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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Cem F Dagdelen on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Cem F Dagdelen on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Cem F Dagdelen on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[D2D: Towards Decentralized Negotiation Protocols]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@CemFDagdelen/d2d-towards-decentralized-negotiation-protocols-e37d164e91e6?source=rss-339b29f2282a------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cem F Dagdelen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 08 Feb 2021 20:18:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-02-09T11:49:56.362Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*x5PFJmMVaHCHsZ7G8R1kAQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="http://zkga.ma/">zkga.me</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>by Max Hampshire &amp; Cem Dagdelen</em></p><p><em>DAO2DAO (“D2D”) is a research collaboration between </em><a href="https://www.curvelabs.eu/"><em>Curve Labs</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://block.science/"><em>BlockScience</em></a><em>, commissioned by </em><a href="http://primedao.io/"><em>PrimeDAO</em></a><em>. In this article we aim to share theoretical and technical insights on the design of decentralized negotiation protocols.</em></p><p>Over the past few months, the research group analyzed the literature in negotiation protocols and surveyed the crypto ecosystem for suitable primitives in order to propose design patterns for potential deployments in the DAO space. The working group is curating a <a href="https://www.notion.so/D2D-Living-Literature-467de95a20574cfa9babcfb39565cf00">living literature</a> for situating the theoretical understanding around the design methodology, adapting multiple fields of research such as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_choice_theory">social choice</a> in networks, <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1603.04641.pdf">compositional game theory</a>, <a href="http://www.uky.edu/~rhuma0/cmc/ast.htm#:~:text=Adaptive%20Structuration%20Theory%20(AST)%20is,three%20theories%20of%20group%20communication.&amp;text=The%20theory%20seeks%20to%20understand,people%20interact%20with%20these%20technologies.">adaptive structuration theory</a>, and <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226503121_Negotiating_Complex_Contracts">complex contract negotiation</a>.</p><h3>Background</h3><p>This research intends to specify coordination mechanisms between different decentralized autonomous organizations. These interactions can range from joint ventures(i.e funding a common good) to token swaps or distributed monetary policy. In order to situate the theoretical understanding around the problem the research group examined the advancements in <em>negotiation protocols</em>.</p><p><strong><em>What is a negotiation protocol?</em></strong></p><blockquote>Negotiation in general is a process in which a joint decision is made by two or more parties. The parties first verbalize contradictory demands and then move towards agreement by a process of concession-making or search for new alternatives. (Jin, Lu, 2004)</blockquote><p>Negotiations are omnipresent. In order to reduce transaction costs, society tends to develop norms and protocols around these processes. It is possible to observe these patterns in fields such as international relations, social choice and network theory. Auctions, voting modules, and curated lists are all games which can be considered as <em>generative negotiation protocols</em>.</p><p>Negotiation protocols are also the backbone of decentralized governance. Every DAO deploys their own set of parameters for consensus formation with its community, infrastructure and use-case in mind. Thanks to such formalizations, DAOs can evaluate proposals without having to re-define the terms of agreement each time. By creating a generalized model of conditions and outcomes, proposals can be extended to serve a large variety of complex contracts.</p><p>With D2D implementation research, we want to bring the aforementioned formalizations towards an interorganizational framework. <strong>Once DAOs can interface each other through these negotiation mechanisms, we expect the emergence of use-cases such as mergers, joint ventures, community swaps and polycentric policy patterns.</strong></p><h3>Literature overview</h3><p><em>Now, lets take a look at a few theoretical coordinates for situating our understanding around the problem of decentralized negotiation.</em></p><p><em>The goals are to:<br>(a) develop an operational definition of decentralized autonomous organizations<br>(b) establish coordinates in game theory and social choice<br>(c ) gather relevant research on negotiation protocols of simple and complex contracts</em></p><p>When discussing negotiations between entities largely described as DAOs, a taxonomical grounding is required in order to operationally understand the agents taking part in the coordination game. The notion of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Family_resemblance#:~:text=Family%20resemblance%20(German%3A%20Familien%C3%A4hnlichkeit),book%20Philosophical%20Investigations%20(1953).&amp;text=Prototype%20theory%20is%20a%20recent,idea%20has%20also%20been%20explored.">family resemblances popularized by Wittgenstein</a> allows us to take a non-monolithic perspective towards viewing these organizational entities. Looking at the taxonomical variation of games, he concludes:</p><blockquote>“And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; we can see how similarities crop up and disappear. And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities.”</blockquote><p>In recent years advancements were made towards pinpointing these overlapping similarities in the organizational taxonomy. The archetypal similarities in DAOs as family resemblances have been explored by Kei Kreutler in <a href="https://www.ourmachine.net/writing/eight-qualities-daos/">Eight Qualities of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations</a>. In order to accommodate such diverse ontology of actors, the research suggests an agent-agnostic design pattern, which will be discussed later.</p><p>Unsurprisingly, game theory is heavily deployed in the analysis of negotiation. We believe DAO to DAO interactions are appropriately analyzed and synthesized with <em>specific</em> frameworks from the body of game theory. Particularly, von Neumann and Morgenstern’s <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691130613/theory-of-games-and-economic-behavior">cooperative game theory</a> lays the groundwork for insight into how coalitions behave, i.e., how subsets of players bargain over which actions are played. Another critical component for more advanced analysis is the recent iteration on the <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325768626_Theory_of_social_choice_on_networks_Preference_aggregation_and_coordination">Theory of Social Choice on Networks</a> by Stirling which refines <em>“the notion of individually rational behavior whereby the members of an influence network expand their interests beyond their own narrowly constructed individual welfare in order to incorporate the influence of others into their own rationality.”</em></p><p>Perhaps operationally most relevant is the research conducted in the field of negotiation protocols. The body of work is mainly focused on simple contracts — contracts consisting of one or a few independent issues. However <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/224926814_Protocols_for_Negotiating_Complex_Contracts">Protocols for Negotiating Complex Contracts</a> expands the work to complex contracts with large number of inter-dependent issues. This characteristic makes such framework more suitable for real world applications given the complexities around the inter-dependent preference orderings.</p><p><em>As mentioned, the literature review is intended to be a living document and will be updated over the course of this research program to provide reference and context for the technical design and implementation process.</em></p><h3>Technical research</h3><p><em>Besides using the material covered in the literature review as a conceptual stepping stone towards creating a generalizable tech framework, the technical research benefited from the restraint imposed by two research sub-objectives: creating a framework that was as (1) modular and (2) agnostic as possible.</em></p><h4><strong>Design objectives</strong></h4><p><em>Modularity</em> is a standard objective in software development and a key aspect of <a href="https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/general_philosophy/#fundamental-tradeoffs-simplicity-versus-complexity-cases">decentralized application design</a>. Creating a mechanism that is as modular as possible and utilizes already existing (and audited) code modules allows for proper attention to be spent on modelling application-level security and making sure that the mechanism is easy to interface with; reduction in code complexity generally also leads to a reduction in the size of attack surfaces. Furthermore, reusable and modular code cuts down on the amount of time and effort needed to integrate this module into already existing smart contract architectures, bolstering potential uptake in use.</p><p><em>Agnosticism</em> is the characteristic of software or hardware whereby it does not rely on (or work solely with) a specific system or device. In the case of our mechanism, we aim to reduce complexity of integration and user experience by creating a module that is both <em>agent agnostic</em> and agnostic with regards to processes occurring before the creation of a shared agreement (referred to herein as <em>behind-the-condition agnosticism</em>).</p><p><em>Agent-agnosticism</em> refers to the need to create a mechanism that works regardless of the size and complexity of the DAOs making use of it: each DAO is abstracted to being an instance of the type <em>agent</em>. The mechanism must be able to account for DAOs represented by either externally owned accounts (EOAs) or Contract addresses to create an agreement solely by calling smart contract functions, regardless of the number of constituents they represent and the DAO framework (if any) they are built on top of.</p><p><em>‘Behind the Condition’ (BtC) agnosticism</em> specifies that the technical barrier to use the mechanism must be extremely low. As long as a DAO can call a smart contract function, it should be able to use the mechanism. If a specialized interface contract is required, then a contract factory would have to be created as part of the mechanism instantiation to allow contracts to interact with the mechanism without having to undertake code modifications. One example of this is that Contract addresses must implement methods to receive ERC-1155 tokens and interact with Gnosis’ <a href="https://docs.gnosis.io/conditionaltokens/docs/ctftutorial13/">Conditional Tokens Framework</a>, whereas EOAs do not. This must be accounted for within the mechanism by creating factory for interface contracts to be owned by DAOs who do not implement these methods in order to interface with the D2D mechanism when Conditional Tokens are involved.</p><h3>Use-cases</h3><p>There are numerous potential use-cases for a D2D mechanism, ranging from simple joint ventures to the creation of (essentially) temporary markets for whitelisted participants (members of the respective DAOs). Although simple D2D collaborations already take place, these collaborations are reliant on social and legal agreements — the D2D mechanism outlined herein aims to create an mechanism by which these agreements are superseded by on-chain agreements, replacing these messy and time consuming practices with secure, web3-based forms of collaboration agreements.</p><p>When scoping these use-cases, agreements were defined simply as <em>A &amp; B agree that X happens</em>. This already occurs internally within DAOs (e.g. when voting on proposals), multisig wallets (e.g. M of N members agree to sign a transaction), and decentralized escrows; the aim of this mechanism is to formalize key aspects of these existing negotiation processes within an external code module.</p><p>In the real world escrows work through trusted 3rd parties to hold valuables until a certain condition has been met. Smart contracts are able to take on the role of mediation usually reserved for middlemen, thus significantly reducing enforcement costs. It is possible to satisfy a simple negotiation protocol by iterating on on-chain escrow mechanisms whereby the constituencies of each community express their willingness for a deal by voting in their respective organizations.</p><p>The escrow modality heavily relies on the monolithic consensus produced by the DAOs. A consequence of this is the marginalization of opposition in these communities. We believe it is possible to propose different mechanisms which allow for wider expression. Markets for instance allow for and reward granular interaction. The more independent negotiations there are on an asset, the more depth and information that market carries. Thus we can speculate that through a D2D mechanism, it would be possible to create closed-markets* where only the respective members of community can buy or sell each others native tokens (or any other asset). This way two (or more) communities can engage in organic value osmosis, which could be seen as a kind of democratic merger. This mechanism however is much more complex and will be the subject of further study prior to any implementation</p><p>(*) W<em>hen a company buys/sells stock options to/from its employees, it engages in closed-market transactions. Two or more DAOs can facilitate such environments where their respective tokens are auctioned to whitelisted community members.</em></p><h3>Technical overview</h3><p>Below is an overview of the primitives that have been assessed during our research. Note that whilst there have been many developments across the ecosystem in recent years, this document will only discuss those aspects pertinent to the D2D mechanism itself: specifically code modules and smart contracts facilitating collateralized agreements and oracles. DAO-specific advances have been excluded from this review as the D2D mechanism aims to be as agnostic as possible regarding the organisational forms engaging in collaborative work, and as such is of little importance herein.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*blZst_CGYJk9V7iMk_35hA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.notion.so/e629aa07d63346368fe00221300c9a6a">Ecosystem primitives</a></figcaption></figure><p>Gnosis’ <a href="https://docs.gnosis.io/conditionaltokens/">Conditional Tokens Framework</a> (CTF), although mainly geared towards providing a primitive for the creation of prediction markets, offers the possibility for anyone to “<a href="https://docs.gnosis.io/conditionaltokens/docs/introduction1/">[t]rade any asset under the condition that a specific event happens</a>”. This can be leveraged to allow key elements of D2D collaborations (e.g. co-funding) to be ‘locked in’ on-chain, sidestepping the need for expensive and long-winded legal agreements or relying on good faith. Whilst simple D2D collaborations could be facilitated by other modules such as Escrow contracts, the CTF allows for more complex conditional environments and to be created using the same core primitive (the conditional token contracts), removing the need to write custom escrow smart contracts for complex agreements. Furthermore, the CTF allows for the creation of novel arrangements to be created between DAOs (see examples of <em>Market Logic</em> use-cases) which are currently not facilitated by existing code modules, as well as offering the creation of multi-layered conditions, which could be used to create sub-contracts within larger umbrella agreements between DAOs. CTF is already in use by prediction market <a href="https://omen.eth.link/#/liquidity">Omen</a> (using Kleros as an Oracle) and social-impact platform <a href="https://alice.si/">Alice</a>.</p><p>A simplified version of the CTF-reliant use-case outlined above is a decentralized escrow service such as that provided by <a href="https://escrow.kleros.io/">Kleros</a>, wherein both parties could lock development funds to be used in the process of creating a joint venture. Once an agreement has been reached by both parties, these funds would made available to agreed-upon accounts, such as a multisig controlled by members of both DAOs.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/api3/airnode/home">API3’s Airnode</a> is a “<a href="https://github.com/api3dao/airnode">fully-serverless oracle node that is designed specifically for API providers to operate their own oracles</a>”, designed to incentivise first-party Oracles, whereby the operator also maintains their service. One advantage of the Airnode is that it relies on the sunk-cost of setting up an Oracle node and the reputation of the node operator to bolster trust in its decision, as well as relatively little maintenance (and downtime) compared to other Oracle services. <a href="https://reality.eth.link/">Reality.eth</a> takes the opposite approach and instead offers a “<a href="https://reality.eth.link/app/docs/html/">crowd-sourced on-chain smart contract oracle system</a>” as both a standalone dapp and smart contracts that can be interacted with directly. Questions must adhere to their <a href="https://reality.eth.link/app/docs/html/contracts.html#templates">template</a> in order to be accepted.</p><p>Kleros (as well as operating an escrow service) also operates “<a href="https://kleros.io/about/">an open source online dispute resolution protocol which uses blockchain and crowdsourcing to fairly adjudicate disputes</a>”, and is potentially useful to outsource decisions to; instead of having to find adjudicators for D2D collaborations, decisions could be outsourced to a specifically-designed protocol, further streamlining the development. It is utilized by Omen as the oracle role for their CTF implementation. They utilize the ERC-1497 <a href="https://developer.kleros.io/en/latest/erc-1497.html">Evidence Standard</a> and the ERC-792 <a href="https://developer.kleros.io/en/latest/introduction.html">Arbitration Standard</a>.</p><p><a href="https://keep3r.network/">Keep3r</a> creates the possibility for projects to outsource certain jobs to accounts outside of the project, be these contracts, bots, or EOAs. This is a use-case which mostly relates to devops and function calls / jobs that “<a href="https://docs.keep3r.network/#jobs">[t]hey would like the action to be performed in “good will” and not have a malicious result</a>”, and as such may not be suited for larger scale oracle functions as used by the CTF. However, it is a useful functionality to retain for smaller ‘housekeeping’ functionality that may arise.</p><h3>High-level assemblage</h3><p>This high-level overview outlines a D2D collaboration that allows for iterative negotiations and shared funding via an escrow smart contract. The mechanism can be clearly broken into two phases:</p><h4><strong>Phase 1: D2D Negotiation</strong></h4><ol><li>DAO1 internally discusses a potential joint venture among its constituents, before writing a proposal.</li><li>The constituents of DAO1 vote on this proposal according to whatever consensus model the DAO utilizes.</li><li>Assuming the vote passes, DAO1 then sends this proposal to DAO2 (if not, then the proposal is either reworked before going to another vote, or the process ends).</li><li>DAO2 internally discusses the proposal.</li><li>DAO2 then votes on this proposal. If this vote passes, Phase 2 begins. If not, then there is the potential for DAO2 to make a counter-proposal to DAO1 (process begins again at step 1) or the DAO rejects it entirely and the process ends.</li></ol><h4><strong><em>Phase 2: Escrow funding</em></strong></h4><ol><li>One of the two DAOs (e.g. DAO1) create an escrow contract from a factory smart contract which is initialized with the contract parameters specified in the agreed-upon proposal. Funds from this DAO are also sent to the escrow contract, and the timelock period begins. *</li><li>The other DAO (e.g. DAO2) must then fund the escrow with their agreed-upon amount of tokens before the timelock ends. If they do not, then the timelock period may be extended, or the operation is aborted and locked funds return to DAO1. If funding occurs before the end of the timelock, then the negotiation is a success and the function designated as ‘operation x’ occurs (e.g. the joint funding of a liquidity pool, the moving of shared development funding to a multisig, etc). *<em>In future iterations this could be achieved in a more collaborative fashion by creating a multisig wallet from which the contract is deployed and executive functions executed. Since this would require a modification of the escrow logic however this will not be expanded upon here.</em></li></ol><p>When designing this first abstraction we prioritized processes already occurring within the space of D2D collaborations, creating a standalone mechanism that could easily replace the need for legal or social agreements. An escrow model was employed for the sake of modularity, security, and overall ease of use by participating DAOs.</p><p>The separation of the mechanism interactions into two distinct phases primarily serves to facilitate iterative proposal negotiations between both DAOs, allowing for counter-proposals to be swapped between parties until the constituents of both are satisfied with the terms of collaboration.</p><p>In the future this model can easily be modified to create a mechanism whereby one party creates the timelocked escrow alone, removing the possibility for counter-proposals and presenting the proposal in a manner more akin to a bounty or open task that requires collaborative effort to achieve.</p><h3>Topics of further research</h3><p>In cases where an Oracle is required — cases of shared futarchy or common goods — the need for an <em>oracle taxonomy</em> might arise if multi-outcome conditions are to be utilized by the mechanism. These differences could depend on the location of the data that is being read (on- or off-chain), the type of data (<a href="https://medium.com/api3/the-api-connectivity-problem-bd7fa0420636">objective vs subjective information</a>), or (e.g.) whether the answer to a condition could be crowdsourced, in the case of a very subjective condition. Furthermore, certain parties may wish to specify the oracle used for particular decisions (see API3’s <a href="https://medium.com/api3/first-party-vs-third-party-oracles-90356e3cffe5">distinction between first- and third-party oracles</a>). In the case of the following D2D interactions, there are obvious preferences regarding the type of oracle used:</p><ul><li>Joint Venture: the preferred case would be for a first-party Oracle with reputation-based ties to both parties, as the completion of the terms of the JV involves both subjective and objective information both on- and off-chain.</li><li>Swap: a third-party oracle would be sufficient as the information can be ascertained using only on-chain information by checking whether the token balances of DAO1 and DAO2 have changed by the agreed-upon amounts by the predetermined time <em>X</em>.</li></ul><p>Regarding the safety of the mechanism: although the simplicity of the code base used for many D2D collaborations mitigates many safety concerns by reducing the possible attack surface, the broader implications of larger D2D interactions utilizing conditions relating to (e.g.) the price of different assets may open up attack vectors akin to those seen over the past year involving flash loans. The inclusion of insurance primitives or capping conditional payouts in D2D agreements may help to mitigate these risks. Proper modelling of the creation and mitigation of honeypots and wider vulnerabilities has yet to be carried out.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Due to the omnipresent characteristic of negotiation protocols and the infinite variety in the taxonomy of “agreements”, the possibility space is very large when it comes to implementations. In the majority of cases, it would be possible to utilize one of many primitives at each stage outlined in the D2D mechanism. Further research and empirical iterations should yield tangible synergies towards more complete designs.</p><p>In order to craft attainable objectives, we have applied a number of selection criteria in order to increase usability and channel the focus of the implementation research. Framing each DAO as a single agent in our scoping significantly reduces the complexity of the mechanism and simultaneously allows for the creation of a single interface contract with which DAOs can interact. By utilizing existing primitives from across the Ethereum stack we are hoping to create an open negotiation environment within which the plurality of needs of the DAO ecosystem can be met.</p><p>We will implement a simple MVP utilizing Escrow Logic on testnet in the next few months and keep expanding the theoretical work as part of the D2D research group. We thank our partners and the core contributors of the D2D research initiative: <em>Shermin Voshmgir, Michael Zargham and Jeff Emmett</em>. We also thank <em>Patrick Rawson, Graeme Barnes and Beth McCarthy</em> for some very stimulating D2D design sessions.</p><blockquote><a href="https://medium.com/curve-labs/part-i-the-twilight-of-neoliberalism-3150b9b1af1b">More about DAOs from Curve Labs</a> ➡</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e37d164e91e6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Announcing pando’s AGP proposal: Aragon Black]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/pando-network/announcing-pandos-agp-proposal-aragon-black-78ce0b805dae?source=rss-339b29f2282a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/78ce0b805dae</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aragon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cem F Dagdelen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jan 2019 20:48:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-28T20:48:18.205Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/850/1*F_or1-V1RORrioHaJLR6GQ.png" /></figure><p><em>It’s been a year now that our team has been working on pushing open source development towards a higher degree of decentralization and sustainability. Most of this work has been funded by Aragon through their Nest program. The more we moved forward in this program, the more we realized that it was not only about getting funded, but about the emergence of a common thought, bringing together a community around the same vision. As this relationship has become more intertwined and synergic than ever, we have decided to take things to the next level, and have the pleasure to announce our run for Flock. In this article, we will thus propose </em><strong><em>Aragon Black</em></strong><em>, the new flag bearer of the pando vision, powered by and integrated to the Aragon stack.</em></p><h3>Open Source Sustainability</h3><p>January 2009, Bitcoin is released as an open source project. The following years saw an aggregation of talent around the technology: individuals took upon their role as contributors and turned it into a new common. Today, this journey continues with an accelerated momentum. The blockchain open source ecosystem has never been so vibrant and we witness the emergence of sizable ecosystem funds for the sole purpose of allocating incentives towards it. Though, something is missing: the ability to actually decentralize these very initiatives and cut off their dependence to any kind of social, political or economic centralized point of failure. One year ago, to contribute solving that issue, we started working on<a href="https://medium.com/pando-network/pando-b5e1a2af3152"> pando: a distributed VCS enabling DAO-based governance and curation of OS repositories</a>.</p><p>As we write this article, pando has covered significant progress as we have:</p><ul><li>laid down the building block of a blockchain-native VCS</li><li>implemented a new IPFS-based version-tracking system from scratch</li><li>developed an on-chain governance scheme to handle basic collaboration around a repository</li><li>implemented a custom Aragon DAO template [to be soon published on Rinkeby] allowing anyone to turn its DAO into a github-like organization</li></ul><p><em>Everything will be demoed at AraCon on January, 30th. Come and say hi!</em></p><h3>pando ❤ Aragon</h3><p>Since the beginning, pando has been tightly linked to Aragon. First of all because aragonOS is the DAO framework pando relies on. Its fast-moving technical stack has allowed to fasten and strengthen pando’s development by orders of magnitude. Then, because these months of work and the features delivered wouldn’t have been possible without the help of the Aragon Nest grant program. Finally, since beyond funding, Aragon and its ecosystem have been an uninterrupted source of inspiration.</p><p>On the 8th of May 2018, Aragon published the<a href="https://blog.aragon.org/the-aragon-manifesto-4a21212eac03/"> Aragon manifesto</a>. The text includes diagnostics with respect to the pivotal role of technology in social transformation: technological development is not a mere series of engineering achievements, but a battleground for freedom. Aragon makes its position very clear:</p><blockquote>“We believe humankind should use technology as a liberating tool to unleash all the goodwill and creativity of our species, rather than as a tool to enslave and take advantage of one another.”</blockquote><p>This explicit statement is what brought us as pando together in the first place. It still is what keeps us upstanding toward a common horizon today: enabling political/organizational experimentation, experimenting with new expressions of collective will, redefining revolutionary action. We think that Aragon, and the decentralized organizations it brings to the masses, will be [for the coming years and decades] a critical challenger in this fight for freedom — and we would like to be a part of it.</p><h3>Our Proposal</h3><p>More precisely, we propose to provide the Aragon stack the building blocks needed for a more sustainable and decentralized OS ecosystem. Thus, we expect to turn Aragon into the go-to choice when it comes to host and manage an Open Source good, the DAO way. To achieve this, we propose to work on the following topics.</p><h4>Aragon Development Infrastructure</h4><p>Pando is not ready for production yet, but will soon be ready for pre-production tests. Thus, we would like to keep on developing and enhancing the pando protocol, support Aragon teams in experimenting with pando to gradually migrate Aragon codebase to a fully decentralized infrastructure, and work closely with all the other Aragon teams to design [and experiment with] a possible reward systems for the Aragon contribution process.</p><h4>Aragon Package Manager</h4><p>Most of us rely on NPM for everything we work on. NPM is far from being perfect, though: centralized infrastructure, security issues, lack of incentivization, etc. To solve this issue, we propose to bring native compatibility to pando and aragonPM, and enhance aragonPM to the point where it becomes a serious — and backward compatible — alternative to NPM.</p><h4>Fundraising</h4><p>Spawning an open-source project is a challenge. Not only a technical one, but often, an economical one. We have been thinking about tackling this issue through curved-bonding primitives for a long time. Now, we would like to take this idea to the next-step and develop a fundraising application for Aragon DAOs that would allow anyone to raise funds the DAICO way in a few clicks.</p><h3>One last thing</h3><p>Working on Aragon has never been and will never be a technical-only task. Yet, as the pando team, we wanted to make a point of honor in theorizing the way we build the emancipation tools of tomorrow. This momentum towards the future can not be achieved without a remembrance of the past. That’s why, by advancing pando, we have shared our vision with the blockchain space and the OS movement but also with a wider community convinced in the rise of new tools that would enable a new activism. We still believe that, <em>critique should most preferably take the form of a substitutive act</em> and that spirit is what we intend to engrave in Aragon Black.</p><p>With the further integration of pando into the Aragon stack, we also hope to onboard new organizations into the Aragon DAO landscape by spinning content-DAOs out as a use case to the ecosystem and eventually to users beyond the blockchain space. We also will be working on enabling decentralized organizations to bootstrap their projects by lowering the cost of raising funds through the fundraising app. This mechanism to turn OS initiatives into financially sustainable and well-curated entities will create organic avenues for use case based on-boarding for Aragon.</p><p>As the toolset of Aragon is getting more and more comprehensive, we take the task upon ourselves to propagate the use cases which arise towards the larger community, both through ecosystem utilization of Aragon tools and public intellectual discourse with regards to putting revolutionary thought into practice.</p><p>All in all, if the Aragon community approves our proposal, the development goals of both Aragon and pando will merge in practice in the deliverables set forth by Aragon Black. It is with great excitement and anticipation that we share our intentions today and hope that it resonates with our community which has given us the most valuable and genuine support.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=78ce0b805dae" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/pando-network/announcing-pandos-agp-proposal-aragon-black-78ce0b805dae">Announcing pando’s AGP proposal: Aragon Black</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/pando-network">Pando Network</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[DAO Petri dish]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@CemFDagdelen/dao-petri-dish-4927d1307ce3?source=rss-339b29f2282a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4927d1307ce3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cem F Dagdelen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Feb 2018 18:08:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-20T12:47:42.616Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/743/1*xapgJBHUGwj18g6OVxXplw.png" /></figure><p>I remember watching <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vDwzmJpI4io">an interview of Elon Musk</a> a while back and one of the things he said really stuck with me, for no obvious reason. While describing certain promotional strategies they would utilize at PayPal in order to accelerate adoption he said:</p><p>“<em>And then we did a bunch of things to decrease the friction. It’s just like bacteria in a Petri dish. So what you want to do is try to have one customer generate like two customers. OK? Or something like that. Maybe three customers, ideally. And then you want that to happen really fast. And you could probably model it just like bacteria growth in a Petri dish. And then it’ll just expand very quickly until it hits the side of the Petri dish and then it slows down.”</em></p><p>Apart from the a**hole side of me that enjoys bacterial metaphors on humans, I’m quite sure I had appreciation for the experimentative thought process which was simple and worthwhile.</p><p>I recall this metaphor, or rather method when I was contemplating on the process to find optimal governance models in decentralized organizations. Thanks to blockchain we are at a stage in which we have the tools (the stack) to build DAOs which can effectively govern themselves. The question becomes at this point; “Which governance models are superior per use case?”.</p><blockquote>“Systems learn at the collective level by mechanism &amp; selection: by eliminating those elements that reduce the fitness of the whole, provided they have skin in the game.” — Nassim Nicholas Taleb</blockquote><h3>Natural vs Artificial Selection</h3><p>Natures answer to this is to wait and see how the ecosystem will play out. But as species we never took evolutionary time scale as a given (which might spell our destruction. see: AI). I can think of 3 reasons to actively interfere with this process:</p><ul><li>Saving time: DAOs will succeed and fail at long timeframes without controlled environments (which will also make measurement more difficult).</li><li>Saving resources: Failing DAOs will have an economic cost on most or all their participants. This could be mitigated if there were best practices developed in advance <a href="https://medium.com/daostack/decentralized-governance-first-principles-1fc6eaa492ed">(e.g Holographic consensus by Matan Field)</a></li><li>Saving reputation: This is especially relevant when we are dealing with a nascent use case of a nascent technology, since <strong>reputation = adoption.</strong></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/832/1*3SQum6oMkb0843FlHUdV0A.png" /></figure><p>Instead experiments could be made. Games with incentives can be designed to create a competitive (0-sum) or collaborative (non-0-sum) environments for DAOs to interact to exhibit various capabilities.</p><p>Competing/collaborating agencies in a zero-sum/non-zero-sum scenario on a sufficient time-frames could reveal key insights as to the sustainability of different governance structures or efficiencies of different settings &amp; combinations of schemes.</p><p>The parameters that can be varied are:</p><ul><li>(In)Equality of funds</li><li>(In)Equality of reputation</li><li>Constraint tresholds</li><li>Types of schemes</li><li>Number of agents</li><li>Federated v assembly v …<br>(Some of these properties could be previously encoded in the subject controllers)</li></ul><p>The requirement or the success parameter could be set to measure the desired characteristics such as:</p><ul><li>The ability/flexibility of an agency to unlock protocol upgrades</li><li>Constraint removal/addition</li><li>Token printing etc.<br><em>(I would appreciate any comments if you’re able to imagine others)</em></li></ul><p>These all are consensus challenges and different governance structures will have different experiences in reaching or trying to reach that goal. This is why I think its possible and relevant to run such bounty competitions on the platform.</p><p>Its also just exciting to imagine we can have different Petri Dishes of decentralized organizations growing, collaborating, competing.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4927d1307ce3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Reputation Interoperability]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@CemFDagdelen/reputation-interoperability-80207e6135c8?source=rss-339b29f2282a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/80207e6135c8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[decentralization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cem F Dagdelen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Feb 2018 14:31:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-16T14:31:25.887Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IQyP17W4B0iu-24orSL6NA.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Role of reputation</strong></p><p>What sets apart meritocratic governance models is the allocation of influence to the contributors within the system. This allows greater incentivisation for a given success parameter and a flatter structure, less influenced by the uneven distribution of funds. This subject has been covered at length at other posts &amp; papers. In order to get a full-view of where reputation sits in a decentralized governance model I recommend taking the time to <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CqNhy-P1IaZMWkPUf61HYZ5zo1FnDYAp/view">read the DAOstack WP</a>.</p><p><strong>Local vs Global</strong></p><p>The reputation generated by agents in a local DAO, or the avatar of this agency is relevant to the governance mechanisms of the local DAO.</p><p>But even if reputations are <em>non-transferable</em> assets they can surely be <em>translatable</em>. Assuming there is global value in harnessing these reputation points in wider use cases, It’s important to consider what the <em>interoperability or the standardization</em> of these local reputation could take place. An example to locally generated globally relevant reputation would be performance of fund managers or rating agents. If this can be facilitated, it would unlock, I think, the potential in hosting crowd intelligence applications on top of crowd intelligence operating systems like <a href="https://www.daostack.io/">DAOstack</a>.</p><p><a href="https://bloom.co/">Bloom</a> is trying to create a global credit rating system because there is value in using local non-transferable reputation globally. <a href="http://aion.network/">Aion</a> is working on interoperability of chains because there is immense value in chain integration and scaling.</p><p>A similar standardization must take place in order to have an efficient merit allocation, incentivisation and scaling in a future where DAOs are ubiquitous and the interactions within its ecosystem have global relevance beyond local governance.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=80207e6135c8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Information Bottleneck in Crypto Trading]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@CemFDagdelen/information-bottleneck-in-crypto-trading-c3ca00697f03?source=rss-339b29f2282a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c3ca00697f03</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Cem F Dagdelen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jan 2018 08:29:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-22T08:29:54.109Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Asymmetric information exists almost everywhere aside from controlled environments. Think of a doctors visit: they tend to know much more than you on diagnostics and medical treatment, justifying the high costs they charge their patients. The objectives of the patient and the doctor is convergent thanks to a payment which acts as contract of common will towards a solution to the patients problem.</p><p>The discrepancy in knowledge is not always as easy to bridge — or the interests are not as easily aligned. Financial trading for instance operates on the fundamental basis of acquiring assets at relatively low valuations and exiting at higher valuations. In isolation this seems like a solitary act with a simplistic profit motive. But markets are environments in which a multitude of actors interact and impact others’ performance. Thus, a cleaner way to look at this is through the lens of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_fool_theory"><em>the Greater Fool Theory</em></a>, according to which the price of an asset has little resemblance to the intrinsic valuation, but rather the expectation of an exit thanks to the demand surplus on that very asset. Thus being a first mover allows unrivalled performance. This all seems acceptable when you are considering individual traders competing with each other based on technical analysis and due diligence. But consider for a second the leading institutions in the finance industry (such as hedge funds, market makers, whales). These firms have built their hegemony <strong><em>based</em></strong> on asymmetric information. Their profits are re-invested into <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-quants-run-wall-street-now-1495389108"><em>acquiring the best quant talent</em></a>, <a href="https://www.ted.com/talks/kevin_slavin_how_algorithms_shape_our_world"><em>building the fastest optical communications infrastructure</em></a> &amp; <a href="https://www.wired.com/2016/01/the-rise-of-the-artificially-intelligent-hedge-fund/"><em>developing/purchasing cutting-edge machine learning software</em></a>.</p><p>Wall Street <em>lives</em> on asymmetric information. It creates it, consolidates it.</p><p>Projects like <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603120/new-hedge-fund-relies-on-an-anonymous-army-of-coders-to-turn-a-profit/"><em>Numer.ai</em></a> are tweaking the model of Wall St. by incentivising &amp; crowdsourcing the quant workload. However exciting this is as far as game theory &amp; incentive design is concerned, it does little in the name of democratisation of financial trading.</p><blockquote>“Mechanisms emerge to enable a larger part of the population to participate in what is deemed desirable but, until now, had been hard to access.” — Mohamed A. El-Erian</blockquote><p>“Hard to access” refers to the entry barriers which are either inherent or deliberate. By ditching intermediaries such as brokers &amp; funds, massive participation was rendered possible in cryptocurrency markets attracting individuals with technological enthusiasm and desire to become financially independent. The barriers are not at all brought down in their entirety however. As far as mass adoption is concerned, technological barriers persist (not to mention sky high tx costs &amp; exchange fees). But there are projects underway trying to find ways to expand the trading toolbox of the public. In the world of finance, where returns are increasingly proportional to access to relevant information, democratisation can only be achieved through the re-distribution (relax capitalists) of data and the vehicles to process it.</p><p>To achieve this state we first must analyse the nature of the bottleneck in question. We can build a model based on two integral elements which actors utilise in cryptocurrency trading: T<strong><em>ime (t) </em></strong>&amp; <strong><em>experience (xp)</em></strong>.</p><p>The amount of time parties allocate to due diligence processes and technical exposure can be directly linked to higher returns. The same can be said for experience in trading. We can also link the two parameters on the assumption that time allocation leads to higher experience thus more sustained ROI levels. We can distinguish between two groups based on the distribution of the two parameters: Full time crypto traders v Enthusiasts/Hobbyists. Naturally there is osmosis between the two groups, catalysed particularly by the link between time endowment and increasing crypto-relevant experience.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XtC6ou1bSwmR1XJ_FExbAQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Avantgarde asymmetric information chart in collaboration with artist <a href="http://www.canaksan.com/">Can Aksan</a></figcaption></figure><p>This chart aims to visualize the following assumptions: Time allocation &amp; experience are parameters of success in cryptocurrency trading and time allocation trivially leads to higher levels of experience. But the pace of growth in the general public is orders of magnitude stronger than the growth of expertise, leading to an increasing discrepancy between the two groups. This effect is helping create, or rather fortify, the bottleneck of information in the sphere.</p><p><strong>Opportunity:</strong> Bottlenecks are a measure of market inefficiencies, thus indicators of opportunities for entrepreneurs attempting to bypass or widen the bottleneck since the marginal impact is largest for solutions closer to the congested focal points. In this case, the opportunity lies in the transfer of knowledge/experience/best practices of the few to the interested mass market.</p><p><strong>Landscape: </strong>The current organic model of information diffusion in crypto is based on signals. These signals at times rely on financial indicators &amp; TA, at others qualitative information pulled together by experience market watchers. The business model is rather simple: establishing closed groups which charge monthly membership fees paid in cryptocurrencies (usually Bitcoin). Due to frictions such as collection, competition and the intrinsic need for exclusivity of the model, there is limited scalability of these ventures even if they generate substantial revenue for the administrators.</p><p><strong>Proposal: </strong>With a proper incentive model and a dynamic user base these actors can be converted to “content creators” on a platform on which they are able to monetize the signals they create. Users can buy access to these signals that are competing against each other for user ratings and the track record. Tokenization of this project will provide intrinsic value from both sides of the model (user &amp; content creator) leading to faster adoption, thus higher # of transactions.</p><p><strong>Signal Mechanics:</strong> Signal is a generic term which contextually signifies a notification which has the potential to prompt a buy or sell decision. As mentioned these signals can rely on quantitative and/or qualitative factors. The indicators used for TA are integrable elements of quantitative nature. But in markets where speculation plays a big role on price action, disregard for qualitative factors can make a huge difference in performance. Some examples of these factors are sentiment analytics, rumors, due diligence reports, competition analytics, technical review and so on. If you have been in crypto for some time you know those factors can mean the difference between going the moon or getting ‘REKT’. Due to the generative differences between the Qualitative and Quantitative elements, the platform which aims to host these signals must be designed with these frictions in consideration.</p><p><em>As we are building </em><a href="http://www.botta.io/"><em>Botta.io</em></a><em>, a personalized assistant for crypto trading, we are aggregating the tools and the potential to lay the groundwork for this future marketplace. This platform for knowledge exchange will contribute to speeding up adoption and enable smart trading across the board. Since we are at a very early stage of development we welcome all contributions. Feel free to get in touch with us through our website or at cem@horatiipartners.com .</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c3ca00697f03" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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