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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Matthew Gentry, PhD. on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Matthew Gentry, PhD. on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@DrMatthewGentry?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Matthew Gentry, PhD. on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@DrMatthewGentry?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 05:46:41 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[EU Hydrogen Bank Auction results and next steps]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/auxnab/eu-hydrogen-bank-auction-results-and-next-steps-afc94577ce47?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*oTjVUofrfaN-RgW0X2hs_w.png" width="600"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">The first EU-wide auction for the production of RFNBO (renewable fuel of non-biological origin) hydrogen was launched closed in February&#x2026;</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/auxnab/eu-hydrogen-bank-auction-results-and-next-steps-afc94577ce47?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2">Continue reading on European Greentech »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/auxnab/eu-hydrogen-bank-auction-results-and-next-steps-afc94577ce47?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[clean-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[green-hydrogen]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy-transition]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Gentry, PhD.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 30 Apr 2024 12:33:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-04-30T12:33:00.289Z</atom:updated>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Meeting need for more electricity and electrolysis]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/auxnab/meeting-need-for-more-electricity-and-electrolysis-8cfa8686b999?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[renewable-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hydrogen]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[electrolyzer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Gentry, PhD.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 07 Jul 2023 07:55:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-07-07T07:55:41.780Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sometimes you’ve gotta spend money to make money. To reach Net Zero, we have to increase electricity production to reduce GHG emissions. Much of this is to power the rapidly growing need for electrolysers — the powerhouses behind the new hydrogen economy and the key to decarbonising hard to abate industrial sectors.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xyTN2JoIZs5IzJ6B4Vr_5Q.png" /></figure><p>The EU aims to be climate-neutral by 2050 — an economy with net-zero greenhouse gas emissions. This objective is at the heart of the European <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en">Green Deal</a> and in line with the EU’s commitment to global climate action under the Paris Agreement.</p><p>However, this ambitious target cannot be realised without a significant increase in electricity production. To reach Net Zero requires more than 80,000 terawatt-hours of electricity to be generated worldwide, more than three times the amount generated today (BloombergNEF <a href="https://about.bnef.com/new-energy-outlook/)">New Energy Outlook 2022</a>).</p><p>The decarbonisation of the electricity sector is the linchpin of any successful energy transition. Fossil fuel-powered plants still dominate the energy landscape, emitting substantial amounts of greenhouse gases and exacerbating global warming. To reverse this trend, Europe must significantly ramp up its renewable energy generation and decrease its reliance on fossil fuels. Renewable sources such as wind, solar, and hydroelectric power hold immense potential in meeting Europe’s electricity demand while drastically reducing its carbon footprint.</p><p>This means more infrastructure, more renewable or non-fossil energy production and more innovative methods for electricity storage. The driving reason behind this is the need to decarbonise hard to abate sectors such as steel, cement, chemicals, and aviation (due to their reliance on fossil fuels and energy-intensive processes) without relying on increased natural gas and coal usage.</p><p><strong>The need for green hydrogen</strong></p><p>Industry needs to rapidly decarbonise. While progress has been made in decarbonising the power sector and promoting renewable energy adoption, heavy industry remains a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions. By transitioning to cleaner energy sources, implementing energy efficiency measures, and investing in breakthrough technologies like carbon capture and storage (CCS) and green hydrogen, we can pave the way for a sustainable and low-carbon future, ensuring the long-term viability of heavy industry while mitigating the impacts of climate change.</p><p>Crucially, one of the most promising avenues for decarbonising industry lies in the production of green hydrogen. Hydrogen, when produced using renewable electricity through a process called electrolysis, is a versatile and clean energy carrier that can replace fossil fuels in various sectors, including transportation, industry, and heating. However, to harness the full potential of green hydrogen, Europe must scale up its electrolyser capacity, and to do that, the amount of installed renewable energy capacity needs to increase dramatically.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*oOv1gkRDFXxysPeVSzsULw.png" /><figcaption>The basics of electrolysis for green hydrogen. Renewable energy is used to split water into Hydrogen and Oxygen.</figcaption></figure><p>Take for example Hydrogen Breakthrough Ironmaking Technology (<a href="https://www.hybritdevelopment.se/">HYBRIT</a>) demonstration project being deployed in Sweden. This will replace coal-based blast furnaces with direct hydrogen-based reduction technology. HYBRIT will thus demonstrate a complete industrial value chain for hydrogen-based iron and steelmaking. The new facility will be established for first-of-a-kind hydrogen-based direct reduction, with 500 MW fossil-free electrolysis and two blast furnaces will be replaced by an electric furnace. The project, which will The project will produce approximately 1.2 Mt crude steel annually and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 14.3 Mt CO2 over the first 10 years of operation, was one of the first projects to be funded by the EU Innovation Fund scheme.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/880/1*a7Vi-yIT8cDd5ebJzv5e8A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Fossil-free steel production at HYBRIT</figcaption></figure><p>The promise for hydrogen technology is high, but so is the demand. Under a Net Zero scenario, power demand for Hydrogen production is close to 23,000 TWh per year by 2050 and it is estimated that 88% of hydrogen production is achieved via grid-connected electrolysers. <strong><em>That makes hydrogen the single biggest source of power demand globally by 2050, equal to total global demand in 2020.</em></strong></p><p>Currently however, Europe’s electrolyser capacity falls short of the requirements to produce enough green hydrogen to meet the continent’s growing demand. A major bottleneck in this development is securing sufficient renewable or non-fossil energy.</p><p>Take the ambitious Green Hydrogen project being developed in the Sines port region of Portugal. The project is being developed by <a href="https://madoquapower2x.com/the-project/">MadoquaPower2X</a>, a consortium comprised of Madoqua Renewables, Power2X and Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners (CIP) and will produce 500k tonnes of green ammonia per year — one of the first such projects to produce green ammonia on this scale. Running this plant with a planned 500MW electrolyser would require 4.3TWh (if running at 100% 24/7 — the actual amount would be less than this) of energy- roughly equivalent to 2/3 the entire consumption of the city of Lisbon. So this begs the question:</p><p><strong>How much do we need?</strong></p><p>To bridge the energy gap, significant investments are needed to expand electrolyser infrastructure and encourage the widespread deployment of these technologies. Reaching Net Zero Emissions by 2050 requires expanding electrolysis capacity to above 230 GW by 2030, more than 200 times the installed capacity today. At the moment, the amount of committed projects falls far behind this requirement.</p><p>At the end of 2022, there was 700MW of electrolyser capacity deployed world wide, but over 230 GW worth of electrolysers has been announced to be operational by 2030 (<a href="https://hydrogen-central.com/hydrogen-council-hydrogen-insights-2023/">Hydrogen Insights May 2023</a> — Hydrogen Council &amp; McKinsey). Over 80GW of this has been announced within Europe, which is the single largest region, but so far <strong>only 1.5GW of this has reach final investment decision (FID). Worldwide, this figure is only 9GW.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9dFqHLrckmRlA3KCV-9ELQ.png" /><figcaption>Installed electrolyser capacity and the amount of committed projects (reached FID) falls far below the need by 2050.</figcaption></figure><p>The announced amount is in line with the Net Zero requirement for 2030 (estimated at 233GW by IRENA), but to reach the ultimate goal by 2050, this needs to increase massively to 5,722 GW of electrolyser capacity. So in one sense, it would look like the world is on course, but only is those announced projects are committed to with sufficient investment, and only is the number of projects grows significantly.</p><p>By 2050, we the world needs 35 339 GW of total installed renewable energy capacity, growing from just 2,813 GW (as calculated in 2020) (IRENA — <a href="https://www.irena.org/Publications/2023/Jun/World-Energy-Transitions-Outlook-2023">World Energy Transitions Outlook</a>). This means adding 1,066 GW of new renewable capacity every year until 2050.</p><p>The total requirement for electrolysers would take up around 16% of this renewable energy, however, only around 2/3 of the announced hydrogen production will be green (renewable), with the remainder being ‘low-carbon’ hydrogen (<a href="https://hydrogen-central.com/hydrogen-council-hydrogen-insights-2023/">Hydrogen Insights 2023,</a> Hydrogen Council &amp; McKinsey).</p><p><strong>Does it need to be renewable electricity?</strong></p><p>The need for renewables is clearly a bottleneck in terms of electolyser deployment. Is it possible therefore to utilise other forms of energy to power the required 5,722 GW of electrolysers by 2050.</p><p>Increasing fossil fuel usage is clearly not an option here is we want to lower emissions, but there are two others — carbon capture from natural gas plants, and nuclear. Carbon capture of otherwise grey hydrogen (that is hydrogen produced with natural gas) would be termed blue hydrogen. This option is less than optimal, as rates of carbon capture can be low, and fugitive emissions from the natural gas process means that significant amounts of GHG are still emitted, but the IEA estimate that by 2050, 38% of low-carbon hydrogen production will still be produces through natural gas with CCUS (Net Zero by 2050 —<a href="https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/deebef5d-0c34-4539-9d0c-10b13d840027/NetZeroby2050-ARoadmapfortheGlobalEnergySector_CORR.pdf"> A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector</a>). Although blue hydrogen has been touted by some as greenwashing, it appears to be a necessary step especially in the short term transition of many hard-to-abate industrial sectors as we have <a href="https://medium.com/auxnab/blue-hydrogen-is-it-green-or-grey-ab5cece4abe0">discussed here</a>.</p><p>Nuclear power is seen by many as one of these essential tools in reducing emissions, but as a dangerous alternative by many others who don’t want to see the focus and investment drain away from other renewable energy sources. In terms of practicality however, given the speed at which we must deploy electrolysers to decarbonise industry, nuclear remains a part of all Net Zero models and therefore remains a tool that must be used to reach these targets as we discussed in an <a href="https://medium.com/auxnab/the-role-of-nuclear-power-in-transitioning-to-net-zero-5d02eeaf262b">earlier article</a>.</p><p><strong>The need for energy storage</strong></p><p>Of course, along with the need for increased electricity production comes the need to store it, especially when it is being produced by intermittent energy sources such as wind and solar. Electrolysers are being developed that can handle ramping up and down of operations in response to varying power input from renewable sources, but long duration energy storage is another infrastructure development that must go hand in hand with the increased electricity production.</p><p>Increasing electricity production and expanding electrolyser capacity go hand in hand. Renewable energy sources, like wind and solar, produce electricity intermittently, and their availability does not always align with energy demand. By utilising excess renewable electricity to power electrolysers, Europe can convert it into green hydrogen, effectively storing and utilising clean energy even during periods of low demand. This process, known as Power-to-X, can help balance the grid and ensure a stable and reliable energy supply.</p><p>Power-to-X solutions however, are useful only for seasonal energy storage, not for responding to variations of hours to days without energy production. Batteries are one promising solution for this, and not the large scale lithium deployments that you might be thinking of. Long term energy storage in novel battery systems might unlock the key to more sustainable and effective renewable energy storage, to be dealt with in an upcoming article.</p><p><strong>Final thoughts</strong></p><p>By scaling up electrolyser capacity, Europe can unlock the true potential of green hydrogen, which not only enables the decarbonisation of multiple sectors but also provides a versatile long duration energy storage solution for intermittent renewable sources like solar and wind power. The deployment of electrolysers goes hand in hand with the deployment of renewable energy, both of with face bottlenecks and are lagging behind the requirements for Net Zero by 2050.</p><p>Government support, especially in Europe, is not sufficient and is required to de-risk these large scale projects for private investors. At the other end of the value chain, off-take commitment is also lacking, with many hydrogen off-takers unwilling to commit to ‘green premiums’. Even once this demand is firmly in place, broader infrastructural changes are needed to ensure transport and delivery of green hydrogen to the off-taker.</p><p>It is a complex and daunting problem, but with the momentum picking up behind hydrogen energy, one that is no longer insurmountable, so long as the stakeholders can commit to, and deliver on their announced plans.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8cfa8686b999" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/auxnab/meeting-need-for-more-electricity-and-electrolysis-8cfa8686b999">Meeting need for more electricity and electrolysis</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/auxnab">European Greentech</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Sovereignty, Brexit, and Control of What Exactly?]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/@DrMatthewGentry/sovereignty-brexit-and-control-of-what-exactly-26d459b33ced?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1920/1*l9QbFum3xBRnaBKalm1KKQ.jpeg" width="1920"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/@DrMatthewGentry/sovereignty-brexit-and-control-of-what-exactly-26d459b33ced?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2">Continue reading on Medium »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/@DrMatthewGentry/sovereignty-brexit-and-control-of-what-exactly-26d459b33ced?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sovereignty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-kingdom]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[question-time]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Gentry, PhD.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Jun 2023 13:08:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-23T07:38:48.161Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[We need a safe way to store nuclear waste]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/illumination/we-need-a-safe-way-to-store-nuclear-waste-8a181a100eba?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8a181a100eba</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sustainability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[renewable-energy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Gentry, PhD.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Nov 2022 16:30:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-07T16:30:31.577Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*_tyooyZCp0-6pUK-3aJqaQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://media.discordapp.net/attachments/1009373783561351198/1039187758205386902/Auxn_barrels_of_nuclear_waste_stored_underground_in_a_huge_cave_8a39908d-514c-46b3-a8c8-fa61c76495e6.png">Midjourney</a></figcaption></figure><p>All net-zero scenarios see a role for nuclear power, but we still don’t know how to store the waste.</p><p>Recent reports by the <a href="https://www.unep.org/emissions-gap-report-2022">United Nations</a> and <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2022/executive-summary#abstract">International Energy Agency (IEA)</a> have both shown that the window for keeping global warming below 1.5C is becoming vanishingly thin. If we are to avoid a climate catastrophe, we need to use all means at our disposal to abate greenhouse gas emissions. For better or for worse, nuclear power is one of those tools. I have covered the arguments for and against nuclear power, including the debate in the European Union around its inclusion as a “sustainable” fuel in more depth <a href="https://medium.com/auxnab/the-role-of-nuclear-power-in-transitioning-to-net-zero-5d02eeaf262b">in another article</a>.</p><p>The summary is that the EU has included nuclear power in its list of sustainable fuels (in the EU Taxonomy). In doing so, the EU identified that nuclear is needed to reach net zero carbon emissions, but stated that it can only be regarded as “doing no significant harm” if it can be shown that the high-level waste from nuclear power plants can be safely disposed of. To this day, no one has shown that to be possible.</p><p>The only long-term solution that is considered safe and effective is to bury the waste in deep geological repositories, safely behind clay, rock salt, and granite that should provide a stable structure for millennia to come.</p><p>There are currently two such projects in development, in France and Finland.</p><p>France is already attempting to demonstrate more effective nuclear decommissioning at its Chooz A reactor, which was shut down in 1991. The dismantling of the rest of Chooz A began in 2007, after it received legal permission from the state, and is due to be completed by 2024, at a total cost of €500 million. But the most hazardous waste removed from the site will remain radioactive for centuries to come, and perhaps millennia.</p><p>France has identified a site 300km east of Paris in which to entomb the radioactive waste in a network of tunnels 500 meters below ground. This project has been running for 25 years and cost €2.5 billion so far.</p><p>In Finland, they aim to bury radioactive waste in copper tubes in a tomb 1,400 feet below the granite bedrock in Olkiluoto island. The burial site is expected to begin operation in 2023.</p><p>The problem is that <strong>no one has been able to demonstrate the safe burial of radioactive waste</strong>. The US has come close with a $15 billion project to bury waste beneath Yucca Mountain in Nevada, however, this was eventually abandoned in the face of intense and sustained public backlash.</p><p>I’m not an advocate for nuclear power. In all honesty, I would be happy if we didn’t need it at all, but if it was ever possible to reach Net Zero with (non-nuclear) renewable energy alone then it appears that ship has sailed, and it’s sadly still burning bunker fuel instead of green methanol.</p><p>I am, however a realist and I can only go on the best available data. <a href="https://medium.com/auxnab/the-role-of-nuclear-power-in-transitioning-to-net-zero-5d02eeaf262b">In another article</a>, I look more into the numbers behind both the International Energy Agency (IEA) and BloombergNEF Road maps to Net Zero. Both show Nuclear energy as having at least an equal share of the future energy supply as it has today. In real terms, this means an increase as our total energy needs globally will also increase. In fact, in the IEA’s report, to reach Net Zero, we must increase nuclear power as a share of total energy.</p><p>Why do we need nuclear power? Because we can’t produce enough electricity with renewables alone. Why will electricity usage increase? Because as well as increases in general energy consumption, there is a huge demand for electrolyzers on the horizon, electrolyzers that are needed to split water and fuel the hydrogen economy. Without these, we can’t create green fuels like e-methanol, green ammonia, green ethanol, or replacement chemicals for hard-to-abate sectors like the chemical industry.</p><p>Nuclear evangelists who somehow think that nuclear is a panacea that will save them from the difficult road to Net Zero ahead are going to be disappointed: we still need all of the other measures as well, we still need the wind farms and solar parks, the batteries, and electronic vehicles, we are at a point now where we need every tool available. Nuclear is not your easy way out to maintain business as usual.</p><p>It is however going to be needed for 10% of our global electricity supply if we want to hit net zero targets. Otherwise, we must weigh the damage caused by climate change against the risk of nuclear waste. Under the EU Taxonomy, for nuclear to count as sustainable, it must be shown that the high-level waste can be safely stored or disposed of. Currently, this is unproven and they are gambling on the premise that the stringent requirements of the Taxonomy definition will force new developments to follow the very highest standards and ensure that no harm is done to the environment from nuclear waste.</p><p>The increased use of nuclear energy seems inevitable at this point, both in terms of its necessity as a significant share of the energy mix in all Net Zero scenarios, but also in political terms, with governments pushing for investment in nuclear energy (see for example the new Swedish government or the positioning of the Conservative government in the UK). With this inevitability, stringent oversight is imperative. As the UN and IEA have highlighted in their recent reports, we are at a crucial point in time and must use every tool available to us to avoid climate catastrophe. For better or for worse, nuclear power is one of those tools. The rest of us must hope that it is possible to do so safely and pressure policymakers to use it sparingly and with great caution.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8a181a100eba" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/illumination/we-need-a-safe-way-to-store-nuclear-waste-8a181a100eba">We need a safe way to store nuclear waste</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/illumination">ILLUMINATION</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Role of Nuclear Power in Transitioning to Net Zero]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/auxnab/the-role-of-nuclear-power-in-transitioning-to-net-zero-5d02eeaf262b?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5d02eeaf262b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[eu]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[renewable-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Gentry, PhD.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 31 Oct 2022 08:55:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-10-31T08:55:47.069Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KZok-L64A4ZkAWvmCcOOxg.png" /></figure><p>With the time remaining to reverse a climate catastrophe running out, was the European Union right to declare Nuclear Energy as sustainable?</p><p>Recent reports by the UN and International Energy Agency (IEA) have both shown that the window for keeping global warming below 1.5C is becoming vanishingly thin. If we are to avoid a climate catastrophe, we need to use all means at our disposal to abate greenhouse gas emissions. Nuclear power is seen by many as one of these essential tools in reducing emissions, but as a dangerous alternative by many others who don’t want to see the focus and investment drain away from other renewable energy sources. This is often viewed as a political decision; in Sweden, the recent election of the right-wing coalition to government came with a drive for new nuclear power; similarly, in the UK, the Conservative Party (particularly under the dismally short-lived lurch to the economic right under Liz Truss) came with promises of nuclear power, dismissing all opposition to it as “anti-growth”. The decision, however, should not rest in political posturing in either direction — we are now at the point where pragmatism is what matters; we no longer have the luxury of proselytising. We need to look at the data and make an informed decision.</p><p>Earlier this year, the EU included nuclear power in the EU taxonomy, its classification of environmentally sustainable economic activities. The decision sparked a lot of resistance from climate campaigners among others as a cynical move. Here, we will look at the projections for net zero, the risks around nuclear energy, and whether the EU was cavalier in promoting the use of nuclear power as a sustainable energy source.</p><p><strong>What is the EU taxonomy?</strong></p><p>Essentially it is a means to direct investments towards sustainable projects and activities. Doing so requires that a common language and clear definition of what is ‘sustainable’ are used. According to the European Commission, the EU must invest an additional €350 billion per year this decade in order to reach its 2030 climate targets. Therefore, the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/sustainable-finance-renewed-strategy_en">European Commissions action plan on financing sustainable growth</a> called for the creation of a common classification system for sustainable economic activities, or an “EU taxonomy”. Activities listed under this taxonomy will be eligible for investment under different sustainable schemes. The taxonomy is led by six main objectives:</p><ul><li>climate change mitigation climate change adaptation</li><li>sustainable use &amp; protection</li><li>circular economy</li><li>of water &amp; marine resources</li><li>pollution prevention &amp; control protection and restoration</li><li>of biodiversity &amp; ecosystems</li></ul><p>The inclusion of nuclear and natural gas in the EU taxonomy was met with heated resistance. On July 6th, 2022, the EU Parliament <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220701IPR34365/taxonomy-meps-do-not-object-to-inclusion-of-gas-and-nuclear-activities">rejected the motion</a> to oppose the inclusion of nuclear and gas as environmentally sustainable economic activities.</p><p>The WWF accused the EU of <a href="https://www.wwf.eu/?7016216/European-Parliament-to-pull-the-trigger-on-the-inclusion-of-fossil-gas-and-nuclear-power-in-EU-Taxonomy#:~:text=The%20development%20of%20the%20EU,late%20on%2031%20December%202021.">greenwashing,</a> stating:</p><blockquote>“Labeling fossil gas and nuclear power as green in the EU Taxonomy could take away billions of euros of investments from renewable energy and green technologies.”</blockquote><p>The inclusion of Natural gas in the EU taxonomy was particularly galling to most, especially given how the invasion of Ukraine has highlighted our dependence on imported Russian gas and the long overdue need to wean ourselves off it. It was, however, a package deal, and that in itself was a major issue with the change, though not the one being addressed here.</p><p>The accusation comes because although nuclear does not contribute significant CO2 emissions, it is famously regarded as an unsafe, harmful power source.</p><p><strong>Do no significant harm</strong></p><blockquote>“For an activity pursuing one or more of the six objectives to qualify as sustainable it cannot cause significant harm to any of the other Taxonomy objectives.”</blockquote><p>This phrase is embedded in the requirements for the EU taxonomy. The ‘do no significant harm’ principle put simply states that no activity under the taxonomy that contributes to one of the six objectives above can lead to significant harm to any of the other five objectives. So, a project that contributes to climate mitigation (objective 1) does not fit the taxonomy if it also causes pollution (objective 5).</p><p>And herein lies the rub. Nuclear power does not have a carbon footprint, but famously produces highly toxic radioactive waste that can persist for thousands of years. I come from Cumbria, the picturesque north-west county in England where I know this only too well. Hidden away from the rolling hills that inspired Wordsworth, there exists a clean-up operation the size of a small town. The Sellafield nuclear power facility was shut down in 2003 but remains the county’s biggest employer as it undergoes a 100-year long clean-up operation, expected to cost upwards of £90 billion. This is because it houses the largest stock of untreated nuclear waste on earth, including 140 tonnes of plutonium. There have been several reports of waste leaking to the surrounding environment, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/jul/29/undersea-nuclear-waste-dump-off-cumbria-risks-harm-to-marine-life-experts-warn#:~:text=In%202019%2C%20radioactivity%20leaked%20into,radioactive%20waste%20across%20the%20UK.">including recent concerns about marine life in the area</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*ek4NEkp42PTje3gqKgoA6Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Sellafield, UK, where a century-long clean-up operation is underway. Source: <a href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0b/Aerial_view_Sellafield%2C_Cumbria_-_geograph.org.uk_-_50827.jpg">wikicommons</a></figcaption></figure><p>Sellafield’s nuclear processing began in 1956. Surely, we have learned some lessons on safe nuclear storage in the last 70 years?</p><p>The <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/210329-jrc-report-nuclear-energy-assessment_en.pdf">EU Commission’s own subgroup of experts, the Joint Research Council (JRC) disagrees</a> stating:</p><h4>“Safe and secure long-term storage of nuclear waste remains unresolved and has to be demonstrated in its operational complexity.”</h4><p>In other words, a ruling that nuclear power does not “do significant harm” under the EU taxonomy’s own criteria, requires that there be safe storage already in place. So, what is the current state of nuclear storage technology?</p><p><strong>Storing nuclear waste</strong></p><p>Under the European Commission’s ruling, nuclear power is considered as sustainable if member states can prove they can safely dispose of the waste. Part of the assessment of for the EU taxonomy includes a technical screening, one criteria of which states <strong>that a technology cannot be considered eligible or aligned if the technology has not been proven </strong>to be sustainable as a whole.</p><p>In a technical assessment of nuclear energy with respect to ‘do no significant harm’ the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/210329-jrc-report-nuclear-energy-assessment_en.pdf">JRC also took the view in 2021</a> that:</p><blockquote>“A combination of temporary storage plus permanent disposal in geological formation is the most promising, with some countries leading the way in implementing those solutions. <strong>Yet nowhere in the world has a viable, safe and long-term underground repository been established.</strong> It was therefore infeasible for the Technical Expert Group to undertake a robust DNSH [Do No Significant Harm] assessment as no permanent, operational disposal site for <strong>High Level Waste</strong> exists yet from which long-term empirical, in-situ data and evidence to inform such an evaluation for nuclear energy.”</blockquote><p>To explain the term “high-level waste” above, nuclear power produces mainly low-level radioactive waste, for which there are disposal facilities that have operated for decades, while high-level radioactive waste accounts for 1% of total nuclear waste. It is the disposal of this 1% that is in question.</p><p>The Taxonomy rules state that Member States should have in place a detailed plan to have a high-level waste disposal facility in operation by 2050 in order to meet the requirements (with disposal of low-level waste already being operational).</p><p>The only long-term solution that is considered safe and effective is to bury the waste in deep geological repositories, safely behind clay, rock salt, and granite that should provide a stable structure for millennia to come.</p><p>There are currently two such projects in development, in France and Finland.</p><p>France is already attempting to demonstrate more effective nuclear decommissioning at its Chooz A reactor, which was shut down in 1991. The dismantling of the rest of Chooz A began in 2007, after it received legal permission from the state, and is due to be completed by 2024, at a total cost of €500 million. But the most hazardous waste removed from the site will remain radioactive for centuries to come, and perhaps millennia.</p><p>France has identified a site 300km east of Paris in which to entomb the radioactive waste in a network of tunnels 500 meters below ground. This project has been running for 25 years and cost €2.5 billion so far.</p><p>In Finland, they aim to bury radioactive waste in copper tubes in a tomb 1,400 feet below the granite bedrock in Olkiluoto island. The burial site is expected to begin operation in 2023.</p><p>The problem is that <strong>no one has been able to demonstrate the safe burial of radioactive waste</strong>. The US has come close with a $15 billion project to bury waste beneath Yucca Mountain in Nevada, however, this was eventually abandoned in the face of intense and sustained public backlash.</p><p>So, the debate comes down to whether the storage and disposal facilities <em>to be developed</em> will be sufficient to <em>do no significant harm. </em>Although technically, the technology has not yet been demonstrated, the Commission is banking on the procedures they have put in place to be stringent enough to ensure that no harm is done.</p><p>The reviews of the JRC technical assessment by Member States’ experts concluded that compliance with the safety standards and waste management requirements under the regulatory framework in EU Member States will ensure a high level of protection for the environment and for people.</p><p>For nuclear energy activities to be enlisted under the taxonomy, the screening criteria set requirements beyond the existing regulatory framework; for instance, sunset dates for accelerating transition to advanced technologies, and definite dates for operational disposal facilities to be in place.</p><p>The Commission has concluded that:</p><blockquote>“Subject to strict safety and environmental conditions (including on waste disposal) that ensure the respect of the do no significant harm principle, can play a role in the transition towards climate neutrality in line with the European Green Deal.”</blockquote><p>The transition aspect here is important. Along with the strict disposal requirement, the Commission has stated that nuclear will only be considered green if it is used as a <strong>transition fuel </strong>to enable the shift away from dirtier fossil fuels such as coal and oil.</p><p>Does this mean that we have to have nuclear in order to transition to a net zero scenario?</p><p><strong>Current nuclear power in the EU</strong></p><p>Nuclear plants generated around 24.6 % of the total electricity produced in the EU in 2020, but this is a decrease of 25% since 2006. All in all, 13 EU countries have operational nuclear reactors: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Spain, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/696/1*cq4IlCNoDNfVkgg6QVFS-g.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Nuclear_energy_statistics">Eurostat</a></figcaption></figure><p>One should also consider how resources vary on a country-by-country level. In Czechia for example, there are limitations to the amount of renewable energy that can be implemented. As a landlocked country, Czechia doesn’t have the options for offshore windfarms. It also doesn’t have the ample space for solar farms, or the hydroelectric opportunities of say Norway. Therefore, nuclear power has formed part of the national energy strategy. With the need to wean off fossil fuels, what are the other options for them to transition to a green economy?</p><p><strong>Do we need nuclear power?</strong></p><p>Just as the call for nuclear to be regarded as sustainable has been met with fierce opposition, it has also been lauded, particularly in those member states who have always supported its use. There are many who say that we simply cannot achieve our climate goals without it.</p><p>The International Energy Agency (IEA) <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/nuclear-power-in-a-clean-energy-system">paints a picture</a> of a net zero future that relies on at least some nuclear power and recommends several policies for governments to ensure existing nuclear power plants can operate as long as they are safe.</p><h4>“Alongside renewables, energy efficiency and other innovative technologies, nuclear can make a significant contribution to achieving sustainable energy goals and enhancing energy security.”</h4><p>— Fatih Birol, Executive Director, IEA</p><p>The nuclear plants in advanced economies are 35 years old on average, with many nearing the end of their designed lifetimes. The IEA estimates that failing to replace these aging plants will result in a “nuclear fade” where the total amount of power produced from nuclear energy will fall to just 16% of current levels by 2040 in the EU.</p><p>Many would see this as a good thing of course. In a nuclear fade scenario, further investment would be required in wind and solar energy (around €1.6 trillion worldwide) to fill the gap. This would increase the already high demand expected for energy storage, which we will deal with in a future article.</p><p>In a separate report, BloombergNEF puts forward three future energy scenarios, Green (renewable energy), Grey (natural gas), and Red (nuclear power). Under their Green Scenario 505GW of new wind and 455GW of new solar need to be every year to 2030. For perspective, this is over 5.2-times the amount of wind capacity added in 2020, and 3.2-times the amount of solar.</p><p>Under this scenario, hydrogen, carbon capture and storage (CCS) and new nuclear technologies do not play a meaningful role in the 2020s, but scaling all three is still critical through the next decade to prepare for the 2030’s as 1.9TW of electrolysers need to be deployed by 2030 to kickstart the hydrogen sector. In the Red Scenario, hydrogen fuel production is led by nuclear power, with the first small modular nuclear reactors coming online by 2027. By 2050, there would be over 7TW of nuclear capacity under the Red scenario. This is around 19-times the nuclear power capacity installed globally today and would account for 56% of energy production.</p><p>It should be noted, that even under the Green scenario, BloombergNEF estimate that nuclear energy accounts for 2% of total energy production, which would remain roughly unchanged as a share of the total from today, however even this would require building new facilities as the total energy requirement, particularly in electricity use which is what almost all nuclear power is used for, will also increase in this period.</p><p>The <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2022/executive-summary#abstract">latest report by the IEA</a> confirms this maintenance of total energy share. Under their scenarios whereby governments follow their stated policies, or more ambitiously, reach all their announced pledges (both of which are not sufficient to limit global heating to 1.5C by 2050), nuclear maintains a 10% share of electricity generation. This would require adding 120 GW of new nuclear capacity by 2030 as well as adding 300 GW worth of new reactors between 2030 and 2050 in over 30 countries (approximately 75% more than current capacity).</p><p>To reach the more ambitious Net Zero requirements, and to limit global warming to 1.5C by 2050, the IEA calculates that we need to double our nuclear capacity worldwide by 2050.</p><p><strong>Should nuclear count as sustainable under the EU?</strong></p><p>The debate around the use of nuclear power comes down to a few key questions:</p><p><em>Is it safe</em>?</p><p>Potentially. The argument is that the requirements needed to be part of the EU taxonomy are strong enough that nuclear power will do no significant harm. In other words, the high-level waste will be safely stored. This, however, is as yet unproven. It will be up to all stakeholders, including the EU, to ensure that disposal happens exactly according to the stringent requirements stated in the Taxonomy.</p><p><em>Is it needed?</em></p><p>It would seem so. Even the most optimistic Green energy scenarios require at least maintaining the current level of nuclear power as a proportion of total energy usage, which involves extending the lifespan of the older facilities and adding new facilities. If it is needed, then at least the inclusion in the EU taxonomy should ensure that the stringent disposal requirements are met. However, it can remain at a minimal level, accounting for only 2% of total energy sources.</p><p><em>Will it detract from other renewable energy investment?</em></p><p>A major criticism was that the investment in nuclear will take away investment in other renewables. However, several financial institutions including the European Investment Bank, the EU’s lending arm, have already said they are likely to ignore the gas and nuclear designation. This means that EU funds, such as the €10 billion Innovation Fund, are unlikely to be used for nuclear projects.</p><p><em>But is it really safe?</em></p><p>There is another consideration here that I have not touched on. The invasion of Ukraine has also highlighted the strategic weaknesses of having a nuclear reactor in your country. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station became a major crisis point in the war when fighting commenced around the facility in March this year, stocking fears of a potential nuclear catastrophe. The plant was shut down in September but remains under the control of Russia. We are entering a period of global upheaval and a weakening of international ties, and nuclear facilities will always be a potential disaster during war time. One could potentially argue however that that threat is already here and maintaining or even increasing capacity does not change the risk much unless there were a possibility of decommissioning all facilities.</p><p><strong>Final thoughts</strong></p><p>All climate models that put us even close to avoiding a climate catastrophe require the use of nuclear energy, both in terms of maintaining our current capacity and deploying new facilities. We must be aware however that this comes with an element of risk. The safe storage of high-level waste has not been demonstrated and we must weigh this against the impending damage of global warming. The inclusion in the EU taxonomy in Europe at least will likely play a large role in maintaining the high standards needed for safe disposal of waste, something that will hopefully benefit other regions as well. Even if some nuclear evangelists see it as a panacea for the climate crisis, it is clearly only a small part of the overall strategy and should remain so. This risk of adding new nuclear facilities does not pay off unless we also do everything else to abate greenhouse gas emissions. Those who look on this as a political choice, and who think that somehow promoting nuclear will free us from the need to follow every other climate commitment on renewable energy deployment, structural changes to industry, and consumption reduction, are sorely mistaken. As the UN and IEA have highlighted in their recent reports, we are at a crucial point in time and must use every tool available to us to avoid climate catastrophe. For better or for worse, nuclear power is one of those tools, but we must treat it with caution.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5d02eeaf262b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/auxnab/the-role-of-nuclear-power-in-transitioning-to-net-zero-5d02eeaf262b">The Role of Nuclear Power in Transitioning to Net Zero</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/auxnab">European Greentech</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[3 Times Science Fiction Tackled Issues No Other Genre Could]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/illumination/3-times-science-fiction-tackled-issues-no-other-genre-could-194c4947a4e6?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DbWaNsJjq_KvYkC2Sr3UDQ.png" width="1024"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">Science fiction, as a less critically acclaimed genre, has always been able to get away with more daring concepts.</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/illumination/3-times-science-fiction-tackled-issues-no-other-genre-could-194c4947a4e6?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2">Continue reading on ILLUMINATION »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/illumination/3-times-science-fiction-tackled-issues-no-other-genre-could-194c4947a4e6?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/194c4947a4e6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[progressive]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[star-trek]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science-fiction]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[battlestar-galactica]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Gentry, PhD.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Aug 2022 19:46:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-08-17T19:46:27.956Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[An entrepreneurial EU]]></title>
            <description><![CDATA[<div class="medium-feed-item"><p class="medium-feed-image"><a href="https://medium.com/auxnab/an-entrepreneurial-eu-aca7396e51a5?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2"><img src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1010/1*hvUSlsWcy5NwcEvhbeECiQ.png" width="1010"></a></p><p class="medium-feed-snippet">The thinking behind Europe&#x2019;s leading innovation fund</p><p class="medium-feed-link"><a href="https://medium.com/auxnab/an-entrepreneurial-eu-aca7396e51a5?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2">Continue reading on European Greentech »</a></p></div>]]></description>
            <link>https://medium.com/auxnab/an-entrepreneurial-eu-aca7396e51a5?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aca7396e51a5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[deeptech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Gentry, PhD.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Aug 2022 07:46:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-11T08:49:11.639Z</atom:updated>
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            <title><![CDATA[The role of biogas in energy independence for Europe]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/auxnab/the-role-of-biogas-in-energy-independence-for-europe-897d957402c6?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/897d957402c6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[biomethane]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ukraine-crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sustainability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fuel]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Gentry, PhD.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 13 Jul 2022 08:21:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-07-13T08:21:28.890Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*p0opu_wXmqfemfYDfRRpQA.png" /></figure><p>Is it feasible to replace imported natural gas from Russia with homegrown biogas in Europe?</p><p>In late March, some weeks into the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen stated in a Twitter post that the EU was “too dependent on Russian fossil fuels and in particular, gas.” This was no great revelation, but the invasion of Ukraine had, in the starkest terms, brought home the realisation once and for all that the EU must break its dependency on Russian gas. European leaders are now under extreme pressure to expand sanctions against Russia and finally end the EU’s decades-long dependence on the Russia’s oil and gas.</p><p><a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/communication-repowereu-plan-com2022230_en">REPowerEU</a>, the European Commission’s roadmap for ending the EU’s reliance on Russian natural gas, features a key role for renewable energy, now not only expected to reduce fossil fuel-based electricity generation but to also significantly contribute to green hydrogen production, which is planned to replace natural gas in a wide range of uses. The hope is for the EU to reduce their import of Russian gas by two thirds.</p><p>Calls have been made however, for a complete and immediate embargo on the import of Russian gas to the EU. In April Lithuania was the first EU country to cut off Russian gas supplies completely, with the two other Baltic states also temporarily stopping its flow in response to the invasion of Ukraine. Pressure is mounting for more countries to join, but there is resistance from member states, particularly from Germany, who imported 102 billion cubic meters of gas in 2020, the majority of which came from Russia. To put that into context, the EU in total consumed <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/265406/natural-gas-consumption-in-the-eu-in-cubic-meters/#:~:text=The%20consumption%20of%20natural%20gas,of%20379.9%20billion%20cubic%20meters.">379.9 billion cubic metres of natural gas in 2020</a>. Russian imports account for about half of this, coming to 155 billion cubic meters in 2021.</p><p>Within the REPowerEU plan, the EC lays out 4 simple pillars to reduce reliance on Russian gas:</p><ul><li>save energy;</li><li>diversify gas supplies;</li><li>quickly substitute fossil fuels by accelerating Europe’s clean energy transition;</li><li>smartly combine investments and reforms.</li></ul><p>The plan builds on the full implementation of the Fit for 55 proposals tabled last year (which already aim lower our gas consumption by 30% by 2030) without modifying the ambition of achieving at least a 55% reduction in net GHG emissions by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050 in line with the European Green Deal. A boost to renewable energies, with a focus on solar as the fastest to roll out, is put forward as the best way to achieve this increase, supported by similar boosts to wind and heat pumps. The aims for hydrogen production under the Renewable Energy Directive is also increased, with a focus on hard to abate emissions in industry (with some in transportation).</p><p><strong>Fuelling the change</strong></p><p>Biogas is also included in the REPowerEU plan, with the EC announcing a target for the production of 35 billion cubic metres (bcm) of biomethane within the EU by 2030, touting an estimated investment of €37 billon to cover the increase. This is almost double the 17 billion cubic meters previously given in the Fit for 55 program. It is a huge increase in the pledge to increase biomethane reduction in the EU, but is it feasible?</p><p>There are over 16,000 biogas plants in Europe today, with an estimated production in 2020 of a<a href="http://europeanbiogas.eu/commission-announces-groundbreaking-biomethane-target-repowereu-to-cut-dependence-on-russian-gas/">round 3 bcm</a>. To increase the current levels more than ten-fold to reach the REPowerEU plans is already a tall order when only considering the infrastructure and investment required, but there is a more pressing challenge — the feedstock.</p><p>Perhaps the biggest controversy with biogas is the use of crops as the primary feedstock. If crops are being grown for fuel, then they are not being grown for food. This is the core of the food versus fuel debate that has hindered biogas investment. It is a strong argument against massively increasing biogas production from an environmental point of view (as much more land will be needed to provide the necessary space), but also from economic and societal points of view. In times of hardship, the choice would need to be made of being cold or being hungry. In this case, hunger wins out and during food shortages, biogas feedstock would need to be repurposed for food. This also has huge implications on price. As demand grows, so will the price of the feedstock. This was observed after the <a href="https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/6t053f96k/9c67ws03q/4f16c7191/WRS-06-28-2011_Special_Report.pdf">2008 recessions and in response primarily to the extreme weather and droughts in 2011</a> where prices for European corn doubled and sugar increased by 50%. This susceptibility to price fluctuations in feedstock makes many biogas plants economically unsustainable. In Germany, which hosts over 10,000 of Europe’s biogas plants, most of the plants have been sustained by 20-year EEG subsidies that are now coming to an end.</p><p>The feedstock source is particularly pertinent point. Ukraine is responsible for <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/729368/EPRS_ATA(2022)729368_EN.pdf">52% of the corn imports to the EU</a>. With the current crisis therefore, on top of the inescapable pressure to get away from Russian gas, Europe is also experiencing a grain shortage due to the drop in production from Ukraine and at the time of writing, corn prices are up <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/food-farming-fisheries/farming/documents/commodity-price-dashboard_2022-06_en.pdf">approximately 40% from this time last year.</a> A shift to biofuels using feedstock specifically grown for this purpose, therefore, is simply not sustainable in the long term because it is too susceptible to the fluctuating prices and greater need for food and feed over renewable energy.</p><p><strong>Alternative feedstocks</strong></p><p>There are other options. Biofuel that uses crops grown specifically for them are regarded as 1st generation (1G) biofuels. There is also the possibility to use 2nd generation, or 2G sources of feedstock for biomethane production. This involves essentially using discarded material from other processes rather than specifically growing biomass for biofuel production. This can involve for example, forestry waste, bagasse, agricultural residues, or even municipal waste. In doing so, it is possible to avoid the food versus fuel conflict. Of the 13 billion tonnes of forestry and agricultural biomass harvested worldwide, more than half, 7 billion tonnes, is wasted. This biomass has enormous potential to be used as an alternative, sustainable, low-cost feedstock for biomethane production, so why are we not using it? The problem comes in the additional steps needed to process this material. Unlike the easily digested 1st generation biomass, this is primarily woody material that is hard to break down. Additional processing steps must be used to break apart the fibrous material to access the sugars within that can then be processed into biomethane (or even processed further to bioethanol). By ‘woody material’ here, what is really meant is lignocellulose — this is the tough, fibrous material the comprises the plant cell wall. It consists of lignin and cellulose fibres: long microfibrils containing chains of cellulose molecules. It is these cellulose molecules that provide the sugars for biomethane production. To get at them, the lignocellulose must be broken down.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qwr3Fls4oyNszxvxmktsyQ.png" /><figcaption>Breaking don the plant cell walls to get at the cellulose within is key for efficient generation biogas production.</figcaption></figure><p>Some treatments already exist for this, but they are harsh chemical treatments that are difficult to scale due to the additional cleaning steps that are needed to remove unwanted products. <a href="https://www.upmbiofuels.com/about-upm-biofuels/production/upm-lappeenranta-biorefinery/">The UPM Lappeenranta Biorefinery</a> in Finland uses 2G feedstock (from a nearby pulp and paper plant) to create liquid biofuels. The same process could potentially be used to process 2G material for biomethane plants, but the problem is one of scale: biochemical plants like these are typically producing around 200,000 tonnes per year, far greater than the majority of biogas plants in Europe. To service the 16,000 biogas plants in Europe, there needs to be a process that can break open the woody material and which is still profitable at smaller scales, in the region of 10,000 to 50,000 tonnes per year. This where some innovation is needed. The research institute, Fraunhofer is working on solutions to break down woody material for biogas processing that <a href="https://www.igb.fraunhofer.de/en/research/industrial-biotechnology/bioprocess-engineering/processing-of-renewable-raw-materials-and-residuals/saccharification-of-lignocellulose.html">have been performed successfully at lab scale</a>. The <a href="https://lxp-group.com/">LXP Group</a> in Germany has had more success so far, with a 500 tonne per year demonstration plant successfully implementing an economically viable process to break down the woody material and access the cellulose within. The next step, hopefully to come soon, will be to scale this process to a full-size biomethane plant.</p><p><strong>Do we have enough waste?</strong></p><p>Assuming the method to process 2G biomass is successful, is there enough waste material to fuel the production of 35 bcm of biomethane within the EU by 2030? Currently, almost half of biogas production in <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/outlook-for-biogas-and-biomethane-prospects-for-organic-growth/an-introduction-to-biogas-and-biomethane">Europe is from 1G sources,</a> with the remaining from animal manure and municipal waste. In 2018, this meant that around 8 million tonnes of 1G feedstock was used to produce around 1 bcm of biomethane. To reach the proposed 35 bcm with around 50% 1G feedstock sources would require an additional 132 million tonnes of crops to be used. To put this in perspective, that is roughly equivalent to the total amount of agricultural imports to the EU in a single year. Clearly not a viable option. So, do we have enough 2G sources to fuel this increase?</p><p>The maths here is tricky because we do not yet know the efficiency of converting woody biomass into biomethane using the new approaches. It is however reasonable to make a conservative estimate that around 2<a href="https://geography.upol.cz/soubory/vyzkum/aupo/Acta-44-2/AUPO_Geographica_44-2_Martinat_et-al_RGB.pdf">00 m2 of biomethane is produced per tonne of biomass.</a> On this basis, producing 35 bcm of biomethane in Europe, would need 175 million tonnes of biomass. We are in luck then, because in Europe we produce around <a href="https://theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/WASTED-final.pdf">900 million tonnes of waste paper, food, wood, and plant material each year</a>. However, much of these “waste” streams are already being used as low-value inputs for industrial and agricultural processes and cannot be diverted to bioenergy production without secondary impacts on downstream markets. Some proportion of these “wastes” play a valuable environmental role in protecting soil quality, preventing erosion and supporting biodiversity. Taking these points into consideration, it is estimated that ~225 million tonnes of biomass is technically available as a feedstock for advanced biofuels. This includes around 40 million tonnes of forest slash, 44 million tonnes of municipal waste, and 139 million tonnes of crop residues that can be sustainable captured. If we could mobilise all of wasted material, there is ample supply within Europe to achieve the far-reaching goal of producing 35 bcm of biogas by 2030 without needing any 1G feedstock sources.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OV6Vl_qEKInefjYbmsj80A.png" /><figcaption>The available biomass waste in Europe could produce 45 bcm of 2G biomethane. To go further, innovation is needed to improve conversion rates.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Can we go further?</strong></p><p>In 2021, the EU imported approximately 155 bcms from Russia. Utilising the estimated 225 million tonnes of wasted biomass that can be sustainably used would help to replace only 45 bcms of imported natural gas. There are several options here: 1. increase the efficiency of biomass conversion through investment in improved pretreatment methods to break down the woody material and release the cellulose within; 2. Reduce the reliance on natural gas with increased renewables; 3. increase imports of natural gas from elsewhere. In the short term, the EU has opted for option 3. We desperately need to increase the effort into options 1 and 2, but with the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-06/eu-lawmakers-remove-last-hurdle-for-gas-nuclear-as-green">recent approval of natural gas as sustainable under the EU taxononomy</a>, the question is whether there is still the will to invest heavily in green alternatives to natural gas.</p><p><strong>Conclusions</strong></p><p>Europe urgently needs energy security. The recent global events, including the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, has now made this need unavoidable and the changes that should have already taken place are now an absolute necessity. We must transition to state of energy independence for the sake of our security, stability, and to remove the hypocrisy inherent in a continent that tells others to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels while being reliant on Russian gas and <a href="https://resourcegovernance.org/blog/europe-demand-africa-gas-toward-more-responsible-engagement-just-energy-transition">demanding increased fuel production from Africa</a> when things get tough.</p><p>The resources are there to achieve the EU’s biomethane production goal by 2030. This might be coming late, but perhaps not too late. It is necessary now for the EU to invest in the technologies that will enable this transition. There are thousands of biomethane plants in Europe that need to be converted to 2G feedstocks and incentives must be put in place for this to happen. In Germany, the 20-year EEG grants that enabled the proliferation of biomethane plants are coming to an end, and many plants are starting to close due to a lack of profitability. In order to renew these subsidies, biomethane plant owners will have to show a reduction in 1G feedstocks. Such measures should be rolled out across Europe to push biomethane producers to shift towards 2G sources. That is the stick. There is also a carrot: 2G feedstocks are very cheap, they are after all waste material that is available at little or no cost. With the right pre-treatment to break down the woody material, transitioning to 2G sources can in fact be much more profitable for biomethane plant owners. This however would require investment from the EU into those new technologies that can unlock the potential of these currently wasted materials. It is a shame that it took the outbreak of a war to push forward the transition to energy independence; these changes should have been implemented years ago, but if the best time to plant a tree was a decade ago, then the second-best time to plant one is today. A transition to renewable and sustainable biomethane production is one part of the puzzle. All of the elements are there, it only remains to be seen if the will to change can be translated into positive action in time.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=897d957402c6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/auxnab/the-role-of-biogas-in-energy-independence-for-europe-897d957402c6">The role of biogas in energy independence for Europe</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/auxnab">European Greentech</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Blue hydrogen: is it green or grey?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/auxnab/blue-hydrogen-is-it-green-or-grey-ab5cece4abe0?source=rss-41c809f001e9------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ab5cece4abe0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[renewable-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[climate-change]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hydrogen]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[green-energy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew Gentry, PhD.]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Feb 2022 07:40:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-22T07:40:43.607Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-KhIK3-iJTzeBFwX31-EwQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Source: Clean Air Task Force (https://www.catf.us/)</em></figcaption></figure><p>Blue Hydrogen could help to tackle climate change, but hidden emissions mean that without proper controls, it might do more harm than good.</p><p>Owing to the decreasing costs in production, hydrogen is now moving towards the centre of green innovations that could help abate the climate crisis. Today, 17 governments have released hydrogen strategies, more than 20 governments have publicly announced they are working to develop strategies, and numerous companies are seeking to tap into hydrogen business opportunities (<a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/global-hydrogen-review-2021">IEA Global Hydrogen Review 2021</a>). Under the <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050">2050 net zero emissions roadmap</a> published by the International Energy Agency (IEA), hydrogen is expected to account for 6% of the carbon dioxide (CO2) emission reductions. Conflicts arise however in how we produce this hydrogen — will it truly be a greener alternative, or will it simply enable business as usual for fossil fuel companies?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wBrRqJIqa3k_J1gto9dwhg.png" /><figcaption>The contribution of different energy sources in achieving net zero by 2050. Source: IEA (2021), Net Zero by 2050, IEA, Paris <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050">https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>How much hydrogen do we need for net zero?</strong></p><p>So, hydrogen is a modest but significant chunk of the energy production required to reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions. In real terms, this means that we need to produce 530 million tonnes (Mt) annually by 2050, up from about 90 Mt today under the IEA’s net zero roadmap.</p><p>But the question is, what form, or to use the emerging definitions, what colour will this hydrogen take?</p><p>Producing hydrogen by way of fossil fuel use is dubbed brown or grey hydrogen: coal or natural gas is burned in the production and CO2 is emitted into the atmosphere. At the other end of the spectrum is green hydrogen, whereby renewable energy sources (RES) are used to power an electrolyser to split water into its constituent parts of hydrogen and oxygen. Somewhere between these is blue hydrogen, and it is in this murky middle ground that suspicions have formed.</p><p>Essentially, blue hydrogen is using carbon capture (CC) to abate the CO2 emission released from grey hydrogen, from which the captured carbon will be stored or further utilised in another process, such as in the chemicals or cement industry.</p><p>Under the IEA’s net zero strategy, by 2050 we will have a mix of hydrogen with around 60% coming from electrolysers (green hydrogen) and involving CC from natural gas usage (blue hydrogen). It is not considered that coal production with CC will be in use at this point. Why is green hydrogen not higher? In the projections, even at only 60% of the required hydrogen coming from 3,600 gigawatts (GW) of renewable electricity is needed. To put this into perspective, IRENA estimate the global electricity production from solar and wind will be 13,000 GW. The extra 2,400 GW needed to make 100% green hydrogen would therefore require an 18% increase in an already best-case scenario for renewable energy production.</p><p>The transition period is also an important consideration. About half of the hydrogen used will be in heavy industry (mainly steel and chemicals), where rapid decarbonisation is needed. So, where the best-case alternatives of green hydrogen are not available, is it a good idea to focus on blue hydrogen production to decarbonise these industries, or is this another case of greenwashing, allowing fossil fuel use to continue with the illusion of mitigating climate change?</p><p><strong>The problem with blue hydrogen</strong></p><p>Concerns over the use of blue hydrogen we summed in the Just Have a Think (JHaT) episode: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2EA4tDYwNYo">Blue Hydrogen. The greatest fossil fuel scam in history?</a>, which also provides a succinct overview of the different forms of hydrogen production. The episode largely draws on a single paper by Howarth &amp; Jacobsen (H&amp;J) entitled <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/ese3.956"><em>How green is blue hydrogen,</em></a><em> </em>published in July 2021. Both sources paint a damning picture of blue hydrogen, with Dave Borlace of JHaT suggesting in that and other episodes that the shift to blue hydrogen is being promoted by the fossil fuel industry as a way to continue business as usual. This has, of course, caused some backlash from the industry.</p><p>H&amp;J claim that:</p><blockquote>“For our default assumptions (3.5% emission rate of methane from natural gas and a 20- year global warming potential),<strong> total carbon dioxide equivalent emissions for blue hydrogen are only 9%- 12% less than for gray hydrogen.</strong> While carbon dioxide emissions are lower, fugitive methane emissions for blue hydrogen are higher than for gray hydrogen because of an increased use of natural gas to power the carbon capture. <strong>Perhaps surprisingly, the greenhouse gas footprint of blue hydrogen is more than 20% greater than burning natural gas or coal for heat </strong>and some 60% greater than burning diesel oil for heat, again with our default assumptions.”</blockquote><p>This goes even further then. Not only is blue hydrogen only marginally better than grey hydrogen, for heating homes it is actually worse than just burning the natural gas in the first place! It is easy to see why there has been a backlash: how can blue hydrogen, much touted by the industry as a ‘greener’ alternative, be worse overall than fossil fuels? It is important to tease out the points of contention here, starting with those made in the H&amp;J paper and then stacking them up against what can be seen in industry today.</p><p><strong>Use of blue hydrogen</strong></p><p>H&amp;J focus very heavily on the use of hydrogen for heating buildings and compare it very unfavourably with natural gas. This is misleading, however. Despite calls by some, such as the <a href="https://hydrogencouncil.com/en/">Hydrogen Council</a>, a multi-stakeholder CEO-led global initiative, heating of homes with hydrogen will be a fraction of hydrogen usage at best, likely coming only after 2030 and only in certain situations in which other clean and more efficient technologies cannot be adopted. The majority of hydrogen usage will be used in industry and refining (as it is today) with big developments also in transportation, for example in the use of ammonia and methanol liquid fuels.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/993/1*2h_BKOYXWcnVhAiwYHZ_IA.png" /><figcaption>Hydrogen will primarily be used in heavy industry and transport, with very little being used in buildings. Source: IEA (2021), <em>Global Hydrogen Review 2021</em>, IEA, Paris <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/global-hydrogen-review-2021">https://www.iea.org/reports/global-hydrogen-review-2021</a></figcaption></figure><p><strong>Low Carbon capture rates of blue hydrogen</strong></p><p>H&amp;J focus on a form of hydrogen production called steam methane reforming (SMR) wherein heat and pressure are used to bombard methane and release the hydrogen.</p><blockquote>“The vast majority of hydrogen (96%) is generated from fossil fuels, particularly from SMR of natural gas but also from coal gasification.”</blockquote><p>The CC rates of SMR are quite low, modelled at 76% in the H&amp;J paper. This is due to the flue gas being diluted by the natural gas used, making it more difficult to pull out the CO2.</p><p>The focus on SMR is important, as although it is currently the dominant form of hydrogen production, other methods are on the horizon, namely Autothermal reforming (ATR). ATR is an alternative technology in which the process itself produces the required heat. This means that all related CO2 is produced inside the reactor, resulting in a more concentrated flue gas stream that, when compared with the SMR process, allows for 95% or higher CC rates..</p><p>Yet ATR is not mentioned at all by H&amp;J and even within SMR, they seem to have their numbers wrong. The number of projects using CC with SMR according to H&amp;J are:</p><blockquote>“As of 2021, there were only two blue-hydrogen facilities globally that used natural gas to produce hydrogen at commercial scale.”</blockquote><p>For this, they cite the <a href="https://www.sustainablefinance.hsbc.com/carbon-transition/global-carbon-capture-and-storage-status-report-2020">Global CSS Institute’s ‘Global Status of CCS’ report</a>, which states that:</p><blockquote>“Today there are four industrial-scale SMR hydrogen facilities with CCS worldwide, producing a total of around 800,000 tonnes of low-carbon hydrogen per year.”</blockquote><p>Whether H&amp;J have a definition of commercial scale is unclear, since they do not state so in their paper, but it is telling that they did not see this statement in their own reference. This also focusses on SMR only. <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/global-hydrogen-review-2021">By the end of 2021, there were 16 projects generating hydrogen from fossil fuels with CCUS, 10 of which are commercial-scale plants</a>. Four of these are at oil refineries and three are at fertiliser plants. Notably, six are retrofits of existing sites.</p><p>The focus on SMR might be reasonable when judging blue hydrogen production now, but when looking to the future, we should also consider the technologies that are on the horizon. JHaT specifically mentions concerns over upcoming blue hydrogen projects in the UK. In fact, two major projects in the UK, <a href="https://hynet.co.uk/#:%7E:text=HyNet%20aims%20to%20be%20the,the%20North%20West%20of%20England.">HyNet</a> and <a href="https://www.equinor.com/en/news/plan-for-world-leading-clean-hydrogen-plant-in-the-uk.html">H2H Saltend</a> will use ATR technology. A good sign for the technology being used. Unfortunately, for both projects, the carbon will be stored and not used for greater benefit. This is a separate issue but does speak to the fact that blue hydrogen projects run the risk of taking the best economic case in storing the carbon, instead of the best environmental case of using it to further abate GHG emissions. This aspect of contributing to the circular economy is baked into the EU’s Taxonomy for environmentally sustainable economic activities and should not be forgotten when discussing blue hydrogen projects.</p><p><strong>High fugitive emissions of blue hydrogen</strong></p><p>A major criticism of blue hydrogen is the fugitive GHG emissions throughout the process. H&amp;J describe their rationale for measuring fugitive emissions and focus on the level of methane emissions that are often overlooked in these processes. Methane is a vastly more potent GHG than CO2 and remains in the atmosphere for a much longer time.</p><p>Since SMR involves the use of methane as a raw material, the suggestion that significant levels of this gas escape is fair. These are called upstream fugitive emissions and refer to the methane that escapes into the atmosphere before it can be processed, thus contributing to climate change. The values for upstream fugitive emissions of methane according to H&amp;J are assumed to be 3.5%.</p><p>This figure of 3.5% took many in industry by surprise. In 2019, the actual recorded value of fugitive methane emissions was 0.23% (Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI) figures), with values recorded by Equinor in their <a href="https://www.equinor.com/en/news/20210319-annual-sustainability-reports-2020.html#:~:text=The%202020%20Sustainability%20Report%20offers,its%20most%20material%20sustainability%20impacts.&amp;text=In%202020%2C%20Equinor&#39;s%20(scope%201,portfolio%20and%20lower%20activity%20level">sustainability report</a> to be even lower at 0.03%.</p><p>So why do H&amp;J calculate fugitive emissions at a level that is magnitudes higher than the industry records? They are clearly using a different methodology, perhaps one that is more trustworthy than the self-reporting of private industry.</p><p>Firstly, we need to look at the assumptions in the H&amp;J paper. They state that:</p><blockquote>“Here, for our default estimation of the greenhouse gas footprint of gray hydrogen, we rely on a recent synthesis on “top–down” emission studies.”</blockquote><p>The reference they use for these estimates? A chapter in ‘<a href="http://www.eeb.cornell.edu/howarth/documents/Howarth_2021_Methane_and_Climate.pdf">Environmental Impacts from Development of Unconventional Oil and Gas Reserves</a>’ written by Howarth himself, which was in press at the time the Blue Hydrogen paper was written, so was not possible to verify right away (although to be favourable, let us assume that the peer reviewers had access to it). They do however allude to the fact that the reference comes from satellite and airplane flyovers from 20 different studies in 10 major natural gas fields in the United States and then take the average of those values. This is, in their own words, “a good estimate for the upstream emissions that occur in the gas fields.” Not bad, even if Howarth does say so himself.</p><p>This reference, gives a value of 2.6% for upstream fugitive emissions. H&amp;J then add 0.8% for emissions that occur in transport after processing (the reference for this is again a paper by Howarth in the <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1943815X.2020.1789666">Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences</a>). Combined with the initial 2.6% figure, this gives a total of 3.4% in fugitive emissions. The remaining 0.1% comes from methane being burned by the natural gas industry to power natural gas processing and transport. So, 3.5% in total, but taken from self-referenced academic papers. This is not bad in and of itself, but it does add a layer of obfuscation and takes a little digging to pull out where the numbers actually come from. To do this, we are going to have to dive into the figures from some of these references.</p><p>The book chapter that provides the average of 20 estimations of fugitive emissions ranging from 0.2% to 17% above is <a href="http://www.eeb.cornell.edu/howarth/documents/Howarth_2021_Methane_and_Climate.pdf">now available</a>. Interestingly, the very highest and lowest estimations in this range come from the same author, Pieschl et al. This provides a nice comparison since we have the same author providing vastly different figures.</p><p>The highest comes from the Los Angeles basin in California, a region of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/jgrd.50413">extremely low natural gas production at the time</a>. Peischl’s <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/2014JD022697">remarks on the more recent</a>, lower value of 0.2% are:</p><blockquote>“The regions investigated in this work represented over half of the U.S. shale gas production in 2013, and we find generally lower loss rates than those reported in earlier studies of regions that made smaller contributions to total production. <strong>Hence, the national average CH4 loss rate from shale gas production may be lower than values extrapolated from the earlier studies</strong>.”</blockquote><p>It would seem therefore, that the lower value would be the more accurate one. It is after all, more recent and based on a much wider range of sites. Would that it were so simple. Pieschl goes on to list some more values:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*srtLf7qfqD2IKsgsZeoI3w.png" /></figure><p>The range is clearly huge, but when H&amp;J then go on to provide a sensitivity analysis to include two lower levels of methane emissions. In fact, they omit these figures completely from their analysis. They use instead values of 2.54% and 1.45% for the lower end of the scale instead of any of the much lower values from their own sources. This is part of their basis for the unfavourable comparison with natural gas for heating homes (which as we have seen, is unlikely to be a major use of hydrogen anyway).</p><p>The other thing you might notice is that all of the estimates by H&amp;J are from quite dated sources, most of which are before 2016, so at least 5 years old by the time their Blue Hydrogen paper was published. Perhaps because for an academic paper, they felt they had to use academic sources, and as such they eschewed the lower industry figures. From the outside, it is difficult to know which figures to trust. Thankfully, more recent data are available and perhaps with these, we can get a better handle on where the true value lies within this range. These come from 2<a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/methane-tracker-2021">021 estimates made by the IEA</a> in collaboration with Kayrros, an earth observation firm.</p><p>From this, global methane emissions were estimated at around 570 Mt. Fugitive methane emissions from natural gas activities specifically are responsible for about 40 Mt of methane (or about 1.5% of global GHG emissions). This gives a rough estimate of fugitive emissions of 7.4% — higher than both the industry figures and even H&amp;J’s average figure. So is the actual value even worse than we thought?</p><p>Yes and no is the answer to that. Taking a global look at fugitive emissions (in this case figures for both gas and oil are included) <a href="https://www.iea.org/articles/greenhouse-gas-emissions-from-energy-data-explorer">we see an average of 10%</a>. When looking more closely however, we see that there is huge variation from region to region. There are lower values for the EU (1%) and the U.S. (8%), while the global average is skewed by higher values coming from Venezuela, Iraq, and Turkmenistan, each with values exceeding 50%.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*v2ae3zfnXrmmxuYfLjrV5w.png" /><figcaption><strong><em>Fugitive emissions vary wildly from region to region. Source: IEA (2021), Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Energy Data Explorer, IEA, Paris </em></strong><a href="https://www.iea.org/articles/greenhouse-gas-emissions-from-energy-data-explorer"><strong><em>https://www.iea.org/articles/greenhouse-gas-emissions-from-energy-data-explorer</em></strong></a></figcaption></figure><p>So, while the methodology of H&amp;J to find their value of 3.5% fugitive emissions is riddled with problems, they do land on a number representative of the most recent and accurate readings, perhaps even significantly lower. What is clear from all of these numbers, is that fugitive emissions from natural gas vary wildly and are a direct consequence of the technologies used and the regulations in place to control them. Just because there are high fugitive emission levels in some regions, does not mean that that needs to be the case in the future. In short, it is something we can control.</p><p><strong>Reducing fugitive methane emissions</strong></p><p>So what can be done in this regard? According to the IEA, at least 50% of global (fugitive) methane emission from natural gas activities could be saved by using technologies and approaches that would pay for themselves through the captured methane that can be sold. This would be by a mixture of applying strict regulatory measures on reporting, and providing the right information to industry actors about the win-win technological options available.</p><p>IEA analysis estimates that it is technically possible to avoid around three-quarters of today’s methane emissions from global oil and gas operations. Established policies (including leak detection and repair (LDAR) requirements for fugitive sources, equipment mandates for sources known to emit significant volumes of methane, and measures designed to limit non-emergency flaring and venting) have proven both effective and relatively straightforward to implement. Most standards in this category do not require a robust measurement-based monitoring regime to verify compliance, although a quantification and reporting system is usually necessary.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*s03seLGguTJbV6neMkfskQ.png" /></figure><p><em>Established policies can have a huge impact on reducing fugitive methane emissions. Source: IEA, Methane abatement potential of well-established policy measures, IEA, Paris </em><a href="https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/methane-abatement-potential-of-well-established-policy-measures"><em>https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/methane-abatement-potential-of-well-established-policy-measures</em></a></p><p>Significant fugitive emissions could therefore be abated rather easily and at little cost. This has to be a consideration for regulators and policy makers on future blue hydrogen projects.</p><p><strong>Conclusions</strong></p><p>The high-level conclusions of the H&amp;J’s Blue hydrogen report are correct: green hydrogen produced from renewable energy is much better for the environment, and there are hidden emissions within blue hydrogen that must be accounted for. Whether these emissions make it worse or only marginally better that grey hydrogen is unclear at this point.</p><p>There are major problems with H&amp;J’s paper and with JHaT’s claim that it is biggest scam in history. Both major errors are in the use of outdated sources. On the one hand, they focus on SMR technology, which is clearly not going to be the major form of blue hydrogen moving forward and as a result underestimate CC rates. On the other, their use of outdated values for fugitive emissions, even if they omitted the lowest values, may have actually underestimated the problem.</p><p>The need to reduce fugitive emissions has been widely acknowledged by industry. The OGCI aims to improve methane data collection and develop and deploy cost-effective methane management technologies; with a target to reduce the collective average methane intensity to ultimately achieve a level of 0.2%. As we have seen however, there is a huge range of values worldwide for methane fugitive emissions, partly due to reporting differences, and partly due to varying engineering and infrastructural aspects. The results seen from established policies by the IEA clearly go a long way to reaching this level, but it is up to regulators to make sure that they are enforced.</p><p>As ever, details matter. To dismiss blue hydrogen altogether would be a mistake, but so would blanket approval, which runs the risk of enabling greenwashing. We should not let perfect be the enemy of the good: the availability of RES will not be enough to fuel the required hydrogen production under a net zero scenario, so we should look to other solutions to bridge that gap. This is especially true when there are heavy industries in urgent need of decarbonisation — we simply cannot wait until 2050 to start these processes.</p><p>Shining a light on the issue of fugitive emissions will push regulators and stakeholders to demand more of industry in these regards. So too will highlighting recent advancements in blue hydrogen technology, like ATR, which can drastically increase the CC rate and lower emissions further. It is quite clear already that the future of blue hydrogen will not be SMR, but this needs to be continually reinforced to avoid setting up less efficient facilities.</p><p>H&amp;J highlight other issues that should be considered — namely what should be used to power the CC at the blue hydrogen plant? If it is the abundant sources of natural gas available to the plant rather than renewable energy, then it unnecessarily increases GHG emissions. What should the hydrogen be used for? If it is for heating homes as the Hydrogen Council suggests, it could even lead to an increase in natural gas usage compared to today (hence the cynicism around the fossil fuel industry-led council). However, their heavy focus on the weaknesses of hydrogen for heating homes is something of a red herring as it is likely that most of the hydrogen production will be used in heavy industry and transport, with only a fraction being used in buildings. Lastly, what should the CC be used for? For enhanced oil recovery as suggested by the JHaT vlog (which would violate the EU Taxonomy’s requirement to “do no significant harm”) or to abate emissions in the concrete and chemicals industries, or even combine with the produced hydrogen to generate synthetic fuels (such as e-methanol).</p><p>Blue hydrogen is not a scam; it is a necessary step to net zero, but one that must be done correctly. This will require transparency on all fronts, from industry, regulators, policymakers, and from its detractors, so that we can transition to a cleaner economy.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ab5cece4abe0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/auxnab/blue-hydrogen-is-it-green-or-grey-ab5cece4abe0">Blue hydrogen: is it green or grey?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/auxnab">European Greentech</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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