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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Crisis Group on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Crisis Group on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@CrisisGroup?source=rss-b8580e8a76e0------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[How Good Data Can Help Build World Peace]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/how-good-data-can-help-build-world-peace-d423132859c7?source=rss-b8580e8a76e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d423132859c7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sustainable-development]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conflict-resolution]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Crisis Group]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 11 Aug 2016 10:03:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-11T10:03:24.632Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By Steve Killelea, Founder and Executive Chairman of the Institute for Economics and Peace</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gxcymf9gMrb_gBpWXHrlZA.jpeg" /><figcaption>School children play between water-level gauges alongside the Ziglab Dam in northern Jordan in May 2009. Jordan today has an official youth unemployment rate of around 30 per cent and is struggling to cope with an influx of refugees. MAGNUM/Paolo Pellegrin</figcaption></figure><figure><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/meet-the-authors-6d41374b1554#.qrd5ysric"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*bruT1RrrH_v6-CdLsBB0gA.png" /></a><figcaption>Steve Killelea</figcaption></figure><p>The world has witnessed a historic decline in world peace over the past decade that interrupts the long-term improvements since the Second Word War.</p><p>This trend is largely driven by the intensifying conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa. Terrorism is at an all-time high, battle deaths from conflict are at a 25-year high, and the number of refugees and displaced people are at a level not seen in sixty years. Notably, the sources for these three dynamics are intertwined and driven by a small number of countries, demonstrating the global repercussions of breakdowns in peacefulness.</p><p>So intense is the current concentration of violence and conflict in the Middle East that it drags down the global average. When considered separately, the rest of the world’s average peace levels actually improved. Many countries are at record-high levels of peacefulness, while the bottom twenty countries have progressively become much less peaceful, increasing the levels of global inequality in peace.</p><p>This striking data comes from the latest edition of the <a href="http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/GPI-2016-Report_2.pdf">Global Peace Index</a>, produced by the <a href="http://economicsandpeace.org/about/">Institute for Economics and Peace</a> (IEP), which I founded. Our aim is to provide the world with the research, data and insight required to inform decisions we take to secure a more peaceful future.</p><p>Measuring peace is, of course, a difficult task. However, thanks to the Global Peace Index, now in its tenth year, we have solid quantitative analysis that can shed light on the questions of whether we are becoming more or less peaceful, and what are the underlying factors that help maintain peace.</p><p>For example, our research shows that, amidst the global deterioration, the world continues to spend enormous resources on creating and containing violence but comparatively little on promoting peace. The economic impact of violence in 2015 was estimated at $13.6 trillion, or 13.3 per cent of world GDP. Of this amount, the economic losses caused by armed conflict amount to $742 billion. The corresponding global investment in peacekeeping and peacebuilding was around $15 billion — or less than 2 per cent of the economic losses from conflict.</p><blockquote>The economic impact of violence in 2015 was estimated at $13.6 trillion, or 13.3 per cent of world GDP. Of this amount, the economic losses caused by armed conflict amount to $742 billion.</blockquote><p>I believe that the key to reversing the global decline is through support for <a href="http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Positive-Peace-Report-2015.pdf">Positive Peace</a>, a holistic framework made up of eight pillars which together create an optimum environment for human potential to flourish. Derived from a statistical analysis of over 4,000 datasets, we identified pillars for peace — including well-functioning government, low levels of corruption, equitable distribution of resources and free flow of information — and established three indicators in each category. This provides a baseline measure of the effectiveness of a country’s institutions and attitudes to build and maintain peace. It also provides a measure for policymakers, researchers and corporations to use for monitoring and evaluation efforts.</p><p>Many of the challenges facing humanity are fundamentally global in nature, such as climate change, decreasing biodiversity, continued economic instability and increasing migration. All of these challenges are interconnected and multifaceted, requiring new ways of conceptualising the relations between countries and the larger systems upon which humanity depends. We need to use systems thinking, as it has developed in the study of ecology, and consider how it applies to nation states.</p><p>As part of this effort, the Institute for Economics and Peace has also conducted an audit of the available data to measure the <a href="http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/">Sustainable Development Goal</a> (SDG) related to the promotion of peace, justice and strong institutions, <a href="https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16">SDG16</a>. For the first time, UN member states have formally recognised the critical nature of peacefulness in advancing the global development agenda, alongside issues like poverty, inequality, and climate change. We believe that SDG 16 incorporates key aspects of both Negative Peace, which is defined as “the absence of violence and the fear of violence”, as well as Positive Peace, which is defined as “the attitudes, institutions and structures that support and sustain peaceful societies”.</p><p>At the IEP, we found that measuring Goal 16 presents a number of methodological concerns. In the spirit of the SDGs being country-led, the intention is for many of the measurements to be guided by National Statistical Offices. However, national statistical data is non-existent for many of the targets and indicators. In addition, the majority of targets in Goal 16 face potential conflicts of interest in measurement by the state. We recommend that independent third-party organisations provide complementary support to the national offices, and offer a useful benchmark against which to compare results. We have joined the <a href="http://www.sdg16.org/">SDG16 Data Initiative</a>, which brings together a coalition of well-respected international organisations that will collaborate to identify information gaps and useful alternative data sources in SDG16 target areas.</p><blockquote>Thanks to data and research, we can develop better informed analyses and insights on peace — enabling more intelligent, focused action to reverse the terrible recent trend toward more deadly conflict.</blockquote><p>Measuring Goal 16 is not an easy task, but it is one that injects accountability into an otherwise elusive yet coveted ambition for the world. This is a serious challenge that needs greater investment and levels of cooperation.</p><p>Thanks to data and research, we can develop better informed analyses and insights on peace — enabling more intelligent, focused action to reverse the terrible recent trend toward more deadly conflict.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/100/1*LfyQypOZUfXQcN-nC8rQuQ.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/about-the-future-of-conflict-project-7a6129b4725e#.d1rd3gy5k"><em>About The Future of Conflict</em></a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/meet-the-authors-6d41374b1554#.y6z6zzy7l"><em>Learn more about our contributors</em></a></p><p><em>This article represents the view of the individual writer, not that of International Crisis Group or of its Board.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d423132859c7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/how-good-data-can-help-build-world-peace-d423132859c7">How Good Data Can Help Build World Peace</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict">The Future of Conflict</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Toward Building a More Humane Refugee Policy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/toward-building-a-more-humane-refugee-policy-b27228e6aba8?source=rss-b8580e8a76e0------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[conflict-resolution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Crisis Group]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 May 2016 08:26:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-05-19T08:26:26.381Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By Emma Bonino, Former Foreign Minister of Italy and European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LzNi4qETLFg34u2rkJcbVw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Kara Tepe transit camp for refugees near Mytilène on the island of Lesvos, Greece, on 23 December 2015. MAGNUM/Jerome Sessini</figcaption></figure><figure><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/meet-the-authors-6d41374b1554#.y6z6zzy7l"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*YMcA7RbmnGTo38mHV-Ye8Q.jpeg" /></a><figcaption>Emma Bonino</figcaption></figure><p>European countries are accepting migrants and integrating them into their societies. So my question is: Why not more Syrians? And, for that matter, why not more Iraqis, Afghans or Somalis? Is it because of racism? Is it because they are suspected of posing a risk of terrorism? Is it because they are considered not properly skilled or trained? These are questions that European leaders need to begin answering in order to overcome the refugee crisis.</p><p>Europe is well aware that it faces a structural problem, with dramatic demographic declines in Germany, Italy and Spain to name but a few. In 2014, European countries welcomed in around <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Residence_permits_statistics">2.3 million migrants</a> and successfully integrated them — reuniting them with their families, and providing them with work permits and education. In fact, the UK was the best country at integrating migrants, taking in 568,000 people in 2014 alone, including from the U.S., India, China and Brazil. But how many from Syria? Almost none. Even my country, Italy, integrated more than 200,000 people in 2014. And yet many Europeans continue to resist accepting refugees and migrants stemming from the “crisis” along the continent’s southern borders.</p><blockquote>We need more immigrants of all kinds, not less.</blockquote><p>When refugees make it to Europe, there must be an effective integration policy that avoids past mistakes. Investment is needed in areas such as housing, education, language and skills training to avoid future alienation or disenfranchisement. Europe cannot afford to continue its uncoordinated and woefully inadequate approach to the reality of human migration. Our failure to effectively manage the entry and resettlement of refugees and migrants has magnified the problem, creating an acute political crisis.</p><p>In the absence of a comprehensive plan for managing the arrival and distribution of asylum seekers, the nations of Europe have panicked. Many of them have erected strict border controls and cast about for scapegoats.</p><p>Greece, which has been under economic strain for years before the current crisis, has been singled out for failing to adequately process and house refugees. It is unreasonable to expect the country to bear such huge burdens alone. The <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1447_en.htm">EU has pledged €509 million</a> for the Greek national program (2014–2020) — and additional aid totalling €264 million — to help the country manage the influx of migrants. However, some member states have failed to pay their share. This lack of solidarity is compounding the crisis and means that Greece does not have the resources to individually process each migrant to determine their right to asylum. That process requires more case workers, interpreters and judges — which <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-942_en.htm">Europe has promised</a> but not yet provided.</p><p>While it is true that there has been a lack of leadership on this problem, there have been some positive actions taken. For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel bravely opened the door to refugees — or, as she put it recently, simply refused to close the door. She has been accused and criticised for “picking and choosing refugees”, favouring Syrian refugees in particular who tend to be better trained and educated. Regardless, at least she kept the German border open in order to process new arrivals, and I would encourage other European Union (EU) states to follow that example.</p><p>In Italy, we can be proud of the lives saved through the Mare Nostrum search-and-rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea. That program rescued <a href="http://ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/855-operation-mare-nostrum-to-end-frontex-triton-operation-will-not-ensure-rescue-at-sea-of-migrants-in-international-waters.html">more than 140,000 people</a> in less than a year, before it officially wound down in late 2014. We are continuing with search-and-rescue on a much more limited scale, thanks to efforts by the Italian Coast Guard, fishermen’s associations and NGOs.</p><blockquote>A properly conceived mission in the Mediterranean should include an active search-and-rescue program, following the successful model of Mare Nostrum, in order to negotiate the coming months and years of this crisis. The idea of losing lives at sea is absolutely unacceptable.</blockquote><p>European institutions need to improve their forecasting ability to identify early warning signs of political instability and potential conflict — and take pro-active steps to help vulnerable states before another mass exodus of people begins. One country at risk is Algeria, where there is extensive social conflict, a closed political system, and widespread corruption. There is no viable successor to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Considering all the turmoil in Libya and other neighbouring countries, it is fair to describe Algeria as a ticking time bomb. Europe is not doing enough to anticipate and prevent a potential eruption and the inevitable migration consequences that would have for our continent.</p><p>There are a number of complicating factors regarding the current crisis, including how to separate refugees from economic migrants. This is, of course, an important distinction, but one that is not always easy to make. First of all, most of these people come without documents. They might say that they come from Eritrea, for example, but how would one establish whether or not this is true? And then, should this person be categorised as a refugee or as an economic migrant? It is admittedly very difficult.</p><p>We can build a more rational system to address the challenges, but only if we first calm the hysteria that is gripping Europe. Millions of people are fleeing war, repression, torture and death threats. Above all, refugee policy must safeguard human lives.</p><p>This is a global problem, not confined to the Mediterranean. It helps to look at the situation in other countries: Tunisia has taken one million Libyans into a population of around eleven million; Lebanon has absorbed more than one million Syrians into a population of around four million. How can Europe not show the same generous spirit in welcoming those fleeing horrors?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/200/1*NVYeI6HPjWHAa143d-MMBQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/about-the-future-of-conflict-project-7a6129b4725e#.d1rd3gy5k"><em>About The Future of Conflict</em></a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/meet-the-authors-6d41374b1554#.y6z6zzy7l"><em>Learn more about our contributors</em></a></p><p><em>This article represents the view of the individual writer, not that of International Crisis Group or of its Board.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b27228e6aba8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/toward-building-a-more-humane-refugee-policy-b27228e6aba8">Toward Building a More Humane Refugee Policy</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict">The Future of Conflict</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@CrisisGroup/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state-31a12d1a7150?source=rss-b8580e8a76e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/31a12d1a7150</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[islamic-state]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[violent-extremism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Crisis Group]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Mar 2016 13:17:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-03-15T13:17:16.306Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yJOSSGhMsJtEUt_dL2AXKQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Mortars fired by the Islamic State destroyed this market street in Kobane, Syria, in December 2014. MAGNUM/Lorenzo Meloni</figcaption></figure><h4>Executive Summary</h4><p>The Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda-linked groups, Boko Haram and other extremist movements are protagonists in today’s deadliest crises, complicating efforts to end them. They have exploited wars, state collapse and geopolitical upheaval in the Middle East, gained new footholds in Africa and pose an evolving threat elsewhere. Reversing their gains requires avoiding the mistakes that enabled their rise. This means distinguishing between groups with different goals; using force more judiciously; ousting militants only with a viable plan for what comes next; and looking to open lines of communication, even with hardliners. Vital, too, is to de-escalate the crises they feed off and prevent others erupting, by nudging leaders toward dialogue, inclusion and reform and reacting sensibly to terrorist attacks. Most important is that action against “violent extremism” not distract from or deepen graver threats, notably escalating major- and regional-power rivalries.</p><p>“Little suggests these groups can be defeated by military means alone, yet they espouse goals hard to accommodate in negotiated settlements.”</p><p>The reach of “jihadists” (a term Crisis Group uses reluctantly but that groups this report covers self-identify with; a fuller explanation for its use is on page 2) has expanded dramatically over the past few years. Some movements are now powerful insurgent forces, controlling territory, supplanting the state and ruling with a calibrated mix of coercion and co-option. Little suggests they can be defeated by military means alone. Yet, they espouse, to varying degrees, goals incompatible with the nation-state system, rejected by most people in areas affected and hard to accommodate in negotiated settlements. Most appear resilient, able to adapt to shifting dynamics. The geography of crisis today means similar groups will blight many of tomorrow’s wars.</p><p>IS has reshaped the jihadist landscape: its strategy bloodier than that of al-Qaeda, from which it split in 2013; its declared caliphate across much of Iraq and Syria and grip on a Libyan coastal strip; thousands of foreigners and dozens of movements enlisted; its attacks in the Muslim world and the West. Fighting on multiple fronts — against Iran’s allies, Sunni Arab regimes and the West — it has woven together sectarian, revolutionary and anti-imperialist threads of jihadist thought. Its leadership is mostly Iraqi but the movement is protean: millenarian and local insurgent; to some a source of protection, to others of social mobility and yet others of purpose; with strands aiming to consolidate the caliphate, take Baghdad or even Mecca, or lure the West into an apocalyptic battle. Primarily, though, its rise reflects recent Iraqi and Syrian history: Sunni exclusion and anomie after the disastrous U.S. invasion; harsh treatment under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki; and the brutality of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and its allies. Any response must factor in IS’s many faces. But mostly it needs to address Sunni suffering in the Levant and the dangerous sense of victimisation that has helped spawn across the Sunni Arab world.</p><p>In part obscured by IS’s rise, al-Qaeda has evolved. Its affiliates in the Maghreb, Somalia, Syria and Yemen remain potent, some stronger than ever. Some have grafted themselves onto local insurrections, displaying a degree of pragmatism, caution about killing Muslims and sensitivity to local norms. Around the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram, the latest in a string of revivalist movements rooted in the marginalised political economy and structural violence of northern Nigeria, has morphed from isolated sect to regional menace, though formally joining IS has changed little about it. Movements of different stripes — the largely nationalist Afghan Taliban, resurgent as foreign troops draw down from Afghanistan, and Pakistani groups including sectarian movements, tribal militants fighting the central state and Kashmir- or Afghanistan-focused elements aligned to its military establishment — comprise an evolving South Asian jihadist scene.</p><p>The roots of this expansion defy generic description. Patterns of radicalisation vary from country to country, village to village, individual to individual. Autocrats, political exclusion, flawed Western interventions, failing governance, closing avenues for peaceful political expression, the distrust of the state in neglected peripheries, traditional elites’ declining authority and the lack of opportunity for growing youth populations have all played their part. So, too, has the dwindling appeal of other ideologies, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood’s peaceful political Islam — jihadists’ main ideological competitor — diminished by President Mohamed Morsi’s ouster and the subsequent crackdown in Egypt. Proselytising of intolerant strands of Islam has, in places, helped prepare the ground. The sectarian currents coursing through much of the Muslim world both are aggravated by IS and give it succour.</p><p>“Jihadists’ expansion is more a product of instability than its primary driver, is due more to radicalisation during crises than beforehand, and owes more to fighting between their enemies than to their strengths.”</p><p>But if roots are complex, the catalyst is clear enough. The descent of most of the 2011 Arab revolutions into chaos has opened enormous opportunity for extremists. Movements have gathered force as crises have festered and evolved, as money, weapons and fighters flow in, as violence escalates. Mounting enmity between states means regional powers worry less about extremists than about traditional rivals, leverage the fight against IS against other enemies or quietly indulge jihadists as proxies. Especially in the Middle East, jihadists’ expansion is more a product of instability than its primary driver; is due more to radicalisation during crises than beforehand; and owes more to fighting between their enemies than to their own strengths. Rarely can such a movement gather force or seize territory outside a war zone or collapsed state.</p><p>Geopolitics hinders a coherent response. The starting point should be to dial back the Saudi-Iranian rivalry that drives Sunni and Shia extremism, deepens crises across the region and is among the gravest threats to international peace and security today. Easing other tensions — between Turkey and Kurdish militants, for example, Turkey and Russia, conservative Arab regimes and the Muslim Brotherhood, Pakistan and India, even Russia and the West — is also essential. In Libya, Syria and Yemen, tackling jihadists requires forging new orders attractive enough to deplete their ranks and unite other forces. Of course, none of this is easy. But redoubling efforts to narrow other fault lines would be wiser than papering them over in an illusion of consensus against “violent extremism”.</p><p>Vital, too, is to learn from mistakes since the 9/11 (2001) attacks. Each movement, notwithstanding the links between and transnational ties of some, is distinct and locally rooted; each requires a response tailored to context. They can, however, pose similar dilemmas and provoke similar blunders. Major and regional powers and governments in areas affected should:</p><ul><li><strong>Disaggregate not conflate</strong>: Making enemies of non-violent Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, prepared to accept political and religious pluralism and engage in politics is self-defeating. Also important is to distinguish movements seeking a place within the international order from those wanting to upend it. Even IS, its local branches and al-Qaeda affiliates, despite belonging to the latter category, are not monolithic. They have dedicated cores with transnational goals, but rank-and-files with diverse, mostly local motives whose loyalty can shift, and perhaps be shifted, with changing conditions. Governments should disaggregate even radical movements with an eye to ending violence, not lump others in with them looking for a fight.</li><li><strong>Contain if no better option exists</strong>: Foreign powers should always have a viable plan for what comes next if they undertake to oust militants; the same applies to governments in their hinterlands. Today’s strategy in Iraq — razing towns to defeat IS in the hope Sunni leaders in Baghdad can regain lost legitimacy through reconstruction — is unlikely either to meet Sunnis’ grievances or create conditions in which they can forge a new political identity. In Libya, a heavy bombardment or deployment of Western troops against IS without a wider political settlement would be a mistake, likely to deepen the chaos. In both cases, slowing military operations also carries grave risks but, without a workable alternative, is the safer option — for those contemplating going in and those in areas affected alike.</li><li><strong>Use force more judiciously</strong>: Although force usually must be part of the response, governments have been too quick to go to war. Movements with roots in communities, tapping genuine grievances and sometimes with foreign backing are hard to extirpate, however unappealing their ideology. Wars in Somalia and Afghanistan show the shortfalls of defining enemies as terrorists or violent extremists and of combining efforts to build centralised state institutions with military action against them absent a wider political strategy that includes reconciliation. Nor can Russia’s scorched-earth approach in Chechnya — even leaving aside the human cost — be replicated in areas affected today, given porous borders, collapsed states and proxy warfare.</li><li><strong>Respect rules</strong>: Too often military action against extremists helps them recruit or leaves communities caught between their harsh rule and indiscriminate operations against them. Jihadists’ ability to offer protection against predation by regimes, other militias or foreign powers is among their greatest assets, usually more central to their success than ideology. While often guilty of atrocities, they fight in conflicts in which all sides violate international humanitarian law. Recovering the rulebook must be a priority.</li><li><strong>Curb targeted killings</strong>: Drone strikes can, in places, hinder groups’ operations and ability to hit Western interests and their leaders’ movements. But they feed resentment against local governments and the West. Movements weather the deaths of leaders, and the replacements that emerge are often harder-line. Foreseeing the impact of killings is hard in a reasonably stable order; doing so amid urban warfare and jihadist infighting — with al-Qaeda and others confronting IS — is impossible. Even leaving aside questions of secrecy, legality and accountability, targeted killings will not end the wars jihadists fight in or decisively weaken most movements.</li><li><strong>Open lines of communication</strong>: Notwithstanding the difficulties, governments should be more willing to talk, even with radicals. Opportunities to engage in ways that might have de-escalated violence — with some Taliban and al-Shabaab leaders, Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, for example — have been lost. The decision whether a group is irreconcilable rests with its leaders, not governments. Although policymakers can entertain no illusions about the nature of the IS and al-Qaeda top commands, opportunities to open unofficial, discreet lines of communication, through community leaders, non-state mediators or others, are usually worth pursuing, particularly on issues of humanitarian concern, where there may be shared interest.</li><li><strong>Narrow the “countering violent extremism” (CVE) agenda</strong>: As a corrective to post-9/11 securitised policies, the CVE agenda, pioneered mostly by development actors, is valuable; so, too, are recognising the underlying conditions that can, in places, enable extremists’ recruitment and shifting funds from military spending to development aid. But re-hatting as CVE activities to address “root causes”, particularly those related to states’ basic obligations to citizens — like education, employment or services to marginalised communities — may prove short-sighted. Casting “violent extremism”, a term often ill-defined and open to misuse, as a main threat to stability risks downplaying other sources of fragility, delegitimising political grievances and stigmatising communities as potential extremists. Governments and donors must think carefully what to label CVE, further research paths of radicalisation and consult widely across the spectrum of those most affected.</li><li><strong>Invest in conflict prevention</strong>: IS’s and al-Qaeda’s recent expansion injects new urgency into prevention, both during crises, to halt their radicalisation, and upstream. Any further breakdown in the belt running from West Africa to South Asia is likely to attract an extremist element — whether these movements provoke crises themselves or, more likely, profit from their escalation. Although generic prescriptions are of limited value, nudging leaders toward more inclusive and representative politics, addressing communities’ grievances and measured responses to terrorist attacks usually make sense. Overall, in other words, preventing crises will do more to contain violent extremists than countering violent extremism will do to prevent crises.</li></ul><p>The past quarter century has seen waves of jihadist violence: a first in the early 1990s, when volunteers from the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan joined insurrections elsewhere; a second pioneered by al-Qaeda culminating in the 9/11 attacks; and a third sparked by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Today’s fourth wave is the most perilous yet. Partly this is thanks to IS’s territorial control and ideological innovation — its tapping of both local Sunni and wider anti-establishment discontent. Mostly, though, it is dangerous because of the currents propelling it, particularly the Middle East’s upheaval and fraying state-society relations there and elsewhere. World leaders’ concern is well-founded: IS’s attacks kill their citizens and threaten their societies’ cohesion. They face enormous pressure to act. But they must do so prudently. Missteps — whether careless military action abroad; crackdowns at home; subordinating aid to counter-radicalisation; casting the net too wide; or ignoring severer threats in a rush to fight “violent extremism” — risk aggravating those deeper currents and again playing into jihadists’ hands.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7mBulKkuqgwB1e7JU2qy0w.png" /></figure><p>Read the full report online, alongside photos, videos and podcasts.</p><p><a href="https://crisisgroup.atavist.com/exploiting-disorder"><strong>Read now &gt;&gt;</strong></a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=31a12d1a7150" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Seven Lessons of State Building]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/the-seven-lessons-of-state-building-ba07f8daf5e3?source=rss-b8580e8a76e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ba07f8daf5e3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[conflict-resolution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[peace]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Crisis Group]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Mar 2016 09:59:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-04-22T14:53:38.001Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By Carl Bildt, Former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bb29CmlnxmtTS4cMdFB-8A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Children peer through the rubble following an airstrike by the Saudi Arabian-led coalition in September 2015 that killed 30 civilians and wounded 48 in Sawan district, among the poorest areas of the Yemeni capital, Sanaa. MAGNUM/Lorenzo Meloni</figcaption></figure><figure><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/meet-the-authors-6d41374b1554#.y6z6zzy7l"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*6SjmP4fTa6m4U3FIP5QK2Q.jpeg" /></a><figcaption>Carl Bildt</figcaption></figure><p>We failed to see war coming in former Yugoslavia. After Bosnia, resting on our laurels, we repeated our mistake as Kosovo slid into open conflict. The international community’s interventionist wisdom was tested again in Afghanistan and Iraq, and most recently in Libya.</p><p>Today, as Syria looms ever larger, one hopes there is full recognition at last that the phase of winning or ending a war must be seen as just the initial part of the far more complex and demanding task of winning peace, building states and consolidating nations.</p><p>I have long maintained that there are seven lessons of nation-building to be heeded whenever intervention leaves instability in its wake. I have been refining these ever since Bosnia war ended two decades ago, at which time I first became immersed in the far more complex and demanding phase of recovery.</p><p><strong>Lesson 1: Establish a secure environment fast.</strong></p><p>Establishing a secure environment means much more than separating warring parties. As long as the gun is seen as the fastest way to power or property, we can be certain that it will be used. There will be little room to develop the most elementary part of economic recovery: democratic dialogue and entrepreneurship.</p><p>In Iraq, there was a serious shortage of both soldiers and plans for a secure post-war environment. The U.S. decision to disband virtually all structures of the previous regime, including the entire army, is probably one of the worst decisions in the history of post-conflict efforts. It opened the door to the instability that today haunts the entire region of the Levant and Mesopotamia.</p><p>In Libya, naivety reached new heights after the previous regime’s massive stockpiles of armaments were looted. Virtually no effort was made to disarm rival groups; indeed, different parts of the international community actually armed some of them. Libyan instability spread across the Sahara, making necessary new interventions and international peace operations.</p><p><strong>Lesson 2: Focus on state building first.</strong></p><p>Too often it is said that the task immediately after war is reconstruction, implying a need to pour in money to rebuild houses, bridges and whatever else might have been destroyed by the conflict.</p><p>In fact, the central challenge is nearly always state building. If that succeeds, other tasks will have the possibility of progressing. If it fails, we can be certain that everything else will fail as well.</p><p>From the start, the focus has to be on building a political infrastructure that unites competing forces and ensures some sort of order, and creates a framework for economic governance that promotes jobs and growth.</p><p>The essence of many of the post-conflict situations we are confronted with is often that there is too much nation and too little state. The central task is therefore to build a state that can transcend the differing national agendas — ethnic, cultural, religious — that otherwise risk tearing everything apart.</p><p><strong>Lesson 3: Know what kind of state to build.</strong></p><p>States come in different incarnations, and it is important to establish early on which type of state to build. This requires agreement on a constitutional framework and in many cases trying to resolve up front some of the core issues of the conflict.</p><p>In all of the post-Ottoman area, from Bihać in Bosnia in the north west to Basra by the Gulf in the south east, we have been faced with essentially the same challenge of devising a constitutional framework that can be accepted by different national or cultural groups.</p><p>The key goal of state building is to prevent national disintegration, which, despite extensive efforts since 2003, is now a real possibility in Iraq, with vast implications for the entire region.</p><p>That’s because the Baghdad government now faces a serious crisis of legitimacy for key groups. In any new constitution, different groups must be able to accept that any lasting solution is one that meets the minimum demands of everyone, while not meeting the maximum demands of anyone.</p><p><strong>Lesson 4: Focus early on the preconditions for long-term economic growth.</strong></p><p>While humanitarian issues are always at the forefront, it is dangerous to give them precedence over long-term challenges. There must be an early focus on establishing the conditions most conducive to economic growth. Priority must be given to basics like currency, taxation, and the banking system.</p><p>The fate of sanctioned states merits particularly close attention. Iraq’s strict pre-war sanctions drove many of its entrepreneurs and the middle class into poverty or exile, forcing the population to live on UN-financed and state-supplied food handouts. The country still hasn’t recovered.</p><p>Job creation, and bringing back a vibrant middle class, is the key to long-term stability. Without them, despair and resentment will soon disrupt even the most ambitious state building efforts.</p><p><strong>Lesson 5: Nurture a benevolent regional environment.</strong></p><p>In the Balkans, regime change in Zagreb and Belgrade was the key to improving prospects in Bosnia and Kosovo. Integration with the European Union (EU) has done much to regularise the position of Kosovo.</p><p>In Afghanistan — bridging South and Central Asia — the cooperation of all neighbouring and regional states as a precondition for long-term stability has been belatedly, if too modestly, recognised so-called Istanbul process since 2011.</p><p>In Iraq, the failure to establish a benevolent and coherent regional framework has contributed to the continuation of the conflicts inside the country. With fundamental interests at stake for neighbours like Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, any regional tensions are bound to be reflected inside Iraq. Long-term stability will be elusive until such differences are at least to some extent overcome.</p><p><strong>Lesson 6: The greater the international support, the easier the process.</strong></p><p>As the Balkans showed, if the outside world can’t agree on the terms of a political solution, it is hardly surprising that those fighting can’t either. The war in Syria, soon to enter its sixth year, has tragically illustrated this again. If there is a divided UN Security Council, there is no way to avoid a divided country.</p><p>Some sort of UN framework can help, although it is no guarantee. It is very hard to stand against the legitimacy given by the UN and its Security Council. And the greater the legitimacy of any state-building enterprise, the less there is any need for coercion.</p><p>Building peace is a far more fragile, complex, costly and drawn-out process than fighting a war. Accordingly, a peace coalition normally needs to be much broader than a war coalition.</p><p><strong>Lesson 7: Nation-building takes time and resources.</strong></p><p>As the first high representative in Bosnia, I was told that everything should be concluded within a year. When the folly of this was recognised, a new deadline of two years was declared. Twenty years after the war, there is still a high representative sitting in Sarajevo, with some international actors still believing this is vital to keep the country together.</p><p>Peace building requires an abundance of patience. It also needs resources, from those most able to give them.</p><p>Today around 110,000 people are deployed in UN peacekeeping operations across the world, in addition to EU, NATO and African Union peacekeepers. But the share supplied by European countries has diminished from more than 40 per cent to less than 7 per cent. And the U.S. today provides just 82 persons to all UN peacekeeping operations. We face even larger shortfalls in other critical areas such as administrators, judges, policemen and engineers.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Nation- or state building after conflict remains one of the most complex undertakings the international community can engage itself in. While the bitter experiences of the last decades have discouraged many, there is no doubt that we must prepare ourselves for more of these missions in the future.</p><p>We know how failed and failing states in distant areas can threaten our security: there is the obvious scourge of terrorism; we have again been reminded of the destabilising effects of large refugee flows; and hard drug production is most prevalent in failed states, with their trade routes of death becoming highly destabilising too.</p><p>Ahead of us, at some point in time, lies the task of bringing some sort of stability to the Levant after the civil war in Syria has run its course, the forces of fundamentalism have been defeated and all the international and regional actors have reached a consensus on what needs to be done.</p><p>When that day comes, it will be the mother of all state and peace-building challenges. We must prepare ourselves to meet it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/200/1*NVYeI6HPjWHAa143d-MMBQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/about-the-future-of-conflict-project-7a6129b4725e#.d1rd3gy5k"><em>About The Future of Conflict</em></a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/meet-the-authors-6d41374b1554#.y6z6zzy7l"><em>Learn more about our contributors</em></a></p><p><em>This article represents the view of the individual writer, not that of International Crisis Group or of its Board.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ba07f8daf5e3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/the-seven-lessons-of-state-building-ba07f8daf5e3">The Seven Lessons of State Building</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict">The Future of Conflict</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Rethink Refugee Policy before the Next Emergency]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/rethink-refugee-policy-before-the-next-emergency-975ebbd09f56?source=rss-b8580e8a76e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/975ebbd09f56</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Crisis Group]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2016 16:56:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-04-22T14:54:48.311Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4><strong>By Lord Mark Malloch-Brown, Chairman of the SGO Group and former Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tGFNnAaFv2WM1uLELa3rIg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Refugees and migrants arriving on Lesbos island (Greece) are transferred to Moria refugee camp to register with authorities before they can move on. MAGNUM/Alex Majoli</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*kUY0wbrlihTJRQ4jtaY3JQ.jpeg" /><figcaption><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/meet-the-authors-6d41374b1554#.t7qmqy1qn">Mark Malloch-Brown</a></figcaption></figure><p>Syrians arriving by boat at the end of harrowing — and for some, fatal — journeys have shaped the image of Europe’s refugee crisis. Yet Europe is in the grip of something even bigger — a combined refugee and migrant crisis. So although most of the new refugees are fleeing from a handful of violent conflicts, many recent arrivals are part of a growing, long-term pattern of migration. Over the next decades, the pressures of global demography and inequality could lead to tens of millions, or even more, making the journey to a developed country in search of work and a better life.</p><p>Among the many misfortunes of refugees and migrants today is that they came too soon. Europe has yet to wake up to the fact that Western countries, with ageing populations and dwindling numbers of young, will soon welcome significant numbers of newcomers of working age. Politically, the conversation now is more about the limited resources of host countries rather than the potential value of the people coming in. As European countries begin to understand their own demographic changes, these attitudes will likely transform. This shift is yet to happen in the aftermath of the financial crisis.</p><p>In the meantime, if asylum for refugees is to be preserved and public confidence restored, the refugee and migrant flows need to be treated as separate. For economic migrants, that tragically means much more robust and prompt, although humane, policies of deportation home; hopefully accompanied over time by a more generous visa regime for those whose skills are needed. For Africa, in particular, there needs to be much higher global investment in imaginative and ambitious development strategies which will create good jobs at home. More than a third of the world’s working-age population will be African by the end of this century; the continent currently risks decanting an increasing portion of jobless from its growing population into neighbouring Europe.</p><blockquote>For now, the international community, and Europe in particular, urgently needs to focus on rethinking refugee policy. The crisis in Syria has revealed that the current system, instituted after the First World War, is politically untenable.</blockquote><p>For a long time, Europe has cruised on its refugee history. Generosity in the first half of the century to the victims of Nazism, Stalinism and other ruthless systems made modern Europe, setting both its values and providing the human capital that drove a disproportionate amount of its economic, intellectual and cultural success. Later, smaller-scale but successful resettlement of those driven from their home countries — from the Ugandan Asians expelled by Idi Amin and welcomed into the UK, to the Vietnamese “boat people” who found new homes in France and Germany, among other places — confirmed the win-win proposition. A generous asylum policy that showed respect for international law was rewarded by an injection of remarkable, hard-working arrivals into their new communities. This was an investment that paid off handsomely.</p><p>Today, we are in danger of trashing the moral leadership that Europe has earned over the years. Our exhortations to others to show generosity to refugees sound hollow when we are seen as evading our own responsibilities and — Germany and Sweden apart — accepting derisory numbers of refugees.</p><p>This shabby response is partly because public opinion is alarmed by the violence and chaos associated with Syria and the wider Middle East. Islamophobia is on the rise following the Paris attacks in November and sexual assaults in Cologne on New Year’s Eve. But this sense of panic in the face of a “flood” of refugees is accentuated by the failure of political leaders to demonstrate they have a coherent plan to contain the situation.</p><p>What is needed is a four-part plan that will both address the current crisis and lay the foundations for how future refugee emergencies will be addressed:</p><ol><li><strong>We need much more proactive diplomacy to head off crises before they spin out of control.</strong></li></ol><p>It was this ambition to detect the early warning signs of conflict and to take preventive action that drove the establishment of the International Crisis Group, born out of the Balkans experience. Usually refugees come from just a handful of countries. Currently, Syria is by far the largest driver of population flows, accounting for almost a quarter of all refugees and the largest number of internally displaced persons. But Syrian diplomacy has been a stop-start affair that never seems to grasp the nettle of the conflict — whether that is the future of President Bashar al-Assad or the rise of the Islamic State. That failure is only compounded as Russia and Turkey militarily leap in while a hesitant U.S. and Europe wring their hands. An unaddressed crisis in “faraway” Syria has metastasised into a cancer that eats at the European Union itself.</p><p>Syria now has up to eleven countries indirectly taking part in its civil war. The second and third biggest refugee producers, Afghanistan and Somalia, suffer from similarly internationalised conflicts as proxies and their outside sponsors proliferate. Death and destruction of local communities are the first costs of festering conflict; second are massive outflows of refugees; and the third can be regional or even global stability. Neglect carries a high price.</p><p>2. <strong>Proper support must be provided for countries that bear the brunt of today’s refugee crisis.</strong></p><p>In the context of the Syrian emergency, countries of first asylum include Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey — which together are now home to more than four million refugees. If pledges from the successful Syrian donor conference held in London in February to raise money for these front-line states can be combined with a commitment by the hosts to liberalise work permits and residency requirements to allow long-term stay, we may rebuild a credible asylum policy. And it is true that many refugees would like to remain close to home. Lebanon is hosting over 1.1 million refugees and rising, almost a third of its original population. Turkey currently hosts the largest number of refugees of any one country, and Jordan has also allowed in massive numbers. So support has to be forthcoming in a predictable and sufficient volume from the beginning of a crisis. This should be part of a new codified approach to refugee care along with reciprocal obligations on the host countries to allow refugees to work and integrate. Refugees are no longer short stayers. Rather, the average period of exile across the world’s 60 million refugees is seventeen years.</p><p>3. <strong>Europe must provide direct asylum to refugees.</strong></p><p>Turkey has mixed the generosity of its asylum policies with the bargaining style of the bazaar, raising its price to keep refugees away from Europe itself. This tawdry game of cards is only possible because Europe has sacrificed its moral leadership by closing its doors to refugees and failing even to achieve any real internal burden-sharing. Europe cannot be limited to paying the costs for others to host refugees — it must also include a generous element of direct asylum. Canada, under new Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, has shown this is not a game of numbers (Canada has only offered 25,000 places so far), but rather the character of the offer. Canada’s offer was not made grudgingly under pressure of arriving boats, but out of respect for its international humanitarian obligations. So the moral power of Canada on this issue rides high globally even as Europe’s descends to new depths.</p><p>4. <strong>We need a consistent and compassionate approach to distinguishing between migrants and refugees.</strong></p><p>From a public policy point of view, it remains necessary to separate economic migrants and refugees, though increasingly this is not all that easy considering the interplay of economic failure and political fallout in weak states. A dependable and widely agreed upon system that allays the economic fears of host countries while making sure that no vulnerable people are ever sent back to dangerous situations is essential.</p><p>Part of ensuring this is to share direct asylum across Europe equally and fairly — Sweden and Germany have had to consider a high rate of repatriation in the face of a surge in asylum applications. As long as asylum systems work to consistent standards and are not overwhelmed, they should be able to distinguish between economic migrants and refugees. For now, where job seekers cannot be accommodated, their humane return home is required. With time, and labour shortages, this will look the most ephemeral part of policy, but for the moment it is an indispensable public confidence-builder.</p><p>This new four-step policy has to be fit for purpose not just for Syria but for other refugee emergencies. An axiom of foreign policy regrettably seems to be to act only when a problem arrives at your own doorstep, which is why this crisis that threatens to engulf Europe may be an opportunity to create a more realistic policy framework for the future. This is despite the fact that whatever policy is forged now is likely to be looked back on as strangely xenophobic for an allegedly open world: the migrants who today will fail the test of asylum and be sent home will be tomorrow’s indispensable and youthful addition to an old Europe’s declining workforce. However, the first three steps may be a solid platform for sharing a global responsibility that is not going away.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/200/1*NVYeI6HPjWHAa143d-MMBQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/about-the-future-of-conflict-project-7a6129b4725e#.d1rd3gy5k"><em>About The Future of Conflict</em></a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/meet-the-authors-6d41374b1554#.y6z6zzy7l"><em>Learn more about our contributors</em></a></p><p><em>This article represents the view of the individual writer, not that of International Crisis Group or of its Board.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=975ebbd09f56" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/rethink-refugee-policy-before-the-next-emergency-975ebbd09f56">Rethink Refugee Policy before the Next Emergency</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict">The Future of Conflict</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Flare of the Med]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/the-flare-of-the-med-a523cdfcf4ca?source=rss-b8580e8a76e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a523cdfcf4ca</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mediterranean]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conflict]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Crisis Group]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 04 Feb 2016 11:58:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-04-22T14:55:32.169Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By Cleopatra Kitti, founder of the Mediterranean Growth Initiative</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hkOszpsw_uzCvGWreUaGwg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Outskirts of Misrata (Libya) taken from a commercial airplane. MAGNUM/Michael Christopher Brown</figcaption></figure><figure><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/meet-the-authors-6d41374b1554"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*_aWaiAUnl0Upxqr9Ugxjdg.jpeg" /></a><figcaption>Cleopatra Kitti</figcaption></figure><p>The Mediterranean is the cradle of civilization. Today, a rich maritime history, culture and economy are being threatened by the tentacles of deadly conflict spreading across the region.</p><p>Redrawn borders, proxy fighters, political and economic inequality, instability and corruption, are at the root of uprisings, wars, protests, and forced migration.</p><blockquote>Unless Europe combines diplomacy with economics, matches peace making with governance-conditional aid, and embraces cultural and ethnic diversity on its Mediterranean flank, the region will become utterly engulfed by the crisis. The Mediterranean will move into Europe.</blockquote><p>The twenty countries lining the shores of the Mediterranean are diverse, with about 500 million people spread out over the region. Numbers tell a story. The European Union (EU) Med countries account for close to 80 per cent of the region’s GDP but only 40 per cent of its population. However, for the years to 2020, GDP growth among the region’s EU member states is expected to remain sluggish at around 2 per cent, while in the countries of North Africa and the Levant growth is forecast to be above 4 per cent. It is also indicative that on average, European youth along the Mediterranean currently have more than ten years of formal education, while Mediterranean youth outside Europe have less than seven years of schooling.</p><p>Mediterranean migration has been a chronic issue, but now it is an acute crisis. In 2013, the last year for which definitive data is available, there were 30 million migrants living in the Mediterranean. Nine million of this total originated from another Mediterranean country. More than 15 per cent of the people living in Croatia, Lebanon, Cyprus and Israel are immigrants. Immigrants also make up between 10 to 15 per cent of the population of France, Spain and Italy, three of the largest and richest countries of the Mediterranean.</p><p>However, deteriorating situations in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and the Sahel have resulted in an unprecedented flow of refugees and migrants. The crisis affects the Mediterranean region and beyond, rocking the foundations of the EU.</p><p>Responsibility for solutions lies with those of us in the Mediterranean region, with international actors and in particular with Europe. It requires bold leadership, using economics as an enabler for politics. More importantly it necessitates tolerance of “otherness” to foster collaboration and trust.</p><p>Classicist Nicholas Purcell, in his studies on the Mediterranean, used the term “thalassography” to describe the kind of history in which the sea serves as a “stage” for humanity. “Thalassographies,” Purcell argues, do not have to be about seas themselves but about the movement and connections between people that characterise life on and around the waters. Now, tragically, the Mediterranean Sea serves as a deathbed for those seeking to escape conflict and find sanctuary on the southern shores of Europe.</p><p>From Marseille to Efessos, from Piraeus and Split to Benghazi, Sousse and Tangiers, nomads, crusaders, traders, and artists, all have defined the Mediterranean trajectory and generated links across the world.</p><p>It is in the same pattern — but this time overlaid with the paradigm of conflict — that beliefs and assimilation spread today from the Mediterranean to global communities.</p><p>The international order and nation-state system, in Westphalian terms, are being tested. The Mediterranean — which includes and borders Europe, the Middle East and North Africa — is challenged by holy and sectarian wars. A hundred years on from the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, the map of borders and influence is unravelling. It remains to be seen if and how the Mediterranean, Middle Eastern and North African states will be able to reach a settled concept of international order, how the maps of tribal and political influence will be redrawn, and how any reconfiguration will be accommodated by the world community.</p><p>War fatigue may eventually lead to peace, which weak statesmanship so far has failed to deliver. It is this lack of statesmanship that is shaking Europe, rattles NATO and may draw the U.S. into more Middle Eastern wars.</p><p>Strategies that worked in the past — such as the purchase of tribal loyalties and Western favouritism based primarily on security interests — will not work now in an interconnected world. The emphasis on identity, based on religious and political power, meets the lack of opportunity and crushed dignity of millions of youth around the Mediterranean. Heightened frustration permeates across Arab and Levantine communities as the internet and social media have opened windows to a world that is unattainable for them because of bad politics, tribal ambitions and war.</p><blockquote>The future of the Mediterranean lies in economic opportunity and good governance to ensure individual and social dignity. It is Europe’s responsibility to lead the way forward.</blockquote><p>Europe and the international community can begin by bolstering economic bright spots in the region, such as Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Lebanon. This is the only way to counter the ongoing recruitment of youth by extremists, and to offer a ray of hope.</p><p>It is five years since the Arab uprisings. Nothing much has improved. This January, Tunisian youth again took to the streets to protest the lack of jobs. Egyptian youth, terrorised and disengaged, have lost hope of securing reforms. Syrian children are spending their formative years out of school in camps spread from Jordan to Lebanon and Turkey.</p><p>While traditional diplomacy walks a tight rope to end the conflict in Syria and combat the Islamic State, it is missing a broader strategy to strengthen fragile societies. A range of actions are needed in order to contain extremism, dent radicalism and pave a way for peace making and stability.</p><p>Support from the U.S. and Europe to invest in the private sector in North Africa and the Levant would create jobs, spread skills and expertise, and strengthen capacity in key sectors of new economies. Building infrastructure to connect urban and rural centers would boost Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. It is essential to address the need for health care, access to water, sanitation, housing, and telecommunications. Investments in technology to grow food, cultivate fisheries, process olive oil, and expand citrus groves would support the traditional Mediterranean staples cherished around the world.</p><blockquote>Access to capital and financing must be conditional on good governance, institution building and more equitable sharing of wealth.</blockquote><p>European politicians struggling with sluggish economies as well as migrant flows must see this opportunity as the only future solution for resolving the crisis and opening the door to growth for their big and small corporates.</p><p>From my visits to rural Tunisia and Egypt, the to-do list is simple: bright young people are in need of work, families are in need of basic welfare, local governments are in need of institution building and governance rules that would help deliver jobs. Connecting rural to urban centers allows for access to education and health care. Combine this with European expertise, U.S. and Asian capital structures, and there’s a win-win situation.</p><p>In this new political reality, where no single society has overwhelming power, no leadership is perfectly resilient and no one faith imposes absolute authority, Mediterranean citizenry struggles for survival in varying degrees. South European Mediterranean citizens have redefined survival under the austere circumstances of failing economic policies. North African and Levantine Mediterranean citizens seek to escape war, brutality and poverty. The lack of moral authority and leadership only prolongs the crisis.</p><p>Conflict resolution formulas must be re-engineered. There needs to be a rethink of economics, private sector empowerment, and financing that is conditional on governance and institution-building. There is a need to contextualise risk and redefine opportunity, and a need to focus on the bright spots. Support forces for good, don’t just fight evil. The Mediterranean can demonstrate Europe’s political and economic flair, or it risks flaring up across Europe.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/200/1*NVYeI6HPjWHAa143d-MMBQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/about-the-future-of-conflict-project-7a6129b4725e#.d1rd3gy5k"><em>About The Future of Conflict</em></a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/meet-the-authors-6d41374b1554#.y6z6zzy7l"><em>Learn more about our contributors</em></a></p><p><em>This article represents the view of the individual writer, not that of International Crisis Group or of its Board.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a523cdfcf4ca" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/the-flare-of-the-med-a523cdfcf4ca">The Flare of the Med</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict">The Future of Conflict</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Crutch to Catalyst? The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/crisis-group/crutch-to-catalyst-the-international-commission-against-impunity-in-guatemala-b6d2128b1c3f?source=rss-b8580e8a76e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b6d2128b1c3f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[guatemala]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Crisis Group]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 Jan 2016 14:43:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-01-30T09:55:10.337Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eWPOwIlAkd9c6Tt09Q5sEQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>People hold national flags and a sign reading “I love CICIG (International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala)” as they take part in a demonstration in demand of Guatemalan President Otto Perez’s resignation, in Guatemala City on 22 August 22. AFP/Johan Ordonez</figcaption></figure><h4>Latin America Report N°56 | 28 January 2016</h4><h4>SUMMARY</h4><p><strong>Dramatic changes upended Guatemalan politics in 2015. Forcing the pace were international prosecutors, bolstered in their fight against corruption and impunity by a great wave of support from ordinary citizens. If Guatemala’s national reforms continue when outside help leaves, it can become a true role model for the region.</strong></p><p>Guatemala — one of Latin America’s most violent, unequal and impoverished countries — is enjoying a rare moment of opportunity. A new president, Jimmy Morales, bolstered by a landslide victory, has taken office promising to end corruption. The old political elite is in disarray. Emboldened citizens are pressing for reforms to make justice more effective and government more transparent. Behind these changes is a unique multilateral experiment, the UN-sponsored International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), whose investigators work with national prosecutors to dismantle criminal networks within the state. CICIG is not a permanent fix, however. Guatemala will lose its opportunity unless national leaders assume the fight against impunity as their own, approve stalled justice and security sector reforms and muster the financial resources to strengthen domestic institutions.</p><p>CICIG began operations in 2007 to investigate clandestine security groups that continued to operate within the state following the 1996 accords that ended 36 years of intermittent armed conflict. Such groups still undermine the state, though their main goal now is economic power, not elimination of political opponents. International support and financing guarantee the commission’s independence, though it operates under Guatemalan laws. Unlike traditional capacity-building efforts, it not only trains, but also works side by side with national prosecutors and police, providing them with the necessary technical expertise and political autonomy to hold powerful suspects accountable before the law.</p><p>CICIG has promoted and helped implement legislation to create a witness protection program, tighten gun controls, establish rules for court-ordered wiretaps and asset forfeiture and institute high-risk courts for the trial of particularly dangerous defendants. At the same time, it has carried out complex, high-profile probes that resulted in charges against a former president for embezzlement, an ex-minister and other top security officials for extrajudicial executions and dozens of additional officials and suspected drug traffickers for fraud, illicit association and homicide.</p><figure><a href="https://infogr.am/grafico_4-6781314"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/387/1*N_wNPSPQ_ktsKRWEGARUgA.png" /></a><figcaption>Guatemala has slowly but constantly achieved decreases in its rates of homicidal violence since 2009. It is leaving the ultra-violent levels of its neighbours in the Northern Triangle trying to join another group of neighbors with more moderate levels of violence. CRISIS GROUP</figcaption></figure><p>The commission has faced significant setbacks and limitations, however. Some high-profile cases have ended in acquittal. Key reforms, such as a judicial career law, have stalled in Congress. While it has helped strengthen certain specialised prosecutorial units, the public prosecutor’s office remains overstretched, even absent, in much of the country. Other institutions essential for combatting impunity — notably the civilian police and judiciary — are still weak, vulnerable to corruption and largely unaccountable.</p><p>The most dramatic blows it has delivered against impunity came in 2015 with the arrest of almost 200 officials for corruption, including a multi-million dollar scheme to defraud customs. Working with national prosecutors, CICIG collected and analysed massive amounts of evidence. The evidentiary trail, according to prosecutors, led to President Otto Pérez Molina, who resigned (though denying any criminal activity) and now awaits trial in a military prison.</p><p>Much of CICIG’s recent success is due to the determination and persistence of its current commissioner, Iván Velásquez, a jurist known for uncovering the links between politicians and paramilitary structures in his native Colombia. CICIG cannot function, however, without the close collaboration and support of Guatemalan prosecutors. Very different attorneys general — Claudia Paz y Paz, a former human rights activist, and Thelma Aldana, a veteran jurist — have shown the independence and courage to pursue complex, controversial cases against powerful suspects.</p><p>A crucial ingredient is popular support. Both the commission and public prosecutors enjoy wide approval among citizens exhausted by violent crime and corruption. The investigations spawned a broad civic movement for justice reform and government transparency. In a country long polarised by ideological, economic and ethnic differences, the anti-corruption crusade has at least temporarily united groups ranging from business associations to labour unions, urban professionals to indigenous leaders.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MDxe04ebl734XIR9Lr2LHA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Guatemalan presidential candidate for National Convergence Front Jimmy Morales addresses the media at his campaign headquarters in Guatemala City, 6 September 2015. REUTERS/Jorge Dan Lopez</figcaption></figure><p>Anger over government fraud holds this movement together, rather than any clear agenda for change. Elected leaders should channel discontent into positive action by initiating a national debate on the reforms needed to strengthen justice and encourage accountability. Morales, a former television comedian, campaigned as the anti-politician. He has yet to put forward a clear reform program, including new legislation to guarantee the independence of judges and prosecutors, toughen campaign-financing laws and create honest, professional civilian police. Moreover, a weak, underfunded state needs to enact fiscal and tax reforms so that its justice institutions have the resources needed to pay good salaries, provide decent working conditions and extend their coverage across the country.</p><p>CICIG’s mandate ends in September 2017, though the president wisely has proposed extending it. International assistance cannot last indefinitely, however. The commission is Guatemala’s best opportunity for genuine justice reform, and it should not be wasted, but the government must start planning for its departure by fortifying its own capacity to fight crime and corruption.</p><h4><em>RECOMMENDATIONS</em></h4><p><em>To translate anticorruption promises into clear action plans and prepare for the time when CICIG is no longer needed</em></p><p><strong>To the Guatemalan government:</strong></p><ol><li>Promote, adopt and implement legislation and policies to further professionalise prosecutors and judges, including reform of the selection and recruitment process, longer terms to guarantee independence and new mechanisms to evaluate performance and curb corruption.</li><li>Revive efforts to transform the civilian police into professional forces focused on preventing violence and to revamp its investigative body to work with prosecutors on resolving crimes, including the transfer of capacities and knowledge from CICIG.</li><li>Give police, prosecutors and judges more resources to fight crime and impunity by carrying through tax and fiscal reform, including by challenging private sector leaders, economic experts and civil society to devise proposals for making taxing and spending more efficient, equitable and transparent.</li></ol><p><strong>To the Guatemalan Congress:</strong></p><ol><li>Work across party lines and with the president and civil society to devise a strategy, including tax and fiscal reform, for combating corruption and strengthening justice and security institutions.</li><li>Schedule promptly a final vote on the bill to reform political parties and tighten campaign-financing rules.</li><li>Reconvene the working group on justice reform, bringing lawmakers together with CICIG, judges and civil society to propose and debate initiatives to strengthen judicial independence and competence, as well as whether or how to limit the prosecutorial immunity of members of Congress and other public officials.</li></ol><p><strong>To the Guatemalan judiciary:</strong></p><ol><li>Provide additional training for judges at all levels on use of criminal analysis, scientific evidence and new prosecutorial tools, such as plea-bargaining with defendant/informants.</li><li>Work with the president, Congress and civil society on the career law and other initiatives to make the judiciary more independent and professional.</li></ol><p><strong>To the Guatemalan Public Ministry (MP) and CICIG:</strong></p><ol><li>Expand cooperation to transfer capacities to specialised prosecutors working on complex cases, such as those investigating organised crime, money laundering and human trafficking.</li><li>Strengthen the MP’s internal affairs office to identify, sanction or remove officials guilty of misconduct.</li><li>Work jointly on a strategy to build a professional corps of investigative police.</li><li>Promote accountability within the MP and CICIG by devising measurable goals and benchmarks.</li></ol><p><strong>To the U.S., European Union and its member states and other donor states and institutions:</strong></p><ol><li>Continue to provide CICIG with the resources needed to conclude its work, including additional funds for capacity building.</li><li>Encourage other countries struggling with corruption and violence to consider an appropriate version of the CICIG international/national partnership model.</li></ol><p><strong>Guatemala City/Bogotá/Brussels, 28 January 2016</strong></p><figure><a href="http://cdn.knightlab.com/libs/timeline3/latest/embed/index.html?source=1KZUykbPubzkmrvVXnMMjfTVP9G0Rjhd0iyUq6DbyXwg&amp;font=Rufina-Sintony&amp;lang=en&amp;initial_zoom=2&amp;height=650"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oUSZN1h2aWWOdxqtu458HA.png" /></a><figcaption><a href="http://cdn.knightlab.com/libs/timeline3/latest/embed/index.html?source=1KZUykbPubzkmrvVXnMMjfTVP9G0Rjhd0iyUq6DbyXwg&amp;font=Rufina-Sintony&amp;lang=en&amp;initial_zoom=2&amp;height=650">Use our interactive timeline</a> to explore the developments leading to CICIG’s creation, its impact and the dramatic events of 2015.</figcaption></figure><h4>I. INTRODUCTION</h4><p>Guatemalan democracy survived political earthquakes in 2015. Investigations into massive fraud at the customs agency and social security institute ensnared nearly 200 suspects, including top officials and business people. Wiretaps and other evidence led prosecutors to Vice President Roxana Baldetti, then President Otto Pérez Molina, both now in prison <a href="http://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/justicia/mp-pedira-cese-de-funciones-de-perez-molina">awaiting conspiracy and fraud trials</a>. Prosecutors in separate probes have charged judges with accepting bribes, lawmakers with hiring phantom employees and politicians with violating campaign rules. All this sparked an anti-corruption social movement, as protestors poured into the streets to demand justice, and took place during an election campaign in which voters unexpectedly elected Jimmy Morales, a political outsider, by a landslide.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AFtuMGjJNhl957K0AeuHWA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Former President Otto Pérez Molina. REUTERS/Jorge Dan Lopez</figcaption></figure><p>The catalyst for these changes is a unique multilateral experiment: the UN-sponsored, donor-funded International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG, for its Spanish initials). Created in 2007 to combat powerful clandestine networks that had penetrated state institutions, it is empowered to initiate and conduct investigations in cooperation with national prosecutors. Under the leadership of Iván Velásquez, formerly an investigating magistrate with the Colombian Supreme Court, and in collaboration with Attorney General Thelma Aldana, it has enabled Guatemala to do more, more quickly to combat corruption than any other country in the region.</p><p>But CICIG and the public prosecutor’s office cannot transform Guatemala without political support for further legal and institutional change. In his 14 January inaugural speech, President Morales asked the public to stay united against corruption, which he promised <a href="http://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/politica/discurso-de-jimmy-morales-en-frases">his government would “not tolerate”</a>. He has been vague about his policies, however. Whether he has the political will and influence to push reforms through a divided Congress remains unclear.</p><p>This report explores CICIG’s unique justice sector reform model, analysing achievements, setbacks and challenges. It looks first at its evolution under three very different commissioners, then examines the 2015 cases that shook the political system and the social movement they generated. Finally, it discusses the reforms needed to sustain progress. Research in Guatemala (April 2015-January 2016), included more than 40 interviews with officials, analysts and activists.</p><h4>II. <strong>CICIG’S EVOLVING MISSION</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2hV94H6zp6an9YIr43yEkA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Valerie Julliand from the UN, President Jimmy Morales, President of the Supreme Court of Justice Rojas, Former President of Guatemala Alejandro Maldonado, General Attorney Thelam Aldana and Head of CICIG Iván Velásquez. Flickr/US Embassy</figcaption></figure><p>CICIG emerged to address unfulfilled promises of the 1996 peace accords that ended Guatemala’s 36-year armed conflict. Among the agreements negotiated during a lengthy, internationally monitored peace process was a commitment to dismantle the clandestine CIACS (Cuerpos Ilegales y Aparatos Clandestinos de Seguridad), illegal groups directed by former or current members of the military, intelligence and police forces. After debate over the type of intervention and under pressure from civil society, the government finally signed an agreement in 2006 with the UN that created a unique hybrid mechanism: an international investigative commission operating under Guatemalan law.</p><p>While the commission’s principal mission is to break up CIACS, it has other important attributes. It can publish reports on issues relevant to its mandate and recommend policy reforms; request that the government act to protect witnesses and victims; and denounce public employees who interfere with its work before administrative authorities, participating as a third party in disciplinary proceedings. It also has an important capacity-building function. CICIG is financially and politically independent of the government, depending on donors for its expenses. The UN Secretary-General names the commissioner, who chooses his own staff, though Guatemala’s president can decide whether to extend its mandate.</p><p>CICIG’s influence depends largely on perceptions of its leaders. The commissioners are its public face and subject to intense media scrutiny. The three it has had — Carlos Castresana, Francisco Dall’Anese and Iván Velásquez — have defined and approached the CIACS issue with different priorities and methods. Two attorneys general from different backgrounds have worked closely with it since 2010, though this has not always been the case with judges.</p><p><strong>A. Consolidation and Controversy</strong></p><ol><li><em>Carlos Castresana</em></li></ol><p><a href="http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2011/10/07/biografiaeldebate/1318007019_970335.html">CICIG began in September 2007 under a Spanish jurist known for high-profile domestic corruption investigations</a> and the case against ex-Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.</p><blockquote>He started it “from nothing. There was no structure, no system”, said a former CICIG consultant. “Without Castresana, CICIG would never have been implemented”, said a veteran human rights activist.</blockquote><p><a href="http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/2015/COM_085_20151113_VIII.pdf">During his almost three years, he hired staff and negotiated establishment of a special prosecutor’s office within the Public Ministry</a> (MP for its Spanish initials). This office is the crucial link with the legal system, <a href="http://“Convenio%20de%20Cooperación%20Bilateral%20entre%20el%20Ministerio%20Público%20y%20la%20Comisión%20Internacional%20Contra%20la%20Impunidad%20en%20Guatemala-CICIG”,%2029%20February%202008.">litigating in court and processing requests for search or arrest warrants, witness summons and other legal instruments</a>.</p><p><a href="http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/informes/INFOR-LABO_DOC02_20090901_ES.pdf">Under Castresana, CICIG championed reforms that have given prosecutors essential tools to enhance criminal prosecution and combat organised crime</a>, including legal wiretaps and use of “defendant-informants”, which allows them to negotiate for information. It helped set up the first witness protection program, in collaboration with Colombian prosecutors and the U.S. Marshals Service, and promoted legislation on high-risk criminal proceedings.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F5nb5FojaQyM%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D5nb5FojaQyM&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F5nb5FojaQyM%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/a8479f89c9dd16dcface04d16ed902ab/href">https://medium.com/media/a8479f89c9dd16dcface04d16ed902ab/href</a></iframe><p>During its first three years, the commission also assisted <a href="http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/informes/INFOR-LABO_DOC05_20100901_ES.pdf">investigations of drug-related killings and of a former president for embezzlement</a>. Its most notorious case involved a Guatemalan lawyer, Rodrigo Rosenberg, who staged (or was manipulated into staging) his own murder to discredit the president.<a href="http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/04/04/a-murder-foretold"> It sparked protests that threatened to bring down the Colom government</a>, until CICIG’s investigation used cell-phone records, security-camera footage and other evidence to show that Rosenberg had plotted his own death. It was one of the first cases to use plea-bargaining (defendant/informant testimony). It was, presiding judges later said, <a href="http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/2010/COM-025-20101103-DOC01-ES.pdf">“unlike any other in Guatemala’s history … using scientific and technical methods of investigation to solve a crime”</a>.</p><p><a href="http://elpais.com/diario/2010/10/24/domingo/1287892354_850215.html">Castresana’s term ended in controversy.</a> He clashed with President Colom over appointment of Conrado Reyes as attorney general, accusing him of ties to organised crime. <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/10299442">(Reyes denied the allegations)</a>. The Constitutional Court annulled the appointment on procedural grounds, but after Castresana had resigned.</p><blockquote>“Nothing of what was promised [by the state] is being fulfilled”, he said later. <a href="http://noticias.com.gt/nacionales/20100607-renuncia-carlos-castresana-jefe-de-la-cicig.html">“At a personal level I feel I can do nothing more for Guatemala. I am more useful outside than in”</a>.</blockquote><p><em>2. Francisco Dall’Anese</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*akTWtV1flpjbjzY0PoIXmQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Francisco Dall Anese. Flickr/Presidencia de Guatemala, Paulo Raquec</figcaption></figure><p>The UN Secretary-General named Francisco Dall’Anese, former Costa Rican attorney general, as Castresana’s successor in June 2010, within weeks of his resignation. <a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/latin-america/36%20Learning%20to%20Walk%20without%20a%20Crutch%20---%20The%20International%20Commission%20Against%20Impunity%20in%20Guatemala">His tenure coincided with that of Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz</a>, a prominent human rights lawyer chosen after the Reyes debacle. CICIG’s major achievement from 2010 to 2013 was helping to professionalise the MP under Paz y Paz’s leadership. The new attorney general expanded the criminal analysis unit, building databases capable of accessing police records, vehicle registrations and telephone and video information. <a href="http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/2013/COM-045-20130822-DOC01-EN.pdf">The objective was to cross-reference evidence in order to identify and dismantle criminal structures</a>, not just individuals.</p><p>CICIG lent experts to work directly with prosecutors on money laundering and financial analysis, while advising on creation of specialised units, such as one dealing with human trafficking. <a href="http://www.mineduc.gob.gt/portal/documents/memoriaLabores/Memoria_de_labores_2013.pdf">It also strengthened the “Special Methods Unit”</a>, which oversaw communications intercepts and was credited with preventing 231 murders in 2013 alone, and created and monitored protocols for the fledgling witness protection program, <a href="http://www.mineduc.gob.gt/portal/documents/memoriaLabores/Memoria_de_labores_2013.pdf">which provided security, social assistance and/or relocation benefits</a>. Though these joint efforts may not generate headlines, they are among CICIG’s most important contributions and laid the groundwork for collaboration with the MP on the corruption cases of 2015.</p><blockquote>“There is no better way to transfer capacity than by working within the prosecutor’s office on a daily basis”, said the head of the MP’s special office against impunity. “It’s also sharing capacity, because CICIG has learned from us too”.</blockquote><p>By September 2012, CICIG had investigated and/or charged more than 200 individuals, but its setbacks often received more publicity than its achievements. Perhaps the biggest blow came in 2011, when judges <a href="http://www.ticotimes.net/2011/05/10/ex-guatemala-president-found-not-guilty-of-embezzling-millions-from-government">acquitted former President Portillo of embezzling $15 million from the defence ministry</a>. CICIG asserted that prosecutors had presented “conclusive” evidence and urged society <a href="http://www.cicig.org/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&amp;cntnt01articleid=103&amp;cntnt01returnid=67">to demand “an impartial, fair and independent justice system”</a>.</p><p>CICIG ran into more opposition over its investigation into the killings of seven inmates during an operation to take control of Pavón prison. Prosecutors accused the government minister, the national prison director and top police, among others, of extrajudicial executions. <a href="http://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/11/15/56479d69268e3ee6518b45f3.html">The courts convicted the head of the investigative police but acquitted the former prison director</a>. Other defendants, including the government minister, fled the country. In its annual report, CICIG cited the “double standards” of a judicial system that quickly convicted gang members while allowing the “master-minds of extrajudicial killings” to avoid punishment through “frivolous or inadmissible” petitions. “Most of the cases investigated by CICIG are currently stagnant”, it stated, <a href="http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/2012/COM-067-20120911-DOC02-EN.pdf.">“due to a number of legal remedies that prevent criminal prosecutions from continuing”</a>.</p><p>To address judicial malfeasance, CICIG issued a report accusing eighteen magistrates of decisions “contrary to the law … and favourable to criminal networks”. <a href="http://www.cicig.org/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&amp;cntnt01articleid=306&amp;cntnt01returnid=67">However, nothing reached a court</a>. Dall’Anese fuelled further controversy with a CICIG statement on the trial of former dictator Efrain Ríos Montt for genocide and war crimes during the armed conflict in the 1980s. It was neutral on the merits but called for a halt to a media campaign against the process and reportedly infuriated President Pérez Molina, who had publicly repudiated the genocide charges. A month later Dall’Anese, in conflict with both the judicial and executive branches, announced he would leave in September 2013 for “personal reasons”.</p><p><strong>B. Targeting Corruption — Iván Velásquez</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*u_V1bTsuGSFAZtEV2HgNMA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Iván Velásquez. Flickr/US Embassy Guatemala</figcaption></figure><p>When the UN Secretary-General announced appointment of the new commissioner in August 2013, CICIG’s future was in doubt. Some supporters saw it as weakened and complained it spent too much time and resources on relatively minor cases and had failed to win some major ones, such as that against ex-President Portillo. Pérez Molina made clear his opposition to extension of the mandate, which would expire in September 2015, and told reporters CICIG should “transfer capacities to Guatemalan institutions” rather than opening new investigations.</p><p>The new commissioner, Iván Velásquez, was uniquely qualified to investigate political corruption, however. As an investigating judge on Colombia’s Supreme Court, he had probed the links between politicians and paramilitaries. Unlike his predecessors, he came from a violence-wracked country where powerful criminal groups had penetrated the state.</p><p>“It was easier for Velásquez to understand the social dynamic in Guatemala because it was very similar to what he lived through in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s”, said an expert on security and justice reform.</p><blockquote>He understood the “type of criminal he was dealing with because he had seen it before”, said an ex-prosecutor and government ministry adviser. He also understood the political implications, “that these cases would grow into a snow ball that no one would be able to stop”.</blockquote><p>Velásquez focused on five priorities: contraband, administrative corruption, illegal campaign financing, judicial corruption and drug trafficking/money laundering. He maintained that CIACs had become conspiracies to secure and exercise power by economic means and called them RPEIs (Spanish initials for Illicit Political-Economic Networks). “Our objectives did not change”, he said. <a href="http://Crisis Group interview, Iván Velásquez, Commissioner, CICIG, Guatemala City, 11 November 2015.">“The CIACs changed. The RPEIs are their updated version”</a>. This conceptual revision allows case selection based on a strategy to erode impunity’s economic underpinnings.</p><p>In his first two years, Velásquez and the MP delivered blows against criminal conspiracies in each priority area. In September 2014, <a href="http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/bishops-killer-rain-prison-crime-ring-in-guatemala">investigators dismantled an extortion ring allegedly led by Byron Lima</a>, an ex-army captain imprisoned for a role in the 1998 assassination of Bishop Juan Gerardi. Prosecutors accused him and accomplices (including the national prisons director) of selling protection and favours, including transfers, cell phones and conjugal visits. Two months later, <a href="http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/justicia/haroldo_mendoza-morales-izabal-despojo_de_tierras_0_1297670338">a CICIG investigation led to the arrest of Haroldo Mendoza</a>, reputedly a leader of one of the most powerful drug trafficking families, for operating a “private army” in eastern Guatemala and responsibility for multiple homicides, disappearances, land theft and other crimes. In both cases, CICIG said it was going after “parallel” powers: criminal syndicates that had taken over state institutions.</p><p><a href="http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/2015/COM_085_20151113_VIII.pdf">Under Velásquez, CICIG has investigated nine members of Congress, five judges and a prosecutor</a>. Among the alleged crimes uncovered are schemes to falsify passports and sell “ghost jobs” in Congress and illegal enrichment through bribes. CICIG also issued a report on illegal campaign financing. Its most prominent case, however, was an investigation into customs fraud that became a scandal that brought down a president and ignited an unprecedented social movement.</p><h4>III. SCANDAL AND PROTEST</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gzqaSHtBKXDzXm8vbAAKag.jpeg" /><figcaption>Aerial view during a protest against Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina and Vice President Roxana Baldetti for the recent corruption cases in the government, in Guatemala City, 25 April 2015. AFP/ CARLOS ALONZO</figcaption></figure><p><strong>A. &quot;La Línea&quot;</strong></p><p>On 16 April 2015, CICIG and the MP revealed that they were investigating a network of senior officials who had allegedly conspired to defraud the state of customs revenues. Early that morning 21 suspects were arrested, including the current and former heads of the superintendency of tax administration (SAT). Juan Carlos Monzón, private secretary to Vice President Roxana Baldetti, was accused of orchestrating the fraud; he was abroad when the arrests were announced and remained a fugitive for almost six months. CICIG and the special prosecutor’s office had been investigating for more than eight months, collecting massive evidence, including financial records, some 66,000 intercepted telephone conversations and more than 6,000 electronic messages. Other CICIG-trained offices also took part: the special methods of the investigation unit did wiretaps and the criminal analysis unit worked with CICIG’s foreign experts to process evidence, including analysis of financial documents. This gave prosecutors physical and scientific evidence, a break with practices that had relied largely on witness testimony or confessions.</p><figure><a href="http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Timeline-the-Final-Days-of-Guatemalan-Presidents-Government-20150903-0008.html%22"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*SNahrvGaMsjhbPQLHMtGCA.jpeg" /></a><figcaption>(L-R) Roxana Baldetti, Otto Perez Molina and Juan Carlos Monzon, Baldetti’s private secretary. TeleSur.</figcaption></figure><p>The inquiry had started nearly a year earlier, when investigators began to suspect that a group of importers was conspiring with customs agents to secure illegal discounts on duties. <a href="https://prezi.com/l5mmrkm_vfn4/aduanas/">Prosecutors dubbed the case “La Línea” for the phone line used to negotiate illegal benefits and kickbacks</a>. According to prosecutors, conspirators manipulated shifts so that agents participating in the fraud were in certain ports or border crossings at specific times. Customs supervisors used a parallel tax table to determine the duties owed by their “clients” after fraudulent verification of their containers’ contents. CICIG maintained, moreover, that the plot extended beyond the SAT, that other officials instructed customs agents how to deploy personnel, apply fake duties and collect bribes.</p><p><a href="http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/even-with-mandate-renewed-cicig-will-not-save-guatemala">The arrests forced the president, who had opposed extending CICIG’s mandate despite international pressure, to make an about-face</a>. Revelations about possibly massive fraud within the customs agency touched a nerve, uniting civil society groups across the political spectrum.</p><blockquote><a href="http://Crisis Group interview, Luis Mack, researcher/professor, Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), Guatemala City, 27 May 2015.">“It’s an issue [about which] no one feels divided into left and right”, said a sociologist. “No one is likely to openly defend the corrupt”</a>.</blockquote><p>Powerful interests lined up behind CICIG. The Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations (CACIF, an umbrella body of the main business groups), which had been critical of the commission,<a href="http://www.estrategiaynegocios.net/lasclavesdeldia/833154-330/importante-se%C3%B1al-empresarios-guatemaltecos-piden-continuaci%C3%B3n-de-cicig"> joined longtime supporters including the Catholic Church and human rights organisations in calling for CICIG to stay</a>. A justice-sector panel (previously viewed as likely to oppose or condition any renewal) <a href="http://www.s21.com.gt/nacionales/2015/04/22/unanimidad-recomiendan-ampliar-mandato-cicig">also issued a favourable report</a>. Two days later, the president said he would ask the UN for a new two-year mandate, beginning in September 2015.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f0lJZ8FIU6bX-FSgeqHf3w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Former vice president of Guatemala Roxana Baldetti is put behind bars, 21 August 2015. YouTube/Publinews Guatemala</figcaption></figure><p>La Línea was a game changer. The case not only assured CICIG’s future; it also exposed allegedly historic patterns of corruption. “The structures of customs fraud arrested today”, Velásquez said, “have operated since the Moreno network”, referring to a conspiracy to defraud customs allegedly directed by ex-military officers in the 1990s. According to CICIG, these networks <a href="https://prezi.com/l5mmrkm_vfn4/aduanas/?utm_campaign=share&amp;utm_medium=copy.">“moved between the public and private realms, between governmental and entrepreneurial domains, between licit and illicit grounds”</a>. The scandal also reached the judiciary. Prosecutors later accused the judge in charge of the case of releasing six suspects from pre-trial detention on bail in exchange for bribes. Powerful defence lawyers working for “law firms of impunity” (<em>bufetes de la impunidad</em>), <a href="http://bdc.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20150508/pais/12217/Espionaje-telef%C3%B3nico-detecta-%E2%80%9Cbufetes-de-la-impunidad%E2%80%9D-tras-fianzas-otorgadas-por-jueza-a-La-L%C3%ADnea.htm">CICIG said, were colluding with judges to subvert justic</a>e. Wiretaps detected the allegedly illegal negotiations.</p><p>Over the next months, CICIG and the MP continued to uncover apparent administrative, judicial and Congressional corruption. In May, prosecutors announced seventeen arrests linked to a scheme to defraud the national social security institute (IGSS) by awarding, in return for kickbacks, a $15 million kidney dialysis treatment contract to a firm without adequate experience, possibly contributing to thirteen deaths. The arrested included IGSS board members, such as the president of the central bank and President Pérez Molina’s ex-private secretary.</p><p>As cases multiplied — including separate investigations involving a prosecutor, judges and lawmakers — citizens began to look forward to “CICIG Thursdays” (#juevesdeCICIG), <a href="http://www.s21.com.gt/nacionales/2015/07/17/uhoy-jueves-cicig-se-populariza-redes">when the commission was expected to lob another judicial bombshell.</a> A new wave of activists, unburdened by memories of repression and radicalism that had shaped their elders’ politics, took their demands to the streets.</p><p><strong>B. The Civic Awakening</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mvCWEhADpTOXOcuGQ-5Mrw.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bWBSNR6Lynk_JTicztyEzQ.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*T7pAsBJvNbaZmE_VP7cJmA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OT0r39BPrA1hU-Y7RdchQg.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Mg2Pzog8wsa3acz_u_Di3g.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fsj1_jlCOjKMC2nfU7zpxQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Protesters gather at Guatemala’s Metropolitan Cathedral. Crisis Group/Arturo Matute</figcaption></figure><p>The customs case produced indignation and support for CICIG. The magnitude of the fraud — prosecutors said each conspirator may have received up to $5 million a year — mobilised citizens long infuriated by corruption but powerless to confront it. Activists soon began gathering in the capital’s Constitution Plaza to demand an end to impunity and “punishment for the thieves”.</p><blockquote>Tweeting #<em>RenunciaYa!</em> (Resign now!), they called for a peaceful protest on 25 April. Several thousand people, including students, middle class professionals, indigenous and human rights advocates — demanded that the vice president leave.</blockquote><p>Her resignation two weeks later, far from deflating the movement, helped fuel weekly Saturday protests. On 16 May, more than 40,000 demanded that the president resign — <em>Otto te toca</em> (Otto it’s your turn) — along with other corrupt politicians. By early June, the tag was #<em>JusticiaYa!</em>, as demonstrators called for the trial of corrupt politicians, officials and the business people who paid them off. Protests spread to regional capitals, Quetzaltenango, Cobán, Chiquimula, Huehuetenango, Escuintla and others.</p><p>The high point came in August, after prosecutors announced they were arresting ex-Vice President Baldetti and petitioning for withdrawal of the president’s immunity. Students and other activists called for a general strike to demand Pérez Molina’s resignation. Breweries and other factories suspended operations; shops and restaurants, including large fast-food chains — from Guatemalan-owned Pollo Campero to international franchises like MacDonald’s — shut their doors. CACIF urged members to allow employees to attend the demonstrations, reversing its opposition to any disruption of transit or commerce. Tens of thousands came to Constitution Plaza on 27 August, while thousands more gathered in regional capitals, summoned now by the tag #<em>NoTengoPresidente</em> (I don’t have a president).</p><p><strong>C. The New Generation</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mQFSmAgz_yM1qldwMH5Cog.png" /><figcaption>Crisis Group’s Guatemala Analyst Arturo Matute explained to the media the political crisis when the protests sparked. Al Jazeera</figcaption></figure><p>For those who lived through military governments and the armed conflict, the peaceful protests were unprecedented. There had been nothing like it “since 1962”, said a security consultant, referring to protests against the then-military government’s electoral fraud, which ended in repression. The 2015 protests were massive, peaceful and non-partisan. Protestors condemned corruption without waving party banners. Perhaps most importantly, the organisers were largely young and unknown. “There was a bit of everything at the plaza”, said a human rights leader, “but the leadership was young. It began with social media and came together naturally”. “Finally the new post-conflict generations are emerging”, said an academic. They don’t share our generation’s fear of speaking out”.</p><blockquote>Though the protests took place during an election campaign, “there were no platforms and no microphones for politicians”.</blockquote><p>Organisers banned masked or hooded protestors, as possible provocateurs. Instead of avoiding police cameras, some youths mugged for them and publicised their participation through social media. Volunteers kept order and collected trash at the end of each rally.</p><p>Established but somewhat dormant coalitions joined, demanding that the anti-corruption crusade also address electoral and institutional reform. The Group of Four (G4, representing the Catholic and Evangelical Churches, the human rights ombudsman and San Carlos, the public university) called for a “citizen’s coalition” to push for electoral reforms to address a “crisis of legitimacy”. Business associations voiced support for CICIG and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), <a href="http://elperiodico.com.gt/2015/07/18/pais/el-cacif-apoya-al-tse-y-le-preocupan-acciones-de-lider/">calling for strict enforcement of electoral rules</a>. On the left, the Social and Popular Assembly, indigenous, peasant farmer and human rights groups, demanded that authorities suspend the vote until reforms guaranteed the participation of native peoples, women and youth. Though the authorities did not postpone the vote, the groups did not disrupt the campaign, which, despite the upheaval, was less violent than those in 2011 and 2007.</p><p>On 2 September, Pérez Molina resigned, after Congress withdrew his immunity. Four days later, TV comedian Jimmy Morales eliminated the favourite, Manuel Baldizón, in the presidential election’s first round. The protestors had won their main objective, to oust the president and force him to face trial. Until the general strike, Congress seemed unlikely to desert the president, who sought support from former adversaries in the opposition. The defiance of a broad spectrum of citizens put the political elite on the defensive; the peaceful nature of the protests helped avert any violent response by security forces. The movement also set a precedent that political leaders are unlikely to forget.</p><blockquote>“The population has a short fuse” regarding corruption, said a former vice president. “Citizens in general are not going to give the new government six months or even 100 days of grace”.</blockquote><p><strong>D. New President, Same System</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*T4Qdnlu2DmUcgH3eob0HOw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Television comedian Jimmy Morales stood against Guatemala’s former first lady Sandra Torres in a presidential run-off election on 25 October. Crisis Group/guatemalaelecciones.com</figcaption></figure><p>Morales defeated former first lady Sandra Torres in the run-off on 25 October, 67 per cent to 33 per cent. It worked to his advantage that he ran as the candidate of a small, relatively unknown party: his better-financed opponents led parties under investigation for violating electoral law. Scandal-weary voters were <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/tv-comedian-former-businessman-lead-guatemalan-election-1441597400">“searching for a political virgin, and that virgin is Jimmy Morales”, said a commentator</a>. Rather than a vote for a candidate or platform, the election was a rejection of politics as usual. “The vote for Jimmy was anti-Baldizón in the first round and anti-Sandra Torres in the second-round”, said the political scientist.</p><blockquote>With Pérez Molina’s resignation and a relative unknown to take office, the reform movement seemed to lose steam. “The elections were the perfect way to oxygenate the system so there could be changes but no real change”, said the consultant.</blockquote><p>Whether new lawmakers, without the pressure of popular protests, would take up the reform agenda was unclear. Congress was divided into more than a dozen blocs, as the members of defeated parties changed affiliation. The president-elect’s lack of experience or pro-gram <a href="http://blog.crisisgroup.org/latin-america/2015/10/05/guatemalas-electoral-dramas/">left some reformers wondering whether they had won the battle to oust a president but lost the struggle for genuine change</a>. Morales’s ties to military veterans of the armed conflict, including opponents of justice for victims, moreover, made human rights defenders uneasy.</p><p>Some reformers worry anger at an unpopular president, not institutional change, motivated the movement. The public “is fascinated by images of a president and vice president arrested for corruption”, said an economist and analyst. “Structural changes interest them very little”. United by indignation, protestors are deeply divided on policy. The movement’s “interclass” nature is not necessarily a strength, said a sociologist. “The sectors don’t trust each other”. A largely conservative society’s distrust of government may also hinder action. The economist called the citizen awakening “very questionable”, simply reflecting “antagonism toward the state and taxes”. For the human rights activist, the question was “whether [young activists] recognise the need to organise for political change, which is very different from organising a demonstration”.</p><p>Ultimately, however, the protests also seem to show consensus for more accountability.</p><blockquote>“Society”, as the consultant said, “is more vigilant, more aware, more critical, more willing to protest. The people might not take to the streets in demonstrations as massive, but the candle is still lit”. Guatemalans are unlikely to return to passivity.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HFhmMZA5IaVaOqQAhw0WbQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Guatemala Congress withdraws immunity Otto Perez Molina. YouTube/TeleSur</figcaption></figure><h4>IV. UNFINISHED AGENDA</h4><p>CICIG begins 2016 from a position of unprecedented strength, at least in terms of popular approval. According to an August 2015 poll, it is Guatemala’s most trusted institution, with a positive rating of 66 per cent, slightly above the evangelical protestant and Roman Catholic churches (both 64 per cent), and well above the army (50 per cent). <a href="http://www.estrategiaynegocios.net/lasclavesdeldia/868160-330/cicig-instituci%C3%B3n-mejor-valorada-por-guatemaltecos-presidencia-la-peor">Its prestige outstrips that of police (26 per cent), judges (25 per cent), Congress (12 per cent) and the presidency (11 per cent)</a>.</p><p>But CICIG cannot fulfil its mandate alone. It depends on other institutions. National prosecutors are in charge of some 30 CICIG court cases, with success depending not only on evidence, but also ability to manoeuvre in a judicial system that does not shield judges from political pressure and gives defence attorneys tools to delay sentencing indefinitely. Moreover, that system, and government institutions generally, face severe budget pressures in a country with one of the hemisphere’s lowest tax collection rates. CICIG and its allies must convince Congress to pass adequate budgets and act on legal reforms, some stalled for years. If powerful business interests continue to block fiscal and tax reforms, prosecutors, judges and police will neither enjoy the safeguards to work efficiently and honestly, free from political (or criminal) pressure, nor have the resources they need.</p><p><strong>A. Budget Woes</strong></p><figure><a href="https://infogr.am/graph_1-295552962"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/379/1*ZrvS0R4HU-v8YBRBb4tCSg.png" /></a><figcaption>The graph illustrates how far Guatemala’s expenditure is from safer nations in the region as Panama and Costa Rica. Very low public expenditure on security takes place in the other Northern Triangle countries, Honduras and El Salvador. Nicaragua is an exception with the lowest levels of expenditure and relatively low levels of violence. CRISIS GROUP</figcaption></figure><blockquote>Both Attorney General Aldana and Commissioner Velásquez have warned that prosecutors need more money. “Resources are fundamental”, said Aldana, whose plans to decentralise her institution by adding prosecutors have been frustrated by too few funds.</blockquote><p>The MP has offices in only 53 of 338 municipalities. Lack of personnel contributes to a huge backlog that has grown since it was some 1.2 million cases when she took office in May 2014. Only about 3 per cent of new cases opened that month had been decided by March 2015. Though the MP’s budget has grown, it has received far less than asked. In 2015, Congress approved 60 per cent of the amount requested, though even this may not be distributed. In 2014, the MP did not receive about 27 per cent of the budget approved by Congress. CICIG has proposed a temporary tax to fund prosecutors. The UNE’s similar initiative in December 2015 to fund prosecutors with new income taxes on those earning more than about $80,000 a year failed to receive support.</p><figure><a href="https://infogr.am/graph_1-295552962"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/394/1*9wWo1JFl2TDReXhs7JIErg.png" /></a><figcaption>This graphic shows how Guatemala’s Public Ministry (MP) requests for funding from the central government have not been met during the past years, and how since 2013 the central government has failed to disburse event the budget allowed by Congress to the MP. In 2015 the MP only received 43% of what it calculated it would need. CRISIS GROUP</figcaption></figure><p>Guatemala has one of the lowest tax burdens in Latin America: 13 per cent of GDP, compared to a regional average of 21 per cent. It also has one of the lowest social spending rates: $179 per capita in 2013 compared to a regional mean of $777. <a href="http://www.resdal.org/libro-seg-2013/resdal-index-2013.pdf">The government likewise spends less on public security</a>: $48 per capita in 2013 compared to an average of $101 in Central America.</p><p>Business leaders have fiercely opposed new taxes, arguing that the government must first tackle inefficiency and corruption, but there are some signs their opposition may be softening. Instead of rejecting new taxes outright, <a href="http://lahora.gt/empresarios-se-oponen-a-impuesto-anticorrupcion-propuesto-por-cicig/">CACIF has proposed that revenues be discussed as part of a national security and justice plan</a>. Some individual leaders have directly addressed the need for more government funding. “It is true there is corruption”, wrote the vice president of an influential private foundation, “but it seems we have forgotten that the institutions that should combat it (the MP and courts) cannot carry out their jobs without resources”.</p><blockquote>“You want a first-class country while paying third-class taxes”, Alvaro Arzú a conservative ex-president, now mayor of Guatemala City, told a business forum. “It can’t be done”.</blockquote><p><strong>B. Pending Legislation</strong></p><p>Without the passage of key reforms in 2010 — such as laws authorising wiretaps, providing witness protection and creating high-risk courts — CICIG and the MP would not have been able to investigate and prosecute corruption in 2015. But their legislative agenda has been largely stalled since. More reforms are needed to fight corruption in the political system, make prosecutors and judges more independent, limit public officials’ immunity and expedite criminal proceedings.</p><p><em>1. Electoral reform</em></p><p>Per capita income is among the hemisphere’s lowest, but campaign spending per capita is among the highest. Long, costly, poorly regulated campaigns render elected leaders vulnerable to manipulation by private, including illegal, interests. <a href="http://www.cicig.org/uploads/documents/2015/informe_financiamiento_politicagt.pdf">A 2015 CICIG report</a> estimated that candidates raise most funds illegally via networks created to get influence and favours, like public contracts. Laws regulating parties are loose, making them easy to form and leave: lawmakers and other elected officials change them opportunistically (<em>transfugismo</em>), regardless of constituent interests. Under civil society pressure, Congress has discussed a reform bill based on a TSE proposal to make parties “less like private clubs” by increasing penalties for violating electoral laws, establishing rules for election of party officials, limiting re-election, distributing more free television airtime and raising the number of required affiliates to make forming parties tougher. It fails to address certain issues, such as <em>transfugismo</em>, but would make elections more transparent and officials less vulnerable to influence peddling and other fraud.</p><p><em>2. Reform of the Judiciary and the Public Ministry</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/1*isOvkV8rlxW0CxjzadBgDA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Guatelama&#39;s Public Ministry. Twitter/MP de Guatemala</figcaption></figure><p>The working group set up in May 2015 to discuss judicial reforms — presided over by CICIG and the representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) and including representatives of the Supreme Court and the judges, among others — reached consensus on the need to fortify judicial independence but failed to send a common proposal to Congress. At issue is how to improve the process for selecting judges and enhance judicial independence. The Supreme Court (which holds both administrative and judicial functions) chooses trial judges and justices of the peace in competitions criticised as opaque. Selection Commissions, whose deliberations are subject to intense lobbying by private interests, nominate judges for appellate courts. All judges serve renewable five-year terms, which means they have little security of tenure.</p><p>The term length and selection process can only be changed by constitutional amendment, which requires approval by two thirds of Congress and a plebiscite. Selection, however, could become more transparent by requiring the commissions to use more objective criteria and opening up their deliberations. Congress is also considering modifying the judicial career law, to promote fairness in recruiting and promotion, and strengthening internal disciplinary mechanisms.</p><p>The MP’s organic law needs reform to regulate careers and strengthen prosecutorial independence. The attorney general serves a four-year term and can only be removed by the president for “good cause”, such as negligence, corruption or other crimes. Yet, none of the eleven attorneys general appointed since establishment of the ministry in 1994 has completed a full term. The working group suggested measures that would limit the president’s authority to oust the attorney general and strengthen the independence of prosecutors by establishing clear criteria for recruitment, evaluation and promotion. <a href="http://www.cicig.org/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&amp;cntnt01articleid=649&amp;cntnt01returnid=67">It is likewise pushing to amend laws regulating political immunity and “<em>amparos</em>”</a> (petitions for constitutional protection). Both mechanisms are needed to protect fundamental political and civil rights but can be abused by suspects to avoid prosecution. Proposed reforms would expedite legal procedures for lifting immunity and make proceedings more transparent. The filing of frivolous <em>amparo</em> petitions by defence attorneys to delay or derail judicial proceedings would be liable to fines or disbarment.</p><p><strong>C. Institution Building</strong></p><p>CICIG’s most important achievement, according to Velásquez, is its impact on attitudes, inside and outside government. “If there was just confidence in CICIG that would be negative”, he said.</p><blockquote>“What is important is that society now has confidence in the MP and in its own justice system. The public knows that impunity is not inevitable”.</blockquote><p>Prosecutors also have a new mindset. Before they would not touch certain investigations, not for lack of will or expertise, but because they knew the cases would never go to trial. “CICIG has given prosecutors confidence that if they do their work well, they will be able to bring their results before a judge”. This was on display in early January, when the MP ordered the arrest of fourteen military veterans for <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/06/guatemala-arrests-human-rights-abuse-civil-war-killing">war crimes and petitioned to lift the immunity of a new Congressman</a>, who co-founded the president’s party, on the same charges. This demonstrated that prosecutors working independently of CICIG are ready to take on a politically sensitive case involving some of the president’s closest allies.</p><p>Whether most prosecutors, including those outside the capital, share this new mentality is not yet clear. The MP has specialised agencies, created or strengthened with CICIG support, that investigate complex cases such as extortion and human trafficking based on material evidence. But its resources are stretched thin, especially outside major cities. CICIG collaboration with prosecutors involved in less emblematic cases has been limited. The prosecutor in charge of the recently created office on human trafficking said, “our agents have received training … but not in a formal, systematic way. CICIG could help us build that expertise”. Prosecutors also need to develop their courtroom skills. According to a former prosecutor, the MP lacks skilled litigators trained in oral argument, which means defence lawyers often outmanoeuvre them in the courtroom. Because judges are not trained (or objective enough) to understand complex investigations, some complicated cases may end with “miniscule” sentences despite a wealth of evidence.</p><p>Even more serious is the lack of professional investigative police. Legislation was passed in 2012 to create a new directorate general of criminal investigation (DIGICRI), which was to operate under the government ministry, though separate from the National Civilian Police (PNC). <a href="http://elperiodico.com.gt/2015/12/21/pais/la-digicri-el-proyecto-que-no-convence-a-la-fiscal-general/">It never received funding for more than a few employees</a>, however, and now exists only on paper. Meanwhile, the PNC’s own investigative division needs training to deal with complex cases, especially white-collar crime.</p><figure><a href="https://infogr.am/graph_3-327676111"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/566/1*QvZejcQhrwgBOOv-bqUy8w.png" /></a><figcaption>This graph shows a growing budgetary allocation for the police and for “public order and citizen security” during the past years, even in real terms. CRISIS GROUP</figcaption></figure><p>Security sector reform, a condition of the 1996 peace agreements, remains unfinished business. Strengthening the civilian police is especially urgent. The Pérez Molina government set up three academies in the interior, increasing the force from about 24,000 in 2011 to 37,000 in 2015. Critics point out, however, that conditions and instruction at the academies are poor. To churn out agents quicker, basic training was reduced from a year to six months. <a href="http://elperiodico.com.gt/2015/12/21/pais/morales-se-plantea-poner-alto-a-la-reforma-policial/">President Morales has said he plans to dismantle the National Police Reform Commission</a>, citing lack of results, but he has not proposed a new strategy for overhauling the civilian forces on the front lines of the struggle against gangs and other violent criminals.</p><h4>V. CONCLUSION</h4><p>Few could have predicted the dramatic changes that upended politics in 2015. Most remarkably, the upheaval was contained within rule of law, without reigniting the bloody cycles of rebellion and repression that have characterised much Guatemalan history. The agents of change were neither soldiers nor revolutionaries but national and international prosecutors, working together through the unique CICIG experiment and bolstered by peaceful demonstrators from across the political, economic and social spectrum. Whether the shakeup will result in sustainable reform is uncertain. The hard work of building domestic institutions capable of combatting impunity without international help remains unfinished.</p><p>Though its ultimate success is unclear, the CICIG model could offer hope to other countries where corrupt, abusive public officials undermine fragile institutions from within. The Organization of American States in January 2016 signed an agreement to create a similar entity in Honduras, which is convulsed by protests over alleged corruption. Like CICIG, it is authorised to oversee and collaborate with investigators, prosecutors and judges handling corruption cases and to propose initiatives to strengthen justice system reforms and guarantee government accountability and transparency.</p><p>Accepting international help is the easy part. President Morales to his credit has promised to extend CICIG’s mandate beyond its current September 2017 end. He should also promise that his government will use the extra time to pass and implement the reforms that will enable Guatemalan institutions to combat impunity on their own. The international community, especially the U.S., has both the responsibility and interest to help build institutions capable of combating powerful criminals, including those who traffic illegal drugs abroad. Donors cannot bankroll the commission’s mandate indefinitely, however. They must work with the president to make sure CICIG is not a crutch, but a catalyst for genuine change.</p><p><strong>Guatemala City/Bogotá/Brussels, 28 January 2016</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*p4f_0Lyo1iTGAEihDMh5uw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Protests in Guatemala City’s Plaza de la Constitución in August 2015. Wikimedia/Nerdoguate</figcaption></figure><p><em>For more on Crisis Group’s reporting on Guatemala, see</em><a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china.aspx"><em>crisisgroup.org</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><em>Follow Crisis Group’s Guatemala Analyst </em><a href="https://twitter.com/AMatuteICG"><em>Arturo Matute</em></a><em> and Crisis Group&#39;s Central America Project Director </em><a href="https://twitter.com/speckmary"><em>Mary Speck</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b6d2128b1c3f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/crisis-group/crutch-to-catalyst-the-international-commission-against-impunity-in-guatemala-b6d2128b1c3f">Crutch to Catalyst? The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/crisis-group">Crisis Group</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Some Thoughts on Dialogue]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/some-thoughts-on-dialogue-788ee529875a?source=rss-b8580e8a76e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/788ee529875a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[diplomacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conflict]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Crisis Group]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 28 Jan 2016 14:43:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-04-22T14:55:56.819Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By Micheline Calmy-Rey, former President of Switzerland</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e81IMXHMAE9ChDkZZpM8UA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Kurds watch airstrikes in Kobane, on 7 November 2014. MAGNUM/Peter van Agtmael</figcaption></figure><figure><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/meet-the-authors-6d41374b1554#.p8fp00x3j"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*D3A9bsAL1IxC8vBOcSUSdA.jpeg" /></a><figcaption>Micheline Calmy-Rey</figcaption></figure><p>At a time when the U.S., UK, France, and Russia have gone to war with the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS or ISIL) and intensified their airstrikes in Syria, the legitimate question is whether this is effective. Do these interventions have the capacity to put an end to the war? <a href="http://www.state.gov/s/seci/">The U.S. State Department lists 65 countries</a> as partners in the so-called Global Coalition to Degrade and Defeat ISIL, established in September 2014. Since then, the Islamic State movement has maintained its control over a large swathe of territory in Syria and Iraq, and it is gaining strength elsewhere.</p><p>Armed action may not single-handedly provide the solution to the Syrian crisis, but what about diplomacy and negotiation? UN-sponsored peace talks on Syria are being undermined by a host of factors, including proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, blockades by the warring parties have reportedly put hundreds of thousands of Syrians at risk of starvation and malnutrition. The Syrian war has killed more than 250,000 people and displaced more than eleven million.</p><p>Current global news is not dissimilar to the darkest pages of religious history in the 16th and 17th centuries, where inclusive dialogue and persuasion were often portrayed as the work of the devil. Once again, ostracism and brutal punitive force are becoming popular solutions. One wonders whether the Enlightenment ever took place.</p><blockquote>Should we look for dialogue without discrimination — even if that means sitting down at the table with armed groups such as IS?</blockquote><p>What is to be done when states and non-state actors violate international law and its principles? When they kill indiscriminately, rape, and torture? Who should be called a terrorist, and who should be called a freedom fighter? Which are the legitimate means for political action, and which should be banned?</p><p>There has been increased consensus over the last few years as to what should be considered, in law or in fact, as a threat to security or a serious violation of human rights. But we often have difficulty agreeing on whether to negotiate or to sanction, whether to engage or to boycott, whether to enter into dialogue or to exclude.</p><p>Our international system is in the midst of an upheaval. Violence, terrorism and war continue to wreak havoc: there have been more conflicts in the last five years than ever before. These conflicts reflect new forms of violence. Transnational movements and new technologies change their nature. And we know of the shocking number of victims these scourges leave in their wake, mostly civilians.</p><p>It is obviously not a matter of advocating dialogue against all odds. One must assess the risks before acting, and not hesitate to ask the fundamental questions: is there a chance of moving things forward, or is the perceived opening a mere delaying tactic? What are the goals of dialogue? To deal with what issues, with whom, and at what level? In this field, each case is unique.</p><p>A growing number of countries and organisations are advocating “soft power,” which involves maintaining dialogue across a number of fields of international politics. This approach may be used to defend national interests, solve global problems or facilitate talks between parties to a conflict. States seeking influence through soft power now take part in genuine “dialogue competition”. More of them wonder how to move from a simple discussion to authentic political negotiation on a crisis or conflict. In so doing, it is a matter of defending the cause of political pragmatism: asking ourselves whether it is worthwhile distinguishing between good and bad political forces.</p><p>Some are outraged as they see a pro-terrorist slant to this realism. Let us not be fooled: dialogue does not inevitably lead to accepting what is unacceptable. Trying to understand does not mean excusing and does not mean complicity.</p><blockquote>Dialogue does indeed depend on compromise: but pursuing compromise certainly does not mean jeopardising the values one firmly holds.</blockquote><p>True dialogue is nevertheless a risky enterprise. It requires a significant investment in time and resources, with uncertain and often modest results. One is faced with political deadlocks and terribly frustrating situations, as with ongoing peace efforts in the Middle East. And success is often fragile.</p><p>These factors may explain why so little time is dedicated to negotiations before deciding on armed intervention. They may also explain why many key stakeholders don’t get a seat at the table. The ongoing UN-brokered peace process in Syria remains fragile because important groups or parties of the conflict have been excluded. Why exclude the main players from the discussion? Why lay down preconditions, such as the departure of President Bashar al-Assad? More than half of the population of Syria is living under the control of armed groups. Why is it not possible to negotiate humanitarian access to these conflict zones?</p><p>Dialogue also presents a number of dilemmas due to its very nature:</p><ul><li>Tensions between the pursuit of peace and respect for human rights lead to debates around impunity for abuses, as in the cases of President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan; Joseph Kony, head of the Lord’s Resistance Army; former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic; or the FARC rebels in Colombia;</li><li>Tensions between economic interests and international commitments, including cases where legal standards and principles are seen to be sacrificed for economic interests, and others where economic interests may be jeopardised by advocacy for peace and human rights;</li><li>Tensions between each country’s desire to keep the best relationships possible with other countries, and their readiness to accept the risk of temporary deterioration in ties.</li></ul><p>These dilemmas require a realistic approach, as Manichaeism leads nowhere. For the people most affected by conflict, the answer does not lie in exclusion: peace or human rights, prosperity or principles, engagement or isolation. In conflict zones, people die, are wounded, go hungry. They rightly expect their politicians and diplomats to find solutions. A traditional justice system can be aligned with the requirements of the International Criminal Court. National economic necessities and global objectives must necessarily be reconciled.</p><p>A country’s status depends partly on its contribution to solving global problems and to producing “global public goods”. Armed intervention is not the only type of action. Good offices, mediation and dialogue are also tools — not only after military interventions, but also as preventive instruments to forestall greater harm.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/200/1*NVYeI6HPjWHAa143d-MMBQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/about-the-future-of-conflict-project-7a6129b4725e#.d1rd3gy5k"><em>About The Future of Conflict</em></a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/meet-the-authors-6d41374b1554#.y6z6zzy7l"><em>Learn more about our contributors</em></a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/200/1*NVYeI6HPjWHAa143d-MMBQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/about-the-future-of-conflict-project-7a6129b4725e#.d1rd3gy5k"><em>About The Future of Conflict</em></a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/meet-the-authors-6d41374b1554#.y6z6zzy7l"><em>Learn more about our contributors</em></a></p><p><em>This article represents the view of the individual writer, not that of International Crisis Group or of its Board.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=788ee529875a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/some-thoughts-on-dialogue-788ee529875a">Some Thoughts on Dialogue</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict">The Future of Conflict</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Stirring up the South China Sea (IV): Oil in Troubled Waters]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@CrisisGroup/stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-iv-oil-in-troubled-waters-7d4b7286aac0?source=rss-b8580e8a76e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7d4b7286aac0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[south-china-sea]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[oil]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Crisis Group]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2016 08:12:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-01-27T08:12:41.658Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2fL9iez6bC-6mBAJObcp7A.jpeg" /><figcaption>AFP/Hoang Dinh</figcaption></figure><p><em>Also available in: </em><a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/275-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-iv-oil-in-troubled-waters.aspx?alt_lang=zh-CN"><em>中文</em></a></p><h4>SUMMARY</h4><p><strong>The race for hydrocarbon reserves in the South China Sea is aggravating conflicting territorial claims. The regional players need cooperation, yet have increasingly open confrontations at sea. For peaceful joint energy development, all parties need to stop acting unilaterally and do more to understand the others’ goals and limitations.</strong></p><p>The South China Sea’s hydrocarbon resources are hotly contested though its reserves are unproven. While their potential economic benefit may be considerable, their foremost significance is political, as their division has implications for sovereignty and fundamental law of the sea principles. Exploration frictions have deepened geopolitical fault lines. Competition once framed by verbal warnings and diplomatic pressure today frequently takes the form of physical confrontation. A key factor is China’s growing capability and accompanying desire to expand its own exploration while preventing other claimants’ activity. In parallel, Beijing has advocated setting aside disputes and developing resources jointly, but as collaboration remains elusive, analysts in China have called for unilateral measures to pressure uncooperative parties. Better would be greater efforts to create mechanisms for preventing competition from becoming conflict, while seeking better understanding of motivations needed for eventual cooperation.</p><p>China’s state-owned oil majors, known collectively as the “three buckets of oil”, have grown rapidly in financial strength and technical capability, especially deep-water drilling. Driven by political zeal and internecine competition, their executives have for years pressed the government for policy and financial support to enable exploration farther from the Chinese shore and deeper into disputed waters. Vietnam, for which crude oil is vital for exports, government revenue and GDP, has made development in the South China Sea a national priority. To insulate itself from Chinese pressure, it actively courts foreign partners, some of which baulk due to Beijing’s warnings. The Philippines badly need new sources of domestically produced energy, as they import nearly all their crude oil and petroleum products, and their only natural gas field will soon run dry.</p><p>While each party’s energy hunger could be an incentive for cooperation, joint exploration and development face obstacles. China’s precondition that its sovereignty be recognised over the areas concerned raises fear that collaboration amounts to accepting its claims. Vietnam insists on defining overlapping claims pursuant to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) before defining joint development areas. China’s maps do not conform to UNCLOS principles, and it refuses to clarify the extent or nature of its claims. Compliance with Philippine law that oil and gas projects must be 60 per cent Philippine-owned, might appear to accept Manila’s ownership and by extension sovereignty.</p><p>Despite the obstacles, collaboration has been tried. The most advanced partnership, the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU), began as a bilateral agreement between Beijing and Manila in 2004 to survey the seabed for hydrocarbon deposits in some disputed areas. Vietnam joined in 2005, as the area overlapped with its claims. The parties shared expenses and responsibilities equally and worked together. But in late 2007–2008, nationalists in the Philippines accused the government of secret, corrupt concessions that violated the constitution. When the pact expired in July 2008, Manila did not renew it.</p><p>The JMSU was conducted under particular circumstances. Most importantly, each party prioritised maintaining stable relations over asserting claims. That ingredient has been missing in recent years marked by frequent friction, heightened tensions and volatile ties. Another promising opportunity for a joint development agreement of comparable scope is unlikely to appear soon. Beijing (political) and Manila (economic) have incentives to cooperate, but their frigid relationship, resulting from China’s assertive actions and the Philippines’ subsequent request for international arbitration, has made collaboration an even harder public sale for Manila, and Philippine law remains a problem. Hanoi is less constrained but also economically less motivated to collaborate with China, though they consult on joint exploration outside the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin.</p><p>There are two key challenges. The first is to establish mechanisms to prevent current competition from escalating to the point of conflict, whether by accident or design; the second — the subject of this report — is to understand the motivations and limitations of the players in order to lay the foundations for greater collaboration, first in exploration, then in development.</p><p>To preserve the long-term prospect of collaboration and minimise the danger of clashes, parties should refrain from unilateral exploration and exploitation, particularly around land, such as islands in the Paracel and Spratly groups, whose sovereignty is hotly contested. When a more favourable regional environment is restored, steps can be taken to lower the obstacles. China’s preconditions might be countered by specifying in legal terms that participation in joint exploration and development does not imply sovereignty concessions.</p><p>Misgivings about its maps could be mitigated if China were to move in the direction of framing its claims under UNCLOS, even implicitly. To incentivise Vietnam, for example, it should follow UNCLOS principles in quiet negotiations on the area of joint exploration outside the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin. In exchange, Vietnam should refrain from trying to open negotiations on the Paracels.</p><h4>I. INTRODUCTION</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*JxnoI9_R-a4twH9eFmyifw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Paracel islands. FLICKR/Swaminathan</figcaption></figure><p><a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china.aspx">The South China Sea is often said to be rich in hydrocarbon reserves, though most deposits are unconfirmed, due in part to the barriers that multiple claims by several coastal states put in the way of exploration.</a> The significance of the potential resources, therefore, is first and foremost political, as entitlement to them derives from sovereignty over land according to principles of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Disputes over oil and gas prospecting thus have ramifications that extend well beyond division of resources.</p><p><a href="http://www.amazon.com/The-South-China-Sea-Struggle/dp/0300186835">Friction has escalated in recent years into confrontations at sea.</a> In 2011–2012, Chinese law enforcement vessels and fishing boats confronted Vietnam’s seabed survey ships, three times severing their seismic cables. In May 2014, Beijing deployed a deep-water drilling rig in waters disputed with Hanoi, triggering a two-month standoff involving dozens of vessels and violent anti-China protests in Vietnam. The intensity of Hanoi’s pushback was substantially due to the fact that the drilling was adjacent to the Paracel Islands, which China occupies and both claim.</p><blockquote>Beijing’s action touched a raw nerve, a government-affiliated analyst in Hanoi said, since Vietnam sees the island group “as being long under illegal occupation, and the government is under public pressure to take it back”. <em>[Crisis Group interview, Hanoi, September 2014.]</em></blockquote><p>Tensions cooled after China withdrew the rig, but despite the resumption of diplomacy, relations have yet to recover fully, a status described as “the new normalcy” by a senior analyst in a think-tank affiliated with Vietnam’s foreign ministry: “Normal, because official exchanges returned to the pre-[rig deployment] situation. New, because there is lower trust in the relationship even though it appears normal”. Mistrust of Beijing has fuelled calls among the public and foreign policy intelligentsia for the leadership to overcome its ideological suspicion of the West and seek closer economic and security ties with the U.S.</p><p>China has taken a similar stance toward the Philippines. In March 2011, two of its law enforcement vessels forced a survey ship doing seismic studies away from the Reed Bank, near the uncontested Philippine island of Palawan. <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12672889">Manila explored legal recourse and in January 2013 began arbitration proceedings against China at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague under UNCLOS Annex VII</a>. <a href="http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1503">It asked for a finding that “China has unlawfully interfered with” the Philippines’ exercise of sovereign rights with respect to resources of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf.</a> It also requested the tribunal to rule illegal the “nine-dash line”, which according to official Chinese maps loops down from the coast to take in most of the South China Sea. Beijing has refused to participate and pressured Manila to withdraw the suit.</p><p>Beijing, however, has tolerated Malaysia, some of whose natural gas fields are within Chinese-claimed waters, not objecting to its agreement with Brunei to jointly develop energy resources in an area all three claim. The difference likely reflects appreciation that Malaysia and Brunei downplay their differences with China, while Vietnam and the Philippines seek to rally international support.</p><p>China’s seeming flexibility partially reflects asymmetry in the economic significance the claimants attach to hydrocarbon resources. Vietnam and Malaysia rely heavily on oil from the South China Sea for export. The Philippines count on domestically produced natural gas to escape what otherwise appears a future of dependence on polluting coal or expensive liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports. China, though energy hungry, has access to diversified sources of imported fuel, some of which arguably are less politically costly to obtain than the South China Sea’s unproven, disputed reserves.</p><p>Beijing’s apparent flexibility also reflects the elasticity of its claims. It declares “China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof”. But it defines “adjacent waters” or “relevant waters” vaguely, offering only a rough delimitation within the nine-dash line, an area that significantly overlaps EEZs asserted by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia. It has deliberately maintained “strategic ambiguity” by clarifying neither the coordinates and legal basis of that line, nor the sovereign rights and jurisdiction it intends to enforce within it.</p><p>Vietnam has the second most expansive claim. It asserts sovereignty over the entirety of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, the most significant land features in the South China Sea. The Philippines claim the western section of the Spratlys (the Kalayaan Island Group) and the Scarborough Shoal. Malaysia claims sovereignty over a cluster of features in the Spratlys close to its coast, and Brunei claims two Spratly features.</p><p>China has also proposed joint development as a provisional measure before settlement of sovereignty disputes. Sound in principle, this has met lukewarm responses from most other claimants, who see the presumption the nine-dash line would be the starting point of negotiations for joint development as fundamentally unfair. That line contradicts a cardinal principle of UNCLOS, to which all claimants are parties, namely that “the land dominates the sea”, so a coastal state can claim maritime zones based only on land over which it has sovereignty.</p><p>The consequent failure of joint development as a confidence-building measure has had a destabilising effect, as Beijing blames rival claimants for not reciprocating its gesture for collaboration. As oil companies acquire the technology, capital and appetite for deep-water drilling, pressure has been increasing on the government to respond by undertaking unilateral exploration and development. The artificial islands under construction since early 2014 in the Spratlys could enable logistic support that enhances the capabilities of the companies and their drilling platforms, as well as surveillance vessels and coast guard ships, both to explore further into the southern part of the South China Sea and to obstruct rival claimants’ activities.</p><p>This is the fourth Crisis Group report on South China Sea disputes. The first two, published in 2012, examined competition and lack of coordination among China’s government agencies that drove them to stoke tensions and analysed factors that motivated other claimants, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, to assert their positions. The third focused primarily on the domestic, diplomatic, strategic and geopolitical drivers of events since late 2012 and their implications for regional security. This report studies the economic and political factors that motivate the competition for hydrocarbon resources and the prospect for eventual joint development. China, the Philippines and Vietnam (the most active claimants) are the main subjects. It is based principally on interviews in Beijing, Manila, and Hanoi with government officials, diplomats, security and energy analysts, academics and lawyers, many of whom requested that their names be withheld.</p><h4>II. CHINA’S MARCH TO THE SEA</h4><p><strong>A. “Three Buckets of Oil”</strong></p><p>China’s appetite for fossil fuels in the South China Sea grew with its hunger for energy, overall foreign policy assertiveness and technical capabilities. Nicknamed the “three buckets of oil”, the national oil companies (NOCs) — China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China Petroleum &amp; Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) — have led the march, their eagerness for development driven by potential political gains as much as economic interest and intensified by competition.</p><p>The NOCs are overseen by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, but the Central Organisation Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appoints their top executives, who are also the companies’ leading party cadres and typically hold vice ministerial rank. It is not rare for NOC executives to ascend to prominent political positions.</p><blockquote>Economic and commercial interests, therefore, may not be the only determinants when NOC executives make business decisions. “They could have hoped to use achievement in the South China Sea to propel their political careers”, said a Chinese maritime policy analyst.</blockquote><p>CNOOC, China’s largest offshore oil and gas producer, was created in 1982 with exclusive rights to offshore exploration, development, production and sales. Due to technical constraints and political considerations, its operations in the South China Sea were until recently confined to shallow, undisputed waters. It lost its offshore monopoly in 2004, when CNPC obtained government permission to explore and develop eighteen South China Sea blocks, some in the disputed waters around the Spratlys. Sinopec was reported to have also submitted applications for offshore permits, including in the South China Sea, and a competition among the three NOCs began there. Executives lobbied the government for permission and support, often in the name of asserting Chinese sovereignty.</p><p>In 2008, CNOOC announced it would invest about $32 billion over ten to twenty years in developing the South China Sea, which CEO Fu Yucheng declared a “priority”. During the National People’s Congress the following March, delegate and CNOOC executive Song Enlai urged the government to boost policy and financial support for deep-water exploration there, an urgent task, he said, because claimant countries were engaged in “predatory exploitation” in Chinese waters. During the People’s Political Consultative Conference, held at the same time, delegate and former CNPC Vice President Jia Chengzao said, “China already has the technical capability for large-scale oil and gas exploitation in the South China Sea. It is necessary for the state to treat it as a priority and provide policy support”.</p><p>Imports exceeded 50 per cent in China’s oil consumption in 2009, prompting the National Development and Reform Commission to convene experts to evaluate hydrocarbon exploitation in the South China Sea in early 2010. Soon after, Sinopec allotted about $28.3 million for a survey vessel to enhance its maritime exploratory capability, and the competition between the three NOCs intensified.</p><p>Drilling in the disputed waters is politically sensitive, technically challenging and financially risky, since deposits are unproven. A Chinese energy analyst said in 2011 that “China would rather go to Africa”, as the South China Sea was “too troublesome”. At the time, the NOCs also lacked in-house capability to drill deeper than 300 metres.</p><p>Beijing once seemed to prioritise good relations with neighbours, quietly calling off controversial projects. After Vietnam protested in 1994, CNOOC abandoned a joint exploration project with the U.S. firm Crestone Energy near the Spratlys. In 2009, Sinopec backed away from drilling in a disputed area when Hanoi protested after company sources leaked the plan to the press.</p><p>Exploration in the South China Sea cannot be done without the state providing policy support and underwriting the risk. Such sponsorship materialised as China grew richer, more powerful, hungrier for energy and bolder in its quest for resources in the South China Sea. In hindsight, 2012 was a turning point. “The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for the Development of National Strategic Emerging Industries”, issued by the State Council that year, included the goal of obtaining indigenous capability for the design and manufacture of deep-water resource exploitation equipment by 2015. The eighteenth party congress in November, when the CCP also completed its once-in-a-decade leadership transition, set a goal of building China into “a maritime power”. In June 2012, responding to a Vietnamese law with new navigation regulations covering the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands, CNOOC offered oil exploration leases for bid in nine blocks within the disputed areas.</p><p>It may not be a total coincidence that Haiyangshiyou (HYSY) 981, China’s first indigenously-designed and manufactured ultradeep-water semi-submersible drilling platform, began operations in May 2012, drilling its first well in the Liwan gas field, 198 nautical miles from Hong Kong. Ten years and roughly $1 billion in the making, it is owned by CNOOC, operated by its subsidiary, China Oilfield Services, and reportedly increases China’s deep-water drilling capability from 300 to 3,000 metres. However, it spent part of 2013 in repairs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*Gombm1U1TEXDNDtM-veIDg.png" /><figcaption>Map 1: Overlapping CNOOC and PetroVietnam blocks</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*f_9wgXahgMMjlmo4K1QFTg.png" /><figcaption>Map 2: Deployment of HYSY 981</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9-PHJzTPv5-XOCxPMIQISA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Former CNOOC Chairman Wang Yilin. FLICKR/QGCinfo</figcaption></figure><p>Said to be “born for the South China Sea”, HYSY 981’s mission has always been more than commercial. Then CNOOC Chairman Wang Yilin called it on commissioning “mobile national territory” that would help “ensure our country’s energy security, advance maritime-power strategy and safeguard our nation’s maritime sovereignty”. In May 2014, China deployed it seventeen nautical miles from the south-western-most island in the Paracels, whose sovereignty Vietnam also claims. The ferocity of Hanoi’s pushback and a chorus of regional criticism prompted Beijing to quietly adjust tactics. HYSY 981 was sent to the Bay of Bengal from February to April 2015. In June, it was again deployed to an area where Chinese and Vietnamese claims overlap, but on the Chinese side of the median line between the two coasts. Hanoi largely remained mute.</p><p>China, however, has not given up its ambition to develop the South China Sea. Construction of HYSY 982 began in July 2015. Expected to be delivered in the second half of 2016, it is said to be a sixth-generation deep-water, semi-submersible drilling rig specifically designed for “hazardous weathers in the South China Sea”.</p><p><strong>B. Hainan Province</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*9Tx7KUTQ9oMvS4xMMAc-wA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Hainan Province. FLICKR/Xianyi Shen</figcaption></figure><p>The NOCs have not been the only ardent supporters of and participants in South China Sea ventures. China’s island province Hainan has claimed to govern all South China Sea islands and their surrounding waters since 1988. Its officials often have a maritime background. Current governor Liu Cigui served as director of the State Oceanic Administration and political commissar of the coast guard. A booming resort island, Hainan relies on natural gas for power generation and transportation. It is highly dependent on CNOOC production from the South China Sea and faces a growing supply deficit. In 2011, offshore fields supplied 97 per cent of its natural gas. In 2014, CNOOC estimated Hainan’s annual natural gas consumption had grown to 5.6 billion cubic metres (bcm), while supply remained at 4.4 bcm, leaving a deficit of 1.2 bcm to be filled by imported LNG.</p><p>Unsurprisingly, Hainan has long pushed for more aggressive development of the ocean. In January 2006, then Governor Wei Liucheng, formerly CEO of CNOOC, prioritised tourism, deep-sea fishing and energy exploration in the South China Sea in the province’s next five-year development plan. In March 2006, during the fourth session of the Tenth National Political Consultative Conference, Hainan delegates proposed a bill that described expanding exploration further out into the South China Sea as vital to the defence of China’s maritime rights and interests. In 2014, Hainan’s Political Consultative Standing Committee proposed to “push the central government to partially decentralise the rights of energy development in the South China Sea; support Hainan’s participation in the development of South China Sea … actively support CNPC, CNOOC and Sinopec’s energy surveillance and development in the South China Sea … and encourage large-scale offshore oil field service companies to set up offices in Hainan”. It has been unsuccessful, but not for want of trying.</p><p><strong>C. The Ship Builder</strong></p><p>China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC), the country’s largest and also state-owned, built HYSY 981, which on delivery was hailed as a major boost to a shipbuilding industry that, facing overcapacity, had hung its hopes for revival on “a rapid expansion of the offshore equipment market”. CSIC has been a strong advocate for hydrocarbon exploration in the South China Sea. During the March 2014 National People’s Congress, Chief Engineer Yan Kai, representing Jiangsu province, said the lack of ocean infrastructure had handicapped economic development, including “oil and gas exploitation in central and southern South China Sea”. He proposed China “urgently” build multiple sea bases to give “comprehensive support” for development of the South China Sea and defence of sovereignty. Around that time, China began the large-scale construction of artificial islands in the Spratlys that it said would serve both civilian and defence purposes.</p><h4>III. VIETNAM’S RELIANCE ON OIL</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*wspsXZLTJiOo84V9pOnh4A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Vũng Tàu oil field in Vietnam. WIKIMEDIA/Paul Meffin</figcaption></figure><p>Vietnam is fourth in South East Asia for oil and gas production, after Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. The bulk of its reserves are in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand. A net exporter of crude oil but a net importer of oil products, with domestic consumption increasing in line with robust growth that surged by more than 70 per cent between 2004 and 2013, it has been self-sufficient in natural gas. However, demand is projected to surpass supply eventually, particularly in the south. The 2011 Gas Master Plan includes initiatives to promote natural gas in the primary energy mix, gas production and consumption targets and detailed infrastructure plans for gas gathering systems, pipelines and processing facilities.</p><p>Vietnam gives high priority to developing South China Sea economic resources. Policy directives by the Vietnamese Communist Party’s (VCP) top echelon since the early 1990s have specified that “becoming a strong marine economy” is the “strategic goal”. Official documents set guidelines for development of sea-related industries, especially hydrocarbons and fisheries. The most important is the “Vietnam Maritime Strategy Toward the Year 2020”, adopted by the Central Committee in 2007, which set the target that sea-related economic activities should be 53–55 per cent of GDP and 55–60 per cent of exports by 2020.</p><p>Oil and gas extraction has been a large feature of its marine economy. In August 1975, a few months after toppling the South Vietnamese government, the triumphant VCP issued a resolution outlining guidelines for oil and gas exploration throughout the country. It identified the continental shelf off the southern coast and the Tonkin Gulf in the South China Sea as priority exploration areas, but it was not until 1986 that Vietnam, with help from the Soviet Union, produced its first barrels of oil from the Bach Ho (White Tiger) field in the South China Sea. Since then, a series of party resolutions and nation strategic plans have promoted development of the oil and gas industry.</p><p><strong>A. PetroVietnam</strong></p><p>The national priority accorded to the oil and gas industry gave rise to the Vietnam Oil and Gas Group (PetroVietnam). Wholly owned by the central government, it is responsible for all oil and gas exploration and production, as well as storage, processing and distribution, on its own or through joint ventures. By early this decade, it had become Vietnam’s largest corporation, accounting for about 20 per cent of GDP and generating 25 to 30 per cent of annual government revenue. Its chairman, appointed by the prime minister, also serves as party secretary and a member of the VCP Central Executive Committee. The company’s general director (equivalent to CEO) is appointed by the PetroVietnam Members’ Council with the prime minister’s approval. PetroVietnam thus has a major role in making laws, regulations and policy concerning the oil and gas industry.</p><p>Given the outsized share of oil — crude petroleum was the third largest category in 2013 — in overall exports, GDP and government revenue, the recent decline in prices has meant pressure to increase production. PetroVietnam has in recent years intensified deep-water exploration and exploitation activities with the hope of bringing new fields into production. It also has at times been on the front line of disputes with China. In 2012, after CNOOC opened bidding on blocks within Vietnam’s claimed EEZ, PetroVietnam called the Chinese action illegal and urged foreign firms to stay away.</p><p><strong>B. Foreign Partners</strong></p><p>With claims significantly overlapping, Vietnam’s endeavours in the South China Sea have frequently resulted in friction with China. Partly to insulate itself from pressure, PetroVietnam actively courts foreign partners and had signed about 100 exploration and production contracts by 2013. Leaked U.S. State Department cables revealed Chinese campaigns since 2006 to persuade companies such as BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil to cancel oil exploration deals. BP and Chevron, both with significant investment in China, cancelled operations after Beijing warnings, though BP insisted its decision was purely “commercial”. ConocoPhillips divested its interest in South China Sea blocks. ExxonMobil, which has limited stakes in China, continued exploration with PetroVietnam.</p><p>In 2006, ONGC Videsh, an Indian state-owned oil exploration corporation, obtained permission from Vietnam to explore several blocks (including 127 and 128) in the South China Sea in waters also claimed by China. In 2011, Beijing warned ONGC that its activities were illegal and violated China’s sovereignty, but the pressure seemed to have backfired.</p><p>After relinquishing its lease on Block 127 where it found no oil or gas, ONGC in June 2012 also sought to abandon Block 128 as not commercially viable. However, it later extended that lease three time, reportedly at insistence of the Indian foreign ministry, which was said to want to maintain the country’s strategic presence in the South China Sea via its NOC. The current lease expires in June 2016. ONGC and PetroVietnam further agreed to expand cooperation on exploration and production in September 2014. According to Vietnamese analysts, “Chinese pressure has made India dig in and become more determined to work with Petro Vietnam”, despite questionable commercial prospect. After Vietnam accused China of interfering with its exploration, the chief admiral of India’s navy pledged in December 2012 to protect ONGC’s interest in the South China Sea.</p><h4>IV. THE PHILIPPINES’ HUNGER FOR ENERGY</h4><p>The Philippines import more than 90 per cent of their crude oil and petroleum products, as they produce only a minuscule amount domestically. In 2014, about 75 per cent of the crude oil imports originated from the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia alone supplying 57.1 per cent. State-owned Philippines National Oil Company (PNOC) is the primary operator in the oil and gas industry. Its chairman is appointed by the president and is simultaneously secretary of the energy department.</p><p>The Malampaya natural gas field — jointly operated by PNOC, Shell and Chevron — is the largest source of energy, providing 30 per cent of power needs. For the last few years, it has been the primary power source for Luzon, the largest and most populous island. The gas reserve is expected to run dry, though the estimated depletion date has been extended from around 2024 to 2029 or 2030 thanks to new extraction technology. Electricity demand in Luzon is projected to increase by 4.59 per cent annually in the same period. Without a new supply and unable to import LNG due to lack of infrastructure, the Philippines will have to rely more heavily on coal for power generation.</p><p>Developing new energy sources has proved extremely challenging, if not impossible, for the Philippines. Such projects — financially risky, capital intensive and technologically demanding — are impossible without foreign partners, as “even the biggest Philippine company doesn’t have that kind of resources or experience”. Most blocks explored or studied for potential reserves are “marginal”, meaning small, thus unattractive to large conglomerates. The only sizable commercial-grade natural gas reserves are on the Reed Bank, which Manila claims as part of its EEZ but is within Beijing’s nine-dash line.</p><p>Despite five rounds of offering blocks for bidding since the early 2000s, the Philippines have failed to attract large investors. “We went around the world to attract bidding. Nobody came. Not a single bid”, said Eduardo Manalac, former energy under-secretary, recalling the disappointment after the first effort in 2003. Many foreign companies, he said, stayed away for fear the maritime boundary dispute with China would jeopardise their investment. “We threw a party and nobody came”, he recalled with chagrin.</p><p>The companies’ concerns about Chinese interference have proven justified. Forum Energy, a UK-incorporated upstream oil and gas firm with a Philippines focus, acquired a 70 per cent interest in a service contract awarded by Manila for exploration of Block SC-72 on the Reed Bank. SC-72 is known for indications of natural gas based on previous PNOC drilling. After obtaining the requisite license and contract, Forum Energy began seismic surveys in 2011. In March that year, two Chinese law enforcement vessels used aggressive manoeuvres to force a Philippine survey ship to leave the area. Exploration has since stalled. Forum Energy confirmed in March 2015 that the energy department had ordered it to halt activities on SC-72, as the area is subject to the arbitration case that Manila initiated against Beijing. Energy department officials said the order came from the foreign ministry, which is concerned that exploration at the Reed Bank would undermine Manila’s position in The Hague arbitration.</p><p>Parallel to friction and confrontation, however, hydrocarbon exploration in the South China Sea is also a tale of repeated attempts at cooperation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*Yrv4m_5haQJ4xpI1UZWFbQ.png" /><figcaption>Map 3: SC-72</figcaption></figure><h4>V. JOINT DEVELOPMENT</h4><p>“Setting aside disputes and pursuing joint development” of natural resources, including oil and gas, has been a central component of China’s maritime-dispute policy since the 1970s. Created by Deng Xiaoping, it proposes that “when conditions are not ripe to bring about a thorough solution to a territorial dispute, discussion on the issue of sovereignty may be postponed”, while “the territories under dispute may be developed in a joint way”.</p><p>Subsequent leaders have repeatedly promulgated “joint development” as a potentially effective approach to managing South China Sea disputes. “China is very keen on joint development, even if it’s just a symbolic gesture and nothing of substance is achieved”, a Chinese analyst on Asia-Pacific security said. “It shows China’s contribution to maintaining regional peace and promoting regional cooperation”. But because so many leaders have endorsed the concept, objective analysis of obstacles can be politically perilous. Instead, Chinese analysts often cursorily attribute lack of success to rival claimants’ preference for unilateral development at China’s expense and call for Beijing also to go it alone.</p><p><strong>A. Obstacles</strong></p><p><em>1. China’s precondition and Vietnam’s suspicion</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6nqRRNT0BOK9zGxcj4lDfw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Newspaper article from 1974 shows that territorial disputes over the Paracel islands between China and Vietnam is not a modern phenomenon. FLICKR/Manhhai</figcaption></figure><p>Beijing’s policy has four components. The first states: “The sovereignty of the territories concerned belongs to China”. “Vietnam and other countries can’t accept that”, said a Vietnamese foreign ministry official. A Philippine politician explained: “In principle we are open to joint development, but the dilemma is that joint development necessitates we recognise hereto unrecognised claims of China”.</p><p>The undefined nature of Chinese claims is another obstacle, especially for Vietnam, which deeply mistrusts China and 60 to 70 per cent of whose claimed EEZ is within China’s nine-dash line, which takes in most of the South China Sea’s surface area. Hanoi thus fears that joint development before agreeing on the disputed areas according to the UNCLOS would amount to legitimising the nine-dash line. A Vietnamese foreign ministry official commented:</p><blockquote>Joint development is one of the practical and provisional steps toward settling disputes. But the number one thing we need to do is to verify claims. If a partner can’t show me which area it claims with reasonable legal ground, we can’t do joint development. We can’t accept ambiguous claims without clarification. We can’t just accept some dotted lines.</blockquote><p>Without Beijing’s clarification, Hanoi suspects that “China … wants to develop on Vietnam’s EEZ”, especially the resource-rich area in the south.</p><blockquote>“Vietnamese people and leaders see that as our backyard. It’s what we own. Someone comes in and say we want to do joint development in your backyard. It’s not acceptable”.</blockquote><p><em>2. The Philippine law</em></p><p>Oil and gas exploration and development involving foreign companies are governed in the Philippines by the 1987 constitution and 1972 Oil Exploration and Development Act. The former stipulates that exploration, development and utilisation of natural resources is under the control and supervision of the state, which may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with private companies, but Philippine citizens, corporations or associations must own at least 60 per cent of the capital. The latter requires the government to retain at least 60 per cent of net profit. Collectively, these provisions are known as the 60/40 rule. The government may, however, offer investing companies financial incentives, including service fees, cost reimbursement and tax exemptions. The net effect is that foreign partners may receive financially advantageous contracts, but Philippine law requires that joint development projects in disputed waters include majority Philippine ownership, a nonstarter for China, which requires equal division of ownership.</p><p>In late 2014, a resolution was introduced in the Congress that aims to loosen these requirements. Known as the Charter change (Cha-cha), it would add the phrase “unless provided by law” to the constitution’s foreign-ownership provision, enabling Congress to begin an arduous process to modify or remove the 60/40 rule. Proponents argued that the constitutional restrictions on foreign ownership have impeded investment and thwarted economic development. Opponents charged that the resolution would lead to foreign possession of Philippine land.</p><p>The Cha-cha resolution became fodder for election politics when President Benigno Aquino III said on TV in August 2014 that he was open to seeking a second term through constitutional amendments, despite popular opposition to term extension. This roused suspicion that his allies in Congress would tack changes to presidential term limits onto the process that would modify the economic clause of the constitution. Despite support among businesses, the resolution’s prospects appear dim, especially with politics heating up ahead of the May 2016 election. “Waiting for it to succeed is like waiting for the sun to become the moon”, said a former energy department under-secretary.</p><p><strong>B. Attempts at Joint Development</strong></p><p>Despite diplomatic, political and legal obstacles, claimants have attempted joint development, albeit with scant success.</p><ol><li><em>The Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking</em></li></ol><p>In 2003, Manila was short on options after failing to attract international investors to develop indigenous hydrocarbon resources. “At that time, the situation in the Philippines was such that we imported almost 99.9 per cent of crude oil and petroleum products, mostly for transportation. It was … the era of $100 per barrel of oil. We wanted indigenous oil but couldn’t explore ourselves in our backyard”, said Manalac, then PNOC president and CEO and energy under-secretary. During his tenure at Phillips Petroleum, Manalac worked with Chinese NOCs on joint projects.</p><blockquote>“I was close to the Chinese companies. My instinct was, why can’t I ask these guys to help out with joint development? So I presented this to the [Philippine] president, and she enthusiastically approved”.</blockquote><p>Concerns about sovereignty and possible problems under Philippine law were suppressed but surfaced later to haunt the project.</p><p>Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was presiding over a “golden age” of Sino-Philippine relations, underwritten with generous Chinese infrastructure loans. During her 2004 state visit to Beijing, PNOC and CNOOC signed the Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) to collaborate on seismic surveillance. It covered an area of 142,886km2. Without directly mentioning sovereignty, the agreement stated that it “shall not undermine the basic position held by the Government of each Party on the South China Sea issue”. According to Manalac, the parties looked for an area only the two sides claimed but “couldn’t find anything that’s of significant size”, due to China’s nine-dash line and Vietnam’s also substantial claims. The area covered by the bilateral agreement overlapped with Vietnam’s claims, and after six months of strong objection, Hanoi reluctantly joined the deal in order to “make the best of an unsatisfactory situation”.</p><p>Under the tripartite agreement, CNOOC geological surveillance vessels collected data that was processed in Vietnam and subsequently brought to the Philippines for interpretation. All three parties were present at each step. “One of the strongest incentives of the tripartite agreement was the confidence building among the countries. We worked together to demonstrate it could be done. We succeeded at that”, said Manalac.</p><p>In late 2007-early 2008, when data arrived in the Philippines for interpretation, the JMSU was up for renewal and facing a public backlash. According to then Energy Under-Secretary Guillermo Balce, a Manila press conference was held to publicise the surveys. “It was then the media asked about the location of the area, and the controversy began”. Though the size of the area the JMSU covered had been made public, its location was confidential. Balce said the intent was not to deceive.</p><blockquote>“It was done among the companies. The foreign ministries advised the process. The negotiations were very technical … I don’t think it was necessary to divulge technical details to the public. It was normal business activities”.</blockquote><p>Press articles, especially one in the <em>Far Eastern Economic Review</em>, revealed details of the JMSU, including its location. The author said the Philippines had “made breathtaking concessions in agreeing to the area for study”, and “about one-sixth of the entire area, closest to the Philippine coastline, is outside the claims by China and Vietnam”. Manalac admitted the Philippines may have appeared to have conceded too much.</p><blockquote>“The real question, however, is what’s our national interest? If there’s no joint development, nobody will come to help us develop it. We don’t have the money to explore it ourselves. … Who else will come if China claims it?”</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*yZRNu34L8supcVpQslZJcQ.png" /><figcaption>Map 4: Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking</figcaption></figure><p>Around the same time, sentiment was turning against Arroyo and Chinese investments. The president and her husband were accused of corruption in a $329 million telecommunications deal with a Chinese company, and JMSU revelations further energised her critics. Opposition lawmakers filed resolutions seeking probes into whether the administration had compromised sovereignty and sold out national territory for an $8 billion loan package. Some urged impeachment.</p><p>Critics also challenged the JMSU’s constitutionality for not abiding by the 60/40 rule. Opposition lawmakers further argued that it should have been treated as an international agreement, not a commercial contract, and thus, under the constitution, that it required ratification by the Senate.</p><p>According to Manalac, the negotiators had foreseen and sought to forestall the legal troubles with clever wording:</p><blockquote>The title of the agreement was Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking. There’s no mention of oil exploration, so we said this had nothing to do with petrol exploration. It was an undertaking. The Philippines said there could be no mention of exploration.</blockquote><p>The agreement’s careful language specified that the parties would be “engaging in a joint research of petroleum resource potential … as a pre-exploration activity”. The Arroyo administration thus argued that JMSU data-gathering was outside the constitutional requirements for exploration and development. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court was petitioned in May 2008 to nullify the JMSU, inter alia, for violating the 60/40 rule. China and Vietnam wanted renewal, but the Arroyo administration, besieged by legal challenges and political troubles, chose to let it expire on 1 July 2008, after reportedly keeping it on operational hold since March.</p><p>Had the parties managed to push forward, said Manalac, the 60/40 rule might have proved insurmountable, as the next stage would have involved drilling. More than seven years after the JMSU expired, the challenge to its constitutionality is still pending before the Supreme Court and a threat to new joint projects.</p><p><em>2. China-Vietnam</em></p><p>In 2006, CNOOC and PetroVietnam agreed on joint exploration in the Tonkin Gulf, at the north-western corner of the South China Sea, framed by China’s Hainan, its southern coast and Vietnam’s northern coast. China had first marked its boundary in the South China Sea in 1936, with eleven dashes, two in the Tonkin Gulf. In 1953, the CCP erased the two dashes as a gesture of communist camaraderie to Vietnam. The sides agreed in 2000 on the boundary delimitation in the Gulf, and joint exploration has been ongoing there since 2007. The sides extended the agreement in 2013 to the end of 2016 and expanded its area from 1,541km2 to 4,076km2, with each contributing an equal amount across the boundary line. The boundary settlement made cooperation uncontroversial, but despite seismic surveillance and the drilling of one well, commercial-grade deposits have not been found.</p><p>Cooperation where the boundary is unsettled has been more challenging. In October 2011, China and Vietnam agreed to speed up delimitation outside the mouth of the Tonkin Gulf and discuss joint development there. During a Hanoi visit in October 2013, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang urged that the sides “try to make substantive progress” on jointly developing the outer mouth of the Gulf by the end of 2013 to “demonstrate to the world that China and Vietnam have the ability and wisdom to maintain peace in the South China Sea”. They did create a working group, but seven rounds of consultations have made little progress.</p><p>Beijing and Hanoi disagree on the priorities. China presses for progress on joint development first; Vietnam insists on delimitation first. On delimitation, they vaguely agree to the principle of a median line between China’s Hainan Island and Vietnam, but Vietnamese sources say Hanoi insists it be drawn between the territorial sea baselines of each, while Beijing wants to draw it between the coasts, resulting in a difference of about ten to twenty nautical miles. Further, Hanoi seeks to use the political significance Beijing attaches to joint development to open negotiations on the Paracels, which both claim but China occupies, denies they are disputed and refuses to negotiate about.</p><blockquote>“The ultimate issue is the Paracel [group]. Joint development is Vietnam’s leverage, but China doesn’t want to discuss the Paracel, so it’s deadlocked”, said a former Vietnamese foreign ministry official.</blockquote><p><em>3. China-Philippines</em></p><p>The Philippines’ hunger for domestically produced energy and inability to obtain this on their own have continued to fuel their desire to cooperate with China. As put by Energy Secretary Petilla, “the alternative is not to drill, probably forever”. In May 2012, Philex Petroleum — a private Philippine company and majority shareholder of Forum Energy — held initial talks with CNOOC, offering it an investor role in SC-72 on the Reed Bank. CNOOC reportedly responded “positively”, yet ultimately declined, as participation could be interpreted as recognising Philex ownership and, by extension, Philippine sovereignty. Talks have continued on-and-off, most recently in July 2014, but without agreement.</p><p>The Aquino administration has insisted that any prospective Chinese partner for development of Reed Bank must recognise Philippine sovereignty and accept all royalties going to the Philippines. Further, it has stressed that “any exploration agreement in the West Philippine Sea must be in accordance with Philippine law”, ie, the 60/40 rule. Partnership is thus unlikely under the Aquino administration, but the president to be elected in May could be more flexible. When asked about joint development, Jejomar Binay, vice president and presidential candidate, said, “China has all the capital and we have the property so why don’t we try and develop that property as a joint venture?” Another frontrunner, Senator Grace Poe, said she expected a Senate committee to “recommend new approaches to solve the conflict that may include regional cooperation, joint exploration based on parity and law and continuing dialogue”.</p><p>A willing president could supply the political will, but joint development would still face nationalist pushback — Binay was accused of being a “Manchurian candidate” after his remark — and legal obstacles, including the 60/40 rule and the challenge to the JMSU pending before the Supreme Court. Many supporters of cooperation with China are energy officials and industry executives who tend to discount the political and legal difficulties. For example, a former energy under-secretary said, “at the end of the day, it’s the economics that matter. It’s about whether we can find oil and gas. CNOOC only wants oil and gas out”.</p><p>Chinese actions in recent years — seizing control of the Scarborough Shoal, blocking Philippine access to the Second Thomas Shoal, refusing to participate in arbitration at The Hague and building large artificial islands in the Spratlys — have also made joint development less palatable to the Philippine public and politically more perilous for leaders. “Joint development is China’s preferred approach, but it requires trust and confidence”, an academic noted. “… China has not done anything recently that could generate trust. In fact, China’s actions have only deepened suspicion that joint development is just another ploy”.</p><h4>VI. CONCLUSION</h4><p>Joint development as a confidence-building measure has potential but is not compatible with the current political environment. Beijing is an eager proponent for joint measures but lacks appreciation for the political, technical and legal obstacles, including other claimants’ suspicion that the precondition China sets and its unwillingness to clarify its claims suggests its objective is less confidence building than obtaining resources from their EEZs.</p><p>The start of the JMSU showed that concerns can be allayed if relations are stable, flashpoints are kept under check and diplomacy is unimpeded. The demise of that project, however, was evidence that the obstacles have to be addressed. Several years of tensions have undermined political will — especially in Manila and Hanoi — to work for cooperation and fuelled the nationalism that was a major factor in derailing the JMSU. It is highly unlikely a similar endeavour would succeed in today’s climate.</p><p>Bilaterally, China and the Philippines appear the best aligned for cooperative energy exploration. China considers such an endeavour would vindicate a central pillar of its South China Sea approach, prove the wisdom of generations of its leaders and showcase its constructive role in maintaining regional stability. The Philippines have compelling economic incentives that make cooperation with China appear a financially attractive option. Due to Beijing’s sharp-elbowed pursuit of claims and Manila’s arbitration case, however, relations are at an all-time low. In Manila, advocating cooperation with China has become riskier politically, and the 60/40 rule remains a major roadblock. Prospect for Sino-Philippine joint development, therefore, is dim at best. China and Vietnam have nominally active consultations on the somewhat less controversial measure of joint exploration outside the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin, but scant progress has been made due in part to a mismatch in priorities.</p><p>Joint development, therefore, is unlikely to be implemented in the near term. The first step toward establishing norms that would allow the benefits of South China Sea hydrocarbon resources to be exploited might be to address in greater detail the less controversial issue of exploration. However, understanding and highlighting the overall challenges of partnership is crucial to discredit the assertion that China needs to respond with unilateral actions to other claimants’ refusal to cooperate.</p><blockquote>Acknowledging the obstacles could change the narrative from assigning blame to seeking remedies and managing expectations.</blockquote><p>China’s precondition might be countered by specifying in legal terms in the agreement that participation in joint development does not imply a sovereignty concession or prejudice future delimitation negotiations.</p><p>Misgivings about the nine-dash line could be mitigated if China were to move toward bringing its claims into compliance with international law, even implicitly. Beijing, though not ready to publicly clarify its claims, could allay Vietnam’s suspicion by following UNCLOS principles in defining overlapping claims, which could then provide the basis for closed-door consultations to establish areas of joint exploration outside the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin. In exchange, Vietnam might refrain from trying to open talks on the Paracels.</p><p>These enabling diplomatic and legal manoeuvres would need to be preconditioned on a favourable and stable regional environment. Preserving the long-term prospect of joint development requires all parties to manage flashpoints, refrain from provocation and invest in diplomacy. In particular, they should refrain from unilateral exploration or development in the most contested areas, those around the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The arbitration ruling in The Hague, when it is eventually handed down, could provide legal clarity on maritime zones (though not sovereignty) that land features are entitled to. Even if it does not accept the ruling, China should use it to guide its behaviour, for example by refraining from policing areas that it cannot claim legally even if they are within the nine-dash line. A degree of confidence needs to be built first by such means before joint development itself can become a viable confidence-building measure.</p><p><em>For more on Crisis Group’s reporting on the South China Sea, see </em><a href="http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china.aspx"><em>crisisgroup.org</em></a><em>.</em></p><p><em>Follow Crisis Group’s Senior China Analyst </em><a href="https://medium.com/u/5eaa3637cd65"><em>Yanmei Xie</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7d4b7286aac0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Fighting the Digital Wars of the Future]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/fighting-the-digital-wars-of-the-future-3b70cdebca7f?source=rss-b8580e8a76e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3b70cdebca7f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Crisis Group]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 07 Jan 2016 12:50:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-04-22T15:02:32.341Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>By Ed Williams, CEO of Edelman UK and Ireland</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*78DIJocbsDPL7mxBscJPLQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>A group of activists opposed to the dictatorship of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi huddle over computer screens in Benghazi in 2011. The same technologies used by dissidents can be exploited by violent extremists and criminal groups. MAGNUM/Thomas Dworzak</figcaption></figure><figure><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/meet-the-authors-6d41374b1554#.7p4y3dfst"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/1*NBvHKquAmKbsa8b0MwqEjg.jpeg" /></a><figcaption>Ed Williams</figcaption></figure><p>Imagine a world in which an extremist preacher sitting in the desert in Syria could preach hatred to 5 million potential recruits simultaneously. Through virtual reality, the would-be jihadis could feel the wind and dryness of the purifying desert on their skin, alongside the rhetoric of glory in this world or the next.</p><p>Consider a time when there is no cash and funds skulk across borders, untraceable, funding terror cells anywhere. Malevolent forces could hack into your home via your computer or even your television. Cyber-terrorists can hack into driverless cars to create mass casualties.</p><p>These scenarios are not too far away; some are with us today. The so-called Islamic State (IS) is <a href="http://news.sky.com/story/1617197/exclusive-inside-is-terror-weapons-lab">reportedly experimenting with its own driverless cars</a>. It already uses social media and digital channels to recruit, propagandise and intimidate. IS has embraced digital warfare in a far more effective way than any terror group that has come before it.</p><blockquote>Increasingly over the past decade, wars have been fought online as well as offline. This trend will only grow due to the speed of technological change and easier access to a shrinking world.</blockquote><p>Add the possibility of ballooning levels of unemployment caused by automation in “the fourth industrial age”, accompanied by growing anger and alienation, and that will create a lethal cauldron from which we can expect future crises to emerge.</p><p>Over the next twenty years, the means for terror groups to stoke fear, inspire recruits and generate chaos will be limited only by their creativity. Technology will be central to future global crises. Terrorists and aggressive states see tech’s potential to offer affordable, achievable weapons of mass destruction.</p><p>Already, fifteen-year-old hackers can commandeer millions of computers from their dark suburban bedrooms, bringing down corporations and doing violence to the competence of, and confidence in, all governments. Some of these individuals are part of a global hacking movement driven by good old-fashioned counter-cultural resistance. We live in an increasingly noisy “post-truth” era, in which teenage hackers consider business as bad, governments as corrupt and the “house” — as they view the gambling excesses of global capital markets — skewed toward the richest 1 per cent.</p><p>Computing power is growing so fast and the hacking tools are so easy to find that this movement poses a very real risk to future stability. If it remains true that computing power doubles every two years, then in twenty years our current technological capabilities will be about 8,000 times more powerful. Cryptography will be many orders of magnitude tougher to break. The same tools that protect our security also pose a real threat.</p><blockquote>Terror groups will ride these trends too. Front of stage, we will see greater sophistication in the use of social media platforms — the visible manifestation of technology as a terror weapon.</blockquote><p>The marketing skills consumer brands use to “tell stories” will increasingly be adopted by extremist organisations. Communication will take the form of much visually richer video and images, used to spread fear and brag about successes. Messages could be targeted to social feeds, seeking out vulnerable individuals or groups, or intimidating policymakers directly. In a parallel of targeted advertising, terror groups will pick off audiences and deliver specific tailored messages. Like media organisations, they will move from broadcasting to narrow casting.</p><p>A black flag flying on the public website of the U.S. State Department is simply a toe in the water. In October,<a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/15/politics/malaysian-hacker-isis-military-data/"> a young man from Kosovo was arrested in Malaysia on charges of stealing the personal data</a> of more than 1,000 U.S. military personnel and federal employees — and handing over the information to IS for use in targeted attacks. Such incidents are likely to become much more commonplace.</p><p>Meanwhile, backstage will be dominated by encrypted communication and digital currencies. The “dark wallet” and the digital ledger were invented by financial institutions to ease capital flows and protect privacy. The cryptography used to create such products may, however, allow terrorist groups to elude state surveillance.</p><p>In twenty years’ time, when many countries will be cashless, relatively unsophisticated groups will be able to smuggle money with ease. Nobody yet knows what threats this might present to capital markets, financial institutions and the global economy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4bens5koiXdNuRKnn2Lo_Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>An office in Ciudad Mier, Mexico, after an attack on 16 November 2010. MAGNUM/Jerome Sessini</figcaption></figure><p>In hardware, technological advancements — robotics or artificial intelligence — are also potential weapons that may be wielded to spark conflict. Virtual and augmented reality offer the most potent recruitment or intimidation tools the world has ever seen.</p><p>Within five years, most children from industrialised nations will have a form of virtual reality (VR) in their bedrooms. VR’s powerful immediacy can be used by groups like IS to bring followers closer to their perverted version of the world. The experience will be more impactful and more intoxicating to those vulnerable to the message.</p><p>A fully immersive sensory experience will result in a far more rapid assimilation of information, a boon for organisations that seek recruits through brainwashing. The optic nerve processes data at 8 megabits per second. But we use just a fraction of this at 1 kilobit per second when we are reading on the screen.</p><p>With VR, converts won’t be made in prisons or prayer groups, but in bedrooms.</p><p>Of course, technology is an enabler; when it comes to terrorism, it is human beings we should be more worried about. This goes to the heart of the biggest risk we face with respect to future crises — millions of disenfranchised, disaffected, unemployed people angry at the growing opportunity gap between the super wealthy and everyone else. The Arab Spring was driven by this phenomenon, and the main conflicts over the next twenty years will be too.</p><p><a href="http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employment.pdf">A 2013 study by Michael Osborne and Carl Benedikt Frey, which looked at over 700 different job types</a>, found that almost 50 per cent of total U.S. employment was at risk of substitution by robot or computer. That is about 60 million jobs. If the 1990s were about squeezing out the middle of the job market, the future will be about squeezing almost everywhere else, unless your work involves personal and direct interaction with other human beings. New types of jobs will be created too, but many economists predict that government share of GDP will have to go up to pay for welfare as we experience racing levels of unemployment.</p><p>Capital is rising in GDP terms while labour is falling, most dramatically in the U.S., where corporate profits make up nearly 10 per cent of GDP. Future businesses will be much more like Instagram — which had only thirteen employees when it was acquired by Facebook for $1 billion — than like Kodak, whose workforce once numbered 145,000 people.</p><blockquote>The risk of civil disruption will increase as fewer people find rewarding employment. Large groups of unemployed, tech-savvy youth will look to get even with society. How will we help them? How will we disentangle idealism from violent extremism?</blockquote><p>Facing such complexity, any response will require a sophisticated and subtle hand to balance new restrictions with freedoms, particularly the right to free expression. We must prepare for enemies of democracy to take the fight online. But we must be careful to avoid doing their work for them by curbing freedoms in the digital world that earlier generations won on bloodier battlefields.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/200/1*NVYeI6HPjWHAa143d-MMBQ.jpeg" /></figure><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/about-the-future-of-conflict-project-7a6129b4725e#.d1rd3gy5k"><em>About The Future of Conflict</em></a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/meet-the-authors-6d41374b1554#.y6z6zzy7l"><em>Learn more about our contributors</em></a></p><p><em>This article represents the view of the individual writer, not that of International Crisis Group or of its Board.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3b70cdebca7f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict/fighting-the-digital-wars-of-the-future-3b70cdebca7f">Fighting the Digital Wars of the Future</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-future-of-conflict">The Future of Conflict</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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