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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by henry on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Henry:The full 2026 roadmap of global mining capital’s（From Indonesia’s nickel ore quota slash to…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@DrHenry/henry-the-full-2026-roadmap-of-global-mining-capitals-from-indonesia-s-nickel-ore-quota-slash-to-0c99582603d1?source=rss-c88c018cb25e------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[henry]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 06:37:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-04T06:37:37.203Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Henry:The full 2026 roadmap of global mining capital’s（From Indonesia’s nickel ore quota slash to Africa’s mining window）</p><p>In February 2026, a notice from Indonesia’s Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources cut the country’s annual nickel ore mining quota from 379 million tons to 250–270 million tons, marking a drop of over 30%. The quota for Weda Bay, the world’s largest nickel ore park, was directly reduced from 42 million tons to 12 million tons, a staggering 71% decline. By mid-May, Weda Bay had exhausted its full-year quota, and the entire production line entered a “maintenance and upkeep” state — the machines were still in place, but the furnaces had gone out.</p><p>This is no isolated industry news. As the furnaces in Indonesia are extinguished, the mining map across Africa is being re-illuminated.</p><p>1. Indonesia’s three consecutive policy cuts and Chinese mining enterprises’ “relocation-style withdrawal”<br>Indonesia’s policy adjustments to the nickel ore industry are not one-off measures, but a series of consecutive moves rolled out within half a year:<br>The first cut is the quota slash. Announced in February and officially implemented on March 19, the approval cycle was changed from a triennial review to an annual approval. The Indonesian Mining Association calculated that a full-load annual operation requires 415 million tons of quota, but the government only approved 250 million tons, leaving a nearly 40% gap.<br>The second cut is pricing restructuring. Ministerial Decree №144, which took effect on April 15, raised the benchmark price correction factor for 1.6% grade nickel ore from 17% to 30%, and for the first time included associated cobalt, iron and chromium for separate pricing. The benchmark price for 1.2% grade hydrometallurgical nickel ore jumped from about 17 USD per wet ton to about 40 USD per wet ton, representing a 132% increase. This caused Huayou Cobalt’s Huafei project to see its per-ton nickel cost surge by 1700–3000 USD, forcing it to shut down half of its production capacity. GEM also put on hold its 1.2 billion USD capital increase plan.<br>The third cut is foreign exchange locking. Export revenues must be deposited in Indonesian state-owned banks with a 12-month lock-up period, effectively putting enterprises’ capital flows under tight control.<br>The reaction from enterprises came far faster than the Indonesian government had expected. In June, firms including Tsingshan Holding and Lygend Resources began inspecting nickel ore resources in Madagascar, Tanzania and New Caledonia. Some nickel smelting projects in Indonesia started to reduce load, with part of the production lines shutting down. Chinese-funded enterprises were even willing to pay 110 million USD in freight out of their own pockets to dismantle and ship away core production processes and equipment — leaving no chance for Indonesia to reverse-engineer and learn their technologies.<br>On September 15, the Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources quietly lowered the pricing coefficient for low-grade nickel ore — a rollback after testing the bottom line of enterprises. It was only when Chinese firms truly started dismantling production lines and halting operations that Indonesia realized: rules can be revised, but if investors are driven away and the mineral resources stay buried in the ground, Indonesia itself will suffer the most losses.<br>Yet by this point, the flow of capital has already turned and will not turn back.</p><p>2. The new mining policy window on the African continent<br>Over the past three years, around 15 African mineral-rich countries have revised their mining laws, established independent regulatory bodies, and comprehensively strengthened government control over mining rights issuance, tax and fee ratios, export control, and the local extension of industrial chains. On September 29, 2026, *World Knowledge* published an article by Sun Hong, Deputy Director of the Institute of African Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, defining this round of adjustments as a “dual logic of resource sovereignty and economic transformation”.<br>Several core threads stand out:<br>Zimbabwe — Africa’s top lithium producer, banned the export of unprocessed lithium ore in 2022, further suspended all exports of unprocessed mineral products in February 2026, and will only allow the export of lithium sulfate starting in January 2027. Thirteen key minerals including cobalt, platinum group metals and rare earth elements will be prohibited from being exported in the form of raw ore from 2027. China Mineral Resources’ subsidiary Bikita Mining plans to invest a total of over 900 million USD by the end of 2027, among which the 400 million USD lithium sulfate project is the largest ongoing construction project. This is not following the logic of “how much ore to mine”, but the industrial upgrading logic of “how many salable products can be ultimately retained from the same ton of ore”.<br>The Democratic Republic of the Congo — the world’s top cobalt producer, suspended cobalt exports in February 2025, launched a quota system in October, and set the 2025 total export cap at 96,600 tons, which is nearly a 50% cut compared to 2024. The 2018 mining law stipulated that the government holds 10% non-dilutable equity free of charge, and in January 2026, it further required mining enterprises to allocate 5% of their equity to local employees.<br>Nigeria — Africa’s largest economy, where solid minerals account for less than 1% of GDP, and a large amount of lithium, gold and bauxite are exported in the form of raw ore. In July 2026, it implemented a ban on the export of lithium ore in raw form, establishing the approval principle of “no processing plant, no mining right granted”. On September 24 during the UN General Assembly, Nigeria and the United States signed a key minerals MOU, covering five major cooperation directions including joint geological exploration, local value-added processing of minerals, introduction of ESG governance systems, and joint construction of a resilient West African supply chain. Nigeria’s mining reform is clearly modeled after Indonesia’s nickel industry local value-added model — but constrained by insufficient power supply, the coexistence of federal and state-level approval processes, and infrastructure shortcomings, the reform is being carried out in a gradual and layered manner.<br>Mali — the 2023 revised mining law stipulates that the state can acquire 10% equity free of charge in new mining projects, and further increase its stake by 20% within two years after the project is put into operation.<br>According to research by the Open Prices organization, if African minerals are processed before export, the continent will achieve an additional 32 billion USD in annual export growth, contributing 24 billion USD to GDP and creating 2.3 million jobs. This is the economic driving force behind African countries’ collective shift to the “mining rights in exchange for processing” strategy.</p><p>3. The synchronous restructuring of logistics corridors<br>As mining capital shifts from Southeast Asia to Africa, logistics infrastructure must keep pace.<br>On August 28, 2026, Ethiopian Airlines flight ET3005, a full cargo plane, landed smoothly at Chengdu Tianfu International Airport. The Boeing 777F operates twice a week, with plans to increase to four flights per week later, offering a single-flight effective payload of 105 tons. Relying on the Addis Ababa hub for transit, outbound cargo can be distributed to key cities in 54 African countries including Lagos, Accra, Dakar, Entebbe and Lubumbashi. Outbound shipments cover new energy vehicles, photovoltaic equipment and lithium batteries, while inbound shipments include African coffee, flowers, fruits and vegetables, beef and mutton.<br>The opening of this route came exactly two months after Chinese-funded mining enterprises began inspecting nickel mines in Africa. The “factory accessories exported by Dongfang Electric” among the outbound goods are not just power equipment exports, but also a leading indicator for the supporting infrastructure construction of mining areas.<br>The Chengdu-Addis Ababa passenger route, opened in 2017, has expanded from 3 flights per week to 6, with the belly cargo volume increasing year by year: 2540 tons of exports in 2024, and 2766 tons in 2025. As the belly cargo capacity could no longer meet demand, the full cargo plane service was launched.<br>On May 1, 2026, China fully implemented zero tariffs on 100% of tariff items for 53 African diplomatic countries. In the first month of the policy implementation, China’s imports from these African countries reached 951.3 billion RMB, a year-on-year increase of 15%. In the first five months, the total China-Africa import and export volume exceeded 1 trillion RMB for the first time in the same period of history. At Shanghai Customs, the value of goods enjoying preferential tariffs exceeded 1.2 billion RMB in just two months, with tax reductions amounting to 120 million RMB.<br>On September 30, 2026, the “Chengdu-Europe-Africa” cross-Mediterranean multimodal transport route made its maiden departure from Chengdu. Exiting the country via Horgos Port, it passes through Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, connects with Mediterranean shipping at the Istanbul hub in Turkey, and finally reaches the Port of Casablanca in Morocco — this is the first multimodal transport route of Chengdu International Freight Trains that extends to North Africa via Turkey.<br>The African aviation market itself is also accelerating its development. From July to December 2025, Nigeria led the top 10 African markets in seat growth, reaching 1.224 million seats, a year-on-year increase of 37%. Murtala Muhammed International Airport in Lagos ranked first among the top 10 busiest airports in Africa with a growth rate of 25.6%. On August 6, Nigeria and Canada signed an expanded air transport agreement, allowing designated airlines from both sides to operate regular direct flights for the first time. The Lufthansa Group also reached a revision of the bilateral air transport agreement with Nigeria, with Eurowings planning to enter the Nigerian market in 2027.</p><p>4. The “aviation code” behind the flow of mining capital<br>Connecting all the signals above:<br>Indonesia’s 34% nickel ore quota slash, Weda Bay’s 71% quota cut → Chinese mining enterprises inspect Madagascar/Tanzania in June → At the African Mining Promotion Conference of the China International Mining Conference in September, representatives from Tanzania, Gabon, Madagascar, Botswana, Sierra Leone, South Africa and other countries attended, with over 200 Chinese-funded enterprises participating → On September 16, the SMM 2026 African Critical Minerals Conference was held in Lusaka, Zambia, with more than 400 industry representatives in attendance → On October 28, MinExpo Africa 2026 was held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, merging MinExpo Africa and MinExpo Tanzania to expand its radiation scope from Tanzania to the entire East African Community → The Chengdu-Addis Ababa full cargo route opened in August → The zero-tariff policy took effect in May → China Mineral Resources increased its 900 million USD investment in Bikita → Tsingshan’s 15-year layout in Zimbabwe, with its Dingsen Steel Project approved as a “Zimbabwe National Project” and granted special economic zone status → Nigeria signed the US-Nigeria MOU during the UN General Assembly on September 24, drawing lessons from Indonesia’s model.<br>For those engaged in cross-border mining investment, the meaning of these signals is crystal clear: Indonesia’s “resource nationalism” cycle has started, and Africa’s “investment attraction window” is opening. But Africa is no paradise —</p><p>5. The window of opportunity comes hand in hand with risks<br>The effective supply of global wide-body cargo planes has a compound annual growth rate of 2.6%, while the long-term average annual growth rate of air cargo volume stands at 4.0%. The first delivery of the Boeing B777–8F has been postponed to 2029, the first delivery of the Airbus A350F has been delayed to the second half of 2027, and the current B777F will cease production by the end of 2026. The active B747–400F fleet has an average age of 25.7 years, and the MD-11F fleet has an average age of 32.0 years. The capacity supply is almost locked in place.<br>This means that as mining capital shifts from Indonesia to Africa, the capacity bottleneck of logistics corridors will arrive even earlier than the mining investment itself. Those who can secure full cargo plane slots at the Addis Ababa hub, pre-book bulk carrier berths at the Port of Dar es Salaam, and solve customs clearance delays at Lagos Airport will hold the throat of Africa’s mining supply chain.<br>At the same time, we must clearly recognize the risk structure in Africa:<br>Political risks — The political stability of Madagascar and Tanzania is far less robust than that of Indonesia, and regime changes may lead to renegotiation of mining agreements. Mali has experienced two coups since 2020, and its mining law has already been revised.<br>Infrastructure risks — The upfront infrastructure investment for mining area development in Africa may account for 30–40% of the total investment. To achieve the annual copper output target of 3 million tons, Zambia’s power utility ZESCO has admitted that it must significantly increase power supply, and is pushing forward a diversified power portfolio covering solar photovoltaic, hydropower, thermal power, energy storage and regional power trade.<br>Security risks — In the first half of 2025, 1383 security risk incidents were recorded in Nigeria, averaging 223 incidents per month. The U.S. Department of State classified 23 states including Borno and Zamfara as “Level 4 High-Risk Areas”. The number of kidnapping cases in 2025 increased by over 70% year-on-year, with foreign nationals becoming high-risk targets. Enterprises that have not conducted security assessments take an average of 72 hours longer to rescue their personnel than those that have completed assessments.<br>Regulatory risks — The new mining policies across African countries share a common direction: strict control over raw ore exports, locking in local shareholding, and exchanging mining rights for processing. This means any investor who tries to replicate the “mine, load and ship away” model in Africa will hit the same wall as they did in Indonesia.</p><p>Conclusion: Indonesia’s nickel ore quota slash is not the end, but the starting point for the reallocation of global mining capital. The African window has opened, but the width of this window depends on whether you can simultaneously solve three key issues: capacity locking, political and business liaison, and security guarantee. The policy cycles of resource-rich countries follow predictable patterns, but no resource country will always be friendly to you. Your sense of security does not come from the promises of any single country, but from the fact that you hold alternative solutions in several resource countries at the same time.</p><p>Author:Mr.Henry (An analyst specializing in Asian business and tech trends, delivery deep insights into aviation, supply chains, and AI computing capacity.）</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0c99582603d1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Henry: Who is quietly reshaping the global supply chain?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@DrHenry/henry-who-is-quietly-reshaping-the-global-supply-chain-bc4965a1516e?source=rss-c88c018cb25e------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[business-strategy]]></category>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[henry]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 26 Sep 2026 09:10:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-26T09:10:40.851Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Behind the dramatic changes in the Asian air cargo landscape in the second half of 2026: Who is quietly reshaping the global supply chain?</p><p>If you have been tracking the capacity allocation data of Asian air cargo in the past three months, you will notice an unexpected phenomenon: The long-term growth rate of global air cargo has been 4% per year, but the annual compound growth rate of the effective capacity of wide-body cargo aircraft is only 2.6%. The supply growth rate is 1.4 percentage points slower than the demand growth rate. This is not a temporary fluctuation — the first delivery of the Boeing B777–8F has been postponed until 2029, the first delivery of the Airbus A350F has been delayed until the second half of 2027, the current model B777F will be phased out by the end of 2026, and the production line of the Boeing 767 cargo aircraft will be completely shut down in 2027.</p><p>What does this mean? During the “vacuum period” of the old and new aircraft models, whoever has the transportation capacity holds the key to the global supply chain.</p><p>I. AI Hardware Investment is Reshaping the Asian-North American Freight Corridor</p><p>The data from IATA reveals a structural turning point: In 2025, AI-related goods contributed 53.5% of the aviation trade volume with only 7% of the aviation cargo volume. In the first half of 2026, global air freight turnover increased by 4.9%, with the Asian-North American route growing by 14.7% in June and 9.2% in July. The institution estimated that the air transport demand related to AI infrastructure in 2026 was approximately 300,000 tons, an increase of about 130,000 tons compared to 2025, providing a static pull of approximately 1.8% on the cargo volume of the Asian-North American route.</p><p>Global semiconductor sales soared by 106% year-on-year in April, reaching the strongest growth rate since 1986. This is not a cyclical recovery of consumer electronics — it is a supply chain reconfiguration driven by AI data center investment. Server racks, precision equipment, high-voltage batteries, liquid cooling modules, these high-value, high-urgency, and vibration-sensitive special goods are replacing low-value cross-border e-commerce packages and becoming the core driving force of the trans-Pacific route.</p><p>Cathay Pacific’s actions confirm this. In August 2026, Cathay Pacific’s cargo load was 151,900 tons, up 8.6% year-on-year, and the cargo load for the first eight months increased by 8.2% year-on-year. Cathay Pacific’s “Special Cargo Transportation” scheme saw the most significant growth — this is precisely the label of AI hardware special goods. At the same time, Cathay Pacific signed a long-term lease agreement for A330F and placed an order for 8 A350F, accelerating the layout of wide-body cargo aircraft capacity.</p><p>China Eastern Logistics’ revenue in the first half of 2026 was 14.253 billion yuan, up 26.62% year-on-year, and its net profit was 1.418 billion yuan, up 10.05%. The company has 20 B777F all-cargo aircraft, 833 passenger aircraft belly compartments, and 17 self-owned cargo terminals. Its network covers 145 countries. It is expected that the number of all-cargo aircraft will increase to 23 by early 2027. The three major aviation logistics enterprises — China Cargo Airlines, China Eastern Logistics, and China Southern Logistics — achieved a total revenue of 37.804 billion yuan in the first half of 2026, up nearly 20% year-on-year, with the majority of the growth coming from international routes.</p><p>Those who are knowledgeable see this: When AI hardware investment generates an additional 300,000 tons of annual air transport demand, while the net increase in wide-body cargo aircraft capacity almost stagnates, the ceiling of freight rates is firmly held. The high value attribute of high-value cargo types (AI hardware) is providing unprecedented resilience support for the freight rates of the Asian-North American route.</p><p>II. A Major Structural Transformation of Trade Structure between China and Africa Behind a Full-Cargo Aircraft Route</p><p>On August 28, 2026, Ethiopian Airlines’ ET3005 full-cargo aircraft landed smoothly at Chengdu Tianfu International Airport. This is the first direct full-cargo route from the southwest to Africa, operated by Boeing 777F, with two flights per week, and will be further expanded to four flights per week. Each flight has an effective payload of 105 tons.</p><p>What is the background for the opening of this route? In 2025, the trade volume between China and Africa reached 348 billion US dollars, growing by 17.7%. On May 1, 2026, China implemented 100% tariff-free policies for 100% of product categories from 53 African countries. In the first month of policy implementation, China’s import from African countries reached 95.13 billion yuan, growing by 15% for nine consecutive months. In the first five months, the total trade volume between China and Africa exceeded 1 trillion yuan for the first time in history.</p><p>Departure direction: New energy vehicles, photovoltaic equipment, lithium batteries — the “new three things” of foreign trade. Arrival direction: African coffee, flowers, fruits, beef and mutton. Relying on the Addis Ababa hub for transshipment, the departure cargo sources from Chengdu can be distributed to key cities in 54 African countries such as Lagos, Accra, Dakar, Ndempé, and Lubumbashi.</p><p>However, the true significance of this route does not lie in the trade items, but in “who is flying” and “why now”. Since its opening in 2017, the passenger route from Chengdu to Addis Ababa has increased from 3 flights per week to 6, and the cargo hold capacity has been steadily rising — 2,540 tons of exports in 2024 and 2,766 tons in 2025. The cargo hold capacity is insufficient, so the all-cargo planes have arrived.</p><p>For shipping business owners and investors, the underlying message of this route is: The logistics infrastructure for the China-Africa supply chain is upgrading from “passenger cargo hold as the backup” to “all-cargo line dedicated guarantee”. This means that the trade volume has crossed the critical point where a dedicated freight route is required. And Chengdu is just the starting point — the first flight carried about 100 tons of goods, including Dell laptops produced in Chengdu, HP laptops from Chongqing, and factory accessories from Dongfang Electric’s export factory.</p><p>III. The “Hidden Supply Chain” of the Southeast Asian Fresh Produce Route</p><p>On September 19th, Wenzhou Airport, in collaboration with Zhongyunda Group and JD Aviation, launched the Bangkok — Haikou — Wenzhou — Shenzhen cargo route. The B738 all-cargo plane operates twice a week, with a maximum single journey load capacity of 22 tons. The first flight carried Thai imported durians, which were cleared at Haikou and then delivered to Wenzhou. The entire transportation time was shortened by over 70% compared to traditional sea transportation plus land transportation.</p><p>This route reveals an overlooked fact: Wenzhou Airport does not have the qualification for fruit import ports. The solution is the “cross-border fresh produce transportation new path” of overseas picking — clearing at Haikou — distribution in Wenzhou, relying on the designated supervision site for inbound fruits at Haikou Meilan Airport for rapid inspection and clearance. Haikou Meilan Airport has cumulatively operated 9 international cargo routes, covering Europe, West Asia, and Southeast Asia.</p><p>The Thai Customs Administration has fully implemented the new e-Import system since 2025, with average clearance delays extending to 3.8 working days (2024 was 2.1 days), and the failure rate of cabin allocation has risen to 17% (especially during the rainy season from June to October). This means: Whoever has the THACO certification for customs clearance and dedicated contact channels at the Thai port can guarantee the delivery of customers’ fresh goods in the 17% failure rate of cabin allocation.</p><p>For those engaged in Southeast Asian fresh produce trade, this is not a logistics news — it is a reshuffling of the clearing qualification shield.</p><p>IV. The “Aircraft Code” of Mining Capital Flows</p><p>In June 2026, Chinese mining enterprises such as Tsingshan Holdings and Liqin Resources began to investigate nickel resources in Madagascar, Tanzania, and New Caledonia. On September 13th, Zimbabwe’s Vice President Chiwenga led a delegation to visit Tsingshan Industry, visiting Ruipulanjun Energy. Tsingshan stated that it has been deeply involved in Zimbabwe for nearly 15 years, covering chromium iron smelting, coke, steel, and lithium ore processing, and the Dingsen Steel project has been approved as a “Zimbabwe national project” and “economic special zone”.</p><p>On September 11th, the 2026 China International Mining Conference African Mining Promotion Conference was held, with representatives from the mining management departments of Tanzania, Gabon, Madagascar, Botswana, Sierra Leone, and South Africa attending, and over 200 representatives of Chinese enterprises participated.</p><p>Looking at these signals together: The nickel mining quota in Indonesia has been reduced from 379 million tons to 2.5–2.6 billion tons (a decrease of over 30%), and the Vedanta Bay quota has been reduced from 42 million tons to 12 million tons (a 71% decrease). Tsingshan Holdings’ Vedanta Bay mining area exhausted its annual quota in May and completely halted production. Huayou Cobalt’s Huafei Nickel Cobalt project partially halted production, affecting 50% of the capacity. Greenemeier officially announced the suspension of all new investment and expansion plans in Indonesia. The mainstream RKEF smelting in Indonesia’s operating rate dropped from 84% to 76%.</p><p>When Indonesian mining enterprises start to dismantle and load ships and inspect African mining sources, what changes will occur in the air freight data? The demand for business class flights from Jakarta to Shanghai will surge in the period of divestment decisions — because the decision-making of senior management regarding fund withdrawals and the scheduling of production line dismantling logistics consume far more resources than regular operations, occupying more business class and premium cargo cabin slots.</p><p>Meanwhile, the launch time of the all-cargo route from Chengdu to Addis Ababa coincides with two months after Chinese mining companies began to assess African nickel mines. The “Eastern Electric Export Factory Components” in the outbound cargo — this is not only the export of power equipment, but also a leading indicator for the supporting infrastructure in the mining area.</p><p>V. The Logic of Winners in the Capacity Bottleneck Period</p><p>From 2026 to 2030, the global delivery of large wide-body cargo aircraft will be 215 units, with 135 units retiring, and the FedEx MD-11F will be re-flown 8 times. The net increase will be only 88 units. The average age of the active B747–400F/BCF fleet is 25.7 years, and the average age of the MD-11F fleet is 32.0 years. The effective supply grows at a compound rate of 2.6% annually, while the long-term average annual growth rate of global air cargo volume is 4.0%.</p><p>This is a hard constraint: Before the delivery of the new generation of cargo aircraft by Boeing and Airbus (the earliest 2027年下半年 A350F， 2029年 B777–8F)， the global supply of wide-body cargo aircraft capacity is almost locked. Whoever has an active B777F fleet in hand， has the pricing power.</p><p>Cathay Pacific has 8 orders for A350F； Air China Logistics has 20 B777F aircraft， and expects to increase to 23 by early 2027； China Cargo Airlines is also on the customer list of A350F. From November 3–5， 2026， the Super Terminal Expo (Super Terminal Expo) will be held at the Hong Kong Asia International Exhibition Hall. Hong Kong International Airport， Wuhan Hubei Wuhu Airport， and YTO Airlines will deeply participate — this is a flagship-level industry gathering for global air cargo digitalization and cross-border supply chain collaboration.</p><p>For overseas business owners and investors， the conclusion is clear： In the next 3–5 years， air cargo capacity is a scarce resource. Your supply chain security depends on whether you can secure stable cargo cabins and customs clearance channels in the context where AI high-value cargo types are occupying the capacity. This is not a logistics issue， but a strategic security issue.</p><p>Author:Mr.Henry (An analyst specializing in Asian business and tech trends, delivery deep insights into aviation, supply chains, and AI computing capacity.）</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bc4965a1516e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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