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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Dany Eid on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[HEDERA vs AVALANCHE: The Ultimate Decentralization Showdown]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@EidDany/hedera-vs-avalanche-the-ultimate-decentralization-showdown-c2d7aad94ad2?source=rss-8bae5544d1a------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dany Eid]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 14 May 2022 11:43:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-05-14T11:43:22.743Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>HEDERA vs AVALANCHE: The Ultimate Decentralization Showdown</p><p>Disclaimer: As my readers may already know, I’m an independent researcher, and an Hbar enthusiast. <br>I’m not affiliated with Hedera’s management in any capacity, and my opinions are solely my own.</p><p>Moreover, I’m an architect by profession, and my expertise is definitely not distributed systems, but you’d be correct to assume that I have done required due diligence and do take full responsibility for the claims I make in this article. You should be able, on your own, to either intellectually corroborate or refute those claims. I acknowledge beforehand that some of my statements might come across as a bit extrapolated at times. I was purposefully aiming to create that deliberate tension between my opposing arguments when comparing those 2 networks, so as to easily convey to the not-so-technical reader the essence of my conclusions. This is not a deep-dive technical analysis, but rather a high level attempt to capture and explain complex consensus mechanisms in simple layman’s terms.</p><p>Let me get that straight first. <br>DLTs are not “trustless” systems, they are “trust amplification” systems. You always start with some initial trust, and you distribute that trust over time. You start with a handful of nodes, and you gradually expand those nodes. You start by controlling some stake and your influence in the network in the beginning, with the aim to let go of that control gradually, and you do that so that your system acquires resilience and becomes unhackable.</p><p>A network holding trillions of dollars of native Internet value should not be allowed to go down, it should not have a single point of failure. A global distributed database of money should not be controlled by a handful of people.</p><p>Proof of Work is faster than Proof of Stake in distributing influence.</p><p>1 node=100% Hash Power. You control the network, you mine all the coins, you write the longest chain. <br>2 nodes=50% Hash Power, and your influence immediately halves in two. <br>100 nodes=1% Hash Power. You now only have 1% influence over the network.</p><p>PoW is a powerful decentralization mechanism, but it unfortunately comes at a cost. It’s expensive, slow, energy inefficient, and because of the way the profit incentive model is implemented in the Bitcoin blockchain as an example, miners end up discarding the idea of further decentralization in favor of more consolidation in the hands of a few pools.</p><p>On the other hand, Proof of Stake mints all the coins beforehand. It has to do that, because it needs to calculate a percent influence from the total number of coins, so at any given time, the system has to be aware of the total coins in the network. You initially hold 100%, and you gradually distribute them away.<br>Holding all the coins yourself renders them worthless, sharing your coins accrues their value, and the security of your network.</p><p>PoS is slower than PoW in distributing trust, because a PoS network relies on its scarce resource (A coin) to be valuable as a premise to begin with. PoS advantages are that it’s cheaper, faster, and unlike PoW gives you some insight over who’s controlling the influence in the network.</p><p>So, without delving deep into the PoW vs PoS debate, both assume some initial trust, (Trust in the code, the consensus mechanism, the core developers, the tokenomics, etc…), and both aim at ultimately distributing and amplifying that trust to the edges of the network, albeit in different ways.</p><p>So the question becomes…<br>Are all PoS networks created equal? Are they all designed the same? What kind of PoS system should I trust? Which consensus mechanism using PoS is designed to gradually decentralize, and which one is, like Nakamoto Consensus, naively designed to resist further decentralization and ultimately consolidate? Which systems allow the gradual release of power and which become vulnerable if power is conceded?</p><p>But what is Avalanche Consensus first?</p><p>Avalanche primary network comprises of 3 chains, P-Chain, X-chain, and C-chain. Avalanche consensus is applied onto a DAG in the X-chain, which is optimized for payments and assets transfers.<br>Snowman Consensus is a specific implementation of Avalanche Consensus on the P-Chain and the C-Chain, both linear blockchains.</p><p>Avalanche on X-chain doesn’t totally order all transactions, but aims to only order its conflicting transactions, which are basically “double spend” transactions that are trying to spend the same UTXO.</p><p>To keep it simple, Bob has 100$. He gossips transaction A (I want to buy 100$ worth of Gold) to half of the network, and transaction B (I want to buy 100$ worth of Silver) to the other half of the network. Because of network latencies, each half now receives both transactions at different time intervals, in a different order, and each node, on its own, needs to figure out which TX to accept first and which to discard, and they all need to reach the same conclusion or consensus.<br>So how does the Snowball protocol (Avalanche without a DAG) achieve that?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*o8f1Pp_LzhrV52orU3Ot4g.jpeg" /></figure><p>As an example, imagine you’re the top left node in Figure 1 above. The initial ttansaction you received is A, so your preference is (Gold Yellow), and you set your initial Consecutive Success counter ß to 0. You then query a fixed preset number of nodes (ex: k=5, highlighted in red, out of the total nodes n=68), and you wait for a majority quorum size ex: α=&gt;3. If the majority 3 is same as your preference, you increment your success counter ß (0+1=1). You sample again another 5 nodes at random, if you get the same majority color, you increment again your Consecutive Success counter ß (1+1=2). If you get a majority for a different color, you switch your color and reset ß to 1. If no majority is reached (ex: 2 yellow, 2 blue, and 1 node goes offline), you reset ß to 0. You repeat the same process and keep sampling until your Consecutive Success counter ß reaches a predetermined number ex: ß=10 then you terminate the algorithm, you decide on that final color, you execute the transaction and discard the other. Every other nodes does the same and they all reach the same conclusion.</p><p>The way these parameters are currently set in Avalanche are as follows:</p><p>n(network nodes)=1578</p><p>k(sample size)=20 nodes</p><p>α(quorum size)=14 nodes</p><p>ß(decision threshold)=20</p><p>One could immediately notice that there are no mathematical guarantees in this model to align with the traditional sense of Byzantine Fault tolerance, which requires 2/3 safety, 1/3 liveness deterministic thresholds.<br>Why sample k=20 nodes for example instead of a 2/3 of n, or 1/3rd of n, why should you parametrize α=16 instead of α=15, why choose 20 instead of 10 as your consecutive success counter? <br> Avalanche naturally pretested those numbers to achieve what it deemed were optimum results to reduce bandwidth, whilst achieving some high probability safety and liveness thresholds.</p><p>Unfortunately, the Snowball algorithm above is slow, and has poor liveness guarantees, if you had to choose nodes at random. A small number of malicious nodes can steer the decision in either direction and prevent honest nodes from reaching consensus.</p><p>Listen to Associate Professor John Augustine from IIT Madras referencing the paper “Stabilising consensus with the power of two choices” at min 43:06 where he explains that this majority sampling algorithm can only tolerate √n.<br> <a href="https://youtu.be/lroPq170RiM">https://youtu.be/lroPq170RiM</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mC9BY7L5hkw4TW-S1VGnCA.jpeg" /></figure><p>The Avalanche whitepaper mentions the same:</p><p>“If f ≤ O(√ n), then the Snow protocols terminate with high probability (≥ 1−ε) in O(logn) rounds”, which basically just means that if malicious nodes f in Avalanche are less then 40 for a 1600 nodes network, then the protocol terminates with high probabibilty in 3 to 4 rounds.<br>40 nodes is only 2.5% of total nodes in the network! If the network is 10,000 nodes, it can tolerate 100 nodes being malicious. That’s 1% of all the nodes!</p><p>In our Figure 1 example, instead of tolerating 22+, 1/3 of 68, the network can only tolerate roughly √ 64=8 malicious nodes for liveness.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Vtwmbfa1IXuFCVRlW31SQg.jpeg" /></figure><p>But wait? What happened to the strong mathematical definition of Byzantine Fault Tolerance BFT, which stipulates that in order for a distributed system to achieve the highest level of security, its algorithm has to make sure it can optimize and tolerate for a 1/3 malicious participants?</p><p>Yet Snowball settles for √n.</p><p>But the Avalanche team doesn’t give up! They optimise the system, or should I more accurately say… THEY CENTRALIZE IT!</p><p>So instead of selecting 20 nodes at random to query, they toss a global coin for everyone to follow, they create a bias to accelerate the drift towards one color or the other. They instead choose 20 nodes with the highest stakes. The more Avax a node bonds, the more often it is queried by other nodes. Now, I’m not sure exactly how this stake weighted selection mechanism is tweaked to work, but it sure seems to mean that if you hold 50% of the coins, you’re guaranteed to be queried 50% of the time, and it sure seems that it’s designed to keep the stewards of the Avalanche network in control!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*joD6xbVl3-LoWHVrB7BU5A.jpeg" /></figure><p>You see, Proof of Stake means different things to different DLTs.<br>PoS is a weaker Proof in Avalanche. In Avalanche, you don’t vote with your coins on the order of transactions. In Avalanche, you vote with your nodes, 14 nodes to be exact, and PoS, instead of being a scarce resource to weigh your influence, is just a selection mechanism to choose the powerful and prevent the cheaper stake nodes from participating in consensus.</p><p>The total supply of Avax is 395,891,290M. <br>The circulating supply of Avax is roughly 268,777,038M. <br>A node’s maximum stake is 3,000,000M Avax, including its own stake and the stake delegated to it.</p><p>Here’s a small table showing the 40 nodes with the highest stakes. <a href="https://avascan.info/staking/validators?s=totalWeight%2Cdesc#tabletop">https://avascan.info/staking/validators?s=totalWeight%2Cdesc#tabletop</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*U5bQw5SmUCV20TIHLndf9Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>You can see that the top 40 ranked nodes hold around 100M in stake, that’s around 40% of the circulating supply (That’s 2.5% of 1600 nodes holding 40% of the stake), with the bulk of each node’s own stake being =&gt; 2M, and the rest delegated to it. Now, if you’re wondering who’s controlling these nodes, I’ll leave you with these snapshots from the Avalanche Telegram Group.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xrnUjZp2CrtTGWmABl_HJA.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TWX77Mw-4ghlPgX3P2imqA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Now, that’s not how PoS in Hedera works. A better PoS is one that actually represents your true influence in the system. In Hedera all the nodes participate in consensus, all the nodes vote and weigh in with their coins. 1coin = 1 vote, and your power is proportional to the coins you hold. The Hashgraph measures that, and each node virtually collects 66,66% Hbar votes before commiting to a value. Now, that’s a strong mathematical guarantee. In Hedera, you would need to buy up more than 1/3rd of the coins to disrupt liveness (slow or freeze the network) and 2/3rd of the coins to disrupt safety (corrupt the database, double spend etc). Now that’s a hard protocol to break.</p><p>In Hedera, all nodes participate in the same protocol, all nodes are equal, all first class citizens. You spin up a node on Hedera, you vote, regardless if you stake a penny or a million, unlike Avalanche which has its first class citizens with a higher stake that dictate the consensus, and it’s 2nd class citizens on the receiving end, just validating and accepting the majority rule.</p><p>PoS is a filtration mechanism in Avalanche. You currently require 2000 Avax to spin up a node, and the reason Avalanche caps the minimum stake, is so that it’s expensive for a malicious node to cheaply spin up additional nodes (sybil attack).</p><p>If Avalanche allowed any node with any amount of stake to participate in the consensus queries (as a truly democratic and decentralized model should), a malicious actor holding a Million Avax would spin up a Million nodes with 1 Avax each, and that’s bad for the Avalanche consensus, because the bad guys now have 1M nodes against 1600 honest nodes, and if you allowed a random selection of any 20 nodes in the system regardless of their stake (as a truly democratic and decentralized model should), the Avalanche protocol has a higher probability of choosing the bad guys, and your system is jeopardized.</p><p>What do you do instead? <br>You optimise your protocol, or more accurately said…YOU CENTRALIZE IT. <br>You make sure your algorithm selects only the powerful few, that’s Emin Gun Sirer, and 19 nodes of his best friends.</p><p>You see, in Avalanche you don’t vote with your stake, you vote with your nodes. Avalanche is just a weak emulation of Bitcoin’s PoW, but it’s worse, because it’s got no coins at stake, no slashing…<br>But more on that later.</p><p>Hedera’s PoS instead translates sound BFT guarantees. It allows all nodes to participate, all nodes to be queried on equal footing, and collects 66.66% of all votes, and does that without actually sending any votes. No queries at all.</p><p>Now, that is BRILLIANT.</p><p>If you want to dive deep into the Hashgraph algorithm, here’s your video:<br> <a href="https://youtu.be/wgwYU1Zr9Tg">https://youtu.be/wgwYU1Zr9Tg</a></p><p>All Hedera coin holders vote democratically. You can stake 100 Hbar/node or you can stake a million, it’s your choice, and you get rewarded proportionally to your stake. If you had 1M hbar, you can spin up 1M nodes, it doesn’t matter, your influence will always be 1M hbar, because on Hedera, unlike Avalanche, you don’t vote with your nodes, you vote with your Hbars, and as long as no single or multiple malicious entities hold more than a third of all 50B Hbars in existence, your system is safe.</p><p>It’s true that in Avalanche, all 1600 nodes validate, but not all get queried, not all have a say in consensus. Only the powerful 20 get queried, they steer the ship. The remaining nodes just accept the color preference and the consensus the powerful in the system dictate.</p><p>Now let that sink in, which is more decentralized, a protocol that chooses 14 nodes out of the same powerful 20 to give you the consensus between A or B, or a protocol that weighs in 2/3 of its 50 Billion distributed coins. 14 nodes vs 16B coins voting. That’s easy math for me.</p><p>You see, the Avalanche protocol is not a BFT protocol in the strongest sense of the term, and that’s why it has to remain centralized. Avalanche is unable to democratize its stakes, and these will likely always remain high. The powerful few will never dare let go of their control, because if they did, the bad guys could easily take over.</p><p>On the other hand, Hedera’s BFT algorithm is built to scale, and is designed to allow gradual decentralization. The larger the distribution of the coins, the bigger a third of the Hbar pie in circulation. The bigger the pie, the more utility for the coin, the more expensive it is to acquire, and the more resilient the network.</p><p>In Avalanche, its risky to give up control. <br>In Hedera it’s better to give up control. <br>In Avalanche, the more concentrated the stake, the more secure the chain. <br>In Hedera the more distributed the stake, the more secure the chain.</p><p>Now that you know that the Avalanche PoS network has “nothing at stake”, let’s dive deeper.</p><p>As much as Avalanche likes to brag about its DAG, its consensus mechanism is a cheaper “longest chain” rule Nakamoto Style consensus, masquerading as a revolutionary “sub-sampling” Consensus, whereas in reality, this sub-sampling is more akin to an election mechanism that only filters the powerful to vote on 2 forks of the DAG. But instead of voting with costly scarce resources such as a valuable coin (PoS) or with expensive computation (PoW), the powerful 20 vote with… CHIT!</p><p>You heard that right. It’s all about the precious chit, literally! 😅</p><p>Now, before you go on reading, I strongly advise you to watch this full Avalanche Consensus video first, and more specifically watch 15:05 onwards to understand the remainder of this article below:<br> <a href="https://youtu.be/ZUF9sIu-D_k">https://youtu.be/ZUF9sIu-D_k</a></p><p>Avalanche protocol is the same as the Snowball protocol described above, but optimized and implemented specifically over a DAG. Specifically, Avalanche is trying to resolve 2 conflicting transactions on 2 forks of the DAG. So let’s recap what the video explained.</p><p>Everytime a conflicting “double spend” transaction is issued, nodes query other nodes to ask them their preference for either one of the 2 forks. If a majority 14 nodes over 20 prefers fork A over fork B, you give A a chit and set its value to 1. You increment your confidence counter for A, and your consecutive success counter for A, and transitively upwards in the DAG, you increment A’s ancestors’ both confidence and success counters as well.<br>If chit is false=0 (14 nodes queried don’t prefer it), you set confidence for A to 0, and your consecutive success counter to 0. This automatically resets A’s ancestors consecutive success counters to 0.</p><p>To keep things simple, Confidence is designed to steer nodes and force them to converge towards one fork versus another. So when a node asks another node about its preference between 2 forks, the node replies with the fork that has the highest confidence counter. <br>In Bitcoin terms, think of it like the fork with the most proof of work every node is trying to rally after, but instead of expensive PoW, in Avalanche you just spin chit up. <br>The Consecutive Success counter is akin to block confirmation time in Bitcoin, it’s just a finality counter, because just like Bitcoin, Avalanche has to wait to resolve its forks before it makes any decision on either one.<br>The current finality counter for accepting and executing a transaction on Avalanche is set at 20 success confirmations. (At least 20 blocks deep).</p><p>Now does the above sound familiar?<br>If you thought “longest chain rule”, you would be totally right!<br>Avalanche just reinvented Bitcoin, but instead of voting with your hashing power, so that it’s prohibitively expensive for you to vote on 2 forks and revert history, in Avalanche you vote with cheap chits on 2 forks of the DAG without incurring any cost or penalties. <br>A breakthrough consensus mechanism indeed. No PoW, no PoS slashing. <br>Proof of Chit is the new kid on “the block”.</p><p>So let’s try to double spend and create money out of thin air on Avalanche. <br>In the example below, I showcase how an account A with 1M Avax, can send 2 transactions to 2 different accounts B and C, all 3 anonymous accounts belonging to the same malicious group, succeed in both transactions, effectively doubling a Million by minting another 1M Avax out of thin air, convincing half of the network of tx B and the other half of tx C.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NNEu0rXeUGZ3ZLAw2RzO4A.png" /></figure><p>The attack is as follows:<br>You prepare 2 Forks in secret. You stack 19 blocks on top of your “double spend” transaction, and you get ready to release both forks at the same time.</p><p>Network latencies will make sure half of the network receives Fork1 first and the other half receives Fork2 first. Since half of the network isn’t aware of a conflicting fork and cannot see it yet, no conflicts in chit or confidence counters are spotted between the two. The protocol queries for the top tx on each fork, and checks downwards to see if any of the 20 transactions on any fork are within some conflict set and finds none, gives all 20 transactions a chit, applies transitive voting downwards, increments both confidence and success counters on both forks, and 2 “double spend” transactions get accepted in different parts of the network. There you go, you just minted 1M Avax out of thin air.</p><p>Pulling such an attack is no easy feat of course. You have to be lucky on both sides of the network to get a majority of 14 queried nodes receiving the same fork to double spend, prefer it, vote on it and accept it. (The higher the % of malicious nodes within the network and the 20 sampled of course, the more successful the attack).</p><p>So how do you thwart or minimise the likelihood of such an attack occuring?<br>You guessed it right, you centralize Avalanche and you only select to query the 20 nodes with the highest stakes.</p><p>But hold on!<br>Something just doesn’t add up in this model! <br>What if the nodes with the highest stakes are the ones trying to pull that double spend, or mint free money? <br>Who’s going to prevent that? <br>Will they get slashed for behaving maliciously? No. <br>Will they lose their stake if they voted on 2 different forks with cheap chit? No.</p><p>Unlike Bitcoin which demands expensive energy to be able to fork a longer chain, manipulating history on Avalanche seems like a random walk, especially when you’re controlling all the stakes to get elected all the time, with no built-in penalties in your protocol to prevent you from abusing your own chain.</p><p>Now, I’m not saying that the nodes with the highest stakes are going to attempt such a feat. All I’m saying is, “YOU HAVE TO TRUST THEM NOT TO DO SOMETHING BAD”, which defeats the whole purpose of a decentralized Blockchain in the first place.</p><p>As mentioned in the beginning of this article, initial trust in a handful of nodes/developers to bootstrap a PoS network may be required at genesis, as long as the ultimate goal is to distribute that trust, and as long as you are able to do so. The issue I have with the Avalanche protocol, is that it is designed to remain centralized and under the control of only a handful of wealthiest nodes.</p><p>Unfortunately, The Avalanche protocol just cannot scale, and as much as Avalanche likes to claim it is decentralised, the Nakamoto Coefficient doesn’t lie. The number of nodes may lie, but the stakes don’t lie. The Nakamoto Coefficient represents the number of validators that would have to collude together to successfully slow down or block any respective blockchain from functioning properly, and here’s the number for Avalanche, estimated at 26 by a few sources online. As I’ve shown above, it’s actually lower than that. It’s only 14.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vzGh01JCHMerqvp-ZoKCKw.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6q99g0UBupwdfwv4WZZmiQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Now compare that with the full 39 seats of the Hedera Hashgraph Council members who will be the initial set of nodes bootstrapping the network.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CjUnBhm7kq0EdEB9R8NpAQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Hedera is starting with an initial set of 39 nodes. Community nodes are estimated to gradually join later this year as well. <br>The Hedera Governing Council Members running the nodes are not currently required to purchase and hold Hbar. The Hedera nodes running the network are not staking Hbar yet. <br>The way the system is architected currently is as follows:<br>The Hedera Treasury consists of multiple cryptographically secure, multi-signature accounts.<br>The Treasury Account delegates (proxy- stakes) its Hbars to the nodes equally, so every node votes with equal stake on the order of transactions.<br>This is a temporary measure. <br>Once Hedera goes permissionless, any node will be able to participate in consensus with any amount of Hbars it stakes. <br>All nodes are equal, all nodes get queried, a truly optimized aBFT PoS mechanism.</p><p>This PoS IS NOT an election mechanism to filter the powerful. On Hedera, you vote your true weight with a scarce resource called Hbar, which will only get more expensive as utility grows and the network expands, a valuable resource which you have to pay for to acquire.</p><p>It is COSTLY to acquire 16 Billion Hbars to attack the system, and the more you buy of it to try and corner the market, the higher you’ll have to go and chase the price.<br> In Hedera, CHITS are not allowed.</p><p>The snowman++ consensus on the C-Chain (Smart contract linear blockchain) is geared towards even more optimization… <br>Or should I more accurately say…CENTRALIZATION!</p><p>Unlike the X-chain, the C-Chain relegates the ability of nodes to asynchronously propose blocks to the background, practically redesigning the “leaderless” part of Avalanche as a contingency plan, and instead, to speed things up and reduce the many forks on the linear blockchain, C-chain introduces a random selection mechanism for only 6 nodes (waiting in line for 5 seconds each) at each block height. And, as you might have already guessed, these 6 nodes are selected according to stake weight. So now we’re down from 1600 nodes proposing blocks at blockchain height H to only…1 node.</p><p>From the GitHub page, we read the below:<br> <a href="https://github.com/ava-labs/avalanchego/blob/v1.6.0-fuji/vms/proposervm/README.md">https://github.com/ava-labs/avalanchego/blob/v1.6.0-fuji/vms/proposervm/README.md</a></p><p>“-Validators are pseudo-randomly sampled without replacement by weight, seeded by S.<br> -maxWindows number of subnet validators are retrieved in order from the sampled set. maxWindows is currently set to 6.<br> -Each proposer gets assigned a submission window of length WindowDuration. currently set at 5 seconds”</p><p>In layman&#39;s terms, 6 nodes with the highest stakes are chosen for each block height just in case, but 1 ultimately proposes, and gossips the block. Now this part is not very clear to me (I couldn’t find any documentation), but I’m going to assume that upon receiving that block, all nodes validate and then query again the 14 nodes with the highest stakes for their preference to check if any conflicting fork exists, and just follow the same Avalanche protocol until the fork with the highest success counter is approved. <br> Are the confidence and consecutive success=20 parameters the same on both the X-chain and the C-chain? Mystery!</p><p>You see on Hedera, you have 1 chain, you have 1 DAG, and you transfer assets, and you do smart contracts and a lot of other things, and everything is totally ordered, and it’s asynchronous aBFT and it’s leaderless…</p><p>But most importantly, in Hedera you vote with your Hbar because the Hashgraph Algorithm is truly…</p><p>DECENTRALIZED…</p><p>I’ll just end with a final short comparison. <br>Decentralization is also the capability for a consensus protocol to scale. Sharding is one way to measure scale. <br>There is a limit to how much throughput and latency one shard can tolerate.<br>Hedera is capable of tens of thousands of TPS, 3 seconds latency and deterministic finality. With these powerful aBFT features, Hedera is able to issue state proofs necessary for inter-blockchain communication. Every round, every node changes the state of its accounts, computes a state root hash and gossips it to the rest of the network to get 2/3 signatures on it. <br>In layman&#39;s terms, It’s like a proof that certifies that whatever a single node IS communicating to another shard, it is indeed the 2/3 consensus of its own shard and that it’s not lying about it. You cannot forge a state proof. You can learn more from Dr. Leemon Baird at 23:10 onwards. <br> <a href="https://youtu.be/mYrTBxfanPU">https://youtu.be/mYrTBxfanPU</a></p><p>Avalanche cannot scale and decentralize because Avalanche doesn’t shard.<br> Avalanche doesn’t shard because state Proofs in Avalanche are expensive, slow and unsafe to produce (Probabilistic finality is not good enough).<br> A shard in Avalanche cannot trust another shard. <br> Don’t take my word for it, listen to Zaki Manian, ex Director at Tendermint Labs (Cosmos) and Emin Gun Sirer, Founder of Avalanche, discuss interoperability (from min 48:30 to 50:10)<br> <a href="https://youtu.be/WL4vdAR0vSs">https://youtu.be/WL4vdAR0vSs</a></p><p>Here’s a snapshot from the Telegram channel that seems to refer to the same issue. (I am unable to confirm the veracity of the claims though):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VfBWiL3mFCbUVmvpXWE7pA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Conclusion 1:<br> Avalanche’s algorithm protects its network by always making sure they have a high probability of electing the good guys to give you consensus (Chosen by Stake weight). This assumes perpetual trust in the good guys. That’s a weak assumption. <br> Verdict: <br> Semi-Trustless system. Semi-decentralized.</p><p>Conclusion 2:<br> Hedera protects its network by preventing ANYONE (The good guys and the bad guys) from acquiring 1/3rd of its total coins. It makes no assumptions of who’s good or bad. No single minority is in control, and everyone weighs in. <br> Verdict: <br> Trustless system. Highly Decentralized</p><p>I could go on and on, but that’s enough comparisons for one article.<br> <br> If there’s a conclusion to be drawn here, it is the fact that most people don’t really understand the true meaning of decentralization when it relates to blockchains and the purpose decentralization is aiming to achieve. <br> Sure enough, It is not always black and white, and decentralization is definitely a spectrum.<br> Its boundaries is constantly being stretched and redefined.</p><p>Finally, despite my rough take on the Avalanche protocol, my respect goes to all the smart researchers on both the Hedera and the Avalanche team. <br>Different blockchains for different purposes and usecases.</p><p>May all the good blockchains prosper</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c2d7aad94ad2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[AMA HEDERA HASHGRAPH]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@EidDany/hedera-hashgraph-12b2cf92ef2e?source=rss-8bae5544d1a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/12b2cf92ef2e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dany Eid]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jun 2021 20:51:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-09-24T15:48:13.808Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Blockchain HEC, France</h3><h3>An English translated transcript of &quot;AMA Hedera Hashgraph&quot;, a French presentation held by Greg Scullard, Lead Developer Advocate at Hedera, at Blockchain HEC, France.</h3><p><a href="https://youtu.be/TvOHRtJKfNE">https://youtu.be/TvOHRtJKfNE</a></p><p>I’m only going to highlight below one relevant point mentioned in the first half of the AMA, which lead me to ask Greg specifically about Automotive and Insurance, topics he will further elaborate on during the Q&amp;A part. The first half of the presentation is a generic overview of Hedera Hashgraph and its well-known features, which most in the community are familiar with, so I’ll immediately translate the Q&amp;A part instead.</p><h4>&quot;<em>One thing I like the most vis-a-vis my job on a daily basis, is the fact I spent a lot of time in Telecommunications, I was a bit verticalized, I was a bit specific to that domain, and now I’m really exposed to all industries, whether it’s the Automotive, whether it’s Insurance, and you can imagine all the usecases that could exist, it spans all industries and it’s super interesting</em>&quot; Greg Scullard min 9:00</h4><p>Beginning of Q&amp;A at min 29:20</p><h3><strong>Question: Can you elaborate more on the token economy in Hedera?</strong></h3><p><strong>Answer</strong>: Yeah, sure, but beforehand and as discussed, I’m not going to go into the speculative aspect.</p><p>Hbar exists for 2 reasons, the first is to pay transaction fees, the operation fees on the network, so someone who wants to create a token or wants to exchange Hbars with someone else has to pay the operation costs in Hbars. <br>So that’s the first reason, the second, consequently, is that this allows as well for securing the network simply because the Hashgraph consensus, once it determines an operation, doesn’t calculate the number of nodes but determines the weight of that node in Hbars.</p><p>So currently, the Council Members are the only ones elligible to operate nodes, said otherwise, the 50 Billion existing Hbars are nominally distributed and divided equally between these nodes, such as each node has equal voting power at the consensus level. Eventually, it’ll be possible to bring your own wallet portfolio to a node, to add to this node whatever is in that wallet, so if a node holds 10 Hbars, or 10% of votes and then I add 2 Hbars through proxy staking, the node now has 12% in voting power.</p><p>So by staking your wallet funds to a node, You augment the weight of that node at the voting level. This helps secure the network, such that anyone can bring in their weight to the voting process, and you could eventually choose which node to add your weight to, without the need for locking your coins. So you are still able to transact with your Hbars whilst they are being &quot;lent&quot; to that node, they are neither blocked nor stuck as is the case in other networks.</p><p>And because of the characteristics of the Hashgraph consensus, slashing is not even required either. We have a lot of documentation and papers on that, but if a node is byzantine or behaves maliciously, it’ll cost it Hbars to do so, so roughly speaking, we don’t need to fine that wallet to dissuade it from doing that, which is once again different from a lot of other networks whereas if you operate a node and behave maliciously, you are at risk of losing your stake. That is not the case with Hedera.</p><p>So the Governing Council today is owning a large majority, more than 2 thirds of Hbar, during this bootstrapping stage. Once the Governing Council determines that enough Hbars are now well distributed amongst the community, it will eventually be possible to operate a node on the network, this wouldn’t only be limited to governing members, but the network will become fully public, fully open.</p><p>That’s a risk we cannot take today, simply because Hedera’s market cap isn’t high enough and the price of Hbar isn’t high enough, which could eventually tempt anyone to behave maliciously without necessarily risking big financial losses or otherwise. So during this development or bootstrapping phase, we secure the network via the trust we bring through the Governing Council.</p><h3><strong>Question: What is Hedera’s business model, and the History of Hashgraph?</strong></h3><p><strong>Answer</strong>: At the Cryptoeconomic level and the incentives we have to operate a node. Each transaction has a cost, and this transaction cost is divided between nodes. <br>In other words, to remunerate the nodes participating in consensus, and in deciding if a transaction should be validated in the network or not, they are compensated in Hbars proportionally to operation costs.</p><p>So a node operator will eventually be able to profit from that node’s operations, once naturally we start having enough transactions per second, compare that to the actual model, where in most cases or at least in PoW, you do the work to gain the right to publish a block, and this right is what grants you a revenue.</p><p>So in Hedera, it’s more a question of, if we participate in that network and validate operations, we are remunerated almost in real time. So that’s the remuneration model for the nodes.</p><p>To go back a bit to the History of Hedera, Leemon Baird, who is one of our co-founders, is a mathematician in his spare time. He started in Computer Science, but he loves Mathematics, and spends his free time trying to solve hard math problems that have existed for a long time. He recently shared in a Townhall, which is a monthly meetup with Mance and Leemon, where he explained he was trying to solve a theorem, which existed for a while, one that nobody ever managed to resolve. and one of these theorems or one of these problematics is “voting” in distributed networks. So you have these voting algorithms at the heart of these distributed systems, which are the most secure today, but are also the most expensive in terms of network bandwidth, and in practice, outside the lab where they were experimented, they were never really implemented in the public domain.</p><p>They are the most secure, so secure that they are nearly impossible to use.<br>So Leemon set himself to solve this problem and resolve the issue, and found this notion of Gossip about Gossip, which effectively allowed him to implement at the heart of the Hashgraph consensus algorithm that same secure voting principle, but in a virtual way.<br>So he eliminated all that heavy weight off of those voting algorithms, he rendered them highly elegant, simple and efficient.<br>This was back in 2015, even before distributed systems were even launched. <br>He committed himself to codifying this algorithm, in Java at the time and today still, then both Leemon and Mance were challenged in a way to prove this algorithm could function, so they met with private enterprises and deployed this algorithm purely in private settings, to prove that at the heart of an enterprise running on distributed nodes, this algorithm was effectively capable of synchronizing multiple databases, multiple systems in a completely asynchronous and efficient manner.</p><p>Having proved that in the private domain, they then decided to launch Hedera, and grant it the license to use the Hashgraph consensus algorithm.</p><p>Then they were demonstrating about governance, about everything that was lacking at some point in distributed ledgers today, to really allow ledgers to take off and become usable by most people, the microcosm we know today.</p><h3><strong>Question: What is the position of Hedera vis-à-vis its competitors such as Algorand, Solana, Ripple, maybe Tezos as well, compared to mass adoption, and usecases related to future digital currencies?</strong></h3><p><strong>Answer</strong>:I don’t come from the crypto world, I was mostly in Telecom, in private enterprises with Cisco... So my past is less crypto, and more enterprise oriented than maybe crypto in general, so what we are actually seeing a lot of today, and even a few months back with only 15 council members instead of 19, is that a lot of enterprises were saying then, &quot;You know 39, we don’t need that many, 15 is enough for us&quot;.</p><p>These enterprises were looking for a public network managed by names they recognized, and brands they were able to trust, rather than having to trust instead a group of developers working in a corner, or a network that is operated by a leader which may not necessarily be democratic. There again, you have that notion of trusting a larger management group comprised of all these different enterprises around the world, which, like I previously said, means that even without 39 but 15 members, the majority of these enterprises were content with the level of decentralization that exists today. We are working on 39, but that is not an issue for these enterprises.</p><p>Then you have all these issues about Forking. Unfortunately, everything related to cryptocurrencies has this financial lure to it, and often a dispute at the heart of an organization or a network’s management could result in a fork and the creation of a second network, like what happened with a lot of networks until a recent past, simply because, not only do you have this technical disagreement, but for those willing to launch this parallel network, you arguably have this very attractive financial incentive, which makes it somehow very tempting to split from the original network.</p><p>We, on the other hand, are banking on stability, on those operation costs fixed in dollars that aren’t going to massively fluctuate on a weekly basis, with real performance capabilities and all the security attributes that come along.</p><p>I say this because when we market our TPS, it’s sometimes easy to pull under the rug certain aspects pertaining to security. So you have a leader, and this effectively allows you to go much faster, but this leader is susceptible to being attacked, and this complicates stuff, so you always have to weigh things...</p><p>In blockchain, you always mention this trilemma: security, decentralization and TPS scalability, and in general, when you improve upon one element, you lose a bit on the others. <br>Hashgraph is one of the first consensus algorithms that does not compromise on any of those elements. <br>I regularly talk to Leemon. The security of the network is his first priority. We’re not going to do 100,000 tps tomorrow, although we could. A little modification to the network’s configuration, and we’re able to do 100,000 TPS, but security could be compromised and this is a big no no.</p><h3><strong>Question: Can you give us some information on the ongoing efforts with the governing council members related to a potential CBDC, the US and the Fed, South Korea with Shinhan Bank, and Africa with Standard Bank?</strong></h3><p><strong>Answer</strong>: Yeah sure, so without going much into details, we have indeed many banks on our Governing Council.</p><p>We are working as well, and this is public information, with an enterprise called EMTECH. If you follow our Twitter account, or Hedera related Twitter discussions, EMTECH has created many prototypes and sandboxes, which are testing and are verification environments for CBDCs. They are working with many banks around the world, mainly in the Caribbeans, so we hope and believe Hedera has the necessary properties to operate a digital currency.</p><p>Personally, I think and feel a lot of tension in the Crypto community, because a digital currency for some is a currency that’s fully open to the public, like stablecoins such as USDC and USDT, and for the big banks, this is a way perhaps to improve things on the operational level, and perhaps on expenditures as well, but not necessarily to render everything public, and somewhere I’m thinking as well that many big enterprises don’t really fancy seeing their bank accounts exposed to the public, so I believe we’re going to reach a hybrid model of private networks that rely on a public network for consensus, but the operations themselves will be privatised inside a private network.</p><p>A big discussion in the Crypto world.</p><h3><strong>Question: You mentioned earlier that Hbar price needs to rise to secure the network. How do you plan to impact the Crypto markets to raise the price and pursue your goals of opening your nodes to the public</strong></h3><p><strong>Answer</strong>: Hedera behaves differently than many other networks, and one of the reasons is a legal one. Once we start marketing, or even try to do market making within exchanges, which we don’t do to boost the value of our cryptocurrency, we become immediately susceptible to a lot of potential issues vis-à-vis the regulators or the regulatory bodies. Since we have big enterprises that trust us, we also seek their trust, and refrain from creating the buzz around the subject of HBAR, instead we create a buzz, whenever possible, around the platform, its technology and its capabilities.</p><p>The hope and certainly the idea is, as things progress, and adoption of the platform increases, and this could take a while, we shouldn’t fool ourselves, big enterprises don’t necessarily have their usecases handy, many need to be convinced, many need to understand how this all works, &quot;why shouldn’t I simply use the centralized database I’ve been using for the past 15 years&quot; , so there’s a lot of education at this level that’s ongoing, but with adoption and the demand for Hbar to pay transactions, this should create an economy where such demand should result in price appreciation, but this will indeed be an organic appreciation, rather than a speculative one, based on the utility of the network.</p><h3><strong>Question: Can you talk a bit about the Eftpos usecase in Australia, can you elaborate if it&#39;s being used in real, on the mainnet, or was it just a test. Any issues, what was the feedback?</strong></h3><p><strong>Answer</strong>: At the moment, no, Eftpos is not using it in production. It was a test, a proof of concept, a validation in fact. It was implemented before Eftpos became a Council Member.</p><p>So to answer your question if it was a success, if we had issues… It was such a success that they ended up becoming Council Members.</p><p>It went extremely well, and they are now in a reflection phase, to think over how they would be better suited using the platform, and for them it’s not just a matter of creating a cryptocurrency, but rather creating usecases around that cryptocurrency. So for example, it could be such as making sure that when I consult an online website, instead of paying for a monthly or yearly subscription, I pay a small proportion of an Australian cryptocurrency, or an Australian stablecoin, for the right to visualise an article or another. So what’s really interesting for me with what we’ve done with them is not just electronic payment or cryptocurrency, but it’s micropayments which becomes possible. We’re talking about a fraction of a cent for a transaction, so if I wanted to pay 10 cents in Euro to view an article, economically it’s feasible, whereas with most of the platforms today, 10 cents to view an article but I’m paying 3 Euros for the transaction, that’s not very efficient.</p><p>So instead of just launching an Australian stablecoin, they are really seeking to create that ecosystem that goes beyond a mere stablecoin.That will allow for a more global and wider adoption.</p><p>I think they’re really looking at, say you have an Eftpos Debit Card, we’ll call it E-Eftpos, it’s a wallet, and we start having Australian dollars in stablecoins, but we can also use it in an ecosystem, not simply peer to peer, but also with shops, merchants and others...<br>So voila, a reflection and a discovery period for Eftpos.</p><h3><strong>Question: You mentioned earlier your interaction with the Automobile and Insurance industries, can you please elaborate on any potential partnerships?</strong></h3><p><strong>Answer</strong>: I cannot disclose any particular names, but we are exploring a few avenues at the GC membership level. What I can say for instance, is that we have worked closely on a POC with a big European car manufacturer, logging the history of modifications happening at the vehicle software level, so when the microcode of a vehicle is modified, and gets updated, all these alterations are tracked, traced, and notarized into consensus, such as that this tracking and tracing is recorded and becomes immutable.</p><p>We can then imagine all the usecases related to car maintenance etc, in the network of an Automative Manufacturer...<br>All of this is centralized today, and not necessarily easy to maintain on a daily basis... So there you go, those are usecases we are looking into...</p><p>We are also further looking into...I mentioned connected objects and then everything related to carbon, with Electrical Vehicles... You have EDF for example, who joined our Council very recently, and is pretty much interested in a lot of usecases related to Carbon Credit exchanges, so if I produce Electricity, but then I consume it in the car, how will these exchanges occur...<br>And the above, consequently, might end up involving eventual car manufacturers...</p><h3><strong>Question: I have a question on the modality of your partnerships, without going into details, like with an enterprise such as EDF, how does it work concretely when they aboard Hedera, and tell you they need to take it further?</strong></h3><p><strong>Answer</strong>: Well it takes different forms. I’d say the first ones were the most difficult, because when you are a big enterprise, like IBM or Deutsche Telekom, or Swisscom at the time, to bring one’s name to a public distributed ledger, a technology that was rather novel…</p><p>And then in the Crypto world you have this notoriety perhaps, it wasn’t that easy of a sales pitch I’d say, because of course they’re attaching their brands to it, so if we ever &quot;fail&quot; , they become associated with this &quot;failure&quot; , so there you go, failure was not an option.</p><p>I am also aware that on the legal side, and let’s not forget what I mentioned earlier, they are full owners of Hedera, so you have rules, and everything is public on our website. You have a Charter, and obviously, at the beginning, we may not have gotten everything 100% right, so we had to do minor modifications at the legal level…</p><p>But then we discuss it with a group, for example with Swisscom, and they need to modify it, and this modification has to be brought to Deutsche Telekom as well, and then brought to Magalu too, and then IBM, so you can imagine the difficulty and the complexity to synchronize, you’d think you’d need a DLT for that 😊, synchronize all these lawyers&#39; teams, before they are ready to sign on paper.</p><p>After the first Ten cycles with these early adopters it became a lot easier because in fact we had a more fluid system, we had a Charter and a contract which was almost fully tight, which has already been verified by almost everybody, so it became easier.</p><p>And then for someone today to be associated with Hedera has become easier, since they are not the early ones anymore. <br>In the beginning, it was more like negotiating an assault course to obtain these first partnerships... <br>I say partnerships, but I’d really like to stress that it’s more than just partnerships.</p><p>Now, we’re having discussions with many, who often immediately and rapidly join the Council, with usecases already in mind, and then they start working on them, but they become part of the council before they start working internally on projects.</p><p>Others like Eftpos, as I mentioned earlier, did a PoC and we worked with them to validate and verify the technology before they were willing to impose their brand and their stamp.</p><p>So there you go, it’s pretty much organic, quite flexible depending on the organizations we work with, knowing that, and that I am neither sure nor persuaded of, but since we need 11 different verticals, if a bank today came to meet us, and we already have a few, or a Telecom came to meet us and we already have a few, there are big chances we’d ask them to wait for their turn, until another Telco rotates and we’re able to accept them. <br>It’ll eventually be an interesting situation to have, when we’ll be asked on such matters.</p><p>I just like to echo an anecdote from Lionel Chocron, who is our VP Products who once said:&quot; <em>For a lot of these enterprises, to invest in Hedera, it’s as laborious as acquiring an enterprise. It is the same process</em>&quot;</p><p>As was mentioned yesterday in an interview, they become full owners of Hedera. This may have an impact on their annual reports, they may need to explain why they’re operating a node, how much it is costing them, what’s their revenue, etc... So it has a larger impact then simply stating &quot;Yeah! we want to participate, and that’s it! &quot;. It’s an elaborate process, relatively complex, but which is becoming more affordable, yet not to be underestimated.</p><h3><strong>Question: Can you elaborate a bit on the Dovu Project? What is Dovu and what will they contribute to the environment?</strong></h3><p><strong>Answer</strong>: I’m not familiar with the project, but my understanding is it’s related to Carbon Credit exchange. So what we see nowadays is, a producer of carbon credits eventually able to exchange them with a carbon consumer, to make sure carbon neutrality is achieved. <br>So in a lot of usecases, what we find is that the producers of decarbonised energy transform this energy into a token which represents the carbon quantity that was saved. This token might then become exchangeable in a marketplace, so for example if I have solar panels in my house, I could sell my carbon tokens on that marketplace to someone, somewhere in the world, who is himself a carbon consumer, and needs to rebalance his account to achieve net zero by buying my tokens.</p><p>This is where we start having usecases at the token level, and you have minting and burning happening in real time. <br>We’re working also very closely with Interwork Alliance who study much everything related to tokens, the taxonomy and the definition of these tokens. We’re working closely with them to define tokens that represent for example these notions of carbon and energy.</p><h3><strong>Question: Today everything is declarative, how is decarbonised energy concretely verified?</strong></h3><p><strong>Answer</strong>: it’s indeed declarative, and I believe in certain cases, some are even able to value their carbon credits twice. In other words, I sell them once to someone, and then I sell them again to someone else, but at the carbon level, only one credit was issued and not two.</p><p>We are looking at a lot of applications, where we’re joining multiple technologies, the likes of Decentralized Identity and Verifiable Credentials. In other words, the supply chain is going to sign the KWh that it’s producing, it’s going to bring electronic and cryptographic signatures to the information that’s being produced. <br>This signature needs to be verified through a party issuing that credential, who in turn needs to be verified.</p><p>In other words, we can verify that I am indeed an accredited producer, accredited by EDF for example or a big public group that’s responsible for such accreditations, and consequently the data I’m generating becomes verifiable. <br>They could be hence attributed to me, they could be verified, and this then serves to create a token. All the chain of that token’s production, its consumption, its utilisation etc, behaves a bit like a product manufacturing supply chain, where the whole traceability exists and everything is verifiable from end to end, so we avoid a big part of that declarative aspect which omits verification, and solve the double spend issue that exists in this industry.</p><h3><strong>Question: What can you say about the development of the Hedera French community in France, in Europe and other countries?</strong></h3><p><strong>Answer</strong>: Yeah, it’s a bit true, I am part of a French Telegram group, with not much activity happening there. There’s also in our Discord a French group, where once again less activity is noticed. I have to admit that I’m more of a taker than a community developer. To put it otherwise, if people in France are interested in Hedera but do not necessarily want to ask English technical questions or participate in English groups, I’m more than ready to reply to their questions in French, and create this francophone community, but it’s true I’m not much into the modus operandi of Sales or Community creation. I’m not super active in this domain.</p><h3><strong>Question:How can the Insurance Industry benefit from DLT and Enterprise DeFi?</strong></h3><p><strong>Answer</strong>: There are a lot of usecases, particularly related to programmability... A lot of insurers today, mostly in the USA since I haven&#39;t necessarily seen such in France, talk of what is referred to as parametric insurance.</p><p>In other words, if we are insured against floods for example, and that it is proven it rained 50 centimeters in a particular region, and this information is verifiable, some insurers will indemnify their clients with a pre-specified payout, to provide against potential deteriorations.</p><p>So this pre-specified payout amount could end up being either higher than the necessary costs of deterioration or reparation, or eventually cheaper...But it&#39;s more economical...The fees are cheaper as well, and you avoid all the evaluations that require a lot of time etc... So in cases related to natural disasters, this allows a more agile reaction vis-a-vis compensation, avoiding the need to send experts to report valuations, counter estimations etc, relying instead on meteorological data.</p><p>So if proof is collected via multiple organizations, and what eventually comes to mind is the equivalent of an Oracle in blockchain which allows the aggregation of multiple data, at this moment, the insurance contract goes immediately into effect...<br>This is related to individual insurance...</p><p>Certain usecases I have discussed with insurers are related to containers crossing oceans...</p><p>If I have a container full of crystal glasses departing from China, and 50 are broken at arrival, I need to prove that...I need to prove that everything went alright...You need an expert to be present...He needs to count the broken glasses etc...But if you had a vibration sensor in that container, and let’s say a specific number is crossed, then it is estimated a 100 glasses have been broken, and I could be compensated right away. I could either have a lost or a winning case, but this accelerates the compensation procedures in a consequent manner...</p><p>All this needs to be verifiable though, so we need the traceability of the vibration measurements of this sensor, or the temperature measurements of that other sensor, and as long as we can verify this traceability...We can effectively consider triggering automatic compensation contracts. This is one example.</p><h3><strong>Question: Once the 39 members have been chosen, how do you plan to elect their replacements at the end of their mandate?</strong></h3><p><strong>Answer</strong>: This is going to be the task of one of the Governing Council committees, a committee specialised in &quot;Recruiting&quot;. Their role between the 39 will be to decide the next candidates, the ones we would have managed to recruit through somewhat of a traditional sales process, it&#39;s for them to decide who will be the next to come. So it&#39;s a voting process that will be executed by the 39 governing council Members</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=12b2cf92ef2e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[An HBAR Saga]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@EidDany/an-hbar-saga-7785e26b50ec?source=rss-8bae5544d1a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7785e26b50ec</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dany Eid]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Mar 2021 14:45:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-22T05:09:12.907Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>MY HBAR SAGA</strong></h3><p>My HBAR token pursues a goal</p><p>Accrues in value, rejoices my soul</p><p>I once wished upon a star</p><p>HBAR will moon, will make it far</p><p>My HBAR passion shall never wane</p><p>My sleepless nights won’t go in vain</p><p>Patience is a virtue I long to perceive</p><p>Before I’m able my dreams to achieve</p><p>If ever in doubt, I cast the demon</p><p>I close my eyes, and trust in Leemon</p><p>I purchase Hbar, that’s financial advice</p><p>How else would I make it any otherwise</p><p>I jump ahead, I throw the dice</p><p>I take a risk, I don’t think twice</p><p>I bid that order, I take a chance</p><p>I Hodl HBAR, but so does Mance</p><p>Today I awoke and cursed my luck</p><p>Erratic markets eroded my buck</p><p>Trader’s mistakes along the way</p><p>If that’s the price I have to pay</p><p>Candles green reverse and crumble</p><p>On bumpy rides the price may stumble</p><p>It’s all but hurdles so you may learn</p><p>Hodling is a virtue you ought to earn</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7785e26b50ec" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[HBAR HOLY COMMANDMENTS]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@EidDany/hbar-holy-commandments-9f38a716fdf7?source=rss-8bae5544d1a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9f38a716fdf7</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dany Eid]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 28 Mar 2021 21:00:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-31T17:49:50.976Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>HBAR HOLY COMMANDMENTS</strong></p><p>And Hbar spoke all these words:<br><br>I am Hbar your Coin, who brought you out of the land of Fiat, out of the land of slavery<br><br>1-Thou shalt have no other Coins before me</p><p>2-Thou shalt not make for yourself an image of Cardano, in a digital form in heaven above, on the earth beneath or a logo of it in the waters below.</p><p>You shall not bow down to it or worship it, for I, Hbar your Coin am a jealous Coin, punishing children nodes for the forking of the parent nodes, to the third and fourth round for those who misuse my protocol, but granting rewards to a thousand rounds to those who love me and implement my protocol.</p><p>3-Thou shalt not FUD the name of Hbar your Coin in vain.</p><p>4-Thou shalt remember Starbucks Day by keeping it Holy. Six days you shall invest and trade, but the seventh day is Starbucks day to Hbar your Coin. On that day, you shall Hodl, for in six years Leemon made the Hashgraph, HCS, HTS and all that is in them, then he initiated the network and rested on Starbucks Day. Therefore the community blessed Starbucks day and made it Holy.</p><p>5-Thou shalt honor founder and co-founder, Leemon and Mance, so that you may always trade long in the land of crypto.</p><p>6-Thou shall not murder, your byzantine actions are logged in an immutable ledger.</p><p>7-Thou shalt not commit adultery with Cardano’s founder, even if he proposes a “job”.</p><p>8-Thou shalt not steal another’s Hbars or private keys.</p><p>9-Thou shalt not give false testimony against other ledgers, even if their tech is patented.</p><p>10-Thou shalt not covet Hoskinson’s blockchain. Thou shalt not covet his coin Ada Lovelace, his governance model Voltaire, his sidechain solution Basho, his decentralisation scheme Shelley or his Guogen smart contracts, or anything that belongs to the IOHK foundation.<br><br>When the Cardano community saw the aBFT thunder, the lightning TPS, heard the trumpet playing “I’m the new best thing”, and saw the mountain in smoke, they trembled with fear.<br><br>Exodus (Not the Wallet) Chapter 20, Verses 1,18<br><br><em>P.S: The above commandments were patented over 2 tablets of stone and cannot be forked</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9f38a716fdf7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bitcoin Price Technical Analysis]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@EidDany/bitcoin-price-technical-analysis-232e969d316d?source=rss-8bae5544d1a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/232e969d316d</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dany Eid]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 29 Nov 2020 11:44:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-12-02T12:39:13.658Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Bitcoin Price Technical Analysis</strong></p><p>I have to admit beforehand.</p><p>I am not a trader myself. I have never actively participated in any retail market trading activities, and my only contribution to the space is a one time crypto-currency investment I bought into, last February of 2020.</p><p>Regardless, I’ll have my own attempt at my first interpretation of Bitcoin’s chart price action, using observation patterns, and the more common Technical Analysis tools, which I have a basic understanding of.</p><p>It’s useful to remind the reader that TA is not an exact science, but more of an art form, since past performance is never indicative of future price action. Price is merely the result of “real-time” supply and demand dynamics at play, is not predictable, and could easily sway in any direction, whether bearish or bullish, regardless of past chart data.</p><p>With that in mind, my chart “observations” could be erroneous, over-analysed, and should never be taken as financial advice to either sell or buy.</p><p>All chart price action is roughly similar, comprising mainly of either green or red candles, and the patterns one observes could be purely coincidental or even intentionally correlated together to suit a trader’s bias.</p><p>This analysis is pure technical fun combined with a bit of graphical correlations, and does not take into consideration any fundamental inputs or any adoption metrics into it, thus is highly speculative.</p><p>I’ll start by saying that my chart “observations” lead me to believe that despite the bullish run we’ve had over the past few months, Bitcoin could still be in a corrective phase overall in the short run, and might be trading in a range for a while, below its 20,000$ ATH. It might temporarily break above it, yet won’t be able to sustain it through, unless further demand and greater adoption are confirmed.</p><p>But let’s get into some chart “observations”, and I encourage you to investigate the dates, timeframes and patterns below on your own charts, so you get a better feel and understanding.</p><p><strong>Same pattern unfolding?</strong></p><p>The ABC pattern observed from 26 Jun 2019 until 13 Mar 2020, is a “smaller” version, and is comprised within an identical “bigger” pattern that’s still unfolding, starting from 16 Dec 2017 until today. Here’s the smaller corrective pattern ABC:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7IoGNGFj2YbNGhTmjeeYGA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Below is the “bigger” pattern:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*q_N5LCZwd-aF3nPDfHLjDA.jpeg" /></figure><p>And visualized together:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Syv94kZwzzstupzkjsg5sw.jpeg" /></figure><p>I’m going to argue that these patterns are almost identical in their corrective nature and their respective waves structure and composition , to ultimately investigate if wave C in the “bigger” pattern above could be predicted from the “smaller” one, maybe try and predict where Bitcoin may be heading to next.</p><p>But let’s visually breakdown these patterns further. Moving forward, whenever I mention waves A, B, C, D or E, I’m referring to the similar waves in both figures below:</p><p>The same “smaller” ABC pattern labelled ABCDE now:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jEJF1WHNyBfEcz8akvB5pA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Which correlates to the “bigger” ABCDE pattern below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fxGEaEYctZrsRsnHZl0imw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The difference between those 2 corrective patterns is their baseline denoted in red. The “smaller” pattern draws a descending double “three” Elliot Wave like pattern or what is more commonly known as a WxYxZ pattern, whereas the “bigger” pattern seems to be following an ascending ABCDE triangular formation.</p><p>Let’s break each pattern’s wave components further, and indeed observe that each wave in both patterns have almost identical price action.</p><p>To avoid confusion, note that some ABC or 12345 annotations below are not meant to describe Elliott Waves counts. I just placed them so the reader correlates both “bigger”and “smaller” patterns by identifying and respectively matching the numbers and the colored waves (pink/blue)</p><p>So here’s the 4 hours graphical count in the “smaller”pattern A wave:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cvvxtj0fvJc7UrAHPw-3qA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Which price action is almost identical to “bigger” pattern A wave below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-upsPnWTf5cTcBveSjtXcQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Wave B (of ABCDE) in both patterns was an attempted rally after the initial correction, but both ultimately failed to breach the previous high.</p><p>4 hours “smaller”pattern wave B:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Gn8u7pmewX_UXB8nSNHkYg.jpeg" /></figure><p>And 4 hours “bigger” pattern wave B:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e_vsLEOLhIU6wZAFjwi4Uw.jpeg" /></figure><p>In the smaller pattern, wave B has a more corrective nature to it “Expanding Flat”, and is slightly different than its “bigger” counterpart which is a “Zigzag” .</p><p>Whereas many have mistaken wave B in the “bigger” pattern to be impulsive (the 2019 rally), and still consider it to be wave 1 in a 12345 bullish Elliott Wave count, my conclusion is that the rally from 3,000$ to 14,000$ was actually a corrective zigzag (ABC), validated by the 1 to 1 Fibonacci relationship between waves A and C, and the shallow 0.236% B retracement as shown below, parameters not found typically in impulsive waves 1 and 3.</p><p>Needless to say the subsequent price action and the retracement back to 4000$ invalidated the whole impulsive scenario:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mNnj5DJO7fnNOlfmVh2_Bg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Let’s move forward with both waves C of ABCDE, but let’s visualize them together on the chart, and break them both into 3 waves ABC:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Dyi7ruCPX9zq5Pq1n0DjBg.jpeg" /></figure><p>I won’t go too much into details here because the smaller pattern is becoming fractal, but we can zoom in into the 2 hours “smaller”A leg of the ABC pink color wave above, to see how it correlates to its corresponding “bigger” blue A wave above. We can clearly see the ABCDE subwave count and the similar price action in the below chart:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JszbI1P8xAumq-FyJUP9og.jpeg" /></figure><p>Now let’s dive into the D waves of ABCDE, shown together below, each divided into ABC patterns, and see how similar they are:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hpBo_vXdxl2xjGVuC-pmkQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Let’s check the 4 hours “smaller” pattern first, the rally from 18 Dec 2019 to 14 Feb 2019, which I’m arguing is similar to the rally we’re currently having, started 13 March 2020 and is unfolding until today:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Hv3FWPcXE4L_9XjBU4bKpQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Compare it to our “bigger” pattern that’s currently unfolding below. We’re currently in wave 4 of wave C, wave 5 still to unravel:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sYP1fUk8yucCQ_HIxWn9oQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>You can see the striking similitude. In both patterns, you have a 1 to 1 Fibonacci relationship in wave A, of waves 1,3,and 5 relative to each other. Wave C is 0.78% Fib extension of wave A in the “smaller” pattern, and a 100% Fib extension in the “bigger” pattern.</p><p>But let’s dive deeper in the final leg portion of wave C, showcased below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*g0nnLeCcWHvjIR2Ieu7h0Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>And let’s zoom in on the above chart, specifically on the 1 hour price action from 21st Oct 2020, moving forward until today. That’s the chart below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6GQAKupH3NipghY7v_12SQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Let’s compare it to the similar corresponding 1 hour “smaller” pattern price action, starting 28 Jan 2020,till 15 Feb 2020:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Cx32k3tkM2d5fs3yZt6z2w.jpeg" /></figure><p>And here are both price charts overlayed on top of each other:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nKDniyKDFcWYKg2d1CbaZw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Once again the price action similitude is striking. Could this mean, if the price is to remain visually correlated, that our current price action may be hitting a bottom at a resistance level (say roughly 15,800$ max), and then a rally up towards 20,000$ is to be expected , maybe even exceeding the previous ATH, before price retraces back significantly below?</p><p>Is the 1 hour price action below, starting on the 10th Feb 2020 similar to what’s awaiting Bitcoin in the short few days or weeks ahead ( We’re currently at a position similar to the blue arrow position)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dJU771ooSM6CeRhckWD-Lg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Zooming out of the time frame above, could further price action for Bitcoin correlate to the below?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HyVxV2aeIjL-jUY5pQwNhg.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>So where is Bitcoin heading to ?</strong></p><p>I’m going to consider both the bearish and the bullish scenarios for Bitcoin moving forward.</p><p>I’ll label them bullish, mildly bullish, and bearish.</p><p>But let’s start with the mildly bullish first, or what I like to call the 2024 pre-halving delayed bull run (The halving events are the vertical blue lines on the chart).</p><p>If the price action correlation denoted above was to continue, a strong corrective ABC is likely to be the pattern to unfold next, and the future price action of Bitcoin could look like the chart below, with the final E wave in our “bigger”ABCDE being the first ABC pattern drawn after the most recent price action. This correction will eventually be followed by an impulsive 12345 wave, as shown:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*P1AsjDVMPY-75FOYSvfzRg.jpeg" /></figure><p>With that pattern, Bitcoin will have completed a WXY corrective pattern from its ATH, W to 3000$, X to 20,000$, and Y to 6000$, before resuming the rally.</p><p>You may have noticed that all previous price corrections have systematically hovered around that middle red line. If you look closely, all 4 ABC blue corrective patterns depicted above, and the 2 smaller pink ABCs in the subwaves have consistently bumped against it. I’d like to think of it as Bitcoin’s fair value price, or Bitcoin’s median price at the current adoption rate, and it is currently hovering around 10,000$. If Bitcoin shoots higher, or dips deeper, its price eventually adjusts to that line’s mean, which is slowly but clearly heading up towards 20,000$.</p><p>A closer look at some ABC corrections bumping against that red line :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2i2lZqs8UIrIDpB0zrencg.jpeg" /></figure><p>So if an ABC correction is to unfold, revisiting that median line, price may dip further and bump against the 10,000$-12,000$ range again, repeating the smaller E wave pattern.(The price action that started mid Feb 2020 until mid March 2020).</p><p>If Bitcoin holds the middle red line (around 10,000$), and stays above it, we’re in the bullish scenario described below, or else Bitcoin shows further weakness, price dips further down towards the 6,000$, and halts at the red lower line. Bitcoin might eventually manage to rally, but it’ll take another halving, further adoption and greater demand to validate this mildly bullish trend.</p><p>A 2024 post-halving delayed bull run or the bearish scenario could look similar to the chart below. Bitcoin will basically trade within a range tracing an ABCDE corrective pattern, in an ascending triangle formation until finally breaking out above its ATH, as shown below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Vg40mkA1ZWNDbwZiGavL7Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>Now let’s examine the bullish case, and that’s Bitcoin never crossing below that median red line.</p><p>But let’s digress first to the price action prior to the recent 2020 Feb market crash.</p><p>What if that market crash was never destined to occur, could the price action have evolved any differently? What if price was initially headed the bullish way, up until that “Black Swan” event took the market by surprise, shifting sentiment overnight from its “greed” extreme to its “fear” extreme, eventually leading up to a massive market capitulation?</p><p>What if that D wave in the “smaller” pattern was labelled differently, and instead of being an ABC, was originally an impulsive wave 1 to begin with, comprised of 5 smaller waves as shown in the chart below?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aeqBLGQOIlvn3KIjq7_zFA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Despite the “123 corrective-like” appearance, the Fib relationships between the different waves correlate perfectly with a 12345 impulsive scenario, and the Fib retracement on the right clearly shows, the 50% and 61.8% levels supporting price for a short while (typical of a wave 2 pullback), suggesting the market buying at those levels, expecting a further wave 3 rally, succeeding a due correction.</p><p>Unfortunately that rally never came. Once price broke below the 61.8% level, market participants realised, too late, market sentiment had already shifted, and the dump was imminent.</p><p>Back to our recent “bigger” pattern D wave, and the market slowly recovering, it would only be fair to consider the probability of this wave switching from a corrective ABC to an impulsive wave, which we could label as below, with the Fib relationships perfectly maintained:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DV6l0BAJNYNHmEkxnDoz8g.jpeg" /></figure><p>Even if we consider the possibility of this wave being impulsive, I believe a major correction is to be expected.</p><p>That bull run was too extended to be sustainable, and the wave 2 shallow retracement at 23%, suggests that wave 4 could retrace as much as 50 to 61%, downwards to 12,000$.</p><p>And the price action that might ensue afterwards could look similar to the below, with a 1.61% extension of the current wave eventually leading Bitcoin to 40,000$:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kWFiWSEhR6Ybzl71Bg1sUw.jpeg" /></figure><p>I have to be clear though. In order to chart the bullish patterns above, I forecasted the typical Fibonacci relationships between motive waves, that’s wave 3 as a 1.61% extension of wave 1, and wave 5 as a 100% extension of wave 1.</p><p>If massive adoption was to kick in for Bitcoin with the advent of new financial on-ramp services and other catalysts for global demand, those Fib relationships could be further extended, and price might even reach higher.</p><p>I am not personally convinced that global demand is there yet though, and Bitcoin might require another halving for its built-in scarcity effect to kick in, all that assuming naturally that supply shortage is far exceeded by increasing, and most importantly sustainable demand.</p><p>Despite the long term potential bullish scenario, it could be that Bitcoin’s price might be trading in a range for a while, before “sustainably” breaking and maintaining its ATH.</p><p>Moreover, and assuming a degree of correlation is to pertain between Bitcoin price and the Equity markets, can we trace some relationships there?</p><p>Here are my “flat” projections for the markets for the short-term:</p><p><strong>S&amp;P chart price projection:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*f6sivOFh5ScywcW8Mlt80Q.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Dow Jones price projection:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bnIuNPduEzXthoNJx8Urmw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Markets have traced a similar 5 legs ABCDE expanding triangle pattern once before in History, back in 1966, and here are the charts:</p><p><strong>S&amp;P back in 1966:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BTCxn0sIZisdog4aP4PS5A.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Dow Jones back in 1966:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_jHscMPvpLVFiuZNELrYoQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Granted the wave correction timeframes back in 1966 were longer compared to the recent market corrections, one cannot but notice the similitude in patterns as well, and the flat trade-in-range price action that succeeded the ABCDE expanded triangular correction.</p><p><strong>A final word</strong></p><p>Where market sentiment is headed next is anyone’s best guess.</p><p>It would be appropriate to remind the reader that this piece is only meant to be read as “entertainment” analysis, and less of a scientific approach to predicting market behavior, thus shall not be construed as financial advice whatsoever. Market movements are not steered by technical analysis, but rather governed by the macro forces of supply and demand, forces an article written on a weekend afternoon would only dare begin to fathom.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=232e969d316d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[HEDERA HASHGRAPH vs BITCOIN: “a BETTER store of value”]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@EidDany/hedera-hashgraph-vs-bitcoin-a-better-store-of-value-a0393fb2b822?source=rss-8bae5544d1a------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a0393fb2b822</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Dany Eid]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2020 18:52:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-17T14:32:12.851Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>HEDERA HASHGRAPH vs BITCOIN: “<em>a BETTER store of value”</em></strong></p><p>A few months back, I published an article discussing the “technical” advantages a Distributed Ledger Technology implementing the Hashgraph algorithm had over Blockchain.</p><p>In this article, my exploration will try to uncover the well crafted components of Hedera’s economic architecture, and how they interact with each other to drive the value of the network.</p><p>Granted the timely business adoptions, I believe Hedera is poised to achieve a sustainable growth over the next following years, such growth to be reflected in the gradual valuation of its native cryptocurrency “Hbar”, a token well positioned to becoming the “Better” digital store of value on the Internet.</p><p>First and foremost, I’d like to state that my professional expertise is into Architecture (As in buildings, not IT systems). My learnings and research into microeconomics only started a month back and I hold a fair understanding of market supply and demand mechanisms, but nonetheless will try to present my case, to the best of my knowledge.</p><p>My aim is not to tackle this subject from a highly technical perspective, but instead convey through simplified logic, rather complex market dynamics, so that readers are able to evaluate the fundamentals behind Hbar economics, and make informed investment decisions accordingly.</p><p>We will attempt to understand the dynamics of supply and demand in Hedera’s Ecosystem, and how they specifically manifest and interact on the network. We will try roughly to quantify the impact of business application adoption over price appreciation and forecast the long term value of Hedera’s token” Hbar”.</p><p>The feedback from the Hedera Community on this tentative endeavour will be highly appreciated, and I will gladly adjust, improve, even redact potential inaccurate affirmations included in this article, if such is brought to my attention and understanding. I would highly welcome any professional expertise in the field of economic modeling, to help contribute to this article as well.</p><p>So let’s dive in.</p><p>Hbar is the Cryptocurrency used on the Hedera network. Hbar is a scarce commodity (Only 50 Billion Hbar will ever be minted ), it’s a useful digital good , sometimes referred to as a “Utility Token”, and is used for two purposes, to protect the network and transfer value between the network participants.</p><p><strong>Hbar has 2 main functions ( Security and Usability) :</strong></p><p>1)	Preventing Sybil attacks by weighing the votes of each participating node proportional to the cumulative sum of a node’s stake (How many Hbar in the node’s operator’s account) and a node’s proxy stake ( How many Hbar wallet users are “lending” to this node).</p><p>2)	Users/Applications using the network will pay nodes fees in Hbar, to compensate them for allocating their scarce resources ( RAM, CPU, Bandwidth, etc) to help the network secure the distributed ledger. Fees are denominated in $ dollars, but paid in Hbars.<br>The average fixed cryptocurrency and HCS transaction fee is set to 0,0001$.<br>Ex: if Hbar Exchange Rate=0,04$, One transaction cost is: (0,0001$/0,04=0,0025 Hbar)</p><p>Let’s try defining the types of Demand for Hbar token, which could be summarized as follows:</p><p><strong>1)	Speculative demand</strong><br>A)	Traders will day/swing trade Hbar using technical analysis tools, and will speculate over the near to mid term future valuation of the token.<br>(This demand is volatile, fluctuates between crypto platforms, is only for short to medium term profits and is ultimately supplied back to market in exchange for traditional fiat money).</p><p><strong>2)	Fundamental demand</strong><br>a)	Node operators buy Hbar to stake their nodes’ accounts towards consensus and get rewarded.<br>(This demand should be gradually increasing once available, once permissionless nodes are allowed at scale on the network)</p><p>b)	Users buy Hbar to proxy stake their accounts to reliable nodes and get rewarded.<br>(This demand should be gradually increasing once available, to be weighted in combination with other incentives. Stakers might reallocate funds to other platforms offering higher staking returns)</p><p>c)	Users buy Hbar to transfer value across accounts:<br>(This demand will be active between business accounts, IoT devices, etc).</p><p>d)	Users/Business Applications buy Hbar to pay transaction fees, to be able to use the network.<br>(This demand is fully optimised. Unique aBFT features and low transaction fees, allows Hedera to scale to potentially hundreds of shards, and thousands of transactions at scale, a comparative advantage over other platforms).</p><p>Since its hard to quantify and analyse speculative demand, I’m going to succinctly go over major key figures below, and move on to focus more on the Business Applications demand side on the Hedera network.</p><p>The above fundamentals (A, B, C) will be disregarded as well in this analysis since no detailed metrics for staking/proxy staking rates/yields have been made publicly available to the community yet.</p><p>So let’s get started.</p><p>First of all, why would applications want to use a distributed Ledger in the first place? And why would they incur cost and buy Hbar?</p><p>From a technical perspective, applications may consider using a public DLT for the properties this technology provides, including but not restricted to; advanced cryptography, immutability, log transparency, automation processing, disintermediation, public notarization, asset tokenization, micro-value transfers, “real time” auditable consensus, security and trust amplification, and many more, which specifics are not the scope of this analysis.</p><p>From a financial perspective, these businesses are willing to incur transaction fee costs on a public DLT, because implementing such solutions will help contribute to their bottom line by substantially improving on their marginal costs.<br>If a Telco consortia implementing “wholesale” roaming agreements between its different operators, at operating costs of 100,000$/month, are able through the use of a DLT solution, to reduce such costs to 50,000$ instead, by automating procedures through chaincode and monitoring proofs of actions on a transparent “real-time” auditable ledger, they would definitely not want to miss out on that opportunity cost.</p><p><strong>The Fundamental Supply Metrics</strong></p><p>Let’s dive deeper into the supply metrics of Hbar and see if we can derive the supply curves from the data available to us in the Hedera documentation, and plot these onto a graph.</p><p>As shown in the latest release of the <a href="https://www.hedera.com/hh-hbar-coin-economics-paper">Hedera’s Economics paper</a>, we can track the following yearly supply schedule:</p><p>50 Billion Hbar total supply, 34% to be supplied by 2025, as follows:</p><p>2020 supply = 4,441,691,370 Hbar, an additional 9% from 2019<br>2021 supply = 2,492,686,435 Hbar, an additional 5% from 2020<br>2022 supply = 2,525,088,170 Hbar, an additional 5% from 2021<br>2023 supply = 2,293,289,865 Hbar, an additional 4% from 2022<br>2024 supply = 2,118,882,550 Hbar, an additional 5% from 2023<br>2025 supply = 1,227,196,667 Hbar, an additional 2% from 2024</p><p>We can already note that starting 2021, the supply is scheduled to almost split in half and be reduced from 9% of total supply to 5%, and is going to remain almost constant at 5% for the next 4 years, and then be halved again in 2025.</p><p>The policies behind the Hbar supply schedule after 2025 have not been disclosed in advance by Hedera, and would probably be commensurate with actual TPS adoption figures, along additional security considerations as well. It would be interesting to observe the monetary policies implemented after 2025, and their impact over price valuation.</p><p>A typical supply curve would usually plot like figure 1 below, the “Law of Supply” stating that:</p><p><em>Ceteris paribus</em>, there should be a direct relationship between the price of a good and its quantity supplied to the market, whereas suppliers are only willing/able to supply more of a good if its price increases and are willing/able to supply less of a good if its price decreases; an elastic supply, correlated with a good’s marginal costs of production.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/394/1*Ydf-qszL8OdJpmdD9gQWsA.png" /></figure><p>Unlike the supply curve above, all Hbar coins have already been pre-minted at the genesis of the network and securely stored in advance in a multi-signature account, therefore there are basically no significant resources nor marginal costs the issuer (Hedera) has to incur, hence the supply schedule of Hbar does NOT need to be constantly adjusted to mitigate for price fluctuations, but can instead be supplied in fixed scarce quantities, decreasing at carefully determined time periods, and thus supply can be very much predictable in that sense.</p><p>Moreover, following the above assumptions, we can then calculate the Price Elasticity of Supply. PES is the responsiveness or sensitivity of quantity supplied to price changes, and is calculated as follows:</p><p>PES = % change in the quantity supplied / % change in price, during a given time period.</p><p>Now let’s examine our schedule release to deduce our PES.<br>We know that supply is fixed over a specific monthly period, for instance:</p><p>400M Hbar/month (2020) =&gt;(%change in quantity supplied/% price change=0)<br>200M Hbar/month (2021 to 2024) =&gt;(% change in quantity supplied/% price change=0)<br>100M Hbar/month (2025) =&gt; (% change in quantity supplied/% price change=0)</p><p>From the above, we conclude the Price Elasticity of Supply (PES = 0), known in Microeconomics terminology as a Perfectly Inelastic Supply. In simple terms, the supply of Hbar, during a certain time period, is fixed in advance, will not vary, and is not affected by any price fluctuations.</p><p>Now instead of figure 1, our Hbar supply curve would look similar to figure 2 below, which just means that regardless at which price the market is currently at, the quantity supplied to market will always be fixed during a defined period.</p><p>That is the blue vertical linear curve at 400M Hbar/month in 2020, which will halve, slide leftwards, remain at 200M Hbar/month from 2021 to 2024, then slide leftwards again in 2025, halving to 100M Hbar/month, a supply curve that might (or might not) keep on reducing onwards, commensurate with platform adoption and other security determinants, until all 50B Hbars are fully disseminated into the market.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iTFmGwamq6Oa1t3UNBTiTA.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>The Fundamental Demand Metrics</strong></p><p>Let’s dive deeper into the Applications demand metrics of Hbar and see if we can derive the demand curves from the data available to us in the Hedera documentation, and plot these onto a graph.</p><p>Every Application submitting transactions to Hedera’s network has to pay different fee rates for different types of transactions, whereas the average common fee is a fixed value denominated in dollars, but settled and paid in Hbar on the network:</p><p>Example of Fixed transaction fee rate: ConsensusSubmitMessage=0,0001 $<br>Fee paid in Hbar= Fixed fee in $/ Hbar Exchange Rate.<br>Hbar exchange rate = 0,04$ , Application pays=0,0001$/0,04$ Application pays=0,0025 Hbar/tx</p><p>So how many transactions/month are currently being submitted to the network, and what are the quantities of Hbar purchased to pay for those transaction fees?</p><p>We’re going to assume for simplification purposes that all fees are being paid for by Applications, thus excluding other types of transactions (such as users crypto transfers etc.)<br>If we check Hedera’s available <a href="https://explorer.kabuto.sh/mainnet">explorers</a>, we can see that 15 TPS has been the average for the past few months, at the time of publishing this article.</p><p>We then calculate the demand equation as follows:</p><p>Hbar purchased/month =</p><p>Nb of tx/month x Fees in Hbar =</p><p>Nb of tx/month x (Fee $/Ex rate)=</p><p>15 tps x 60 sec x 60 min x 24 hrs x 30 days x ( 0,0001$/0,04$)=</p><p>38,880,000 tx/month x 0,0025Hbar</p><p>=97,200 Hbar/month</p><p>Rounding the above number 100,000 Hbar is the average demand generated monthly for fee payments, at the publishing time of this article.</p><p>From the demand equation above, we deduce the following observations:</p><p>1)<em>	</em>Since transaction fee is fixed (0,0001$), quantity demanded by Applications for Hbar increases if :</p><p>a)	Exchange rate decreases<br>b)	App increases its TPS (Traffic increase, Subscribers increase, etc)<br>c)	Fixed 0,0001$ fee increases (possible for new transaction types or when fee market is open)</p><p>2)	Since transaction fee is fixed (0.0001$), quantity demanded by Applications for Hbar decreases if:</p><p>a)	Exchange rate increases<br>b)	App decreases its TPS (Traffic decrease, Subscribers decrease, etc)<br>c)	Fixed 0,0001$ fee decrease (possible for new transaction types or when fee market is open)</p><p>3)	Since transaction fee is fixed (0,0001$), assuming the App monthly TPS remain constant , the Application dollar costs/month remain fixed, regardless of the Hbar Exchange Rate and Price fluctuations.</p><p>Observations above perfectly align with a typical demand curve, which would usually plot like figure 3 below, the “Law of Demand” stating that:</p><p><em>Ceteris paribus</em>, there should be a direct relationship between the price of a good and its quantity demanded from the market, whereas buyers are only willing/able to buy more of a good if its price decreases and are willing/able to buy less of a good if its price increases; an elastic demand, correlated with a good’s diminishing marginal utility.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/366/1*sGv0GW97uwlSUj49GICalw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Denominating a “fixed” dollar fee has the following positive implications:</p><p>1)	Shields Apps from price volatility, allows business Applications to predict their monthly costs<br>2)	Lowers the network Attrition Rate and reduces the Substitution Effect.<br>3)	Apps purchase Hbar at market prices at any rate, practically sustaining a price floor for Hbar.<br>4)	Unifies the Price Elasticity of Demand along the demand curve</p><p>Moreover, following the above assumptions, we can then calculate the Price Elasticity of Demand. PED for Applications, is the responsiveness or sensitivity of quantity demanded relative to price changes during a given time period, and is calculated as follows:</p><p>PED = % change in the quantity demanded / % change in price.</p><p>Given our demand equation above, assuming a fixed 100,000 txs/month, let’s plug in 2 exchange rates 0.04$ and 0.12$ and see their impact on quantity of Hbar demanded:</p><p>Hbar purchased for 0.04$ rate= 100,000x(0.0001/0.04)=250Hbar</p><p>Hbar purchased for 0.12$ rate = 100,000x(0.0001/0.12)=83.33Hbar</p><p>PED=((83.33-250)/250) / ((0.12-0.04)/ 0.12) = 1</p><p>From the above observations, we conclude that the PED = 1, known in Microeconomics terminology as a Unit Elastic Demand. In simple terms, the percent change in quantity of Hbar demanded by Applications is proportional to the percent change in price.</p><p><em>If price goes up 33%, quantity demanded goes down exactly 33%.<br>If price goes down 6.3%, quantity demanded goes up exactly 6.3%.</em></p><p>And our Apps demand curve would now look similar to figure 4 below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LpHA9mcDzlnCzb9zldsjFw.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Speculative Demand</strong></p><p>As stated previously, I’m not going to delve deep into the speculation aspect of demand since its hard to quantity and I don’t have neither the tools, the accurate exchange data nor the expertise to do that, so I’ll just present the basic figures.</p><p>We calculated above that the demand deriving from Applications payments for 15 TPS is roughly 100,000 Hbar/month.<br>This amount is far less inferior to the monthly supply of 400M Hbar during 2020, so what’s been absorbing all the supply, especially since the price equilibrium has been stable and hovering around 0.04$ for the past few months?</p><p>I calculated the average trading volume from May 25th till June 25th, with the lowest daily trading volume being 3,749,489 $ traded on 16th June at a price of 0.041$, and the highest daily trading volume being 53,983,137 $ traded on 28th May at a price of 0.046$, with a total volume of 468,128,986 $ for this 31 days period.</p><p>Average daily volume would be 468,128,986$ / 31 = 15,100,935$<br>If Daily Volume = Quantity traded (bought and sold) x Price =&gt;<br>Average Daily Quantity traded = Average Daily Volume /Average Price = 15,100,935$/ 0.04$</p><p>=377, 523,375 Hbar</p><p><strong>Observation 1</strong>: The average daily quantity traded is close to the monthly quantity supplied of 400M Hbar</p><p>The Monthly Quantity traded = 468,128,986$/0.04$ = 11.7B Hbar</p><p><strong>Observation 2</strong>: The Monthly quantity traded 11.7 B is higher than the circulating supply up till end of June which was 4,672,677,666 Hbar.</p><p>Since the same Hbar could exchange hands multiple times during the same day, the above figures cannot advise to the percentage of circulating supply that is being actively traded, but we can clearly deduce from the above figures that most demand on the platform is being currently derived from speculation, and price has found an Equilibrium at 0.04 $, which basically means that, at this rate, sellers are not willing to sell Hbars for less than 0.04$, and buyers are not willing to buy Hbar for more than 0.04$.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong>:<br>1)	At this early stage of the platform development, at only 15 TPS, most price action is being derived from speculation rather than Application usage of the platform.<br>2)	The ratio of speculative demand over App demand is relatively high, ( 400,000,000/100,000) = 4000 x</p><p><strong>Demand/Supply Dynamics</strong></p><p>In this brief part, I’m going to rapidly skim over the supply/demand dynamics and explain the main interactions between these market forces, so understanding the latter parts of this article becomes easier.</p><p>Figure 5 below, is a rough representation of both supply and demand for Hbar as of July 2020. The blue vertical linear curve represents an estimated fixed 400M Hbar monthly supply and the red linear curve represents the current demand, intersecting at an equilibrium price of 0.04$. (These should have been the only curves on the graph, the others were added to explain the potential supply/demand interactions)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*02Ch1UGSkHRt5l53q1TYxw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The current supply, as shown above, will only shift leftwards, and will decrease from 400M/month in 2020, to 200M/month from 2021 to 2024, then halves again to 100M/month in 2025. The yearly supplies beyond 2025 have not yet been disclosed, and will probably be subject to adoption figures and other considerations.</p><p>If supply decreases, and demand stays the same, the price still increases. (On the illustration above, the black dot at 0.04$ slides along the red demand curve to reach 0.08$)</p><p>If supply decreases, and demand increases, the whole demand curve shifts rightwards (purple curve), the price increases further. (On the illustration above, the black dot at 0.04$ slides along both blue and purple curves to reach 0.16$)</p><p>If supply decreases, and demand decreases, both curves shift leftwards (blue and green curves), the price will either decrease, increase or remain stable, depending on the demand curve shift.</p><p>The above is only for illustration purposes, is not an accurate representation of Hedera’s supply and demand curves, and is meant to give a basic understanding of such dynamics at work.</p><p><strong>Transactions vs Price Action</strong></p><p><em>“Moving forward in this article, I will only assume that Applications are the sole drivers of demand on the Hedera network, and calculate demand for Hbar based on the “Hedera Token Service” fee (0,001$), thus totally excluding the impact of speculation over price”</em></p><p>The supply curve is manageable and predictable. The Apps demand curve, due to its Unit Elasticity is also predictable. My goal is to identify the existence of any such dependant relationships that could signal, if not predict with a certain degree of accuracy, the effects of “fundamental” adoption on price appreciation, even if speculation was to be greatly diminished on Hedera or even totally absent, what I describe as the “Fundamental” support.</p><p>To articulate it better, what happens if all speculators capitulated and sold all their positions, would Applications salvage the situation, absorb the supply and support specific price floors for Hbar? What are the minimum amounts of TPS required to achieve such stability?</p><p>This analysis is not meant to dismiss the role of speculation as related to a token’s valuation. Speculation is an essential component of any market, and its impact on price appreciation is highly relevant, but is only sustainable if it piggybacks a genuine market demand driven by sound economic incentives.</p><p>In reality, the speculative demand curve is aggregated over the “fundamental” demand curve, and may even sharpen up its PED at lower prices, further reducing the overall demand elasticity. Hbar would be cheap and affordable at these lower prices, which will definitely attract many traders, easily leading to a decrease in the token’s PED from 1 to 0&lt;PED&lt;1, therefore increasing volatility and price appreciation.</p><p>On the other extreme, if Hbar was to attain higher valuation targets, spot price speculation may gradually be impacted beyond traders’ psychological price thresholds, and we may witness temporary platform attrition, induced by market effects such as the Substitution Effect (traders betting on cheaper tokens) or the Income Effect (traders affected by their income limitations). This may end up increasing the elasticity of the aggregate demand curve (PED&gt;1), therefore reducing price volatility and inducing price stagnation. Worth noting that the derivatives markets could compensate for that though.</p><p>Between the 2 extreme elasticities the speculative demand is subject to, the Unit Elasticity of the “fundamental” demand, brilliantly designed, stabilizes the different elasticities at play, and pulls all elasticities towards its stable mean. At high prices and a PED&gt;1, Apps will tend to magnet elasticity back towards 1. At lower prices, Apps will absorb a higher volatility and magnet elasticity back towards 1. These stabilizing effects reduce overall price volatility, without impacting price appreciation, and will start to fully manifest once real business adoption kicks in.</p><p>Concretely interpreting the above, Business Applications WILL ALWAYS buy Hbar, no matter what the price. If prices soar and Hbar exchange rate is 10,000$, Apps don’t care, they consume Hbar anyway, whilst their monthly dollar costs remain constant. If speculators panic sell, Apps don’t care, they buy Hbar at spot market prices, periodically supporting the price up, and reliably acting as a safe buffer against market capitulation.</p><p><em>Applications are the “Buyers of Last resort”</em></p><p>Imagine a worst case scenario; All speculators panic and trigger volumes of market sell orders. Applications salvage the situation and literally gobble up all Hbar available to fuel their Applications. Depending on the sell pressure, Apps might temporarily bid prices down, pay their recurrent fees and immediately recycle Hbar back to the Treasury Account.</p><p>Next distribution period comes along, Treasury makes available the same scarce supply as the previous month. At these recent lower prices, the quantity demanded will now be greater than the quantity supplied. The only way to reduce that huge demand, so it matches the released supply, is for Apps to bid the price back up to a higher Price Equilibrium. That new found price floor will depend upon the total TPS these Apps are submitting to the network, as we shall explore below.</p><p>But let’s first observe the effect of TPS over price appreciation and discuss figure 6 below:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fII3Z5uNvKh5FE4iy7L_qw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Imagine 2025 has come along, and the supply is 100M Hbar/month, as mentioned in the distribution schedule.<br>That’s the vertical blue linear curve, a fixed monthly supply throughout 2025. The 1st slanted blue linear curve (D1) from the bottom is the demand generated from 1,500 TPS, intersecting with the supply at a price Equilibrium of 0.04$</p><p>Indeed, if we plug the numbers in our demand equation:<br>Quantity Hbar demanded/month= 1,500TPSx(60x60x24x30)x (0.001/0.04)= 97M Hbar or roughly 100M Hbar for the sake of our demonstrations.</p><p>We can then affirmatively state, that Applications joining at a price of 0.04$, submitting 1,500 TPS are solely able to consume independently the entire 100M Hbar for any particular month period in 2025, effectively establishing a price floor at 0.04$.<br>The blue D1 curve actually represents “1,500 TPS demand”.<br>If App demand stays the same ( fixed TPS), and price still changes because of other determinants (ex: sudden volatility due to speculation) , the red dot on D1 will just slide “along” D1 (D1 will not move) . That’s called a change in “quantity demanded” from a fixed set of Apps (constant TPS) vs a change in “demand” (increase of Apps/TPS), which shifts the whole demand curve rightwards.</p><p>Example of change in “quantity demanded” vs change in “demand”:</p><p>If price goes up to 0.08$, D1 curve doesn’t move, and the red dot slides up along the D1 curve to meet the 0.08$ horizontal line. If we project that intersection point down onto the “quantity” axis, we now see that these same Apps generating 1,500 TPS now have to buy 50M Hbar instead of 100M, which coincides with what we concluded previously that if price goes up X %, Hbar demanded by Apps goes down X %. In our case, price doubled, resulting in half consumption of Hbars by the same set of existing Apps.</p><p><em>But how does an increase in TPS increase demand, and what is the effect over price?</em></p><p>An increase in TPS (ie: demand) shifts the whole demand curve rightwards. In figure 6, D1 shifts to D2 for the additional 1,500 TPS increase.</p><p>What this actually means is this; At “any” given price, the quantity demanded for Hbar will now double. In the case above, an additional 1,500 TPS joining the network at the current price of 0.04$, increases the demand from 100M Hbar to 200M Hbar. Indeed, we can verify that on Figure 6. Drawing a horizontal line at 0.04$, we’ll see 2 dots intersecting with S1 and D2. ( 1 red dot on S1, 1 red dot on D2). These dots projected down on the X axis, represent the quantity supplied and the quantity demanded at 0.04$. When the quantity demanded (200M) becomes greater than the quantity supplied (100M), prices get bid up and dots slide up along both curves to reach a higher Price Equilibrium, raising the price up from 0.04$ to 0.08$.</p><p>The Apps (total 3,000 TPS now), end up buying up the same 100M Hbar quantity supplied in total. If you have, as an example, 2 Apps (Each 1,500 TPS), each will now be buying 50 Million Hbar at 0.08$. So even though the total number of Hbar consumed remains the same (100M), individual Apps are buying less (proportional to their %TPS), in our case 50% each.</p><p>Doubling the demand for Hbar at a lower price level, eventually bid up and doubled the price of Hbar.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong>: At any given price, since supply is fixed at a PES=0, when TPS increases by X%, demand fixed at a PED=1 increases by X%, and Price Equilibrium increases by X%.</p><p>The same logic ensues when demand increases and shifts from D2 to D3 (TPS increase), then from D3 to D4 etc...<br>If we follow the rest of Figure 6, when Apps reach 24,000 TPS, for a fixed supply of 100M Hbar, the price will get bid up to 0.64$ or exactly :</p><p>Rate=(fee$ x Tx/month)/Qty/month, Rate=0.001x( 24,000TPSx60secx60minx24hrx30days)/100M = 0.622$</p><p>Now you know how “Fundamental” demand on Hedera works, and how systematic adoption gradually supports network and price valuation.</p><p>But I know what you’re probably thinking right now.</p><p>You’re thinking 24,000 TPS is a lot of transactions, and wondering if Hedera is even capable of scaling up to that extent. Isn’t the current throughput throttled down to 10,000 TPS? How many nodes on the network will that require to handle all that additional throughput anyway?</p><p>So let’s explore further and shard it, shall we?</p><p><strong>The journey to 1 Million TPS</strong></p><p>For those not familiar with sharding, it is the ability to divide a network of connected nodes into smaller clusters of networks that are able to communicate with each other. Each shard will host a limited set of nodes (ex=39 nodes), a number that will depend on the optimizations required from each shard ( the throughput and latencies sought, the nodes geographical distribution etc).</p><p>Nodes within a shard only communicate with peers within that specific shard, achieve consensus on the order of transactions, and update their states accordingly. Different shards host different nodes, different accounts, and update their own separate states.</p><p>Shard communication is reliable and efficient, only if designed properly. Hedera’s aBFT properties and the finality of its transactions allows for such scaling to be optimized. One single shard is only able to scale to a limited finite set of nodes, the set ultimately constrained by the throughput and latency optimizations within that shard.</p><p>I quote the Hedera Website:</p><p><em>“Furthermore, we test hashgraph’s capability for high performance, achieving over 100,000 TPS with less than 5 seconds latency in some instances”</em></p><p>For a more conservative outlook, we refer to the <a href="https://www.hedera.com/hh-ieee_coins_paper">Hashgraph Protocol paper</a> on Hedera’s website.</p><p><em>“Hashgraph has been tested in high performance settings, covering 4 to 128 nodes, distributed over 1,2 and 8 regions. The 8 regions are: US East, US West, Canada, Sao Paulo, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and Germany”</em></p><p>Let’s populate the table below with some of the info that transpired from that paper, with an array of node distributions and throughput/latency combinations :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dv2KoxFo4cQHM2jU5FKpCw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Now my understanding is this;</p><p>Shards with different configurations could be established to serve different requirements. If below 1 sec latency is sought by some business applications, a shard could eventually be configured for ( 32 nodes, 20,000 TPS, 0.75 sec in the US West Region). If most business applications require “Visa like performance” under 7 sec finality, maybe ( 32 nodes, 50,000 TPS, 7 sec, 8 regions) would end up being the most deployed shard configuration on the Hedera network.</p><p>The network will ultimately host a mix of different shard setups. An application joins Hedera, and depending on its practical business application, is presented with various shard specifications to choose from.</p><p>Sharding has been mentioned in the Hedera <a href="https://www.hedera.com/hh-whitepaper">Whitepaper</a>, briefly discussing its mechanics, but neither testing results nor performance metrics have been disclosed to the community yet. I look forward to reading those once available.</p><p>Meanwhile, for the sake of further simulation, I’m going to make a few assumptions below. So let’s hit those 1 Million TPS.</p><p>I’m going to take a standard “Visa” like performance setup, and configure a shard as follows, (33 nodes, 50,000 TPS, 7 sec, 8 regions) and presume all remaining shards have the same configuration within the network.</p><p>Let’s assume again we’re in 2025, the fixed monthly supply is 100M Hbar and our single shard starts hitting those 50,000 TPS. Supported by Fundamental demand as discussed in the previous section, Hbar secures a predictable consistent monthly bid for Hbar at a price of :</p><p>Hbar/month=Tx/mth x (fee$/rate) Rate=Fee$x(Tx/mth)/(Hbar/mth)<br>Rate= 0.0001$ x (50,000 TPS x 60 x 60 x 24 x 30) / 100 M = 0.12 $.</p><p>Now for the readers who are not familiar with Hedera’s<a href="https://www.hedera.com/blog/fragility-in-dlts"> Proof of Stake</a> weighted mechanism, the 50 Billion total issued coins figure might have purposefully been chosen and pre-minted to raise that 3rd minimum threshold a malicious byzantine node (or group of nodes) would need to acquire in order to disrupt consensus within 1 shard. If only 1 shard was involved, 16.66B Hbar would be that 3rd threshold.</p><p>At a 100M supply and a shard processing 50,000 TPS, a price floor of 0.12$ ensures that an attacker would have to incur at least a 2 Billion $ cost (16,66 Billion Hbar x 0.12$) to try and buy up 3rd of this shard’s total coins, in order to disrupt its consensus.<br>Don’t take my word for it, listen to Dr. Leemon Baird at min 9:30 in the link below:<br><a href="https://youtu.be/QTNNYeSks-s">https://youtu.be/QTNNYeSks-s</a></p><p>Naturally, once multiple shards start to emerge in the ecosystem, disrupting consensus would only require a malicious node(s) to only buy up the 3rd stake of the shard’s total coins it resides in.</p><p>But would distributing and dividing the stake onto multiple shards reduce the security of the system?</p><p>Let’s take forward our simulation logic. Let’s consider 2 options of a possible shard split:</p><p>1)	Shard 1 splits into 2 shards( 25,000 TPS each), at the same price of 0.12$, reducing the 3rd threshold security to 1B $, which is still a high security cap. Each new shard grows to 50,000 TPS. 100,000 TPS establishes a new fundamental base price of 0.24$ and 2B $ security threshold for each shard is established again. This process replicates to indefinite number of shards.</p><p>2)	Shard grows to 100,000 TPS first, establishes a new fundamental base price of 0.24$, raising the 3rd threshold security to 4B $, and then splits into 2 shards (Each 50,000 TPS), preserving the 3rd threshold security at 2B $, and the process replicates to indefinite number of shards.</p><p>Note that only the fundamental demand is calculated here, to showcase the system’s minimal quantifiable security parameters. In practice, once a shard is noticed remotely approaching 50,000 TPS, at such unprecedented rates in the industry, speculation and traders’ “FOMO” will have already driven the price to substantially much higher figures than the ones stated above, further cementing the security of all shards. I’m purposefully being extremely conservative.</p><p>One could argue as well, that even if fundamental adoption was to be slower than intended, hitting a target of 12 cents, driven by speculation alone, would be secure enough to shard. That would be true, but it would be reasonable to assume that a higher price threshold could be sought to mitigate for price volatility.</p><p>Moreover, since Hedera uses “adaptive sharding”, the system will be closely monitoring for price, mapping accounts to different shards, and reallocating nodes between shards as required. These measures prevent malicious or faulty nodes from jeopardising the shards’ security.</p><p>I quote the whitepaper:</p><p><em>“ A master shard will assign new nodes to a shard once a day, and will move nodes between shards, as necessary to ensure that each shard has a large total amount of Hbars being staked, and that no one node within a shard will have a large fraction of that total amount”</em></p><p>So how many shards do we need anyway to reach that 1 Million TPS?</p><p>Doubling shards doesn’t necessarily output an obvious doubling of throughput. As Dr. Leemon Baird often states in his public appearances, throughput scaling depends on the interaction patterns between shards.</p><p>In the next segment, I’ll just call the actual transactions that are paid for and submitted to the network, the “actual throughput”, and the effective throughput realized after sharding, the “practical” throughput.</p><p>Once again, I’m neither a tech guy nor an expert in distributed systems, and since no documentation is available, the below is just for simulation purposes, and I’ll make the basic following assumption;</p><p>“Each time you need to double the “practical” throughput, you triple the number of shards”</p><p>So let’s have the rough calculations below:</p><p>50,000 TPS x 2 = 100,000 TPS =&gt; 1 shard x 3 = 3 shards.</p><p>100,000 TPS x 2 = 200,000 TPS =&gt; 3 shards x 3 = 9 shards.</p><p>200,000 TPS x 2 = 400,000 TPS =&gt; 9 shards x 3 = 27 shards</p><p>400,000 TPS x 2 = 800,000 TPS =&gt;27 shards x 3 = 81 shards</p><p>800,000 TPS x 1.25 = 1 Million TPS =&gt; 81 shards x 1.875 = 150 shards</p><p>Granted the accuracy of the “triple” shard scaling assumption above, transaction throughput could range between the below 2 optimizations, and we’ll have the below figures:</p><p>1)	Shards not fully optimized and cross shard communication is high :<br>7.5M TPS actual throughput (50,000 TPS x 150 shards) but 1M TPS practical throughput.<br>4,950 nodes (33 nodes x 150 shards)<br>3rd stake of 111,111,111 Hbar (50 Billion/150 shard/3rd stake)<br>2 Billion $ to buy up 3rd of stake in each shard<br>A price security of 20$ per shard (0.0001 x (7.5Mx60x60x24x30)/100M Hbar)</p><p>2)	Shards fully optimized and cross shard communication is low:<br>1 Million TPS actual and practical throughput (50,000 TPS x 20 shards)<br>666 nodes (33 nodes x 20 shards)<br>3rd stake/shard of 833,333,333Hbar (50 Billion/20 shards/3rd stake) 2 Billion $ to buy up 3rd of stake in each shard<br>A price security of 2.59$ per shard (0.0001 x ( 1M TPSx60x60x24x30)/100 M Hbar)</p><p>Kindly note that the price security thresholds mentioned above will even increase further if supply decreases after 2025. Ex: If supply halves to 50M Hbar, the cost required to attack the network doubles.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong>: Because of Hedera’s scaling capabilities, low latency finality and aBFT properties, relatively smaller numbers are required to achieve 1Million TPS:</p><p>a) If cross shard interaction is fully optimized, requiring minimal shard communication: 666 nodes distributed over 20 shards (33 nodes each), at a relatively low price security of 2.59$ could achieve that “practical” Million TPS.</p><p>b) If cross shard interaction is not fully optimized, requiring active shard communication: 4950 nodes distributed over 150 shards (33 nodes each), at a relatively low price security of 20$ could achieve that “practical” Million TPS.</p><p>Compare that to Bitcoin for instance, with the number of “full nodes” estimated at 200,000 in 2018 dropping to 50,000 in 2020, and individual miners estimated at hundreds of thousands ( Slushpool has 100,000 miners), with a network throughput rate of a meager 7 TPS.</p><p><strong>Transactions vs Annual Supply</strong></p><p>You may have noticed that I’ve been using 100M Hbar/month as a basis for my calculations. I chose that number because it’s the final Hbar release schedule planned for 2025. Referencing it in figure 7 below, I am able to benchmark various price thresholds for different TPS adoption rates, each rate representing the “fundamental” demand curves, (speculation would be extra demand layered on top of these fundamental curves). These curves range from 1,500 TPS to 96,000 TPS.</p><p>Once again, the below numbers have been calculated taking into account the new “Hedera Token service”, and its fee rate as a benchmark, which I believe, due to HTS numerous implementations ( Security Token Offerings, Social tokenization, IoT, NFTs, etc) will end up consuming the bulk of transactions on the network.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vIKBmVc7czJfDcSnsGS4EQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>The above figure means that, in 2025, at 100M Hbar monthly supply:</p><p>1,500 TPS monthly demand will stabilize the price at roughly 0.04$</p><p>3,000 TPS monthly demand will stabilize the price at roughly 0.08$</p><p>6,000 TPS monthly demand will stabilize the price at roughly 0.16$</p><p>12,000 TPS monthly demand will stabilize the price at roughly 0.32$</p><p>24,000 TPS monthly demand will stabilize the price at roughly 0.64$</p><p>48,000 TPS monthly demand will stabilize the price at roughly 1.28$</p><p>96,000 TPS monthly demand will stabilize the price at roughly 2.56$</p><p>On the graph above, I maintained the PED=1 relationship established previously, that is the proportional relationship of the % change in quantity demanded over % change in price, which explains the supply halvening on the X axis and the price doubling on the Y axis. You can notice when the supply curve slides leftwards (ex: from 100M to 3.12M), even if demand was to remain constant, the price will ramp up along those curves and increase proportionally to the % of supply change.<br>We can notice how a minor tweak to the supply schedule could significantly impact the price appreciation of a scarce resource. The only remaining variables would be deciding the quantities supplied and the appropriate time periods to apply these supply reductions to.</p><p>For further simulations, let’s slide the 2025 blue vertical line leftwards, and see the impact of different supply strategies over price and distribution time frames :</p><p>a)	What if, starting 2026, we decided to halve the previous yearly schedule from 1 Billion to 500M Hbar/year, or approximately 50M/month, releasing only 1% of the total supply? The impact of such a drastic supply reduction will effectively double the price for all of the different TPS demand curves.<br>What if we decided to keep that yearly supply constant at 1% going forward? Since 34% of the coins would have been distributed by 2025, It’ll take another 66 years for the remaining 66% of the total tokens to be distributed.</p><p>b)	What if instead of a constant yearly supply, we decided to halve the supply on a yearly basis going forward? This will double the price, on a perpetual yearly basis, as shown in figure 7 above, stretching the supply time frame almost indefinitely.</p><p>c)	What if we removed in Figure 7, all intermediary steps between 2026 and 2029, and instead of waiting until 2030 to reduce the supply to 3.12M/month, reduce it effective 2026. That drastic supply shock would propel the price for 1,500 TPS from 0.04$ to 1.28$, and that’s not even factoring neither the fundamental demand derived from staking/proxy-staking discussed at the beginning of this article, nor the impact of the speculative demand curve.</p><p>The supply from 2026 onwards has not yet been disclosed by Hedera, understandably so, since it will be justifiably commensurate with effective network adoption, price appreciation, security parameters and other relevant determinants.</p><p>My perspective is, (I haven’t thoroughly explored that part for the purpose of this article) 3% might be the percentage of coins dispatched from 2026 onwards, on a yearly basis, 2% as cumulative for both “staking” and “proxy staking” rewards, dispatched directly to participating nodes and users, and 1% made available to market through exchanges, this extended over a period of 22 years (to distribute that remaining 66%).</p><p>Node operators “stakers” and users “proxy stakers”, will have a tendency to hoard Hbars (They get paid proportional to their holdings), further reducing the selling pressure on the market, leading to further price appreciation, and the overall security of the network. I may elaborate further on the economics of staking /proxy staking on Hedera, once these figures become available.</p><p><strong>Final Thoughts</strong></p><p>If you managed to read through to this point, then I congratulate you for your patience and your intellectual rigor.</p><p>I personally enjoyed writing this long article, even had my own “Aha! Moments” along the way.</p><p>Most importantly though, I hope I managed to accurately convey to you dear reader, the strong fundamentals behind Hedera’s economic ecosystem.</p><p>My personal conclusion is this;</p><p><em>Each component in Hedera’s economic architecture has been carefully crafted, from the selection of its 50 Billion total supply figure, to the reasoning behind its fixed tiny dollar fee rate, and how it all blends together to make the Hedera economy whole. Nothing was left to chance.</em></p><p>Consequently, it would only be natural that such elaborate economy, would be constantly maintained and upgraded, and who best to steer that ship but the stewardship of Hedera’s diversified model of governance.</p><p><strong>Hbar is indeed “ THE BETTER” prospect store of value in the digital asset market today, intrinsically engineered to increment in value with every added use case. A value not built over speculation and hype, but one ultimately derived from true wealth creation and the unfolding of many new and exciting opportunities.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a0393fb2b822" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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