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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Defense Unicorns on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Software Origins of DoD Software Factories with Enrique Oti]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/defense-unicorns/software-origins-of-dod-software-factories-with-enrique-oti-a8596a6d1c92?source=rss-1711b5016c9c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[software-engineering]]></category>
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            <category><![CDATA[department-of-defense]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Defense Unicorns]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Aug 2023 14:18:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-29T14:18:56.903Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/851/1*pY5g2HBsQh_K0Kaob52EkQ.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/software-origins-of-dod-software-factories-with/id1612914663?i=1000561804969">‎Defense Unicorns, A Podcast: Software Origins of DoD Software Factories with Enrique Oti on Apple Podcasts</a></p><p><em>Listen on iTunes, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.</em></p><p>On this episode of Defense Unicorns, Enrique Oti joins Rob to discuss the origins of Department of Defense Software Factories and his strategy of innovation used to build Kessel Run, using a strategy opposite to most innovators, instead of keeping their heads low and unseen, they made noise, told as many leaders as possible and eventually went all the way to the top for support. Enrique Oti is a retired Air Force Colonel of 23 years and the founding director of Kessel Run, an acquisition and operations unit that rapidly deploys modern software capabilities for Air Force programs, as well as completing many operations in Cyber Warfare and intelligence. He also co-founded the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) in Silicon Valley.</p><p>Defense Unicorns, a Podcast, is hosted by<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/robertcslaughter/"> Robert Slaughter</a>, Founder and CEO of<a href="https://www.defenseunicorns.com/"> Defense Unicorns</a>.</p><p>Guests this week include:</p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/enrique-oti/">Enrique Otis</a>, retired Air Force Colonel of 23 years, founding director of <a href="https://kesselrun.af.mil/">Kessel Run</a>, and CTO at <a href="https://www.secondfront.com/">Second Front System</a></p><p>Highlights from Defense Unicorns, a Podcast:</p><p><em>This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.</em></p><p>(00:23) What is Kessel Run and how it started</p><p>(2:56) Choosing military members</p><p>(12:31) Building talent</p><p>(18:55) Navigating Risk</p><p>(30:06) Overcoming low points</p><p>(36:08) Second Front</p><p>(40:20) Advice for the listeners</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: One of the first questions I have for you is, Can you describe for the audience what Kessel Run is?</p><p><strong>ENRIQUE</strong>: Kessel Run is the term being used by the Department of Defense for a software factory. I don’t like to think of it as a software factory, but really, Kessel Run is an organization. It’s a military unit that actually builds, deploys, and runs software on behalf of the Air Force. When we stood it up, it had a very specific mission: to support air operations centers. So it’s the idea that, rather than just building software over a period of years to point it at somebody in the field, you actually use modern, agile methodologies and modern DevOps principles, where the team that’s building the software is continuously iterating with the users, deploying it to the field, and running it along with the user. So that was Kessel Run. I think right now, it’s probably 1200–1300 people, a mixture of military, civilian, and contractors building a wide variety of software products.</p><p>Before Kessel Run, when we actually started the program, I was working at the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUX) out in Silicon Valley. I helped co-found DIUX back in the 2015 timeframe; I ran the Air Force team out there. What eventually became Kessel Run was actually just one of many little products we tried to see what we could do differently. Our innovation in the early days of DIUX wasn’t terribly focused; we were trying a lot of different things and conducting a lot of different experiments. What turned into Kessel Run was one of those early experiments that just happened to be successful.</p><p>Prior to being called Kessel Run, the project didn’t really have a name. Internally, we called it MDOC, which stands for Multi Domain Operations Center. We chose that term because we thought it would sell pretty well in the building because that was the term that was in the Air Force future operating concept that had come out earlier, I think in the 2015 timeframe. And we’re like, Ooh, there’s this whole MDOC concept of a future operating center; why don’t we try to build one of those? So, internally, at DIUX, we called it MDOC, but our first product name was Jigsaw. I think a lot of people know us from that first product that we rolled out, Jigsaw.</p><p><strong>ROB: </strong>One of the things that I love about the military software factories is the inclusion of active-duty military members&#39; writing software. What did it take to get active-duty members to stop working on whatever they were supposed to be working on and head out to help and support you?</p><p><strong>ENRIQUE: </strong>When we first decided at DIUX that we wanted to experiment with building software and try a different way, like agile software development practices and DevOps principles, we really weren’t thinking that we were going to stand up a software factory. That was actually not part of the original design; the original design was for us to learn how to do it and demonstrate there are better ways of building software, with the idea that the Air Force should know those better ways. Again, this is all about innovation and experimentation in the early days. When I looked at how software was being built in the DOD, it had really long timelines and was being done by defense contractors. So I said, What’s the opposite of defense contractors in traditional defense facilities? Well, let’s go, airmen only; nothing gets civilians or contracts. If I’m going to prove a use case, I’ve got to show the extreme: I grab only airmen, stick them in civilian clothes, and stick them in downtown San Francisco. Let’s go the complete opposite of what someone in the military is expected to look like, and let’s try that.</p><p>When I was looking for airmen, it was initially an email from myself to a few other officers I knew around the Air Force, and then I got the Air Force A6 staff to forward it around to all the cyber squadron commanders. And I had — I think it was 47 names come back at me, both officers and enlisted; blue-suit, active duty. I went through with a software developer I knew because, truth in advertising, I am not a software developer; I was a history major in college. We dug through all these records, probably interviewed about a dozen, and we chose six — three officers and three enlisted.</p><p><strong>ROB: </strong>Talk to me about those six airmen at the time. What were they like? What were their backgrounds?</p><p><strong>ENRIQUE: </strong>Sure. I won’t use names. What were they like? They were motivated. Part of it is that I didn’t pick the right people, but it turned out fine. The reason I didn’t pick the right people is that I didn’t know what I needed. All I knew was that I needed like six people; I was told that’s about the right size for a team. Then we worked at the company that did the enabling for us, called Pivotal Labs, which is now part of VMware. We show up the first day, and they’re like, Hey, who’s your designer? And I’m like, First of all, what does the designer do? I don’t have a designer. I have a bunch of people who write code. So I tried to force one of my airmen — a Master Sergeant at the time, I believe — to be a designer because his portfolio was the best-looking for it. It turns out he’s not a great designer. He’s a great front-end developer — actually, a great full-stack developer. He was like, “No, I’m not going to do it.” Well, I don’t have many options. So we just looked around the room, and I literally just picked a dude. I’m like, “I’m sorry, I have to have a designer. You’re my designer.” The same thing happened with the product manager. I told one of the software developers, “You seem like a pretty good leader. I grabbed one of my officers and was like, “You’re gonna be a product manager.” Because I didn’t pick a product manager, I didn’t know I needed a product manager. When you talk about experimentation and just going with what you got, I just went with what I got. I had six people. I told them, “We’re going to use you for the best you can do, even though it’s not what you signed up for.” And they had a great attitude about it.</p><p>They are militaristic, not in a bad way, but when you grab a bunch of military people, and you’re hanging out together, you act militaristic, which is kind of awkward sitting in a downtown San Francisco office with a bunch of less than-military companies working chairs over. So it was a fun dynamic, but I actually think everybody kind of loved it. They thought we were weird, that we were the military guys in the back corner. We thought all of them were kind of weird because they have purple hair and everything, while we all have shaved heads. It’s such a different mentality and cultural mix, but I think that’s what made it work — forcing us out of our comfort zones into this environment. Actually, I think it made the process and the product much better.</p><p><strong>ROB: </strong>Do you believe that the active duty and civilian workforce in the federal government and in the DOD lacks the talent to write good software?</p><p><strong>ENRIQUE: </strong>No, not at all. I think we have the talent, and even if we don’t, we have people who have the mindset and the capacity to learn to develop it. The problem is not talent. The problem is structure, policy, and guidance as to how to build software and why we build software. So we have the talent. I’ve never believed it was a talent issue, but we’ve proved that. I actually took over the Kessel Run program office, and we took people into the program office and made them designers and PMs (program managers). We actually made some software developers by sending them to boot camps. We have the talent; what we don’t have is the understanding that allows us to make good decisions about how to use that talent.</p><p><strong>ROB: </strong>Okay, then talk to me a little bit about that talent aspect of things. Of course, in the military, federal government, and civilian, everything’s about your job code. Are there enough software engineers working across the federal government?</p><p><strong>ENRIQUE: </strong>I’ll stick with the Air Force first; I don’t want to speak to the federal government or the DOD. The big answer is no; there’s not enough. Let’s parse that a bit because nuance really matters. Let’s look at the Air Force. We have hundreds of software developers, but we used to have thousands; it used to be an officer career field, and it used to be a very large enlisted career field. Now it’s a small enlisted career field, and there’s no officer equivalent. Active duty, we have probably 500, or a little more, coded software developers. The real question is how many of them are doing real software development. The answer is a very small number; a lot is being used for other things that are not slinging code; they’re doing quality control and management functions. They’re working on people’s websites, and it’s a different skill set between building a PA (page authority) website versus writing a full-scope application. So, I think the issue is that we have a lot of people who can code because it’s their career field but aren’t being used appropriately.</p><p>In addition, there are a lot of people all over the DOD in a bunch of different career fields that also know how to code, but because of the way we set up the personnel system and the way we set up primary duty assignments or secretary of duty assignments, we don’t give them the opportunity to use that skill set to be software developers within their own organizations. I think that’s something that we really should address, and a lot of people are trying to do that, but I don’t think we’re quite there yet as an organization on how to properly use people that can code and put them into an environment that enables them to actually deliver code. It’s just playing around until it’s in production, so we have to find ways to help them get their software into production.</p><p><strong>ROB: </strong>So pre-Kessel run, even during Kessel run, or possibly even during the M-DOC days, was it ever at risk of just getting shut down?</p><p><strong>ENRIQUE: </strong>There was not a lot of risk in the early days, in the first few months, because we did it out in California. We did it under the authority of DIUX, for which we work directly for SecDef, and we didn’t actually interface with the program. We deployed the stuff out to the Middle East, and the initial iteration did not actually require technical integrations with the weapon system. So when we first did it, it was actually not bad; there was no real pushback. It’s when we started building the second application because we had some publicity on the first one. So we started putting this up on the second application, and that one’s a little more closely tied to the weapon system. We now have at least one member of the program office working with us; we have parts of the program office advocating this methodology, and the rest of the program operations are going, “Who are you, and who said you’re allowed to do this?” So there was definite tension. It was in that transition at the end of March, where Jigsaw gets deployed before we actually officially stand up Kessel run by name at the end of April that there was that tension of “oh my gosh, they’re just going to shut us down.” We were actually very worried about that. We’ve got a product live, and now we’re going to be shut down because now it has attention. Now that people have seen it, they are talking about it. So suddenly, the antibodies come up.</p><p>So it was part of that four- to six-week period where we were really concerned about what that future was going to hold. But again, by bringing everybody out to the valley and taking it in a collaborative, cooperative manner versus saying, “This is the right way to do it; you guys are wrong,” and doing it more of an educational methodology, we actually were able to gain supporters and kind of keep ourselves, but yeah, there was some worry in there.</p><p><strong>ROB: </strong>Describe for me your journey as Kessel Run went from DIUX and a good idea into a large organization. What was, in your opinion, the lowest point for you?</p><p><strong>ENRIQUE:</strong> I’ll tell you, right now is actually a pretty low point. That’s kind of strange to say because I’ve been out for two years, but seeing where the community is going right now in terms of Kessel Run explicitly, not talking software development to the government writ large in the duty of software development writ large, I think is on a good path. My personal view is that Kessel Run is meandering a bit and is not going in the direction we need to go. I think we’re going back more toward stovepiping: among operations, among development, and among acquisitions. We built the organization to get all that stuff together in one area where we have a single authority to execute all aspects of what it takes to build a weapon system.</p><p>I think what you’re seeing now is the same tension to rip it back apart into traditional models to fit into traditional structures. So it’s actually kind of a low point right now to see what’s happening. During my time at Kessel Run, I’ll be honest, every day had a high point and a low point at any given moment. I think we’re doing amazing work, and I have probably the best airmen — writ large airmen or military contracts — I have the best of the Air Force. I fully believe that. They’re the most motivated, creative people you can imagine, but at the same time, I’m just constantly fighting for budget. I’m fighting for authority. I’m fighting to explain to people why those airmen should even be there as organizations try to pull them back to their core career fields. So I don’t think there’s a single explicit low point, but there are a lot of low points throughout the day, a lot of frustration throughout the day, and a lot of different topics.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: So, talk to us a little bit about how you bounce from those low points. Especially in terms of giving folks recommendations, if you’re going to bounce between them multiple times in a day, you probably have a pretty good strategy. Just listening in terms of any advice you might have for folks about how they can push through when the bureaucracy is overbearing when they should have authority yet don’t have authority, when they know what’s right but aren’t allowed to do what’s right.</p><p><strong>ENRIQUE:</strong> The greatest way to overcome those negative low points is success; success trumps everything. Let’s say you build an organization with the ultimate culture. You can imagine that if you don’t actually succeed, that culture starts to fray over time. It’s human nature. You thrive on accomplishments; success actually matters. So one of the things you can do is look back at any moment in time.</p><p>When I was at Kessel Run, I could look back on where we were a month ago, six months ago, two years ago, and five years ago. You mentioned that cloud article I wrote in 2015. I look back on that article (which, by the way, I’m in the process of writing an update on where I think we’ve gone since then), and I see some things that have not changed since 2015. There is some stuff you look at and go, “Oh my gosh, the world was different; what I wrote doesn’t even make sense anymore,” because you can imagine that old world. So I think part of bouncing back is looking back and seeing where you’ve actually been, where you’ve made accomplishments, and being proud of those. Be proud of what you’ve done. I think that’s a huge aspect of it.</p><p>The other part of it is: don’t take it personally. People will make it personal. There are people in the Pentagon who, I think, made it very personal. And I know that because either they said it to my face or I heard about it from others; they made it personal. It shouldn’t be personal. At the end of the day, all of us have the intent of enhancing national security. All of us have the intent of enabling the warfighter, but we may have different opinions on how to do that. So different opinions are not about making it personal. It’s not about making it emotional. A difference of opinion means that if someone does not agree with you, you do not yell at them. It doesn’t mean go stab them in the back. It doesn’t mean you get angry at it. What it means is that you need to think about what your underlying positions are. You think about how you’re enumerating those and figure out how to sell it better, how to convince someone, or how to educate somebody. I think people hit those low points in innovation — I have at multiple times — because they take it personally instead of buckling down and actually figuring out how they can do things better, which kind of leads to a third area of what they can do. Find someone you can talk to.</p><p>There is a difference, and you need to understand the person you’re talking to. If it’s just one person you’re going to talk to, and the two of you are just going to bitch and complain, you bring each other down and become more and more negative. That’s not helpful. You see this continuous downward spiral of negativity, where people now become an echo chamber among themselves, saying things like, “We’re the best; we’re doing it right; everyone else is wrong.” That’s the wrong kind of person to tell. You need to find a person you can talk to and who you can speak openly to, but the next sentence they’re going to have is, “Well, why don’t we try this? Or maybe this is the approach we should take.” and they’re looking for solutions. You need a sounding board for your negativity; get it off your chest, but that has to end with solutions, not with more negativity. It is hard to find those people. There were times in my career where I got trapped mentally, sitting around, calling people up on the phone, basically just complaining, which has never helped anybody. I see it a lot in our innovation ecosystem. I see a lot of people who just like to complain about everything, but they’re not doing the hard work of being solutionary and solving the problems. Everything is solvable, but you’ve got to be willing to do the work and find and hold a positive attitude that you can solve it. So.</p><p><strong>ROB:</strong> You’ve transitioned from the service; you’re now working at a small startup called Second Front as the CTO. Do you want to talk to us a little bit about what you’re doing with Second Front?</p><p><strong>ENRIQUE:</strong> Second Front is something I’ve been thinking about for quite a while. We have done a great job with software innovation in the DOD, focusing on: how does the government build better software. And how does it build it faster? What we have not quite done is figure out how to get the government to adopt commercial software faster. There are few efforts out there, honestly, and I think P1 has laid an incredible foundation for thinking through how to rapidly accredit and onboard software, but at the end of the day, there are still a lot of issues in terms of scalability. There are process issues as well as policy issues. So a lot of what I’ve been thinking about here is, How do we make it easy? How do we reduce friction? There should not be friction for commercial companies to get into the DOD. At the same time, there should not be friction for a government program officer, crediting official, or evaluator securing that software.</p><p>So what we’ve done is build a platform that’s really, we’ll call it a DevSecOps platform, but really the focus is on security and operations. How do we run high-quality and secure Day 2 operations on behalf of commercial entities to allow them to be accredited and operating inside the DOD’s environment? That’s what we’ve built — a product called Game Warden. And that’s really kind of the focus of it.</p><p><strong>ROB:</strong> If Game Warden is successful, what does that mean to folks across the DOD or federal government? What does success look like?</p><p><strong>ENRIQUE: </strong>I think what success initially looks like is competition. That’s how I’m going to know we’re successful. As soon as you have someone trying to compete with it, you know it was right, and that’s not a bad thing. I’m a massive believer in competition and free markets. I think competition is great because, at the end of the day, what are we trying to do? We’re trying to make sure that our government users have the best quality technology. There is no one person, organization, or company that could scale to do that. It just cannot be done. It’s going to take an ecosystem because there are a lot of nuances on how to do it. Some are going to go through something like Platform One, some will go through something like Cloud One, and I think some will continue to use FedRAMP. Some will come through someone like us who can actually operate it on their behalf in a commercial manner. So success from a user standpoint is when somebody puts a piece of software into a contract and is able to use it live in their operational environment within days because we’ve solved the accreditation challenge. So that’s what I think success looks like.</p><p>From the commercial side, it’s different. So it’s not like a multi-party, multi-market system here. What does it look like when we talk about the DOD and competition with China, and how do we establish a new defense innovation base to enable the warfighter? Well, then, success looks like a small startup that’s venture-backed and can get their products into the hands of a warfighter and make revenue so they can continue to improve that product. Rather than having their company basically die during that multi-year valley of death, then either the company collapses, or the company leaves government marketing and says, “Forget it; we’ll leave that to defense contractors. We’ll do commercial work only”, so there is an entire other avenue of success.</p><p>We, as a nation, have built a defense innovation base. It’s competitive with China because we no longer have software security accreditation as a barrier to getting access to the best quality technology. So that’s kind of what I’m seeing. I really believe what we’re building is game-changing. It will change the dynamic for both the commercial markets and for DOD users.</p><p><strong>ROB: </strong>What advice and recommendations do you have for the listeners right now who are going through their own innovation struggles and trying to accomplish their own missions and objectives, potentially on a smaller scale or possibly growing?</p><p><strong>ENRIQUE:</strong> A couple of things: First of all, you’re going to have to put in the hard work of getting top cover. You can’t avoid that. The greatest idea will lose out to a mediocre one if the mediocre idea is being backed by a program office. This is the reality of it. So if you are an innovator, you are going to have to do the hard work of getting leadership cover. If it’s at the unit level, maybe the link matters top cover. If you’re in a program office, it’s going to be like your senior material leader, a PEO, but you have to get top cover. There are so many things we can do to change the system. Let’s accept the fact that this is the system you have. How do you excel? How do you exceed inside that system? Because your success is what allows you to change. So stop complaining about the system, execute inside of it, and use those wins every step of the way to change the system.</p><p>That’s kind of like the first level of bias for innovators. The second one is, don’t stop innovating, but there are going to be setbacks. We had a product on which we pivoted. I thought it was a good product; I thought it had utility, but it didn’t have a product-market fit. So we pivot; there’s nothing wrong with that. I’ve had some other ideas inside the DOD that aren’t as great. That’s fine; it’s okay to not have successes. But when you don’t have success, we need to understand why you failed to understand how to do better the next time. Sometimes it’s out of your control, and sometimes it’s in your control, but either way, don’t stop innovating; keep trying. And at the end of the day, if you know who your user is and what they need, and you can find and fix that pain point, you’re probably on the right track. Don’t just innovate to solve your own problem.</p><p>Everybody thinks that they’re the smartest person in the world, and “I got this great idea.” Well, if you haven’t validated that with people who are going to use whatever you’re doing — process, product application, whatever it is — then you’re just being self-serving, and that’s not really innovation. Innovation has to be humble. So if everything you’re doing is self-serving, then you’re wrong. You have to do something that helps your users.</p><p>Subscribe to Email Option?</p><p>Keep up with the industry’s sharpest minds right from your inbox.</p><p>Want to hear more? Tune in to the podcast episode, where we cover lots more.</p><p>You can also subscribe to Defense Unicorns, a Podcast on <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/future-of-fintech/id1557519332">iTunes</a>, <a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/0HKyOUUHzT9o14h5FJVpB0?si=mm2RhoHqS7KeH10g6Wby4A">Spotify</a>, or your favorite podcast app.</p><p>Thanks,</p><p>The Defense Unicorns Team</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a8596a6d1c92" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/defense-unicorns/software-origins-of-dod-software-factories-with-enrique-oti-a8596a6d1c92">Software Origins of DoD Software Factories with Enrique Oti</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/defense-unicorns">Defense Unicorns</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Istio Service Mesh to Tetrate with Zack Butcher]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/defense-unicorns/istio-service-mesh-to-tetrate-with-zack-butcher-2e34c59245c2?source=rss-1711b5016c9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2e34c59245c2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[istio]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[microservices]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[service-mesh]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Defense Unicorns]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Aug 2023 15:39:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-15T15:39:12.655Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/istio-service-mesh-to-tetrate-with-zack-butcher/id1612914663?i=1000559446435">‎Defense Unicorns, A Podcast: Istio Service Mesh to Tetrate with Zack Butcher on Apple Podcasts</a></p><p><em>Listen on iTunes, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.</em></p><p>In this episode of Defense Unicorns, Zack shares his way of innovating, starting new projects, and what it takes to reach success by finding what’s broken and fixing it in a way that provides value. He is currently a Founding Engineer at Tetrate and has helped in a variety of roles across the company — currently, he’s Head of Product. Connect with Zack on LinkedIn today.</p><p>Defense Unicorns, a Podcast, is hosted by<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/robertcslaughter/"> Robert Slaughter</a>, Founder and CEO of<a href="https://www.defenseunicorns.com/"> Defense Unicorns</a>.</p><p>Guests this week include:</p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/zack-butcher-339a2180">Zack Butcher</a>, Founding Engineer at <a href="https://tetrate.io/">Tetrate</a></p><p>Highlights from Defense Unicorns, a Podcast:</p><p><em>This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.</em></p><p>(01:53) Service Mesh Technologies</p><p>(6:30) Creating projects that change the world</p><p>(13:27) What is Tetra</p><p>(19:20) Cybersecurity value proposition of Istio and Tetra</p><p>(28:41) What is TID</p><p>(31:33) Big Bang</p><p>(38:25) Advice for entrepreneurs</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: Can you explain a little bit about service mesh technologies in general?</p><p><strong>ZACK</strong>: I think it’s helpful to go back and look at the set of problems that we had at the time when we started to build this architecture, and that helps motivate why we did what we did and what it does. There were two big moves that were happening. One was the adoption of microservices. Google has always been a pretty tech-forward company, and it adopted a service-oriented architecture a long time before others. However, we’re starting to proliferate that into a microservices-oriented architecture as well, which has brought about connectivity concerns and a range of security concerns. A lot of the listeners here that are looking at Kubernetes and similar technologies are probably grappling with a very similar set of challenges.</p><p>Then there’s the other set, which is where the technical implementation of the service mesh came from; we had this monolithic API gateway, and every single Google application programming interface (API) — whether you use maps, translate, or any of the cloud APIs — went through it. There were a slew of problems there that you might expect. If you have a shared API gateway in your organization, you probably have the same problems, right? They’re shared-fate outages; someone misconfigured it and brought the entire system down; now everybody’s out and not just the one service. We have resource attribution problems. You can imagine that when you’re serving, say, all of Google’s API traffic, that’s a huge amount, a large footprint, and it’s expensive. It becomes very important to be able to track who’s spent this where so that we can do capacity planning and chargeback correctly.</p><p>Then we had a bunch of locality problems. You have a lot more services communicating as we’re load balancing and doing API gateway things, and it turns out that those API gateway things, those functions like rate limiting and authentication and authorization, you actually want in-between all your surfaces. If you have to go out and back in, it winds up inefficient and slow. As a result, we wanted to avoid that set of circumstances. We had a communication proliferation problem as well as a monolithic API gateway problem. And so we said, “How do we start to solve this?”</p><p>So the idea came to use what’s called the sidecar pattern. It was not original to the service mesh, but it was used; it’s been used for years in a variety of different places, most commonly for logs. If you’ve had a damon that rotates log files and ships log data, it’s very similar to the sidecar pattern that we use now, except we’re using it to manage network behavior instead of the file system. That was the key idea. We can then push that proxy, that gateway, right next to the application itself and implement it. Originally, inside Google, it was about implementing that API gateway-style functionality. As we took the problem into open source with Istio, it became very clear that there was a related set of problems that needed to be solved around baseline communication. Inside Google, that was handled in remote procedure call (RPC) frameworks and similar things, but there wasn’t a good general solution in open source at the time. It was a phenomenal solution for encryption in transit for application identity. You can actually write “the front end can talk to the back end”, and not “this virtual private cloud (VPC) can talk to that VPC,” because who knows what’s in those VPCs and what that means semantically to start to facilitate fine-grained traffic control. So, not just connection level and load balancing, but allowing decisions per request. How do I load balance? Let me apply security policy so that I can ultimately achieve what we’re talking about with a zero-trust architecture. Turns out, that’s a perfect fit for that service mesh architectural pattern.</p><p>So that’s a little bit about how it kind of came to be and how we got there. And maybe a little bit about what it does as well. So hopefully, that’s a helpful overview.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: To me, technologies like Istio and Kubernetes have fundamentally changed the entire planet. Walk us through what it takes to start a project that changes the world.</p><p><strong>ZACK</strong>: The first point to make is that we did not expect it to change the world. We definitely hoped that it would do big things, but we had a very specific set of problems that we wanted to solve to start with. I think that’s a really important feature — if you’re going to go in and tackle some big problem, you need to have a specific pain point. You can’t go do a science project. As much as an engineer, I love it; I want to go play with cool technology. We have to keep it grounded in a real set of problems and a set of user pain that we can address.</p><p>So that was the first thing. As we looked around the service mesh space, we knew that networking and Kubernetes were doing a lot to solve compute. It was helping you realize that the idea of compute being fungible and really easy is awesome. As we were seeing that happen, we saw that networking was becoming the next big bottleneck for people. That was a sharp pain that we knew was present. We knew there were these inner connectivity problems as you adopt a service-oriented architecture. We knew that inside Google, we had teams of engineers investing huge amounts of money in solving this problem for the organization, which doesn’t scale out. So that’s the first bit: we had a pain point that we knew was large and that we knew was going to be hit by a large part of the community.</p><p>And so that’s what gives you the confidence to go spend the political capital to spin up a project like this. For us, inside Google, it was made easier because of the success of Kubernetes. We had this project that is continuing and, as you say, revolutionizing the industry. We have a lot of political capital to point to the set of problems around networking that Istio could solve and say, “Hey, I think we can go do this again”, “We’re pretty sure that this problem is big enough”, “We’re pretty sure that the industry is at a spot where we think we can start to do it”. So, in my opinion, the single most important trait is to be focused on the end-user and to have a specific set of pain points, or perhaps just one pain point — one big problem. If it’s only going to be one that you can solve, and you can stay laser-focused on that, you can then listen to that customer, that set of customers, and that set of users; they’re going to guide you to the right spot.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: Talk to me a little bit about Tetra; what made you want to leave the comfort of Google and start your own startup? Tell us a little bit about the big idea or big problem that Tetra is out there trying to solve.</p><p><strong>ZACK</strong>: Google is a very comfy job; it’s hard to justify leaving, and it took a good bit to convince me. What it came down to was identifying a key problem that was obvious to myself and JJ — who started it —and that had to be solved. That problem was; when search engine optimization (SEO) was introduced, Varun, the CEO of Tetrate and a product manager at Google for SEO, was assigned the task of finding the first users. For an infrastructure project, especially that chicken-and-egg problem of “Are you going to be the first person to bet the farm, being your infrastructure, on this new, untested technology?” It’s a hard pill to swallow. That’s a lot of risk. He was given the directive, “Hey, let’s go get a list of users; let’s go track them down and get them to use Istio”. It happened that it wasn’t really selling to most of the companies that we were talking to; it was “Hey, use our open-source project, and we’ll make your life better”. Google wasn’t trying to get money from them out of it, but just adoption.</p><p>I was the only engineer on the project who worked in San Francisco proper at the time; everyone else for Google was in the South Bay. Varun said, “Hey, come along; I need somebody to do some technical sales”. We went and talked to a whole bunch of different companies — 20 or 30 at least — and never in my life have I heard a more consistent articulation from many different people using the same words, which are: “Hey, look, there’s this cool thing, Istio; you should use it.” The first thing they said was, “What is it?” as well as, “Wow, I’ve never heard of this before.” We’d respond with “It just came out” — this is 2017 that we’re doing this, in the early days. “You can secure your communication, control your communication, and observe it if you’re in Kubernetes,” we said. They all responded, “I have problems,” “I need encryption in transit and fine-grained traffic control,” “I have outages,” “I want to be able to carry my services.” “I need to be able to get insight into what’s going on,” and “Everything you’re saying checks out, but you said I could only use it in Kubernetes, and I don’t have anything that runs in Kubernetes right now. Where I’m at is that all my stuff is on virtual machines (VMs), which is the monolith. I’m trying to figure out how I’m going to get to that spot. “Once I’m there, I’ll definitely use that, but my real pain is: how do I get there? How do I bridge the gap between my legacy and modern infrastructure?” That idea of “bridging the gap” is a phrase that we heard articulated a ton in our main product today. The reason is because it’s all about bridging that gap in infrastructure. Then the third thing we heard from every single person that we talked to in that set of calls was, “Who else is using it?” We said, “You can be the first,” and universally, they said, “Hell no”. Although they didn’t say it quite so nicely.</p><p>We eventually got past that and got the initial users bought in. But that core idea was that the real pain that people had was not, “Hey, I’m in the cloud; I’m in a modern cloud-native infrastructure; how do I manage it? How do I transition from a traditional legacy infrastructure focused on VMs in a data center with firewalls, VPCs, and demilitarized zones (DMZs) to a cloud-native architecture?” And that’s the key pain that I need to help bridge. So that was the insight we were looking to solve. And we spent nearly a year internally, with Google pushing management to reorient the project to focus on the idea of adoption or bridging legacy and modern infrastructure. It appeared to make a lot of sense for Google, but we never really made much headway in convincing management or executives, but we were sure that it was a problem because we kept going and talking to new customers and new prospects, and they kept saying the same thing.</p><p>So that’s what gave us the confidence to leave that very cushy, very safe spot that was Google to really go do this. We had heard from so many people that this was a problem, and we couldn’t get the organization to solve it. So we said, “Look, let’s go prove it; the proof is in the pudding. Maybe the executives are correct, and there isn’t a problem, and we’ll just fail, but we’re pretty sure it’s a real problem. So let’s go solve that.” That was in early 2018 when Varun left first, and I joined him about a month later. And here we are today, four years later, doing very well helping with service mesh adoption, in particular in that niche. The reason that folks come to us versus some of our competitors is because A) we have deep expertise and a lot of experience because of the stuff around Google that I’ve talked about. But B), because we fit where they are: attempting to transition from a legacy system to a modern architecture and system. This is one of the big reasons we helped write some of the security standards. We’re helping some of the larger organizations in the world navigate that very sticky, muddy ball.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: You briefly brought up some of your newest work and some of the cyber security benefits of adopting some of these technologies, both Istio and Titrate Service Bridge. Do you want to recap for us some of the whys from a cybersecurity perspective? What unique value proposition does Istio and Tetrate Service Bridge bring to someone going through what I’ll refer to as their cloud-native transformation?</p><p><strong>ZACK</strong>: I think that the key thing here is that the set of features and functionality that the service mesh brings into play isn’t unique. You must have it to have a successful distributed system. When I say that, I mean an identity for every workload that can be authenticated and used for authorization at one time. It means to control how traffic moves through your system so that you can do things like Canary and upgrade applications gracefully, as well as implement policy. Traffic control is fundamentally a security policy. Availability is fundamentally a set of security trade-offs versus an absolutely safe system that nothing could touch. We have to make realistic decisions on availability versus security. The service mesh gives us the tools to be able to do that. Then, finally, it gives us insight into everything that is happening — all of the traffic that is flowing in our system. That’s a really powerful set of capabilities to bring to bear on the applications and on security as a domain.</p><p>The main point that we emphasize in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) papers is that we need those capabilities if we are to begin to achieve a zero-trust architecture. We need encryption in transit — every single request must be authenticated and authorized both at the workload and the end-user level. So now, how do we start to achieve them? What we have seen, based on some of the scale of Google and the adoption of the service mesh in open source as well, is that the service mesh as an architecture is a really effective way to achieve those kinds of necessary features.</p><p>Why is that the case? We can usually drop that sidecar, that proxy, next to an application without having to change that application because we’re interacting at the network layer and redirecting all traffic into and out of that application through that sidecar proxy. What that does more than anything is give us a policy enforcement point. So if we’re going to drop into some of the NIST requirements, when we have an access control system, we have Password Authentication Protocols (PAPs), Policy Information Points (PIPs), and Policy Decision Points (PDPs); policy machine language. One of the most fundamentally important ones is the policy enforcement point. That takes a verdict from an access control system and ensures it’s enforced at one time. And so, because that sidecar proxy is intercepting all network communication into and out of the application, we have the opportunity to apply any of the policies that we want, whether that’s a security policy, a traffic shaping policy, or something similar.</p><p>This is why it’s such a compelling toolset: we basically get next to the application in the network and can apply layer seven application layer policy to the traffic that’s passing through. That isn’t revolutionary in and of itself; you could do it with a software development kit (SDK) or a serving framework. The other key thing that the service mesh brings is a central control point so that I can go to one place and change configuration, and that will be pushed to the runtime system basically immediately and have that take effect. So now, for example, to mitigate a security problem, change the cipher suite that I’m using, enable encryption in transit, or rotate certificates, rather than having to go and change my application and redeploy it, I can update the configuration, and that can take effect in a matter of seconds. What we end up with is a much more robust system that can provide a security baseline for entire sets of applications without changing the application itself. That gives us the substrate to start building our security model on top of. That’s a lot of what we’re trying to do in those necessities: outline what the security model for a microservice should be and how we can start to implement that. We do talk about the service mesh specifically because we believe that it is the most compelling way to implement this set of behaviors compared to some of the other ones, like doing it in an SDK or doing it at the node level, for example. There are a range of different implementations. We’re confident that the service mesh is a good starting point. It’s not the right choice for everybody, but it’s a good first choice to look at.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: One of your other products that I’d love to talk about a little bit is called Tetrate Istio Distro (TID). What is the background, and what problem is TID helping folks solve?</p><p><strong>ZACK</strong>: The simple answer is that there are a couple of different things that we like to achieve with that one. So one, we’re not landing a bunch of functionality above and beyond the open source project. It exists primarily for us to facilitate security patches. We have a bunch of customers that update at a variety of different cadences. For example, we have large financial institutions and places like the DOD, which are not well known for keeping things updated or updating rapidly. The open-source project only supports two releases at a time. It’s just the reality that a quarterly release cadence for many organizations doesn’t jive with what they need. So we have extended security patching for 14 months for the Istio version; it was one of the baseline pieces.</p><p>One of the second things that we do is a much more comprehensive set of testing than upstream does, basically emulating every single customer environment that we can to a reasonable degree. Maybe most importantly for some of the federal audience, one of the big benefits of the service mesh is that you can use it to do encryption in transit for your applications. As soon as we’re in that realm, the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) become incredibly important. We actually have FIPS-validated builds of Istio and Envoy as well. Which do quite a bit to smooth over your Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (fedRAMP) process because any issue is going to make it very easy to implement encryption and transit across your entire infrastructure. Having infrastructure components that are already validated for you makes the validation process for your overall infrastructure a lot faster and cheaper. Then, of course, there’s the support when you’re having a sad day, as well as some of the architectural planning and stuff like that. So you can make sure you’re actually using and deploying it effectively.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: One of the other products we’re going to quickly talk about is called Big Bang, and the way I describe it is: you take those Iron Bank containers and assemble them in a declarative, or everything is code, fashion to build a DevSecOps system that secures infrastructure providers can leverage. The reason I bring up Iron Bank and Big Bang is that there’s a rumor on the street that TID is both through the Iron Bank, and I’m hearing people talk about it actually being fully integrated with Big Bang.</p><p><strong>ZACK</strong>: We are pretty excited about that because it’s been quite a while in the running. TID is in Iron Bank. For folks who are already in the public sector and are starting to do some of the exploration in the space, if your authorizing official (AO) has already approved the use of Iron Bank, the TID images and the Istio containers are there for you to pull and play with. You can start doing that right away, including the FIPS fields. We’re super, super excited. Big Bang is basically an instantiation; it’s a set of blueprints as code for how you would stand up a Kubernetes stack with Istio in it with a whole bunch of other battery-included systems as a really effective and powerful baseline for a zero-trust run time. We’re very excited that we should actually start to use TID as the default Istio out of the box because FIPS is so important. That will become the default for Big Bang as well.</p><p>As you’re playing with the “batteries included” platform there, for folks in the public sector and private sector as well, I recommend checking out Big Bang as a really good set of blueprints with a well-reasoned, pretty well-articulated set of decision points there for how to assemble an architecture, even if you’re not going to use it directly. That’s one of the other areas that we help out with some of the TID things, like security posture, Big Bang, and similar.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: I definitely don’t want to encourage everybody to quit their jobs and create a startup because I think there’s a lot of opportunities to innovate within larger organizations. Whether it’s large companies, the Department of Defense, Medicaid, or Medicare, there are a lot of very large organizations that struggle with innovation. I think within those organizations; there’s a lot of risk that you can sometimes take when starting new things. You can sometimes put your career on the line just to start a project, even internal to the company. With that context, what advice do you have for the people who are considering or looking at making that jump?</p><p><strong>ZACK</strong>: I think it goes back to what I talked about before, which is that you need to have your eye on the pain that you’re going to solve. It doesn’t matter if it’s a startup or if it’s a new project inside your existing organization. You need to have the focus on the user and on the pain that you’re going to solve. If you’re solving pain within the organization, you’re going to be showing value. You’re going to be successful because, at the end of the day, that’s going to be the success criteria by which you’re going to be judged. Whether you’re a startup that goes off internally or you’re pushing new programs inside of some of the largest organizations on the planet, like the DOD, Medicare, Medicaid, CMS, and similar organizations, keep your eye on the value. You get to the value by focusing on where people are struggling and where there is pain today that’s stopping them from doing great things. As long as you stay focused on that, I believe you will be successful.</p><p>(5–8 paragraphs)</p><p>Subscribe to Email Option?</p><p>Keep up with the industry’s sharpest minds right from your inbox.</p><p>Want to hear more? Tune in to the podcast episode, where we cover lots more.</p><p>You can also subscribe to Defense Unicorns, a Podcast on <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/future-of-fintech/id1557519332">iTunes</a>, <a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/0HKyOUUHzT9o14h5FJVpB0?si=mm2RhoHqS7KeH10g6Wby4A">Spotify</a>, or your favorite podcast app.</p><p>Thanks,</p><p>The Defense Unicorns Team</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2e34c59245c2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/defense-unicorns/istio-service-mesh-to-tetrate-with-zack-butcher-2e34c59245c2">Istio Service Mesh to Tetrate with Zack Butcher</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/defense-unicorns">Defense Unicorns</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Disrupting for Impact with Preston Dunlap]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/defense-unicorns/disrupting-for-impact-with-preston-dunlap-52067457fa10?source=rss-1711b5016c9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/52067457fa10</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[disruption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[motivation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[air-force]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[impact]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Defense Unicorns]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Jun 2023 16:34:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-06-27T16:34:52.435Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*w1adciJ7UD96OwMNJPoW-g.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/disrupting-for-impact-with-preston-dunlap/id1612914663?i=1000602071459">‎Defense Unicorns, A Podcast: Disrupting for Impact with Preston Dunlap on Apple Podcasts</a></p><p><em>Listen on iTunes, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.</em></p><p>In this episode of Defense Unicorns, a podcast, Preston Dunlap takes you on the journey of being the former Air Force CTO and 1st Chief Architect. He goes into the value of people with authority providing support and top cover for those disrupting for impact and how to turn motivation into outcomes. He also tells listeners the importance of finding urgency without waiting for emergencies. Preston is the founder of Arkenstone Ventures, and you can follow his career and journey by following him on LinkedIn.</p><p>Defense Unicorns, a Podcast, is hosted by<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/robertcslaughter/"> Robert Slaughter</a>, Founder, and CEO of<a href="https://www.defenseunicorns.com/"> Defense Unicorns</a>.</p><p>Guests this week include:</p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/preston-dunlap/">Preston Dunlap</a>, former Air Force CTO, and 1st Chief Architect</p><p>Highlights from Defense Unicorns, a Podcast:</p><p><em>This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.</em></p><p>(0:16) What is CTO &amp; Chief Architect</p><p>(3:09) Challenges of systems integrations.</p><p>(7:11) Is there Progress or Talking Points in Acquisition</p><p>(12:51) Motivation Into Outcomes</p><p>(20:18) What type of change would make the biggest impact?</p><p>(27:38) urgency within the department</p><p>(36:23) National Security Issues with current events</p><p>(41:54) Advice for Disruptors</p><p>(49:42) Advice to those with Authority</p><p>(53:43) Exciting things between DOD and technology</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: We’ve been working together for a number of years while I was still serving. One of the things that always confused me a little bit is the title of CTO in Chief Architect. I’d love to hear, in your own words, what those positions referred to and what sort of roles and responsibilities you had at the time.</p><p><strong>PRESTON</strong>: Thanks for asking. It was quite an honor to be asked to come back to the Defense Department after a hiatus of a few years at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab. At the time, there was only one service that sort of brilliantly recognized that the department was basically scattering seed corn for science and technology activities. We had folks overseeing that, and then we had a whole slew of programs of record and acquisition programs, sort of like “silos of excellence,” as some folks would affectionately call them. Each of them got together, and they, I think, astutely realized that if you had a company, you would have somebody that was looking at the collection of products as a whole and the engineering and technology associated with those programs and products from inside that business.</p><p>Many titles could go along with that, but basically, they recognized one thing: the need for coherence across all the different programs. And second, to be able to think about the integration of those activities in the acquisition process. So that at the end of the day, you don’t just have a series of a thousand widgets coming off the proverbial conveyor belt; you actually have systems that are modular and upgradable. Then, as one might crazily sort of want, you actually get them to work together so that you can bring together a system of systems that work as our operators need them, which is actually how we use them in sort of day-to-day operations or conflict.</p><p>Being able to pull together the technology, the startup mindsets, and the industry experience into the way the Pentagon works to try to change that was essential to being able to be part of the acquisition apparatus because that’s where money flows. That’s where scale happens. That’s where programs become more real and get delivered. Having a foot in that was essential to being able to have actual influence and the opportunity to partner with all the great folks that are requiring, designing, building, and delivering systems for what was just one service.</p><p>And then, about a year into it, it became two services for both the Space Force and the Air Force.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: When you talk about systems integration, can you talk a little bit about some of the challenges and some of the things that are going well or maybe not so well?</p><p><strong>PRESTON</strong>: This is not too dissimilar to large corporations, but the government is the largest company, certainly in terms of human capital, on the planet. So the largest employer and, on a bad day, the largest bureaucracy. There you’ve got the challenges of scale, and that’s both a people challenge as well as a product and how you build challenge, and what the system or the approach to acquisition and developing requirements tends to do, in some sense by design, is to basically remove any type of dependency on another program or another office. That, in its time, has good reasons. The idea is that you don’t want to hold up your schedule waiting on someone else’s or multiply risks from one product to another.</p><p>That sort of isolation basically created the incentives so that whenever we decided we needed to go buy a new plane or a new munition or a new software system, we thought of those as a department by design and effectively as an individual island of itself. It would have its own requirements, its own schedule, its own vendor or vendors, and its own metrics for the whole delivering and developing of the program itself as a thing. Then the incentives were applied to program managers and engineers and to the oversight organizations, from Congress to the White House to the Secretary of Defense’s office. All those pressures are there to basically deliver on time and on schedule.</p><p>Those are good ambitions and a good end state. But what happens is that the tendency is to basically remove any risks associated with allowing, say, that munition to talk to a different platform. You end up in states where, say, former and now-late Secretary Ash Carter would often tell me and others, “We’re buying platforms without bullets.” You know, we need to have munitions to go with our platforms and sufficient inventory and capability. So that mindset has largely been missing, with few exceptions or “lighthouses on the hill”, so to speak. What that means is that when we build something and design it, we need to think of it as an ecosystem.</p><p>That tends to go against the grain of the natural processes — the training that we put our folks through is, in fact, exactly how we operate, right? We don’t just fly planes without munitions. We don’t have maintainers that don’t have platforms with them. We don’t have aircraft carriers without planes and sensors. It all goes together. So it makes sense that we should actually have people thinking about how to not only deliver excellent warfighting capabilities but also how those systems come together to achieve the intended effect, as a family would.</p><p>Coming back to the department, the last three years, at a service level as opposed to the Secretary of Defense level, provided the opportunity to work with like-minded folks and find brilliant people that were out there ready to actually think differently about acquisition and technology integration. Where do we get it from, and how do we pull together both commercial and traditional sources into not just great individual programs but actually thinking of a collective whole — a collective Air Force, a collective Space Force, a collective Department of the Air Force, a collective joint force, and so on.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: Can you talk a little bit about the progress that’s been made? Do you think things are heading in the right direction? Do you think it’s moving fast enough? It sounds obviously very promising, but one of the first thoughts that come to mind is the difference between the talking points and what’s actually getting executed.</p><p><strong>PRESTON</strong>: Yeah, Rob, it’s a great observation. The question is how much of our speeches or visionary statements are coming to fruition and at what scale, speed, and pace. And that’s a good question to ask, and I don’t think we should ever stop asking that question.</p><p>I don’t know if it was fear or inhibition of being able to integrate and apply capabilities, technology, and products that exist for things like commercial applications that was an inhibitor to that speed and agility. This is a common talking point now, but say, in 2014 or 2015, this was a new idea. Various secretaries, like Ash Carter, pushed this in a big way to try to instill it inside the Department of Defense and the intelligence community as well. But one obvious thing is trying to figure out how to integrate and adapt technologies that exist either in another part of the government or in the commercial sector where something is serving an excellent purpose that could be transferred or maybe slightly modified to be able to be used in a national security setting to be able to design acquisition programs or requirements to absorb that in other cases; it doesn’t make sense to be able to do that. There are things like munitions and others that don’t have broad commercial applications, thank goodness. So you need to be able to think about how to design and develop those in an agile way, both from a software and a hardware perspective. So there’s a variety of strategies that have been proven both successful and where you should watch out to make sure there are no warning signs.</p><p>However, we’re not near the speed and pace that we should be in developing and integrating modern technologies. And that’s a concern because, number one, we’re losing out on tech and products that are available across the globe because we have limitations, concerns, or risks associated with integrating them. The speed is way too slow. That’s sort of our problem on the supply-side, ingestion side. It’s there; we just can’t integrate it; it’s right beyond our grasp; you just can’t touch it and pull it in. On the other side, in the more competitive landscape, you can look out and see China, which is sort of the standard example of a country that has a different approach to things. That’s not an approach that we would want, but they’ve also shown the ability to push and deliver technologies very quickly.</p><p>So you’ve got an outside that is moving quickly, building technology in a rapid way, and expanding in a bunch of different directions, both physically and from a tech perspective. And so we’ve got this opportunity loss from not being able to integrate what’s literally right here on our shore and risk of competitors or potential competitors growing overseas, developing technologies that would put us and our allies and partners at risk. I think removing that pence from both the inside and outside creates sufficient desire and momentum to be able to push the boundaries, deliver, and motivate. I think it does so in a big way. That’s why you hear people talking that way. That’s why a lot of the forces are communicating that way. But what happens is that that sort of vision, desire, motivation, and energy gets hit by the wall of the way things have been done, the way procedures have been incentivized, the way we’ve been trained, or the risks that could be posed. If things don’t go perfectly, what happens to the people or the programs? What happens to the money? There are all these incentives that push against a true and genuine desire to move quickly, adapt, and deliver technologies.</p><p>I believe we are in a good place in terms of the idea, the concept, and the vision. I think both in Congress, and in this and previous White Houses, as well as in the Department of Intelligence community, the rubber meets the road. Just like in a startup or a business, it’s all about execution and finding everything from A to Z. You’ve got to be able to then take that vision and translate it into policies, procedures, execution, and delivered programs that not only work well themselves but also integrate together. That’s the secret sauce. So, when you get a team together — you get programs together, leadership together, executors together, builders together, and users together — it’s not surprising that great things happen. It’s just really hard for a massive institution to do it, and that’s no excuse. So long way of saying, Rob, I think we’ve got to move, move faster, more quickly. We can do it smartly, but we shouldn’t do it foolishly. That’s just essential, and it’s just an opportunity lost if we don’t.</p><p>Every time I see things like that happen, I just get excited that people are taking the mantle from those of us that have gone before and are continuing to not only deliver but also move to deliver at scale. That’s so essential, not simply in software, although we talk a lot about that, but it’s also a revolution in hardware as well.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: So clearly, the motivation is there, both from external factors as well as internally within the Department of Defense; a lot of passionate, motivated people really create that change. How do you turn motivation into outcomes, though? What do you think specifically are the steps for success that you think, in general, the DOD has been missing?</p><p><strong>PRESTON</strong>: When it comes to getting from A to Z or from a vision and desire to reality, there are so many people, programs, and businesses that, frankly, trip up along the way. I mean, that’s why the common adage is that you can have a great idea as a startup, an early founder, or an early company. But execution is the secret sauce. or if you’re building hardware, it’s not just that designer prototype; it’s the execution at scale and the manufacturability of the programs. That’s where things make a difference at scale. And so, to not be too enamored with one side or the other of that equation, but to be able to get all the way through the process, it is essential to have something like a strong commercial sort of play, a strong defense, and intelligence play, or a broader national security type of play.</p><p>So how do you do it well? There are easier-to-touch metrics in the private sector, things like revenue and the valuation of companies — a more quantifiable approach. You can find some of those, although we tend to report out and get asked about input metrics. It’s not obvious that those input metrics are directly related to the output results. In some cases, those are there for excellent reasons. In other cases, they’re there because a program had a serious issue that shouldn’t have happened. So rules or procedures were in place to do it.</p><p>But I think that there’s a better way: if we could work as a community, from the builders outside the department to the buyers inside the department and the overseers and Congress on the hill, we could actually transition to thinking about measuring performance on outputs. You’ve got a different set of incentive structures. It’s not just, “Am I doing the checklist?” for whatever program or acquisition, or “Am I building the artifacts?” but “Am I delivering?”. For things like software, we’ve seen where that actually can play out, where people can tangibly see code being not just developed but delivered into production and used. Software is sort of attuned to that.</p><p>What hasn’t happened as much is revolution. We have tried to push this and will continue to do so on things like open architecture, digital engineering, and standards. But in some sense, you should be able to see that either sub-components or portions of hardware can also be thought of as modularly built. And if you do that, you sort of have a moral equivalent to software modularity and deployment. So, by thinking of building hardware in an agile fashion, you can begin to have time and space where you can actually begin to see the output of the development of hardware and not just software. This shift from input to output is just a really powerful tool to be able to incentivize delivery.</p><p>Now, I’ll just say that’s motivational and explain why I think it works. The challenge is that you have to have not only the right motivation but also pull together a team of people who understand what the technology, the components, and the products need to be. In other words, not just how to construct a contract but actually how to build a thing — a product that meets users&#39; interests, needs, and requirements. Then you have to have operators that are able to interact with that. In the government, we tend to train our folks more for the checklists and contract actions of program management. We need that, but we also need to push harder on getting in-depth and understanding the technology and the product space because you need that to be really good buyers and really good partners with industry and operators so that you’re all in this together to develop. It takes those budgetary requirements, contracting, acquisition builders, and operator partnerships to actually make this magic happen, where you can actually deliver quickly, use it, and build as you go. Those are just some of the things that I would say that we need to do to be able to make this sort of future a reality, and you can see pockets where it happens. The secret sauce is not dissimilar. That’s a future that I think we still have to go towards. It’s one that I saw firsthand and helped push in the three-ish years that I was back in the department, and I’m so excited to see people sort of carry that torch on.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: If you could make a change or two, something concrete, to change the entire department, what type of change in policy, law, or practice do you think would have the biggest impact?</p><p><strong>PRESTON</strong>: Rob, that’s a great question again, and I’d certainly be interested in your thoughts as well since you’ve got this great perspective from living it, building it, and delivering it certainly in the software space. Let me take a stab at it, and I will certainly be appreciative of any thoughts you want to offer on the subject too.</p><p>You could take a few different angles. One is a cultural one. I don’t think you can mandate or write an instruction to say that if you’re in the space of developing, delivering, requiring funding, and acquiring a product, you should actually wake up every morning passionate about delivering it and fight as hard as you and the team can go deliver it. We don’t always incentivize that. We have people that want to do that, but they are not supported or enabled. The most impactful thing would be moving to a culture where that’s something that is not only broadly encouraged but practically encouraged as well. Both in terms of time and dedication and fundamentally as an expectation.</p><p>When I first arrived three-ish years ago, I did a tour of all the units across the globe and across the country that were doing acquisition. I by no means talked to everybody; however, in the sample size that I did talk to, I don’t think I came across anyone who had directly had conversations with their end-user or operational customers. The moat, or distance, between the user and the person trying to acquire it — and even the person writing the requirements — was large in both time and space. And so number one would be a culture of building products, not programs. Number two would be shortening the distances between the key stakeholders and that product that’s being built: the users, the builders, the requirers, and the acquirers, and pushing them together right at the beginning and keeping them together as they do that. Three would be where you can think of buying a portfolio of systems or a family of systems to be able to achieve that operational end state. We should be thinking about acquiring and developing portfolios or families of systems. We’ve done this in small portions and pockets. This is something that some people will often say and think of as a budgetary trick to get a pool of resources that can be moved from one project to another, and oversight is difficult. That’s not all, although I could see how that could be helpful. What I really mean is that you’ve got an integrated team where they’re not all behind various walls, not talking to each other or working together, so you end up having every single program needing to solve every edge case for that problem.</p><p>You could actually do it better and more effectively if you had a collection of capabilities. That portfolio product approach or portfolio acquisition approach isn’t simply a budget thing. This is really a product approach to being able to do that. So you have to consider the ecosystem, and we don’t really consider, plan for, or drive ourselves toward the portfolio ecosystem. So we may organize on an org chart, and it looks like that from a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) management perspective, but we’ve gotta really push ourselves to actually go beyond the administrative collection of programs into the development and delivery of programs.</p><p>That’s not just on the government side. If you’re in a large profit-and-loss organization, the tendency is going to be there too. If you’re a commercially facing organization, seeing and harnessing the power of transforming your P&amp;L or your business into an ecosystem of capabilities that reinforce each other and integrate with other systems is just so powerful to be able to unlock the potential. That means you can move away from singular and proprietary approaches to revenue-generating opportunities and toward those that have a larger pie to go after because you can interlock and work with others.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: Talk a little bit to the audience about the sense of urgency within the department. Do you think there’s a point in the future where we’ve waited too long to change and can no longer hit the pace that’s required?</p><p>Preston: Urgency is so key. If we’ve hit that point where it’s just too late, we’re probably not doing a Defense Unicorns podcast. This is not a good world to be in; that’s a bad day, and we’ve got lots of problems. Until then, we have to figure this out and try to effect change and scale quickly. That in and of itself is sufficient in my mind to think about driving the urgency. I talked about the lost opportunities where we can touch something but can’t use it, and the overseas side, where we have potential adversaries that are building capabilities that can contest, congest, or make our operations difficult. Those two things should be sufficient to motivate urgency. But those aren’t necessarily the things that we wake up to in the inbox, drilling us in the morning; it’s something else, or it’s an administrative matter, or it’s part of the input metrics that are at the top of the inbox to go execute during the day.</p><p>Aside from a national crisis moment where you can focus and achieve urgency through that focus, it’s very hard to do. You end up getting these pockets of urgency and opportunities to be able to take effect. That crisis of urgency creates opportunities to be creative and break down barriers for people to be able to see the problems in front of them and recognize that we need to actually go through that to be able to not only continue to work but to be able to enable our people to do what they need to do. What creative opportunities and urgency are out there from a real-world operational perspective that could drive things like advancing sensors, integrating data networks and observation, or being able to address and deal with a different class of challenges? Those are questions that people in the department are grappling with. That clear-eyed view of a real problem and a real challenge, and then driving to deliver it, has come to a focus like the point of a pin. A point in an era where everybody’s aiming in the same direction is essential.</p><p>The other approach that I came to the department recognizing is that you don’t always have an unfortunate real-world activity to drive that creativity and to work through molasses-like procedures and processes and try to make things better. You can do it program by program, acquisition by acquisition, or intelligence unit by intelligence unit. One of the things that I thought of was organizing, training, and equipping. It was basically not just bringing Silicon Valley speed into the department but also driving urgency for execution. And you could do that in a variety of ways.</p><p>I did it through a series of time-driven exercises led by the operational community that required a whole bunch of platforms and systems, some existing and some new to the community, with massively difficult objectives to achieve. Very short timelines — weeks to build or maybe a couple months to deliver — where the whole “classified” world is watching. There’s this immense sense of urgency to deliver something that is useful because the operators are driving it. Using that approach to being able to not give exact pinpoint answers to problems but to shake the system and be able to deliver and design, and waking up to the fact that we can actually do this here in the broader defense department and in the intelligence community, we’re literally doing it, and everybody’s aiming towards it. That was a tectonic shift in the way the department’s been thinking, and the ripple effects continue in a positive way. These ripple effects are continuing, and it’s encouraging to be able to see them.</p><p>We should watch them, encourage them, and enable them to continue to happen. Not just ones and twosies, but we need to do this in an exponential sense. Urgency is essential; it can be driven by a real-world operational focus of it’s here, and it’s pressing, and we have to address it, an operational future-where things actually happen in the world, where we need to be able to stabilize and be able to support our allies and partners. Then three: opportunities to be able to drive that sense of urgency through activities and procedures that could push not only operators and acquisition professionals together but also the community of developers.</p><p>As you can tell, I’m pretty passionate about the need for urgency. I think there’s a good number of folks that have it in the department. They’re often not the ones enabled to actually go execute and deliver. It brings us back to bridging the gap and shortening the distance between those people to get the job done.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: This podcast is focused on innovative and passionate people centered on national security. A lot of those folks that are listening are a little bit on the junior to mid-career level. What advice do you have for the contractor, civilian active duty, enlisted, and officers who are trying to disrupt the system and, in many cases, trying to achieve an outcome in the direction upon which you talked about on this podcast? Those trying to achieve that mission impact but struggling with the day-to-day bureaucracy, what advice do you have for those folks?</p><p><strong>PRESTON</strong>: First of all, I came across so many in those categories who saw the vision either themselves (almost in all cases) or heard from the top leaders talking about it and encouraging it. I was overwhelmed with the potential and excited by the possibility that even a quarter of those folks would actually come through and push through the potential of those ideas. It’s a different world. You’ve identified a real risk, which is that it’s no easy path to be a disruptor, an innovator, or an urgent deliverer inside a fairly arcane organization — the largest bureaucracy on the planet. So point one would be: Keep going; don’t stop. Point two would be: It’s going to be painful; recognize that upfront, and don’t be discouraged by it. It may or may not get easier, but go into it with your eyes wide open and with the tenacity that it takes to actually achieve something new. Number three is that it’s not necessarily inside the government versus outside. Any game-changing, innovative, forward-thinking individuals that see the world differently than others are going to push to create it and are going to face headwinds. The fourth thing I would say is that if you are in this apparatus that we’re talking about, in the national security-focused area, I would encourage you to be professional and respect the organizations you’re in. You can find folks that are out there that could be champions and meet them, and they won’t always have the bandwidth to be able to help guide, give advice, or maybe even directly support or enable you, but don’t be shy about doing it again in a professional way.</p><p>I think one of the things that I saw on this point was folks being concerned about talking to a superior or somebody in a different chain of command. There are good reasons why that is the case, but in the innovation space, if you do it appropriately, it is one of the most helpful opportunities because different people have different perspectives. It’s not the most senior person, it might actually be a more junior person that sees it, but they’re positioned appropriately to be able to take effect, order, and appreciate the problem that you’re seeing and perhaps help overcome whatever the barriers are to being able to achieve that. Raise the issue, ask for help, and build partnerships. Be professional, but don’t be shy. It may or may not come to fruition, and you may have to figure out a different path to achieve it, but remember, you’ve got advocates that are around the ecosystem, all the services, and the Department of Defense. There is certainly a general sense of collaboration focused on innovation and delivering real products. You’re not going against the grain of the strategic conversation. It’s really, Rob, as you mentioned, going against the grain of the way things are done or the execution approach.</p><p>Whether you’re a four-star or a one-star, enlisted, a junior officer, or part of the contractor innovation team, it can be a tough slog, but you have to see the vision and encourage others to move towards it. I hope to see more advocates out there at the senior and mid-level enable and empower folks to do that. I’m seeing a good trend, but I’d like to see the curve grow exponentially rather than linearly.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: What advice do you have for those people who are already in that leadership role?</p><p><strong>PRESTON</strong>: If you have some sense of authority, stop relitigating the same questions every day and free up that time, focus, and energy for delivery and not further deliberation, which is often in your power to do for the circle of authority that you’ve been granted. You can usually use that influence to influence other circles of influence, either above, adjacent, or certainly below. Be bold about how to do it. If you find yourself or others thinking, “That’s not the way we usually do it,” or “I’m concerned that somebody will raise a flag if we do it this way”, or “That’ll just delay us”, you might be right, but you gotta ask your question: is it worth going lower? Is it worth doing less for greater assurance of procedural success? Or do we take the procedural risk, so to speak, or the institutional risk to achieve something that not only is great but is essential for us to be able to deter defeat if necessary? And with that sense of urgency, I think it drives — certainly for me — a different calculus for those decisions.</p><p>You make decisions every day, maybe even every hour, on certain things. And that mentality shift, that sort of wartime mentality, even if we’re not in war, is what you’ve got to have to go do it, whether you’re at a low, mid, or high level. If you are in a position to simplify, enable, and encourage different thinking, you should do it if you can, and you’re going to have to communicate that. You’ve got to bring everybody along with you, so you can’t just sort of go rogue, but you can go bold. That’s what I encourage you to do: listen to those below you or adjacent to you, hear the problems or the opportunities, and apply a megaphone to those opportunities where you can. For the people’s sake, because it shows that you’re genuinely, authentically listening, but also for the country’s sake, because should we have to execute, we’ve gotta be able to do so and save people’s lives at the least possible risk. At the end of the day, that’s why you have a defense department and an intelligence community. We have the privilege and the opportunity in this acquisition, development requirements, and tech space to make a massive difference. You know, if we rise to the occasion.</p><p><em>Want to hear more? Tune in to the podcast episode, where we cover lots more.</em></p><p><em>You can also subscribe to Defense Unicorns, a Podcast on </em><a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/future-of-fintech/id1557519332"><em>iTunes</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/0HKyOUUHzT9o14h5FJVpB0?si=mm2RhoHqS7KeH10g6Wby4A"><em>Spotify</em></a><em>, or your favorite podcast app.</em></p><p><em>Thanks,</em></p><p><em>The Defense Unicorns Team</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=52067457fa10" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/defense-unicorns/disrupting-for-impact-with-preston-dunlap-52067457fa10">Disrupting for Impact with Preston Dunlap</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/defense-unicorns">Defense Unicorns</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Generative AI for Secure Systems]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/defense-unicorns/generative-ai-for-secure-systems-e89fc22ce577?source=rss-1711b5016c9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e89fc22ce577</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[generative-ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[large-language-models]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[open-source-software]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Defense Unicorns]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 May 2023 15:53:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-23T23:07:37.485Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Defense Unicorns is excited to announce the development of <a href="https://github.com/defenseunicorns/leapfrogai">LeapfrogAI</a>, a new open source project that accelerates secure Generative AI solutions for mission customers in highly regulated environments such as the Department of Defense, Intelligence Community, and commercial enterprises.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6j2GLZctlNMKOQHyKPj1hQ.png" /></figure><p>The pace of innovation in the open source Generative AI space is astounding. As AI “eats the world”, open source models will continue to close the gap with commercial and proprietary models. General purpose AI models that are common in commercial/SaaS offerings are transforming how businesses operate because they are capable of so many different types of tasks. However, these general purpose models will often fail to outperform much smaller open source models that have either been fine-tuned or augmented with mission-specific data.</p><p>Defense Unicorns is building LeapfrogAI to enable our military, our financial systems, and other secure enterprises to leverage their data advantage by bringing AI capabilities in-house in a secure, reliable and easy to use platform. Leapfrog AI provides the ability to use open source models, fine-tune them with mission data, create and search embeddings for building retrieval-augmented generation systems. Leapfrog AI brings the capabilities in-house needed to build transformative AI solutions to make mission impact.</p><p>LeapfrogAI allows mission-focused users to:</p><ul><li>Deliver new Generative AI capabilities in minutes</li><li>Provide security and compliance artifacts that meet regulatory requirements</li><li>Leverage their data to fine-tune models</li><li>Retain control of their data and fine-tuned models</li><li>Deploy AI solutions to the cloud, on-prem and the edge</li><li>Remove the complexity requiring niche expertise to use Generative AI</li></ul><p>LeapfrogAI builds on top of classified and unclassified cloud, on-prem, or edge infrastructure to support the mission, wherever the mission goes. While development is still early, first adopters for LeapFrogAI can be found across the Department of the Navy and the United States Space Force, building on top of and integrating with the Department of Defense’s <a href="https://docs-bigbang.dso.mil/">Big Bang</a> and <a href="https://defensescoop.com/2023/03/20/navys-new-project-openship-aims-to-swiftly-apply-ai-to-data-captured-by-vessels-at-sea/">OpenShip</a> capabilities.</p><p>Defense Unicorns, using LeapFrogAI, are bringing transformative AI capabilities to the most restrictive, secure, and important mission environments in the world. Feel free to continue the discussion on our Github page or by reaching out to <a href="/service/mailto:AI@leapfrog.ai">AI@leapfrog.ai</a></p><p>Source code here: <a href="https://github.com/defenseunicorns/leapfrogai">LeapfrogAI</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PDFgs3jcGsD2M3p61WsoeQ.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e89fc22ce577" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/defense-unicorns/generative-ai-for-secure-systems-e89fc22ce577">Generative AI for Secure Systems</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/defense-unicorns">Defense Unicorns</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Stop The Innovation Theatre with Steve Blank]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/defense-unicorns/stop-the-innovation-theatre-with-steve-blank-4fa872959268?source=rss-1711b5016c9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4fa872959268</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dod]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[silicon-valley]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[steve-blank]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Defense Unicorns]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 03 Apr 2023 13:01:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-04-03T13:01:56.952Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/defenseunicorns/episodes/Stop-The-Innovation-Theatre-with-Steve-Blank-e218tum">Stop The Innovation Theatre with Steve Blank by Defense Unicorns, A Podcast</a></p><p><em>Listen on </em><a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/stop-the-innovation-theatre-with-steve-blank/id1612914663?i=1000606269043"><em>iTunes</em></a><em>, </em><a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/4BZRQtDNntYAB753CsQSDy?si=8FPb-g8SR56skl14b8jjkw"><em>Spotify</em></a><em>, or your favorite podcast app.</em></p><p>In this episode of Defense Unicorns, Join Steve Blank as he shares his experience working across Silicon Valley, the Department of Defense, and beyond. Steve goes into the current state of national security innovation, how he co-created the Department of Defense Hacking for Defense and Department of State Hacking for Diplomacy curricula, and why the DoD needs an innovation doctrine. We hope you enjoy this episode and encourage you to check out Steve at <a href="http://www.steveblank.com/">www.steveblank.com</a> and learn from him as we have.</p><p>Defense Unicorns, a Podcast, is hosted by<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/robertcslaughter/"> Robert Slaughter</a>, Founder, and CEO of<a href="https://www.defenseunicorns.com/"> Defense Unicorns</a>.</p><p>Guests this week include:</p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/steveblank/">Steve Blank</a> is an adjunct professor at Stanford and a co-founder of the Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. Steve consults for the National Security establishment on innovation methods, processes, policies, and doctrine.</p><p>His book <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Four-Steps-Epiphany-Steve-Blank/dp/0989200507"><strong>The Four Steps to the Epiphany</strong></a> is credited with launching the Lean Startup movement. He created the curriculum for the National Science Foundation Innovation Corps. At Stanford, he co-created the Department of Defense <em>Hacking for Defense</em> and Department of State <em>Hacking for Diplomacy</em> curriculums.</p><p>His follow-on book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Startup-Owners-Manual-Step-Step/dp/0984999302"><strong>The Startup Owner’s Manual</strong></a>, described a process for turning ideas into scale, and his <a href="https://hbr.org/2013/05/why-the-lean-start-up-changes-everything"><strong>Harvard Business Review cover story</strong></a> redefined how large organizations can innovate at speed.</p><p>Steve’s latest class at Stanford, <a href="https://steveblank.com/category/technology-innovation-and-modern-war/"><strong>Technology, Innovation, and Great Power Competition</strong></a>, is providing crucial insight into how technology will shape all the elements of national power.</p><p>Highlights from Defense Unicorns, a Podcast:</p><p><em>This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.</em></p><p>(00:15) Four Steps to the Epiphany</p><p>(3:12) Hacking for Defense</p><p>(7:35) Connecting civilian populace to the military</p><p>(13:23) Silicon Valley, Startups, and the greater Department of Defense</p><p>(22:29) Timeline of change</p><p>(29:19) Challenges and Potential</p><p>(44:11) Innovation Doctrine</p><p>(1:02:34) Advice to disruptors</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: Steve, the first time I came across your name was several years ago. I had started my first startup while I was still on active duty and working things on the side, and somebody recommended a book by you known as The Four Steps to the Epiphany. I was curious for our listeners if you could give some insights on what that epiphany was.</p><p><strong>STEVE</strong>: The Four Steps to the Epiphany was based on having done eight startups in Silicon Valley. At least in the 20th century, investors simply asked you to write a business plan. And whether you had the right font and waved your hands in the right direction, you might get money. Then investors basically insisted you execute the plan. We went through a serial process, which was kind of a lot like the requirements in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process in the military. Simply put, I gave you the money; now, go build the team, build the product, and execute it. The only problem we’re going to have is whether the building has enough space for the bags of money that were going to come.</p><p>Of course, it never worked like that because, as we discovered, no business plan survives first contact with customers. What I realized is that while large companies were executing known data, startups simply had a series of untested hypotheses; they were searching where companies were executing. We had a hundred years’ worth of tools from business schools and management consulting firms on how to build execution processes, stage gates, product management, et cetera. We had almost no tools for thinking about, “How do you deal with a series of unknowns?” The question had never even been asked; perhaps startups and new ventures needed different toolsets.</p><p>The Four Steps to the Epiphany was the first book that literally took me three years to get my head around the idea that maybe we need something different, which you could probably explain in 30 seconds today. Which is basically saying there are no facts inside the building, so get the hell outside. Also, what you should be building are minimum viable products — small things to test hypotheses, whether they’re about products, features, or pricing. That is the long answer for what were The Four Steps to the Epiphany. What kick-started essentially 21st-century entrepreneurship is my work, and now someone named Eric Ries and Alexander Osterwalder are at the core of what’s called the Lean Startup, which is these three core tools that entrepreneurs use to figure out “I believe X and Y.” That is, I believe people have this problem or need, and I’d want to jump to building the solution, but maybe I should actually back up a bit for about a couple of seconds and think perhaps I should test whether other people share that problem and what is the right way to solve it?</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: It’s been inspiring to me as an entrepreneur, and I get so much out of your work, both in your books and in another thing you do, which is Hacking for Defense. I’d love to hear from you about where Hacking for Defense came from and how that relates to the Four Steps of the Epiphany.</p><p><strong>STEVE</strong>: I mentioned that my work, Eric Rie’s work, and Alexander Osterwalder&#39;s work ended up being called a lean startup. We all published books on this stuff, but there was no class to teach it. Here I am teaching entrepreneurship at, at the time, both Berkeley and Columbia universities, though now I’m full-time at Stanford. The capstone class, which is the top class in any university, was still how to write a business plan, even though we were saying that business plans were not very useful for entrepreneurs, and those were the documents that venture capitalists made you write that they never really read, or at least there was nothing to operationalize in them.</p><p>I realized we needed a new class. So I created a class at Stanford, which is now in its second decade, called the Lean Launchpad. Six or nine months later, the National Science Foundation (NSF) adopted it and called it I-Corps or the Innovation Corps, which is also now in its second decade. The NSF used I-Corps to train principal investigators and their graduate students and postdocs on how to commercialize science in the United States. That is now the course being taught to do that. It was the exact same class at Stanford, which was teaching you the lean methodologies: What are my hypotheses? I came up with this great idea, and I’m so excited, but who are the customers? What are the right features? How do we find something called product market fit? How do we discover pricing and all the delivery components, et cetera? Then it got adopted by the National Institute of Health and other agencies as well. I stood up a version inside the National Security Agency (NSA) eight years ago called ICorps at NSA; it’s put more people through it than I think the commercial versions. Then the classes took off in multiple universities because I open-sourced the class.</p><p>The Hacking for Defense class came from those commercial classes when I met two retired Army colonels. One Pete Newell, who used to run the Army’s rapid equipping force, had just retired and set up a commercial company called BMNT in Palo Alto to do from the outside for the Department of Defense (DOD) what he did for the Army on the inside, which was rapid problem solving and rapid delivery of solutions, which he did on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. And then there’s Colonel Joe Felter, a retired Special Forces colonel now teaching at Stanford, still the senior military person on the Stanford campus. The three of us literally got in a conference room for the first time we met and realized that we all had kind of the same desire to connect the civilian populace to military problems, certainly in research universities and other places where student&#39;s only choices of thinking about service might have been Teach for America and other places. Most students were thinking about Facebook and Google at the time as their destinations. We realized that perhaps we could create a mission-driven class while solving serious national security, DOD, and intelligence community (IC) problems and, at the same time, connecting students who never would’ve understood, let alone considered, government service. The reason I told you all about the Lean Methods and the NSF classes is that basically, Hacking for Defense is that exact same class, but instead of students working on their own problems, we go out to the DOD and the intelligence community and solicit scrub down problems that could be worked on by students.</p><p>They get to pick from a series of problems that each class offers, and they form teams and then go work on them. Hacking for Defense is now in 60 universities and multiple countries. It’s in the UK and Australia as well. It has also spawned a nonprofit called The Common Mission Project, which collects all the DOD problems and doles them out to all 60 universities.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: You mentioned that you had a desire to connect the civilian populace to military use cases; where did that come from? I’d love to hear more about you and what inspired your focus and mission statement.</p><p><strong>STEVE</strong>: Well, I served during Vietnam for four years in the Air Force and a year and a half in Southeast Asia. There are two memorable things about my connection to the civilian world when I got out. I remember coming back from Southeast Asia through Travis Air Force Base and rapidly changing out of my uniform because that was not a popular thing to be in. Then, when I did my startups in Silicon Valley, I never mentioned my military career except in my first startup, which was kind of a halfway house. So between my military career and entrepreneurship, it was run by a Ph.D. mathematician named Bill Perry, who would eventually become the Secretary of Defense. But after that, they were all commercial companies, and most of the valley at the time did not have non-ex-military folks (at least at non-military companies if you worked for Lockheed, of course), so it never came up.</p><p>Fast forward a quarter of a century, and post-9/11, people started saying, “Thank you for your service.” And I almost fell off my chair. Thank you for my service. Where in the hell were you, like 25 years ago, when that was not something to be proud of? Then I realized that if you hang around long enough, the world kind of goes full circle and that people — certainly post-9/11 — appreciated the value of keeping the country safe and secure. The fact that, as screwed up as some of our policy and civilian decisions have been in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, we’re still the best bet for freedom if we want to live an unencumbered life in a dystopian, totalitarian autocracy. This is our best bet so far, and we ought to figure out how to defend it. At the same time, I always believed that.</p><p>When I was young, we had the draft, which was when, during the war, you had a lottery number, and you got picked, and you went into service, but there was such a counter-prevailing view that that was a bad thing for the country. They ended that. And I’ve just watched that, without any form of national service, this disconnect between the body populace and military — it’s just the gulf has grown wider every year. And in fact, I believe that the gulf has let our civilian leadership make some pretty bad decisions because there was no skin in the game for most of the country. We’ve developed a professional military class with multiple generations following in service, whereas the rest of the country basically got a free pass. I still believe we ought to have national service — not necessarily the draft but some form of mandatory service for 18-year-olds. Whether it’s education or work in hospitals or somewhere else, the fact that you’re part of something larger is, I think, something that most 18-year-olds tend to look for anyway, whether they join gangs or use social media or something else. I think those are actually substitutes, or the military substitutes for something that, at that age, you’re kind of searching for. In lieu of that, we’ve failed to build a single national identity. In fact, we are basically breaking into tribes.</p><p>So with all that, I’ve had a constant belief since getting out of the service that having some type of connection to national interest would be helpful. When I saw the chance to do that with Hacking for Defense, I jumped right at it. And, of course, that intersection of Newell’s work and building probably the most innovative group in the Army, which we’ll talk about later that the DOD tends to kill any innovation organization it stands up just because of the nature of large organizations. But Pete was probably the epitome of innovation and the Army on the battlefield. Joe in Special Forces — I mean, by design, special operators are innovative, or they don’t get to see another day. So that intersection really helped in one way we could deliver. So now we’re touching thousands of students who never would’ve considered some form of service.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: I’d love to hear from you about some of the key things that you’ve learned or that you think stand out in terms of this relationship between Silicon Valley and tech startups and the greater Department of Defense.</p><p><strong>STEVE</strong>: The whole interest in how Silicon Valley got started, and its relationship with the military started when I used to ask my students, “Who started Silicon Valley?” Some of them might say, “Oh, it was Steve Jobs.” It’s like, Oh yeah, he’s a real old guy — this is when he was alive at the time. “Well, think a little more” “oh, maybe the Intel guys, I don’t know. Who were they?” There were some buildings named after them: Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore. Well, they were even older. “Anybody ever heard of a company called Hewlett-Packard?” There were buildings named after them at Stanford, but very few actually knew who these people were. The real history of Silicon Valley started with a set of entrepreneurs. The first company spun out of Stanford was Paulson Electronics in 1909. The area we now call Silicon Valley made vacuum tubes. Lee De Forest, who invented the triode, started in Palo Alto, which was the basis of basically all vacuum tube amplifiers before we had transistors and chips.</p><p>More importantly, during World War II, the US government did something that no other country did. It enlisted civilians to develop the most advanced weapon systems. That sounds insane, even today. Just before the war started, someone named Vanover Bush, who had worked with the Navy but ran engineering at MIT and then the Carnegie Institute and had good connections with President Roosevelt, said to Roosevelt that when World War II comes, it’s gonna be a technology war. Our Army and Navy were not prepared to do that. We had great arsenals that knew how to bend sheet metal — essentially ships and airplanes. But knew nothing about these advanced things like rockets, missiles, physics, radar, and all these other things. His proposal was that civilians ought to be developing those weapons.</p><p>Of course, the military laughed hysterically, patted him on the head, and said, “Don’t worry your little head, we’ve got this.” and Roosevelt said, “No. Bush, you own it. Build the advanced weapon systems and Army and Navy will build the planes, subs, and ships”. The radical thing was that they stood up something called the Office of Scientific Research and Development. OSR&amp;D had 19 divisions or organizations, each focused on a separate military weapons application area. Radar was at MIT, electronic intelligence (ELINT) and electronic warfare (EW) was at Harvard, operations research for anti-submarine warfare was at Columbia and Johns Hopkins, rockets was at Caltech. Pre-World War II, no universities received federal funding; that’s not how they funded research and Development (R&amp;D) inside of a university. For the first time ever, during World War II, they poured the equivalent of hundreds of millions of dollars, in fact, billions across all these research universities, to build these weapon systems. Stanford didn’t get any of this money, except they got $50,000 for teacher training; That’s how much they thought of Stanford’s R&amp;D and Silicon Valley. Except they took the one professor who wrote the textbook on radio engineering at the time, Fred Turman, and made him move to Harvard to run what was called the radio research lab, which had nothing to do with radio research. It was building EW and ELINT for the United States, for the first time, in an industry that never existed.</p><p>To make a long story short, Turman built that from zero to 800 people. When the war ends, he comes back to Stanford to do three things. One is to become dean of engineering. Two is that he swore that Stanford would never be left out again for government research and development money. And three, he started building essentially a weapons systems lab inside Stanford University. And this was, by the way, not some anomaly. Every university after World War II said, “Hey, that government money was pretty good. Thank you; can we have more, please?”</p><p>When the Cold War broke out during the Korean War, from the 1950s all the way through the Vietnam War, every major research university in the United States had essentially a weapons lab. Not a production lab but an R&amp;D research facility. Whether it was rockets, missiles, spacecraft calculations, or working on <em>intercontinental ballistic missile</em> (ICBM) reentry vehicles, these were all doled out to different universities. Turman turned Stanford into the center of excellence for electronic warfare and electronic intelligence. So basically, entrepreneurship and innovation in Silicon Valley started with a professor who turned a second-rate engineering school into a powerhouse in microwaves and electronics. And that’s where it would’ve stood except for another guy in World War II named William Shockley. Shockley basically worked on radar bombing training for what was then the Army Air Force. He then went back to Bell Labs, where he was the co-inventor of the transistor. After that, he was recruited to run the DOD’s Weapon System Evaluation Group and was about to take that job when instead, he decided to found a semiconductor company in Mountain View, California, right down the street from Stanford. While Fred Turman thought that it wouldn’t be Silicon Valley, it would be Microwave Valley, another military guy with a military background started the semiconductor business. So, this is a long, shaggy dog story. If there’s any interest, it’s on YouTube as a talk called The Secret History of Silicon Valley. That’s how the DOD and the IC basically founded Silicon Valley, with a ton of government funding.</p><p>Simultaneously, the other third leg of this story is that in the 1950s, in the middle of the Cold War, the US decided that strategically we needed intercontinental ballistic missiles, and an airplane company in Burbank, California, named Lockheed (that all they knew how to do was make great planes at the time) decided they wanted a piece of the action. Someone else was building the land-based ballistic missiles. Lockheed bid and won the contract for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), but they had no space in southern California. So they moved to a place called Sunnyvale in Northern California, in the middle of Silicon Valley, and they set up Lockheed Missiles and Space Division, which went from having zero employees in 1956 to having close to 30,000 employees 10 years later. In fact, Lockheed, building the Polaris Poseidon and Trident SLBMs, was the largest employer in Silicon Valley for about 30 years. They also got the contracts, first from the CIA and then from the National Reconnaissance Office, to build the first, second, and some of the third generation of overhead reconnaissance stuff, starting with the Corona, Gambit, and Hexagon programs for the imaging stuff and other signals intelligence (SIGINT) and other interesting payloads for overhead reconnaissance.</p><p>None of that was obvious to people who were puttering around with commercial stuff at the time. So, while you had Shockley in the transistor curve going up, building companies like Fairchild and then eventually Intel. Every chip company in Silicon Valley came from Shockley Semiconductor, 65 of them spun out in the next 20 years. At the same time, Lockheed was building up an even more massive workforce for national security, and they kind of evolved in parallel for quite a long time.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: One question that comes to mind when I hear the story, though, is: over time, what changed? Was it just a slow change propagated over years or decades?</p><p><strong>STEVE</strong>: It’s hard to believe, but in the 1950s, 1960s, and even a good chunk of the 1970s, the most advanced technology was developed and procured for defense needs. The only people who could pay for these early transistors and then early integrated circuits were the Department of Defense and, not the DOD directly, but its subcontractors. For example, the first mass use of integrated circuits — people tend to point to the Apollo guidance systems, but actually, it was the Minuteman II guidance system that basically put Fairchild in business, which was one of the first successful semiconductor companies in Silicon Valley. That happened again in vacuum tubes, transistors, and then integrated circuits. Then people were building air-to-air radars and bombing navigation systems, et cetera. Low power, low heat, or low whatever were incredibly useful for airborne systems. So, being able to turn vacuum tube systems into transistors and then into integrated circuits, they would pay anything. And boy, if you’re a founder and you have a customer who says that — in fact, in my career, I’ve only heard that four times: “We’ll pay anything if you could do X.” Those were four public offerings. Three years later, when you hear something like “we’d pay anything if you could solve that problem,” that’s what advanced technology was doing for the military during the Cold War. So, I tell you all this as background: it was the driver of advanced technology until essentially personal computers.</p><p>All of a sudden, when mass markets for electronics came out, the cost drivers for making them cheaper were consumer markets. When PCs were shipping in millions of units rather than the bespoke, exquisite systems that we were building for things in space — missile guidance systems, airborne radars, et cetera — which might have been a good procurement at thousands but typically hundreds, it was the consumer electronics companies. That no longer held true only for hardware; it also held true for software. It didn’t mean that the military companies stopped existing; they were still building exquisite systems, and in fact, I mentioned that my first company in Silicon Valley was this company called ESL. They were building things that are in space or other places today that would still boggle your mind 40 years later. I mean, literally, you’d go, “We did what?” And more importantly, the military would spend dollars on achieving an outcome that no rational commercial company could do. That is, if I wanted to find a signal that was theoretically impossible to find and I threw 40 million dollars of equipment and semiconductors into a configuration that was unimaginable, not only by a commercial company but also by a potential adversary, and then coupled it with the engineering talent of Stanford, MIT, or something else, then yes, those are things today that still the military builds, and their primes and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) could deliver. But for the mass market, that’s how the technology is now being driven by civilian companies.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: One of the topics you bring up is this transition between the DOD being the sole developer and maintainer — really the only customer of these exquisite technologies — and then having to transition to an ideal early adopter type of persona so that way you can integrate this technology that you didn’t necessarily create yourself, yet you could have a strategic advantage by adopting it first. Can you talk a little bit about the challenges you see there and maybe some ideas around potential?</p><p><strong>STEVE</strong>: Number one is an organizational problem: if you try to stand up disruptive innovation organizations or execution organizations — those that do repeatable processes — you will run into this problem. Innovation organizations always die unless they’re strongly defended by being put into law. So, for example, DARPA exists because it exists in law, but organizations like the Rapid Equipping Force, the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, or even the Army’s Future Command all die. They die because most of those leaders have three-year tours. So when it was a hot item for some Secretaries of the Army in one generation, it’s not for the next Secretary of the Army or even the Secretary of Defense.</p><p>Defense Innovation Unit is another example; once you pushed DIU down and it was not enshrined in law, we thought of commercial stuff with the DoD as this pain in the ass to OSR and where China has spent close to a trillion dollars. In the last eight years since we punted it to the side, they’ve raised $900 billion in what are called guidance funds. Think of it as the province’s venture capital funds, and the pro province is equivalent to our states, plus they securitized, which is a fancy word for taking public, all their state-owned enterprises and used the money to pour back into advanced avionics and shipyards. And so they basically used private capital as a force multiplier. We have stiff-armed both venture capital and private capital. And the reason why is, again, that no one in the civilian leadership of the DOD has had experience in private capital, venture capital, or innovation. At the same time, Congress lives in a deep-pocketed democracy that is coin-operated. By coin-operated, I mean there’s a whole street in Washington called K Street full of lobbyists. The people who fund the lobbyist are not startups; they are the existing primes. So if you look at the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and who funds their campaigns, it’s the primes. And the prime contractors have not been told that the world has changed. Primes have a role, but I believe that they have a different role and, more importantly, a different business model that they, in the DoD, need to be figuring out.</p><p>So here you have an organization that needs to execute. Think of it as the DoD part that executes existing doctrine through existing tools, existing training, existing services, and existing operational concepts, but you have a whole other half of the organization that’s building the future. The DoD has no concept of that. Congress has not basically said, “You guys don’t have a model, so we’re going to create one,” or “You guys need a model, and we’re going to force you to have one.” In lieu of that, what we’ve created is an innovation theater that is inside the DoD. A good number of your listeners are probably part of the hundred-plus DoD incubators, accelerators, initiatives, etc. None of them connected together, or only a few of them did. That doesn’t mean that they’re not useful; they’re useful in shaping culture, but the real test of whether innovation and change are happening in the DOD is to take a look at the Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and say, “Okay, who are the new names in the last 20 years that’ve been added?” Not even SpaceX and Palantir make that list. Therefore, we’re doing innovation theater. It doesn’t mean SOCOM isn’t getting innovative devices or that we’re not deploying tools X and Y. But if you want to know if a program is real and whether an organization has bought into it, just follow the money, budget, and authority. But we’ve not built the equivalent of our execution doctrines.</p><p>My original point was designed to take advantage of private capital and external stuff on top of all the great existing assets we have. Most of the primes can’t get paperwork across the Pentagon for less than a hundred million. But when you need systems that could be incredibly cheap, treatable, disposable, and upgradeable, that’s just not an existing concept. It doesn’t mean they’re not capable, but it requires the DoD’s leadership to have a different mindset from top to bottom and for Congress to get aligned on how to do that. These reforms are hard, and the time to want and need them is not when the first missiles start hitting your bases or ships. For innovators, this is pretty obvious. And for people inside the building, whether it is a five-sided whatever or a building without windows, this is really hard to imagine because they have no experience with it.</p><p>In this part of the world and for innovators inside the DOD, this is worse because you could see it, and your leadership might even give you lip service, but then you have to deal with the PPBE or processes designed in the 1960s. Though it was useful in the cult ward when we built all those systems, no one, in fact, figured out, “Well, how are we going to maintain them?” And that’s when we came up with DotMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities). When Packard came in as secretary of Defense, we came up with the 5000.1 series, which actually made acquisition times actually sprayer around even more. But, and just as again, I’ll take a sidebar, people who think that we should be working on reforming the PPBE are actually, I believe, on a major fool’s errand.</p><p>Commercial companies know how to build and buy billion-dollar things without a process that looks like that. The PBE is the world’s largest cover-your-ass thing, without focusing on speed or urgency. We don’t have to invent procurement; in the commercial world, we know how to do that.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: I’ve heard other people talk about it, but I was curious: are you working on an innovation doctrine guide, or do you know of other people working on it? I’d love to hear you elaborate on what that looks like. Is there already a plan to make something like that? And is that something that you’re involved with?</p><p><strong>STEVE</strong>: Pete Newell, who ran the rapid equipping force and is now the CEO of BMNT, and I, along with Steve Spear at MIT, who wrote the High-Velocity Edge book, have all been thinking about this notion that we have all these hundreds of innovation activities, but there’s no playbook. There’s no equivalent to doctrine. And if you’re familiar with doctrine, it goes all the way back to high-order concepts: what is the Army? What’s a joint command? All the way down to how we think about intelligence, fires, operations, etc. Then all the way down to TTPs and field manuals, et cetera. We need the same for innovation. How do we think about innovation? How is this connected to deployment? What’s the difference between demos and deployment? By the way, just as a sidebar, most of the innovation groups inside the DOD, and in the commercial world as well, do demos to impress the general and maybe get some more funding. But in fact, if I asked you, “Well, what’s the color of money, and how are you going to get this deployed to the field? And who’s the saboteur?” Most groups just roll their eyes and say, “I don’t even understand the question.” Well, the goal isn’t to get the generals excited; that is a milestone, but the goal is to figure out how to get to deployment.</p><p>And an innovation doctrine would actually describe both the needs and the strategy, as well as how innovation works to actually get things done with speed and urgency. This would be the equivalent of a playbook that, instead of having the Navy’s 2035 shipbuilding plan in the Army’s 2040 plan, I’m glad we have that, but I don’t think China and the South China Sea are waiting for those plans. I think they’re going to solve the Taiwan Strait problem certainly way before that. So in an innovation doctrine, some of those things might be, How do we deliver things with speed and urgency using Horizon 1, 2, and 3 activities? Horizon One is: how do we make stuff better than we already have in existing organizations? Horizon two is: how do we repurpose some of the things that we’ve built for X and now we need for Y, like putting harpoons on ships or something else? Horizon three is: how do we do disruptive or breakthrough stuff?</p><p>Now, we used to be proud of those, which we called the offset strategies that we did with the Soviet Union. The Cold War people have stopped talking about that because China has done at least five of them to the islands in the South China Sea. Man, that’s a disruptive innovation that’s probably the most expensive one we have to counter, and that required 19th-century dredging ships. That did not require advanced technology; it required dredging ships, and they rolled the dice and hoped we wouldn’t react. But for example, there are asymmetric operations against our carriers with DF-21s and 2026s and their use of hypersonic and glide vehicles. I mean, all of those things are disruptions to existing systems and operational concepts we had put in place. They have basically used offset strategies against us. So what are our versions that we could either quickly deploy or figure out how to get to that don’t require the next two decades and hundreds of billions of dollars? That’s the role of innovators. And it’s not a replacement for the existing long-range programs that we have.</p><p>That&#39;s the thing about the innovation playbook and the innovation doctrine. That is exactly what you need to create an ambidextrous organization. We have doctrine for the execution half. We are in the theater right now for the innovation half. We essentially need a doctrine that ties those pieces together and explains why they interact. Just like we developed joint doctrine to explain how combatant commands work, it’s not just a service showing up; it’s here’s how you interrelate, and here’s who’s in charge, et cetera. Now we need innovation doctrine to say, How do we play not only internally with new things, but how do we get the whole country integrated in this stuff that just simply doesn’t exist?</p><p>The good news is most four-star officers and admirals get this; most innovators on the bottom, whether you’re a captain or an airman, you get it. It’s both the people who’ve been around going, “No, no, that’s not my job, it’s not my MOS,” and “Wait a minute, do I get promoted for this or not? Is this on the promotion board? Is this a question that’s going to be asked on the test, professor?” Or the prime who simply go, “well, that’s not a nerve of financial interest. Why would we be doing that?” And by the way, welcome to capitalism. It’s a good question. No one has gone back to the CFOs of every prime and said, “How do we keep you in business and make you even more money as we reconfigure your business model to deal with this stuff?” That’s all part of an innovation doctrine and playbook. So that’s a long answer to a great question.</p><p><strong>ROB</strong>: Any recommendations or advice to some of those disruptors that are trying to find a way to add to mission value and mission outcomes when they’re surrounded by a system that obviously makes it very challenging?</p><p><strong>STEVE</strong>: Well, the higher-order bid means you can make a difference. You can make a change; you can make the country safer and more secure. If we have to fight a war, we’ve failed. We’ve all failed. I mean, the goal is to deter war like we did for the last 75 years by just making the calculus clear to a potential adversary. So we’re depending on all of you to help do that. Some of the dead ends in helping do that are to proselytize new methodologies. It doesn’t mean you need to convert everybody. Just figure out who you need to convert and what you need to deliver to them. Is it a minimum viable product that you are showing somebody — not just a piece of paper but actually a prototype — or is it to find somebody in some command who might want to grab that idea out of your hand and actually say, “Well, we’ll give you money to do that” over the dead body of your leadership?</p><p>The other thing is to decide whether you’re an innovator or an entrepreneur and what kind of team you need to actually deploy. What I mean by that is that an innovator is somebody who invents something and loves inventing something. The entrepreneur is maybe your partner who figures out this is a product or that this ought to be deployed everywhere. Then maybe there’s somebody who’s great at working the system. So maybe you have a third team member who says, “No, let me tell you about the color of money; here’s where we could get some O&amp;R money, and here’s where it now needs to be in Newark” or, “Raytheon thinks they’re building this well; why don’t we partner with them?” Or “why don’t we start something and compete with them” So, rather than saying, “Hey, look at this neat demo I have,” you should build a team with the goal of getting this into the hands of a warfighter, a war preventer, or someone.</p><p>Want to hear more? Tune in to the podcast episode, where we cover lots more.</p><p>You can also subscribe to Defense Unicorns, a Podcast on <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/future-of-fintech/id1557519332">iTunes</a>, <a href="https://open.spotify.com/episode/0HKyOUUHzT9o14h5FJVpB0?si=mm2RhoHqS7KeH10g6Wby4A">Spotify</a>, or your favorite podcast app.</p><p>Thanks,</p><p>The Defense Unicorns Team</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4fa872959268" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/defense-unicorns/stop-the-innovation-theatre-with-steve-blank-4fa872959268">Stop The Innovation Theatre with Steve Blank</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/defense-unicorns">Defense Unicorns</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Getting the Best Technology into the Hands of the Warfighter TODAY!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/defense-unicorns/getting-the-best-technology-into-the-hands-of-the-warfighter-today-85679d476443?source=rss-1711b5016c9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/85679d476443</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[defense]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[podcast]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Defense Unicorns]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Feb 2023 23:09:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-02-16T23:09:29.939Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://anchor.fm/defenseunicorns/embed/episodes/Getting-the-Best-technology-into-the-hands-of-the-warfighter--Today--with-Michael-A-Brown-e1uud2q">Anchor - The easiest way to make a podcast</a></p><p><em>Listen on iTunes, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app.</em></p><p>This episode of Defense Unicorns is with Michael A. Brown, former director of Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), as he shares the importance of getting the best technology into the hands of the warfighter today before our adversaries. Brown also shares the value that DIU provides and how it has morphed over the years to meet the needs of the defense community. Connect with Michael Brown on LinkedIn to learn more.</p><p>Defense Unicorns, a Podcast, is hosted by<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/robertcslaughter"> Robert Slaughter</a>, Founder, and CEO of<a href="https://www.defenseunicorns.com/"> Defense Unicorns</a>.</p><p>Our guest this week is <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/michaelabrownceo/">Michael A. Brown</a>, former director of <a href="https://www.diu.mil/">DIU, Defense Innovation Unit</a></p><p>Highlights from Defense Unicorns, a Podcast:</p><p><em>This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.</em></p><p>(0:29) What is DIU?</p><p>(5:43) How does innovation scale?</p><p>(14:34) What are potential solutions to increase scale?</p><p>(34:32) What are the biggest gaps in talent within the Department of Defense?</p><p>(48:36) What advice do you have for grassroots innovators?</p><p><strong>ROB:</strong> I&#39;d love to hear in your own words what is DIU?</p><p><strong>MIKE:</strong> The Defense Innovation Unit, DIU, was started by Ash Carter back in 2015, and Ash had the insight, frankly, a decade before, that there was a lot more of the technology that the military needed being developed by the commercial sector than by the defense enterprise itself. And this is a big switch for if you go back and look at the technology the Defense Department was pioneering in the sixties and seventies.</p><p>You know, that&#39;s when DARPA was really doing some of the first thinking about the internet and some of the first experiments there. The Defense Department was basically a first a customer of the semiconductor industry in the late sixties and seventies when we were miniaturizing electronics for nuclear weapons chips being used for the space program.</p><p>So, that&#39;s changed a lot. If we look at the technologies that the defense department needs today, ai, cyber tools, autonomy, that&#39;s all being developed by the commercial world. A lot of it in Silicon Valley, Boston, and other innovation hubs around the country. So Ash Carter had the insight that we really need a way to bring that technology in more easily than we buy aircraft carriers or fighter aircraft.</p><p>We need a group that is focused on that commercial technology, scouting it, and then pioneering some of the ways we can use a; I&#39;ll call it a streamlined or lighter way of contracting for those items and bringing them into the defense department so that we get them into warfighters hands sooner.</p><p><strong>ROB: </strong>So, in terms of DIU scale, because having worked with DIU over the years, the scope and scale of it continues to evolve, and it continues to grow. But it still represents a very, very, very small percent of the defense budget.</p><p>And so, one of the things I&#39;m always curious about and would love your opinion on is how does innovation scale? Is it organizations like DIU growing, or does innovation scale more internal to the program offices and the PEOs, that actually have the majority of funds?</p><p><strong>MIKE</strong>: Well, you&#39;re really hitting on an important point. When I talk about DIU, I&#39;m very proud of what DIU has accomplished, but when you think about it, are we moving fast enough and at a big enough scale? The answer is clearly no. So DIU, with 67 transitions that we have completed, is responsible for something on the order of about $5 billion of contract value.</p><p>Significant because it begins with a B. So not to make light of that, but relative to what the Pentagon has bought in the last seven years, which would be over a trillion dollars, it&#39;s a very small percentage. So I think, frankly, we&#39;re just scratching the surface on what the possibilities could be of bringing more commercial technology into the military.</p><p>It&#39;s really a lot more to go.</p><p>One of the things that we&#39;ve done is recommended a parallel process for bringing in that technology. So what we&#39;ve observed back to the Ash Carter insight is, yeah, it&#39;s pretty difficult to bring commercial technology in because we use basically the same process to bring in you know, an AI software tool as we would to develop a fighter jet which is starting with requirements telling the market what we need, going out to do a competitive selection, which DIU very much supports the competitive aspect, but we use a different contracting mechanism, other transaction authority instead of federal acquisition regulations.</p><p>And the area where we find the most difficult is flexibility in budgeting to get the dollars in place to scale a solution. So we&#39;ve recommended something we call a fast follower strategy, which basically means what we could do so that we have a parallel process. We don&#39;t go through the same process as an aircraft carrier or fighter jet, but we have a streamlined process that will allow us to bring in many more commercial solutions on a timely basis.</p><p>So we&#39;ve made the recommendation that if the Pentagon were to adopt it, we&#39;d be able to go a lot faster. I was very pleased to see that that was part of the National Defense Strategy that was released this past year is a reference to Fast Follower Strategy, meaning it may not be in place yet, but there&#39;s a growing recognition that, yeah, this, this makes sense.</p><p>This would really help us support a growing vendor base for national security and bring in solutions that we get to war fighters&#39; hands more quickly.</p><p><strong>ROB:</strong> And, and you brought it up, you know, this concept of an OTA versus FAR structure, and I know in DIUs case, you know, it&#39;s really a, a CSO model, which is different than your consortium OTA models. And so I&#39;d love to hear from you a little of those differences of why, you know, what is the difference between an OTA strategy versus a far-based strategy and how does DIUs model, which is, you know, CSO focused different than like a consortium model.</p><p><strong>MIKE: </strong>Okay, lots of terms here. Let&#39;s see if we can start and make them a little easier to understand. So in, in 2015, Congress gave the defense department the capability to use Other Transaction Authority, which basically was the same capability they gave NASA in 1958 after Sputnik. And why did they create this authority?</p><p>They basically saw that Federal Acquisition Regulations, which you could think about as something that gets built on over time. And after 40-50 years, there was a lot to the Federal Acquisition Regulations that are ensuring some social goals, making it easy to protest. There are a lot of things that make that a bit more cumbersome.</p><p>You can go fast using the Federal Acquisition Regulations, but that&#39;s not the mode we&#39;re typically in. It&#39;s usually a slower process, more cumbersome because it involves so many more regulations. So Congress was saying to the defense department, just like we asked you to go fast after Sputnik, you can go fast if you can apply Other Transaction Authority to be bringing in commercial goods.</p><p>Congress has been asking the defense department to bring in commercial items as a preference to defense-specific items going back 30 years, all the way to something called Federal Acquisition Streamline Act, something like that. So this isn&#39;t a new idea, but we&#39;ve just been slow to adopt it at the Pentagon.</p><p>So the big difference between consortia and non-consortia, you can apply Other Transaction Authority in two ways. One using a consortium, which basically says, let&#39;s pull together a group of vendors, a set, and we&#39;re gonna have someone manage that consortium. And then it&#39;s a pay-to-play model so that those folks who are part of the consortium have to pay for the overhead of the administrator, the organization that&#39;s coordinating that consortium.</p><p>We are not using that because we think every competition should be open. You shouldn&#39;t be reliant on people who have agreed to pay to play and be part of a club if you will. I&#39;m sure there are some examples of where that can make sense, but for most of the commercial items, we think it should be an open competition and a different set of vendors every time.</p><p>We don&#39;t need to turn to the same consortium because we&#39;re doing everything from, you know, new batteries that we might be converting ground vehicles to hybrid, to AI and cyber tools. So too much variety in the technology we&#39;re bringing to rely on one, a single consortium. So the non-consortium model basically says this, will make public the problem that we&#39;re working on, and then we&#39;ll see which vendors would like to respond to that. We down-select from those vendors who have responded. It&#39;s a very competitive, transparent process, and we work with the DoD partner or customer to do that down-select process.</p><p>And then we&#39;re gonna test those companies who have a solution that we think is gonna work. We&#39;re gonna put a couple of them on a prototype contract, which is called a Prototype OT, a Prototype Other Transaction, and those who are selected for that prototype, to get a prototype contract, have an opportunity to show how they do in a military environment. If that&#39;s successful, then the DOD partner or customer can choose that vendor and immediately scale up, going to production without having to re-compete the contract. So you can go from a Prototype OT to Production OT, so that allows you to go fast.</p><p>Very competitive process, and what I just described is DIUs Commercial Solutions Opening process or CSO, as you mentioned it, Rob. So it&#39;s a, a lot of jargon here, but basically, it relies on the authorities that we got with Other Transaction Authority, thanks to the Congress, but puts a process together around that authority that makes it look like very much like a commercial competition.</p><p>Which is, you know, what I experienced in most of my career working for commercial companies. This is how they select vendors. So we tried to mirror that with an emphasis on speed and try and get companies on contract within 60 to 90 days from the time they might submit a proposal. We make it very easy for companies to submit that proposal.</p><p>They can submit a five-page white paper or a 15-page slide deck that would be the same material they&#39;d put together for any commercial customer they&#39;re pursuing. So we don&#39;t want anything that needs to be custom for the government, so we make it easy to participate, and as a result, For every problem set DIU put out in 2022, 45 companies responded on average, so incredibly competitive, but it&#39;s allowed over a hundred new vendors to get selected at DoD over the time DIU been in business. So we think that really provides the most competitive best value for the taxpayer and gets the, you know, most current, best technology for the application into warfighters hands quickly, we&#39;ll be, we&#39;ll be able to get these solutions into warfighters hands in one to two years.</p><p>And believe it or not, the average of bringing in defense-specific technology is nine to 26 years. 26 years, obviously, for a very complex, you know, fighter jet or aircraft carrier, but nine years for something that is even simpler, like a new rifle. So it, it takes a very long time with the defense department&#39;s processes.</p><p>We could talk about how to improve that, but it&#39;s a, you know, order magnitude improvement to use the Commercial Solutions Opening, or CSO process, and bring out a commercial item.</p><p><strong>ROB: </strong>So you see the Fast Followers, Program Offices, learning the techniques and developing their own acquisition strategies that allow them to go faster, not necessarily increase DIUs budget.</p><p><strong>MIKE: </strong>Well, I&#39;m saying two things here. Frankly, DIU has some sufficient budget now, thanks to the Congress and the appropriations that were just done. We&#39;re actually more limited by billets now. We have the same number of active-duty billets that Ash Carter provided to DIU in 2015. So meanwhile, the organization now has over a hundred projects underway.</p><p>At the time Ash Carter set us up, we probably had just a handful. So tremendous scale, but we haven&#39;t received the manpower increases that we probably would benefit from. But the two things to scale, separate from DIU, getting some more people to help, would be number one, DoD to adopt a Fast Follower Strategy so anyone can use the tools, and we make it a little bit easier to do that. Let me come back to that and give you an example.</p><p>And then the second thing would be we work with more of the PEOs for that to become a normal part of the process. PEOs use to think about their acquisition strategy where they&#39;re turning to DIU.</p><p>So we&#39;re doing that with a grassroots outreach today. And the more that catches on, the more that would, you know, give people the experience of working with DIU and hopefully seeing some benefit.</p><p>Let&#39;s come back to the example of what the department could do for Fast Follower Strategy, that really has a couple of different elements to it.</p><p>And the first one is deciding where in the Pentagon some of these commercial technologies should be procured. We&#39;re not asking for a single organization for all commercial technology. That would be confusing, but for small drones, we shouldn&#39;t proliferate offices across the Pentagon for where those should be procured.</p><p>We should say one branch needs to be the executive agent or control point for that technology. And we&#39;ve been reluctant to do that. And if you think about what&#39;s different than with commercial technology versus defense-specific technology, you know, if, if a shipbuilder has a new idea for a ship or the department asks for a ship, it&#39;s pretty clear that&#39;s gonna be a Navy procurement.</p><p>But small drones, where should that be procured? Everyone&#39;s gonna use that. That could be the Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marines, but we don&#39;t need to. Service-specific items. We don&#39;t want a Marine-specific, Army-specific. That&#39;s the way we&#39;re used to buying things at DoD, is it&#39;s service specific. So many of these commercial technologies are not, so therefore, we need to designate a dedicated organization for the assessment and procurement of that item.</p><p>It&#39;s as true for small drones as it is for satellite imagery. You know, is that the Air Force&#39;s responsibility? Is it Space Force? Is it NGA? Is it NRO? So you have to decide where are these things gonna be purchased. Now, fortunately, the war in Ukraine has simplified commercial satellite imagery, that now is an NRO responsibility.</p><p>But for many of the technologies, we don&#39;t have an executive agent where they should be procured. AI software, and digital wearables, which DIU did a project that allows you as a soldier, as an individual to see if you&#39;re coming down with covid symptoms up to 72 hours before you feel the first symptom.</p><p>But where should that be bought? Where are digital wearables? So the first thing is designating an organization. The second thing is, of course, gathering this skillset to do the assessment in that organization and already having the mindset that we&#39;re gonna need to refresh that technology as frequently as commercial vendors provide upgrades, so if we&#39;re thinking about a fighter jet, you know, we don&#39;t change that very often.</p><p>We don&#39;t upgrade from F 22 to F 35 with the kind of speed we probably would like to have, but we are in control of that. With commercial technology, the DOD is not in control of it. If we don&#39;t refresh that, we frankly are at a disadvantage relative to adversaries who might refresh at a commercial rate.</p><p>It&#39;s taken us 10 years to basically field a drone for the US Army. That&#39;s a small quadcopter. In that 10 years, DJI, the primary Chinese supplier of drones, has been through six or seven generations, and they&#39;re producing their drone for less than 10% of what the Army&#39;s paying for its drone. So we&#39;re not, you know, taking advantage of the trends in the commercial market here to provide the best value for taxpayer and the latest technology to warfighters.</p><p>That&#39;s part of what would need to change.</p><p>In addition to the designated organization getting the skillset that&#39;s assessing on a commercial cycle, we basically need some help from Congress here so that we can buy more things in a current budget year. It takes 24 to 30 months to program a dollar of spending at DoD.</p><p>That&#39;s a tremendous lead time, and that lead time is longer than the commercial cycle of some of the technologies that we&#39;re bringing in. So you couldn&#39;t possibly have specified to Congress, I need this; it wasn&#39;t invented. And now you&#39;ve got a 30-month delay. So part of the fast follower strategy is calling for instead of a program of record, which is basically one requirement, one vendor, and the government buys based on that for 30 or 40 years.</p><p>We need a capability of record, not a program of record, capability of record, like small drones. We know we&#39;re gonna need small drones, but I don&#39;t wanna specify a single model and work with one vendor for 30 years. Technology changes too fast. So Congress, please allocate the dollar value for that capability.</p><p>And then the Defense Department can use that to understand what&#39;s coming out, who are the right vendors to choose from, and change vendors if we need to. So that capability of record would give us the flexibility we need to buy certain capability, not a vendor for a specific requirement, but the best vendor with the most current tech that we could then supply to the warfighters. So it&#39;s that combination of elements that creates the fast follower strategy the, the dedicated organization, the idea that we need to refresh on a commercial cycle, and the budget flexibility to be buying that as the new technology comes out from commercial vendors.</p><p><strong>ROB: </strong>One of the things that I, in my opinion, made DIU and other organizations tremendously effective is by having the ability to take experts outside the traditional DoD ecosystem like yourself and bring them in to provide, you know, different, not only different viewpoints but different types of talents and skill sets.</p><p>Can you talk to us a little bit about where you see the biggest gaps are within talent within the Department of Defense and maybe some of your ideas of how how to close that talent gap?</p><p><strong>MIKE: </strong>Well, you&#39;re right. I think one of the things that has made DIU successful is we&#39;re trying to blend a workforce of active duty military reservists who already have a blended career because they&#39;re spending their day job, maybe working for a tech company and their reservist role in the military.</p><p>You know, helping to support the mission of the defense department, DIU, or elsewhere. We were lucky to have a very capable team of reservists at DIU, and then we have civilian people like myself who spent their careers in the industry. So we&#39;re really blending that workforce together. If you look across the military, you find a lot less of what I just described; you&#39;d find a lot more active-duty folks.</p><p>And maybe reservists who don&#39;t have the benefit of spending their day job in the tech world. I&#39;d love to see a more tech-savvy workforce at DoD. I think that is one of the skills gaps. Another thing we need to do is make sure that those who have specialty skills, like cyber operators, continue to foster that expertise and allow folks to stay in a career track where they can develop themselves. You might know that cyber is not viewed so much as a specialty but part of a general IT background, so someone could be transferred after their three years. The military transfers folks regularly every three years as kind of a rule of thumb. And you might go from being part of the cyber national mission force to being responsible for the IT shop of a platoon, which is not very interesting for someone that&#39;s developed some specialized cyber skills. So we need to think about both. How do we get more tech skills into the folks working in the military? That probably means we&#39;re gonna need to draw on the civilian sector to help support the military.</p><p>And second, for what we have trained the military. We need to help those folks who are interested maintain that specialization if they would like to and not penalize them from a career stand-by, thinking that everyone needs to be a generalist. And that&#39;s very similar to what the private world does with kind of a two-track career program.</p><p>If you went to IBM or Google, you&#39;d find that gee, there&#39;s a way to advance in a technical ladder as well as a managerial ladder. We need that same kind of thinking at the Defense Department. The other thing you could say is I&#39;d love to see more, more fluidity in people being able to go back and forth between the government and private sector a couple of times in their career.</p><p>We would benefit tremendously on both sides, civilian world and military, by that kind of movement. We don&#39;t make it easy for that to happen today. We make it easy for folks in the military, or if you&#39;re a civilian supporting the military, to stay in that silo for a very long period of time. That&#39;s how the benefits and the incentives are aligned, and we make it difficult to go back and forth.</p><p>We would benefit if we created more programs to do more cross-pollination.</p><p><strong>ROB: </strong>This podcast focuses a lot on grassroots innovators. So a lot of the folks listening are, you know, either trying to start their own initiatives or in the middle of the gauntlet of what it takes to innovate within the DoD. What advice or recommendations do you have for folks that are trying to innovate in a system that quite honestly makes it very.</p><p><strong>MIKE</strong>: Yeah, I&#39;d say two things, and I&#39;ve seen this in practice, one persistence. So don&#39;t take the first no as an answer. It&#39;s easier to say no than to sometimes make way for an idea that&#39;s innovative, and then second, go develop some champions and show how it can be done. So you need support. I worked with someone at DIU who said, go where the daylight is.</p><p>If you find one door shut, go to another one. The good news is at the Pentagon, there&#39;s plenty of doors. So look for where you can get some support. And then show your leadership the way, meaning this is how we can get it done easily and within whatever construct that your leadership is concerned about.</p><p>So, don&#39;t take the first no as an answer. Go find a way to make it happen.</p><p><em>Subscribe to Email Option????<br>Keep up with the industry&#39;s sharpest minds right from your inbox.</em></p><p>Want to hear more? Tune in to the podcast episode, where we cover lots more.</p><p>You can also subscribe to Defense Unicorns, a Podcast on <a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/defense-unicorns-a-podcast/id1612914663">iTunes</a>, <a href="https://open.spotify.com/show/1OUXOHlhDPzHkMEEcoT8Tl">Spotify</a>, or your favorite podcast app.</p><p>Thanks,</p><p>The Defense Unicorns Podcast Team</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=85679d476443" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/defense-unicorns/getting-the-best-technology-into-the-hands-of-the-warfighter-today-85679d476443">Getting the Best Technology into the Hands of the Warfighter TODAY!</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/defense-unicorns">Defense Unicorns</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[History of DI2E & announcement of DI2-ME]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/defense-unicorns/history-of-di2e-announcement-of-di2-me-ab650bd953f0?source=rss-1711b5016c9c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ab650bd953f0</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Defense Unicorns]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Oct 2022 15:01:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-09-13T19:17:56.940Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Author: Andrew Roth, Software Engineer at Defense Unicorns</p><p><strong><em>Note: DI2-ME has been deprecated and replaced by Defense Unicorns’ Unicorn Delivery Service (UDS) Software Factory. For more information, please visit the </em></strong><a href="https://www.defenseunicorns.com/uds"><strong><em>UDS information page.</em></strong></a></p><p>Almost a decade ago, the U.S. Government’s Intelligence Community set up a software factory tool stack called Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise (DI2E) and provided it free of charge to any government program that wanted to use it. This was an enormous benefit as it contained many of the capabilities that modern software teams that practice DevSecOps use, such as source code management and version control, automated workflows, issue tracking, documentation repositories, artifact management, code quality analysis, security scanning, and collaboration.</p><p>Over the years, it has been used by every major command, service, and agency in the DoD and the Intelligence Community. It has supported thousands of software development and project management groups and enabled sharing of work and ideas across many efforts that had historically been in isolation.</p><p><strong>And then it was killed.</strong></p><p>We don’t have the full picture of why it was killed; only that politics were involved. What we’re sure of is that an enormous void has been left in its place. Most of the teams and organizations that were using DI2E when it was killed are being forced to independently come up with a “Plan B” with very little guidance and no additional funding.</p><p>In January 2022, in partnership with some of our trusted mission partners, we started building an open source, self-contained, Do-It-Yourself “software factory in a box” that we have nicknamed “DI2-ME”. Our goal is to make it as easy as possible for a software engineering organization to run their own tool stack with capabilities as good as, or better than, DI2Es. While development is still ongoing, a basic functionality threshold has been crossed. We are excited to announce DI2-ME as a Minimum Viable Product (MVP) that can be used to quickly get up and running with one’s own software factory toolset.</p><p>Here’s a quick feature comparison between what DI2E offered and what DI2-ME offers (or will offer):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YqkDCHHEDeXS39x4Fpo_bA.png" /></figure><p>Under the hood, DI2-ME is a Kubernetes-native solution that builds upon Platform One’s excellent Do-It-Yourself Platform as a Service (PaaS), Big Bang. This makes DI2-ME compliant <em>by default</em> with the DoD Enterprise DevSecOps Reference Design, including a Service Mesh and Sidecar Security Stack, full centralized logging and monitoring, runtime security, and sophisticated network routing. Additionally, it builds on Defense Unicorns’ open-source product Zarf, making it deployable across an air gap as easily as it is to a cloud service provider.</p><p>DI2-ME is still rough around the edges in certain areas but has provided mission value to the organizations that are leveraging it. Work is ongoing, and additional open-source contributions are gladly welcomed! Our priority is decreasing the amount of post-deployment configuration needed, with the goal being that our users have full production readiness immediately after deployment. That includes automated backup and restore and full support for Single Sign-On (either username+password+MFA or CAC/SmartCard), plus enough documentation to easily seek an Authorization to Operate (ATO) at whichever impact level or classification that the user needs.</p><p>One important note is that we are <em>not</em> trying to absolve DI2-ME users of the need to understand how the various services, software factory tools, Big Bang, or Kubernetes function. We want to make it easier and faster for Kubernetes-native software engineering teams to support software factories using the tools they <em>have</em> to know (and love) rather than removing the need to learn the underlying technologies.</p><p>Please come check us out! Feel free to “kick the tires” and let us know what feedback you have. We can be found at:</p><ul><li><a href="https://github.com/defenseunicorns/zarf-package-software-factory">The open source repo for the project</a> (there’s an “issues” tab as well as a “discussions” tab for feedback)</li><li>The open-source Kubernetes Slack organization (an invite can be obtained <a href="https://slack.k8s.io/">HERE</a>). We’re on the channel called “#zarf”</li><li>Via email at <a href="/service/mailto:di2me@defenseunicorns.com">di2me@defenseunicorns.com</a></li><li>At this year’s Kubecon! We’ll be hard to miss; look for Doug the Unicorn!</li></ul><p><strong>More Links for reference:</strong></p><ul><li>Defense Unicorns’ open-source Zarf tool <a href="https://zarf.dev/">website</a> and <a href="https://github.com/defenseunicorns/zarf">GitHub repo</a></li><li><a href="https://repo1.dso.mil/platform-one/big-bang/bigbang">Platform One’s open-source Big Bang platform</a></li><li><a href="https://www.di2e.net/">DI2E’s website</a> (while it is still up)</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ab650bd953f0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/defense-unicorns/history-of-di2e-announcement-of-di2-me-ab650bd953f0">History of DI2E &amp; announcement of DI2-ME</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/defense-unicorns">Defense Unicorns</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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