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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by De.Fi Security on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by De.Fi Security on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[REPORT: $55M Lost in Crypto in May in 2023 (Infographics)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/defiyield-official-blog/report-55m-lost-in-crypto-in-may-in-2023-infographics-283b11fca273?source=rss-22914eb1d61------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/283b11fca273</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto-scam-reports]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[De.Fi Security]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 05 Jun 2023 15:10:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-05T15:10:10.034Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>REPORT: $55M Lost in Crypto in May in 2023</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GAlfuEQF3Yk9Ehe4MdG8QA.png" /></figure><h3><strong>$55m Funds Lost in May 2023: Top DeFi Scams and Exploits</strong></h3><ul><li>In May 2023, the cryptocurrency market experienced significant losses, with a total of $54,954,345 reported as funds lost.</li><li>Unfortunately, no funds were recovered during this month. The majority of the losses were attributed to the Binance ecosystem, with a total of $37.1m reported across ten cases.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XkdHQWfCZ08cczbf49_Hgw.png" /></figure><p>In May 2023, the DeFi space experienced a series of scams and hacking incidents, resulting in significant losses. The total amount lost this month reached $55 million, a notable decrease compared to the same period last year when losses amounted to a staggering $40 billion. This is also considerably lower than in April, where $101.5 million was lost.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XkdHQWfCZ08cczbf49_Hgw.png" /></figure><p>Although the decrease in losses is encouraging, this figure remains a reminder of the ongoing challenges faced by the DeFi industry in ensuring platform security. Efforts to enhance security measures and raise awareness about fraud and scams seem to be producing positive outcomes.</p><p>Regrettably, no recoveries were made in May 2023. The recovery of funds remains a crucial aspect in mitigating the impact of losses and restoring confidence in the DeFi ecosystem.</p><h3><strong>DeFi Exploit Trends: May 2023 Overview</strong></h3><p>The cryptocurrency landscape in May 2023 witnessed a significant amount of funds lost, totaling $54,954,345. Binance remained a prime target for these incidents, with six cases reported and a total loss of $37.1m. Another hotspot, the Ethereum Chain experienced ten cases, resulting in $2.1 in losses.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YkSDI9uyYPnamBVb2Uf5ng.png" /></figure><p>Among the top 10 cases, DFintoch suffered the highest loss of $31.7m due to a smart contract exploit. Jimbo Protocol on Arbitrum experienced a loss of $7.5 as a result of a rugpull, while Deus Finance on BNB lost $6.2 in a smart contract exploit.</p><p>Tornado Cash, on the Ethereum blockchain, also suffered a loss of $1,049,513 due to an exploit. Other notable cases include Mother, WSB Coin, Linda Yaccarino, Block Forest, SNOOKER, and land, with losses ranging from $145,043 to $733,883.</p><h3><strong>Types of Exploit</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8EwX0B8N7p3M5fqOj_ggDA.png" /></figure><p>In May 2023, various types of exploits were employed by cryptocurrency criminals. However, rug pulls continued to be the most prevalent, accounting for 12 cases and losses totaling $36.9m.</p><p>9 cases of exploits have taken place, resulting in losses amounting to $8.8m. Flash Loan Attacks, although less frequent with 5 cases, still led to significant losses totaling $8.9m.</p><p>Other exploit types, such as access control issues, phishing, and oracle issues, were not reported during this period. However, 2 cases of exit scams resulted in a loss of $177k.</p><h3><strong>Funds Recovered</strong></h3><p>In May, no exploited funds were recovered, continuing the unfortunate trend of low recovery rates in recent months. This highlights the importance of improved security measures and investor vigilance in the DeFi space.</p><h3><strong>Attack Vectors</strong></h3><p>Among the different categories of targets, tokens were the most commonly attacked, with 19 cases reported and losses totaling $3.3m.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8dk0LEIadLz7PBGwT2hygQ.png" /></figure><p>Borrowing and Lending protocols experienced no reported losses during this month. Decentralized Exchanges (DEX) were targeted in 3 cases, resulting in losses of $4m.</p><p>Notably, Stablecoins were the category with the highest amount lost, amounting to $6,227,977 in a single case. Other categories, including CeFi (Centralized Finance), Yield Aggregators, Gaming &amp; Metaverse, and NFTs, did not report any losses during this period.</p><h3><strong>Top Exploits in May 2023</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UpbvXOFdaDWjB8s57NLx9g.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Let’s take a look at the top 5 cases this month:</strong></h4><p><strong>1. DFintoch — $31.7m Lost (Rug pull, 22 May)</strong></p><p>The DFintoch project deployed the FintochSTO contract using the deployer address 0x8a0deffb71a5dc17a779ab25fdc17fdeb249aa63. During deployment, 100,000 FTH tokens were minted. These tokens were then sent to address 0xfce4d. However, on the May-22–2023, a transfer of 34,341 FTH tokens was made from 0xfce4d to address 0xec1a.</p><p>Following that, 20,000 FTH tokens were swapped for 31,666,317 USDT using the “swapForUSDT()” function on the contract with address 0x19a00e359990ec7daf6e9dd9a2fb7664014bb5f7.</p><p>The funds were subsequently moved to address 0x398dcb3e535f701e93ed2891aaab601c25ebacf4. Multichain and SWFT were utilized for the bridging of funds.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Transaction deploying FintochSTO contract: <a href="https://bscscan.com/tx/0x3ef479ba75e07ad04f02b5a5f4df476bbbc83bb5d15fdcd2acd1955a4e87fce6">https://bscscan.com/tx/0x3ef479ba75e07ad04f02b5a5f4df476bbbc83bb5d15fdcd2acd1955a4e87fce6</a></p><p>Transaction transferring 34,341 FTH to address 0xec1a:<a href="https://bscscan.com/tx/0xee053bf3c429603319d352979e09b207103a08ebf5f42aa0ddd22a9d67f004d6">https://bscscan.com/tx/0xee053bf3c429603319d352979e09b207103a08ebf5f42aa0ddd22a9d67f004d6</a></p><p>SwapTx: <a href="https://bscscan.com/tx/0xa5e64161928ee40f6af02a32fc5c1fb9efa05cca6b91d88326279329b71c7ea2">https://bscscan.com/tx/0xa5e64161928ee40f6af02a32fc5c1fb9efa05cca6b91d88326279329b71c7ea2</a></p><p><strong>2. Jimbo Protocol</strong></p><p>The attack on Jimbos Protocol exploited the lack of slippage control on liquidity conversions, allowing the attacker to reverse swap orders and benefit from the price discrepancy. The protocol’s mechanism, designed to address liquidity and volatile token prices, had a logical vulnerability that enabled the exploit. As a result, the price of the native token, Jimbo (JIMBO), dropped by 40%. The attackers extracted 4,090 ETH from the Arbitrum network and used the Stargate bridge and the Celer Network to transfer around 4,048 ETH from the Ethereum network.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Exploit tx:<a href="https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x44a0f5650a038ab522087c02f734b80e6c748afb207995e757ed67ca037a5eda">https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x44a0f5650a038ab522087c02f734b80e6c748afb207995e757ed67ca037a5eda</a></p><p>Exploiter: <a href="https://arbiscan.io/address/0x102be4bccc2696c35fd5f5bfe54c1dfba416a741">https://arbiscan.io/address/0x102be4bccc2696c35fd5f5bfe54c1dfba416a741</a></p><p>Bridged funds:<a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x5f3591e2921d5c9291f5b224e909ab978a22ba7e">https://etherscan.io/address/0x5f3591e2921d5c9291f5b224e909ab978a22ba7e</a></p><p><strong>3. Deus Finance</strong></p><p>DEI is a stablecoin of Deus Finance which lost its dollar peg on the previous hack. On May 5th, 2023 Deus Finance’s $DEI token was exploited due to a logic flaw related to burn issue that allowed an attacker to drain DEI/USD and DEI/USDC pools on both Arbitrum and Binance Smart Chain (BSC) chains. The attacker performed zero-amount burns and received $DEI tokens for nothing, which was consequently swapped for valuable stablecoins. On BSC chain alone roughly 1,336,814 $USD was lost. The stolen funds were transferred through several EOA addresses and then swapped for $DAI. And 4,891,163 $USD were drained from the Arbitrum chain and swapped for 2,529 $ETH, which remain at the same address.</p><p>The attack resulted in a total loss of approximately 6,227,977 $USD worth of crypto assets from both chains combined.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Attacker initial address in BSC: <a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x08e80ecb146dc0b835cf3d6c48da97556998f599">https://bscscan.com/address/0x08e80ecb146dc0b835cf3d6c48da97556998f599</a></p><p>Funds holder address in BSC: <a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0xdf61022837de1126488ed80f179eedd7af9cb465">https://bscscan.com/address/0xdf61022837de1126488ed80f179eedd7af9cb465</a></p><p>Malicious transaction in Binance Smart Chain: <a href="https://bscscan.com/tx/0xde2c8718a9efd8db0eaf9d8141089a22a89bca7d1415d04c05ba107dc1a190c3">https://bscscan.com/tx/0xde2c8718a9efd8db0eaf9d8141089a22a89bca7d1415d04c05ba107dc1a190c3</a></p><p>Attacker initial address in the Arbitrum chain: <a href="https://arbiscan.io/address/0x189cf534de3097c08b6beaf6eb2b9179dab122d1">https://arbiscan.io/address/0x189cf534de3097c08b6beaf6eb2b9179dab122d1</a></p><p>Malicious transaction in the Arbitrum chain: <a href="https://arbiscan.io/tx/0xb1141785b7b94eb37c39c37f0272744c6e79ca1517529fec3f4af59d4c3c37ef">https://arbiscan.io/tx/0xb1141785b7b94eb37c39c37f0272744c6e79ca1517529fec3f4af59d4c3c37ef</a></p><p><strong>4. Swaprum — $2.9m Lost (Rugpull, 18 May)</strong></p><p>Swaprum, an Arbitrum-based decentralized exchange (DEX) project, recently fell victim to a rugpull orchestrated by its own deployer. The rugpull resulted in a substantial loss of funds, totaling 2,915,567 USD. The exploit involved privileged access to liquidity providers (LPs) across multiple pools and the unauthorized minting of the project’s native token, $SAPR.</p><p>The rugpull consisted of two main components. Firstly, the deployer executed liquidity removals from various pools, including USDT/WETH, USDT/USDC, ARB/WETH, ARB/USDC, WOM/USDT, and more. These removals amounted to approximately $951,000 in losses, depleting the liquidity in these pools.</p><p>The second part of the exploit focused on the $SAPR token itself. The deployer initially minted 800,000 $SAPR tokens directly into their wallet address. Subsequently, an additional 500,000 $SAPR tokens, along with approximately $94,000 worth of WETH, were drained from the SAPR/WETH pool. This malicious action left the pool completely emptied of liquidity.</p><p>To compound the damages, the attacker deployed a malicious upgrade for the SAPR Controller Proxy contract. This upgrade enabled the creation of an additional 200 million new $SAPR tokens through two separate transactions, effectively diluting the value of existing tokens and harming legitimate token holders.</p><p>The total loss resulting from the rugpull amounted to 2,915,567 USD. The stolen funds were then transferred to another externally owned account (EOA) address in two transactions, which equated to 1,617.7 ETH. The attacker utilized various techniques to obfuscate the movement of the stolen funds, including utilizing privacy-focused tools like TornadoCash and bridging assets through platforms such as Celer Network and Multichain Bridge.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Scammer address:</p><p><a href="https://arbiscan.io/address/0xf2744e1fe488748e6a550677670265f664d96627">https://arbiscan.io/address/0xf2744e1fe488748e6a550677670265f664d96627</a></p><p>Fund holder address:<br><a href="https://arbiscan.io/address/0xaaf8b44376f4ef3ed477eeeb3553b7623fef5e1c">https://arbiscan.io/address/0xaaf8b44376f4ef3ed477eeeb3553b7623fef5e1c</a></p><p>Liquidity removal transaction examples:</p><p><a href="https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x0ebc5f9108974f5518cee002ab7dc4cfed6affb8e5f83ad430bfb00431f0c3be">https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x0ebc5f9108974f5518cee002ab7dc4cfed6affb8e5f83ad430bfb00431f0c3be</a></p><p><strong>5. Level Finance — $1.1m Lost (Exploit, 1 May)</strong></p><p>Level Finance, a decentralized perpetual exchange operating on the Binance Smart Chain, fell victim to an exploit that resulted in a significant loss of funds. The exploit specifically targeted the Referral Controller Contract, enabling the attacker to claim referral amounts in the form of $LVL tokens multiple times, ultimately draining the contract of 214,000 $LVL tokens. The stolen tokens were subsequently exchanged for 3,345 BNB, which amounts to approximately $1,097,160 USD at current market prices.</p><p>The attack was orchestrated by an individual operating from the address `0x61bb…412e`. The stolen funds are currently held under the control of the attacker at the address `0x7031…a9d5`. It is worth noting that this exploit exclusively targeted the Referral Controller Contract, and other entities such as LPs (liquidity providers) and the DAO treasury remained unaffected, as the attack was isolated from other contracts within Level Finance.</p><p>Attacker Address:</p><p><a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x61bbd8c1bc09c4f4549f3f77be5ad61a9929412e">https://bscscan.com/address/0x61bbd8c1bc09c4f4549f3f77be5ad61a9929412e</a></p><p>Funds Holder Address: <a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x70319d1c09e1373fc7b10403c852909e5b20a9d5">https://bscscan.com/address/0x70319d1c09e1373fc7b10403c852909e5b20a9d5</a></p><p>Malicious Contract Address: <a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0xf08a01d2cace301ae69f07af5fdfb2336da2f629">https://bscscan.com/address/0xf08a01d2cace301ae69f07af5fdfb2336da2f629</a></p><p>Affected Proxy Contract Address: <a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x977087422c008233615b572fbc3f209ed300063a">https://bscscan.com/address/0x977087422c008233615b572fbc3f209ed300063a</a></p><p>Affected Implementation Contract Address (LevelReferralControllerV2): <a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x9f00fbd6c095d2c542687ed5afb68d9c3fb2f464">https://bscscan.com/address/0x9f00fbd6c095d2c542687ed5afb68d9c3fb2f464</a></p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The scale of monetary losses during May 2023 underscores the importance of heightened risk management and attentiveness when engaging with the decentralized finance (DeFi) industry. It is crucial for investors to familiarize themselves with potential risks and implement suitable strategies to safeguard their investments. Here at De.Fi, we recognize the significance of offering support in navigating the intricate and dynamic DeFi ecosystem. Consequently, we are committed to providing our users with valuable tools and information to enable well-informed investment choices within the sector.</p><h3>🚨 SUPER IMPORTANT:</h3><p>Right now we are GIVING AWAY free copies of Security Bibles — the most comprehensive DeFi Security Guide brought to you by the De.Fi Team!</p><h3>Grab your copy NOW at: <a href="https://join.defiyield.app/">https://join.de.fi/</a></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/541/0*_aPXf2oaaEouOFeJ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://join.de.fi/">https://join.de.fi/</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=283b11fca273" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/defiyield-official-blog/report-55m-lost-in-crypto-in-may-in-2023-infographics-283b11fca273">REPORT: $55M Lost in Crypto in May in 2023 (Infographics)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/defiyield-official-blog">De.Fi</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[REPORT: $452M Lost in Crypto in Q1 2023. New Trends of Hacks & Scams]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/defiyield-official-blog/report-452m-lost-in-crypto-in-q1-2023-new-trends-of-hacks-scams-48bb186d6f16?source=rss-22914eb1d61------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/48bb186d6f16</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto-scam-reports]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[De.Fi Security]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 31 Mar 2023 12:04:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-31T16:07:19.409Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lxURhND1XbjkELdIaYwOTw.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Table of Contents:</strong></h3><blockquote>1. Key Points</blockquote><blockquote>2. Observable Trends in DeFi Exploits</blockquote><blockquote>3. Funds Recovered</blockquote><blockquote>4. Types of Exploits in Q1</blockquote><blockquote>5. Attack Vectors</blockquote><blockquote>6. Top Five Losses in Q1</blockquote><blockquote>7. Cщnclusion</blockquote><blockquote>8. About De.Fi</blockquote><blockquote>9. Free Security Bible (Book)</blockquote><h3>Key Points:</h3><ul><li>While these losses are staggering, they also mark a decrease as compared to the same period in 2022, Q1 which counted $1.3 billion in losses</li><li>Flash loans are becoming increasingly common in recent months with over $200m lost through this type of exploit</li><li>$130m was recovered in Q1 this year, marking a recovery rate of 28.7%</li></ul><p><em>De.Fi maintains and updates the largest database of hacks, scams and exploits in crypto via the </em><a href="https://de.fi/rekt-database"><em>Rekt Database</em></a></p><h3>Stats:</h3><p>While all attention has been on the unfolding banking crisis and a subsequent uptick in the Bitcoin market, we saw crypto losses mount to a 9-figure amount in March, and for the second month in a row. Hackers and scammers are upping the stakes as we count a total loss of close to $400 million in the first quarter of the year.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*eKU_fwgeyQh_Lq8Y" /></figure><p>Out of the $452m lost in Q1, a total of $215m was lost in just the first 20 days of March, underscoring the rapid pace at which scammers have been operating in recent weeks.</p><p>While these losses are staggering, they also mark a decrease as compared to the same period in 2022, wherein Q1 saw $1.3 billion lost. Here’s a comparison:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Wgk9875VykA7VESL" /></figure><p>In total, $130m was recovered in Q1 this year, marking a recovery rate of 28.7%. This figure was $520m in 2022, meaning that 40% of funds were recovered in the same month last year.</p><p>Let’s take a brief look at the top cases this quarter. We will then explore more in details the top 5 cases in Q1.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*NO_0SOxHwMOzzbxp" /></figure><h3><strong>Observable Trends in DeFi Exploits</strong></h3><p>As can be seen from the scale of the losses in Q1, a large majority of losses came from two protocols, Euler and BonqDAO — which together amounted to over $316 million being lost.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*9HmAbkslD7NSTOCP" /></figure><p>Notably, this means that the biggest losses this quarter were due to Flash Loan issues, which have been becoming increasingly common in recent months: Over $200m was lost through this channel.</p><p>This also makes Ethereum the chain where the highest losses were recorded in these first three months of the year.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*GwG1X9miBdY9l0vy" /></figure><p>Meanwhile, BNB Smart Chain unfortunately remains popular for crypto criminals, with a whopping 18 cases happening in the first three months of the year, almost double that of its closest peers, with 10 on ETH and 7 on Arbitrum.</p><h3><strong>Funds Recovered</strong></h3><p>In Q1, $130m was ultimately recovered. The whole amount was recovered in March, leaving January and February the rare months when 0$ was recovered in crypto hacks &amp; scams.</p><h3><strong>Types of Exploits in Q1</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*h-kTwaEj-C1CZgqB" /></figure><p>In terms of frequency, smart contract exploits were the most popular among criminals at a total of 17 instances. This was followed by the rugpull and flashloan attack, at 8 and 6 cases respectively — the latter which resulted in a majority of the losses in March.</p><h3><strong>Attack Vectors</strong></h3><p>In terms of attack vectors, Tokens proved to be the most popular targets this year so far — this is unsurprising given that tokens are easy to deploy, and prey on the fear of missing out experienced by many new crypto investors. This is especially true with the market comeback in recent days. In terms of amounts lost, though, Lending and Borrowing protocols took the prize, though this was driven by a small number of high profile events — Euler Finance and BonqDAO.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*OMzEYxMan_RkdO26" /></figure><h3><strong>Top Five Losses in Q1 2023</strong></h3><h4><strong>1. Euler — $196m Lost (Flash Loan, March 13)</strong></h4><p>On March 13th, Euler Finance, a prominent Ethereum-based noncustodial lending protocol, fell victim to a devastating flash loan attack. The breach led to the loss of millions of dollars worth of various cryptocurrencies, including Dai, USD Coin (USDC), staked Ether (StETH), and Wrapped Bitcoin (WBTC). The attacker executed multiple transactions, making away with a staggering total of nearly $196 million.</p><p>Detailed on-chain data revealed the theft included $8.7 million in Dai, $18.5 million in Wrapped Bitcoin, $135.8 million in Staked Ethereum, and $33.8 million in Circle’s USD stablecoin, USDC. Meta Sleuth, a reputable crypto analytic firm, drew parallels between this attack and a deflation attack that occurred only a month prior.</p><p>The attacker utilized a multichain bridge to facilitate the transfer of funds from the Binance Smart Chain (BNB) to the Ethereum network. Upon successfully moving the funds, the attacker commenced the flash loan attack. To further cover their tracks, the stolen funds were deposited into Tornado Cash, a well-known crypto mixer, complicating recovery efforts.</p><p>On March 25th, over 51,000 ether, valued at nearly $90 million as of Saturday, was sent back to the Euler deployer contract in early U.S. hours.</p><p>On March 27th, the hacker returned the additional $39M in 3 transactions.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Funds Return Tx:</p><ul><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0xb0308ee113c541e7c6f4623e833417524d68fd6267d23f43d9041f583c14343f">https://etherscan.io/tx/0xb0308ee113c541e7c6f4623e833417524d68fd6267d23f43d9041f583c14343f</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe3f67f8e50042f09a3d9b6873bd15c14fa8b8176cfa1069bc1d3ab71e4b3fd0d">https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe3f67f8e50042f09a3d9b6873bd15c14fa8b8176cfa1069bc1d3ab71e4b3fd0d</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x19f802affe24572bac3af47983f42bbec6055117c6a32c3fddc58bd7545e5240">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x19f802affe24572bac3af47983f42bbec6055117c6a32c3fddc58bd7545e5240</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x9f3edbd1eb404dec2e4d9aae93c739136f79c87f6382af25413ce705cc431f59">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x9f3edbd1eb404dec2e4d9aae93c739136f79c87f6382af25413ce705cc431f59</a></li></ul><p>Examples of exploit TXs:</p><ul><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0xc310a0affe2169d1f6feec1c63dbc7f7c62a887fa48795d327d4d2da2d6b111d">https://etherscan.io/tx/0xc310a0affe2169d1f6feec1c63dbc7f7c62a887fa48795d327d4d2da2d6b111d</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x47ac3527d02e6b9631c77fad1cdee7bfa77a8a7bfd4880dccbda5146ace4088f">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x47ac3527d02e6b9631c77fad1cdee7bfa77a8a7bfd4880dccbda5146ace4088f</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3097830e9921e4063d334acb82f6a79374f76f0b1a8f857e89b89bc58df1f311">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3097830e9921e4063d334acb82f6a79374f76f0b1a8f857e89b89bc58df1f311</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x465a6780145f1efe3ab52f94c006065575712d2003d83d85481f3d110ed131d9">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x465a6780145f1efe3ab52f94c006065575712d2003d83d85481f3d110ed131d9</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x62bd3d31a7b75c098ccf28bc4d4af8c4a191b4b9e451fab4232258079e8b18c4">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x62bd3d31a7b75c098ccf28bc4d4af8c4a191b4b9e451fab4232258079e8b18c4</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x71a908be0bef6174bccc3d493becdfd28395d78898e355d451cb52f7bac38617">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x71a908be0bef6174bccc3d493becdfd28395d78898e355d451cb52f7bac38617</a></li></ul><p>Attacker addresses:</p><ul><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x5f259d0b76665c337c6104145894f4d1d2758b8c">https://etherscan.io/address/0x5f259d0b76665c337c6104145894f4d1d2758b8c</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0xb2698c2d99ad2c302a95a8db26b08d17a77cedd4">https://etherscan.io/address/0xb2698c2d99ad2c302a95a8db26b08d17a77cedd4</a></li></ul><p>Attacker contracts:</p><ul><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0xebc29199c817dc47ba12e3f86102564d640cbf99">https://etherscan.io/address/0xebc29199c817dc47ba12e3f86102564d640cbf99</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x036cec1a199234fc02f72d29e596a09440825f1c">https://etherscan.io/address/0x036cec1a199234fc02f72d29e596a09440825f1c</a></li></ul><h4><strong>2. BonqDAO — $120m Lost (Oracle Issue, February 2)</strong></h4><p>On 2 February, BonqDAO and AllianceBlock, two blockchain-based platforms, suffered a major loss of $120 million due to a vulnerability in the BonqDAO smart contract. The exploit has forced the suspension of trading and liquidity to prevent the stolen tokens from being converted into other assets. The Bonq protocol has also since been suspended, and the team is currently working on a solution to enable users to withdraw the remaining collateral.</p><p>The BonqDAO exploit occurred when its price oracle was manipulated, resulting in an increase in the WALBT price. This allowed the attacker to mint over 100 million BEUR. The attacker then manipulated the WALBT price and liquidated multiple troves, enabling them to withdraw 113.8 million WALBT and 98 million BEUR, with a combined value of over $10 million.</p><p>The dumping of these illicit gains resulted in a significant drop in the value of both WALBT and BEUR. The WALBT price dropped by more than 50%, and the BEUR price dropped by 34%. As a result, the total loss for BonqDAO and AllianceBlock was estimated to be $120 million.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Examples of exploit TXs:</p><ul><li><a href="https://polygonscan.com/tx/0x31957ecc43774d19f54d9968e95c69c882468b46860f921668f2c55fadd51b19">https://polygonscan.com/tx/0x31957ecc43774d19f54d9968e95c69c882468b46860f921668f2c55fadd51b19</a></li><li><a href="https://polygonscan.com/tx/0xa02d0c3d16d6ee0e0b6a42c3cc91997c2b40c87d777136dedebe8ee0f47f32b1">https://polygonscan.com/tx/0xa02d0c3d16d6ee0e0b6a42c3cc91997c2b40c87d777136dedebe8ee0f47f32b1</a></li></ul><p>Exploiter address:</p><ul><li><a href="https://polygonscan.com/address/0xcacf2d28b2a5309e099f0c6e8c60ec3ddf656642">https://polygonscan.com/address/0xcacf2d28b2a5309e099f0c6e8c60ec3ddf656642</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0xcAcf2D28B2A5309e099f0C6e8C60Ec3dDf656642">https://etherscan.io/address/0xcAcf2D28B2A5309e099f0C6e8C60Ec3dDf656642</a></li></ul><h4><strong>3. CoinDeal — $45m Lost (CeFi, January 4)</strong></h4><p>The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently filed charges against a group of individuals and companies implicated in the CoinDeal investment scheme. This fraudulent operation reportedly raised over $45 million through the sale of unregistered securities, ultimately defrauding tens of thousands of unsuspecting retail investors.</p><p>The individuals charged in the scheme include Neil Chandran, Garry Davidson, Michael Glaspie, Amy Mossel, and Linda Knott, along with two unnamed companies. The SEC alleges that the defendants falsely promoted CoinDeal, a purported blockchain technology company, as having been sold for trillions of dollars. They claimed that investors would generate substantial returns by investing in the venture.</p><p>However, the SEC’s investigation revealed that the defendants misappropriated millions of dollars from investor funds for their personal use. Among other luxury items, Chandran allegedly used the stolen funds to acquire cars, real estate, and a boat. The SEC is now seeking to recover the misappropriated funds, along with pre-judgment interest and penalties. They are also pursuing permanent injunctions against all the defendants.</p><p>Neil Chandran is currently behind bars, awaiting trial in a separate investment fraud case overseen by the U.S. Justice Department. As regulators work to dismantle the CoinDeal scheme, the case serves as a stark reminder of the need for vigilance in the rapidly evolving world of digital assets and blockchain technology.</p><h4><strong>4. Monkey Drainer — $16.5m Lost (Phishing, March 1)</strong></h4><p>The Monkey Drainer phishing group announced in March on their Telegram channel that they are shutting down their illicit service. The group, which specialized in providing phishing smart contracts, reportedly stole a staggering $16,506,602 before ceasing operations.</p><p>Monkey Drainer’s tactics involved supplying malicious smart contracts with unverified source code to unsuspecting users. These contracts were designed to drain the wallets of affected individuals, stealing native coins, ERC20 tokens, and NFTs across various blockchain networks, including Ethereum, Binance, and Avalanche. The group took a 30% cut of the stolen funds as payment for their services.</p><p>Following the announcement, the Monkey Drainer hacker claimed that all files related to the operation had been immediately deleted. SlowMist, a blockchain security firm, confirmed the total stolen amount reached $16,506,602. The sudden closure of the group highlights the ongoing threats posed by phishing scams in the cryptocurrency space and the need for increased vigilance among users and platforms alike.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Malicious contract example:</p><ul><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x5e0102e6448b602fcd955fcfc7ceea9a36e7e5f0">https://etherscan.io/address/0x5e0102e6448b602fcd955fcfc7ceea9a36e7e5f0</a></li></ul><h4><strong>5. Platypus Finance — $8.5m Lost (Flash Loan, February 16)</strong></h4><p>Platypus Finance, an automated market maker (AMM) offering stableswap opportunities, recently fell victim to a flash loan attack. The perpetrator exploited several asset contracts within the protocol using an unverified malicious smart contract, ultimately stealing $8,500,887 in stablecoins. The stolen assets included around 4,400,000 USDC, 2,700,000 USDT, 687,000 BUSD, and 691,000 DAI.</p><p>The attacker took advantage of a vulnerability in the USP solvency check mechanism, securing a flash loan of 44,000,000 USDC. They then swapped the loan for 44,000,000 Platypus LP-USD and minted 41,700,000 USP tokens at no cost. These tokens were subsequently exchanged for various stablecoins. At the time of reporting, the Platypus Finance team was collaborating with third-party services like Binance, Tether, and Circle to freeze the stolen assets, and USDT has already been successfully frozen.</p><p>Despite these efforts, the attacker managed to transfer 2,403,165 USDC through the Gnosis Proxy, moving a portion of the stolen funds. In response, the Platypus Finance team identified and removed the malicious contract and has since implemented additional security measures to prevent similar attacks in the future.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Malicious transaction:</p><ul><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x1266a937c2ccd970e5d7929021eed3ec593a95c68a99b4920c2efa226679b430">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x1266a937c2ccd970e5d7929021eed3ec593a95c68a99b4920c2efa226679b430</a></li></ul><p>Attacker’s address:</p><ul><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/address/0xeff003d64046a6f521ba31f39405cb720e953958">https://snowtrace.io/address/0xeff003d64046a6f521ba31f39405cb720e953958</a></li></ul><p>Malicious contract:</p><ul><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/address/0x67afdd6489d40a01dae65f709367e1b1d18a5322">https://snowtrace.io/address/0x67afdd6489d40a01dae65f709367e1b1d18a5322</a></li></ul><p>Transfer transactions:</p><ul><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x5e3eb070c772631d599367521b886793e13cf0bc150bd588357c589395d2d5c3">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x5e3eb070c772631d599367521b886793e13cf0bc150bd588357c589395d2d5c3</a></li><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x76ceab91aef320d0556029861dc1dde423d100e2a85f7ca4891a924efce4ed5a">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x76ceab91aef320d0556029861dc1dde423d100e2a85f7ca4891a924efce4ed5a</a></li></ul><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>In conclusion, the significant surge in financial losses this quarter underscores the need for heightened risk management and vigilance when investing in the decentralized finance (DeFi) sector. It is crucial for investors to educate themselves on potential dangers and implement appropriate measures to protect their investments. At De.Fi, we acknowledge the importance of offering guidance in navigating the intricate and constantly evolving DeFi environment. As such, we are committed to equipping our users with the necessary resources to make well-informed investment choices within the industry.</p><h3><strong>About De.Fi</strong></h3><p><em>De.Fi is an all-in-one Web3 Super App and Antivirus featuring an Asset Management Dashboard, Opportunity Explorer, and the world’s first Crypto Antivirus powered by the largest compilation of DeFi hacks and exploits, the Rekt Database. Trusted by 600K users globally, De.Fi aims to drive DeFi adoption by making the self-custody transition as simple and secure as possible. Backed by Okx, Huobi, former Coinbase M&amp;A, and used by large companies worldwide, including University College London and Coingecko.</em></p><p><a href="https://de.fi/"><em>Website</em></a><em> | </em><a href="https://twitter.com/dedotfi"><em>Twitter</em></a><em> | </em><a href="https://twitter.com/DeDotFiSecurity"><em>De.Fi Security </em></a><em>| </em><a href="https://de.fi/rekt-database"><em>Rekt Database</em></a></p><h3>🚨 Free Crypto Security Bible!</h3><p>Right now we are GIVING AWAY free copies of Security Bibles — the most comprehensive DeFi Security Guide brought to you by the De.Fi Team!</p><h4>Grab your copy NOW at: <a href="https://join.defiyield.app/">https://join.de.fi/</a></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*4mEYQT0iGfKvTnQo.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://join.de.fi/">https://join.de.fi/</a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=48bb186d6f16" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/defiyield-official-blog/report-452m-lost-in-crypto-in-q1-2023-new-trends-of-hacks-scams-48bb186d6f16">REPORT: $452M Lost in Crypto in Q1 2023. New Trends of Hacks &amp; Scams</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/defiyield-official-blog">De.Fi</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Report: Over $142m lost in February Crypto Hacks and Scams]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@DeDotFiSecurity/as-we-move-into-the-second-month-of-2023-hackers-and-scammers-are-back-in-full-swing-b2ce375eb9ef?source=rss-22914eb1d61------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b2ce375eb9ef</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[De.Fi Security]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Mar 2023 20:43:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-03-02T20:46:49.280Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*HI3tTKx0TBkJUtkq" /></figure><p>As we move into the second month of 2023, hackers and scammers are back in full swing. Despite the mild uptick in the markets, we saw losses mount to a 9-figure amount in February.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*PqiGlZcj73aiWnUJ" /></figure><p>A total of $142.4m was lost in February 2023 alone, marking a year-on-year increase since 2022: by over 200%! Here’s a breakdown chart by month for 2022 for comparison:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*U48hlf2DiJBPAEYw" /></figure><p>Another unfortunate occurrence this month was that in February, none of the losses were recovered.</p><p>On that note, let’s take a brief look at the top 5 cases this month.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ev6PDk9_ONYX8z0L" /></figure><p><strong>1. BonqDAO — $120m Lost (Oracle Issue, February 2)</strong></p><p>On 2 February, BonqDAO and AllianceBlock, two blockchain-based platforms, have suffered a major loss of $120 million due to a vulnerability in the BonqDAO smart contract. The exploit has forced the suspension of trading and liquidity to prevent the stolen tokens from being converted into other assets. The Bonq protocol has also since been suspended, and the team is currently working on a solution to enable users to withdraw the remaining collateral.</p><p>The BonqDAO exploit occurred when its price oracle was manipulated, resulting in an increase in the WALBT price. This allowed the attacker to mint over 100 million BEUR. The attacker then manipulated the WALBT price and liquidated multiple troves, enabling them to withdraw 113.8 million WALBT and 98 million BEUR, with a combined value of over $10 million.</p><p>The dumping of these illicit gains resulted in a significant drop in the value of both WALBT and BEUR. The WALBT price dropped by more than 50%, and the BEUR price dropped by 34%. As a result, the total loss for BonqDAO and AllianceBlock was estimated to be $120 million.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Examples of exploit TXs:</p><p><a href="https://polygonscan.com/tx/0x31957ecc43774d19f54d9968e95c69c882468b46860f921668f2c55fadd51b19">https://polygonscan.com/tx/0x31957ecc43774d19f54d9968e95c69c882468b46860f921668f2c55fadd51b19</a></p><p><a href="https://polygonscan.com/tx/0xa02d0c3d16d6ee0e0b6a42c3cc91997c2b40c87d777136dedebe8ee0f47f32b1">https://polygonscan.com/tx/0xa02d0c3d16d6ee0e0b6a42c3cc91997c2b40c87d777136dedebe8ee0f47f32b1</a></p><p>Exploiter address:</p><p><a href="https://polygonscan.com/address/0xcacf2d28b2a5309e099f0c6e8c60ec3ddf656642">https://polygonscan.com/address/0xcacf2d28b2a5309e099f0c6e8c60ec3ddf656642</a></p><p><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0xcAcf2D28B2A5309e099f0C6e8C60Ec3dDf656642">https://etherscan.io/address/0xcAcf2D28B2A5309e099f0C6e8C60Ec3dDf656642</a></p><p><strong>2. Platypus Finance — $8.5m Lost (Flash Loan, February 16)</strong></p><p>Platypus Finance, an automated market maker (AMM) providing stableswap opportunities, was recently targeted by a flash loan attack. The attacker exploited multiple asset contracts of the protocol, using a malicious smart contract with unverified source code, and stole $8,500,887 worth of assets in stablecoins. This included nearly 4,400,000 $USDC, 2,700,000 $USDT, 687,000 $BUSD, and 691,000 $DAI.</p><p>The attacker used a weakness in the USP solvency check mechanism to take out a flash loan of 44,000,000 $USDC, which was then used to swap for 44,000,000 Platypus LP-USD. The attacker then minted 41,700,000 $USP tokens for free and swapped them for various stablecoins. As of the time of writing, the Platypus Finance team is working with third-party services like Binance, Tether, and Circle to freeze the stolen funds, and it has been reported that $USDT has already been frozen.</p><p>However, the attacker managed to bridge 2,403,165 $USDC through Gnosis Proxy, allowing them to move a portion of the stolen funds. The platform’s team has since identified and removed the malicious contract and has taken additional security measures to prevent similar attacks from occurring in the future.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Malicious transaction:</p><p><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x1266a937c2ccd970e5d7929021eed3ec593a95c68a99b4920c2efa226679b430">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x1266a937c2ccd970e5d7929021eed3ec593a95c68a99b4920c2efa226679b430</a></p><p>Attacker’s address:</p><p><a href="https://snowtrace.io/address/0xeff003d64046a6f521ba31f39405cb720e953958">https://snowtrace.io/address/0xeff003d64046a6f521ba31f39405cb720e953958</a></p><p>Malicious contract:</p><p><a href="https://snowtrace.io/address/0x67afdd6489d40a01dae65f709367e1b1d18a5322">https://snowtrace.io/address/0x67afdd6489d40a01dae65f709367e1b1d18a5322</a></p><p>Transfer transactions:</p><p><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x5e3eb070c772631d599367521b886793e13cf0bc150bd588357c589395d2d5c3">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x5e3eb070c772631d599367521b886793e13cf0bc150bd588357c589395d2d5c3</a></p><p><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x76ceab91aef320d0556029861dc1dde423d100e2a85f7ca4891a924efce4ed5a">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x76ceab91aef320d0556029861dc1dde423d100e2a85f7ca4891a924efce4ed5a</a></p><p><strong>3. DForce — $3.65m Lost (Oracle Issue, February 10)</strong></p><p>On February 10th, the DeFi aggregator platform dForcenet fell victim to an attack, and the attacker made a profit of approximately $3.65 million.</p><p>The attacker employed a flash loan to borrow Wrapped Ethereum (WETH), swapped it into Ethereum (ETH), and added liquidity to the wstETH/ETH pool on Curve, earning wstETHCRV tokens. A portion of the tokens was then deposited in the Curve wstETH-CRV gauge, receiving wstETH-CRV gauge tokens, which were further deposited in the dForce wstETH/ETH Vault, and used to mint share tokens and USX tokens.</p><p>The attacker then removed liquidity using the “remove_liquidity” function, triggering the fallback function of the attack contract, which ultimately decreased the virtual price in the wstETH/ETH pool.</p><p>As a result, the attacker liquidated other users in the dForce wstETH/ETH Vault, profiting from the manipulated virtual price. The stolen funds are still in the attacker’s address as of now.</p><p>The root cause of the attack was the exploitation of the process of transferring native tokens before burning LP when removing liquidity in the wstETH/ETH pool. This triggered the callback for receiving native tokens, which the attacker manipulated to influence virtual prices and liquidate other users for profit.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Exploit TXs:</p><p><a href="https://optimistic.etherscan.io/tx/0x6c19762186c9f32c81eb2a79420fc7ad4485aa916cab37ec278b216757bfba0d">https://optimistic.etherscan.io/tx/0x6c19762186c9f32c81eb2a79420fc7ad4485aa916cab37ec278b216757bfba0d</a></p><p><a href="https://phalcon.blocksec.com/tx/arbitrum/0x5db5c2400ab56db697b3cc9aa02a05deab658e1438ce2f8692ca009cc45171dd">https://phalcon.blocksec.com/tx/arbitrum/0x5db5c2400ab56db697b3cc9aa02a05deab658e1438ce2f8692ca009cc45171dd</a></p><p><strong>4. Orion Protocol — $3.0m Lost (Reentrancy, February 2)</strong></p><p>On February 2nd, Orion Protocol, a decentralized finance (DeFi) platform that aggregates liquidity from centralized exchanges, fell victim to a reentrancy exploit resulting in a loss of approximately $3 million in Ethereum (ETH).</p><p>The attacker utilized manipulated swaps of flash loaned stablecoins and artificially deposited assets twice before withdrawing the inflated balance. To double their balance, the exploiter created and utilized a fake token before making off with the stolen loot. However, Orion CEO Alexey Koloskov confirmed that user funds remained safe and that the damage was contained within an internal broker account.</p><p>After the exploit, the attacker sent 1,100 ETH through the Tornado Cash mixer, which allows users to enhance their anonymity on the Ethereum network, and still holds 657 ETH in their balance.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Exploit TX:</p><p><a href="https://bscscan.com/tx/0xfb153c572e304093023b4f9694ef39135b6ed5b2515453173e81ec02df2e2104">https://bscscan.com/tx/0xfb153c572e304093023b4f9694ef39135b6ed5b2515453173e81ec02df2e2104</a></p><p>Exploiter addresses:</p><p><a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x837962b686fd5a407fb4e5f92e8be86a230484bd">https://bscscan.com/address/0x837962b686fd5a407fb4e5f92e8be86a230484bd<br></a><a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x3dabf5e36df28f6064a7c5638d0c4e01539e35f1">https://bscscan.com/address/0x3dabf5e36df28f6064a7c5638d0c4e01539e35f1<br></a><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x3dabf5e36df28f6064a7c5638d0c4e01539e35f1">https://etherscan.io/address/0x3dabf5e36df28f6064a7c5638d0c4e01539e35f1</a></p><p>Attacker contract:</p><p><a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x84452042cb7be650be4eb641025ac3c8a0079b67">https://bscscan.com/address/0x84452042cb7be650be4eb641025ac3c8a0079b67</a></p><p><strong>5. Dexible — $2m Lost (Access Control, February 17)</strong></p><p>On February 17th, 2022, the multichain exchange aggregator Dexible suffered a flash loan attack that resulted in the loss of over $2,000,000 worth of Ethereum (ETH). Dexible is a decentralized exchange aggregator that allows users to trade on centralized exchanges (CEXs) without losing custody of their assets.</p><p>The attacker was able to exploit Dexible’s v2 contracts by using the app’s selfSwap() function to move over 2,000,000 $USD worth of cryptocurrency from users who had authorized the app to move their tokens.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Attacker address:</p><p><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x684083f312ac50f538cc4b634d85a2feafaab77a">https://etherscan.io/address/0x684083f312ac50f538cc4b634d85a2feafaab77a</a></p><p>Funds transfer example transaction:</p><p><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x4393ca721175e8bc97458f97b5118927a026e73b4a6964d16035090b05686a8c">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x4393ca721175e8bc97458f97b5118927a026e73b4a6964d16035090b05686a8c</a></p><p><strong>DeFi Exploit Trends</strong></p><p>As can be seen from the scale of the losses in February, a large majority of losses came from just one key case: BonqDAO.</p><p>This amounted to over $120 million being lost. Notably, this means that the biggest losses this month were due to oracle issues, which have been becoming increasingly common in recent months.</p><p>This also makes Polygon the chain where cumulative losses this month have been the largest.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*d8vit9sJn6OyL3gM" /></figure><p>Meanwhile, BNB Smart Chain unfortunately remains popular for crypto criminals, with 6 cases happening this month, as compared to 3 on Ethereum, 2 on Arbitrum and 1 on Polygon.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*1CG8rbHE2oSJ0K_-" /></figure><p><strong>Funds Recovered</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*zfGA3IKDy3y3tZ-Q" /></figure><p>Unfortunately, in February, none of the losses were ultimately recovered. This is the second successive month where we are observing a break in the trend of increasing recoveries we have seen over the past few months, on a year-on-year basis.</p><p><strong>Types of Exploit</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*oAGcZj-Jn1DIIyYV" /></figure><p>In terms of frequency, smart contract exploits were the most popular among criminals. This was followed by access control issues, and of course, oracle issues that played a role in the biggest case this month.</p><p><strong>Attack Vectors</strong></p><p>In terms of attack vectors, DEXes and Tokens proved to be popular targets this month — this is unsurprising — in previous months, tokens have often been used as a vehicle to rug investors. At the same time, DEXes hold a large amount of liquidity to facilitate trading, and can therefore be attractive targets to scammers and hackers. In terms of amounts lost, though, Lending and Borrowing protocols took the prize, though this was driven by just one event — BonqDAO.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*9Z4D3_fBNRh7CQbB" /></figure><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>In summary, the sharp increase in losses this month is a reminder of how investing in the decentralized finance (DeFi) space requires a certain level of risk management and vigilance. It is imperative for investors to inform themselves on potential threats and to take the necessary measures to safeguard their investments. At De.Fi, we recognize the importance of providing education in navigating the complex and ever-changing DeFi landscape. We are thus dedicated to providing our users with the resources they need to make informed investment decisions in the sector.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b2ce375eb9ef" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[REPORT: $49 BILLION LOST IN CRYPTO IN 2022 (INFOGRAPHICS)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@DeDotFiSecurity/report-49-billion-lost-in-crypto-in-2022-infographics-a2e83b662196?source=rss-22914eb1d61------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a2e83b662196</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[2022-defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2022-stock-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto-2022]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto-scam-reports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[report-scam]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[De.Fi Security]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Jan 2023 14:44:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-09T14:44:45.169Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TtZ_de6QEvX-A9SCm6RSpg.png" /><figcaption>Source: https://defiyield.app/rekt-database</figcaption></figure><p><strong>There is no way around it — 2022 was a bad year for crypto.</strong></p><p>In the half of the year alone, there were several high-profile incidents that shook the industry. One of the most notable was the failure of a large-cap stablecoin, UST, which resulted in the loss of billions of dollars worth of cryptocurrencies.</p><p>This led to a sharp decline in the value of many digital assets, and left many investors feeling uneasy about the security of their holdings.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*lziy21YctdF6i-Je.jpg" /></figure><p>In addition, there were also the multiple failures of centralized exchanges, driven by the FTX collapse, towards the end of the year.</p><p>Add in all the smaller hacks and scams that happened in the DeFi space, and you can see how all of these events have contributed to a growing sense of fear and uncertainty within the crypto community.</p><h4>Let’s have a look at the toll for 2022!</h4><p>Let’s have the headline figure out of the way: the total losses this year have amounted to $47.4b, compared to ‘just’ $8.7b in 2021. This is a more than 5-fold increase!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*zGowOQ4F1N_FaEGg" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database</a></figcaption></figure><p>That being said, this was driven by several major cases as a result of the failures of centralized entities, along with a singular DeFi project, Terra Luna. The latter alone contributed to $40b worth of losses.</p><p>Before we get ahead of ourselves, let’s have a look at the Top 10 Losses from Crypto Scams, Hacks and Failures in 2022!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2jYmpGr6perj2vo2" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database</a></figcaption></figure><h4><strong>1. Terra Classic — $40b Lost (Stablecoin, May 8)</strong></h4><p>This case has been so well publicized that it needs no introduction.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gdO2C4xN3y4dYz7nBDxQgw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/terra_classic">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/terra_classic</a></figcaption></figure><p>The Terra Luna Network was built around its two native coins, $LUNC and $USTC (Then $LUNA and $UST). $USTC was an algorithmic stablecoin designed to hold a peg to the US dollar, while $LUNC acted as a satellite asset that absorbed the volatility of $USTC through a process of minting and burning, as well as arbitrage. Despite its promise, the network was hit by a series of events that led to its downfall.</p><p>In early May, the Luna Foundation Guard decided to create a new pool, called Curve4, featuring $FRAX, $USTC, $USDC and $USDT as assets. This move was seen as an attempt to undermine the popular Curve3 pool on the Ethereum network, which made use of the stablecoin $DAI. In preparation for the launch of Curve4, the Luna Foundation Guard withdrew 250 million $USTC from the Curve3 pool. At the same time, several large investors, or whales, began withdrawing significant amounts of $USTC from the anchor protocol, a crypto savings bank promising 20% interest per year.</p><p>The mass movement of funds caused an imbalance between $USTC and other stablecoins in the pool, leading to a devaluation of $USTC on exchanges. As a result of how each $USTC was designed to be redeemed for $1 worth of $LUNC, the fire sale of $USTC led to a rapid increase in the minting of $LUNC and a corresponding drop in its value. The panic caused by these events also led to a surge in activity on the Terra network, resulting in it going offline due to an overload of transactions.</p><p>Once the market cap of $LUNC fell below that of $USTC, it became clear that the redemption mechanism for $USTC was no longer a sure thing. The system was officially insolvent, and entered a death spiral.</p><p>Today, both $LUNC and $USTC trade at fractions of a cent, down from their highs of $116 and $1 respectively.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p><strong>Whale Addresses:</strong></p><ul><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x8d47f08ebc5554504742f547eb721a43d4947d0a">https://etherscan.io/address/0x8d47f08ebc5554504742f547eb721a43d4947d0a</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x4b5e60cb1cd6c5e67af5e6cf63229d1614bb781c">https://etherscan.io/address/0x4b5e60cb1cd6c5e67af5e6cf63229d1614bb781c</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x1df8ea15bb725e110118f031e8e71b91abaa2a06">https://etherscan.io/address/0x1df8ea15bb725e110118f031e8e71b91abaa2a06</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0xeb5425e650b04e49e5e8b62fbf1c3f60df01f232">https://etherscan.io/address/0xeb5425e650b04e49e5e8b62fbf1c3f60df01f232</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x41339d9825963515e5705df8d3b0ea98105ebb1c">https://etherscan.io/address/0x41339d9825963515e5705df8d3b0ea98105ebb1c</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x68963dc7c28a36fcacb0b39ac2d807b0329b9c69">https://etherscan.io/address/0x68963dc7c28a36fcacb0b39ac2d807b0329b9c69</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x9f705ff1da72ed334f0e80f90aae5644f5cd7784">https://etherscan.io/address/0x9f705ff1da72ed334f0e80f90aae5644f5cd7784</a></li></ul><h4><strong>2. Genesis — $2.8b Lost (CeFi Contagion, November 10)</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HhqHoxK_0xhyPhnOeZCKpg.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/genesis">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/genesis</a></figcaption></figure><p>The Genesis crypto trading platform has been hit hard by the recent market turmoil, with 2,800,000,000 $USD in outstanding loans on its balance sheet. As a counterparty to many in the digital asset space, the company is closely watched as an indicator of the industry’s overall health.</p><p>On November 10th, Genesis revealed that it had around 175,000,000 $USD trapped in an FTX trading account. In light of the situation, withdrawals were halted on the platform on November 16th due to “unprecedented market turmoil” following the collapse of FTX. While the company is working to resolve the situation without filing for bankruptcy, the future remains uncertain for Genesis and its investors.</p><p>Notably, customer funds that were deposited in Gemini’s Earn program were loaned to Genesis. The CEO of Gemini has since written an open letter to Barry Silbert, of parent company DCG, in a plea to return $900m of customer funds by 8 January 2023.</p><h4><strong>3. Celsius — $1.19m Lost (CeFi, July 13)</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1Uxw5nHj-KvxCfhs1KnVcw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/celsius_network">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/celsius_network</a></figcaption></figure><p>Celsius Network, a centralized exchange and borrowing and earning protocol, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on July 13th. The following day, the company revealed a 1,190,000,000 $USD deficit on its balance sheet. Its liabilities totaled 5,500,000,000 $USD, while its assets were valued at 4,300,000,000 $USD.</p><p>The project had halted operations on its platform a month prior, citing “extreme market conditions” as the reason for this. The bankruptcy filing marked a significant blow to Celsius and its investors, most of whom are still out of pocket today.</p><p>As to the cause of the deficit, Celsius has been criticized for rehypothecation of customer funds to high risk investments, without transparently disclosing this to customers. These investments then took a loss, resulting in the capital hole and inability to service liabilities.</p><h4><strong>4. FTX — $1.0b Lost (CeFi, November 11)</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Tg8dnDqU4Fl1tlSdNS5LDQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/ftx_group">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/ftx_group</a></figcaption></figure><p>This case needs no introduction.</p><p>FTX, Alameda Research, and 130 affiliated companies declared bankruptcy, with lost funds estimated to be worth between 1,000,000,000 and 2,000,000,000 $USD. The events leading up to the bankruptcy began when it was revealed that Alameda Research’s collateral was dominated by FTX’s native token, $FTT.</p><p>Alameda had a total of 14,600,000,000 $USD in assets, with 3,660,000,000 $USD worth of free $FTT tokens and 2,160,000,000 $USD in “FTT collateral” that was borrowed against, as well as significant amounts of $SOL and $SRM tokens.</p><p>The news sparked the realization that FTX may no longer have customer assets backed 1-to-1, prompting a run on FTX. In a span of a few days, panicked customers withdrew billions of dollars from the exchange.</p><p>As a result of this uncertainty, the $FTT token crashed by more than 95% in a 24-hour period. The value of $SOL was also affected, with 49,000,000 $SOL tokens being withdrawn from staking, causing the token price to drop by approximately 60%.</p><p>In response, FTX halted withdrawals on the exchange and declared bankruptcy. The impact of FTX’s bankruptcy was felt throughout the crypto industry, with many projects that relied on the exchange reporting losses. The news of the bankruptcy also caused a plunge in Bitcoin’s price from the $19–20k range to the $15–17k range we are seeing right now.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p><strong>Attacker address:</strong></p><ul><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x59ABf3837Fa962d6853b4Cc0a19513AA031fd32b">https://etherscan.io/address/0x59ABf3837Fa962d6853b4Cc0a19513AA031fd32b</a></li><li><a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x59ABf3837Fa962d6853b4Cc0a19513AA031fd32b">https://bscscan.com/address/0x59ABf3837Fa962d6853b4Cc0a19513AA031fd32b</a></li></ul><h4><strong>5. BlockFi — $1.0b Lost (CeFi Contagion, November 11)</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6Dp5SxvdCd2b66eYoh6p0Q.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/blockfi">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/blockfi</a></figcaption></figure><p>Crypto lending platform BlockFi has filed for bankruptcy following the collapse of FTX and Alameda Research hedge fund, both of which BlockFi cites as having “significant exposure” to the company.</p><p>The firm halted withdrawals on November 11, the day that FTX filed for bankruptcy.</p><p>In addition to filing for Chapter 11, BlockFi filed a lawsuit against Emergent Fidelity Technologies, owned by Sam Bankman Fried, demanding that collateral be turned over. According to the filing, BlockFi estimates its liabilities to be between $1 billion and $10 billion, with more than 100,000 creditors, the largest of which is Ankura Trust, owed approximately $729 million.</p><h4><strong>6. Voyager — $1.0b Lost (CeFi Contagion, May 26)</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HtITxVACukKOi_v1MRPr9Q.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/voyager">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/voyager</a></figcaption></figure><p>In late May 2022, publicly-listed Voyager crypto platform has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, revealing more than $1 billion in liabilities.</p><p>Following the announcement, the Voyager stock price dropped over 12%.</p><p>Operations on the platform had been halted due to its significant exposure to the failed Three Arrows Capital, a crypto hedge fund that was unable to meet margin calls and also filed for bankruptcy. According to the filing, Voyager has estimated liabilities of between $1 billion and $10 billion.</p><h4><strong>7. Bitcoin Sheikh — $766m Lost (Ponzi Scheme, October 7)</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RHT9_Cp7cp695RBrUEt1Xw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/bitcoin_sheikh">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/bitcoin_sheikh</a></figcaption></figure><p>The Bitcoin Sheikh project was arrested for operating a Ponzi scheme. While this does not represent a new loss, the authorities uncovered and seized assets worth $766 million.</p><p>The Brazilian authorities reported the discovery of a Ponzi scheme that was headed by Francisco Valdevino da Silva, otherwise called the “Bitcoin Sheikh”. They claimed that De Silva had exploited hundreds of people through the pretense of 20% returns.</p><p>According to the authorities, their token lacked proper liquidity or backing and even had a few celebrities on their list of exploited investors, such as Sasha Meneghel, a model who had lost $230,000.</p><h4><strong>8. Ronin Bridge — $625m Lost (Bridge Exploit, March 29)</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wpkyG0lb9yvZu1zMkq2wqg.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/ronin">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/ronin</a></figcaption></figure><p>Apart from CeFi failures, 2022 was also the year of the bridge exploit.</p><p>On March 29, the Ronin Network, an Ethereum-based sidechain that hosts the popular play-to-earn game Axie Infinity, discovered that its validator nodes had been compromised.</p><p>The attack resulted in the drainage of 173,600 Ethereum and 25.5M USDC from the Ronin bridge in two transactions. It is believed that the attacker used hacked private keys to forge fake withdrawals, accessing the system through a gas-free RPC node.</p><p>Binance was able to identify and recover $5.8 million in funds that had been spread across 86 accounts and moved to their exchange. In response to the hack, Binance led a funding round that raised $150 million to partially repay affected users and ensure the continuation of operations on the Ronin Network.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p><strong>Hacker Address:</strong></p><ul><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x098b716b8aaf21512996dc57eb0615e2383e2f96">https://etherscan.io/address/0x098b716b8aaf21512996dc57eb0615e2383e2f96</a></li></ul><h4><strong>9. Wormhole Bridge — $625m Lost (Bridge Exploit, February 2)</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*C5D2fcxYT65jnbcG6vTCAg.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/wormhole">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/wormhole</a></figcaption></figure><p>In February 2022, the Wormhole bridge was compromised by an attacker who bypassed the verification process and made away with 120,000 $WETH.</p><p>The attacker minted 120,000 wETH on Solana, then redeemed 93,750 wETH for ETH worth $254 million onto the Ethereum. Using some of these funds, the attacker purchased SportX ($SX), Meta Capital ($MCAP), Finally Usable Crypto Karma ($FUCK), and Bored Ape Yacht Club Token ($APE).</p><p>The remaining wETH was swapped for SOL and USDC on Solana, with the hacker’s Solana wallet now holding 432,662 SOL ($44 million). It is believed that the issue was with the signature verification process, which allowed for an unverified call by the attacker.</p><p>Investors were made whole by Jump Trading, the mother company behind the Wormhole bridge, which replenished the stolen ETH.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference:</strong></p><p><strong>The attacker’s addresses:</strong></p><ul><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x629e7da20197a5429d30da36e77d06cdf796b71a">https://etherscan.io/address/0x629e7da20197a5429d30da36e77d06cdf796b71a</a></li><li><a href="https://solscan.io/account/CxegPrfn2ge5dNiQberUrQJkHCcimeR4VXkeawcFBBka">https://solscan.io/account/CxegPrfn2ge5dNiQberUrQJkHCcimeR4VXkeawcFBBka</a></li></ul><p><strong>Transactions:</strong></p><ul><li><a href="https://solscan.io/tx/2zCz2GgSoSS68eNJENWrYB48dMM1zmH8SZkgYneVDv2G4gRsVfwu5rNXtK5BKFxn7fSqX9BvrBc1rdPAeBEcD6Es">https://solscan.io/tx/2zCz2GgSoSS68eNJENWrYB48dMM1zmH8SZkgYneVDv2G4gRsVfwu5rNXtK5BKFxn7fSqX9BvrBc1rdPAeBEcD6Es</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x24c7d855a0a931561e412d809e2596c3fd861cc7385566fd1cb528f9e93e5f14">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x24c7d855a0a931561e412d809e2596c3fd861cc7385566fd1cb528f9e93e5f14</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x8ab3c4adab6d1a21ec1fcd7dc96523e7dada92d1373ee6919aa6b10b51ebe8d1">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x8ab3c4adab6d1a21ec1fcd7dc96523e7dada92d1373ee6919aa6b10b51ebe8d1</a></li><li>https://etherscan.io/tx/0x697869218add15e019f7a1904b7c3b435f9048ec3bcb9c84cf23e64916a41add</li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x6f17f122dca10e9c894af3766d93e97c08f8925eb3a20b894b810edb3d029ed0">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x6f17f122dca10e9c894af3766d93e97c08f8925eb3a20b894b810edb3d029ed0</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x57a48345888cbfb2d442f272c6fd9d38f57f6f5608c00c4978860eea7dc927c">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x57a48345888cbfb2d442f272c6fd9d38f57f6f5608c00c4978860eea7dc927c</a></li><li><a href="https://solscan.io/account/CxegPrfn2ge5dNiQberUrQJkHCcimeR4VXkeawcFBBka#splTransfers">https://solscan.io/account/CxegPrfn2ge5dNiQberUrQJkHCcimeR4VXkeawcFBBka#splTransfers</a></li></ul><h4><strong>10. Nomad Bridge — $190m Lost (Bridge Exploit, August 1)</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GxvL48YUCzEXb9SJw_cB9Q.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/nomad">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/nomad</a></figcaption></figure><p>The Nomad bridge is an interoperability protocol that connects five different blockchains: Avalanche, Ethereum, Evmos, Milkomeda C1, and Moonbeam. An operational error made by the Nomad team, which was pointed out in an audit report by Quantstamp, enabled an initial attack on the protocol, in which 100 (WBTC) were extracted.</p><p>The error, which marked the zero root (0x00) as acceptable, allowed every message to be auto-proven by default and enabled the attacker to process transactions without any proving by calling the “process()” function.</p><p>This information spread within the community, and hundreds of EOA’s began extracting assets such as $WBTC, $FXS, $C3, $DAI, and $USDC from the bridge. Among the looters were both reputable hackers from previous exploits, such as the Rari Capital exploit, and white hat hackers who intended to return the funds. As of now, approximately $32 million have been returned to the Nomad Recovery Funds Address.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p><strong>Attacker address:</strong></p><ul><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x56d8b635a7c88fd1104d23d632af40c1c3aac4e3">https://etherscan.io/address/0x56d8b635a7c88fd1104d23d632af40c1c3aac4e3</a></li></ul><p><strong>Attacker contract address</strong></p><ul><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0xf57113d8f6ff35747737f026fe0b37d4d7f42777">https://etherscan.io/address/0xf57113d8f6ff35747737f026fe0b37d4d7f42777</a></li></ul><p><strong>Attack transactions:</strong></p><ul><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x61497a1a8a8659a06358e130ea590e1eed8956edbd99dbb2048cfb46850a8f17">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x61497a1a8a8659a06358e130ea590e1eed8956edbd99dbb2048cfb46850a8f17</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x29b67e0701ddd910ff6a069aa039015eb78b1ee6d99ad8da5d0ef63916f3fd57">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x29b67e0701ddd910ff6a069aa039015eb78b1ee6d99ad8da5d0ef63916f3fd57</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0xdf6bef0d8dee8b44863ac61092a711b877dcfe3d61da93d7289e0c6285af1b45">https://etherscan.io/tx/0xdf6bef0d8dee8b44863ac61092a711b877dcfe3d61da93d7289e0c6285af1b45</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3dbed4a1ebb2289273370ce0ef10302882927abe946299cf2ca3073f1a3dcdd9">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3dbed4a1ebb2289273370ce0ef10302882927abe946299cf2ca3073f1a3dcdd9</a></li></ul><p><strong>Nomad Recovery Funds Address:</strong></p><ul><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x94A84433101A10aEda762968f6995c574D1bF154">https://etherscan.io/address/0x94A84433101A10aEda762968f6995c574D1bF154</a></li></ul><h4><strong>DeFi Exploit Trends</strong></h4><p>As can be seen from the scale of the losses in 2022, a large majority of losses were in CeFi and Stablecoins, seen in this case under the ‘Others’ category. This amounted to over $41 billion being lost, out of the $43 billion total. Trailing far behind in second place, we have access control issues, which resulted in a cool $1.1 billion being stolen. Finally, in third place, we have the good old rugpull, which amounted to $301.5 million in losses this year.</p><p>In terms of frequency, however, we have another story. In terms of sheer frequency, rugpulls remain the most common type of exploit — while they tend to be much smaller in value lost per attack, they are also the lowest hanging fruit for DeFi projects to make a cash grab.</p><p>A total of 153 cases occurred in 2022 — this means that there was, on average, more than one rugpull every 3 days!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*1nlyoJ7VVnvdwiAt" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database</a></figcaption></figure><h4><strong>The Growing Threat of Smart Contract Risk</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*yhJjKVcrcdACcVQO" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database</a></figcaption></figure><p>Of all the exploits that happened in 2022, almost half (47.8%) were smart contract-related.</p><p>This highlights the fact that despite all the smart contract auditing and battle-testing that is happening in the DeFi space, smart contract risk has become one of the most prominent threats facing investors.</p><p>To this end, we are on a mission to provide a simple-to-use tool that allows users to scan any smart contract for risks in a trustless manner.</p><h4><strong>Funds Recovered</strong></h4><p>The trend we observed this year was that of an increasing amount of funds being recovered, either by Whitehat Hackers, or by agreed settlements.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*KomeC8Bp5bB-hpA2" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database</a></figcaption></figure><p>In fact, the total amount of funds recovered in 2022 is significantly higher than that in 2021, at $901 million, as opposed to $648 million last year.</p><h4><strong>Types of Target</strong></h4><p>In terms of attack vectors, Tokens proved to be a popular target this year — this is unsurprising, especially given the low barrier to entry required to deploy a new token. A total of 106 scams involving tokens were recorded this year!</p><p>Other popular targets include decentralized exchanges (DEXes), as well as NFTs, clocking in at 39 and 35 cases respectively.</p><p>In terms of amounts, however, the losses from the Terra Luna stablecoin incident and the FTX CeFi fallout dominated all else, with the former contributing $40.2b in losses, and CeFi being the source for $8.1b in losses.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*TrxlM0jR8bUU0o1Y" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database</a></figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Funds Lost by Chain</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*dWzlm2zICVHdEA8f" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database</a></figcaption></figure><p>Needless to say, in this case, the Terra Classic chain led the way when it came to amounts lost. In terms of other blockchains, though, Ethereum remained the runner up in this regard, seeing $1b lost in 2022.</p><p>The BNB Chain unfortunately continues to be a rugpull hotspot, with the highest frequency of rugs and scams at 201 cases — outpacing Ethereum at 89 cases and Solana or Polygon at 11 cases each.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>The cryptocurrency and decentralized finance (DeFi) space has always carried some level of risk, but it is important for investors to take steps to protect themselves and stay informed about potential threats. This is why education is crucial, and at DEFIYIELD, we are dedicated to providing the necessary resources to help our users navigate this complex and constantly evolving space.</p><p>It is ultimately our own responsibility to stay vigilant and ensure that we are making informed investment decisions in the DeFi sector.</p><h4>💙 Hey, thanks for reading!</h4><p>Right now we are <strong>GIVING AWAY free copies of Security Bibles</strong>— the most comprehensive DeFi Security Guide brought to you by the DeFiYield team!</p><p><strong>Grab your copy at: </strong><a href="https://join.defiyield.app/"><strong>https://join.defiyield.app/</strong></a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*X5vAzrBpEnH2NJlKzHW-AA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://join.defiyield.app/"><strong>https://join.defiyield.app/</strong></a></figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a2e83b662196" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Over $41m lost in December: DeFi Rekt Stories]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@DeDotFiSecurity/over-41m-lost-in-december-defi-rekt-stories-df0d1ba15ff7?source=rss-22914eb1d61------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/df0d1ba15ff7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto-scam-reports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[scam]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[december]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[De.Fi Security]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Jan 2023 17:48:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-02T18:59:56.734Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>REPORT: Over $41m Lost in Crypto in December</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_4zg57XqlpkefxaTwsd-Mg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Just as we thought we could wind down for the holiday season, this was clearly not the case as December came with even more nasty surprises, in the form of crypto hacks and scams.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*vFOrXBBXTUx2MdBd" /></figure><p>Compared to the previous year, where December saw over $600 million worth of losses, we actually observed a year on year decrease, to $41 million of losses in December. Moreover, $12 million was recovered.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*PeXbaU01heeW23zX" /></figure><p>In total, with the number of high profile losses such as Terra Luna and FTX, the total losses this year have amounted to $47.4b, compared to ‘just’ $8.7b in 2021.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*tRxulrTfWtc7ykOI" /></figure><p>However, this was driven by two major cases as a result of the failures of centralized entities, rather than native DeFi applications. With that said, let’s take a brief look at the top 5 cases this month.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*v3ZwG6R8GuOG9fm2" /></figure><h4><strong>1. DeFrost Finance — $12m Lost (Stablecoin, December 23)</strong></h4><p>On December 23, 2022, the cryptocurrency platform DeFrost announced that it had suffered a security breach due to a missing reentrancy lock in its flashloan() and deposit() functions.</p><p>This allowed an attacker to manipulate the share price of the LSWUSDC token, resulting in a gain of approximately $173,000 for the attacker. It was later discovered that the attacker had also exploited the protocol’s vaults by adding a fake collateral token and replacing the price oracle with a malicious one using the setOracleAddress() function.</p><p>This led to the liquidation of user collateral in DeFrost’s vaults, with an estimated loss of $12 million.</p><p>Over the past week, we have also carried out a deeper investigation on the DeFrost finance case, to ascertain whether this was an inside job as suspected.</p><p>Needless to say, our findings were beyond belief, with shocking revelations that the project itself had been funded by monies that had originated from a previous rugpull, where the founders stole $7 million. Among other implausible claims, DeFrost’s team alleged that all 4 of their multisig wallets had been compromised at the same time, and then used to deploy a malicious oracle.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*n2jgZczdcGlI1wZH" /></figure><p>As you can see from the timeline above, the plot runs so deep that a dedicated article on the case was in order.</p><p>To read the full details of the case, check out our full article <a href="https://medium.com/@DeFiYieldSec/the-most-evil-crypto-scam-defrost-finance-was-funded-with-criminal-money-cb08c99fb6d9">here</a>.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Attacker address:</p><ul><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/address/0x7373dca267bdc623dfba228696c9d4e8234469f6">https://snowtrace.io/address/0x7373dca267bdc623dfba228696c9d4e8234469f6</a></li></ul><p>Exploit transaction:</p><ul><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xc6fb8217e45870a93c25e2098f54f6e3b24674a3083c30664867de474bf0212d">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xc6fb8217e45870a93c25e2098f54f6e3b24674a3083c30664867de474bf0212d</a></li></ul><p>Sample transaction:</p><ul><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x34eb46f498c418285323e6e146ae84ea836e49822fa254c865f59d650261c3dd">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x34eb46f498c418285323e6e146ae84ea836e49822fa254c865f59d650261c3dd</a></li></ul><h4><strong>2. Bitkeep — $8.0m Lost (Phishing, December 10)</strong></h4><p>On 26 December 2022, some BitKeep multi-chain wallet users reported being affected by a hack on the APK version 7.2.9 of the app.</p><p>The hack was made possible due to a vulnerability in the API server used by the wallet app, which allowed the attacker to access the app’s database and steal critical user information such as private keys.</p><p>As a result, users have lost a total of $8 million in funds on BSC, Ethereum, TRON, and Polygon.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Attacker addresses:</p><ul><li><a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x36225a2721DCb124F3E185d3c177049813b279ba">https://bscscan.com/address/0x36225a2721DCb124F3E185d3c177049813b279ba</a></li><li><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x9f12243d60c301d4e01a3d24bb620e8ffb40f855">https://etherscan.io/address/0x9f12243d60c301d4e01a3d24bb620e8ffb40f855</a></li></ul><h4><strong>3. Lodestar Finance — $5.8m Lost (Flashloan, December 10)</strong></h4><p>On 10 December 2022, the decentralized finance (DeFi) platform Lodestar Finance suffered a security breach that exploited a vulnerability in its GMX Liquidity Pool Token (GLP) Oracle price logic.</p><p>Lodestar is a borrowing and lending protocol that is based on the Compound fork and was initially built and launched on the Arbitrum network. Its goal is to bring decentralized money markets to the Arbitrum community. According to reports, the attacker manipulated the plvGLP oracle price using flashloans to create a large plvGLP collateral position. The plvGLP token is a receipt token for users who stake GLP on Plutus DAO.</p><p>The attackers then increased the plvGLP/GLP exchange rate, resulting in significant borrowing power. They were then able to compound their borrowings through loops, effectively draining the protocol. The Lodestar team is currently working to address the vulnerability and compensate affected users.</p><p>The incident serves as a reminder of the importance of security in the DeFi space, and the need for protocols to carefully consider and address potential vulnerabilities, such as accepting lower liquidity tokens as collateral.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Attacker contract:</p><ul><li><a href="https://arbiscan.io/address/0x7596ACadf6c93f01b877F5A44b49407ffFC53508">https://arbiscan.io/address/0x7596ACadf6c93f01b877F5A44b49407ffFC53508</a></li></ul><p>Attacker address:</p><ul><li><a href="https://arbiscan.io/address/0xc29d94386ff784006ff8461c170d1953cc9e2b5c">https://arbiscan.io/address/0xc29d94386ff784006ff8461c170d1953cc9e2b5c</a></li></ul><p>Exploit TX:</p><ul><li><a href="https://arbiscan.io/tx/0xc523c6307b025ebd9aef155ba792d1ba18d5d83f97c7a846f267d3d9a3004e8c">https://arbiscan.io/tx/0xc523c6307b025ebd9aef155ba792d1ba18d5d83f97c7a846f267d3d9a3004e8c</a></li></ul><h4><strong>4. Ankr — $5.0m Lost (Access Control, December 2)</strong></h4><p>On December 2, 2022, The Ankr protocol, a decentralized infrastructure with a robust ecosystem, fell victim to an exploit.</p><p>The staking contract on the BNB Chain was compromised through an access control vulnerability, allowing the attacker to replace the contract’s implementation with a malicious, unverified version.</p><p>As a result of this attack, the malicious contract was used to mint an enormous quantity of $aBNBc tokens — 10,000,000,000,000 to be precise. These tokens were then exchanged for 5,500 $BNB and 5,340,000 $USDC.</p><p>The attack has had a significant impact on the value of $aBNBc, with the token’s price dropping nearly 99%. Additionally, almost all of the liquidity has been drained from PancakeSwap and ApeSwap pools.</p><p>The stolen funds were largely transferred through TornadoCash, AnySwap, and CelerBridge, and at present, there is only 100 $BNB remaining in the attacker’s original address.</p><p>In response to the exploit, the implementation of the staking proxy has been replaced with a new, unverified version. It is imperative that users exercise caution and carefully verify any contracts before interacting with them to prevent similar losses from occurring in the future.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Attacker address:</p><ul><li><a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0xf3a465C9fA6663fF50794C698F600Faa4b05c777">https://bscscan.com/address/0xf3a465C9fA6663fF50794C698F600Faa4b05c777</a></li></ul><p>Malicious transactions:</p><ul><li><a href="https://bscscan.com/tx/0x61e0f3f0dc5cc84f0547799ebb19515ce5f5d20c0b57442135263bcb1b506812">https://bscscan.com/tx/0x61e0f3f0dc5cc84f0547799ebb19515ce5f5d20c0b57442135263bcb1b506812</a></li><li><a href="https://bscscan.com/tx/0xcbc5ff4a6c9a66274f9bde424777c3dc862ab576e282fbea3c9c2609ca3e282b">https://bscscan.com/tx/0xcbc5ff4a6c9a66274f9bde424777c3dc862ab576e282fbea3c9c2609ca3e282b</a></li></ul><h4><strong>5. Raydium — $4.4m Lost (Access Control, December 16)</strong></h4><p>On December 16, 2022, the private key of the Pool Owner account was compromised, resulting in the theft of approximately $4.4 million worth of cryptocurrency from nine of Raydium’s constant product liquidity pools.</p><p>The affected pools were ETH-USDC, RAY-SOL, RAY-USDC, RAY-USDT, SOL-USDT, SOL-USDC, stSOL-USDC, UXP-USDC, and ZBC-USDC.</p><p>The attacker was able to drain the funds by repeatedly calling the withdrawPNL function, which allows for the withdrawal of fees from the pools.</p><p>To do so, they exploited the SetParams and AmmParams::SyncNeedTake functionality to increase the expected fees that could be withdrawn.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Pool owner account:</p><ul><li><a href="https://solscan.io/account/HggGrUeg4ReGvpPMLJMFKV69NTXL1r4wQ9Pk9Ljutwyv">https://solscan.io/account/HggGrUeg4ReGvpPMLJMFKV69NTXL1r4wQ9Pk9Ljutwyv</a></li></ul><h4><strong>DeFi Exploit Trends</strong></h4><p>As can be seen from the scale of the losses in December, a large majority of losses were in rugpulls. This amounted to over $12 million being lost. Not far behind were phishing attacks, which amounted to $8 million in losses. Flash loan attacks rounded up the top 3, accounting for $5.8 million in losses.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*NmzxjsEp24AceV9Z" /></figure><h4><strong>Funds Recovered</strong></h4><p>The trend we observed last month of increasing recoveries of funds lost continues to take hold in December. A total of $12 million was recovered, making up more than a quarter of all funds lost this month. By comparison, only $1.2 million was recovered in December 2021.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*6oJi-1Owj_MLnw52" /></figure><p>Interestingly, the total amount of funds recovered in 2022 is significantly higher than that in 2021, at $901 million, as opposed to $648 million last year.</p><h4><strong>Types of Exploit</strong></h4><p>In terms of sheer frequency, rugpulls remain the most common type of exploit — while they tend to be much smaller in value lost per attack, they are also the lowest hanging fruit for DeFi projects to make a cash grab. A total of 3 rugpulls happened this month, marking a slowdown as compared to November 2022.</p><p>However, the fact that 15 cases of exploits happened this December implies that someone is losing money in at least one event every 2 days!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*mZ0cBks5Ef1Jyqv3" /></figure><h4><strong>Attack Vectors</strong></h4><p>In terms of attack vectors, DEXes proved to be a popular target this month — this is unsurprising, given the large amount of liquidity usually locked on these protocols. Other popular targets include CeFi platforms and DeFi tokens; similar suspects to in November. DEXes also led the way in terms of amount lost, with $116.7m being lost in DEXes in December 2022.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*nCPnlkHnaHwOOuM8" /></figure><h4><strong>Funds Lost by Chain</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*WIMjqEdE-Ev7NPZU" /></figure><p>Similarly to previous month, the BNB Chain unfortunately continues to be a rugpull hotspot, with the highest amount of funds being lost in December 2022 at $13.8 million. This is trailed in second place by Avalanche at $12.8 million, driven mainly by the large DeFrost case that we covered.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/794/0*tJELNPP1wHBVEH1v" /></figure><p>In terms of frequency, however, it is Ethereum that saw the highest number of exploits this month, despite a lower amount in total losses compared to BNB chain.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>The decentralized finance (DeFi) space has always carried some level of risk, but it is important for investors to take steps to protect themselves and stay informed about potential threats. This is why education is crucial, and at DEFIYIELD, we are dedicated to providing the necessary resources to help our users navigate this complex and constantly evolving space. It is our responsibility to stay vigilant and ensure that we are making informed investment decisions in the DeFi sector.</p><h4>Happy Yield Farming! 💙👇</h4><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Ff%2Fgmyto4%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Upscribe&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Fgmyto4&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/110afc024ce432026ac8a213da2bee80/href">https://medium.com/media/110afc024ce432026ac8a213da2bee80/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=df0d1ba15ff7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The MOST EVIL Crypto SCAM: Defrost Finance was Funded with CRIMINAL MONEY!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@DeDotFiSecurity/the-most-evil-crypto-scam-defrost-finance-was-funded-with-criminal-money-cb08c99fb6d9?source=rss-22914eb1d61------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cb08c99fb6d9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[finnexus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto-scam-reports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rugpull]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defrost-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto-scam]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[De.Fi Security]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Dec 2022 23:18:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-02T10:18:02.306Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The MOST EVIL Crypto SCAM: Boris and Bob Rug-Pulled $19mln</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*G-pZP7uYjtf8h3JD35t1_A.png" /></figure><p>Yesterday, we published the <a href="https://medium.com/@DeFiYieldSec/exclusive-the-defrost-team-rugpulled-12m-7m-999b24c13f47">first part</a> of our investigation on the Defrost Finance Rug Pull. The entire DeFiYield.App’s security department has been investigating the Rug Pull of Defrost Finance, the people who are behind it, and collecting all on/off-chain data. We present to you the <strong>NEW and the FINAL</strong> part of Defrost Finance Saga.</p><p>Since we published the first part, we have gathered much more information about the people behind Defrost Finance and the way the project was funded. That’s why we are now going out with the 2nd part of the Defrost Saga — One of <strong>the Most Evil Crypto Scam: Rug Pulled Defrost Finance and its Connection to Criminal Money.</strong></p><p>We have spent 2 years on creating the<a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database"> Largest Crypto Hacks Database</a> with more than 3,160 hacks added and manually verified by our on-chain researchers and Solidity engineers. Our on-chain investigations have been mentioned by Forbes, Bloomberg, Wall Street Journal, and Blockworks.</p><p>We thought that we had already seen every type of Rug Pull and Scam possible.</p><p>But then Defrost Finance happened, and decided to make a little Christmas gift for its Community — <strong>rug pull</strong> them for $12M.</p><p>The way they have done this might be the <strong>most sneaky</strong> way to rug pull users that DeFi has ever seen.</p><h4>How it started:</h4><p>On December 24th, the World has seen the following tweet by Defrost Finance:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/497/0*uxKKAfE_fQDVpylW" /><figcaption><a href="https://twitter.com/Defrost_Finance/status/1606455304841236480">https://twitter.com/Defrost_Finance/status/1606455304841236480</a></figcaption></figure><p>Defrost claimed that their V2 smart contract was exploited, and that attacker used a flash loan to withdraw funds.</p><p>However, the V1 contracts had been hacked as well resulting in the $12M loss. The oracle address in the protocol’s collateral vaults was replaced with a malicious one, that triggered liquidations of collateralized user funds.</p><p><strong>0x3cd5854fe3a13707b7882d8290d3cae793a7751a — </strong>the Address that called <strong>setOracleAddress()</strong> was added as the Origin address by deployment of the DefrostFactory address:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/0*R5XUFTXNPKkLwoIw" /><figcaption><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x21fb9837044464cfa5db531e7ad07cbed9f60f57315d4a76291dbd2f3803e38d#eventlog">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x21fb9837044464cfa5db531e7ad07cbed9f60f57315d4a76291dbd2f3803e38d#eventlog</a></figcaption></figure><p>The creator of the<a href="https://snowtrace.io/address/0x7f08ba62fadaf3b4b70a8ddc22b3c63669bddeb2#code"><strong> multisig wallet</strong></a>, which has to approve the oracle replacement function before it executes, <strong>is the same address that requested the oracle replacements</strong>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/0*a30afrUvGBuNi33H" /><figcaption><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xfb5faa1e8e51e3649f318f0453002137747c13da7ab8895437e58df86e999bfd">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xfb5faa1e8e51e3649f318f0453002137747c13da7ab8895437e58df86e999bfd</a></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xa5224414de6f5314250108d0ee15abe743e8a2608b09bff2740d19f241a844f7">This is an application</a> for signing the oracle replacement by the multisig:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/0*qrWRlppBcKzAqTiu" /><figcaption><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xa5224414de6f5314250108d0ee15abe743e8a2608b09bff2740d19f241a844f7">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xa5224414de6f5314250108d0ee15abe743e8a2608b09bff2740d19f241a844f7</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Addresses that were signing oracle replacements</strong> in the protocol’s vaults are:</p><ul><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/address/0xf40d59331dcef16a5e6c4f2e5bcc2ca968dea619">0xF40D59331DCEf16a5E6C4f2E5BCC2cA968DeA619</a></li><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/address/0xebbe39e3003013753a0109594b9451bcde625bb7">0xEBbE39e3003013753a0109594b9451bcDe625bB7</a></li><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/address/0xbe22766fdd63d4acc60e6c209ef2eae6dbfc4814">0xbE22766FDd63d4acc60E6c209ef2eAE6DBFC4814</a></li></ul><p>Now, if Defrost Finance claims that the hack happened due to a compromise of the wallets managing the multisig — <strong>how is it possible that 4 wallets got compromised at the same time? How were they stored?</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/664/0*3mNK-Iu75Q7t3fqz" /></figure><p>This is one of the <strong>oracle replacement transactions</strong>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/0*hhYqW5UlqHzy10Pw" /><figcaption><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x34eb46f498c418285323e6e146ae84ea836e49822fa254c865f59d650261c3dd">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x34eb46f498c418285323e6e146ae84ea836e49822fa254c865f59d650261c3dd</a></figcaption></figure><h4>The timeline of Defrost Finance Rug Pull looks like this:</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*o2nsCNHGA0ULeUvfiOcFqg.png" /></figure><h4>🚨 Connection of all the above mentioned addresses points out the hack was an insider job! 🚨</h4><h4>The funny part?</h4><p>Exactly 1 month before rug pulling its users using the oracle vulnerability, Defrost Finance has i<strong>nsured themselves with 2 Crypto Insurance Providers</strong>:<a href="https://app.insurace.io/"> <strong>Insurace</strong></a> and<a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/projectdegis"> <strong>Degis Insurance</strong></a> … against <strong>“Oracle Failure”</strong>.</p><p>What a coincidence! 🤦‍♂️</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/0*PA7vFF5DGXQ7aRKq" /><figcaption><a href="https://medium.com/@Defrost_Finance/the-degis-insurance-lets-get-into-the-details-7d7b8e1c91f1">Article Announcing the Insurance against “Oracle Failure” on official Defrost’s Medium</a></figcaption></figure><p>Official announcement of the cooperation on insurance by Degis:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/495/1*8jmIrihPAFeMxbh5-5KIxg.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://twitter.com/projectdegis/status/1594691914502410240?s=46&amp;t=lAJ7gNxEmV69P20sJJj9rQ">https://twitter.com/projectdegis/status/1594691914502410240?s=46</a></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/0*h-tX-VbmZaxBubjN" /><figcaption><a href="https://app.insurace.io/">Screenshot from Insurace Official Website</a></figcaption></figure><h4>Now is where things are getting interesting.</h4><p>So, back to DeFrost. Just as we did previously with<a href="https://blog.defiyield.app/the-bundles-finance-saga-defiyield-info-9a25a8b99140"> Bundles</a>,<a href="https://blog.defiyield.app/the-yffs-saga-how-a-yield-farming-project-was-compelled-to-fix-its-code-6c5ee77816bb"> YFFS</a>,<a href="https://blog.defiyield.app/pancake-bunny-saga-revealing-all-the-details-of-tough-transformation-d4a68801d4f"> PancakeBunny</a>,<a href="https://blog.defiyield.app/how-deus-finance-fixed-its-code-following-a-defiyield-info-report-51775ef59a5b"> Deus</a>, and<a href="https://blog.defiyield.app/report-the-alpha-lab-infinite-minting-saga-team-controls-96-of-the-tokens-8a7d107c740"> Alpha Homora</a> cases — <strong>we are writing this article to inform the Community about the concerns we have about this project. </strong>As a premise, we would directly say that it seems like they are hiding.</p><p><strong>But let’s start from the beginning.</strong></p><p>Since 2020, we at DeFiYield.App have performed more than 60+ Security Audits, we also analyze the functions / hints if the project retains the ability to scam investors with the following:</p><ul><li>Infinite minting;</li><li>Anti-rug pool functions;</li><li>Minting Exploits;</li><li>Liquidity pooled;</li><li>Transfer Allowlist;</li><li>Owner tampering;</li><li>Backdoor library.</li></ul><p>1 year ago, DeFiYield.App released a 120-page audit on Defrost Finance — <a href="https://defiyield.app/audit-database/defiyield/defrost_finance"><strong>click here to see the full pdf file</strong></a><strong>.</strong> On page 33, we’ve stated the following:</p><p><em>“</em><strong><em>The Origin EOAs can replace the Oracle address</em></strong><em>. Collateral asset prices in the vaults of Defrost Finance depend on oracle contracts. In case the new oracle is insecure and can cause a sharp and unpredictable change in the price of an asset, </em><strong><em>this can lead to liquidation of user collaterals</em></strong><em>.”</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/0*W9a_-4JLgfWxiuBT" /><figcaption><a href="https://safefiles.defiyield.info/safe/files/audit/pdf/SC_audit_for_defrost_f_1.pdf">The 33rd page of DeFiYield.App’s Audit Report on Defrost Finance</a></figcaption></figure><p>We have warned about exactly what happened pn December 24th — the risk associated with the Origin EOAs being replaced with Oracle address in a centralized manner. This is what Defrost Finance used to manipulate with fake oracle and rug pull its users. And warned people about it. Accordingly, it was indicated by<a href="https://www.coindesk.com/business/2022/12/25/defrost-finance-hacked-in-attack-some-say-may-have-been-a-rug-pull/?utm_content=editorial&amp;utm_term=organic&amp;utm_campaign=coindesk_main&amp;utm_source=twitter&amp;utm_medium=social"> <strong>Coindesk</strong></a>, where the journal has featured our Audit and the warning about the crucial vulnerability that we stated in it:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/0*vCjMM93GcoHZo0T4" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.coindesk.com/business/2022/12/25/defrost-finance-hacked-in-attack-some-say-may-have-been-a-rug-pull/?utm_content=editorial&amp;utm_term=organic&amp;utm_campaign=coindesk_main&amp;utm_source=twitter&amp;utm_medium=social">Coindesk Article Featuring DeFiYield.App Audit</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>In total, 151 issues had been detected, 13 of which were Critical and High Risk.</strong> Many who read our Audit and were able to withdraw their funds from DeFrost were lucky enough to save their funds as a result.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/0*qP9dixd1l_bByofS" /><figcaption><a href="https://safefiles.defiyield.info/safe/files/audit/pdf/SC_audit_for_defrost_f_1.pdf">The 9th page of DeFiYield.App’s Audit Report on Defrost Finance</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>We have got in touch with Defrost Finance team 2 times:</strong></p><ul><li>1 Year ago, after we’ve performed an Audit on them. Back then we texted them to inform them about all the issues that we’ve found, and asked them to improve the correspondent functions of their smart smart contract. They never responded to us.</li><li>Yesterday, after their rug pull. Have they responded? No.</li></ul><h4>Defrost Finance got caught.</h4><p>After PeckShield’s and our investigations that we’ve<a href="https://twitter.com/DefiyieldSec/status/1606805685311791104"> <strong>posted on Twitter</strong></a>, it was clear for the Defrost Finance team that they’d been caught, and now there is no way for them to simply launder the funds and live in peace in the Bahamas.</p><p>That’s how they started to think of ways of returning funds back to the users.</p><p>On the next day after the exploit, they proposed the “hacker” a <strong>20% reward</strong> for returning the “stolen” funds:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/605/0*OLsvosbJb8mo3IzK" /><figcaption><a href="https://twitter.com/Defrost_Finance/status/1606985259299790848?cxt=HHwWgIDTvYillM0sAAAA">Official Tweet by Defrost Finance</a></figcaption></figure><p>And on the next day, the “hacker” <strong>has returned all the stolen $12M</strong>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/0*ARD_4HF56bnIQC1a" /><figcaption>9.9M DAI were returned::<a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x5Ad30D7Ec1Ff9D95031E2b4ec2698Df29262867B#tokentxns"> https://etherscan.io/address/0x5Ad30D7Ec1Ff9D95031E2b4ec2698Df29262867B#tokentxns</a></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/0*cftybJVI7r2FjPoo" /><figcaption>And 2.5k ETH were returned as well:<a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x5Ad30D7Ec1Ff9D95031E2b4ec2698Df29262867B"> https://etherscan.io/address/0x5Ad30D7Ec1Ff9D95031E2b4ec2698Df29262867B</a></figcaption></figure><p>Following the bounty hacking industry standard it’s<strong> IMPOSSIBLE to get a resolution so fast! </strong>The dealing process in the bounty program is much longer!</p><p>Moreover:</p><p>Why has “the hacker” returned the full amount of $12M? Why haven’t they taken the proposed 20% Bounty? Or have they sent back the “stolen” $12M and hoped that the Defrost Team will return the promised 20% back (unrealistic scenario, but anyway)?</p><p><strong>Our question is: can the Defrost Team show to the public the transaction with which they have returned the 20% reward to the hacker?</strong></p><p><strong>However, the Developers Behind the Defrost Finance had a more successful RUG PULL in their Career…</strong></p><h3>DEFROST AND FINNEXUS TEAM</h3><p>The Developers of Defrost Finance <strong>are the same people as the Developers of</strong><a href="https://app.phx.finance/"><strong> </strong></a><strong>FinNexus </strong>(later it will be rebranded to Phoenix Finance), where the admin key had “leaked”, which resulted in a $7M loss in 2021. Following our research, considering all the inputs, there is a high chance that it was a rug pull, and the private key didn’t just “leak”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*udGICRV8rZEe2IU0" /><figcaption><a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/finnexus">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/phoenix_finance_(finnexus)</a></figcaption></figure><p>Now we move on to the most interesting part of the entire saga: we believe that people who position themselves as the core team of Defrost Finance are not even real people. Let us explain:</p><p>It has become clear that at least 3 developers of Phoenix Finance (a.k.a. FinNexus that has rug pulled for $7M in 2021) and Defrost Finance are the same people. We have found the same profiles behind GitHub repositories of both projects; moreover, it looks like all these accounts are owned by 1 person, who uses the suffix “jqg” in all of their domains:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/497/0*ZV0jdiQOev4uY_Un" /></figure><p>Now, ask yourself this: would people who are publicly KYC’d behind RUG PULLED (the fact of the rug pull wasn’t 100% clear in 2021, but now it has become clear) FinNexus, and whose identities can be easily found on the Web, start a 2nd project — Defrost Finance, with the same GitHub accounts, knowing, that they want to Rug Pull it too? To do that, you either need to:</p><ul><li>Want to go to jail really bad;</li><li>Make a mistake and use same accounts for Defrost Finance, therefore, accidentally DOX your team, which was planned to be anonymous.</li></ul><p>If you carefully check LinkedIn’s of FinNexus Founders, you will notice that those are clearly fake. No activity. No information. No links to previous projects / organizations / companies. Nothing.</p><p>Want more evidence of the Defrost Finance team being the same people as the FinNexus team? No problem! Today, after the first part of our investigation went live yesterday, FinNexus’s website went down. What a coincidence!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*wB8Q1Y-Yv1D9kDWX" /><figcaption><a href="https://finnexus.io/">https://finnexus.io/</a></figcaption></figure><p>Yesterday, however, the website was still live. Unfortunately, the latest snapshot of the website taken by the webarchive is November 16th:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Vz5IjD4961HEAyjd" /><figcaption><a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20221116225700/https://finnexus.io/">http://web.archive.org/web/20221116225700/https://finnexus.io/</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>At the end, we have the scheme that looks like this:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jCBuy0RWkNSuVSzmGgGc1g.png" /><figcaption>The team behind Defrost Finance and FinNexus (Phoenix Finance)</figcaption></figure><ul><li>Boris Yang’s linkedin: <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/boris-yang-371297199/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/boris-yang-371297199/</a> — clearly a fake one;</li><li>Linkedin of Jacky Wang (their Business co-Founder [whatever that means]): <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/jacky-wang-776458173/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/jacky-wang-776458173/</a> — is clearly fake also;</li><li>Lu Jianqiang linkedin: <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/%E5%BB%BA%E5%BC%BA-%E5%90%95-4400b5168/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/%E5%BB%BA%E5%BC%BA-%E5%90%95-4400b5168/</a> — also fake.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*RxJjidP0bJ0oMTgTVJ6snQ.png" /><figcaption>Doran the Community Manager have stated that the founders ‘’Michele/Melter’’ are based in the Chinese Timezone. This fact is to be verified.</figcaption></figure><p>Pay attention to the Tornado Cash Mixer logo that we’ve put near the Defrost Finance (on the scheme above).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Rd8kC1l5120Y9rgrqOKlNg.png" /></figure><p>You might wonder why we did it? It’s because the deployer of Defrost Finance was funded from the Tornado Cash mixer on Avalanche. Now, ask yourself: as a Founder of a Tier-1 Avalanche Project (at all time highs, Defrost had $120M TVL), would you want to DEPLOY your DAPP with funds from Tornado Cash, unless there is something you want to hide (for example the source of your income?)</p><p>It’s very likely that it was needed to hide the fact that funds used to deploy Defrost Finance were the SAME funds Defrost Finance’s Founders stole from FinNexus Finance in the 2021 Rug Pull</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*jv8dHci8Kl4B9Kk6" /><figcaption><a href="https://snowtrace.io/address/0xbbb2229ed5d1ca3501f8c4ef31741b6800e12d3b">Defrost Finance was funded with Tornado Cash Mixer’s Wallet</a></figcaption></figure><p>All <strong>three multisig signers</strong> were funded by one address:</p><ul><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x0f3442385e191501d86efa89a1730df84223a5cb709f59e164398b78abfa217e">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x0f3442385e191501d86efa89a1730df84223a5cb709f59e164398b78abfa217e</a></li><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x5c6cf35f4560f8097f5a983e30013700651e71b67097ca25cb7ee87d63a53cf2">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x5c6cf35f4560f8097f5a983e30013700651e71b67097ca25cb7ee87d63a53cf2</a></li><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x93e9385f24fd09303442171296e2803b94ab1bdcedffc09ad00e14b90f7d5a57">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x93e9385f24fd09303442171296e2803b94ab1bdcedffc09ad00e14b90f7d5a57</a></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qDN0Al4nqUJ-Didn" /></figure><p>The address on the screenshots above (that was sending funds to all 3 Defrost’s multisig signers), clearly belongs to Tornado Cash Mixer:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*JBg8y0Oe-dhTBqhN" /><figcaption><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x8634fa7f9e18eb5bf2962fc0ca929bb340ddedd351b8398b09ad8cef60d732cb">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x8634fa7f9e18eb5bf2962fc0ca929bb340ddedd351b8398b09ad8cef60d732cb</a></figcaption></figure><p>The connection between Phoenix Finance (FinNexus) and Defrost Finance <strong>can be found on Defrost’s GitHub, in the following repository:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/0*9Af19anDQgZbejjO" /><figcaption><a href="https://github.com/Phoenix-Finance/FinNexus-Eth-Token">https://github.com/Phoenix-Finance/FinNexus-Eth-Token</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>AFTER-RUG-BEHAVIOR</strong></p><p>In our <a href="https://medium.com/@DeFiYieldSec/exclusive-the-defrost-team-rugpulled-12m-7m-999b24c13f47">First Article</a>, we provided all the data needed to prove the rug pull fact behindDefrost Finance’s $12M scam, showing the connection between Defrost Finance and Finnexus (the project rug pulled in 2021 and then rebranded to Phoenix Finance).</p><p>Today, our research got featured on CoinTelegraph:<a href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/defrost-finance-breaks-silence-on-exit-scam-accusations-denies-rug-pull"> https://cointelegraph.com/news/defrost-finance-breaks-silence-on-exit-scam-accusations-denies-rug-pull</a></p><p>After this, we got in touch with the Defrost Team asking them to KYC again. <strong>Unfortunately, no reply has come from its founders.</strong></p><p>What Defrost Finance started doing instead is just banning everyone sending the link to this article in their chat and they are seen lying about the “private key getting compromised” — nonsense.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/619/0*AwsEIqU9saYD9hV5" /><figcaption>Defrost Admin Banning Users who send this Article in Chat</figcaption></figure><p>The <strong>victims</strong> of Defrost’s Rug Pull have united in a Telegram chat, where they dig into the case deeper:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/920/1*jFmizWZERblcKSqy6Sk14w.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://t.me/defrost_rugpull_victims">https://t.me/defrost_rugpull_victims</a></figcaption></figure><p>We have also chatted with a user who claim to be the largest holder of Defrost Finance V1. Now he is hoping for the refund:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/495/1*8XzxMsfrUk32KyHNCeiaiQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://twitter.com/tsetoshi/status/1606909545162608641?s=20">https://twitter.com/tsetoshi/status/1606909545162608641?s=20</a></figcaption></figure><h3>CONCLUSION</h3><p>DeFiYield.App has been fighting DeFi Scams for years, as our main goal is for DeFi to become a safer and a more convenient place for a retail investor. We believe that only by being safe and fully trustless, DeFi can have mass adoption and then we can finally go Bankless!</p><p>That’s why we’ve written the Amazon’s Bestseller:<a href="https://www.amazon.com/Wall-Street-Over-Cryptocurrency-Decentralized/dp/1527295362"> <strong>“The Wall Street Era is Over”</strong></a><strong> </strong>— <strong>the most comprehensive guide on Web3, and how to safekeep your crypto funds.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/667/0*wTjd77CUESKJQ58k" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Wall-Street-Over-Cryptocurrency-Decentralized/dp/1527295362">https://www.amazon.com/Wall-Street-Over-Cryptocurrency-Decentralized/dp/1527295362</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Have comments or opinions? Let us know!</strong></p><p><strong>Check out other articles from the Saga series:</strong></p><ul><li><a href="https://defiyield-guides-news.medium.com/how-deus-finance-fixed-its-code-following-a-defiyield-info-report-51775ef59a5b">The Deus Finance Saga</a></li><li><a href="https://defiyield-guides-news.medium.com/the-yffs-saga-how-a-yield-farming-project-was-compelled-to-fix-its-code-6c5ee77816bb">The YFFS Saga</a></li><li><a href="https://defiyield-guides-news.medium.com/the-bundles-finance-saga-defiyield-info-9a25a8b99140">The Bundles Finance Saga</a></li><li><a href="https://blog.defiyield.app/pancake-bunny-saga-revealing-all-the-details-of-tough-transformation-d4a68801d4f">Pancake Bunny Saga</a></li><li><a href="https://blog.defiyield.app/report-the-alpha-lab-infinite-minting-saga-team-controls-96-of-the-tokens-8a7d107c740">Alpha Homora Saga</a></li></ul><h3>Happy Yield Farming! 💙👇</h3><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Ff%2Fgmyto4%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Upscribe&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Fgmyto4&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/110afc024ce432026ac8a213da2bee80/href">https://medium.com/media/110afc024ce432026ac8a213da2bee80/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cb08c99fb6d9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[EXCLUSIVE: THE DEFROST TEAM RUG PULLED $12M + $7M]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@DeDotFiSecurity/exclusive-the-defrost-team-rugpulled-12m-7m-999b24c13f47?source=rss-22914eb1d61------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/999b24c13f47</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defrost-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto-scam-reports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defrost-finance-rug-pull]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rugpull]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto-scam]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[De.Fi Security]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Dec 2022 21:42:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-28T12:29:03.730Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ulcDeE_X05Ck2i4IKbk31g.png" /></figure><p>We spent 2 years on creating the <a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database">Largest Crypto Hacks Database</a> with more than 3,160 hacks being added and manually verified by our on-chain researchers and solidity engineers. Our on-chain investigations have been mentioned by Forbes, Bloomberg, Wall Street Journal, and Blockworks.</p><p>We thought that we had already seen every type of Rug Pull and Scam possible.</p><p>But then Defrost Finance happened. And decided to make a little Christmas gift for its Community — <strong>rug pull</strong> them for $12M.</p><p>The way they have done this might be the <strong>most sneaky</strong> way to rug pull users that DeFi has ever seen.</p><h4>How it started:</h4><p>On December 24th, the World has seen the following tweet by Defrost Finance:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/497/0*Atir5m31uRtt_iES" /><figcaption><a href="https://twitter.com/Defrost_Finance/status/1606455304841236480">https://twitter.com/Defrost_Finance/status/1606455304841236480</a></figcaption></figure><p>Defrost claimed that their V2 smart contract was exploited, and that attacker used a flash loan to withdraw funds.</p><p>However, the V1 contracts had been hacked as well resulting in the $12M loss. The oracle address in the protocol’s collateral vaults was replaced with a malicious one. That triggered liquidations of collateralized user funds.</p><p><strong>0x3cd5854fe3a13707b7882d8290d3cae793a7751a — </strong>the Address that called <strong>setOracleAddress()</strong> was added as the Origin address by deployment of the DefrostFactory address:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*ytjDWDsBwSATQqmJJgDEfA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x21fb9837044464cfa5db531e7ad07cbed9f60f57315d4a76291dbd2f3803e38d#eventlog">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x21fb9837044464cfa5db531e7ad07cbed9f60f57315d4a76291dbd2f3803e38d#eventlog</a></figcaption></figure><p>The creator of the<strong> </strong><a href="https://snowtrace.io/address/0x7f08ba62fadaf3b4b70a8ddc22b3c63669bddeb2#code"><strong>multisig wallet</strong></a>, which has to approve the oracle replacement function before it executes, <strong>is the same address that requested the oracle replacements</strong>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ak_AhE0fYaJkrGQvDhArWg.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xfb5faa1e8e51e3649f318f0453002137747c13da7ab8895437e58df86e999bfd">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xfb5faa1e8e51e3649f318f0453002137747c13da7ab8895437e58df86e999bfd</a></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xa5224414de6f5314250108d0ee15abe743e8a2608b09bff2740d19f241a844f7">This is an application</a> for signing the oracle replacement by the multisig:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VeBR_QvEvWIKrAYDmgYrnw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xa5224414de6f5314250108d0ee15abe743e8a2608b09bff2740d19f241a844f7">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xa5224414de6f5314250108d0ee15abe743e8a2608b09bff2740d19f241a844f7</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Addresses that were signing oracle replacements</strong> in the protocol’s vaults are:</p><ul><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/address/0xf40d59331dcef16a5e6c4f2e5bcc2ca968dea619">0xF40D59331DCEf16a5E6C4f2E5BCC2cA968DeA619</a></li><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/address/0xebbe39e3003013753a0109594b9451bcde625bb7">0xEBbE39e3003013753a0109594b9451bcDe625bB7</a></li><li><a href="https://snowtrace.io/address/0xbe22766fdd63d4acc60e6c209ef2eae6dbfc4814">0xbE22766FDd63d4acc60E6c209ef2eAE6DBFC4814</a></li></ul><p>This is one of the <strong>oracle replacement transactions</strong>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*t3AC4w5-0qS_rFg6" /><figcaption><a href="https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x34eb46f498c418285323e6e146ae84ea836e49822fa254c865f59d650261c3dd">https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x34eb46f498c418285323e6e146ae84ea836e49822fa254c865f59d650261c3dd</a></figcaption></figure><h4>🚨 Connection of all the above mentioned addresses points out the hack was an insider job! 🚨</h4><h4>The funny part?</h4><p>Exactly 1 month before rug pulling its users using the oracle vulnerability, Defrost Finance has i<strong>nsured themselves with 2 Crypto Insurance Providers</strong>: <a href="https://app.insurace.io/"><strong>Insurace</strong></a> and <a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/projectdegis"><strong>Degis Insurance</strong></a> … against <strong>“Oracle Failure”</strong>.</p><p>What a coincidence! 🤦‍♂️</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Ji0c2HgCc6S53vOS" /><figcaption><a href="https://medium.com/@Defrost_Finance/the-degis-insurance-lets-get-into-the-details-7d7b8e1c91f1">Article Announcing the Insurance against “Oracle Failure” on official Defrost’s Medium</a></figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IODPpnl-_IMPVCq1" /><figcaption><a href="https://app.insurace.io/">Screenshot from Insurace Official Website</a></figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Now is where things are getting interesting.</strong></h4><p>So, back to DeFrost. Just as we did previously with <a href="https://blog.defiyield.app/the-bundles-finance-saga-defiyield-info-9a25a8b99140">Bundles</a>, <a href="https://blog.defiyield.app/the-yffs-saga-how-a-yield-farming-project-was-compelled-to-fix-its-code-6c5ee77816bb">YFFS</a>, <a href="https://blog.defiyield.app/pancake-bunny-saga-revealing-all-the-details-of-tough-transformation-d4a68801d4f">PancakeBunny</a>, <a href="https://blog.defiyield.app/how-deus-finance-fixed-its-code-following-a-defiyield-info-report-51775ef59a5b">Deus</a>, and <a href="https://blog.defiyield.app/report-the-alpha-lab-infinite-minting-saga-team-controls-96-of-the-tokens-8a7d107c740">Alpha Homora</a> cases - <strong>we are writing this article to inform the Community about the concerns we have about this project. </strong>As a premise, we would directly say that it seems like they are hiding.</p><p><strong>But let’s start from the beginning.</strong></p><p>Since 2020, we at DeFiYield.App, have performed more than 60+ Security Audits, in each among other things we also analyze the functions / hints if the project retains the ability of scamming its investors including</p><ul><li>Infinite minting;</li><li>Anti-rug pool functions;</li><li>Minting Exploits;</li><li>Liquidity pooled;</li><li>Transfer Allowlist;</li><li>Owner tampering;</li><li>Backdoor library.</li></ul><p>1 year ago, DeFiYield.App released a 120-page audit on Defrost Finance — <a href="https://defiyield.app/audit-database/defiyield/defrost_finance"><strong>click here to see the full pdf file</strong></a><strong>.</strong> On page 33rg, we’ve stated the following:</p><p><em>“</em><strong><em>The Origin EOAs can replace the Oracle address</em></strong><em>. Collateral asset prices in the vaults of Defrost Finance depend on oracle contracts. In case the new oracle is insecure and can cause a sharp and unpredictable change in the price of an asset, </em><strong><em>this can lead to liquidation of user collaterals</em></strong><em>.”</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/786/0*vdCx5MUxqEq-eYFp" /><figcaption><a href="https://safefiles.defiyield.info/safe/files/audit/pdf/SC_audit_for_defrost_f_1.pdf">The 33rd page of DeFiYield.App’s Audit Report on Defrost Finance</a></figcaption></figure><p>We described <strong>the exact smart contract vulnerability</strong> that Defrost Finance used to manipulate with fake oracle and rug pull its users. And warned people about it. Accordingly, it was indicated by <a href="https://www.coindesk.com/business/2022/12/25/defrost-finance-hacked-in-attack-some-say-may-have-been-a-rug-pull/?utm_content=editorial&amp;utm_term=organic&amp;utm_campaign=coindesk_main&amp;utm_source=twitter&amp;utm_medium=social"><strong>Coindesk</strong></a>, where the journal has featured our Audit and the warning about the crucial vulnerability that we stated in it:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*ZXrIgiX8noG30D49" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.coindesk.com/business/2022/12/25/defrost-finance-hacked-in-attack-some-say-may-have-been-a-rug-pull/?utm_content=editorial&amp;utm_term=organic&amp;utm_campaign=coindesk_main&amp;utm_source=twitter&amp;utm_medium=social">Coindesk Article Featuring DeFiYield.App Audit</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Apart from this exact vulnerability that was used to rug pull users</strong>, we’ve found <strong>151 issues, 13 of which were Critical and High Risk.</strong> Those who read our Audit and withdrew funds from Defrost had saved their funds.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/781/0*b_FIIdjarIxPR0wz" /><figcaption><a href="https://safefiles.defiyield.info/safe/files/audit/pdf/SC_audit_for_defrost_f_1.pdf">The 9th page of DeFiYield.App’s Audit Report on Defrost Finance</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>We have got in touch with Defrost Finance team 2 times:</strong></p><ul><li>1 Year ago, after we’ve performed an Audit on them. Back then we texted them to inform them about all the issues that we’ve found, and asked them to improve the correspondent functions of their smart smart contract. They never respond to us.</li><li>Yesterday, after their rug pull. Have they responded? No.</li></ul><h4><strong>Defrost Finance got caught.</strong></h4><p>After the PeckShield’s and our investigations that we’ve <a href="https://twitter.com/DefiyieldSec/status/1606805685311791104"><strong>posted on Twitter</strong></a>, it was clear for the Defrost Finance team that they’ve got caught, and now there is no way for them to simply launder the funds and live in peace in the Bahamas.</p><p>That’s how they started to think of ways of returning funds back to the users.</p><p>On the next day after the exploit, they proposed a “hacker” a <strong>20% reward</strong> for returning the “stolen” funds:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/605/0*VbxQ-5C00STMdv7c" /><figcaption><a href="https://twitter.com/Defrost_Finance/status/1606985259299790848?cxt=HHwWgIDTvYillM0sAAAA">Official Tweet by Defrost Finance</a></figcaption></figure><p>And on the next day, the “hacker” <strong>has returned all the stolen $12M</strong>:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*MtVTz07jXTKtLaB-" /><figcaption>9.9M DAI returned to this address: <a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x5Ad30D7Ec1Ff9D95031E2b4ec2698Df29262867B#tokentxns">https://etherscan.io/address/0x5Ad30D7Ec1Ff9D95031E2b4ec2698Df29262867B#tokentxns</a></figcaption></figure><p>Following the bounty hacking standard it’s<strong> IMPOSSIBLE to get a resolution so fast.</strong> The dealing process in the bounty program is much longer.️</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*HUdyqTOVo3T-lsdc" /><figcaption>2.5k ETH returned to this address: <a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x5Ad30D7Ec1Ff9D95031E2b4ec2698Df29262867B">https://etherscan.io/address/0x5Ad30D7Ec1Ff9D95031E2b4ec2698Df29262867B</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>However, the Developers Behind the Defrost Finance had a more successful RUG PULL in their Career.</strong></p><p>The Developers of Defrost Finance <strong>are the same people as the Developers of </strong><a href="https://app.phx.finance/"><strong>Phoenix Finance</strong></a><strong> (FinNexus)</strong>, whose smart contract’s private key has “leaked”, which has resulted in a $7M loss in 2021. Following our research, considering all the inputs, there is a high chance that it was a rug pull, and the private key didn’t just “leak”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*avDqb_GiJJTovJsRP8MazA.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/phoenix_finance_(finnexus)">https://defiyield.app/rekt-database/phoenix_finance_(finnexus)</a></figcaption></figure><p>The connection between Phoenix Finance (FinNexus) and Defrost Finance <strong>can be found on Defrost’s GitHub:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TLGm8RlzNbWSc2AnHE3unw.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://github.com/Phoenix-Finance/FinNexus-Eth-Token">https://github.com/Phoenix-Finance/FinNexus-Eth-Token</a></figcaption></figure><p>As pointed by a Twitter User — after the FinNexus got exploited, they forked $FNX to the Phoenix Finance $PHX, <strong>and used part of the rugged money to fund the growth of Defrost Finance</strong>, to rug pull it again:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/494/0*HjW_KvlqIFRlVz7y" /><figcaption><a href="https://twitter.com/ZRBKCE/status/1607189658257227777">https://twitter.com/ZRBKCE/status/1607189658257227777</a></figcaption></figure><h3>UPDATE (28.12.2022)!</h3><p>In this article we provided all the data needed to prove the rug pull fact behind the Defrost Finance’s $12M scam, showing the connection between Defrost Finance and Phoenix Finance (the project rug pulled in 2021).</p><p>Today, our research got featured on CoinTelegraph: <a href="https://cointelegraph.com/news/defrost-finance-breaks-silence-on-exit-scam-accusations-denies-rug-pull">https://cointelegraph.com/news/defrost-finance-breaks-silence-on-exit-scam-accusations-denies-rug-pull</a></p><p>After this, we got in touch with Defrost Team asking them to KYC again. <strong>Unfortunately, no reply has come from its founders.</strong></p><p>What Defrost Finance started doing instead is just banning everyone sending the link to this article in chat. And liying about the “private key getting compromised” — nonsense.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/619/1*j1DobohUgSWgnBMPYR8-Wg.png" /><figcaption>Defrost Admin Banning Users who send this Article in Chat</figcaption></figure><h3>CONCLUSION</h3><p>We, at DeFiYield.App, have been fighting DeFi Scams for years, as our main goal is for DeFi to become a safer and a more convenient place for a retail investor. We believe that only by being safe and fully trustless, DeFi can be mass adopted and we can finally go Bankless!</p><p>That’s why we’ve written the Amazon’s Bestseller: <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Wall-Street-Over-Cryptocurrency-Decentralized/dp/1527295362"><strong>“The Wall Street Era is Over”</strong></a><strong> </strong>—<strong> the most comprehensive guide on Web3, and how to save your crypto funds.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*OCO1mHmlr79jnCYx.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Wall-Street-Over-Cryptocurrency-Decentralized/dp/1527295362">https://www.amazon.com/Wall-Street-Over-Cryptocurrency-Decentralized/dp/1527295362</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Have comments or opinions? Let us know!</strong></p><p><strong>Check out other articles from the Saga series:</strong></p><ul><li><a href="https://defiyield-guides-news.medium.com/how-deus-finance-fixed-its-code-following-a-defiyield-info-report-51775ef59a5b">The Deus Finance Saga</a></li><li><a href="https://defiyield-guides-news.medium.com/the-yffs-saga-how-a-yield-farming-project-was-compelled-to-fix-its-code-6c5ee77816bb">The YFFS Saga</a></li><li><a href="https://defiyield-guides-news.medium.com/the-bundles-finance-saga-defiyield-info-9a25a8b99140">The Bundles Finance Saga</a></li><li><a href="https://blog.defiyield.app/pancake-bunny-saga-revealing-all-the-details-of-tough-transformation-d4a68801d4f">Pancake Bunny Saga</a></li><li><a href="https://blog.defiyield.app/report-the-alpha-lab-infinite-minting-saga-team-controls-96-of-the-tokens-8a7d107c740">Alpha Homora Saga</a></li></ul><h3>Happy Yield Farming! 💙👇</h3><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Ff%2Fgmyto4%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Upscribe&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Fgmyto4&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/110afc024ce432026ac8a213da2bee80/href">https://medium.com/media/110afc024ce432026ac8a213da2bee80/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=999b24c13f47" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Almost $4 billion lost in November: DeFi Rekt Stories]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/defiyield-official-blog/almost-4-billion-lost-in-november-defi-rekt-stories-24c8a3821ba2?source=rss-22914eb1d61------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/24c8a3821ba2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto-scam-reports]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[De.Fi Security]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Nov 2022 17:42:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-24T20:47:03.003Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4WpcDeEo2Tebsl10lSi2nQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Just when we thought we were finally done with October, which was another month with over a billion dollars in losses, November came with even more surprises.</p><p>This was made apparent with the FTX collapse and more recently with the Genesis cryptocurrency trading platform, which has almost $3 billion in outstanding loans. As a consequence, losses incurred in November 2022 were considerably higher than in October.</p><p>Compared to the previous year, where November saw nearly $100 million worth of losses, like the last month, we have observed a massive increase in funds lost, from $100 million to nearly $4 billion.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*r1Inx8OBZ1_e_d0I" /></figure><p>In total, with the number of high profile losses such as Terra Luna and FTX, the total losses this year have amounted to $47b, compared to ‘just’ $8b in 2021.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*IMdDc2t7OalXwuvv" /></figure><p>However, this was driven by two major cases as a result of the failures of centralized entities, rather than native DeFi applications. With that said, let’s take a brief look at the top 5 cases this month.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*M7jfBZSZ93mOymio" /></figure><p><em>Note: Looking for all-time data on crypto exploits? Check out our industry-leading REKT database for </em><a href="https://de.fi/rekt-database"><em>crypto hack &amp; scam</em></a><em> info.</em></p><h3><strong>1. Genesis — $2.8b Lost (CeFi, November 21)</strong></h3><p>Genesis, a cryptocurrency platform for derivatives, trading, and lending, has approximately $2.8 billion in outstanding loans on its balance sheet. Also, the company has not yet filed for bankruptcy. On November 10, the firm revealed that it had around $175 million worth of funds locked within an FTX trading account.</p><p>Then, on November 16, Genesis halted withdrawals on its platform because of what it called “unprecedented market turmoil” following the FTX collapse. Afterwards, on November 22, a spokesperson for the platform stated that they were looking to address the issue without declaring bankruptcy.</p><h3><strong>2. FTX Group — $1b Lost (CeFi, November 11)</strong></h3><p>Sam Bankman-Fried stated that both of his companies, the FTX cryptocurrency exchange and the Alameda Research trading firm, have filed for bankruptcy. Not only that, but over 130 other affiliated firms are bankrupt as well. The total funds lost are worth around 1 to 2 billion dollars.</p><p>The incident began with some research that showed that the collateral of Alameda Research was largely filled with FTX’s native token, FTT. To elaborate more on the nature of its collateral, Alameda’s assets were worth around $14,600,000,000 in total, of which $3,660,000,000 were free FTT tokens and $2,160,000,000 were “FTT collateral.” Furthermore, there were large amounts of SOL and SRM tokens as well, since Mr. Bankman-Fried was one of the early investors in the Solana chain and he was also the co-founder of the Serum Exchange.</p><p>The research that initially hinted at insolvency then ignited a panic-filled bank run on FTX, where users immediately started withdrawing millions of dollars’ worth of funds from the exchange.</p><p>As a result, the FTT token’s value fell by over 95% within 24 hours. Even SOL was affected by this unfortunate incident and also by the recent activity that took place on-chain, where $49,000,000 worth of SOL was withdrawn from the staking pool. This led to the inevitable drop of approximately 60% in its price.</p><p>Following that, the FTX Exchange then stopped its withdrawals and filed for bankruptcy. Since FTX used to be a major player within the cryptocurrency sector, other similar projects that were reliant on the exchange started reporting significant losses one at a time.</p><p>The event sparked a series of exchanges seeking to reassure customers by releasing their ‘Proof of Reserves’. It is important to note in this case that many of these proofs of reserves fail to also account for the size of liabilities that the exchange holds to its clients.</p><p>Furthermore, it should also be noted that a bank run should in theory not be possible if an exchange holds client assets on a 1-to-1 basis.</p><h3><strong>3. Deribit Exchange — $28.3m Lost (Access Control, November 1)</strong></h3><p>The Deribit Exchange was exploited through access control. The private keys of the hot wallet were compromised, which then led to a loss worth around $28,000,000.</p><p>The exchange serves as a platform for cryptocurrency derivatives. The private keys of the initiative’s hot wallet were compromised on both the Bitcoin and Ethereum chains. The total loss of funds amounted to 691 BTC and 9,111 ETH, all of which are worth more than $28 million at this moment. The cold addresses and client assets weren’t affected, and fortunately, on its official Twitter account, the firm stated that the lost funds will be paid.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Attacker addresses:</p><p><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0xb0606f433496bf66338b8ad6b6d51fc4d84a44cd">https://etherscan.io/address/0xb0606f433496bf66338b8ad6b6d51fc4d84a44cd</a></p><p><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x8d08aad4b2bac2bb761ac4781cf62468c9ec47b4">https://etherscan.io/address/0x8d08aad4b2bac2bb761ac4781cf62468c9ec47b4</a></p><p><a href="https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/bc1qw5g8lw4kzltpdcraehy2dt6dqda8080xd6vhl4kg4wwsypwerg9s3x6pvk">https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/address/bc1qw5g8lw4kzltpdcraehy2dt6dqda8080xd6vhl4kg4wwsypwerg9s3x6pvk</a></p><p>Transfer transactions:</p><p><a href="https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/transaction/6ff66fd113afeb88f6d47e3c0a91b00c9f73c55b0366ca47fc217e8f2c1e0e61">https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/transaction/6ff66fd113afeb88f6d47e3c0a91b00c9f73c55b0366ca47fc217e8f2c1e0e61</a></p><p><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0xdd608c8c4e8d8529967955d89f9e71842e80c3c84d592c72054f68090a5a102c">https://etherscan.io/tx/0xdd608c8c4e8d8529967955d89f9e71842e80c3c84d592c72054f68090a5a102c</a></p><p><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0xf3a14bfddc65725b4a345e0bafa84afd328de1b9487339157a0f24c9085b66f2">https://etherscan.io/tx/0xf3a14bfddc65725b4a345e0bafa84afd328de1b9487339157a0f24c9085b66f2</a></p><h3><strong>4. Pando — $18.5m Lost (Access Control, November 5)</strong></h3><p>Based on MTG technology, Pando is a decentralized network that was recently compromised.</p><p>This allowed the hacker to grab 11,107,488 worth of stablecoins and 5128 ETH from the Ethereum chain, while from the Bitcoin chain, he managed to steal 83.5 BTC. It looks like the hacker exploited the wallets’ private keys, since the stolen transactions were simply direct transfers. At the moment, the stolen funds are located at the original addresses of the attacker.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Attacker addresses:</p><p><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0xd3f04cE2d37b182432e2f804F9913a02071CEa54">https://etherscan.io/address/0xd3f04cE2d37b182432e2f804F9913a02071CEa54</a></p><p><a href="https://www.blockchain.com/btc/address/bc1qjnsx0sdxksh4w2azwu5ngr8sax46vcu52ljfcx">https://www.blockchain.com/btc/address/bc1qjnsx0sdxksh4w2azwu5ngr8sax46vcu52ljfcx</a></p><h3><strong>5. DFX Finance — $7.65m Lost (Flash Loan, November 10)</strong></h3><p>DFX Finance, a trading protocol, was exploited because of a flash loan vulnerability. The attacker drained $4,445,279 worth of various tokens and sent 2692 ETH via Tornado Cash.</p><p>$545,312 worth of CADC remains at the hacker’s address, while $135,265 worth of TRYb remains at the contract that was utilized for the attack. The malicious attacker took advantage of an existing smart contract flaw that permits the passing of the balance check following a flash loan and grants permission for tokens to an actor.</p><p>During the token transfers, the <a href="https://www.blocknative.com/blog/what-is-mev">MEV</a> bot was able to frontrun the attacker for an extra $3,200,000 worth in USDC, CADC, GYEN, and NZDS tokens. Following that, the team behind DFX has started what it calls a “multi-phase recovery plan.” The initiative has already offered 2,000,000 DFX tokens that, at the moment, are valued at $204,800 to help the liquidity pools that were affected as a result.</p><p><strong>Block Data Reference</strong></p><p>Attacker address:</p><p><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x14c19962e4a899f29b3dd9ff52ebfb5e4cb9a067">https://etherscan.io/address/0x14c19962e4a899f29b3dd9ff52ebfb5e4cb9a067</a></p><p>Malicious contract:</p><p><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x6cfa86a352339e766ff1ca119c8c40824f41f22d">https://etherscan.io/address/0x6cfa86a352339e766ff1ca119c8c40824f41f22d</a></p><p>MEV bot:</p><p><a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0xfde0d1575ed8e06fbf36256bcdfa1f359281455a">https://etherscan.io/address/0xfde0d1575ed8e06fbf36256bcdfa1f359281455a</a></p><p>Malicious transactions list:</p><p><a href="https://etherscan.io/txs?a=0x6cfa86a352339e766ff1ca119c8c40824f41f22d">https://etherscan.io/txs?a=0x6cfa86a352339e766ff1ca119c8c40824f41f22d</a></p><h3><strong>CeFi vs DeFi Narrative</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2XQqUYCEXHVvcXN5" /></figure><p>As can be seen from the scale of the losses in November, a large majority of losses were in interconnected centralized finance platforms. This amounted to over $3.8b lost, as opposed to $54m on Ethereum and $12.5m on BNB Chain.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*uNODthEGtMohZ55G" /></figure><p>The biggest type of exploit in November was, naturally, the exit scam, with FTX being the prime suspect, and contagion effects still playing out.</p><p>One can think of the FTX saga being an ‘exit scam’ in the sense that client funds were siphoned from the platform to prop up a failing hedge fund, Alameda Research. As a consequence, FTX lacked the required reserves for clients to withdraw their funds in full. The recovery of these funds by clients was then further delayed by the voluntary Chapter 11 filing by FTX, suspension of all withdrawals and a ‘hack’ that drained the remaining assets held by FTX.</p><p>The runner-up is the access control exploit, with $47m lost. Worryingly, this suggests that industry actors are still having trouble keeping their private keys safe from attacks.</p><h3><strong>DeFi Trends</strong></h3><ul><li><strong>Funds Recovered</strong></li></ul><p>If we exclude the black swan events in CeFi, however, we are actually seeing lower losses year on year in November 2022, as compared to the same period in 2021, at $71.5m vs $94.7m in 2021.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/816/0*jCaHmKPAy58LUzuA" /></figure><p>What’s more, whereas no funds lost were actually recovered in November 2021, about $200,000 was recovered this November, continuing the trend of recoveries becoming more likely over time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*WaddoCChbe9o2Weh" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Types of Exploit</strong></li></ul><p>In terms of sheer frequency, rugpulls remain the most common type of exploit — while they tend to be much smaller in value lost per attack, they are also the lowest hanging fruit for DeFi projects to make a cash grab. A total of 9 rugpulls happened this month — or a rugpull every 3 to 4 days on average!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*d_1cJsshYPhwW387" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Attack Vectors</strong></li></ul><p>In terms of attack vectors, tokens remain the most common type of target, underscoring the importance of doing your own due diligence when aping into the latest small-cap DeFi token.</p><p>DEXes also proved to be a popular target this month — which is unsurprising, given the large amount of liquidity usually locked on these protocols. That being said, the magnitude of these aforementioned attacks paled in comparison to the CeFi catastrophes of the past couple of weeks.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*J3iO-1Vzb0cJ3RU3" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Funds Lost by Chain</strong></li></ul><p>Similarly to previous month, BNB Chain unfortunately continues to be a rugpull hotspot, with the highest frequency of funds being lost in November 2022 at 12 cases. This is trailed in second place by Ethereum at 5 cases, and then by Centralized exchanges, at 2 cases.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/0*nRPbDrvGNpISLNcX" /></figure><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>As unfortunate as it is, the DeFi space has never been more risky. Because of this, we have to make it our responsibility to keep stepping up our game when it comes to investing within the DeFi sector and staying alert to any potential threats. Hence, education is vital, which is something that we at De.Fi have you covered on. Get started with our <a href="https://de.fi/">crypto wallet tracker</a> today and check out our resources for staying on top of the industry!</p><h3>Check our other resources to stay safe and explore DeFi:</h3><p><a href="https://blog.de.fi/what-is-total-value-locked-tvl-583d85ad8ba2">What is TVL (Total Value Locked) in DeFi?</a><br><a href="https://blog.de.fi/the-ultimate-crypto-airdrop-guide-a891d86c8d9d">Upcoming Crypto Airdrops for 2023</a><br><a href="https://de.fi/request-audit">Smart Contract Audit Services</a><br><a href="https://de.fi/scanner">Free Smart Contract Audit</a><br><a href="https://de.fi/shield">Revoke Crypto Wallet Permissions Tool</a><br><a href="https://de.fi/explore">Best DeFi Yield Farming APYs</a></p><p><strong>📱 </strong><a href="https://t.me/defiyield_app"><strong>Telegram</strong></a><strong> | 🐦</strong><a href="https://twitter.com/defiyield_app"><strong>Twitter</strong></a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*yO0rqAjYlp9YQQzE.png" /></figure><p><strong>Good luck in farming!</strong></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Ff%2Fgmyto4%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Upscribe&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Fgmyto4&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/110afc024ce432026ac8a213da2bee80/href">https://medium.com/media/110afc024ce432026ac8a213da2bee80/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=24c8a3821ba2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/defiyield-official-blog/almost-4-billion-lost-in-november-defi-rekt-stories-24c8a3821ba2">Almost $4 billion lost in November: DeFi Rekt Stories</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/defiyield-official-blog">De.Fi</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Report: Over $1b lost in October 2022 in Crypto Scams]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/defiyield-official-blog/report-over-1b-lost-in-october-in-crypto-scams-a76a5b5dbbcf?source=rss-22914eb1d61------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a76a5b5dbbcf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto-scam-reports]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[De.Fi Security]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 01 Nov 2022 10:55:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-09T19:49:58.783Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9CkHn3qUQfF6UGOrMqIlEg.jpeg" /></figure><p>October has been quite the month for rug pulls and exploits, with all of them amassing into total losses of over $1 billion, and new losses of over $200 million, a staggering amount for just one month.</p><p><strong>Monthly Statistics for October 2022</strong></p><p>Year-on-year, we have seen an increase in funds lost from $442m to over $1b, a huge increase. More funds were recovered this year in a fortunate turn of events, with over $100m being returned from the hackers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/765/0*HKCRhn9jL3ns7BTJ" /></figure><p>A similar story can be said for the year-to-date statistics. From January to October, as much as $43b was lost this year.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*uo4yMgpbG6a43kB4" /></figure><p>By comparison, only $7.9b was lost for the same period in 2021.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*X5-0w_ulQh74KxnZ" /></figure><p>Overall, in terms of recoveries, a similar amount of funds were ultimately recovered in both years. In January to October 2022, a cool $889m was recovered from hackers and scammers.</p><p>Some encouraging signs can be seen in the data — February 2022 saw the largest amount of funds being recovered, while October 2022 came in 4th in the same metric.</p><p>This seems to indicate a positive trend of the Crypto space actively working on better ways to recover stolen or hacked funds.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*0pqdaOCCrXCTSSXl" /></figure><p>By comparison, a similar $646m was recovered in the same period in 2021. Notably, in 2021, a spike was seen in funds recovered in August — this was due to over $600m being recovered from the Poly Network exploit, which was itself carried out by a white hat hacker.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*RelftueYvZdZJMNP" /></figure><p><strong>Funds Lost by Chain in October 2022</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*xg3PJrTss2ughPFs" /></figure><p>Interestingly, for October 2022, an overwhelming percentage of losses came from Centralized Exchange platforms. This was largely due to the Bitcoin Shiekh incident, which contributed almost all of the $766m loss on centralized exchanges.</p><p>Another unique thing that happened this month was how Solana saw the biggest losses at $116m — surpassing the typical suspects, BNB Chain ($94.9m) and Ethereum ($32.8m). This was of course driven heavily by an abnormally large exploit on Mango Markets.</p><p>Finally, we also did see that Polygon ranked well, with the lowest amount of lost funds in October. Ironically, however, this $190,000 loss was due to a flash loan exploit on QuickSwap, a blue-chip decentralized exchange on Polygon.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*Phau70iKXo0jX1sj" /></figure><p>In terms of frequency, the prize in October 2022 still goes to BNB Chain, with 26 out of 37 cases this month occurring there.</p><p><strong>Types of Exploit in October 2022</strong></p><p>The most common exploit types in October were the rug pull and the exploit,which saw 15 and 14 cases this month respectively.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*Cs2cdHWrZ6aibIHR" /></figure><p>The most popular target for hackers this month was the token, with 22 such cases of tokens being exploited or dumped by rogue developers.</p><p>In terms of funds lost, however, CeFi exploits, DEX exploits and Bridge hacks took centre stage, with each type of target seeing tens or even hundreds of millions lost, from a small number of exploits.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*Q-uS9pZaxjUbQqv7" /></figure><p><strong>Top 5 Cases for October 2022</strong></p><p>With that said, let’s take a brief look at the top 5 cases.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*79YofwoIjptOU1E6" /></figure><h3>1. Bitcoin Sheikh — $766m Lost (Exit Scam, October 7)</h3><p>The Bitcoin Sheikh project was arrested for operating a Ponzi scheme. While this does not represent a new loss, the authorities uncovered and seized assets worth $766 million.</p><p>The Brazilian authorities reported the discovery of a Ponzi scheme that was headed by Francisco Valdevino da Silva, otherwise called “Bitcoin Sheikh”. They claimed that De Silva had exploited hundreds of people through the pretense of 20% returns.</p><p>According to the authorities, their token lacked proper liquidity or backing and even had a few celebrities on their list of exploited investors, such as Sasha Meneghel, a model who had lost $230,000.</p><h3>2. Mango Markets — $166m Lost (Exploit, October 11)</h3><p>The Mango Markets, which is a DeFi exchange on Solana, got exploited due to market manipulation, where the attacker made a profit of exactly $116 million.</p><p>Using two addresses, the attacker pumped the MNGO token’s price and later used the tokens to obtain a $166 million loan from numerous pools.</p><p>Using the first address, the attacker purchased MNGO tokens worth 5,000,000 USDC and generated an open position. The second address was then used to purchase the same number of tokens to open a long position for hedging.</p><p>As a result, the hacker essentially pumped the token price because of the lack of liquidity within the pool. Following that, on the MangoDAO, the attacker began a proposal that entailed restoring the deposit funds of the user for immunity, which turned the users against the MangoDEX.</p><p>One interesting thing to note here is that an FTX address funded the hacker’s address.</p><p>Fortunately, the team was able to recover $69 million of the stolen funds from the hacker. Following the end of a proposal that returned a portion of the funds, the Mango Team marked $47,000,000 for the hacker as a bug bounty and returned the rest of the $69,000,000.</p><p>On Twitter, Abraham Eisenberg, who was responsible for the removal of the funds, stated that it wasn’t illegal since the actions he executed were a part of the project’s design.</p><p><strong>Attacker address: </strong><a href="https://solscan.io/account/yUJw9a2PyoqKkH47i4yEGf4WXomSHMiK7Lp29Xs2NqM">https://solscan.io/account/yUJw9a2PyoqKkH47i4yEGf4WXomSHMiK7Lp29Xs2NqM</a></p><h3>3. BSC Token Hub — $89,530,887 Lost (Exploit, October 6)</h3><p>The native cross-chain bridge known as the BNB Token Hub, which lies between the BNB Smart and Beacon Chains, was exploited, causing a mint of 2,000,000 BNB to the attacker’s address. To mint those BNB tokens, the hacker utilized a low-level proof vulnerability and then started to bridge those funds to the Ethereum and Fantom chains.</p><p>Security experts collaborated with various validators to save most of the funds. However, the hacker was able to bridge $89,530,887 by using the Stargate and AnySwap bridges. 53% of the funds stolen went to Ethereum, 33% went to Fantom, and the remaining went to other chains.</p><p>The attacker’s address was blacklisted by Tether. The $421,000,000 that remained stayed frozen in the hacker’s address.</p><p>Later on, 4.5 million and 1.7 million USDT of the funds stolen were blacklisted and unreachable on the Ethereum and Avalanche chains, whereas the 2 million USDT on the Arbitrum chain still needs to be blacklisted.</p><p><strong>Attacker address: </strong><a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x489a8756c18c0b8b24ec2a2b9ff3d4d447f79bec">https://bscscan.com/address/0x489a8756c18c0b8b24ec2a2b9ff3d4d447f79bec</a></p><p><strong>Malicious transactions: </strong><a href="https://bscscan.com/tx/0x05356fd06ce56a9ec5b4eaf9c075abd740cae4c21eab1676440ab5cd2fe5c57a">https://bscscan.com/tx/0x05356fd06ce56a9ec5b4eaf9c075abd740cae4c21eab1676440ab5cd2fe5c57a</a> <a href="https://bscscan.com/tx/0xebf83628ba893d35b496121fb8201666b8e09f3cbadf0e269162baa72efe3b8b">https://bscscan.com/tx/0xebf83628ba893d35b496121fb8201666b8e09f3cbadf0e269162baa72efe3b8b</a></p><p><strong>Affected contracts: </strong><a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000002000">https://bscscan.com/address/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000002000</a> <a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000001004">https://bscscan.com/address/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000001004</a></p><h3>4. Freeway Protocol — $60m Lost (Rug Pull, October 23)</h3><p>The Freeway Protocol halted its services, stating it experienced “unprecedented volatility.” Following that incident, both the names and images of the team were deleted from its official website. The staking platform promised 43% annual returns, and gathered numerous different assets from its users.</p><p>After it halted withdrawals, FWT, its native token, saw a drop of over 75% in just 24 hours. On October 23rd, the team tweeted that they had made a decision to “diversify their asset base” and temporarily stop purchasing supercharger simulations until they had “implemented their new strategies.” Following this, the token’s market capitalization decreased from $75,000,000 to approximately $15,000,000. The estimated funds lost is around $60 million.</p><h3>5. Transit Swap — $28.9m Lost (Exploit, October 1)</h3><p>The Transit Swap, a multi-chain DEX that operates on both the Binance and Ethereum chains, was exploited. Here, approximately $28,900,000 worth was stolen from users’ addresses. The hacker utilized malicious smart contracts so that he could take advantage of the project’s swap contracts on both chains. Because of a vulnerability the swap contracts had, the hacker was able to exploit the transferFrom() function to drain the approved assets of users and then send them to a different EOA address.</p><p>Following the hack, within 24 hours, Transit Finance revealed that they had collaborated with other security teams and managed to recover 65% of the stolen funds. As a result, they published an article containing a list of addresses that were involved in the exploit and stated that the total amount of funds recovered was from the hacker that had the largest portion of those funds. Not only that, but the team is actively working to recover the rest of the funds while formulating various bug bounty rules.</p><p><strong>Attacker address: </strong><a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x5f0b31aa37bce387a8b21554a8360c6b8698fbef">https://bscscan.com/address/0x5f0b31aa37bce387a8b21554a8360c6b8698fbef</a> <a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x5f0b31aa37bce387a8b21554a8360c6b8698fbef">https://etherscan.io/address/0x5f0b31aa37bce387a8b21554a8360c6b8698fbef</a></p><p><strong>Address funds transferred: </strong><a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x75f2aba6a44580d7be2c4e42885d4a1917bffd46">https://bscscan.com/address/0x75f2aba6a44580d7be2c4e42885d4a1917bffd46</a> <a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x75f2aba6a44580d7be2c4e42885d4a1917bffd46">https://etherscan.io/address/0x75f2aba6a44580d7be2c4e42885d4a1917bffd46</a></p><p><strong>Malicious contracts: </strong><a href="https://bscscan.com/address/0x8ca8fd9c7641849a14cbf72faf05c305b0c68a34">https://bscscan.com/address/0x8ca8fd9c7641849a14cbf72faf05c305b0c68a34</a> <a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x17ff6c94ba3a49c72ef2f10782de8a6152f204ea">https://etherscan.io/address/0x17ff6c94ba3a49c72ef2f10782de8a6152f204ea</a></p><p><strong>Recovery transactions: </strong><a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3da1843247070fbcfcf9c8d0e02dcd660ea882640fc842625b675aabc45e6a2a">https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3da1843247070fbcfcf9c8d0e02dcd660ea882640fc842625b675aabc45e6a2a</a> <a href="https://bscscan.com/tx/0xd941c6012656dae9fe16882becffdf41d91836b19bbcea659cad65f5049c5f83">https://bscscan.com/tx/0xd941c6012656dae9fe16882becffdf41d91836b19bbcea659cad65f5049c5f83</a> <a href="https://bscscan.com/tx/0x53495bd2fddefd179ef107e43d5d2dea922ceda4bb1c9bc183e265dcc6474e02">https://bscscan.com/tx/0x53495bd2fddefd179ef107e43d5d2dea922ceda4bb1c9bc183e265dcc6474e02</a></p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>As we can see from the increasing amount of funds lost year on year, DeFi has never been riskier. Thus, it is crucial that we continue to educate ourselves on the dangers of investing in unknown DeFi protocols, and remain alert to potential risks.</p><p>To see what threats your personal wallet is currently exposed to, check out our <a href="https://defiyield.app/shield">Shield</a>, a first-of-its-kind way to quickly scan your wallet for threats and revoke them in under 10 seconds.</p><p>Stay safe, and happy farming!</p><p>For more De.Fi updates you can visit us at:</p><p><strong>🌐 </strong><a href="https://defiyield.app/"><strong>Website</strong></a><strong> | 📱 </strong><a href="https://t.me/defiyield_app"><strong>Telegram</strong></a><strong> | 🐦</strong><a href="https://twitter.com/defiyield_app"><strong>Twitter</strong></a></p><p>Check our <a href="https://blog.defiyield.app/"><strong>De.Fi Blog</strong></a> !</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*yO0rqAjYlp9YQQzE.png" /></figure><p><strong>Good luck in farming!</strong></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Ff%2Fgmyto4%3Fas_embed%3Dtrue&amp;dntp=1&amp;display_name=Upscribe&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fupscri.be%2Fgmyto4&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=upscri" width="800" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/110afc024ce432026ac8a213da2bee80/href">https://medium.com/media/110afc024ce432026ac8a213da2bee80/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a76a5b5dbbcf" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/defiyield-official-blog/report-over-1b-lost-in-october-in-crypto-scams-a76a5b5dbbcf">Report: Over $1b lost in October 2022 in Crypto Scams</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/defiyield-official-blog">De.Fi</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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