<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Ashkhen Kazaryan on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Ashkhen Kazaryan on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@Ashkhen?source=rss-dff1cccb4bda------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 06:32:23 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@Ashkhen/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Reality Check for Trump & Republicans Crying “Bias!”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/tech-policy-corner/reality-check-for-trump-republicans-crying-bias-a6f4d0ca46ec?source=rss-dff1cccb4bda------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a6f4d0ca46ec</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[free-speech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trump]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ashkhen Kazaryan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Sep 2018 20:07:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-09-04T20:07:52.836Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Last week, Trump posted tweeted this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/634/0*mBkdmT3noU3bbRq0" /></figure><p>Some Congressional Republicans and leading conservatives have made such claims in the past, but Trump’s tweets have really opened the floodgates for other such claims. Here’s a reality check on the top claims:</p><h3><strong>Claim #1: Google searches for “Trump News” only produce liberal media links</strong></h3><p><strong>Reality Check: </strong>Google uses many factors (about 200) in its algorithm to rank search results in the most efficient, relevant and useful way for each user. Mainstream, well-established media outlets are considered the most “authoritative” ones. That’s why they show up at the top of the rankings, but they’re not the only sources listed. There’s <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0747563218303650">no proof of political bias</a> whatsoever. On the contrary, the most thorough research on this issue concluded that users with different political views across a variety of states were recommended very similar news sources.</p><h3><strong>Claim #2: We only want “fairness”</strong></h3><p><strong>Reality Check</strong>: Trump’s talk of “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/08/29/trump-signals-he-may-not-seek-regulate-google-search-results/?utm_term=.d40e82abc19a">Fairness</a>” invokes the “Fairness Doctrine”: from 1949 to 1987, the FCC required broadcasters to present controversial issues in a balanced way, giving equal time to both sides. Violations of this vague, inherently arbitrary requirement could result in the death penalty for broadcasters: loss of their FCC license. Republicans opposed the Fairness Doctrine for generations, arguing that it stifled conservative voices on radio and television. In 1985, after an exhaustive study, President Reagan’s FCC concluded that the Fairness Doctrine “inexorably favors orthodox viewpoints” — and so ended the doctrine in 1987. President Reagan vetoed an attempt by Congressional Democrats to restore the Fairness Doctrine, declaring:</p><blockquote>we must not ignore the obvious intent of the First Amendment, which is to promote vigorous public debate and a diversity of viewpoints in the public forum as a whole, not in any particular medium, let alone in any particular journalistic outlet. History has shown that the dangers of an overly timid or biased press cannot be averted through bureaucratic regulation, but only through the freedom and competition that the First Amendment sought to guarantee.</blockquote><h3><strong>Claim #3: Google promoted President Obama’s State of the Union Address but not Trump’s</strong></h3><h3>Donald J. Trump on Twitter</h3><p>StopTheBias https://t.co/xqz599iQZw</p><p><strong>Reality Check:</strong> Google’s <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/janelytvynenko/trump-claims-google-didnt-promote-his-state-of-the-union">statement</a> says it all:</p><blockquote>On January 30 2018, we highlighted the livestream of President Trump’s State of the Union on the google.com homepage. We have historically not promoted the first address to Congress by a new President, which is technically not a State of the Union address. As a result, we didn’t include a promotion on google.com for this address in either 2009 or 2017.</blockquote><p><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20180131023314/http://www.google.com/">An Internet Archive capture</a> of the Google homepage confirms the company’s statement, showing promotion of Trump’s State of the Union address.</p><h3><strong>House Majority Leader McCarthy’s Claim</strong></h3><p>In his <a href="https://www.insidesources.com/time-tech-transparency-social-media/">op-ed</a> House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy states:</p><blockquote>The companies cannot sit back and say nothing is happening. Algorithms are written by people. Everybody has some bias in them. Anyone claims they don’t have bias, they’re not human.</blockquote><p><strong>Reality Check: </strong>OK, so what? There’s nothing the government can do about this, even if it were true.</p><p>Private entities aren’t bound by law to be unbiased, or to be neutral. In fact, they <em>can’t</em> be — because the First Amendment bars the government from meddling with how social media companies exercise their editorial discretion. The only reason the Fairness Doctrine wasn’t struck down by courts (before the <em>Obama </em>FCC finally took it off the books in 2011) was that broadcasters are the <em>only</em> media that don’t get full First Amendment protection, as we’ve <a href="http://docs.techfreedom.org/Szoka_Testimony-Platform_Reponsibility_&amp;_Neutrality-4-25-18.pdf#page=18">explained</a>. The Supreme Court has <a href="https://casetext.com/case/reno-v-american-civil-liberties-union">already ruled</a> that Internet media get the full protection of the First Amendment.</p><h3><strong>Senator Cruz’s Claim</strong></h3><p>In January, Sen Ted Cruz <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zlfV6ldIbjI">pioneered</a> a creative, indirect line of attack: claiming that social media sites should be held liable for potentially illegal user content unless they’re politically neutral. In April <a href="https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&amp;id=3718">op-ed</a> for Fox News, he argued:</p><blockquote>…if you run a blogging platform and someone posts a terrorist threat in the comments section, you’re not treated as the person making the threat. Without Section 230, many social media networks could be functionally unable to operate. In order to be protected by Section 230, companies like Facebook should be “neutral public forums”.</blockquote><p><strong>Reality Check</strong>: Well, Cruz is right about one thing: Section 230 immunity <em>has</em> been absolutely critical to the development of the Internet. But he totally misunderstands — or misrepresents — what Congress intended.</p><p>Platforms aren’t <em>supposed </em>to be neutral — and no one would want them to be. They exercise editorial discretion all the time. Indeed, <em>that’s the point of Section 230</em>. In a nutshell, website operators can’t be held liable for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”</p><p>What Senator Cruz is talking about is effectively a “Fairness Doctrine” for the Internet. The Fairness Doctrine, ironically, suppressed heterodox viewpoints and enforced a bland orthodoxy in media — thus hurting conservatives. It would do the same for the Internet. President Reagan FCC abolished the Fairness Doctrine and he vetoed Democratic legislation to bring it back, declaring:</p><blockquote>we must not ignore the obvious intent of the First Amendment, which is to promote vigorous public debate and a diversity of viewpoints in the public forum as a whole, not in any particular medium, let alone in any particular journalistic outlet. History has shown that the dangers of an overly timid or biased press cannot be averted through bureaucratic regulation, but only through the freedom and competition that the First Amendment sought to guarantee.</blockquote><p>That’s… basically the complete opposite of what Republicans are saying now. We break down Senator Cruz’s in detail in TechFreedom’s President’s <a href="http://docs.techfreedom.org/Szoka_Testimony-Platform_Reponsibility_&amp;_Neutrality-4-25-18.pdf">testimony</a> in front of House Judiciary.</p><p>In the last few days, Don Trump, Jr. <a href="http://thehill.com/policy/technology/404326-trump-jr-says-hed-back-a-new-conservative-version-of-facebook">has called</a> for a “Facebook for conservatives.” So… would Senator Cruz demand that a conservative leaning platform be neutral, <a href="https://twitter.com/Ashkhen/status/1035508363172478976">too</a>?</p><p>No, we didn’t think so.</p><h3>We’re just gonna leave this here…</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*gBzExI9xCImcSPpQ" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a6f4d0ca46ec" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/tech-policy-corner/reality-check-for-trump-republicans-crying-bias-a6f4d0ca46ec">Reality Check for Trump &amp; Republicans Crying “Bias!”</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/tech-policy-corner">Tech Policy Corner</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[10 Things You Need to Know About Cross-Border Data Flows]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/tech-policy-corner/10-things-you-need-to-know-about-cross-border-data-flows-a2e2a878ac7d?source=rss-dff1cccb4bda------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a2e2a878ac7d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ashkhen Kazaryan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Jun 2017 20:46:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-06-14T21:31:26.002Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BxYQazCwCSJfDlzcU6Poow.png" /></figure><p>As the Internet continues to break down the connection between our physical location and the location of our data, laws surrounding government access to information haven’t kept up. Particularly since the leaks about NSA surveillance activities and the 2014 U.S. government case against Microsoft for not providing access to data held in Ireland, lawmakers are increasingly focused on questions surrounding data held in or outside the United States.</p><p>Most recently, the Senate held a <a href="https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/law-enforcement-access-to-data-stored-across-borders-facilitating-cooperation-and-protecting-rights">hearing</a> on May 24th entitled “Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Across Borders: Facilitating Cooperation and Protecting Rights” and tomorrow the House Judiciary Committee is <a href="https://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/data-stored-abroad-ensuring-lawful-access-privacy-protection-digital-era/">conducting their own investigation</a>. So what do you need to know about cross-border data flows?</p><ol><li><strong><em>Where Is Your Data?</em></strong></li></ol><p>Technological advances in the way that data are stored, transferred, and protected make our Internet-connected lives more streamlined and secure, but have also broken down traditional ideas of where data is located and how to get access to it. Now, much of your data isn’t “at rest” on your personal computer, it is either “in transit” or “at rest” in the cloud. This means your files are in a system of servers, operated in one or many countries, that transmits the data to you when you “access” it.</p><p>The U.S. is <em>the </em>global tech leader, which means data are often stored here or held by American companies on servers they own and operate in other countries. Depending on the cloud company you entrust with your data, the physical location could shift as the service provider optimizes its storage system.</p><p><strong><em>2. Data Security and Law Enforcement</em></strong></p><p>This new system pays huge dividends for consumers and the Internet economy, but it also poses challenges for law enforcement and national security officials. Now, they can’t just serve a warrant, take your computer and filing cabinet, and call it a day. Instead they have to explore a multitude of options to collect evidence — increasingly, across borders.</p><p>This gets even more complicated as private citizens increasingly use encryption to shield their data from hackers and other prying eyes. Even if the police intercept a message or acquire a hard drive, the data are often scrambled by code that even a supercomputer can’t break. Law enforcement is left with a shrinking slate of options: hope the suspect left behind enough unencrypted data, use Network Investigative Techniques (NITs) — aka government hacking — or deputize a third party <em>under U.S. jurisdiction </em>to decrypt which leads to:</p><p><strong><em>3. Data Localization Laws</em></strong></p><p>The Internet thrives when data flow seamlessly between nations. But concerns over privacy and espionage — coupled with global trends toward nationalism, protectionism, and populism — have pushed many countries to prevent data about their citizens being stored abroad. To that end, governments in the EU, Russia, China, and others are <a href="http://www.jurist.org/hotline/2017/01/Courtney-Bowman-data-localization.php">passing</a> data localization laws, requiring tech companies to keep certain categories of data within their physical boundaries. This further complicates U.S. law enforcement jurisdiction, as U.S. companies may hold information about foreign actors that pertain to domestic investigations, such as in:</p><p><strong><em>4. The Microsoft-Ireland Case</em></strong></p><p>In 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) got a warrant to access a Microsoft email account as part of an investigation. The company turned over only data that was physically stored in the U.S. But the emails from the account turned out to be stored in Ireland, and Microsoft maintained that the warrant did not apply to data stored overseas. Law enforcement sued in district court and Microsoft was held in civil contempt.</p><p>That decision was appealed and, in 2016, the Second Circuit ruled that, under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), a warrant obtained by law enforcement applies only to data that is physically in the United States. Separately, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/02/Opinion.pdf?tid=a_inl">three</a> <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Google.Yahoo_.pdf">district</a> <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Florida-case.pdf">courts</a> said the opposite: that any data held by a U.S. provider can, in fact, be reached with a warrant under ECPA. Given the contradictory rulings, this issue may end up at the Supreme Court, but the pathway and timeline remain unclear. In the meantime, the uncertainty undermines law enforcement activities and the competitiveness of American businesses abroad.</p><p><strong><em>5. Congress is Looking Into These Issues</em></strong></p><p>Congress has been assessing these complex legal issues for some time.</p><p>One proposed solution was introduced in 2015: the Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad (LEADS) Act. It would (1) recognize that U.S. agencies can’t compel disclosure of communications that aren’t stored in the country — unless the account is held by a U.S. person; and (2) strengthen the process for exchanging law enforcement information between governments, known as mutual legal assistance treaties (MLAT) by having the Attorney General create an online docketing system for MLAT requests and to publish new statistics on the number of such requests. The bill didn’t pass, but started a valuable conversation and earned broad support in the House with more than 130 co-sponsors.</p><p>Improving on those ideas was the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2986/text">International Communications Privacy Act</a> (ICPA), which included a similar MLAT reform and a warrant requirement for all electronic communications content. ICPA would also create a legal framework that allows U.S. law enforcement to access any U.S. person’s communications — regardless of where the data are stored. The main difference from LEADS is that ICPA would grant warrants based on nationality and the location of the cloud service customer — not state borders. ICPA stalled, but led to a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kGTini4dLx4">hearing</a> last February.</p><p>DOJ has also proposed legislative changes that would require providers subject to U.S. jurisdiction to produce data in accordance with ECPA, even if the provider chooses to store that data outside the United States. Overall this would be a direct reversal of the Second Circuit’s <em>Microsoft </em>decision.</p><p>At the Senate <a href="https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/law-enforcement-access-to-data-stored-across-borders-facilitating-cooperation-and-protecting-rights">hearing</a> on May 24th, Congress took another important step in examining the multilayered and complicated issues surrounding cross-border data flows. The Senators’ questions focused on two main issues:</p><p><strong><em>6. ECPA</em></strong></p><p>Under ECPA, does a U.S. warrant grant law enforcement access only to content stored physically within the U.S.?</p><p>In February of 2016, during the House <a href="https://youtu.be/kGTini4dLx4?t=1h12m59s">hearing</a> on conflicts of law concerning cross-border data flows, Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA) expressed general concerns with the current state of affairs and raised two questions: Should we treat tangible and intangible evidence the same way? Can law enforcement force a tech company to “bring in” evidence that is not in the U.S. just because they said so?</p><p>The search for answers continued in the recent May hearing, which explored whether a legislative reversal of the <em>Microsoft v Ireland</em> case is enough to clear this up, or if there should be more comprehensive <a href="http://techfreedom.org/post/143494312494/house-passes-crucial-email-privacy-bill-senate">ECPA reform.</a></p><p>The witnesses agreed that ECPA needs to be updated and that <em>Microsoft’s </em>outright ban on cross-border data warrants puts too much pressure on law enforcement. Witnesses differed on how best to update the law.</p><p>Brad Wiegmann, U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney General, urged Congress to update ECPA and overrule <em>Microsoft</em> altogether, whereas other witnesses warned that would be no better then the ban we have right now.</p><p>Brad Smith, Chief Legal Officer of Microsoft, argued that a clean reversal of the Microsoft case will create conflicts of law and put tech companies in the middle.</p><p>In answering these questions, policymakers will need to weigh foreign citizens’ concerns over U.S. law enforcement and surveillance activities, the benefits of keeping U.S. tech companies headquartered in the U.S. and their global competitiveness, and the ability of law enforcement to investigate efficiently.</p><p><strong><em>7. What Happens When Another Country Is Looking For Data?</em></strong></p><p>This was the second focus of the hearing: when a foreign government is investigating a local crime and seeks access to data that happens to be in the U.S.</p><p>Creating a uniform process for each country to make requests may seem like an easy fix. But since many nations lack the due process and human rights protections guaranteed in the U.S., the solution must be more nuanced.</p><p>Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) asked about creating a clear path into the “club” of chosen countries that can get stored data from the U.S. via a simpler procedure. Professor Jennifer Daskal assured Senator Whitehouse that such a mechanism can be implemented and there are already a few countries who are “on the margins” of being considered democratic with human rights protections that meet U.S. standards.</p><p><strong><em>8. MLATs</em></strong></p><p>That is why the mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) procedure was created — a web of agreements made between two or more countries regarding international cooperation in criminal investigations.</p><p>Unfortunately, MLATs didn’t smoothly solve the underlying issues. The bureaucratic process has led to severe bottlenecks, since U.S. companies hold a disproportionate share of the world’s data. It usually takes at least <a href="http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/SHB2015/Swire.docx">9–10 months</a> to get a response to an MLAT request. The U.S. government didn’t even request the data stored in Ireland through MLAT, referring to the process as “<a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Governments-Memorandum-of-Law-in-Opposition-to-Motion-to-Vacate-doc-97....pdf">slow and cumbersome</a>.” During the hearing, Rep. Suzan DelBene (D-WA) expressed the widespread view that the MLAT process needs to be updated.</p><p>Baseline reforms are needed to make the process more efficient and standardized, including implementing an “<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf">online request</a>” system.</p><p><strong><em>9. Bilateral agreement with UK</em></strong></p><p>David Bitkower, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General at DoJ and witness at the February 2016 hearing, testified that adopting bilateral agreements with “high volume” (large number of requests) countries will remove some friction from the MLAT process. Additionally, a bilateral agreement with strategic partners who ensure due process and protect human rights will facilitate investigations and international cooperation, easing tension between U.S. tech companies and law enforcement.</p><p>During the recent Senate hearing, both the members of the Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism and the witnesses expressed optimism that the U.S.-U.K. agreement could serve as a model for any future bilateral agreement. For it to work, Congress would need to amend U.S. law to remove the legal barrier preventing U.S. companies from complying with lawful U.K. requests for data. And to ensure due process protections and their enforcement across the globe, the U.S. should lead the charge in helping to establish a web of such bilateral agreements.</p><p>Key scholars have <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/27857/cross-border-data-requests-proposed-framework/">proposed</a> a framework for U.S. leadership in establishing agreements, including minimization procedures, an independent adjudicator, and transparency reports. Further, <a href="https://cdt.org/insight/mlat-reform-a-straw-man-proposal/">some</a> suggest that requests should only be granted when (1) data is held by a U.S. tech company and (2) the crime occurred wholly in the requesting country.</p><p><strong><em>10. Proposed Legislation</em></strong></p><p>During the most recent Senate <a href="https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/law-enforcement-access-to-data-stored-across-borders-facilitating-cooperation-and-protecting-rights">hearing</a>, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT) declared his intention to reintroduce a modified version of ICPA.</p><p>To determine which country has jurisdiction, the revised bill would use the location of the suspect. If that person is a U.S. citizen or located in the U.S., “then law enforcement may compel disclosure, no matter where the data is stored, provided the data is accessible from a U.S. computer and law enforcement uses proper criminal process,” <a href="https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/5/hatch-s-international-communication-privacy-act-icpa-praised-in-hearing">said</a> Hatch.</p><p>Brad Smith (Microsoft) welcomed the new ICPA bill, stating it will “open the door to a new and constructive discussion” on law enforcement access to data.</p><p>Removing barriers to cross-border data flows is no simple task, and it deserves the significant attention it receives from Congress. The key is continuing to focus on bilateral agreements while updating the MLAT process and revising ECPA — both to better protect privacy and remove friction in the process.</p><p>This wouldn’t just address the jurisdictional issues facing law enforcement and U.S. tech companies; it will also ease the tension surrounding encryption both at home and abroad as law enforcement scrambles to meet its mission in a changing environment. Doing so ensures not only the continued success of U.S. economic interests, but also protects a free and open Internet.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a2e2a878ac7d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/tech-policy-corner/10-things-you-need-to-know-about-cross-border-data-flows-a2e2a878ac7d">10 Things You Need to Know About Cross-Border Data Flows</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/tech-policy-corner">Tech Policy Corner</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[To PATCH or not to PATCH: Government Hacking and Cyber Attacks]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/tech-policy-corner/to-patch-or-not-to-patch-government-hacking-and-cyber-attacks-9c80327e078a?source=rss-dff1cccb4bda------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9c80327e078a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[congress]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ashkhen Kazaryan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 24 May 2017 14:37:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-24T14:38:16.423Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Co-authored with </em><a href="https://medium.com/@austincarson"><em>Austin Carson</em></a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lUeEG8i1yaAoEr05boNlwg.png" /></figure><p>It seems like every week we hear of a cyber attack that leaves significant damage in its wake. These attacks are executed by finding and breaking through holes in software where the developers didn’t anticipate a weakness, normally referred to as “vulnerabilities.” As policymakers and the public try to make sense of why cybersecurity continues to be so difficult, the distinction between where different vulnerabilities come from and why they are or are not repaired is critical.</p><p>Some big attacks, like <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/0/ransomware-does-work/">WannaCry</a>, are built off of known vulnerabilities. These weaknesses should’ve been fixed but were not, either due to negligence or the need to keep an older system running because of connected legacy tech such as <a href="https://www.wired.com/2017/03/medical-devices-next-security-nightmare/">medical devices</a>. The other more frightening type of attack is executed against vulnerabilities called “<a href="http://www.pctools.com/security-news/zero-day-vulnerability/">zero days</a>” that were previously unknown and undisclosed to the technology creator.</p><p>Zero days exist for three reasons — software is normally interacting with many different parts of a computer or network, and the developer can’t or isn’t tasked with anticipating security issues at each step of product design; companies are either ill-prepared or unwilling to engage independent security researchers; or the vulnerabilities were found and hidden by national security officials to be later used to break into criminal or foreign devices.</p><p>The last reason, government use, raises a question of intense debate in cybersecurity circles: if the government knows about a vulnerability, when is it appropriate for it to disclose to software makers and the public? Does it have an obligation to disclose the information to companies so they can issue patches? How do they weigh the possible harms to the public and the risk of an attack that weakens national security in their attempts to bolster national or public safety? In order to help answer these questions, a special interagency protocol — the Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP) — was created.</p><p>At least <a href="https://blog.mozilla.org/press/files/2017/05/VEP-History.pdf">since 2014</a>, the federal government has used the VEP to evaluate the costs and benefits of disclosing vulnerabilities. But for such an important and potentially public-endangering consideration, the process around the VEP is quite opaque. The lack of robust oversight has become a growing point of criticism, which led lawmakers to attempt to clarify and codify the VEP.</p><p>To that end, Sens. Brian Schatz, (D-Hawaii), Ron Johnson, (R-Wis.), Cory Gardner (R-Colo.) and U.S. Representatives Blake Farenthold (R-Texas) and Ted Lieu (D-Calif.) recently introduced the <a href="https://www.schatz.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BAG17434_FINAL%20PATCH.pdf">“Patch Act”</a> (Protecting our Ability To Counter Hacking) of 2017. This bipartisan Bill proposes putting guardrails and greater certainty around the VEP, including the creation of a review board, to be chaired by the Secretary of Homeland Security, that would include the Secretary of Commerce and the directors of National Intelligence, CIA, FBI and the NSA. Heads of the Department of State, Treasury, FTC and Department of Energy could be included ad hoc, as well as members of the National Security Council, at the Board’s request.</p><p>Including a full roster of civilian agencies helps ensure a balanced consideration where national security, the public good, and business interests would be taken into consideration. The Board would oversee the VEP process and put together a detailed policy on how it should work. And these are not just guidelines; agencies would be required to follow the details, unless they decide to disclose a vulnerability above and beyond the policy baseline. The PATCH Act also includes important overtures to transparency — the Board is obliged to make their policies public “when possible.”</p><p>The PATCH Act speaks to oversight concerns as well, requiring the board to report on its activities, policies, and numbers of vulnerabilities determined to be shareable or retained. Classified reports go to the appropriate Senate and House committees and an unclassified report is issued to the public. All of these reports are supposed to go to the<a href="https://www.pclob.gov/"> Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board</a>: a bipartisan independent body tasked with the evaluation and analysis of national security agencies’ actions to ensure they are balanced with Constitutional civil liberties.</p><p>Codifying the VEP process and adding oversight mechanisms will put the VEP on solid footing, removing the threat of policy changes at the whims of the executive branch and giving Congress the chance to more fully evaluate the tradeoffs. In this era where cyber attacks are edging ever-closer to becoming cyber wars, the United States government should lead the way in balancing the interests at stake and addressing the cybersecurity concerns directly within its control. The PATCH Act of 2017 is a reasonable and thoughtful step in that direction.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9c80327e078a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/tech-policy-corner/to-patch-or-not-to-patch-government-hacking-and-cyber-attacks-9c80327e078a">To PATCH or not to PATCH: Government Hacking and Cyber Attacks</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/tech-policy-corner">Tech Policy Corner</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Bipartisan Protecting Data at the Border Act Introduced in Congress]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/tech-policy-corner/bipartisan-protecting-data-at-the-border-act-introduced-in-congress-fac122e88971?source=rss-dff1cccb4bda------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fac122e88971</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ashkhen Kazaryan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Apr 2017 17:52:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-04-11T13:46:26.241Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aICaRw9955GUbfMpUxHIJg.jpeg" /></figure><p>On January 31, Sidd Bikkannavar, a NASA engineer and natural-born U.S. citizen, <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/13/us/citizen-nasa-engineer-detained-at-border-trnd/">was compelled</a> to turn over a phone belonging to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, which may have contained highly sensitive information. US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers never explained the reason why they selected him and searched his device. Haisam Elsharkawi, an American citizen attempting to leave the U.S., was stopped and questioned for three hours by CBP agents, who pressured him to unlock his phone.</p><p>These warrantless searches raise significant constitutional questions. Courts have held that the level of sensitive information we keep on our devices warrants <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-132_8l9c.pdf">heightened protection</a> and scrutiny, even <a href="http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/03/30/09-10139.pdf">at the border</a>. Internal safeguards are an important step but can be ignored in practice if the process is not transparent and accountable.</p><p>This week, Sens. Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Rand Paul (R-KY) introduced the “<a href="https://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=9CDE0A37-24DD-4D05-B199-C7E160CAA088&amp;download=1">Protecting Data at the Border Act</a>,” which also enjoys a bipartisan companion in the House and backed by Jared Polis (D-CO) and Blake Farenthold (R-TX). The bill would require law enforcement to acquire a warrant<strong> </strong>for accessing the “electronic equipment” of a U.S. resident. It would also prevent the government from denying or delaying (for longer than 4 hours) entry when a U.S. person’s refuses to provide access to electronic devices and their content.</p><p>As Rep. Farenthold put it “Just because you cross the border doesn’t mean the government has a right to everything on your computer.”</p><p>The bill notes legitimate security interests and attempts to strike a balance by establishing “emergency exceptions” to the warrant requirement, including present and imminent physical danger to any person, organized crime, conspiratorial activities, and threats to national security.</p><p>As technology continues to rapidly evolve, policymakers will often be called on to meet the changing needs of law enforcement and national security without sacrificing civil liberties. The Protecting Data at the Border Act is a bipartisan model for thoughtfully pursuing that balance.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fac122e88971" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/tech-policy-corner/bipartisan-protecting-data-at-the-border-act-introduced-in-congress-fac122e88971">Bipartisan Protecting Data at the Border Act Introduced in Congress</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/tech-policy-corner">Tech Policy Corner</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Creeped Out Congress Grills FBI on Facial Recognition Tech]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/tech-policy-corner/creeped-out-congress-grills-fbi-on-facial-recognition-tech-37a1123f48f8?source=rss-dff1cccb4bda------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/37a1123f48f8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ashkhen Kazaryan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Mar 2017 21:30:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-27T15:57:48.930Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cgABsjpwhZcZiK4EkNMx4w.png" /></figure><p>When you get your driver’s license, the DMV takes your photo. No big deal right? But if you happen to be from Michigan, or 17 other U.S. states, the FBI might scan that photo using facial recognition software.</p><p>If you’re alarmed, many in Congress are right there with you. The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee recently held a<a href="https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/law-enforcements-use-facial-recognition-technology/"> hearing</a> on how law enforcement agencies use facial recognition technologies (FRTs).</p><p>The discussion primarily focused on the FBI’s wide-reaching use of FRTs. Representatives from both parties took aim at the Bureau’s lack of transparency and significant delays in issuing privacy impact assessments, as required by the E-Government <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ347/pdf/PLAW-107publ347.pdf">Act</a>. At a minimum, these assessments are supposed to reassure the public that law enforcement evaluates risks to privacy when implementing new technology. FBI witness Kimberly Del Greco danced around the issue, and committee Chair Jason Chaffetz (R-UT) <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8WhIrGz0TVo">voiced</a> the collective distrust of the panel in the simplest of terms: “Sorry, but we don’t believe you!”</p><p>According to a 2016 <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677098.pdf">report</a> by the Government Accountability Office, the FBI has access to <em>at least</em> 100 million photos from the 18 states that have a “memorandum of understanding” (MOU) with the Bureau — meaning they share photos with the feds, including those taken by state DMVs. The FBI’s staggering access to state information is itself a red flag. Worse, these FBI searches are done without court-issued warrants or basic due process, which exposes innocent, law-abiding citizens to a fundamentally flawed system.</p><p>To be fair, law enforcement’s job is to keep us safe. And new technologies can play a valuable role in that mission. But even the most well-intentioned efforts can backfire. The FBI’s database, the Next Generation Identification Interstate Photo System (NGI-IPS) has a 20% margin of error and a <a href="http://openbiometrics.org/publications/klare2012demographics.pdf">well-established</a> bias against racial and ethnic minorities, particularly African-Americans.</p><p>Members pressed Del Greco on what happens to those who are mistakenly identified. She didn’t offer specifics, only mentioning that they are brought in for questioning and further investigation. Being investigated by the FBI is not some benign act, even if you are eventually cleared of wrongdoing — as recent presidential candidates can attest.</p><p>For Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA) and Rep. Paul Mitchell (R-MI), the biggest problem is the FBI’s previously reported, and potential future use, of FRTs to target protesters who simply exercise their First Amendment rights. If that sounds kooky, consider history of Martin Luther King, Jr. or anti-Vietnam protesters, when FBI’s tools were extremely low-tech compared to today’s capabilities.</p><p>The hearing made clear that the FBI’s critics are bipartisan, and several members promised to take legislative action. Congress should put clear restrictions on real-time face scanning, limiting its use to specific, targeted threats, such as terrorist attacks, or human trafficking. Further, any legislation must prohibit FBI from using FRTs to target First Amendment “activities” such as demonstrations and protests.</p><p>We don’t have to choose between safety and privacy. Proper due process, transparency measures, audits for abuse, and independent testing for bias can ensure law enforcement keeps pace with emerging technology while upholding our core values and civil liberties.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=37a1123f48f8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/tech-policy-corner/creeped-out-congress-grills-fbi-on-facial-recognition-tech-37a1123f48f8">Creeped Out Congress Grills FBI on Facial Recognition Tech</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/tech-policy-corner">Tech Policy Corner</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>