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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ari Peskoe on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Ari Peskoe on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Ari Peskoe on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[PURPA @ 40 - Remarks at NARUC’s 2017 Winter Meeting]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AriPeskoe/remarks-about-purpa-at-narucs-2017-winter-meeting-78efd837c298?source=rss-4937c52d908c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[electricity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[renewable-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ari Peskoe]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Feb 2017 15:57:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-14T16:07:48.088Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The electric utility industry now refers to the 25 or so years after World War II as its “<a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=z8GlVgTKiCEC&amp;pg=PA8&amp;lpg=PA8&amp;dq=electric+utilities+golden+age&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=n4bTwhCEny&amp;sig=p4U1ExHSXv6HEyLMwzSL1NBCSSI&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiA3art94_SAhUM5IMKHTaaA2A4ChDoAQgZMAA#v=onepage&amp;q=electric%20utilities%20golden%20age&amp;f=false">Golden Age.</a>” Demand was increasing by nearly 10 percent per year, and the costs of generation were actually decreasing. The industry continued to capture economies of scale, with plants reaching the gigawatt scale. For a number of reasons, by the 1970s the industry shifted from a decreasing to increasing cost industry. Without getting into the details, the result was that utilities wildly overestimated demand and underestimated costs of new generation and fuel. Consumers’ rates increased and expected demand failed to materialize.</p><p>Amory Lovins and others hypothesized at the time that a spiral of increasing costs and decreasing demand could lead to financial crisis for a utility. He used the term Spiral of Impossibility, not death spiral, but the idea is the same.</p><p>These developments led to debate at many commissions about retail rate design. When PURPA was making its way through Congress, it was commonly referred to as the rate reform bill. <a href="https://www.usbr.gov/power/legislation/purpa.pdf">Titles I and III of PURPA</a> describe ratemaking standards for electric and gas utilities that state commissions had to consider. In these titles, Congress declared its purpose was to encourage “equitable rates.” Title II does not contain that goal.</p><p>The Supreme Court said that Title II was “designed to encourage the development” of QFs. While Title II requires that rates paid by utilities to QFs be just and reasonable the <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/461/402#writing-type-1-MARSHALL">Supreme Court explicitly rejected utilities’ argument</a> that this required the rate to be set at the lowest possible reasonable rate.</p><p>Rather,<a href="https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/qual-fac/orders/order-69-and-erratum.pdf"> FERC’s implementing regulations</a> set QF rates to full avoided cost. Given the upward trajectory of generation costs when PURPA was passed, FERC was aware that this was an advantageous rate for QFs. In upholding FERC’s rule, the Supreme Court wrote that although FERC recognized the rule would not directly provide any savings to consumers, FERC reasonably deemed it more important that the full avoided cost rate would provide a significant incentive for the development of QFs, and that ratepayers and the nation will benefit from the decreased reliance on fossil fuels.</p><p>So that’s the idea behind Title II — encourage QF development to reduce the use of fossil fuels. Another benefit of QFs was that they came in much smaller increments than the gigawatt-scale plants that industry was constructing. The must-buy requirement was necessary because, <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/456/742/case.html">as the Supreme Court put it</a>, utilities were “reluctant to purchase power from non-traditional facilities.” That’s probably an understatement.</p><p>Following FERC’s full avoided cost rule, state implementation of PURPA was uneven. By 1985, at least 10 states required rates higher than full avoided cost. FERC explicitly allowed for these higher rates in the preamble to its regulations. New York required utilities to offer 6 cent per kWh rate, some utilities estimated this was twice their avoided costs. The rate was upheld by NY courts, on the theory that PURPA only limited what FERC could require, and states were free to go above avoided cost.</p><p>A few other examples: Virginia added a 15% bonus to avoided cost to account for “intangible benefits” that would accrue from a vibrant QF industry. Connecticut similarly accounted for “unquantifiable benefits.” New Jersey added 10% to the PJM pool price to account for cost savings to society. Pennsylvania opted for front-loaded capacity payments that provided for above avoided cost rates in the early years.</p><p><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Power-Makers-Americas-Tomorrows-Electricity/dp/0878575502/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&amp;qid=1487087533&amp;sr=8-1&amp;keywords=richard+munson+power+makers">Richard Munson’s 1984 book The Power Makers</a> reports that avoided cost ranged from 1.2 cents in Nebraska, to more than eight cents in Vermont.</p><p>Where the utility had excess generating capacity, some states did not award QFs capacity payments. While other states did on the theory that all utilities have capacity additions planned at some point in the future.</p><p>Congressional hearings held in the 1980s and FERC dockets from that time period are full of utility complaints about PURPA being too successful.</p><p>EEI summarized that by the mid-1980s, less than a decade after Congress passed PURPA there was “legitimate concern and much anecdotal evidence that some utilities were (1) paying too much for QF energy and capacity, and/or (2) buying too much of it.”</p><p>The facts on the ground varied across the country, but the industry was sending out mixed messages. On the one hand, EEI and many utilities were arguing that energy from QFs was not needed, and on the other hand the Chairman of EEI testified before Congress in 1985 that the nation “must be prepared to meet large increases in electric demand” and that “capacity is being added more slowly than demand is growing.”</p><p>FERC Commissioner Stalon acknowledged in a 1988 concurrence that where QFs had not taken off, a major reason was “continued utility recalcitrance and accompanying lack of enthusiasm by some state commissions for QF power.”</p><p>In that order FERC changed its position on avoided cost and now concluded that full avoided cost was a ceiling and states may not set rates any higher. FERC would later specify that all avoidable costs may be included and added later that a state may account for a utility’s procurement requirements. As an example, if a state chooses, it can set avoided cost rates for RPS-eligible QFs based on a utility’s cost of meeting its RPS requirements.</p><p>FERC has never explicitly codified any of this. In March 1988, one month before the order in which is changed position on avoided costs, FERC proposed new rules that would have codified this restriction in FERC regulations, and would have also eliminated a QF’s option to take a rate based on “avoided costs calculated at the time the obligation is incurred.” This provision in FERC’s regulations remains a source of controversy today. QFs argue — and FERC agrees — that it means that QFs must have the option of a long-term fixed price contract.</p><p>NARUC opposed that proposed rulemaking. It passed a resolution in 1988 urging FERC to terminate the proceeding, fearing that more proscriptive avoided cost rules would infringe on state authority. FERC never finalized those rules and it has not modified the avoided cost regulation since. In fact, PURPA itself gives FERC authority to revise its regulations only when FERC determines that revisions are necessary to encourage QF development.</p><p>Courts have placed few limits on state authority over avoided cost rates.</p><p>Several cases hold that a PUC may not reconsider its prior approval of a contract between a QF and a utility or to change the rates in a signed contract.</p><p><a href="https://statepowerproject.org/massachusetts/#Allco">In 2016, a federal district court in Massachusetts held</a> that the state commission’s rule setting the avoided cost rate to the ISO-NE spot price was invalid. According to the court, under FERC’s rules a QF must have the option to receive the avoided costs “calculated at the time of delivery” — which could be the ISO price — or “calculated at the time the obligation is incurred.” By providing only the spot market rate, the state eliminated a QF’s ability to choose the latter pricing option. The court cited FERC orders for the proposition that fixed price contracts further title II’s purposes.</p><p>Two months later <a href="https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/OpenNat.asp?fileID=14407458">FERC issued a declaratory order about a similar Connecticut regulation</a> reiterating that while the state must recognize a QF’s right to a fixed-price contract, states have considerable flexibility in setting avoided cost rates.</p><p>FERC also stated that “Given the need for certainty with regard to return on investment,” coupled with Congress’ directive that the Commission “encourage” QFs,a legally enforceable obligation should be long enough to allow QFs reasonable opportunities to attract capital from potential investors. FERC has never specified that duration.</p><p>Notwithstanding the specific complaint about FERC’s one mile rule, today’s complaints about PURPA are nothing new and echo the complaints made 30 years ago when PURPA was initially implemented.</p><p>PURPA implementation has always been uneven across the country. My own view is that despite challenges, the statute’s requirements are still relevant today.</p><p>Title II of PURPA was largely overlooked in Congressional debates. At the time, few predicted that title II would ultimately play an important role in paving the way for today’s wholesale generation markets.</p><p>In 2005, Congress allowed FERC to exempt utilities from the must-buy requirement where QFs could access open markets. PURPA began as a nationwide pilot project that opened the closed utility system to competition. Its success in demonstrating that generation could be a competitive industry ultimately led Congress to limits its reach.</p><p>But Congress in 2005 did not address the animating purpose of PURPA Title II, which was to reduce fossil fuel use.</p><p>Meanwhile, Congress since 1992 has supported renewable energy by passing and reauthorizing tax credits 10 times. By 2005, when Congress amended PURPA, about 20 states had passed renewable portfolio standards. Congress certainly could have allowed for exemptions based on state requirements or some metric of renewable energy generation or fossil fuel use. Or it could have limited PURPA when it extended tax credits for renewable energy. But it did not.</p><p>Again, implementation has always been uneven, and utility complaints about PURPA are nothing new. Where a utility claims that it has an abundance of QF energy, I suggest that it’s worth investigating how the utility’s actions may have contributed.</p><p>A recent <a href="https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/load-forecasting-electric-utility">Lawrence Berkeley National Lab study</a> of twelve western utilities’ IRPs from 2003 to 2007 found that energy consumption growth was overestimated by all but one utility and eight overestimated peak demand growth. Moreover, for most utilities, more recent IRPs continued to overestimate demand growth, even in the presence of much slowed actual growth.</p><p>The report also states that utilities’ acquisition of supply resources seem to generally follow the original planning, regardless of the short and medium term performance of load forecasts and of actual energy sales and peak demand. To what extent did utilities’ inaccurate load forecasts, failure to correct for those errors, and lack of foresight about the development of renewable technologies contribute to an abundance of QF energy? Should the utility be held accountable for these mistakes, and how can regulators do so while also protecting ratepayers? These are obviously not easy questions to answer but I suggest they are questions worth asking.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=78efd837c298" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Is There an Incentive to Innovate?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@AriPeskoe/is-there-an-incentive-to-innovate-70774693b8cf?source=rss-4937c52d908c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/70774693b8cf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[antitrust]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[renewable-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[utilities]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[solar-energy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ari Peskoe]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jun 2016 15:25:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-22T15:32:05.912Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Remarks to the </strong><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2016/06/something-new-under-sun-competition-consumer-protection-issues"><strong>FTC</strong></a><strong> about State Utility Regulation and Rooftop Solar</strong></p><p>Investor-owned utilities’ century-old technology and business model for electricity distribution is being fundamentally challenged. Decentralized technologies and services owned and provided by ratepayers and third-parties allow consumers to buy less power from their local monopoly utility and may effectively compete with the utility for capital investments.</p><p>State regulation plays a vital role in how investor-owned utilities have responded to this threat. Investor-owned utilities can, and indeed are, using the regulatory system to maintain the status quo of a top-down utility system. However, to varying degrees, regulators in some states are taking steps to enable an innovative environment where decentralized third-party providers of technologies and services can compete and flourish.</p><p>State regulation is about protection. Utilities received protection when states initially passed laws in the early 20th century that tasked public utility commissions with regulating electric companies. State regulation effectively insulated utilities from competitive market pressures, providing them with de facto monopolies over electricity distribution in a geographic region.</p><p>Ratepayers receive ongoing protection from state regulation. By law, utility rates must be approved by regulators and must typically be just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory.</p><p>70 years ago, the Supreme Court concluded that just and reasonable rates must balance consumer and utility investor interests. In practice, rates reimburse utilities for operating expenses and allow them to earn a rate of return on capital investments, while preventing monopoly profits. The just and reasonable price is intended to mimic the price of a competitive commodity market.</p><p>The prohibition on undue discrimination prevents a utility from playing favorites among ratepayers by charging different rates for the same service. Another formulation of the prohibition is that rates should adhere to the cost causation principle. Again, like just and reasonable, undue discrimination connects utility rates to utility costs.</p><p>There are essentially two steps to ratemaking: 1) setting the revenue requirement, which is the total amount of money the utility can expect to earn from ratepayers; and then 2) establishing the rate design, which allocates that amount among different classes of ratepayers and sets volumetric rates and fixed and other charges.</p><p>This is a highly technical and contested process, involving engineers, economists, and lawyers. Although parties often speak in neutral terms, emphasizing that their preferred rate structure is based on cost causation, economic efficiency, and sound engineering, choosing a rate structure involves a subjective balancing of interests.</p><p>State courts reviewing utility commission rate decisions are deferential to the commission on both aspects, but particularly so on rate design. Many state courts have said that while cost causation ought to be a consideration in rate design, it is only one factor. As long as the Commission bases its decision on the record, state courts are very unlikely to overturn a rate design decision. Effectively, regulators have the final say on rate design.</p><p>This regulatory model was created 100 years ago, when it was clearly in the public interest to expand access to electricity and enable more per-capita consumption. The basic ratemaking formula incentivized utilities to invest capital and sell more kilowatt-hours. Growth was the key ingredient that aligned the public interest with private profits.</p><p>Today, total volumetric sales in the US have been flat for nearly a decade, which is unprecedented. Rooftop solar likely played only a small role in enabling this trend, but the prospect for dramatic expansion of rooftop solar, along with other complementary technologies, raises the possibility that utility sales could decline.</p><p>To delay this decline and blunt the effects of flat sales on their revenues, utilities across the country have sought permission to change rate designs. Two widespread utility proposals are to increase fixed fees on all ratepayers and reduce the net metering rate.</p><p>Utilities rationalize these changes by appealing to the cost causation principle. They argue that because they recover most costs through volumetric rates, and the costs of distribution are largely fixed, they must increase fixed fees to account for no volumetric growth. On net metering, they similarly argue that net metered consumers reduce the volume of their purchases and are therefore underpaying for the fixed costs of distribution service. The result, according to utilities, is that net metered consumers are being subsidized by other ratepayers.</p><p>These rationales, and the underlying relevant facts, are hotly debated at state public utility commissions, and I won’t get into that debate here. However, I will highlight that cross-subsidies (or cost shifts) between individual ratepayers are a feature, and not a flaw, of utility rates. There are numerous such cross-subsidies, and utilities and regulators typically ignore differences between individual consumers in the same class. Historically, when utilities have offered specific incentives to individual ratepayers to increase or decrease consumption, regulators have typically looked at the aggregate effect on the utility system. So long as they found that the utility system benefited, regulators often allowed incentives that directly benefited only a few ratepayers, such as incentives offered in many states today for investments in energy efficiency.</p><p>To the extent that regulators today think that they must chase economically efficient pricing to the exclusion of other goals, there are places to start other than targeting ratepayers who buy less energy from their utility.</p><p>Apart from rate designs and any specific policies, such as interconnection procedures, that could be used to slow the growth of solar, there are deeper features of the state regulatory system that put utilities at odds with distributed solar.</p><p>Although rapid per-capita growth in electricity consumption may no longer be in the public interest, one could nonetheless argue that the industry needs major capital investment. Today, ratepayers, independent power producers, third-party service providers, and others, rather than the utility, could make those investments. But, under the traditional ratemaking formula, utilities profit from investing their own capital. Utilities also have an incentive to rely on capital-intensive solutions, rather than operational solutions, to maintain the grid.</p><p>The architecture and ownership of the electric grid are additional factors that put investor-owned utilities at odds with distributed resources. Nearly all power is generated at thousands of large central power plants that are interconnected by nearly 650,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines. Investor-owned utilities own approximately two-thirds of all high-voltage lines in the continental US, and in approximately 35 states, utilities that distribute power also own the vast majority of generating capacity. If the electricity system becomes more decentralized, capital deployed by ratepayers and third parties on the distribution grid may directly compete with utility investments on the bulk power system. The <a href="http://insideclimatenews.org/news/04042016/coned-brooklyn-queens-energy-demand-management-project-solar-fuel-cells-climate-change">Brooklyn-Queens Demand Management Program</a> is the paradigmatic example of this competition.</p><p>Then there are utility holding companies that own generation and also own distribution utilities that do not themselves own generation. Take the case of Exelon, one of the largest generating companies, that also owns distribution-only utilities in five states and DC. Last year, two utility commissioners in Maryland dissented from a state Commission order that authorized Exelon to purchase two distribution utilities. The dissent wrote, “Exelon’s economic interests to shield [its] generating fleet from emerging distributed energy technologies and other competitive threats are inherently misaligned with the interests of the customers” of the distribution utilities it is purchasing.</p><p>A decentralized architecture is a fundamental change to the physical electric grid. It also raises the possibility that rather than paying uniform rates, each ratepayer could have a unique economic profile based on the ratepayer’s own ability to deliver energy and services to the grid on an hourly. And rather than compensating a handful of large-scale generators and transmission owners, utilities could be transacting with tens of thousands of entities.</p><p>This vision is a dramatic departure from the industry’s 100-year old model. This sort of fundamental transformation is very difficult, and the incentives created by the regulatory system appear weighted toward maintaining the status quo, even if decentralized technologies can benefit ratepayers.</p><p>Using regulation to insulate a monopoly from the effects of industry trends and technological development, such as by increasing fixed fees, seems unlikely to facilitate innovation. In fact, high fixed fees appear to be designed to maintain the status quo. The nature of regulation of this industry means that innovation must be a shared endeavor among regulators, utilities, ratepayers, and third-party providers. Enabling competition changes the role of regulation, but it does not diminish its importance.</p><p>Regulators in some states are moving forward. Many states have rejected utility requests for high fixed fees, fees for solar, or reduced net metering rates. A few states, with New York as the leading example, are not just reacting to utility proposals but are taking a broader approach and are changing utility incentives to enable the deployment of decentralized technologies and services.</p><p>As regulators examine whether and how to open up the distribution system, one tool at their disposal is the prohibition on undue discrimination. This prohibition is rooted in concerns about anti-competitive behavior. The connection between discrimination and the economic self-interests of monopolists was a key component of FERC’s argument to advance competition in wholesale generation in the 1990s. FERC concluded that “the incentive [for utilities] to engage in [discriminatory] practices is increasing significantly as competitive pressures grow in the industry.”</p><p>FERC was talking about the very same companies that today are facing competitive pressures on the distribution grid.</p><p>Depending on state law, at the very least regulators may be able to use this authority to ensure fair procedures that allow new market entrants to participate and that are not biased in favor of incumbents.</p><p>For a deeper discussion of these and related issues, please see <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2735789"><em>Unjust, Unreasonable, and Unduly Discriminatory: Electric Utility Rates and the Campaign against Rooftop Solar</em></a>, Texas Journal of Oil, Gas, and Energy Law (2016).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=70774693b8cf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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