>John Doe </em>entities.</li></ol><h3>Legal Analysis</h3><p>The Court examined the multifaceted rights asserted by the Plaintiff, noting that rights over her “Persona Indicia” flow from multiple legal grounds:</p><ul><li><strong>Constitutional Protections: </strong>Rights stemming from the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the Right to Life, Personal Liberty, Privacy, and Dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.</li><li><strong>Statutory Moral Rights: </strong>The moral rights of a performer are protected under Sections 38, 38-A, and 38-B of the Copyright Act, 1957.</li><li><strong>Common Law Torts: </strong>Protections against passing off, unfair competition, commercial misappropriation, and unjust enrichment.</li></ul><p>The Court noted that an actor’s identity and attributes constitute exclusive intangible capital assets. Applying precedents such as <em>Shruti Haasan v. Mahalaxmi Arts </em>(2026), <em>Preity G. Zinta v. Google LLC </em>(2026), <em>Akshay Hari Om Bhatia v. John Doe </em>(2025), and <em>Shilpa Shetty Kundra v.</em></p><p><em>Geoutlive.in </em>(2026), the Court affirmed that unauthorized AI deepfakes and morphing inflict irreparable harm on reputation and goodwill that monetary compensation cannot repair.</p><p>Furthermore, the Court analyzed the obligations of Social Media Intermediaries under Rule 3(1)(b) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021<strong> </strong>(as amended in 2022), which mandates strict due diligence on platforms to prevent and remove illegal or infringing content.</p><h3>Judgement &amp; Directions</h3><p>Finding a strong <em>prima facie </em>case in favor of the Plaintiff, the Bombay High Court granted ad-interim relief in terms of prayer clauses (a) to ©, (h), (j), and (n):</p><ol><li><strong>Temporary Injunction: </strong>Restrained Defendants 1, 4–7, 9–13, and 16–18 from directly or indirectly using, imitating, or exploiting the Plaintiff’s name, voice, image, likeness, or performance style via AI, deepfakes, chatbots, voice cloning, or any other medium without explicit consent.</li><li><strong>Restraint on Passing Off: </strong>Enjoined the defendants from passing off goods, services, or online content as being associated with or endorsed by the Plaintiff.</li><li><strong>Takedown &amp; Blocking Orders: </strong>Directed Defendants 2 (Meta), 3 (Google), 8 (Amazon), and AI/content providers to immediately remove, delete, and disable access to the infringing links, listings, and chatbots detailed in the Plaint.</li><li><strong>Dynamic Injunction Mechanism: </strong>Ordered Defendants 14 &amp; 15 (MeitY and DoT) and intermediaries to block access to existing infringing URLs and any future similar infringing material upon written notification by the Plaintiff.</li><li><strong>Intermediary Safeguards: </strong>Provided liberty to intermediaries to communicate objections to the Plaintiff’s advocate if any future notified links contain genuine, non-infringing material, in line with due diligence requirements under Rule 3 of the IT Rules, 2021.</li></ol><p>The ad-interim orders remain in force until further orders, with the matter scheduled for next hearing on December 10, 2026.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=924772149aba" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Your AI Startup May Be Valuable. That Doesn’t Make Its AI Patentable]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AltacitGlobal/your-ai-startup-may-be-valuable-that-doesnt-make-its-ai-patentable-81fa6cf4c75a?source=rss-36f6eb28c85a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/81fa6cf4c75a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[patents]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intellectual-property]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-development]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Altacit Global]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:00:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-02T11:01:38.244Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Shankar Ravichandran</p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p><em>In India, the useful question is not “Can we patent our AI?” It is “What, precisely, have we invented?”</em></p><p>Picture an AI founder sitting across from a patent lawyer.</p><p>The product works. It inspects images from a factory production line and flags defective components. Customers are interested. The engineering team has spent months improving performance. The investor presentation describes the technology as “proprietary.”</p><p>Then comes the question:</p><p><em>“Can we patent our AI?”</em></p><p>The difficulty is not the word “patent.” It is the phrase “our AI.”</p><p>Does it mean a new model architecture? A distinctive image-processing pipeline? A method of running inference on a memory-constrained device? Or an existing model trained to perform a useful task?</p><p>Those are different propositions. They should not receive the same legal answer.</p><p>An AI product can be commercially impressive without containing a patentable invention. Equally, a patentable contribution may lie in an unglamorous part of the system: how it manages memory, processes signals or coordinates computation.</p><p>Indian patent law asks about the claimed invention not the label on the pitch deck. The Patent Office’s 2025 Computer Related Inventions guidelines expressly address AI and machine learning, but retain the familiar requirements of eligible subject matter, novelty, inventive step, industrial applicability and adequate disclosure.</p><p>The distinction matters because a patent is not a certificate of business potential. And the absence of a patent is not a verdict that a business lacks value.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bUUElZstpllEhrPng3VAWg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Start With The Invention</strong></p><p>“Can AI be patented in India?” is an understandable opening question. It is not a sufficiently precise question on which to base a filing decision.</p><p>Section 3(k) of the Patents Act excludes:</p><p>“a mathematical or business method or a computer programme per se or algorithms.”</p><p>That wording does not support the blanket assertion that every software-based invention is unpatentable. But it does not create a special exemption for AI either.</p><p>The first task is to identify the substance of the claimed contribution. What problem does it address? What implementation solves that problem? What changes because of that implementation?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/525/1*bB43VjtHYLcC6_OwkY2jeA.png" /></figure><p><em>These are screening examples, not patentability conclusions. The actual claims and supporting specification remain decisive.</em></p><p>Indian courts have helped clarify the distinction between a computer programme as such and a computer-implemented technical contribution.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/548/1*14sW8hcwnAORQIpsS702YA.png" /></figure><p><em>All three decisions are discussed in the 2025 CRI guidelines.</em></p><p>The practical lesson is not to insert “technical effect” into every paragraph of a patent application.</p><p>It is to identify and explain the technical effect produced by the claimed implementation.</p><p>“Our product uses deep learning” names a technology.</p><p>“Our implementation changes how the device processes image data under a fixed memory constraint” starts to identify a technical contribution.</p><p>The next questions are harder: How does it do that? What is different from known approaches? And is that difference legally protectable?</p><p><strong>Commercial Success Is Not Patentability</strong></p><p>A founder says the system is “better.”</p><p>A patent professional should ask: better in what sense?</p><p>Better conversion rates, more relevant offers and improved customer retention may be valuable business outcomes. Lower inference latency, reduced memory consumption and improved signal processing may point towards technical outcomes. The distinction is important, although neither category of improvement establishes patentability on its own.</p><p>This is where otherwise productive conversations can go wrong. The founder explains why customers will buy the product. The patent professional is trying to identify what the applicant can validly claim.</p><p>Both questions matter. They are simply different questions.</p><p>The business-method exclusion makes that separation especially important in India. In <em>OpenTV</em>, the Delhi High Court explained that a business method does not escape the statutory bar merely through arguments about technical implementation or technical effect. The underlying question is whether the application addresses a business or administrative problem and provides a solution to it.</p><p>Adding machine learning to a commercial decision-making process does not, by itself, change that analysis.</p><p>There is also a wider reason to resist easy assumptions: AI patent activity is substantial, but patent statistics are often misunderstood.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/518/1*N-4_V7Lx_kI1fh2c01cnSA.png" /></figure><p><em>Source: WIPO’s 2024 Generative AI Patent Landscape Report. These figures concern generative AI, not all AI technologies.</em></p><p>The qualification matters. These are patent-family publication statistics not a count of AI patents granted in India, and not a startup’s probability of obtaining protection.</p><p>The data shows substantial patenting activity. It does not establish that a particular product satisfies Indian law.</p><p>A crowded patent landscape should sharpen the invention analysis, not replace it with enthusiasm.</p><p><strong>A Technical Effect Is Only A Start</strong></p><p>Suppose the inspection startup has developed a specific implementation that reduces peak memory consumption during inference.</p><p>That is a more concrete starting point than “AI-powered quality control.” It still leaves several separate questions unanswered.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/525/1*r5c7MuvOqtFCWCHUtwJb7w.png" /></figure><p><em>These are distinct requirements under the Indian CRI examination framework.</em></p><p>Inventive step deserves particular care.</p><p>Section 2(1)(ja) refers to technical advance over existing knowledge, economic significance, or both and also requires that the invention be non-obvious to a person skilled in the art. Economic significance is not a substitute for non-obviousness, nor does it override Section 3(k).</p><p>A team can spend months integrating components, cleaning data, resolving edge cases and making deployment reliable. That effort may be indispensable to the product.</p><p>But development difficulty and legal inventiveness are not interchangeable.</p><p>The question is not merely:</p><p><em>“Was this hard to build?”</em></p><p>It is:</p><p><em>“What distinguishes the claimed solution from what was already known, and why would that solution not have been obvious?”</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/521/1*zKfWHu_ob7le-sjMp9nnrA.png" /></figure><p><em>This is an illustrative evidence template, not a statutory checklist. No performance figures are assumed.</em></p><p>The important point is the connection between the result and the mechanism. A benchmark can show that a system performs differently. The application must explain which claimed features produce the improvement; the prior-art analysis must then examine whether those features are new and non-obvious.</p><p>Numbers make the account more testable. They do not supply the invention.</p><p><strong>The Black Box Problem</strong></p><p>AI patent discussions often focus on eligibility. Disclosure can be just as consequential.</p><p>Section 10(4) requires a complete specification to fully and particularly describe the invention, its operation or use, and the method by which it is performed. It also requires disclosure of the best method of performing the invention known to the applicant for which protection is claimed. The CRI guidelines separately address sufficiency of disclosure, including AI-related considerations.</p><p>“Our proprietary model predicts equipment failure” describes a capability.</p><p>It may say very little about the invention.</p><p>If the contribution lies in a particular preprocessing sequence, the specification needs to explain that sequence. If it lies in the interaction between a model and an inference pipeline, merely naming the model may leave the critical implementation unexplained.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/546/1*GsdigYtqrnRTpS4TxaYStg.png" /></figure><p><em>The table illustrates claim-dependent disclosure issues; it is not a universal demand to disclose every item in every AI application.</em></p><p>There is no sensible one-size-fits-all instruction to publish every line of code or an entire dataset. The concern is whether the specification provides an adequate technical teaching of the claimed invention, rather than leaving a skilled reader to reconstruct it through undue experimentation.</p><p>That is also why “black box” needs careful use.</p><p>A patent specification does not necessarily have to explain every internal decision made by a trained model. It does have to explain the claimed invention sufficiently. A lack of model interpretability and a lack of enabling disclosure are not the same problem.</p><p>The drafting challenge is therefore not to make the application longer. It is to make the explanation complete where completeness matters.</p><p>A sales demonstration can show that something works. A patent specification must teach the invention for which protection is sought.</p><p><strong>Ask A Better Patent Question</strong></p><p>The revised 2025 CRI guidelines were announced on 29 July 2025. Their express treatment of AI, machine learning and deep learning makes them an important examination reference. But the guidelines themselves state that they do not constitute rule-making: the Patents Act and Rules prevail in the event of conflict.</p><p>So neither of these headlines is a reliable description of the position:</p><p>“India bans AI patents.”</p><p>“India now allows AI patents.”</p><p>The more accurate message is less dramatic: an AI-related application needs a specific, claim-based assessment under Indian patent law.</p><p>Before a founder asks whether the company can patent “its AI,” the team should be able to complete this sentence:</p><p>“We developed <strong>[a specific implementation]</strong> to address <strong>[a technical problem]</strong>. It differs from <strong>[known approaches]</strong> in <strong>[identified features]</strong>, and those features produce <strong>[an explained technical effect]</strong>.”</p><p>That sentence is a preparation tool, not a legal formula. It helps organize the information needed to examine technical contribution, prior art and disclosure.</p><p>A useful internal invention note can then answer five questions:</p><ol><li>What technical limitation did the team address?</li><li>What implementation did it develop to address that limitation?</li><li>Which features distinguish it from the closest known approaches?</li><li>What evidence connects those features to the claimed improvement?</li><li>What information would another skilled person need to perform the invention?</li></ol><p>Those questions may uncover a promising patent candidate. They may reveal that the contribution is already known, falls within an exclusion or has not yet been adequately documented.</p><p>Either outcome is more useful than an unsupported statement that the company “owns the AI.”</p><p>A founder does not need to minimize the business’s achievement to be precise about its invention. Commercial value and patentability can coexist, but one is not evidence of the other.</p><p>Customers buy a solution. Patent law examines a claimed invention.</p><p>The strongest patent conversation begins when the startup can explain the difference.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=81fa6cf4c75a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Are Limitation-of-Liability Clauses Really Absolute Under Indian Law?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AltacitGlobal/are-limitation-of-liability-clauses-really-absolute-under-indian-law-b9d678761c72?source=rss-36f6eb28c85a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b9d678761c72</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[legal-insights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal-updates]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[contract-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[indian-law]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Altacit Global]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 05:31:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-30T05:31:44.507Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Bisvas Dev</p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>In commercial contracts, limitation-of-liability clauses are often regarded as essential safeguards against financial exposure. Whether in technology agreements, service contracts, licensing arrangements, or commercial transactions, parties routinely negotiate provisions restricting their liability to a predetermined amount, such as the fees paid under the agreement or the contract value.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZPmMS-_uKGokQ-li62_mgg.png" /></figure><p>A typical clause may provide that neither party shall be liable for indirect or consequential damages and that the aggregate liability of either party shall not exceed the total consideration paid under the agreement.</p><p>However, an important legal question arises: Can a party rely on a limitation-of-liability clause to escape liability in every circumstance, irrespective of the nature or consequences of its breach?</p><p>Under Indian law, the answer is not an unconditional yes. Although contractual freedom permits parties to allocate commercial risks, the enforceability of such clauses remains subject to statutory provisions, judicial interpretation, public policy considerations, and the language of the agreement itself.</p><p><strong>1. The Legal Framework Governing Limitation of Liability</strong></p><p>The Indian Contract Act, 1872 does not expressly prohibit parties from agreeing to limit their contractual liability. The enforceability of such provisions must, however, be examined alongside several statutory principles.</p><p>Section 23 — Lawful Object and Consideration</p><p>Section 23 provides that the object or consideration of an agreement is unlawful where it is forbidden by law, defeats the provisions of any law, is fraudulent, involves injury to another’s person or property, or is regarded by the court as immoral or opposed to public policy.</p><p>Consequently, a contractual provision cannot automatically be enforced merely because both parties have agreed to it. Its validity must be assessed against the applicable legal framework.</p><p>Section 28 — Agreements in Restraint of Legal Proceedings</p><p>Section 28 renders void, subject to statutory exceptions, agreements that absolutely restrict a party from enforcing contractual rights through ordinary legal proceedings or improperly restrict the period available for enforcing such rights. It also addresses contractual provisions extinguishing rights or discharging liability upon expiry of a specified period where they restrict enforcement.</p><p>Importantly, a genuine monetary limitation on damages is not necessarily equivalent to a restriction on legal proceedings. The distinction depends upon the substance and effect of the provision.</p><p>Sections 73 and 74 — Compensation for Breach</p><p>Section 73 governs compensation for losses arising naturally from a contractual breach or contemplated by the parties when entering into the contract, excluding remote and indirect losses.</p><p>Section 74 addresses reasonable compensation where a contract specifies an amount payable upon breach or contains a penalty stipulation.</p><p>These provisions establish the statutory framework for contractual damages. However, they do not, by themselves, render every negotiated liability cap unenforceable.</p><p><strong>2. Judicial Recognition of Contractual Liability Caps</strong></p><p>Indian courts have consistently recognised that parties entering into commercial arrangements may contractually allocate risks and limit their financial exposure.</p><p>In Bharathi Knitting Company v. DHL Worldwide Express Courier Division of Airfreight Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 704, the Supreme Court considered a courier agreement containing a limitation-of-liability provision restricting compensation to a specified amount.</p><p>The Court upheld the contractual limitation and recognised that parties are ordinarily bound by the terms of their agreement. The judgment also acknowledged that the validity of contractual terms may be examined in appropriate circumstances.</p><p>The decision reinforces the principle that courts will generally respect clearly agreed limitations rather than disregard them merely because the resulting compensation is substantially lower than the loss claimed.</p><p><strong>3. The Delhi High Court’s Approach: Plus91 v. NEC Corporation</strong></p><p>A particularly significant decision is M/s Plus91 Security Solutions v. NEC Corporation India Private Limited, FAO (OS) (COMM) 36/2024, decided on 29 July 2024.</p><p>The dispute arose from a Memorandum of Understanding containing a provision excluding liability for indirect, special or consequential losses, including loss of revenue and profits.</p><p>Despite this exclusion, an arbitral tribunal awarded approximately ₹8.43 crore towards loss of profits. The award was subsequently set aside, and the matter reached the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.</p><p>The Court upheld the contractual exclusion, observing that an agreed limitation of liability forms part of the commercial bargain between the parties. Disregarding such a provision would effectively amount to rewriting their agreement.</p><p>Significantly, the Court distinguished between excluding specified categories of damages and excluding all forms of compensation. The provision concerned did not prohibit claims for direct expenditure or costs.</p><p>The judgment demonstrates that courts may enforce even commercially significant exclusions of liability where the contractual language clearly reflects the parties’ agreement.</p><p><strong>4. Are There Circumstances Where Liability Caps May Not Apply?</strong></p><p>Although limitation clauses are generally enforceable, their application is not necessarily universal.</p><p>First, statutory restrictions remain relevant. A contractual provision cannot override an applicable mandatory statutory requirement merely by declaring that liability is excluded. Any such provision must be evaluated against the governing legislation and Section 23 of the Contract Act.</p><p>Second, the scope of the contractual language matters. A clause excluding consequential damages does not automatically exclude every claim arising from a breach. Similarly, a cap applicable only to claims arising under a particular agreement may not necessarily extend to every independent legal obligation.</p><p>Third, fraud, wilful misconduct and gross negligence require particular attention. Commercial agreements frequently exclude these categories from liability caps. However, Indian law should not be understood as establishing a universal rule that every limitation clause automatically becomes unenforceable whenever such conduct is alleged. The applicable statute, contractual wording and established facts remain decisive.</p><p>Therefore, whether a limitation provision protects a party depends not merely on its existence but also on its legal validity, interpretation and application to the particular claim.</p><p><strong>5. Drafting Considerations for Commercial Agreements</strong></p><p>The judicial approach highlights the importance of carefully negotiating limitation-of-liability provisions rather than treating them as standard boilerplate.</p><p>Parties should consider whether the cap applies to all claims collectively or separately, whether it extends to indemnification obligations, and whether specific risks warrant independent treatment.</p><p>For example, technology and licensing agreements may require distinct consideration of confidentiality breaches, intellectual property infringement, data protection obligations and third-party claims.</p><p>Similarly, the exclusion of indirect or consequential damages should be clearly distinguished from any separate exclusion of loss of profits, revenue or business opportunities.</p><p>Where commercially appropriate, parties may negotiate exceptions for fraud, wilful misconduct, gross negligence, confidentiality breaches and specified indemnification obligations.</p><p>Ultimately, the objective should be to establish a balanced and predictable allocation of contractual risks, ensuring that the provision reflects the nature of the transaction and the parties’ respective obligations.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Limitation-of-liability clauses are important instruments of commercial risk allocation and are generally recognised under Indian contract law. However, their enforceability is not absolute merely because they appear in a signed agreement.</p><p>The Supreme Court’s decision in Bharathi Knitting and the Delhi High Court’s ruling in Plus91 Security Solutions demonstrate the judiciary’s willingness to uphold clearly negotiated contractual limitations.</p><p>At the same time, statutory restrictions, the precise language of the agreement and the nature of the claim remain relevant to determining their application.</p><p>For businesses, the key takeaway is straightforward: a limitation-of-liability clause is only as effective as its legal validity, drafting precision and alignment with the commercial risks it is intended to address.</p><p>A carefully negotiated clause can provide meaningful protection. A broadly worded provision, without adequate consideration of its scope and exceptions, may instead become a source of contractual uncertainty.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b9d678761c72" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Can a Non-use Mark Challenge Pause an Infringement Suit?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AltacitGlobal/can-a-non-use-mark-challenge-pause-an-infringement-suit-4a545f09d1b1?source=rss-36f6eb28c85a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4a545f09d1b1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trademark-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ip-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[intellectual-property]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal-updates]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trademark-infringement]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Altacit Global]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 11:35:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-27T11:35:17.322Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By Mrudula</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ETMoWLb44ESHAlLTTLh_Og.png" /></figure><p>Infringement suits and challenges to a registration often run side by side. Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 steps in here, allowing a court to stay an infringement suit where the validity of a registered mark is questioned, and rectification proceedings are pending.</p><p>The trouble begins when the challenge is made under Section 47, which seeks removal of a mark for non-use, rather than under Section 57, which attacks validity. Does a nonuse action count as a “rectification proceeding”? The Act does not say. The High Courts have answered differently. The Calcutta High Court in Godfrey Phillips (India) Ltd. v. ITC Ltd. observed that removal for nonuse takes effect only from the date of the order and says nothing about whether the mark was validly registered, so Section<br>124 is not attracted. The Delhi High Court in Nippon Soda Co. Ltd. v. V.P. Goyal preferred a wider reading of the words “rectification proceedings”, treating Sections 47 and 57 alike.</p><p>Both views have their drawbacks. A broad reading may tempt defendants to file nonuse petitions simply to secure a stay and delay enforcement. A narrow one may leave courts deciding overlapping questions, with the risk of conflicting findings.</p><p>A sensible middle path is to look at the facts. Where the Section 47 proceeding goes to the heart of the infringement claim, a stay makes sense. Where it is peripheral, the suit should continue. Until the Supreme Court settles the matter, a case-by-case approach seems the fairest option.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4a545f09d1b1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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