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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Peter Morgan on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Peter Morgan on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Peter Morgan on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Southampton: The Era of the Sound Business Plan?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@CulturalMorgan/southampton-the-era-of-the-sound-business-plan-375fdf105a96?source=rss-4ead6ec4073d------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[football]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[southampton]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[premier-league]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Morgan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jan 2018 11:59:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-23T12:09:13.471Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In January 2015, Gary Neville dedicated <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/11366206/Gary-Neville-The-era-of-the-gaffer-is-over.html">one of his columns for <em>The Telegraph</em></a><em> </em>to an exploration of the structural management of Southampton Football Club, which had been revamped drastically since the mid-2000s. Speaking to their executive director, Les Reed, about a recruitment process that involves his collaboration with a chief scout, head analyst and head coach, Neville concludes that their “type of joined-up thinking, planning and detail is where football has to and will go.” The club would go on to finish that season in 7th place and better that by breaking into the top 6 the following year. Yet currently sitting in the relegation zone with 24 games already played, it’s clear that the exemplary foresight the club has shown in its recruitment — of both playing and managerial staff — has stalled somewhere, if not regressed significantly. Three major decisions made in the summer of 2017 are central to their increasingly difficult season, namely the firing and hiring of Claude Puel and Mauricio Pellegrino and the insistence on retaining Virgil van Dijk. Looking further into their recent history illustrates the jarring nature of these choices, in both the economic and stylistic terms of their footballing narrative.<br> <br>Since the surprise inclusion of Theo Walcott in Sven-Göran Eriksson’s 2006 World Cup squad, coinciding with his move to Arsenal as a 17 year old, Southampton have been synonymous with producing outstanding academy players. This was a time when the club were competing in the second tier, having suffered relegation in 2005. Another famous product of their youth set-up during this period was Gareth Bale, sold to Tottenham in 2007. By 2009, Southampton were playing in the third tier of English football and on the verge of bankruptcy. The turbulence at the upper echelons of the club in this period led to developing what Reed refers to as their “very sound business plan,” currently in place. “Because this club nearly went out of existence,” he continues, “our job is to make sure that never happens again. So we do due diligence rather than gamble.” Walcott and Bale were sold in part due to the need to sustain the club financially. Yet since their return to the Premier League, selling players — both academy products and astute signings — has continued, with the primary destination shifting from North London to the North West of the country.</p><p>With the notable exceptions of Victor Wanyama and Calum Chambers (who did indeed move to the capital), Southampton’s most important squad members have been bought overwhelmingly by Liverpool. Adam Lallana, Rickie Lambert, Dejan Lovren, Nathaniel Clyne, Sadio Mané, and Virgil van Dijk have made that move since June 2014, while Luke Shaw and Morgan Schneiderlin have joined Manchester United (Schneiderlin has actually played in both cities, now wearing blue on Merseyside). Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain, another starlet of the Southampton youth ranks, has played for both Arsenal and now Liverpool. Clearly, an element of Southampton’s economic model is to both produce and recruit players that can be sold for vast profits.</p><p>Van Dijk’s transfer, while eventually going through in the current window, was ostensibly blocked during the summer due to an illegal approach made directly to the player by Liverpool. But this transgression has disguised how peculiar it was for Southampton not to take the huge profit on a player they had bought for £13m two years earlier. Some will fairly posit that it was an admirable stance to take that demonstrated resistance to external pressures. Others will argue that in this market, holding out until January was shrewd business. Indeed, the fee Liverpool have paid for van Dijk is not only a world record for a defender, but 25% greater than the £60m price that was floated during the summer of 2017.</p><p>An insightful footballing statistician on Twitter named Christoffer Johansen <a href="https://twitter.com/bojochris/status/946079201890795522">has estimated that Van Dijk’s fee will equate to almost 22% of LFC’s total revenue for the season</a>. Johansen’s data also provides a more appropriate system of understanding the contemporary transfer market than the throwaway comments of “madness” offered by many professionals in the game. If we take <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deloitte_Football_Money_League#2014%E2%80%9315">the Deloitte Money League figures for 2014/15</a>, van Dijk’s transfer to Southampton from Celtic for £13m cost them a mere 8.7% of their own annual revenue, an emphatic demonstration of their model’s financial success. Yet the extra profit gained has come at a cost. Once his desired deal fell through, the player was clearly not committed to the club any longer and their dangerously poor league form means they need to turn to recruiting wisely yet again in the January window. Why they didn’t cash-in during the summer and look to reinvest can perhaps be traced back to the surprising and somewhat uninspiring appointment of Mauricio Pellegrino.</p><p>Reed makes it clear to Neville that Southampton look to managers that fit their own demands, rather than seeking a philosophical reshuffle. He also highlights the club’s future-proofing outlook: “I’m always looking at five or six potential managers who have already impressed me.” Enter Mauricio Pellegrino. But first, exit Claude Puel, who appeared to have done an impressive job last season with an 8th place finish and a narrow cup final defeat to Manchester United, beating Jürgen Klopp’s Liverpool home and away in their semi-final to get there. Looking at the final league table, detractors could point to Southampton’s rather measly points tally of 46 (Watford placed in 17th with 40). Yet that’s deceptively harsh. Southampton had gathered 43 of those points after 31 games. With a top 8 finish all-but secured, their season did fizzle out while playing both Manchester teams, Liverpool, Chelsea and Arsenal in those final seven fixtures, all of whom had more at stake. As Paul Doyle noted <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2017/jun/15/claude-puel-southampton-premier-league-expectations">in his assessment of Puel’s reign</a>, they were also without one of the better centre-back pairings in the league for the second half of their season, with van Dijk suffering a long-term injury and José Fonte moving to West Ham.</p><p>Not good enough for Reed and co., they sought the man who had taken Deportivo Alavés into La Liga in 2016 and, in securing a 9th place and cup final appearance against Barcelona in their first season, essentially mirrored Puel’s achievements, only with an impressive 55 points and being incredibly tall and handsome about it all. Yet their records in goalscoring terms last season were remarkably similar. Alavés scored 41 and conceded 43; Southampton matched their 41 but conceded 48, pointing to a shared ability between the teams, if not philosophy between the two coaches. Besides an opening day draw which had them in 8th, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016%E2%80%9317_La_Liga#Positions_by_round">Alavés were never once above 9th in the table that season</a>. There are multiple factors in the sacking of a manager, but it is difficult to see why Puel, with his debut season in the league going so steadily and his vast experience in France in winning leagues and competing in Champions League knockout stages, was let go so swiftly. He was the first manager since Nigel Adkins in January 2013 to be dismissed, back when they brought in their other Mauricio, from Espanyol.</p><p>Looking back to the time Neville’s article was published, there’s an irony to the recruitment team at Southampton being revered for its organisational synchronicity and attention to minute detail, and Liverpool’s “transfer committee” being cited as a menacing force destroying any chance of some philosophical coherency being maintained at the club (the phrase was put to Klopp in his first press conference as Liverpool manager). There is a kind of twisted truth to this on the surface: Southampton doing all of the hard work in perfecting their academy and scouting; Liverpool coming in a few years later with a chequebook and a prayer. As Neville alludes to in his piece, the discomfort with managerial autonomy being shared with other experts at clubs is something that he’s coming to terms with. The reason for that shift occurring quicker in his mind is probably due to his business interests, particularly his co-ownership of Salford City FC, and the need to manage the club economically rather than on purely sporting terms.</p><p>A recent <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/dec/15/manchester-city-football-group-ferran-soriano">article</a> in <em>The Guardian </em>by Giles Tremlett<em> </em>presented a detailed — and often glowing — dissection of Manchester City’s quest for global domination through their City Football Group. Ferran Soriano, former Barcelona General Manager and current CEO of City, is cited as a key thinker in their business model. Tremlett details a talk that Soriano gave in 2006 at Birkbeck College:</p><blockquote>Thanks to the phenomenal growth in their worldwide fan bases, he noted, big clubs were being transformed from promoters and organisers “of local events, like a circus” into “global entertainment companies like Walt Disney”. If big clubs seized the opportunity to “capture the growth and become global franchises”, they would soon stand apart from their rivals, creating a new, world-conquering elite.</blockquote><p>It’s difficult to argue that Soriano’s proclamation hasn’t become reality in the twelve years since. The gulf between the elite clubs and the rest has widened economically. Southampton’s impressive management over that time has effectively seen them become something akin to Pixar, though their acquisition by bigger players in the market has been atomised and wrenchingly staggered over a number of years. Replacements came and went at the club, but it is only now that their brand identity has begun to slip away.</p><p>When Neville remarks that the Southampton model is commendable because ‘a club should not breach its philosophy for an individual,’ what is also implied is that emotional connection from any of the coaching or playing staff is not imperative. While it’s impressive to retain overarching principles, in a business setting that is so vividly and innately reliant on romance and emotion, there is a demand for individuals, for characters, for connections. Southampton have produced those things until now. Some felt Puel couldn’t provide them. The next five months will be crucial if they are to have them again in the near future.</p><p>The scale of their regression will only be seen when we reach the end of their season. Indeed, a mere 6 points separates Southampton in 18th from Everton in 9th. It is still wholly possible that the club could yet again have a cup final appearance and a top-half league finish by May. But few would say it’s plausible, which highlights the bleaker reality of their form on the pitch this season: when Southampton compete against one of the big six, it’s becoming a surprise, not an expectation.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=375fdf105a96" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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