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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Walter Graber and Andy Sussman on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Walter Graber and Andy Sussman on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Walter Graber and Andy Sussman on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[America’s problem with electric vehicle charging]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AndyandWalt/americas-problem-with-electric-vehicle-charging-e785ee79101d?source=rss-dc60c7d15764------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[electric-vehicles]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mobility]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[charging]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[transportation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tesla]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Walter Graber and Andy Sussman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 05 Jun 2019 18:39:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-05T18:39:38.277Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In <a href="https://medium.com/@AndyandWalt/is-a-lack-of-chargers-preventing-electric-vehicle-sales-c0df70b92a56">our last post</a>, we examined whether the lack of fast charging infrastructure was slowing sales of electric vehicles (“EVs”). While our findings were inconclusive, we wanted to take this line of thinking one step forward: if, hypothetically, charging infrastructure is a headwind for EV sales, what are the major headwinds for installing new, fast charging units?</p><p>Two obvious reasons exist. For one, this is a classic “chicken and egg” situation: property managers don’t want to install chargers if there are no electric vehicles to use them, and drivers don’t want to buy electric vehicles if there are no chargers to fuel them. Secondly, fast charging technology is still in early days, thus it remains expensive and takes time (typically ~30 minutes) to completely fuel a vehicle.</p><p>While these two factors are significant, we envision them naturally working themselves out as technology matures and the market develops. However, beyond these factors, more nuanced issues persist that are discouraging investment in fast charging infrastructure and may require more proactive solutions. Of these, we have identified four key headwinds, and ranked them (criteria for which is discussed later in this article) in the following order, from strongest to weakest:</p><blockquote>1. Installation Investment Risk</blockquote><blockquote>2. Electricity Pricing</blockquote><blockquote>3. Low Utilization</blockquote><blockquote>4. Variation of Technology</blockquote><p>In the remainder of this post, we detail each headwind as well as their potential solutions. We also rate each headwind based upon 1) impact; 2) difficulty of solutions; and 3) timing of solutions.</p><h4><strong>Headwind 1: Installation Investment Risk</strong></h4><p><strong>The Problem: </strong>Investment in charging infrastructure can be a frightening endeavor for landlords or small business owners. The <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/ChargingtheFuture-2.pdf">fixed costs of fast chargers</a> are prohibitive: research has indicated that the total cost of a four-unit fast charging system is ~$205,000, including $30,000 for each unit, $20,000 for installation, $17,500 for utility service extensions, and $40,000 for a transformer. Moreover, the benefits of chargers to businesses are difficult to measure. Retail stores are often told that installing electric vehicle chargers may lead to increased sales or businesses that have chargers will increase employee retention, but these impacts can’t truly be calculated. Lastly, the technology is still in its early days and is changing rapidly. All these factors combined equate to a very risky investment for business owners considering purchasing a charger.</p><p><strong>Possible Solutions: </strong>Charging unit manufacturers are attempting to minimize this investment risk for potential business customers. For one, manufacturers have offered <a href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/chargepoint-launches-100m-public-ev-charger-finance-program#gs.egsod0">leasing programs</a> for a while now, reducing the upfront cost. More recently, EVgo unveiled <a href="https://www.evgo.com/about/news/evgo-faststart-fast-forwards-evgo-charging-station-deployment/">a mobile fast charger</a> that effectively eliminates fixed costs, allows for property owners to test out the technology before fully committing, and prevents a property from being stuck with the asset in the case the owner or renter changes.</p><p>In addition, governments can provide a great deal of support to minimize investment risk. Clearly, financial support in the form of tax rebates and subsidies are a strong driver for charging infrastructure, and <a href="https://www.clippercreek.com/evse-rebates-and-tax-credits-by-state/">the list of incentives in the United States</a> is lengthy. Governments are also <a href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/climate-summit-brings-new-electric-vehicle-charging-commitments#gs.egvr2y">increasingly committing</a> to cutting greenhouse emissions and adopting electric vehicles. These commitments create more certainty around the growth of electric vehicles and the demand for fast charging, thus lessening the associated investment risk. In our minds, however, it is unlikely that these programs are expanded further, thus incentives may not be accelerate the pace of charger installation going forward.</p><p>Investment risk is a strong headwind for fast charging infrastructure given high costs, uncertain benefits, and changing landscape. A few solutions exist, such as pricing programs and government incentives, but the one that may be the biggest driver, technological innovation, will likely take some time to develop.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/740/1*4YkcCEGKHXP0JfTRlZrV4A.png" /></figure><h4><strong><em>Headwind 2: Electricity Pricing</em></strong></h4><p><strong>The problem: </strong>Utility bills for commercial customers have two primary components: energy and demand charges. Energy charges are based on the total amount of energy used during a billing period, typically billed on a $/kWh basis. Demand charges, on the other hand, are based on the peak electricity usage of a customer during a billing period over a 15-minute interval and measured in kW. The rationale for these demand charges is to maintain sufficient capacity: the grid is only as good as the amount of electricity it can transmit during peak periods (otherwise, blackouts occur).</p><p>If a customer draws a large amount of electricity at a constant rate, then this demand charge will be a small slice of its energy bill. On the other hand, if a customer draws a large amount of electricity in short bursts, then the demand charge can be significant. Unfortunately, EV chargers fall under the latter category: chargers are used infrequently, but, when they are, they transmit a large amount of power. The below chart, displaying the hourly utilization of an individual EVgo host site, illustrates the infrequency and variance in faster charger use:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Buvf5T8xeTlul7Eb" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://d231jw5ce53gcq.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/eLab_EVgo_Fleet_and_Tariff_Analysis_2017.pdf">EVgo Fleet and Tariff Analysis</a></figcaption></figure><p>As a result, demand charges make up a significant portion — <a href="https://d231jw5ce53gcq.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/eLab_EVgo_Fleet_and_Tariff_Analysis_2017.pdf">up to 94%</a> for some sites in San Diego — of charging units’ energy bills. The issue stemming from this phenomenon is a revenue-cost mismatch. Chargers earn revenue through energy sales (or use), but costs are primarily based on peak energy demand. Moreover, simply raising prices to alleviate this issue is unlikely as it would erode competitiveness to substitutes like home charging and gas refueling of internal combustion engine vehicles.</p><p><strong>Possible solutions: </strong>Mitigating this headwind appears to be in utilities’ hands, since, as mentioned earlier, charging stations are hamstrung to increase prices in order to compete with substitutes. And utilities are starting to take action with rate reforms. Many are offering <a href="https://www.publicpower.org/periodical/article/report-details-charging-station-demand-charge-alternatives">discounts to demand charges</a>, while some are taking more innovative approaches. PG&amp;E, for instance, has <a href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/pge-ditch-demand-charges-for-commercial-ev-charging#gs.dhczcy">proposed to replace demand charges</a> with monthly fixed rates for certain levels of energy use, similar to a phone subscription plan, which, the utility estimates, will have sizable savings for EV chargers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Stn7lstYoGsB5EPk" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/pge-ditch-demand-charges-for-commercial-ev-charging#gs.g3z0su">Greentech Media</a></figcaption></figure><p>While there has been progress on reforming demand chargers, it has mostly been with a few utilities in more progressive states. We believe these other regions will likely be slower to adopt new pricing structures, until electric vehicle adoption hits critical mass. And, given that the solution is contingent upon regulation change, it is natural that this will take time.</p><p>The downside of these reforms is that they may aggravate the grid capacity problem that demand charges were ultimately created to solve. This is why utilities are also exploring time-of-use rates, which would require charging stations to pay more for energy use during peak periods of demand for the entire grid (~4–6pm). As stations pass this charge through to end-customers, charging would <a href="https://www.utilitydive.com/news/time-of-use-rates-can-manage-ev-charging-new-report-says/515284">shift to off-peak periods</a>, lessening the load on grid capacity. These rates may also reduce demand for fast charging as drivers decide to charger later in the day at home; however, since charging demand is relatively distributed compared to grid demand (as seen by the utilization graph above), we don’t believe this to be a major factor.</p><p>In summary, demand charges are significantly hampering profitability (and, thus, installation) of fast chargers. It will be up to utilities to employ a combination of demand charge discounts and time-of-use rates to mitigate this headwind. While some are already doing so, it will likely take time for others to follow suit.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/740/1*5geP0gO5swPUZLoP8O5Ofw.png" /></figure><h4><strong><em>Headwind 3: Low Utilization</em></strong></h4><p><strong>The Problem: </strong>A charger utilization rate is the percentage of time that a charging port is actively fueling a vehicle. There is little public data available on fast charging utilization, but the majority of the data points we have found point towards utilization ranging from 5–15%. On one end of the spectrum, EVgo <a href="https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/eLab_EVgo_Fleet_and_Tariff_Analysis_2017.pdf">shared hourly utilization</a> for one of its chargers, implying a 15% aggregate utilization. Conversely, New York State <a href="https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyserda.ny.gov%2F-%2Fmedia%2FFiles%2FPublications%2FResearch%2FTransportation%2F2015-10-EV-Charging-Stations-Financing.pdf">published a report</a> back in 2015 that found its fast charging stations to have an average utilization of 3–4%. In contrast, gas pumps have been found to have <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/ChargingtheFuture-2.pdf">utilization of 34%</a>.</p><p>Regardless of the exact rate, utilization is too low for financially-viable fast charging. As you can see below, a Level 3 charger would require ~20% utilization to achieve cost parity with fueling a 24mpg (about the current US average) ICE vehicle. Significantly higher increases in utilization are required to compete with residential charging and more fuel efficient ICE vehicles.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/761/0*bb3LqH3ZtNOJmNlk" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/ChargingtheFuture-2.pdf">Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs</a></figcaption></figure><p>This issue is amplified by the nature of charging. Any time a car has completed a charge, but remains idly plugged into the equipment, it is using up space without generating revenue for the charger owner. Moreover, because charging takes time (~30 minutes for a full charge), many vehicle owners engage in other activities during a charge (e.g., grocery shopping). The end result being that owners do not unplug their vehicles and reopen chargers at the exact time a charge is completed, translating to lower utilization.</p><p><strong>Possible solutions: </strong>Some of this issue may be alleviated by having more EVs on the road, but it is still an open question as to whether new vehicles will use fast charging given the current <a href="https://www.transportenvironment.org/publications/roll-out-public-ev-charging-infrastructure-eu">heavy reliance on home charging</a>.</p><p>Beyond that, the largest opportunity we see to increase utilization is to target fleet customers. EVs have low operational costs compared to ICE vehicles, making them ideal for owners that drive frequently. One type of owner that fits this bill is the fleet owner: fleets, like delivery and taxi companies, run vehicles for much longer periods of time versus the average car owner, and, therefore, would benefit the most from the lower operational expense of EVs. They are also the perfect customers for fast charging operators. Fleets represent a large, centralized supply of vehicles that require constant fueling and do not have the option to use cheaper residential chargers. On top of that, fleets tend to charge during off-peak hours: for instance, <a href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/electric-ridesharing-benefit-the-grid-evgo#gs.g7fv9a">EVgo found</a> that rideshare customers charge most often from 12–2pm and 8–9pm. This has the added benefit of putting less stress on the grid, avoiding time-of-use rates, and complementing demand from retail EV owners who <a href="https://d231jw5ce53gcq.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/eLab_EVgo_Fleet_and_Tariff_Analysis_2017.pdf">charge most frequently ~5pm</a>.</p><p>In order to increase utilization, charging operators should secure long-term contracts with fleets as well as offer exclusive access to chargers for certain times of the day for a price premium. This transition to electric fleets is starting to happen — more than <a href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/electric-ridesharing-benefit-the-grid-evgo#gs.dzqqha">a third of EVgo’s business</a> in 2018 went to fleets — and it should only accelerate moving forward as <a href="https://www.geotab.com/press-release/uk-ev-fleet-survey/">more fleets look to go electric</a> as a result of financial and <a href="https://www.greencarcongress.com/2018/09/20180914-tncghg.html">regulatory incentives</a>.</p><p>Another potential solution for low utilization is through subscriptions or loyalty programs, which charger operators can employ to lock in demand upfront. Some are <a href="https://www.evgo.com/charging-plans/">starting to explore this model</a> already, but it is unclear how successful they have been to date. In fact, some research suggests that subscriptions aren’t a viable option: one <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/ChargingtheFuture-2.pdf">specific report</a> found that fast chargers would require a substantial subscription fee of over $100 / month to simply break even on average energy usage, and, even then, customers would have an incentive to charge more, given the marginal cost would be zero. As a reference, <a href="https://www.evgo.com/charging-plans/">EVgo’s membership</a> charges only $7.99 / month, but still charges for electricity, albeit at a $0.03–0.04 discount.</p><p>Overall, utilization is a major obstacle to installation of fast charging infrastructure, but we feel that emergence of electric fleets will be a large driver to overcome this issue over the next several years.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/740/1*3Abi7wjZ1spjGZiEc-UWEw.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Headwind 4: Variation of Technology</strong></h4><p><strong>The Problem: </strong>Largely attributed to being a nascent industry, a variety of different fast charging technologies currently exist on the market. One such variation is connector type:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*602zGomzjmoYJrurhtd6kw.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="http://www.ev-institute.com/images/media/Plug_World_map_v4.pdf">EV Institute</a></figcaption></figure><p>The cause for this differentiation lies within <a href="https://autorepairfocus.com/why-do-evs-not-have-standardised-charging-connectors/">geographic differences in electricity transmission standards</a>. Thankfully, the major EV charging unit manufacturers have largely solved this issue by including multiple connector types on chargers, the notable exception being Tesla’s proprietary network.</p><p>Where variation of technology truly comes into play is the large number of charging networks. These can be thought of as equivalents to gas station brands (e.g., Shell, Exxon). The issue stemming from this variation is that networks often require memberships (typically free), physical membership cards, and mobile apps, effectively fragmenting the market. The result is that, while a good deal of fast chargers exist, the supply is constrained due to network silos. While we do believe this is a headwind for fast charging infrastructure, we don’t think its impact is significant, at least compared to the other headwinds identified.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/596/1*CI7TLNpU2ZAgPeRG7vQVgA.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_locations.html#/analyze?fuel=ELEC"><strong>Alternative Fuels Data Center</strong></a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Possible Solutions: </strong>We see two paths to fixing this issue. The first being an over-the-top solution that allows users to locate and access chargers from any network. For example, ChargeHub is an excellent resource that <a href="https://chargehub.com/en/charging-stations-map.html">aggregates charging locations</a> of all network providers. Secondly, it seems likely that charging networks will consolidate in order to capture economies of scale and lock consumers into larger networks.</p><p>All in all, while the landscape for fast charging contains many different technologies, we believe the impact of this headwind to be slight, and the likely solutions to be realizable in the near-term.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/740/1*aeOpoYQdB54urtNX59NH5Q.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>Our premise when we started this post was that the challenges of building fast charging infrastructure may be causing consumers who would otherwise want an EV to delay their purchase. After evaluating the four key headwinds to EV charging, we believe they rank in the following order, from strongest to weakest:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*myki8_PLOewF_CGBBzThyw.png" /></figure><p>We are certainly driving towards <a href="https://about.bnef.com/electric-vehicle-outlook/">an electric vehicle revolution</a>, but these structural issues around charging infrastructure may block the road ahead. We believe that implementing some of the solutions we have presented in this article will be critical to realizing the full potential of the EV market.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e785ee79101d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Is a lack of chargers preventing electric vehicle sales?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AndyandWalt/is-a-lack-of-chargers-preventing-electric-vehicle-sales-c0df70b92a56?source=rss-dc60c7d15764------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c0df70b92a56</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[automotive]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[city-infrastructure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[charging]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ev]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[electric-car]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Walter Graber and Andy Sussman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Jun 2019 21:03:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-05T18:42:39.667Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The automotive industry is on the brink of an Electric Vehicle (“EV”) revolution. As battery technology has advanced, EVs have become viable alternatives to internal combustion engines due to their environmental, maintenance cost, and driving-dynamic benefits. While the percent of new EVs sold each year has grown dramatically since 2010 (around the time Tesla released the first Model S), one could wonder why more EVs haven’t been sold to date. We estimate that there are currently about 1.5 million EVs on the road in America today, based on <a href="https://evadoption.com/ev-sales/ev-sales-forecasts/">historical sales data</a> and an average vehicle lifespan of <a href="https://berla.co/average-us-vehicle-lifespan/">11.5 years</a>. With over 280 million cars registered in the United States, this represents less than 1% of all vehicles in the country. This is expected to change though, as EV sales in the US are projected to grow from 2% of new car sales in 2019 to <a href="https://evadoption.com/ev-sales/ev-sales-forecasts/">20% of new car sales in 2025</a><strong>.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*UkjWKX3mD0Sgthfl" /><figcaption>Source data in our <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1oan3lRGw7bSfL7Xw_Fc6VSxs1CCh5jK1_24KQKUyNRQ/edit?usp=sharing">model here</a></figcaption></figure><p>Because EVs need to be charged with electricity instead of filled with fuel, the <a href="https://chargehub.com/en/electric-car-charging-guide.htm">infrastructure required to charge EVs</a> will be critical to their future adoption. The majority of charging today is done at home today with Level 1 and Level 2 chargers. The Level indicates the range of power (or kilowatts) available from the charging unit. In order for EVs to become usable for everyone in the country, most experts believe a network of Level 3 fast chargers (that can charge an EV in ~30 min) will need to be built out. This will allow consumers to abate range anxiety or the fear of running out of charge while driving. This network has already begun to have been built as there are currently <a href="https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_locations.html#/analyze?fuel=ELEC&amp;ev_levels=dc_fast">3,422 Level 3 chargers with a capacity of 12,264 charging outlets</a> in the United States and Canada:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/717/1*f933n9ay6H8qQXXIFVbU5Q.png" /><figcaption><em>Public Level 3 charger locations according to US Department of Energy</em></figcaption></figure><p>But is this network sufficient for the number of EVs on the road today?</p><p>Using a <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1oan3lRGw7bSfL7Xw_Fc6VSxs1CCh5jK1_24KQKUyNRQ/edit?usp=sharing">simple model</a> we were able to project the hypothetical number of public Level 3 chargers that would be required to maintain the national fleet of EVs. In this model we assumed that 80% of EV owners are able to charge at home or work (data from California states that <a href="https://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/US_charging_Gap_20190124.pdf">83% of EV owners live in a detached house</a>). This is higher than the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Home-ownership_in_the_United_States">63% of Americans</a> who own their own home, since EVs are expensive and owners are likely to be wealthier than average. For these EV owners we assume they need to charge 5% of their annual miles on a public network. For the remaining 20% of EV owners, we assume they need to charge 100% of their miles on a public network. Using the US average of approximately <a href="https://www.autogravity.com/autogravitas/money/whats-average-miles-driven-per-year-car-lease-guide">13,000 miles driven per year</a>, and the assumption that 1 hour of charging results in <a href="https://chargehub.com/en/electric-car-charging-guide.html">250 miles of range</a>, we can calculate the hours per year the average EV relies on the public charging network. Then multiplying by the average charger <a href="https://d231jw5ce53gcq.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/eLab_EVgo_Fleet_and_Tariff_Analysis_2017.pdf">utilization rate of 15%</a> found in EVgo’s California network, we can calculate the number of EVs one charger can support (102) and can thus extrapolate the number of Level 3 chargers required for the size of the fleet.</p><p>Reassuringly, our model aligns very closely to the actual historical numbers of Level 3 charges according to the <a href="https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_locations.html#/analyze?fuel=ELEC:">US Department of Energy dataset</a>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*rtQeUCXC5OmSXv9s" /><figcaption>Source data in our <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1oan3lRGw7bSfL7Xw_Fc6VSxs1CCh5jK1_24KQKUyNRQ/edit?usp=sharing">model here</a></figcaption></figure><p>This very strong correlation could be interpreted one of two ways:</p><ul><li>The EV charging market as a whole is very good at understanding demand for chargers, and has scaled the network as EV sales have increased</li><li>Consumers recognize the bottleneck a lack of chargers presents and have only demanded EVs at the same pace that charging has grown</li></ul><p>While the first explanation may seem more obvious to some, we wanted to explore the second explanation. When consumers are asked why they have not considered an EV for their next vehicle, many cite the lack of charging infrastructure as the primary reason. In fact, <a href="https://daliaresearch.com/blog-40-would-consider-buying-an-electric-car-but-logistics-hold-people-back/">one survey found</a> that 50% of those surveyed cited “There are not enough charging stations” as a disadvantage of an EV purchase. Other popular reasons included “I can’t use them for long journeys” (42%) and “They take too long to charge” (36%), both of which could be solved by a larger network of fast Level 3 EV chargers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/685/1*YgvfM-kGdRt-RArcs5m4-A.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://daliaresearch.com/blog-40-would-consider-buying-an-electric-car-but-logistics-hold-people-back/">Dalia Research 2017</a></figcaption></figure><p>The results of that survey are not unique. <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/news/26637/americans-cite-range-anxiety-cost-as-largest-barriers-for-new-ev-purchases-study">Another poll </a>found “running out of of power” and “low availability of charging stations” as the two most popular barriers for purchasing an EV.</p><p>While it is nearly impossible to know if a lack of EV chargers is hindering EV sales, or if a lack of more EV sales is preventing new chargers from being built, we were intrigued by the rate of growth of EV chargers. In <a href="https://medium.com/@AndyandWalt/americas-problem-with-electric-vehicle-charging-e785ee79101d">our next blog post</a> we’ll examine four headwinds to building EV chargers and propose potential solutions.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c0df70b92a56" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[$30,000 from a Tesla Robotaxi?…not as crazy as it sounds]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/swlh/30-000-from-a-tesla-robotaxi-not-as-crazy-as-it-sounds-dafba4c6923c?source=rss-dc60c7d15764------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dafba4c6923c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ridesharing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elon-musk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[self-driving-cars]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tesla]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[autonomous-cars]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Walter Graber and Andy Sussman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2019 20:25:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-15T18:14:56.447Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Two weeks ago, Elon Musk and Tesla unveiled detail on their autonomous vehicle aspirations during an investor-attended <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ucp0TTmvqOE">“Autonomy Day.”</a> In short, the company is aiming to roll out a <a href="https://www.sae.org/news/press-room/2018/12/sae-international-releases-updated-visual-chart-for-its-%E2%80%9Clevels-of-driving-automation%E2%80%9D-standard-for-self-driving-vehicles">Level 5 self-driving robotaxi service</a> by the end of 2020. This service <a href="https://www.sae.org/news/press-room/2018/12/sae-international-releases-updated-visual-chart-for-its-%E2%80%9Clevels-of-driving-automation%E2%80%9D-standard-for-self-driving-vehicles">will allow any Tesla owner to add their car to a network</a> from which consumers will be able to summon a self-driving Tesla on-demand to drive them to a destination for a fee. This creates a self-driving, Tesla-specific competitor to Uber and Lyft.</p><p>We do not have full confidence in the technical feasibility of such a network. To start, many disagree with Tesla’s decision to <a href="https://velodynelidar.com/newsroom/how-lidar-technology-enables-autonomous-cars-to-operate-safely/">forgo using LIDAR sensors</a>, technology that Waymo, Cruise, and other major AV players rely upon to operate their vehicles. While some experts agree with Tesla that <a href="https://cleantechnica.com/2019/05/07/elon-musk-calls-lidar-a-fools-errand-other-autonomous-driving-experts-starting-to-agree/">LIDAR is unnecessary</a>, others believe that Tesla’s self-driving capability is <a href="https://www.teslarati.com/tesla-self-driving-race-navigant-results-2019/">not very advanced</a>. Moreover, Tesla also claims it has a data advantage because its self driving system runs in “shadow mode” on all cars, racking up miles of simulation that can be used to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradtempleton/2019/04/29/teslas-shadow-testing-offers-a-useful-advantage-on-the-biggest-problem-in-robocars/#3306d0dc3c06">improve its technology</a>. However, the <a href="http://www.autonocast.com/blog/2019/4/26/141-the-autonocast-on-autonomy-day">quality of this data is also up for debate</a>, as some argue the cars are not analyzing nor uploading <a href="https://www.theverge.com/transportation/2018/4/19/17204044/tesla-waymo-self-driving-car-data-simulation.">much of the data collected</a>.</p><p>All in all, we have doubts about the 2020 roll-out for Tesla’s robotaxi network. But, let’s push these aside for a moment. Assume that Elon Musk is right and the technology is ready to go. In this scenario, will Tesla be able to fulfill its promise that a Tesla robotaxi network will generate ~$30,000 a year for Tesla owners? To answer this question, we <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1D_k8EfH-fj3F6tV726pNYrc9dl_m__l2-rdJ5ryL_vY/edit?usp=sharing">created a bottoms-up model</a>, using a combination of public data and assumptions to forecast the revenue and costs associated with the Tesla network. In this scenario, we take the point of view of a Tesla owner in Evanston, IL who is leasing a Model 3 extended range on a three-year term. The findings from our base case model are summarized in the table below (<a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1D_k8EfH-fj3F6tV726pNYrc9dl_m__l2-rdJ5ryL_vY/edit?usp=sharing">full model here</a>):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/748/1*Kopx-MZkZA_W7yilaq1p6Q.png" /></figure><p>As you can see, we do see a path to ~$30,000 a year for Tesla owners from the robotaxi service. However, this forecast is very sensitive to several critical assumptions, some of which are different than what Tesla presented at Autonomy Day. Namely, we’d like to highlight 1) pricing; 2) owner usage; 3) utilization; 4) insurance; 5) maintenance; and 6) Tesla-owner profit sharing.</p><h4><strong>Pricing</strong></h4><p>During the Autonomy Day presentation, Elon stated that Tesla assumed $1 per mile pricing for its projections, but admitted that the figure was largely arbitrary. The real takeaway from this is that Tesla aims to undercut Uber and Lyft, which are priced between <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ucp0TTmvqOE">$2 and $3 per mile</a>. Users willingness to pay for a Tesla robotaxi could be higher or lower depending on the relative strength of a few factors:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/724/1*XeE7m545d4mQNstd2k0Z5Q.png" /></figure><p>Overall, the lower willingness to pay factors appear to be ones that should dissipate over time, while the higher willingness to pay factors are more sustainable. A lower price, though, also generates more demand for a service, stealing vehicle-miles-traveled share from not only human-driven ridehail, but also personally-owned cars, public transit, and other modes.</p><p>For simplicity’s sake, we assume in our base case that Tesla’s robotaxi rides are priced the same as Uber rides in Chicago ($2.48 per mile), resulting in $29,207 of gross profit per year for Tesla owners. These calculations assume a percentage of rides that result in a disengagement from the self-driving system (and require <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/designated-driver-teleoperations-self-driving-cars/">teleoperation to get “unstuck”</a>). We assume as compensation for a faulty ride that the rider is refunded in full for these trips. Using Waymo’s market-leading rate of <a href="https://thelastdriverlicenseholder.com/2019/02/12/disengagement-reports-2018-preliminary-results/">1 disengagement per 11,154 miles</a> (we hope Tesla won’t go-to-market with anything lower), this has a negligible impact on gross revenue.</p><p>If, instead, we assume the pricing presented by Tesla ($1.00 per mile), we see a loss of -$2,225 per year after charging, maintenance, financing, and insurance, suggesting that this rate is actually not feasible. We calculate the break-even price for Tesla owners to be $1.11 per mile. While this price still provides significant cushion to current ridehail rates, it does not take into account Tesla’s margin (we project Tesla would earn ~$8,000 of gross revenue per year at $1.11 per mile). The company will have significant expenses associated with the Tesla network, including depreciation, insurance, customer service, operations, data processing, and more. It will have to either price high enough to earn a direct profit on the robotaxi service OR increase sales of other, profitable products or services (e.g., more people buy cars due to self-driving capabilities).</p><h4><strong>Owner Usage</strong></h4><p>Robotaxi profits will vary depending on how individual owners choose to deploy their vehicles on the network. On one end of the spectrum, you have the commuter, who uses the vehicle only a couple hours a day to get to and from work, and seeks to maximize the value of their car by deploying it all other hours of the day. On the other end of the spectrum you have the stay-at-home parent, who needs to use their vehicle throughout the day to run errands and to drive kids around. They might only deploy the car when they know they won’t need it for many hours in a row. The more the owner uses the car, the less that will be earned via the robotaxi.</p><p>For our base case scenario, we assume that the owner uses the vehicle for two thirty-minute commutes per weekday (plus an additional thirty minutes for the car to reach the owner). This equates to ten hours a week dedicated to commuting. In addition we assume the owner will want the freedom to have access to their car at all times during every weekend, and 10 additional weekdays (e.g., for vacations). This results in an additional 53 hours of personal owner time per week (48 weekend hours plus the allocated portion of vacation). Over the course of a year this translates to the owner using the car for 134 days (or 37%) of the year, leaving the remainder available for robotaxi use and servicing.</p><p>On Autonomy Day, Elon indicated that current Tesla owners use their cars ~12 hours per week, translating to 7% of the year. We believe that this is too aggressive of an assumption because 1) it doesn’t account for the empty miles required to have the vehicle reach its owner and 2) it doesn’t take into account the flexibility of having your car available when you want it. We don’t doubt that owners only use their car a few hours on the weekends or during vacation, but we believe that owners do value the ability to access it whenever they see fit during these times.</p><p>Only time will tell how consumers end up splitting their car’s time between personal use and robotaxi deployment, but our model demonstrates the impact of this variance on owner’s bottom line. Specifically, we calculated that a 20% change in days of user ownership per year results in a 18% shift in owner gross profit. Thus, someone who deploys their car 12 more hours per week than we anticipated will see their profit rise from $29,000 to nearly $35,000.</p><h4><strong>Utilization</strong></h4><p>Utilization, or the percentage of time that the robotaxi is carrying a rider divided by the total amount of time it is deployed in the fleet, is a critical factor for profitability. Specifically, utilization is directly linked to revenue, as the time with passengers is billable and empty miles are not. Utilization has been found to be <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w22083.pdf">32–50% for taxis</a> in major U.S. cities, and <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w22083.pdf">43–55% for Uber</a>. It is unclear why a self-driving ridehail would have a different utilization than a human-driven ridehail, so we can conservatively use one of Uber’s lower city utilization rates: <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w22083.pdf">Boston at 46%</a>. Our model suggests that gross profit is very sensitive to the utilization rate: if utilization decreases by 20% (to 37%), then owners’ gross profit decreases by 36% (to $19,000 per year).</p><p>We see two key factors that may negatively impact this variable. For one, we assume uniform utilization across time of day (i.e., utilization at 10pm is the same as 5am). This may be overly aggressive, but <a href="http://datascience.iq.harvard.edu/files/pegroup/files/cramerkrueger2016.pdf">some studies have found</a> that, “drivers achieve essentially the same utilization rate regardless of how long they work.” Secondly, we believe it unlikely that the Tesla network would be able to match the utilization rate of Uber. We have seen that ridehail networks with <a href="https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/1/18525715/lyft-loses-lawsuit-overturn-nyc-driver-wage-law">less drivers have lower utilization</a>, and the Tesla network will almost certainly be smaller than Uber’s: <a href="https://arstechnica.com/cars/2018/07/tesla-sold-200000-cars-in-the-us-so-the-7500-tax-credit-is-going-away/">Tesla has sold ~250k cars in the US </a>while <a href="http://www.businessofapps.com/data/uber-statistics/#4">Uber has ~750k drivers</a>. Tesla could mitigate these headwinds by pricing more competitively; however, this will eat into profits as discussed above and make it difficult to reach $30,000 of profit per year for owners.</p><h4><strong>Insurance</strong></h4><p>Outside of technical feasibility, one of the most critiqued aspects of Tesla’s robotaxi plan is insurance, as it will be difficult for an insurance company to develop plans for such an unknown technology. A few days after Autonomy Day, Musk addressed this concern by announcing that Tesla will create its <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/tesla-plans-to-sell-owners-cheaper-car-insurance-11557221400">own insurance product</a>. Critics such as Warren Buffett, who owns Geico, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/tesla-plans-to-sell-owners-cheaper-car-insurance-11557221400">have stated</a>, “the likelihood of success of auto companies getting into the insurance business is about as likely as insurance companies getting into the auto industry.” This is partially due to the fact that insurance companies rely on years of actuarial expertise to turn a profit, but is also due to the type of risk they are mitigating. Insurance companies are able to spread independent risks across a large pool of drivers so that if one driver has an accident, the premiums from all the other drivers can cover the loss. The problem with insurance owned by Tesla is that the risk is no longer independent and could be correlated. If one driver in a Tesla has an accident due to mechanical or computing error, it might be likely that many more Tesla owners have similar accidents. This would mean that the premiums from the fleet wouldn’t be able to cover the losses.</p><p>Nonetheless, assuming Tesla is able to figure out the intricacies of the insurance business and diversify its risk profile, how would it be priced to consumers? The Model 3 is expensive to insure right now, due to the high cost and long lead times of replacement parts for Tesla’s involved in accidents. According to <a href="https://www.autonews.com/article/20180825/RETAIL01/180829804/tesla-s-affordable-model-3-is-expensive-to-insure">Automotive News</a>, “the average Model 3 insurance cost across 150 ZIP codes is $2,814 per year, which is $35 less than the cost of insuring a Porsche 911.”</p><p>But for Tesla’s robotaxi plan to work, owners will likely want more than just standard auto insurance. Many rideshare drivers <a href="https://therideshareguy.com/how-much-does-rideshare-insurance-cost/">supplement with additional insurance </a>to cover incidents that are not covered by Uber or Lyft’s policies or traditional non-commercial policies. These supplemental policies average <a href="https://therideshareguy.com/how-much-does-rideshare-insurance-cost/">about $150 a month</a>. It is still an open question as to who has liability in these scenarios (i.e., is a Tesla owner liable for damages caused by its vehicle when deployed as a robotaxi?), but, ultimately, we decided to include this expense for owners in our model to be conservative.</p><p>Combining the two types of insurance (vehicle and rideshare) gets us to a total cost of $385 per month or $4,614 per year. But considering Tesla has never offered insurance for its vehicles, no company has ever offered insurance for a fleet of privately owned autonomous taxis, and most insurance quotes aren’t for 70,000 miles per year, it’s really difficult to predict how the insurance will be priced. If our estimate is 30% off in either direction (i.e., insurance is ~$3,000 or ~$6,000 per year) the overall profit equation for consumers changes by +/- 10% or $3,000.</p><p>In short, if Tesla is able to pull off insurance and the prices are within the same order of magnitude as current offerings, the price of insurance won’t make or break the profitability equation for Model 3 owners.</p><h4><strong>Repair Cost &amp; Downtime</strong></h4><p>Maintenance and repairs are factored into two different aspects of our model. The first is annual cost for routine maintenance such as tires, brakes, and other items that wear out with 70,000 miles per year. AAA estimates the cost of these items for an EV is <a href="https://publicaffairsresources.aaa.biz/download/11896/">7.6 cents per mile</a> which equates to $5,358 per year for our high mileage robotaxis. Because EV’s have so much torque and are quite heavy, they are known to notoriously <a href="https://teslamotorsclub.com/tmc/threads/4-700-miles-on-my-model-3-and-my-tires-are-on-the-wear-bar.124595/">eat through tires</a>, so these figures make sense.</p><p>The more complicated consideration for maintenance and repairs is what happens when a Tesla is involved in an accident. A few taxi fleets have already tested ownership of multiple Tesla’s at once and have struggled to <a href="https://www.thedrive.com/tech/27725/tesla-fleet-company-struggles-raise-questions-about-robotaxi-plans">keep the cars on the road continuously</a>. This is because Tesla’s supply chain challenges and overwhelmed service centers, result in repair times that last days or weeks, for cars that have minor problems, accident damage, or <a href="https://jalopnik.com/bumper-falls-off-brand-new-tesla-model-3-after-30-minut-1828306917">quality control issues</a>. For a taxi fleet owner, downtime is lost money and can dramatically hurt the business. In fact, some Tesla taxi <a href="https://www.ec-rent.nl/">fleets have gone bankrupt</a> for this exact issue.</p><p>In our model, we assume that the car will have repair-related downtime of two weeks (14 days) over the course of a year. For each incremental two weeks, though, overall profit to the owner decreases 9%. Thus, if a car is stranded in the shop for many months after a <a href="https://forums.tesla.com/forum/forums/tesla-parts-escalation-help-car-8-months-stuck-body-shop">minor fender bender</a> a sizable portion of the profit a consumer earns in a year could be erased.</p><p>Established OEMs that have tried-and-true repair procedures and strong dealer networks are efficient at fixing broken cars. But given Tesla’s track record of questionable quality and long repair times, the opportunity cost of broken robotaxis could really change the profit equation for Model 3 consumers.</p><p>One additional thing to highlight is cleaning. In our model, we have assumed that downtime associated from cleaning of the interior and exterior of the vehicle overlaps with charging. We believe downtime can be limited in such a way through a combination of automated cleaners, <a href="https://www.consumerreports.org/car-maintenance/protect-car-sensors-from-dirt-and-weather/">particularly for sensors</a>, as well as financial incentives for riders (e.g., charge riders a fee for leaving a mess in the vehicle, and pay riders for cleaning up messes from previous trips). Therefore, we do not envision cleaning having a significant impact on robotaxi economics.</p><h4><strong>Tesla-Owner Profit Sharing</strong></h4><p>Ultimately the profitability of robotaxis for Model 3 owners comes down to how value is split between Tesla and the owner. Because of the complicated nature of this model, money would be exchanged between Tesla and owners across multiple dimensions: a monthly lease payment, the robo-taxi profit revenue split, and insurance costs (which we’ve already covered).</p><p>A long-range Model 3 is currently listed on the Tesla website for <a href="https://www.tesla.com/model3/design#battery">$712 per month</a>. The problem with this payment is that it takes into account the current economics of leasing, but not the robotaxi future. This lease is for 15,000 miles per year for three years, but robotaxis will supposedly cover over 70,000 miles per year, indicating that the payment should be significantly higher. On the other hand, it could be argued that the lease payment should be much lower. Musk has stated that Tesla’s are actually <a href="https://electrek.co/2019/04/12/tesla-vehicles-appreciating-assets-self-driving-elon-musk/">appreciating assets now</a> which in theory means the lease payment should be zero or negative, since the car would be worth more to Tesla when it is returned three years later. We believe this is unlikely to say the least, as it’s hard to imagine Tesla would not charge a substantial lease payment for a brand new Model 3.</p><p>The other major factor that needs to be considered is how much revenue is shared between Tesla and the owner from robotaxi fares. During Autonomy Day, Musk said Tesla would likely take 25–30% as a fee for running the platform. In our base case, we’ve assumed 25%.</p><p>Combining lease payment changes and profit sharing changes gives Tesla the ability to dramatically change the value proposition for both itself and the Model 3 owner. Here is how the net profit to owners varies:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/672/1*X_EpQZiA8KVtn7B7rPiuLg.png" /><figcaption>Tesla owner annual profit from robotaxi</figcaption></figure><p>Tesla will have to think critically about the best way to split profits with its customers to make it advantageous for both parties to deploy the robotaxi network. Perhaps the company will create innovative contracts, such as dynamic lease pricing based on robotaxi deployment, or reduced lease prices with the stipulation that the car must be deployed a certain number of hours per week. Regardless of the final structure, this will be a first for OEMs to charge consumers to use a vehicle, while simultaneously receiving commission from the owner for the value created by the car.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>We created <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1D_k8EfH-fj3F6tV726pNYrc9dl_m__l2-rdJ5ryL_vY/edit?usp=sharing">this financial model</a> to test Tesla’s claim that a Model 3 deployed in a robotaxi network could generate $30,000 profit per year for its owner. As demonstrated with our base case model, this claim is feasible given a certain set of assumptions. But, as discussed, slight tweaks in key variables such as utilization or pricing are likely to impact owner profit dramatically. Notably, the two variables that sway profitability the most are those for which the consumer has the least control (e.g., utilization and pricing).</p><p>If Tesla is not able to establish a network that has high rider demand, is optimized for high utilization, and is priced properly, then owning a Model 3 is likely to be a losing proposition for consumers. This could be further exaggerated if value isn’t split equitably. The variables that owners do have more control over (downtime and owner usage) play significantly less of a role in overall profit.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/836/0*I4OdRVmEldw66ndu" /></figure><h4><strong>Postscript</strong></h4><p>This post was written under the assumption that Tesla can get to Level 5 autonomy and deploy a ridesharing network. But why did Tesla feel the need to make this announcement in April of 2019, when this technology appears to be a long ways away? We believe there are several explanations for Autonomy Day:</p><ol><li>The company genuinely wanted to inform investors about its progress and plans for AVs</li><li>Elon Musk wanted to distract investors from Tesla’s disappointing <a href="https://chargedevs.com/newswire/tesla-q1-deliveries-disappoint-stock-stumbles/">Q1 earnings release</a> a few days later and potentially <a href="https://carbuzz.com/news/is-demand-for-the-tesla-model-3-already-falling">declining sales demand</a></li><li>Tesla wanted to create marketing buzz around Model 3 to sell more cars this year — through the promise of future features</li></ol><p>If we truly believed that Tesla was able to create a fleet of robotaxis that generate significant profits without owner intervention, then it would be best for the company to simply create Model 3&#39;s for its own robo-fleet and not sell them to consumers. But since this is not the case, we have to believe that Musk’s motivation for Autonomy Day was some combination of points 2 and 3 above — in other words, while figuring out the economics of a robotaxi network is an interesting thought exercise, it seems more likely this announcement was meant as a distraction to investors and a marketing exercise for consumers.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dafba4c6923c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/swlh/30-000-from-a-tesla-robotaxi-not-as-crazy-as-it-sounds-dafba4c6923c">$30,000 from a Tesla Robotaxi?…not as crazy as it sounds</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is Uber Eats a better business than rideshare?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AndyandWalt/is-uber-eats-a-better-business-than-rideshare-cab9b4419334?source=rss-dc60c7d15764------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cab9b4419334</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[transportation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rideshare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[business-strategy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Walter Graber and Andy Sussman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 30 Apr 2019 03:25:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-02T13:53:19.175Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Uber is gearing up for their IPO — it <a href="https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1543151/000119312519103850/d647752ds1.htm">released its S-1</a> two weeks ago and recently <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2019/04/25/uber-will-reportedly-seek-up-to-90-billion-valuation-in-ipo/">set a valuation target range of $80–90B</a>. The success of its public offering will be contingent on the perceived strength of its individual businesses units. We decided to evaluate these divisions, first by applying Uber’s five star rating system to assess its market positioning for each business, then by overlaying overall market size and growth to determine which units are most compelling. Our findings are summarized in the chart below, after which we provide detail on our market positioning ratings.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/1*tVPsjGh9EXA0sQX2ZKLQ5A.png" /><figcaption>Businesses in the top right of the matrix are ones in which Uber should invest more while those in the bottom left are ones for which Uber should spend as little as possible or divest</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Ridesharing — United States</strong></h4><p>As <a href="https://medium.com/@AndyandWalt/lyfts-long-path-to-profitability-5e7253def4f2">we’ve written about previously</a>, ridesharing in the United States is notoriously unprofitable, but Uber does have a scale advantage. <a href="https://www.recode.net/2018/12/12/18134882/lyft-uber-ride-car-market-share">Independent reports</a> show that Uber has ~69% share of the US ridesharing market, Lyft has ~28%, and other competitors such as Via and Juno have a combined 2%. Uber’s share is down from 75% last year, a drop that is likely the result of a three key factors:</p><ul><li>Uber’s brand challenges, particularly the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/business/delete-uber.html">#DeleteUber movement</a></li><li>Lyft’s <a href="https://qz.com/1563547/lyft-nearly-doubled-market-share-since-2016-heres-what-it-cost/">increased marketing </a>ahead of their IPO</li><li>Lyft’s <a href="https://www.curbed.com/2017/1/18/14313346/lyft-uber-rideshare-guy-driver-survey">focus on driver satisfaction</a> and <a href="https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/299215">push for more reliable drivers</a></li></ul><p>We believe that this shift in market share is likely to level out. For one, as <a href="https://medium.com/@AndyandWalt/lyfts-long-path-to-profitability-5e7253def4f2">we saw with its S-1</a>, it was extremely expensive for Lyft to spend a large amount on marketing and incentives in order to to gain share. This pace of spending is likely unsustainable, and Uber’s dramatically larger war-chest means it is likely to survive longer than Lyft before running out of capital. In other words, <a href="https://theweek.com/articles/834836/uber-basically-promising-investors-become-monopoly">“the purpose of the money Uber gets from investors isn’t to fund new innovations. It’s to keep plugging the hole in Uber’s finances left by its low fares, so the company can keep functioning financially as it undercuts its rivals”</a> and gains share. Secondly, Uber has been very focused on changing its image through getting new leadership, developing internal policies, and rolling out advertising campaigns.</p><p>In the near to medium term, we believe that US rideshare is commoditized, therefore market share is the most important metric for success, and Uber is clearly dominant from this perspective. With this scale, Uber is well positioned to realize the benefits of continued market growth, which could be significant as <a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/cracks-in-the-ridesharing-market-and-how-to-fill-them">only about 1% of all miles traveled in the US are in ride-hailed vehicles</a>. Regulation, however, may cap this growth. Notably, New York recently passed a bill to place <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/nyregion/uber-vote-city-council-cap.html">a cap on rideshare vehicles</a>. Other US cities often replicate NYC, raising the risk that similar legislation is passed throughout the country.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: Uber is very well positioned as the dominant share leader with the budget to outspend competition. However, due to regulatory risk, we rate Uber’s market positioning in US ridesharing as 4 out of 5 stars.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/487/1*02Aqg91DFjWTSZKbIvLRmw.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Ridesharing — International</strong></h4><p>In its S-1, Uber provides an overview of its international operations:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*d-OVrgykPpEB9n3L" /><figcaption><em>Note: Does not account for impact of Careem acquisition; MS=Market Share= Uber’s rideshare miles divided by size of addressable market (the # of passenger cars multiplied by estimates of miles traveled per car); CP=Category position= Uber’s rideshare gross bookings divided by estimates of all ridesharing gross bookings</em></figcaption></figure><p>As you can see, Uber has quickly built up a global footprint. Not all of these markets are the same, however, and some are more compelling than others. Let’s take a look at two major markets (Europe and Latin America) to get a sense for what Uber is doing abroad.</p><p><strong><em>Europe</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/0*-obAWBPf94noWqV9" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/bizcarson/2018/09/19/where-uber-is-winning-the-world-and-where-it-has-lost/#6fb5494d4d6e">As of September 2018</a></figcaption></figure><p>Europe has been a tough nut for Uber to crack. It <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-13/uber-cedes-russia-to-yandex-with-3-7-billion-merger-agreement">exited Russia</a>, was <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/22/uber-licence-transport-for-london-tfl">temporarily banned from London</a>, and received a burdensome <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/20/eu-rules-that-uber-is-a-transport-service-not-a-digital-company.html">transport firm designation by the EU</a>.</p><p>The root cause of these challenges is the structure of European labor markets. For one, <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/06/20/which-countries-have-the-highest-levels-of-labor-union-membership-infographic/#36cf84833c04">unions are strong in the EU</a>, and they have significant influence with governments. Moreover, while in the United States <a href="http://www.schallerconsult.com/taxi/taxi1.htm">most taxi drivers are contractors</a> of a few, large taxi companies, <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/2016-09-26-pax-transport-taxi-hirecar-w-driver-ridesharing-final-report.pdf">self-employment is much higher for European taxis</a>. Because they have more money invested (e.g., owning vehicles and licenses), EU taxi drivers have more incentive to mobilize against ridesharing companies like Uber. The end result is stronger pushback on Uber, and a more costly environment in which to operate.</p><p>A second cause of Uber’s struggles in the region is the strength of other modes of transportation. Specifically, <a href="https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/10/while-america-suffocated-transit-other-countries-embraced-it/572167/">public transit is excellent</a> and <a href="https://ecf.com/resources/cycling-facts-and-figures">biking is a very common</a>. Consequently, Uber has a bit more difficulty increasing its share of total trips, particularity for commuters.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: While Uber does have a sizable share of the market, this advantage is eroded by a combination of increased costs (through regulation) and superior substitutes (in public transit and biking) that make rideshare a less compelling option.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/487/1*XeAykbJFM7_OkkPZDK4tiw.png" /></figure><p><strong><em>Latin America</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/910/0*kOB9zYbnmtCIMV-i" /></figure><p>Latin America has been a recent focus for Uber and for good reason. To start, public transit is <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/06/brazil-bus-chaos-fare-rise">generally poor and has received little investment</a>. Also, road congestion is very high (<a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/2019-02-12/these-cities-have-the-worlds-worst-traffic-congestion)">3 of the top 5 cities in world by road congestion are in Latin America</a>), leading to significant amount of lost productivity for commuters sitting in traffic.</p><p>Latin American regulation has also been limited. A few countries have laws in place but they have been <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-01/uber-scores-victory-with-new-brazil-legislation-in-major-market">more favorable to Uber</a>, while others have been slow to pass regulation, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-chile-insight/riding-with-uncle-diego-ubers-wild-drive-for-growth-in-chile-idUSKCN1R00BF">forcing Uber to operate in a legal grey zone</a>. Countries without regulations are likely to put something into place soon, however, and they will likely follow suit of their neighbors, leaning towards more lax legislation. In fact, some regulation has been helpful to Uber: for instance, Brazil has <a href="http://www.thebrazillawblog.com/zero-tolerance-law-changed-brazil/">a zero tolerance drunk driving policy</a>, forbidding anyone with more than 0% alcohol in their system to drive, and enforcing harsh punishments. These type of policies actual boost demand for Uber and other ridesharing.</p><p>As a result of inferior transportation substitutes and limited regulation, rideshare has <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanmoed/2018/12/20/is-uber-operating-illegally-in-its-fastest-growing-region/#26bc52619251">flourished in Latin America</a>. Despite not being the first to launch in the region, Uber quickly surpassed incumbents (e.g., Easy Taxi and 99): they were initially focused on providing rides solely to taxicabs, while Uber allowed any driver with a car to offer rides. The competitive landscape is now changing, however, with <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/03/didi-confirms-it-has-acquired-99-in-brazil-to-expand-in-latin-america/">DiDi’s acquisition of 99</a>, giving us round two of the <a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/didi-chuxing-china-startups-uber">Uber vs. DiDi showdown</a> in China. This is certainly a significant dent in Uber’s aspirations in Latin America, particularly given that DiDi doesn’t have to fight a competitor at home in China following Uber’s exit of the market. And it has already had an impact: Uber’s Brazilian rideshare business <a href="https://www.theinformation.com/articles/ubers-ipo-filing-shows-sharp-growth-slowdown-for-ride-hailing?utm_medium=email&amp;utm_source=sg&amp;utm_campaign=article_email">grew only by 15% last year</a> compared to 252% the year prior.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: The region has all the makings of a lucrative market for Uber for years to come, but the entrance of DiDi creates some uncertainty</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/487/1*02Aqg91DFjWTSZKbIvLRmw.png" /></figure><p><strong><em>Other international markets</em></strong></p><p>Not having enough time to dissect all of Uber’s geographies, we summarized Uber’s remaining, active regions below:</p><p><strong>Middle East and Africa:</strong> With its <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-careem-m-a-uber/uber-buys-rival-careem-in-3-1-billion-deal-to-dominate-ride-hailing-in-middle-east-idUSKCN1R70IM">acquisition of Careem</a>, Uber essentially has as a monopoly of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-02/what-it-s-like-to-be-the-uber-of-the-middle-east">a market with limited public transit and regulation</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/288/1*hiOx-JncdXiYBjQWdlZM3w.png" /></figure><p><strong>Australia:</strong> The combination of limited transit and favorable regulations translated to Uber turning a $4M profit in Australia in 2017. But, with the entrance of heavweights DiDi and Ola, the market got <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-yet-another-ridesharing-platform-launches-in-australia-how-does-this-all-end-98389">a lot more competitive</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/288/1*nZOyJmbYurBUK4K95hgQwg.png" /></figure><p><strong>India:</strong> Crowded public transit and cars priced several times higher than average income make India another compelling market; however, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/af3aab5c-52d6-11e8-b3ee-41e0209208ec">Ola represents a strong, well-funded competitor</a> with home field advantage</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/288/1*8IaTIHtD_bb9wgfpwMv3oA.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Food Delivery</strong></h4><p>By most accounts, the food delivery market is going to be a very large opportunity for many companies. One <a href="https://qz.com/1549084/doordash-overtook-uber-eats-in-us-online-food-delivery-second-measure-finds/">sharing-economy reporter </a>writes that “investors are betting on trends like the <a href="https://qz.com/706550/no-one-cooks-anymore/">decline of at-home cooking</a> and popularity of on-demand, app-based services to make online food delivery a mainstay of how the world eats.” Analysts <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-shows-why-food-delivery-business-is-no-cheap-date-11555491600">estimate </a>the total US takeout market will reach $269 billion in 2019, with online penetration rates rising from under 7% in 2018 to 30% by 2028. Globally the market will likely grow to many hundreds of billions of dollars. All of this means that Uber has identified a large and potentially appetizing market to place it’s largest non-ride-hailing bet.</p><p>A big market often means many firms chase the opportunity, and food delivery is no exception. According to Uber itself, there are a number of significant competitors:</p><blockquote><em>Our Uber Eats offering competes with numerous companies in the meal delivery space in various regions for Drivers, consumers, and restaurants, including GrubHub, DoorDash, Deliveroo, Swiggy, Postmates, Zomato, Delivery Hero, Just Eat, Takeaway.com, and Amazon. Our Uber Eats offering also competes with restaurants, meal kit delivery services, grocery delivery services, and traditional grocers. — </em><a href="https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1543151/000119312519103850/d647752ds1.htm"><em>Uber’s S-1 pg 26</em></a></blockquote><p>The good news for Uber is Eats already captured significant market share. In the US, Uber with 27.9% market share lags just behind GrubHub with 34.4% share:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_meqynjZ5QBT7v-z" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://medium.com/edison-discovers/in-us-food-delivery-wars-grubhub-leads-in-market-share-with-uber-eats-close-behind-doordash-f1d9ffc7b8e5">https://medium.com/edison-discovers/in-us-food-delivery-wars-grubhub-leads-in-market-share-with-uber-eats-close-behind-doordash-f1d9ffc7b8e5</a></figcaption></figure><p>And according to Uber’s S-1, the company “believe[s] that Uber Eats has grown to be the largest meal delivery platform in the world outside of China based on Gross Bookings.”</p><p>Market share is good, but in order to sustain that share a company must have competitive differentiation. We believe that Eats does have differentiation from it’s competitors in two ways:</p><ol><li><strong>Platform and brand:</strong> As part of the Uber network and brand, Uber is better able to attract users (eaters), restaurants, and drivers. Importantly, Uber users are loyal across the platform which means as Uber builds more services, eaters are likely to use Eats more and more. For instance, in its <a href="https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1543151/000119312519103850/d647752ds1.htm">S-1</a>, Uber explains that “consumers who used both Personal Mobility and Uber Eats had 11.5 Trips per month on average, compared to 4.9 Trips per month on average for consumers who used a single offering in cities where both Personal Mobility and Uber Eats were offered.” Additionally, Eats attracts new users to the company — “in the quarter ended December 31, 2018, 50% of first-time Uber Eats<strong> </strong>consumers were new to our platform” — indicating that Eats won’t need the same unit economics as competitors since a small loss on Eats initially might drive growth for the overall platform. Uber’s well known brand recognition means that the company doesn’t have to invest as much in advertising when entering a new market. This is important for eaters, but where it really pays off is restaurants and drivers. Clearly Uber is able to leverage its vast driver network for Eats deliveries. But more surprisingly, we’ve heard anecdotes of how the strength of the Uber brand has made it easy for the platform to sign up large food chains. The executives at these chains know the power of Uber, and likely use it themselves for rides, so they are very open to adding their food to the platform.</li><li><strong>Innovation:</strong> Because of Uber’s vast engineering talent and budget, the company is able to invest very heavily in innovations that could improve the user experience, increase efficiencies, or reduce costs. Some examples of innovations that Uber might be better equipped to invest in than other delivery apps includes optimal logistics and routing, autonomous deliveries, or consumer behavior predictions. Uber has already <a href="https://table.skift.com/2019/03/12/ubers-latest-food-delivery-initiative-takes-on-its-founders-new-business/">demonstrated</a> they’re willing to invest serious capital behind innovations by launching a “cloud kitchen,” a restaurant set up strictly for deliveries.</li></ol><p>These two factors give Uber a significant advantage. GrubHub’s annual report reveals that, as these networks expand, they become less efficient because the markets served become less dense and/or more volatile. GrubHub’s operations costs have increased from 35% of revenue in 2016 to 39% in 2017 and 45% in 2018, all while the company has experienced <a href="https://s2.q4cdn.com/772508021/files/doc_financials/2018annual/2018-10-K-Print-Color-Grubhub.pdf">~40% revenue growth </a>each year. Uber has also admitted this in their S-1, but, because Uber can innovate to reduce these costs and has the scale across multiple verticals to make the platform work, we believe that they are set up to succeed more than pure-play food delivery services.</p><p>We’ve established that food delivery is a huge market in which Uber has significant share and is set up to potentially gain more. So what’s the end goal for Eats? Could this be a winner-take-all situation? In short, this is highly unlikely. For one, consumers have little loyalty, a <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/grubhub-still-the-big-cheese-in-online-food-delivery-11549206000">recent survey</a> showing that “more than half of respondents are now using multiple delivery apps.” But thinking more critically, it doesn’t make strategic sense for only one food delivery service to exist. This is because “<a href="https://medium.com/@valeriomagliulo/food-delivery-a-winner-takes-all-8f2669d1eec6">a winner-takes-all marketplace will have to offer the highest quality, the greatest selection, and the most affordable price</a>,” a feat that is difficult to do in this market due to:</p><ul><li>You cannot offer the highest quality at the most affordable prices without controlling or influencing the supply of food. Uber is admittedly <a href="https://www.foodabletv.com/blog/2017/3/14/ubereats-introduces-analytics-platform-restaurant-manager">experimenting with some things on this front</a>, but the extent of its success has yet to be seen.</li><li>You cannot offer the greatest selection of restaurants at the most affordable price without including both high-end and low-end options. However, that means diluting the brand of higher-end restaurants and making it harder to bring them on the platform</li></ul><p><strong>Conclusion: Eats is set up for success in every sense of the word, although it is unlikely the company will become a monopoly in the food delivery space. Still, as one of the world’s largest players, in an industry that faces little regulatory issues Eats is likely to drive significant value for Uber in the future.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/487/1*JIN-zsdDFzhcfg09d4TJ5w.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Freight</strong></h4><p>In 2017, Uber <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/18/uber-launches-uber-freight.html">launched a new product</a> called Uber Freight. Freight is a truck brokerage business that matches loads that require hauling to trucks that can haul. While freight brokerage has been around for decades, only 23% of all loads in the US are covered by brokerages, a figure has grown 5x since 2000.</p><p>Brokerage incumbents conduct business manually, relying on human brokers to facilitate matching and pricing between shippers and truckers. In contrast, digital brokerage (e.g., Uber Freight) aims to automate this process, creating a platform that allows loads to be advertised and booked without human interaction. This is a game changer as it <a href="https://venturebeat.com/2019/02/05/convoy-claims-100-automation-in-matching-freight-loads-with-trucks/">typically takes ~10 calls </a>to find an available truck to carry a specific load at a specific time, a process that Uber is eliminating. However, this may be beneficial only to a smaller segment of the market. Trucking companies, even smaller ones, employ dispatchers or sales people to book loads and rely heavily on phone calls. Since digital brokerage applications are geared towards drivers and don’t allow for person-to-person communication, these companies will likely not use them. Owner-operators appear to be the true target market for Uber Freight, and they account for only <a href="http://inmotionglobal.com/assets/Press%20Releases/UBS%20Report%20-%20CHRW,%20Uber%20Freight%20and%20the%20state%20of%20logistics%20digitization.%20June%202018..pdf">5–10% of trucking capacity</a>.</p><p>Uber defines its serviceable addressable market as not only all $72B spent on trucking brokerage in the US, but the total $700B spent on all of trucking globally. While it did recently announce <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/20/uber-freight-is-expanding-into-europe/">its launch in Europe</a>, Freight has not communicated how it plans on evolving its service beyond the seemingly natural limitation of the owner-operator market, but, anecdotally, it is working with a few corporates. Tweaking the product so that it can work for dispatchers or sales people at trucking companies may be the best route, but we will have to see how this plays out.</p><p>Uber Freight is not the only digital brokerage — Convoy was founded in 2015 and has raised $260M from the likes of Google, Jeff Bezos, Bill Gates, and Y Combinator. The key differentiator of digital brokerages is automation, and it appears that Convoy <a href="https://venturebeat.com/2019/02/05/convoy-claims-100-automation-in-matching-freight-loads-with-trucks/">may be farther ahead </a>in this area. In fact, Uber still employs a number of staff to make calls and fill dispatches. However, Uber can leverage its brand as well as its matching and pricing algorithms to compete, and appears to have the <a href="https://www.freightwaves.com/news/technology/uber-freight-convoy-rise-as-traditiona-load-boards-lose-market-share">highest share of brokerage app downloads</a>. All in all, it is unclear whether Uber has differentiated versus Convoy, and it is increasingly getting <a href="https://www.joc.com/technology/convoy-project44-ride-ramp-freight-tech-investment_20181001.html">more and more competition</a>.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: It is leading innovation in a growing market; however it is unclear how Uber will adapt its product for broader appeal outside of owner-operators.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/488/1*B1aG4_wwJ9UG-m5l1vA9lA.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Autonomous Vehicles</strong></h4><p>Uber launched its autonomous vehicles division, Advanced Technologies Group (“ATG”), in 2015. While the unit has a good deal of hype around it, many in the self driving community have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/technology/uber-self-driving-cars-arizona.html?hp&amp;action=click&amp;pgtype=Homepage&amp;clickSource=story-heading&amp;module=first-column-region&amp;region=top-news&amp;WT.nav=top-news">dismissed it as a laggard</a>, even before its <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Elaine_Herzberg">fatal Arizona crash</a>.</p><p>Last week, Uber announced a $1B capital infusion into ATG as well as confirmed that it is spinning out the unit into a new entity. This is welcome news. Other self driving companies like Waymo, Cruise, and Zoox appear to be further ahead on the development curve. And, as a result of <a href="https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/tempe/2019/03/17/uber-crash-death-who-blame-tempe-arizona-rafaela-vasquez-elaine-herzberg/3157481002/">the Arizona accident</a>, <a href="https://www.recode.net/2017/3/24/14737438/uber-self-driving-turmoil-otto-travis-kalanick-civil-war">leadership turnover and infighting</a>, and <a href="https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/07/uber-just-fired-its-pittsburgh-av-drivers/564947/">clear lack of conviction in the unit from Uber executives</a>, ATG has struggled to keep pace. Spinning it out gives the business a fresh start, and the opportunity to be acquired by another player looking for ever-limited engineering talent.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: Likely behind in development and mired in internal disputes, but still has experienced engineers and significant capital</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/488/1*FAdZiQYziDnt0zkVy3vcDA.png" /></figure><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Uber has evolved from a luxury cab provider in San Francisco to a global transportation and technology company. This transformation has led the firm to enter new markets and new businesses, some of which it has established strong positioning and others it has not. Using our above analysis of Uber’s market positioning as well as each market’s size and growth, we have mapped each of its divisions on the chart below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/1*tVPsjGh9EXA0sQX2ZKLQ5A.png" /><figcaption>Businesses in the top right of the matrix are ones that Uber should invest more in while those in the bottom left are ones that Uber should spend as little as possible or divest</figcaption></figure><p>Our results indicate that Eats and Latin America rideshare are compelling businesses that warrant strong investment, while Europe and India rideshare should be de-prioritized or potentially divested. As Uber enters the next stage of its history as a public company with new leadership, it will be interesting to see how the company allocates its newly raised capital to these different units.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cab9b4419334" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lyft’s Long Path to Profitability]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AndyandWalt/lyfts-long-path-to-profitability-5e7253def4f2?source=rss-dc60c7d15764------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5e7253def4f2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ipo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mobility]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ridesharing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lyft]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uber]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Walter Graber and Andy Sussman]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2019 20:37:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-17T02:35:52.915Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When Lyft went public in early March 2019, their IPO prospectus document gave the public insight into the inner workings of the company for the first time. This <a href="https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1759509/000119312519059849/d633517ds1.htm">S-1 document</a> sheds light on the company’s <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/01/lyft-s-1-ipo.html">rapid growth</a>, product strategy, and risks.</p><p>Two of those risks jump out at us:</p><blockquote>1. We have a history of net losses and we may not be able to achieve or maintain profitability in the future</blockquote><blockquote>2. If we are unable to efficiently develop our own autonomous vehicle technologies or develop partnerships with other companies to offer autonomous vehicle technologies on our platform in a timely manner, our business, financial condition and results of operations could be adversely affected [<a href="https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1759509/000119312519059849/d633517ds1.htm">IPO Pg 10</a>]</blockquote><p>Translated to plain English, Lyft is saying that it is <a href="https://news.crunchbase.com/news/lyfts-ipo-filing-finally-drops-heres-what-you-need-to-know/">not currently profitable</a>, but a big driver of future profitability could be autonomous vehicles. On the surface, this makes sense. Drivers are by far the largest expense any ride-hailing company has for each ride. Research has shown that a fully self-driving ride could be <a href="https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/focus/future-of-mobility/transportation-technology.html">half as expensive per mile to operate as a human-driven ride-hail</a>.</p><p>But how far off is this reality? What happens if autonomous technology takes decades to come to fruition? Or if unforeseen costs negate many of the projected financial savings? In these scenarios, how could Lyft — and by proxy other ride-hailing companies — become profitable and remain a stand-alone viable business?</p><p>In this post, we will examine Lyft’s current financial drivers and propose strategic solutions the company could adopt without relying on AVs to become profitable, before ultimately recommending a path forward.</p><h4><strong>Lyft’s Current Financial Situation</strong></h4><p>From the S-1, we learn that Lyft lost over $900M dollars in 2018, on revenue of $2.2B.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/649/0*rNt3iN-00I_N6AyK" /><figcaption>Source: Lyft S-1 Document</figcaption></figure><p>Digging deeper into the numbers, we can see what is causing this loss. The company is proud that their contribution has been increasing steadily, however this only captures part of the story</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/605/0*sjJZDgnxKrGrzjEx" /><figcaption>Source: Lyft S-1 Document</figcaption></figure><p>Contribution margin is defined as revenue (Lyft’s share of bookings taken from the driver) minus cost of revenue which includes things such as payment processing fees, insurance required by city TNCs, and platform and technology costs. Many of the other income statement line items are quite significant.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*sfeVVRYfUQ6h48Gz" /><figcaption>Analysis based on Lyft’s S-1 Document</figcaption></figure><p>Because these numbers can be hard to interpret on their own, let’s run a theoretical scenario. We can assume that as Lyft gets more efficient, spending on things that aren’t variable with rides such as R&amp;D, Sales &amp; Marketing, and G&amp;A might level off — which would result in a smaller percentage of sales as the company grows. The problem is that these costs currently represent 72% of sales and to break even they would have to shrink to to just 27% of sales — a sizable reduction to say the least.</p><p>But what if Lyft’s revenue was so big that this was possible? If Lyft was able to grow to $5.8 B in revenue without spending a single dollar more on Sales &amp; Marketing, R&amp;D, or G&amp;A then economies of scale would kick in and the company would break even. This assumes variable costs of Cost of Revenue and Ops and Support scale proportionately with revenue (e.g. Payment processing remains 15% of revenue). The problem with these assumptions, is that it seems almost impossible that Lyft would be able to nearly double it’s business without investing in new technology, additional personnel and significantly more marketing. If we assume these costs also grow with revenue — albeit at a slower pace — than Lyft will have to be many times bigger than it is today before the company merely breaks even.</p><p>In short, without fundamental changes to Lyft’s business model, continued growth is not going to help the company’s profitability issues. The rest of this post will examine alternative strategies for Lyft to become profitable without relying on the “silver-bullet” of autonomous vehicles.</p><h4><strong>Option 1: Reduce Marketing and Incentives Spend</strong></h4><p>Two risks in Lyft’s S-1 stand out:</p><blockquote>If we fail to cost-effectively attract and retain qualified drivers, or to increase utilization of our platform by existing drivers, our business, financial condition and results of operations could be harmed. [<a href="https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1759509/000119312519059849/d633517ds1.htm">IPO Pg </a>23]</blockquote><blockquote>If we fail to cost-effectively attract new riders, or to increase utilization of our platform by our existing riders, our business, financial condition and results of operations could be harmed. [<a href="https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1759509/000119312519059849/d633517ds1.htm">IPO Pg </a>23]</blockquote><p>In short, Lyft is spending significant amounts of money on attracting and retaining drivers and riders. This spending comes in several forms: advertising, sign up and referral bonuses, rider promotions and reduced pricing, driver mileage bonuses, and driver discounts on third-party rental cars and maintenance programs. Lyft provides some level of detail on these costs in its S-1:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/506/1*yYvUblmcm-1NOaHXTL9-hA.png" /><figcaption>Analysis based on Lyft’s S-1 Document</figcaption></figure><p>While these costs have come down considerably as a percentage of revenue, they still remain high. Lyft’s path to profitability certainly includes further marketing reduction, but the question is how to do it in such a competitive environment? If Lyft pulls back, Uber will likely eat into its market share. This dynamic was on full display in the months leading up to the Lyft IPO, when the company went on what may have been its <a href="https://www.theinformation.com/articles/lyft-kicks-off-price-war-with-uber-ahead-of-ipos">largest promotion spending spree in company history</a> in order to increase market share and paint a more compelling picture of the company to investors.</p><p>One tool that Lyft can leverage to achieve profitability is a loyalty program. Many of both Uber and Lyft’s promotions target all users in the market, resulting in a fight for market share that lowers pricing and margins. On the other hand, loyalty programs prevent companies from competing for the same customers, ultimately allowing them to raise prices. To illustrate this, let’s run through a simplified hypothetical in which Lyft and Uber both charge $10 for rides and riders make purchase decisions purely on price and brand:</p><ol><li>Instead of targeting all customers, Lyft offers a $2 loyalty discount to the riders that are already choosing Lyft over Uber. Let’s call them “Lyft Loyalists.” The remaining riders that choose Uber can be called “Uber Users.” Since Lyft Loyalists would select Lyft over Uber without the promotion and vice versa for Uber Users, this move does not affect market share.</li><li>Lyft then increases pricing for all riders by $2, the amount of the loyalty promotion. Lyft Loyalists now pay $10 per Lyft ride while Uber Users must pay $12 for Lyft. This move also does not affect market share as, by definition, Lyft Loyalists select Lyft over Uber when prices are equal, while Uber Users will still select Uber for $10 per ride vs. Lyft for $12 per ride.</li><li>If rational, Uber should increase its pricing by $2. This will not affect Lyft Loyalist demand, as they were already riding with Lyft prior to this price increase. This will also not affect Uber User demand as they are now facing the same price for Uber and Lyft rides, and, by definition, will always select Uber in that scenario. The end impact of this move is that market share remains unchanged and price increases, resulting in higher profits.</li><li>Lyft, then, can increase its pricing by $2 as well. Similarly, this will not affect Uber User demand, as they were already riding with Uber prior to this price increase. And it will also not affect Lyft Loyalist demand as they are now facing the same price for Uber and Lyft rides, and, by definition, will always select Lyft in that scenario. The impact is the same: unchanged market share, increased prices, higher profit.</li></ol><p>As you can see below, this process is a cycle, allowing both Uber and Lyft to continue to increase profits:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/404/0*ERB8Ay01ZW29WNNN" /></figure><p>Obviously, the market is more complex than that, but the example should still hold some weight in the real world. And Lyft already has existing initiatives that follow this strategy, but it should lean into them further and make them more transparent in order to more clearly signal to Uber. However, there are issues with this approach. For one, it runs the risk of breaking anti-competitive laws, a fact that <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-15/american-agrees-to-pay-45-million-to-settle-fare-collusion-suit">airlines are all too aware</a>. Secondly, while this strategy works in a market with only two players, users have more options in reality: from taxis to public transit to personal autos. Price increases will be limited by the value of these other options to users.</p><p><strong><em>Conclusion: Reducing marketing and incentive expenses represent a large opportunity, one that Lyft has the ability to execute on if it can cooperate more and compete less with Uber.</em></strong></p><h4><strong>Option 2: Expand Mulitmodal Platform</strong></h4><p>Lyft describes itself as a multimodal platform that offers “riders seamless, personalized and on-demand access to a variety of transportation options.” (<a href="https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1759509/000119312519059849/d633517ds1.htm">IPO pg 130</a>)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/872/1*dUMZ02Po5jJ6VUYP6aj2jw.png" /></figure><p>Within the confines of this business model, there are a number of services Lyft could offer consumers, including rides in shuttles or buses, access to public trains and subways, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-flyingcars-idUSKBN17R28J">VTOLs</a> (vertical takeoff and landing flying cars), or new vehicle form factors such as single occupancy vehicles, motorcycles, electric skateboards and more.</p><p>While some of these modes are novel and may be costly, they don’t all have to drive profitability. Instead, in order for this strategy to work, Lyft must believe one of the following statements:</p><ol><li>Lyft can monetize new transportation services in a way that has stronger unit economics than ride-sharing</li><li>By building such a comprehensive platform, Lyft will have very strong customer loyalty and therefore will be able to reduce marketing and incentive expenses</li></ol><p>Point one may hold some merit, particularly for micromobility transportation such as scooters or bikes. One could imagine that the cheaper vehicle cost and lack of paid driver in scooters and bikes could lead to profitable rides. Lyft’s co-founder Logan Green has stated this is not yet the case, as scooters have a very short lifespan but he <a href="https://www.valuewalk.com/2019/03/lyft-john-zimmer-logan-green-cnbc/">seems confident future redesigns could fix this</a>. Lyft could also find a way to monetize public transit by taking a commision or payment processing fee for trips booked through the app.</p><p>Point two is believable, but will it be a significant driver, particularly given that Uber is building a very similar platform? Pricing schemes such as subscriptions could help to lock users in and ease price competition. And exclusive contracts or permits (e.g., Citibike in Manhattan) exclude competition altogether. While these may appear like more modest initiatives, anything that can be done to decrease the marketing and incentive expenses that account for 62% of revenue would be a plus.</p><p><strong><em>Conclusion: Lyft will likely continue to add new transportation modalities in order to search for better unit economics and increase customer loyalty, but it is unlikely that more and more transportation services can offset the losses generated by Lyft’s core business. Instead the company might have to rely on building very loyal customers so that Lyft becomes the only app one needs for all transportation needs.</em></strong></p><h4><strong>Option 3: Offer Ancillary Services</strong></h4><p>While Lyft’s core business is personal transportation, the company could offer other transportation services such as personal delivery, logistics, or air travel. As <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-19/doordash-was-left-for-dead-until-wooed-restaurateurs-began-to-pay">reports about Doordash</a> or FedEx’s public data indicate, there are opportunities for transportation businesses like these to be profitable. This certainly seems to be a strategy Uber is exploring with Eats and Freight. While Uber’s presence in these markets might prove their viability, it also makes it difficult for Lyft to carve out a unique position of its own.</p><p>Outside of transportation, Lyft could monetize other aspects of its business such as providing in-vehicle content, selling goods, or allowing third party ads. It could also include services that monetize the data and assets that come from the Lyft platform such as real time traffic and weather data. The market potential of this is huge. <a href="https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/10/ovum%E2%80%93intel%E2%80%935g%E2%80%93ebook.pdf">Intel estimates</a> that the market value of in vehicle ads could reach $20B . While this might seem a bit far fetched for Lyft to generate significant profit from businesses other than the core, Amazon faced a similar situation when the company <a href="https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1759509/000119312519059849/d633517ds1.htm">released its S-1 in 1997</a>. The core business of online selling lost money at the time. Over two decades later, Amazon is extremely lucrative, but the profit is driven primarily by the “ancillary” business of web services, <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/all-of-amazons-2017-operating-income-comes-from-aws/">not online retailing</a> <em>.</em></p><p><strong><em>Conclusion: Monetizing other aspects of transportation could be a significant driver of margin for Lyft, but it isn’t clear in what areas Lyft has a competitive advantage.</em></strong></p><h4><strong>Option 4: Influence Regulation</strong></h4><p>For all the noise about ridehailing, it is surprising that it still represents just <a href="https://nhts.ornl.gov/">~1% of total vehicle miles</a> traveled in the United States. People often find public transit, personal cars, micromobility, or other options preferable. As a result, Lyft must keep its prices low (depressing profits) in order to compete with these other modes.</p><p>One way in which Lyft could lessen this pricing pressure is through regulation, specifically <a href="https://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/congestionpricing/sec2.htm">congestion pricing</a>. If implemented on a per vehicle basis, road taxes would make Lyft’s shared rides more attractive versus non-shared autos such as single-occupied taxis or personal vehicles.</p><p>Congestion pricing does not currently exist in any major US city, but both Lyft and Uber are aggressively lobbying for the legislation. Uber announced a <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/26/uber-commits-10-million-to-sustainable-transportation/">commitment of $1 million</a> towards lobbying in New York and other cities, and Lyft has long <a href="https://medium.com/@johnzimmer/the-end-of-traffic-6d255c03207d">called for the regulation</a> as well. New York City is <a href="https://ny.curbed.com/2019/4/8/18299889/new-york-congestion-pricing-plan-exemptions">near approval</a> , and <a href="https://la.curbed.com/2019/2/28/18244978/los-angeles-congestion-pricing-study">other cities</a> are starting to seriously consider the policy as well.</p><p><strong><em>Conclusion: While regulation could be a big boost to Lyft’s profits, It will likely take some time for congestion pricing to be implemented in the US, and even more time for it to meaningful impact Lyft’s bottom line.</em></strong></p><h4><strong>Option 5: Change Insurance Economics</strong></h4><p>One surprising takeaway from Lyft’s IPO filing, is the sheer size of Lyft’s insurance cost. Insurance is listed as a major contributor to Cost of Revenue and General &amp; Administrative. The company uses both a wholly owned insurance subsidiary and third party companies but it is clear this is a major expense that should be reduced.</p><p>Lyft has already indicated they are working to do so by taking initiatives such as routing routes through <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lyft-ipo-roadshow/at-ipo-road-show-lyft-executives-look-to-lower-insurance-costs-idUSKCN1R12GJ">intersections they know to be safer</a> or mining data to tailor rates based on driver history. Thus, while this is an important cost for Lyft, it seems the company has already put a lot of initiatives into place to curtail it.</p><p><strong><em>Conclusion: Lyft should continue to cut insurance costs where it is safe to do so, but given the company’s focus on this already, it is unlike to move the profitability needle too much.</em></strong></p><h4><strong>Summary</strong></h4><p>So what is the best path forward for Lyft? Here is our final prioritization of the company’s options to achieve profitability:</p><ol><li>Reduce marketing and incentives spend</li><li>Expand multimodal platform</li><li>Offer ancillary services</li><li>Influence regulation</li><li>Change insurance economics</li></ol><p>In realty, Lyft will and is pursuing a combination of these options, but it is still a question whether they will result in returns that are acceptable to Lyft shareholders. And while autonomous vehicles are coming to market, it remains an open question as to when and whether Lyft will capture a share of their value. All in all, it will require a significant amount of work and some luck for Lyft to live up to its potential.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5e7253def4f2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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