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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Elan_vital_ on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Coleridge’s long ballad The Rime of the Ancient Mariner: A dream of joy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Elan_vital__/coleridges-long-ballad-the-rime-of-the-ancient-mariner-a-dream-of-joy-8698f4b3975?source=rss-18b0636c4bdd------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[christianity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coleridge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[poetry]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Elan_vital_]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 19 Aug 2017 22:37:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-08-19T22:37:19.299Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*hfXQLMi6DoF-Hub8C4C-8A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Kerry Handscomb</p><p>Interpretation is difficult, of Coleridge’s most famous poem, the long ballad, <em>The Rime of the Ancient Mariner</em>. Nevertheless, the poem retains its allure and its mesmeric qualities. The image of the Mariner with the dead Albatross hung around his neck is spellbinding and iconic.</p><p>The goal of this essay is to suggest a way of thinking about the poem. As a starting point, I will refer to my previous essay on Coleridge’s poem, <a href="https://medium.com/@Elan_vital__/coleridges-theory-of-imagination-in-dejection-an-ode-959d570af43a?source=linkShare-18b0636c4bdd-1503181736"><em>Dejection: An Ode</em></a>, which discusses Coleridge’s theory of the imagination.</p><p><em>The Rime of the Ancient Mariner</em> contains a large number of images in complex interplay. Each image may be regarded as a symbol or a metaphor. The difficulty of the poem is in fitting all images into a single coherent framework.</p><p>In this essay I will review two attempts to explicate the poem by means of an overarching system: Christian allegory and Coleridge’s own theory of the imagination. Both attempts ultimately fail.</p><p>Nevertheless, I have found a way of looking at the poem so that even the apparent difficulties in its interpretation may be redeemed — provided the poem’s frame, involving the wedding guest, is viewed in the right light.</p><p>Christian allegory is an obvious first attempt to fit the imagery of <em>The Rime of the Ancient Mariner</em> into an overarching framework. The poem is packed with Christian references, both explicit and implicit.</p><p>The kirk, or church, is prominent both at the Mariner’s departure and at his return (lines 23, 466, 476, 603, and 605). The poem contains several references to God (lines 97, 470, 599, 616) and one reference to “Lord in Heaven” (line 506). Christ (lines 123 and 487), the Virgin Mary (lines 178 and 294), heaven (lines 244 and 295), and the Mariner’s saint (lines 234 and 285) are each mentioned twice. The singing reanimated crew when the Mariner is close to home is likened to a heavenly choir (line 493). Topping this list, Coleridge completes the poem with some explicitly Christian moralizing in its last few stanzas. Much more Christian imagery is implicit. Let me discuss the most prominent of these implicit symbols, which enters at the major crisis point of the Mariner’s voyage.</p><p>The Albatross, at its entrance, is greeted by the Mariner and crew, and,</p><blockquote>As if it had been a Christian soul,</blockquote><blockquote>[They] hailed it in God’s name.</blockquote><p>(lines 65–66)</p><p>Surely, however, the Albatross is more than simply a “Christian soul.” I see the Albatross above the ship with wings outstretched in the form of a crucifix. Then, when the Mariner kills the albatross,</p><blockquote>Instead of the cross, the Albatross</blockquote><blockquote>About [his] neck was hung.</blockquote><p>(lines 140–141)</p><p>Identification of the Albatross with Christ is strongly hinted at later, in the conversation between the two spirits, when one of them remarks,</p><blockquote>By him who died on cross,</blockquote><blockquote>With his cruel bow he laid full low</blockquote><blockquote>The harmless Albatross.</blockquote><p>(lines 399–401)</p><p>Metaphorically, by shooting the Albatross, the Mariner has rejected Christ. In this state, the Mariner says,</p><blockquote>I looked to heaven and tried to pray;</blockquote><blockquote>But or ever a prayer had gusht,</blockquote><blockquote>A wicked whisper came, and made</blockquote><blockquote>My heart as dry as dust.</blockquote><p>(lines 244–247)</p><p>However, in the light of the Moon, the snake-monsters that the Mariner sees are transformed, and he continues,</p><blockquote>Sure my kind saint took pity on me,</blockquote><blockquote>And I blessed them unaware,</blockquote><blockquote>The self-same moment I could pray;</blockquote><blockquote>And from my neck so free</blockquote><blockquote>The Albatross fell off and sank</blockquote><blockquote>Like lead into the sea.</blockquote><p>(lines 285–290)</p><p>Here, the light of the Moon recalls the redeeming power of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, with the Mariner free of the Albatross from around his neck, the Moon seems to oversee the storm that follows (lines 321, 323), and the crew is reanimated under its light:</p><blockquote>Beneath the lightning and the Moon</blockquote><blockquote>The dead men gave a groan</blockquote><p>(lines 329–330)</p><p>On the other hand, in the period of his remorse, before he can pray, the Mariner describes a crescent Moon:</p><blockquote>The hornéd Moon, with one bright star</blockquote><blockquote>Within the nether tip.</blockquote><p>(lines 210–211)</p><p>Subsequently, “One after one, by the star-dogged Moon” (line 212) the sailors lay their mysterious curse on the Mariner.</p><p>In a footnote Coleridge adds that this configuration of Moon and star indicates that something evil is about to happen. The occlusion of the Moon appears to represent a losing of the power of the Holy Spirit, which returns when the Mariner is able once again to turn to God.</p><p>A good candidate for the completion of the Christian Trinity is the Sun, which is very prominently represented in <em>The Rime of the Ancient Mariner</em> (lines 25, 83, 98, 112, 174, 176, 177, 183, 185, 199, 355, and 383). According to the Mariner,</p><blockquote>Nor dim nor red, like God’s own head</blockquote><blockquote>The glorious Sun uprist.</blockquote><p>(lines 97–98)</p><p>In some ways, the Sun recalls an angry Old Testament Jehovah rather than the New Testament God the Father. The Sun is mentioned frequently during the visit of the grotesque pair “DEATH” (line 188) and “Night-mare LIFE-IN-DEATH” (line 193), and its standing behind their sail seems to imply that they are sent by the vengeful “bloody Sun at noon” (line 112).</p><p>Although the Christian interpretation in many ways seems plausible, there are some anomalies. Would we expect the Risen Christ to sink “like lead into the sea”? Certainly penance for sin belongs to Christian tradition, and, according to the conversing spirits,</p><blockquote>… The man hath penance done,</blockquote><blockquote>And penance more will do.</blockquote><p>(lines 408–409)</p><p>However, the penance of the Mariner appears to be unduly severe and long. As the Mariner explains to the wedding guest,</p><blockquote>Since then, at an uncertain hour,</blockquote><blockquote>That agony returns:</blockquote><blockquote>And till my ghastly tale is told,</blockquote><blockquote>The heart within me burns.</blockquote><p>(lines 582–585)</p><p>Is this the penance one would expect for a man who has turned back to God? Moreover, the Pilot’s boy refers to the returned Mariner as the Devil (line 569). Again, is this the appearance of a man who has turned back to God? The Mariner strikes me as a haunted soul rather than a redeemed soul. He does not find the forgiveness one would expect in a Christian allegory.</p><p>One of the many bizarre characters in <em>The Rime of the Ancient Mariner</em> is the Hermit, who arrives in the rescue party, singing</p><blockquote>… his godly hymns</blockquote><blockquote>That he makes in the wood.</blockquote><p>(lines 510–511).</p><p>The Mariner thinks,</p><blockquote>He’ll shrieve my soul, he’ll wash away</blockquote><blockquote>The Albatross’s blood.</blockquote><p>(512–513)</p><p>Ostensibly, then, the Hermit would be a Christian confessor. However, the Hermit is associated with a woodland life, with “moss” and the “rotted old oak-stump” (lines 521–522). Additionally, the Hermit uses the following striking and fantastic analogy in describing the ship’s sails:</p><blockquote>When the ivy-tod is heavy with snow,</blockquote><blockquote>And the owlet whoops to the wolf below,</blockquote><blockquote>That eats the she-wolf’s young</blockquote><p>(lines 535–537)</p><p>The imagery associated with the Hermit seems to me to be pagan rather than Christian, and I would guess that the Hermit is a druid rather than a Christian confessor.</p><p>While so much seems to fit the Christian model, much does not. As I mentioned above, Coleridge completes the poem with some explicitly Christian moralizing:</p><blockquote>He prayeth well, who loveth well</blockquote><blockquote>Both man and bird and beast.</blockquote><blockquote>He prayeth best, who loveth best</blockquote><blockquote>All things both great and small;</blockquote><blockquote>For the dear God who loveth us,</blockquote><blockquote>He made and loveth all.</blockquote><p>(lines 612–617)</p><p>These lines, however, appear to me to be incongruous with the grotesquerie that governs most of the poem. Surely, if Coleridge had meant his poem to carry a Christian message, he would have written it quite differently.</p><p>A second obvious attempt to explicate the poem is by means of Coleridge’s own theory of imagination. I am going to draw here on my previous essay on Coleridge’s poem <a href="https://medium.com/@Elan_vital__/coleridges-theory-of-imagination-in-dejection-an-ode-959d570af43a?source=linkShare-18b0636c4bdd-1503181736"><em>Dejection</em></a>, in which I discuss his theory of imagination.</p><p>As I explained in that essay, I understand primary imagination to be a mystical source of creative power. Secondary imagination is the poet’s own manifestation of primary imagination, bringing something new into the world, a marriage, as it were, of the mystical source and the world. Fancy, the lowest form of imagination, is a work expressed from the poet’s own resources, devoid of primary creative input. Fancy is pseudo-creation, a new arrangement, but with building blocks already present in the world. In my understanding of Coleridge’s meaning from <em>Dejection</em>, fancy is a prideful activity, an attempt by the poet to usurp creative authority. Fancy, therefore, has a negative moral charge.</p><p>As I mentioned above, the shooting of the Albatross is the major crisis point in the poem. Perhaps the sailors are doomed from the moment they depart on their journey, which after all is a voyage into uncharted regions for who knows what purpose. Their case is most certainly decided when their leader shoots the hapless Albatross for no apparent reason.</p><p>Can the shooting of the Albatross be looked at as a prideful rejection of the primary creative source? Certainly, prideful rejection of the primary source in <a href="https://medium.com/@Elan_vital__/coleridges-theory-of-imagination-in-dejection-an-ode-959d570af43a?source=linkShare-18b0636c4bdd-1503181736"><em>Dejection</em></a> leads Coleridge into his hellish frame of mind: the killing of the Albatross plunges the Mariner and his crew into another kind of hell. If the death of the Albatross is viewed as a turning away from primary imagination, then the Albatross, as a descendent from the sky, may be identified as an imminent infusion of creative power. In other words, the coming of the Albatross may be understood to be the arrival of secondary imagination.</p><p>In consequence, the primary creative source may be placed in the sky, whereas the world is located underneath the Mariner’s ship, in the ocean.</p><p>The</p><blockquote>… slimy things [that] crawl with legs</blockquote><blockquote>Upon the slimy sea</blockquote><p>(lines 125–126)</p><p>and the “thousand thousand slimy things” (line 238) on “the rotting sea” (line 240) may be viewed as expressions of fancy, as with everything else that happens until the Albatross drops into the sea. For example, DEATH and LIFE-IN-DEATH and their bizarre game for the souls of the crew may be manifestations of fancy.</p><p>As I mentioned earlier, the Sun is ascendent during the period when the Albatross is around the Mariner’s neck. Before he shoots the Albatross, however, there is glimmering “white Moon-shine” (line 78).</p><p>Then later, with apparently the Moon’s taking over from the Sun, “The moving Moon went up the sky” (line 263). The Mariner watches the water-snakes being transformed in its light, from monsters into creatures that the Mariner describes in the following glowing terms:</p><blockquote>O happy living things! no tongue</blockquote><blockquote>Their beauty might declare:</blockquote><blockquote>A spring of love gushed from my heart,</blockquote><blockquote>And I blessed them unaware:</blockquote><p>(lines 281–283)</p><p>Subsequently, the Mariner is able to pray — turn once more toward the creative source — and the Albatross drops from his neck.</p><p>The Moon thus appears to be a symbol for primary imagination. Indeed, the Mariner speaks of the relationship between the Moon and the sea (i.e., world) as follows:</p><blockquote>Still as a slave before his lord,</blockquote><blockquote>The ocean hath no blast;</blockquote><blockquote>His great bright eye most silently</blockquote><blockquote>Up to the moon is cast —</blockquote><blockquote>If he may know which way to go;</blockquote><blockquote>For she guides him smooth or grim.</blockquote><blockquote>See, brother, see! how graciously</blockquote><blockquote>She looketh down on him</blockquote><p>(lines 414–421)</p><p>In other words, the primary creative agency, the Moon, acts on the world, the sea.</p><p>The Moon remains a prominent feature of the environment up to the Mariner’s return (lines 432, 437, and 475), indicating, presumably, his access to primary imagination.</p><p>As with the Christian interpretation, however, the question arises why the Mariner must undergo the endless penance if he has recovered access to the primary creative source? In <a href="https://medium.com/@Elan_vital__/coleridges-theory-of-imagination-in-dejection-an-ode-959d570af43a?source=linkShare-18b0636c4bdd-1503181736"><em>Dejection</em></a> the poet descends into hell and appears to remain there, without recovery of primary imagination. The Mariner is no longer in a personal hell by the end of <em>The Rime of the Ancient Mariner;</em> but, as I mentioned above, he is still a haunted, driven figure.</p><p>Also, if we are to associate fancy with pride, as I argued in the essay on <a href="https://medium.com/@Elan_vital__/coleridges-theory-of-imagination-in-dejection-an-ode-959d570af43a?source=linkShare-18b0636c4bdd-1503181736"><em>Dejection</em></a>, pride ought to be an issue in the shooting of the Albatross. I do not detect pride anywhere in the poem. Moreover, are the snake-monsters really a creation from the Mariner’s own resources, whereas the beautiful snakes are created through an infusion of primary imagination? I suppose that the two types of snake exist on the same level of imagination, with one type ugly and one type attractive.</p><p>As with the Christian allegory view of the poem, much of the content fits an interpretation in terms of Coleridge’s theory of imagination. Much, also, does not fit.</p><p>I have considered other possible explications of the poem. The hero’s journey, in the sense of Joseph Campbell’s comparative mythology is another possibility. Or, could it be that <em>The Rime of the Ancient Mariner </em>is a surreptitious autobiography? Whichever framework is tried, however, I suspect that none will fit the poem’s imagery perfectly.</p><p>I wonder about the significance of the crew, one of whom is actually the Mariner’s nephew (line 343), and the crew’s mysterious cursing of the Mariner in Part IV. Does the Lighthouse (24, 465) have a meaning? I wonder also about the two spirits conversing at the end of Part V and beginning of Part VI — are they angels? The spirit that lurks beneath the ship (lines 132 and 379), and which ultimately transports the ship home, is enigmatic, despite Coleridge’s explanation in the gloss. What is the significance of the Pilot and the Pilot’s boy in Part VI? Coleridge scholars may have managed to piece together the various elements of the poem in an overarching theory, but I have not been able to do so.</p><p>Perhaps, on the other hand, the poem is supposed to be essentially meaningless, a simple recounting of a series of bizarre adventures. But I think not. The poem’s riveting, mesmeric power demonstrates that it is not just a random selection of supernatural and natural images, amounting not to much.</p><p>The key I think is in the frame, and the power of the Mariner to cast a spell over his listeners with his “glittering eye” (lines 3, 13, 228) — the wedding guest “cannot choose but hear” (line 18). The frame otherwise is not necessary — except to demonstrate the mesmerizing effect of the Mariner and his tale.</p><p>I take the Mariner to be Coleridge himself and the reader to be the wedding guest. Across the centuries, Coleridge is holding a mirror up to the reader. The first listener is the Hermit, who probably gets more than he bargained for from the Mariner. The last listener is the wedding guest, who becomes a “sadder and a wiser man” (line 624) in consequence of missing the wedding to hear the Mariner’s tale. But the reader now, you or I, is also the wedding guest, albeit vicariously.</p><p>Because there is no easy interpretation of the poem, it is not an example of fancy. For if there were an easy interpretation, in terms of existing ideas, building blocks already present, then the poem would be a fanciful pseudo-creation.</p><p>I believe that Coleridge is telling us through the frame that the spellbinding power of the poem, despite its apparent lack of coherence, demonstrates that it is an expression of secondary imagination: Coleridge himself is manifesting primary imagination in the poem.</p><p>If I am correct, then Coleridge, by informing us of the greatness of his poem in the frame, its ability to grip and transfix, is displaying supreme self confidence.</p><p>In my essay on <a href="https://medium.com/@Elan_vital__/coleridges-theory-of-imagination-in-dejection-an-ode-959d570af43a?source=linkShare-18b0636c4bdd-1503181736"><em>Dejection</em></a> I identified joy as a synonym for primary imagination. The word joy comes up only twice in the whole of <em>The Rime of the Ancient Mariner</em>, once in line 164, when the crew think they are rescued, and again in the Mariner’s first exclamation on sighting his home: “Oh! dream of joy!” (line 464).</p><p>For me, the occurrence of the latter “joy” is crucial, because it epitomizes the self-referential nature that I have identified as Coleridge’s enterprise. <em>The Rime of the Ancient Mariner</em> is not “joyful” in the usual sense of the word. However, if “joy” means primary imagination, then the poem itself is a dream of joy.</p><p><em>© Kerry Handscomb 2017. All rights reserved</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8698f4b3975" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[William James and the conscious zombies]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Elan_vital__/william-james-and-the-conscious-zombies-a27c86f2a4e8?source=rss-18b0636c4bdd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a27c86f2a4e8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[zombies]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bergson]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baruch-spinoza]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Elan_vital_]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Jan 2017 17:52:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-18T18:36:38.092Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*AR9mQN9Z5Cui_N26yZVZNQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>In a previous essay I discussed the views of Henri Bergson on mind-brain parallelism. Bergson argues that the hypothesis of parallelism inevitably entails contradictions.</p><p>William James was a close contemporary and supporter of Henri Bergson. Chapter V of Volume 1 of James’ magum opus <em>The Principles of Psychology</em> (New York: Cosimo Classics, 1890/2007, pp. 128–144) may be interpreted in terms of its relevance to the hypothesis of parallelism.</p><p>James argues against the “conscious automaton-theory” (p. 133), which was an idea that was current in his time. The gist of the theory is that material causation is a closed system, which implies that non-material consciousness has no causal efficacy in the material world. In fact, the progress of cause and effect in the material world, in all its complexity, would continue unabated and unaffected even if consciousness were to disappear.</p><p>The zombie thought-experiment, discussed in many articles in <em>The Journal of Consciousness Studies</em> in the late 1990’s, is related to the conscious automaton theory. A zombie may be referred to as a “non-conscious automaton.” The point is, that if consciousness has no material efficacy, then we can imagine people who externally act just like us, in every way, but who internally have no conscious experience. In the zombie terminology a conscious automaton may be referred to as a “conscious zombie.” According to the hypothesis of parallelism, we are all conscious zombies.</p><p>I will not engage the more recent zombie discussions, restricting myself only to James’ nineteenth century critique of the conscious automaton hypothesis.</p><p>Within the context of parallelism, the conscious automaton theory is a natural consideration. After all, if the mind and brain are parallel and <em>non-interacting domains</em>, and assuming the completeness of material causation, then we must be, in a certain sense, conscious automata.</p><p>In other words, James’ argument opposing the conscious automaton idea may also be read as an argument opposing parallelism.</p><p>To start with, James sees no good reason for the claim that consciousness is <em>not</em> causally efficacious — although he admits that he knows of no mechanism by which this causal efficacy would operate. Nevertheless, he writes,</p><blockquote>My conclusion is that to urge the automaton-theory upon us, … on purely<em> a priori</em> and <em>quasi</em>-metaphysical grounds, is <em>an unwarrantable impertinence in the present state of psychology</em>. (p. 138, original emphasis)</blockquote><p>The question now for James is to identify the utility of the conscious mind with respect to its hypothetical causal efficacy. He claims that “consciousness is at all times a <em>selecting agency</em>” (p. 139, original emphasis).</p><p>Consciousness, in other words, facilitates the brain’s activity (and more generally the whole individual’s activity) towards certain directions rather than others, in circumstances when there is a choice. One might say that the purpose of consciousness is attentional focus. James writes,</p><blockquote>Whether we take [consciousness] in the lowest sphere of sense, or in the highest of intellection, we find it always doing one thing, choosing one out of several of the materials so presented to its notice, emphasizing and accentuating that and suppressing as far as possible all the rest. The item emphasized is always in close connection with some <em>interest</em> felt by consciousness to be paramount at the time. (p. 139, original emphasis).</blockquote><p>James cited three pieces of circumstantial evidence that support the selective role of consciousness. Firstly, he writes,</p><blockquote>Where indecision is great, as before a dangerous leap, consciousness is agonizingly intense. (p. 142).</blockquote><p>In other words, the lived experience of consciousness appears to be strongest when an important decision has to be made, and therefore where one course of action must be selected over others. On the other hand, during habitual actions, in which there is no selection between alternative paths, consciousness appears to be less intense, or even dormant.</p><p>Secondly, following on from brain lesion studies, James observes, often old capabilities are eventually recovered. He suggests that consciousness is active here in retraining the brain, in suppressing error and promoting correctness. Although James is quite unspecific in this regard, we can imagine he has in mind, for example, the stroke victim who struggles to regain the power of speech through conscious effort.</p><p>Thirdly, James suggests, though with exceptions noted, that pleasure is associated with beneficial experiences and pain is associated with detrimental experiences. He writes,</p><blockquote>But if pleasures and pains have no causal efficacy, one does not see (without some such<em> a priori</em> rational harmony as would be scouted by the ‘scientific’ champions of the automaton-theory) why the most noxious acts … might not give thrills of delight, and the most necessary ones … cause agony. (p. 144).</blockquote><p>In other words, the allocation of pleasure and pain to activities that are beneficial and detrimental, respectively, suggests that a purpose of the conscious experience of pleasure or pain is for consciousness to select certain actions and avoid others.</p><p>James concludes,</p><blockquote>Thus, then, from every point of view the circumstantial evidence against [the automaton-theory] is strong. <em>A priori</em> analysis of both brain-action and conscious action shows us that if the latter were efficacious it would, by its selective emphasis, make amends for the indeterminateness of the former; whilst the study <em>a posteriori</em> of the <em>distribution</em> of consciousness shows it to be exactly such as we might expect in an organ added for the sake of steering a nervous system grown too complex to regulate itself. The conclusion that it is useful is, after all this, quite justifiable. (p. 144, original emphasis).</blockquote><p>The hypothesis of parallelism requires that the domains of mind and brain should operate on separate and non-interacting tracks. If it can be shown that consciousness affects events in the material world, then the hypothesis of parallelism is undermined. James’ arguments with respect to the conscious automaton theory may therefore be regarded as arguments against the hypothesis of parallelism.</p><p>My understanding of parallelism, informed by Spinoza, differs from that of James and Bergson. James appears to be fighting a rearguard action for the utility of consciousness, given a material world separate from conscious experience. Bergson, on the other hand, limits the material component of parallelism to the brain, or at most brain and body. Spinoza, I believe, can answer the objections of both. Spinoza’s parallelism is the topic of a further essay.</p><p>© Kerry Handscomb 2017. All rights reserved.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a27c86f2a4e8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Review of Re-visioning Psychology by James Hillman]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Elan_vital__/review-of-re-visioning-psychology-by-james-hillman-9b5ff61fd7a4?source=rss-18b0636c4bdd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9b5ff61fd7a4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[spirituality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[archetypes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[storytelling]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Elan_vital_]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 10 Jan 2017 01:51:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-18T19:47:13.537Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*ICjMmrj3qWmRTh69C-cb4A.jpeg" /></figure><p>In this essay, I will discuss my response to <em>Re-visioning Psychology</em> by James Hillman. I found this book to be interesting and refreshing. Hillman’s view is that the primary reality is psyche. However, the psyche is constituted of archetypal personalities, which may be termed “gods.” Hillman uses the gods of Greek mythology to illustrate the types of these archetypal personalities. The Freudian ego itself is also an archetypal personality, in this case the lead character in the hero myth.</p><p>While they are inhuman, the gods do have specific personalities. Moreover, they are the primary reality. We are persons as such, therefore, because the gods have personality. This interesting idea reverses the usual notion that human personal qualities are projected into mythical systems invented by humans. Quite the contrary, the gods breathe life into us, animate us with their personalities.</p><p>The idea that we are emanations of the gods, rather than the other way round, is reminiscent of the Bergsonian notion of the primordial quality of deep duration. It also brings to mind Julian Jaynes’ theory of the origin of consciousness (i.e., ego) in the breakdown of the bicameral mind, in that the bicameral human psyche is more obviously constellated of gods.</p><p>I would perhaps question Hillman’s emphasis on personality. I would argue for a different ontology, and a bidirectional flow of influence between psyche and world, in which abstract principles originating from the deepest source of our knowing become clothed with human personality.</p><p>In any case, the book is well written and full of attractive ideas. Here are a few of my favourite lines:</p><blockquote>To enter myth we must personify; to personify carries us into myth. (p. 16)</blockquote><blockquote>Thus the soul finds psyche everywhere, recognizes itself in all things. (p. 154)</blockquote><blockquote>Archetypes are the skeletal structures of the psyche, yet the bones are changeable constellations of light. (p. 157)</blockquote><p>And lastly, the rather shocking and debatable,</p><blockquote>Self-realization involves the realizing in consciousness of the psychopathic potential one prefers to call inhuman. (p. 188)</blockquote><p><strong>Hillman, J. (1992). <em>Re-visioning psychology</em>. New York: Harper Perennial. (Original work published 1976)</strong></p><p>© Kerry Handscomb 2017. All rights reserved.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9b5ff61fd7a4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Coleridge’s Theory of Imagination in Dejection: An Ode]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Elan_vital__/coleridges-theory-of-imagination-in-dejection-an-ode-959d570af43a?source=rss-18b0636c4bdd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/959d570af43a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[coleridge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[poetry]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[romanticism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Elan_vital_]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Jan 2017 22:45:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-05T22:48:58.097Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*_kO32v-nsUCWVjo06dvxsA.jpeg" /></figure><p>In this essay I wish to discuss Coleridge’s poem <em>Dejection: An Ode</em> (final version) from the perspective of the theory of imagination that Coleridge outlines in his <em>Biographia Literaria</em>, Chapter XIII. I will restrict my investigation to these two sources, despite the wealth of published research material available on the poem and on Coleridge’s theory of imagination.</p><p>The investigation herein was initially prompted by Coleridge’s engagement with the philosophy of Spinoza, and my intent to understand ways in which Spinoza was an inspiration for the Romantic Movement. Nothing yet has actually resulted from my interest in Spinoza and the Romantics. However, <em>Dejection</em> and Coleridge’s theory of the imagination in the <em>Biographia Literaria</em> can render a way of understanding Coleridge’s most famous poem, the enchanting and enigmatic <em>The Rime of the Ancient Mariner</em>. The essay here is the first of two. The second essay will concentrate specifically on <em>The Rime of the Ancient Mariner</em></p><p>Coleridge’s presentation of his theory of imagination is obscure, and I will try to be careful not to over-interpret, and put words into his mouth, as it were. I will discuss the way in which the meter of <em>Dejection</em>, for me, is illustrative of Coleridge’s state of mind. I will scan through the poem, stanza by stanza, isolating and interpreting examples of Coleridge’s theory of imagination. The crucial fifth and sixth stanzas can offer a surprising insight into Coleridge’s third form of imagination.</p><p>Coleridge discusses his three forms of imagination in the <em>Biographia Literaria</em>, Chapter XIII. Coleridge’s approach to defining imagination is mystical and quite challenging. I will provide a brief alternative description of each form of imagination.</p><p>The first kind of imagination is perhaps the most difficult to grasp. Coleridge writes of it as follows:</p><blockquote>The primary IMAGINATION is the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and a repetition on the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. (p. 516)</blockquote><p>To put it another way, as I see it, primary imagination is participation of the finite, limited human mind in the infinite, eternal creative source. I will try to flesh out my understanding of primary imagination, below, with reference to <em>Dejection</em>.</p><p>Coleridge describes secondary imagination as follows:</p><blockquote>The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the <strong>kind</strong> of its agency, and differing only in <strong>degree</strong>, and in the <strong>mode</strong> of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially <strong>vital</strong>, even as all objects (<strong>as</strong> objects) are essentially fixed and dead. (p. 516, original emphasis)</blockquote><p>I suggest that secondary imagination can be understood as a joining of the infinite, eternal creative source with the external world through the agency of the finite, limited human mind. Secondary imagination is present in two movements, “dissolving, dissipating, and diffusing” in the world in sense of the world being many, and “idealizing and unifying” these many in the sense of the world being one. The world is lifeless without secondary imagination. Primary imagination, life and creation, infuses the world through the human agent, and that is secondary imagination.</p><p>Coleridge’s third kind of imagination is fancy, which he describes as follows:</p><blockquote>FANCY, on the contrary, has no other counters to play with, but fixities and definites. The Fancy is indeed no other than a mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and space; while it is blended with, and modified by that empirical phenomenon of the will, which we express by the word CHOICE. But equally with the ordinary memory the Fancy must receive all its materials ready made from the law of association. (p. 516)</blockquote><p>Fancy, as I understand it, is a working of the human imagination on the objects of the external world — but without the creative and vivifying power of primary imagination. Fixed, lifeless objects are combined and recombined. Authentic creation, in the sense of bringing something new into the world, is not present in fancy.</p><p>Rather than further attempting to flesh out and interpret these three forms of imagination, which would result in my putting my own ideas into Coleridge’s mouth, I intend to search for examples of the three forms of imagination in Coleridge’s poem, <em>Dejection</em>, using Coleridge’s own words for further interpretation. In particular, <em>Dejection</em> seems to contain a surprising and interesting perspective on fancy. Before proceeding, however, I would like to say a few words about the poem as a whole, including its meter.</p><p>The first four stanzas set the scene, with intimations of a coming storm; Coleridge explains that he is unable to “feel” the beauty of his surroundings; he communicates his unhappiness. Stanza IV marks a transition in tone, introducing Stanza V, in which Coleridge launches into what I take to be his descriptions of primary and secondary imagination. In Stanza VI Coleridge speaks explicitly of fancy, which he intimates is the source of his unhappiness. Stanza VII shows Coleridge’s hellish state of mind reflected in the storm, which has arrived. Stanza VIII completes the poem with a prayer for the Lady, to whom the poem has been addressed.</p><p><em>Dejection</em> is written in iambic pentameter, although many lines have less than five feet: 8–11, 18, 24, 39–40, 42–43, 55, 69, 72, 84, 118–119, 121–122, and 132–133.</p><p>The interruption in the rhythm of the poem occurs when Coleridge evokes what seem to be particularly important phrases, such as “And sent my soul abroad” (line 18) or “A new Earth and new Heaven” (line 69). However, in the majority of cases any greater significance of the shorter lines is not immediately apparent.</p><p>Aside from any meanings of the shorter lines in themselves, the interruptions in the meter seem to emphasize Coleridge’s own unsettled mood. One has the sense of the dejected Coleridge sobbing at each break in the metrical flow. With the phrase “dull sobbing draft, that moans and rakes” (line 6) Coleridge could be referring to his own state of mind, rather than the wind.</p><p><em>Dejection</em> is addressed to the Lady in Stanzas II, V, and VII. Despite the intellect in the poem and its display of literary talent, one has the sense when reading it of a distraught, lovelorn young man.</p><p>Now to a more detailed review of the poem. In Stanza I Coleridge uses images from nature, the coming storm, to presage the coming storm of his emotions. In particular, the moon, in its feminine symbolic aspect, may be a reference to the Lady.</p><p>In Stanza II the unhappiness of Coleridge comes to the fore. He is able to “see” the beauty of the landscape, but unable to “feel” the beauty of the landscape. The distinction of the two ways of knowing is emphasized in Stanza III:</p><blockquote>I may not hope from outward forms to win</blockquote><blockquote>The passion and the life, whose fountains are within.</blockquote><p>(lines 45–46)</p><p>In other words, the ability to feel, which comes from within, is lacking. Coleridge, by this time, has bemoaned his unhappy state and his inability to receive “passion” and “life” from the external world. These are two key terms.</p><p>The impotence of external things is developed in Stanza IV, where the world is described as “inanimate and cold” (line 51), in contrast to living. Moreover,</p><blockquote>… from the soul itself must issue forth</blockquote><blockquote>A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud</blockquote><p>(lines 53–54)</p><p>In my opinion, passion, life, light, glory, and luminosity are Coleridge’s descriptors for primary imagination. Primary imagination, he is saying, originates from within, from the soul, to animate an otherwise dead world.</p><p>Coleridge warms to his subject in Stanza V, repeating almost unchanged the phrase, “This light, this glory, this fair luminous mist” (line 62). Now he introduces what I take to be a key descriptor for primary imagination, “joy,” which appears twice in line 64, once in line 67, twice in line 71, once in line 77, and twice again in line 134.</p><p>Identification of joy with primary imagination is contained in the phrase, “We in ourselves rejoice!” (line 72) — joy is that which comes from within rather than from the external world. The importance of the term is emphasized by Coleridge’s choice of the poem’s final word: “rejoice.” Joy contrasts with Coleridge’s morose, unsettled state of mind in this poem. Clearly, he feels he lacks the influx of primary imagination.</p><p>In Stanza V Coleridge reiterates what I understand to be other descriptors for primary imagination: life, spirit, and power. These qualities, together with joy itself, are “wedding Nature to us” (line 68), resulting in a “new Earth and new Heaven” (line 69).</p><p>The “wedding,” or joining, of primary imagination with Nature, or external world, is what I take to be secondary imagination. The contrast of primary with secondary imagination is present, respectively, in the phrases “beautiful and beauty-making” (line 63), “[l]ife, and life’s effluence” (line 66).</p><p>Of the three forms of imagination, “fancy” (line 79) is the only one that Coleridge refers to specifically in <em>Dejection</em>, repeating the same term from <em>Biographia Literaria</em>.</p><p>As mentioned earlier, I understand Coleridge’s third kind of imagination, or fancy, to mean building perceptual structures by utilizing external elements alone, devoid of primary imagination. If the poem stopped at Stanza V, the resulting complex consisting of the three forms of imagination would seem to make sense: secondary imagination is the joining of primary imagination with world; fancy is the building of lifeless forms from lifeless elements.</p><p>However, in Stanza V Coleridge writes that the “new Earth and new Heaven” are “[u]ndreamt of by the sensual and the proud” (line 70). I presume that this line specifically refers to Satan’s sin of pride, which results in Satan’s being cast out of Heaven, according to the Biblical and Miltonic story. Pride prefigures a moral turn in <em>Dejection</em>, in Stanzas VI and VII, in which Coleridge describes his own fall from grace. Interestingly, fancy is the cause of the fall.</p><p>In Stanza VI, Coleridge writes,</p><blockquote>… Fancy made me dreams of happiness:</blockquote><blockquote>For hope grew round me, like the twining vine,</blockquote><p>(lines 79–80)</p><p>The “twining vine” recalls Satan’s snake-form when tempting Eve in the Biblical and Miltonic story. At the beginning of Stanza VII, Coleridge makes the snake imagery explicit with the following lines:</p><blockquote>Hence, viper thoughts, that coil around my mind,</blockquote><blockquote>Reality’s dark dream!</blockquote><p>(lines 94–95)</p><p>The remainder of the long Stanza VII may be taken as a description the poet’s residence in hell, as he refers successively to torture, devils, the agony of war, and suicide.</p><p>Coleridge completes the poem in Stanza VIII with a prayer that the Lady may experience joy, that she may rejoice. He wishes her to be the recipient of an influx of primary imagination, provided my reading of the poem is correct.</p><p>Let me return to what is for me the most crucial and interesting point in <em>Dejection</em>, Coleridge’s <em>moral</em> interpretation of the forms of imagination, specifically his association of fancy with fall from grace.</p><p>The key I think lies in the reference to the sin of pride in line 70, tied to the “sensual,” which I have already mentioned. The sensual implies attention to the objects of the external world, rather than a focus within.</p><p>A focus within could enable the poet to access primary imagination, whereas attention to the external world, to the exclusion of primary imagination, results in the exercise of an inferior form of imagination, fancy.</p><p>With the exercise of fancy, the poet himself, rather than the poet as a channel for primary imagination, is the creative agent, and “… fruits and foliage not my own seemed mine” (line 81).</p><p>The human attempt to usurp (unsuccessfully) the true creative agency of primary imagination is presumably the sin of pride.</p><p>However, a prideful reliance on a purely human creative faculty, ironically, excludes, what is arguably most essentially human, the ability to transform the world in the light of primary imagination. I think this is what Coleridge is getting at with the following lines:</p><blockquote>And haply by abstruse research to steal</blockquote><blockquote>From my own nature all the natural man —</blockquote><p>(lines 89–90)</p><p>The phrase “by abstruse research to steal,” on its own, has scientific and Promethean connotations. However, the verb “to steal” in this case appears to mean to take something away rather than to acquire something new. What is taken away is “the natural man,” which I understand to refer to primary imagination.</p><p>A stemming of the flow of primary imagination leads to the unhappiness of prior sections of the poem and then the hellish experiences of Stanza VII to follow. However, there is some uncertainty in Stanza VI as to the causal order.</p><p>According to Coleridge, each affliction, each unhappy episode,</p><blockquote>Suspends what nature gave me at my birth,</blockquote><blockquote>My shaping spirit of Imagination.</blockquote><p>(lines 85–86)</p><p>Coleridge seems to be saying that the joyless periods of his life are themselves responsible for the curtailing of primary imagination. Lacking access to the creative source, Coleridge would presumably turn to fancy. Then, reliance on fancy, resulting in pride, pitches him into the hellish environment of Stanza VII. The causal chain, if I have understood the poem correctly, appears different to what one would expect: pride blocks primary imagination, removing joy and leading to an unhappy life. Indeed, Stanza V appears to endorse the latter view, in which pride and sensuality come first.</p><p>Whatever interpretation we give to the complex set of ideas expressed in Stanza VI, it is clear that a close reading of <em>Dejection</em> can enrich our conception of Coleridge’s theory of imagination: primary imagination is associated with joy; secondary imagination is the infusion of joy into the world, without which the world is lifeless; fancy is associated with prideful self-reliance, resulting in fall from grace, expulsion from paradise.</p><p><em>© Kerry Handscomb 2017. All rights reserved</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=959d570af43a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[New Year’s Resolution: A more rational life]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Elan_vital__/new-years-resolution-a-more-rational-life-b84f35649f22?source=rss-18b0636c4bdd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b84f35649f22</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[health]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[new-years-resolutions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baruch-spinoza]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[good-and-bad]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Elan_vital_]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Dec 2016 04:29:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-05T00:35:03.283Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*0uFs5Phi7mFrv4QOYsQomA.jpeg" /></figure><p>So often in life, there are things we like that are not good for us; vice versa, there are things we do not like that are good for us.</p><p>Nevertheless, the things that are not good for us, we often persist in thinking of as “good.” For example, the sugary treats we actually refer to as “goodies” are full of white flour and sugar, which is bad for us. And we know that white flour and sugar is bad for us!</p><p><em>We like something that is bad for us.</em></p><p>Likewise, the things that are good for us, we often persist in thinking of as “bad.” For example, many of us dislike spinach and broccoli, which are full of excellent nutrients, which are good for us. And we know that these nutrients are good for us!</p><p><em>We dislike something that is good for us.</em></p><p>The examples I have given involve food, but the same arguments could be made for likes and dislikes in many areas of life.</p><p>Spinoza has something to say on this matter. In Part 4 Proposition 31 Corollary of the <em>Ethics</em> (Elwes translation), he writes,</p><blockquote>Nothing, therefore, can be good, except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature; and hence a thing is useful, in proportion as it is in harmony with our nature, and vice versa.</blockquote><p>For Spinoza, to like something that is bad for us, or to dislike something that is good for us, is irrational.</p><p>Only those things that are good for us are “in harmony with our nature”; only that things that are bad for us are <em>not</em> “in harmony with our nature.”</p><p>Surely, we should strive for things that are good for us and avoid things that are bad for us. In other words, we should like things that are good for us and dislike things that are bad for us. To do otherwise would be foolish. We would be striving contrary to our nature, working against ourselves.</p><p>Let us begin to like spinach and broccoli; let us begin to shun the so-called “goodies” — in fact, let us be accurate, and call them “baddies.”</p><p>For myself, I am already well on the way to liking spinach and broccoli, and at least I try to avoid the sugary snacks, even if my tastebuds play tricks and tell me that they taste good.</p><p>I need to go further, and start actively disliking sugary snacks <em>because</em> they are bad for me. To do otherwise would be contrary to reason.</p><p>In fact, perhaps the whole collection of my likes and dislikes, over many areas of life, needs to be overhauled.</p><p>And so, a New Year’s Resolution for 2017 is to like only what is good for me and dislike only what is bad for me.</p><p>Of course, I am a very imperfect human being, with deeply entrenched behaviour patterns, some of which help me to flourish, and some, unfortunately, that are not in my best interest. I am likely to accomplish the goal only very imperfectly.</p><p>Now, by definition, according to Spinoza, we love what is good for us and hate what is bad for us. Spinoza is defining good and bad, love and hate in absolutely the most rational way.</p><p>Often we misapply the terms “good” and “bad,” as we saw above.</p><p>However, patterns of behaviour that are bad for me, I actually, really, deep-down <em>hate</em>. It does not make sense for me to grasp at these detrimental patterns of behaviour. Likewise, patterns of behaviour that are good for me, I actually, really, deep-down <em>love</em>, and I should always embrace them.</p><p>And so, my task is to live a more rational life. Wish me luck!</p><p><em>© Kerry Handscomb 2017. All rights reserved.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b84f35649f22" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bergson on mind-brain parallelism]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Elan_vital__/bergson-on-mind-brain-parallelism-e266239379fd?source=rss-18b0636c4bdd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e266239379fd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bergson]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[neuroscience]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Elan_vital_]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 30 Dec 2016 00:48:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-05T00:34:24.396Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*P-3ANwz0-vzxkSUxbk71Xw.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ImI00d_IfrZJSSOVL5s4ZA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Henri Bergson was a French philosopher, who was at the peak of his influence and creative power very early in the last century. My earlier post, <em>Bergson’s qualitative multiplicity </em>, is a review of his first book. The present essay concerns just one aspect of Bergson’s thought, his views on the hypothesis of mind-brain parallelism, as these views are represented in his essay “Brain and thought: A philosophical illusion” from <em>Mind Energy: Lectures and Essays</em> (1920) (New York: Henry Holt and Company, trans. H. Wildon Carr, pp. 231–255).</p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>The hypothesis of parallelism is that two orders of reality, the material and the mental follow parallel tracks. Spinoza put the hypothesis most succinctly with the statement, “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (<em>Ethics</em>, 2p7). Parallelism may be interpreted to mean that thought processes and brain activities constitute isomorphic systems. More generally, perhaps, the isomorphism may be considered to be between thought processes and the entirety of bodily activities. Bergson considers only brain-mind parallelism, but his argument, summarized herein, works equally well also for body-mind parallelism.</p><p>Bergson considered that the hypothesis of parallelism was incoherent. Bergson’s second book, <em>Matière et mémoire</em>, published in 1896, contains his argument against the hypothesis in nascent form. A more developed form of certain aspects of the argument is contained in the essay that I am reviewing here. As far as I know, this essay may be regarded as Bergson’s definitive statement on parallelism.</p><p>Bergson defines parallelism as follows:</p><blockquote>A superhuman intelligence, watching the dance of the atoms of which the human brain consists and possessing the psycho-physiological key, would be able to read, in the workings of the brain, all that is occurring in the corresponding consciousness (pp. 231–232)</blockquote><p>Furthermore, “Consciousness tells no more than what is going on in the brain; it only tells it in a different language” (p. 232).</p><p>Bergson does not believe that the hypothesis of parallelism is defensible. In this essay, he argues against parallelism.</p><p>In a nutshell, Bergson’s strategy to discredit the hypothesis of parallelism is as follows. Firstly, a description of reality must adhere either to idealism or to realism. Secondly, idealism and realism are mutually exclusive frameworks. Thirdly, an idealist outlook together with the hypothesis of parallelism involves a contradiction that can only be avoided by adopting a realist position. Fourthly, a realist outlook together with the hypothesis of parallelism involves a contradiction that can only be avoided by adopting an idealist position. Fifthly, and lastly, the hypothesis of parallelism has therefore nowhere to call home, as it were, and must be rejected.</p><p>Problems with parallelism are foreshadowed in the very nature of the hypothesis, according to Bergson, since it attempts to relate the brain, which is a thing, to consciousness, which consists of ideas.</p><p>Bergson points out that the argument works not only for strict parallelism, but also for other mind-brain hypotheses, such as epiphenomenalism, which intermingle the incompatible metaphysical frameworks of idealism and realism.</p><p>Since the argument depends so strongly on Bergson’s notions of idealism and realism, I must first attempt to elucidate Bergson’s usage of these terms in his essay.</p><p><strong>Idealism and realism</strong></p><p>Firstly, with respect to idealism, Bergson defines it as follows:</p><blockquote>For the idealist, there is nothing in reality over and above what appears to his consciousness or to consciousness in general. It would be absurd to speak of a property of matter which could not be represented in idea. There is no virtuality, or, at least, nothing definitely virtual; whatever exists is actual or could become so. Idealism is, then, a notation-system which implies that everything essential in matter is displayed or displayable in the idea which we have of it, and that the real world is articulated in the very same way as it is presented in idea (p.235).</blockquote><p>The ideas, in other words are indeed the things in themselves. There is nothing hidden. I think Bergson implies by example with science that a system of ideas may be analyzed into system of finer ideas — more specific or more detailed — but there is “nothing definitely virtual.” The ideas, at whatever level of analysis, are what they are in themselves, and there is nothing standing behind them that cannot in principle be brought to mind.</p><p>More specifically, when the brain is viewed with the unaided eye, the brain’s electro-chemical activity is hidden. Nevertheless, the brain’s electrochemical activity could “become actual” and is not in principle unreachable. When viewing a written word in an unknown language, on the other hand, the meaning of the word cannot be brought to mind by an analysis of the appearance of the word in itself. Some additional information would be required, such as a key, or a dictionary. I suppose Bergson considers the distinction between these two cases to be obvious, and in consequence he does not discuss it explicitly. Nevertheless, it is an important distinction, which should be borne in mind for his argument to make sense.</p><p>With respect to realism, Bergson defines it as follows:</p><blockquote>The hypothesis of realism is the exact reverse [of idealism]. When realism affirms that matter exists independently of the idea, the meaning is that beneath our idea of matter there is an inaccessible cause of that idea, that behind perception, which is actual, there are hidden powers and virtualities; in short, realism assumes that the divisions and articulations visible in our perception are purely relative to our manner of perceiving (p. 235).</blockquote><p>In other words, realism proposes an underlying level of reality that is in principle unreachable, just as the meaning of the word cannot be determined from the word’s appearance, in the analogy I used above.</p><p>What is present to consciousness must of necessity consist of ideas. For the idealist, the ideas are reality itself; for the realist, the ideas are provisionally real, and the authentic reality lies beyond and behind the ideas, unreachable and unknowable. For, if the underlying reality could be known, it would be no longer be underlying and unknowable, but an idea.</p><p>Nevertheless, scientists, in particular, are forever digging behind their ideas and grasping for more fundamental levels of reality. According to Bergson,</p><blockquote>The hypothesis of the realist is therefore here only an ideal, whose purpose is to remind him that he has never gone deep enough down in his explanation of reality, and that he must discover more and more fundamental relations between the parts of the real which to our eyes are juxtaposed in space (p. 248).</blockquote><p>In other words, it is the movement of the realist toward the more fundamental levels of reality in which the realism is displayed. At some point, the current deepest level of analysis that has been reached, the realist becomes a de facto idealist: the realist cannot, in principle, attain to the “real,” and has no choice but to accept, provisionally, a system of ideas.</p><p>According to Bergson, the self-sufficient reality of ideas means that they are isolable. Each idea is independent. The realist, however, sees the apparent independence of the ideas as an illusion, and beneath it all, each is mutually implicated. Bergson writes,</p><blockquote>Comparing the two systems, we see that it is essential to idealism to stop at what is displayed and spread out in space and at spatial divisions, whilst realism regards the display as superficial and the divisions as artificial: realism assumes behind the juxtaposed ideas a system of reciprocal actions, consequently a mutual <strong>implication</strong> of the pictures or ideas (pp. 247–248, original emphasis).</blockquote><p>According to the realist, when an aspect of reality is separated from the remainder of reality it is an idea and therefore necessarily superficial. For the realist, then, the ultimate level of reality cannot consist of separated objects and must therefore be monolithic and unitary.</p><p>Bergson explains that his definitions of idealism and realism are by no means meant to be definitive: they are conditional for the purposes of the argument in the essay. He writes,</p><blockquote>If any one is inclined to dispute the generality of my two definitions, I simply ask him to accept the words <strong>realism</strong> and <strong>idealism</strong> as conventional terms by which I intend to indicate, in the course of this study, two notations of reality, one of which implies the possibility, the other the impossibility, of identifying things with their ideas, that is with the presentations, spread out and articulated in space, which they offer to human consciousness. That these two postulates are mutually exclusive, that consequently it is illegitimate to apply the two notation-systems at the same time to the same object, every one will agree (p. 236, original emphasis).</blockquote><p>It is important to note here the exact nature of the “mutual exclusivity” that Bergson is proposing. He is not saying that we must make a choice to consider that all ideas are self-sufficient things in themselves or all ideas are superficial and mask a more authentic level of reality. He is claiming merely that it is contradictory to consider an idea to satisfy both points of view at the same time.</p><p>Likewise, it seems obvious, although Bergson does not state it explicitly, that idealism and realism are inclusive: given that consciousness consists of ideas, then either the ideas are things in themselves, or they are not, and a deeper, and unknowable, level of reality supports the ideas. There are no other possibilities.</p><p><strong>Idealism and parallelism</strong></p><p>Let me consider Bergson’s view of the compound hypothesis of idealism and parallelism. Given the idealist position, the objects external to a person are ideas. The activity in a person’s brain is also an idea. Bergson writes,</p><blockquote>External objects are for the idealist images, and the brain is one of them. There is nothing in things themselves over and above what is displayed or displayable in the images. There is nothing then in the dancing about of cerebral atoms over and above a dance of atoms. Since this is all we have supposed to be in the brain, it is all that will be found there or that can be got out of it (p. 238).</blockquote><p>The straightforward implication that lying behind the activity of the brain is something else, in fact a whole virtual world of experience, is in direct contradiction with the idealist notion that ideas are things in themselves. It is not the case, presumably, that the ideas of external objects are implied in the idea of the brain’s activity. Rather, it is the case of the word in an unknown language and its meaning, in the analogy that I used above. An analysis of the brain activity in itself can only result in a more detailed, more comprehensive understanding of the brain activity: it will not lead in itself to another world of hidden meaning.</p><p>Bergson continues,</p><blockquote>To say that an image of the surrounding world issues from this image of a dance of atoms, or that the image of one expresses the image of the other, or that given the one the other is also given, is self-contradictory, since the two images — the external world and the intra-cerebral movement — have been assumed to be of like nature, and since the latter image is, by the very hypothesis, a tiny part of the field of images presented, while the external world is that field in its entirety (p. 238).</blockquote><p>The fact that brain activity is an idea among a collection of ideas — of which the brain activity itself is one of these ideas — raises an interesting point. Bergson explains,, “Formulated in strictly idealist language, the thesis of parallelism would therefore have to be summed up in the self-contradictory proposition: <em>the part is the whole</em>” (pp. 239–240, original emphasis).</p><p>I do not completely understand Bergson’s claim that “the part is the whole” is automatically a contradiction. Bergson would have been unfamiliar with the properties of holograms, for which the whole can indeed be contained in the part, although of lower resolution. Fortunately, the contradictory nature in itself of “the part is the whole” is not essential to Bergson’s argument.</p><p>On the other hand the requirement that a large part of reality necessarily be implicated in a small part of reality leads towards a realist position: in the realist framework the world is ultimately monolithic and unitary — everything is implicated in everything else, and nothing can stand apart. In this context, we can accept “the part is the whole”, because ultimately there are no “parts.”</p><p>The compound hypothesis of idealism and parallelism, as I understand Bergson’s argument, leads towards realism in two ways: firstly, it implies hidden levels of meaning; secondly, it suggests a unitary reality in which there are no parts. Since idealism and realism are incompatible, there is a contradiction</p><p><strong>Realism and parallelism</strong></p><p>Now let me consider Bergson’s view of the compound hypothesis of realism and parallelism. Coming back to the field of objects, one of which is brain activity, Bergson writes,</p><blockquote>[I]t is the essence of realism to suppose that behind ideas is a cause which is not idea. There seems no reason, then, why realism should not hold that the idea of external objects is implied in the cerebral modifications (p. 243).</blockquote><p>The idealist problem, in which brain activity stands for something else, is not an issue in the realist framework. Nevertheless, a different contradiction inheres in the combined assumption of realism and parallelism. Bergson explains,</p><blockquote>But is it not at once clear that to consider the brain separately, and separately also the movement of its atoms, involves now an actual self-contradiction? An idealist has the right to declare any object isolable which gives him an isolated idea, because for him the object is not distinct from the idea. But realism consists precisely in the rejection of this view; it holds that the lines of separation which we draw in the field of presentation are artificial or relative; it supposes that beneath presentations there is a system of reciprocal actions and entangled potentialities; in short, it defines the object not by its entry into our presentation, but by its solidarity with the whole of a reality supposed to be unknowable (p. 244).</blockquote><p>In other words, regarding the brain activity alone as being parallel to conscious experience is not possible within the realist position, because then the brain would be isolated from the rest of the world for this purpose and would therefore become an idea. Strictly speaking, it is not the brain alone that conjures up the objects of the external world, but the whole world as an undivided whole.</p><p>The separation of the brain from the world in this ways leads toward idealism. Once again, a contradiction arises because idealism and realism are incompatible.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>In summary, the assumption of idealism and parallelism leads towards realism and a contradiction; likewise, the assumption of realism and parallelism leads towards idealism and a contradiction: idealism and realism are incompatible frameworks for describing reality, and one should, according to Bergson, choose one or the other for any given application.</p><p>Since idealism and realism, also, are inclusive — there are no other possibilities for any given application — parallelism has no home. In consequence, parallelism is an idea without value.</p><p>Very briefly, again, the argument works like this: within the idealist framework, parallelism implies a virtual meaning behind the idea of the brain’s activity, requiring a realist stance; but within the realist framework, now, the activity of the brain as parallel to conscious experience is de facto a separation of brain activity from the world, requiring an idealist stance. But if brain activity is idea, then it cannot represent virtually the other ideas of the world. The cycle repeats, bouncing back and forth between idealism and realism. Bergson concludes,</p><blockquote>You are therefore oscillating from idealism to realism and from realism to idealism, but so quickly that you do not perceive the see-saw motion and you think yourself all the time astride the two systems joined into one. This apparent reconciliation of two irreconcilable affirmations is the very essence of the the thesis of parallelism (p. 250).</blockquote><p>The thesis of parallelism, according to Bergson, is incoherent.</p><p><em>© Kerry Handscomb 2017. All rights reserved.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e266239379fd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Bergson’s Qualitative Multiplicity]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@Elan_vital__/bergsons-qualitative-multiplicity-2fb335264670?source=rss-18b0636c4bdd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2fb335264670</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[consciousness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bergson]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Elan_vital_]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 27 Dec 2016 19:53:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-01-05T00:33:46.083Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*CRNhtLKNBWnjSTWLZQaYCw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The topic of Henri Bergson’s first major work, <em>Time and Free Will</em>, is phenomenal experience, or, in Bergson’s words, the immediate data of consciousness. A major thesis of the book concerns the distinction between surface and deep psychic states. My goal in this essay is to elucidate and summarize Bergson’s understanding of this dichotomy. All quotations herein, and other references to Bergson’s thought, are from Bergson (1889/1960), with some exceptions, which I explicitly note.</p><p><strong>Ontology and epistemology</strong></p><p>In <em>Time and Free Will </em>Bergson’s approach is fundamentally phenomenological. He makes no clear ontological claims, although he appears to grant equal reality both to an extended material world and to an ideal domain consisting of deep psychic states. The inner, ideal realm is known directly, and I think it is fair to claim that Bergson’s position is that the outer, extended domain of the material world is also known directly. Bergson is explicit with regard to this latter point in his second major work, <em>Matter and Memory</em>. In consequence, there is no hard division between ontology and epistemology in Bergson’s system, what is known <em>is</em>.</p><p>Psyche and world, mind and matter, are intimately connected and commingling, and it would be incorrect to describe Bergson’s system as dualistic. There is one reality, although some aspects of this reality partake of characteristics that are more worldly, whereas other aspects of this reality partake of characteristics that are more properly psychic in origin. Neither does Bergson espouse a straightforward dual-aspect monism. Psyche is not equally and universally commingled with world, and neither is world equally and universally commingled with psyche. A useful metaphor places world at one end of a spectrum and psyche at the other end. There are elements of psyche that have almost no worldly aspect, just as there are elements of world that have almost no psychic aspect. Lastly, we should be clear that psyche cannot be reduced to world and equally that world cannot be reduced to psyche. Bergson’s system is monistic in the special sense that the one substance constituting reality is not uniform. This is my interpretation of the epistemology and ontology of <em>Time and Free Will</em>.</p><p><strong>Surface psychic states</strong></p><p>At the surface of the psyche is perception of the external world. The external world is perceived as a collection of objects, which are separated in space. Of course, there may be some interpenetration of objects, in the sense of physical overlapping of objects, or of one object being physically contained in another object. However, Bergson insists that the objects of the external world, known at the surface of the psyche, are separated and extended through space. His insistence in this respect may be understood in several different ways. Firstly, even though objects may interpenetrate, the interpenetration is <em>local</em>, and undoubtedly a vast number of externally perceived objects definitely are separated in extended space, despite the existence of local interpenetration. Secondly, it is easy to separate the objects mentally, as attention is focused firstly on one aspect and then on another aspect of the external world. Thirdly, the objects when thought of in this way certainly do become separated, and Bergson would argue that this separation takes place in space. I would designate that this region, in which objects are separated and placed side by side, is metaphorical space: the objects are metaphorically separated.</p><p><strong>Metaphorical space</strong></p><p>Bergson himself does not refer specifically to “metaphorical” space. However, the idea of a “metaphorical” space, in contrast to the “real” space in which extended external objects are located, is important for understanding the system in <em>Time and Free Will</em>. Objects at the surface of the psyche that are otherwise interpenetrating may be separated mentally and placed side by side in metaphorical space. The same is true of deeper psychic states, such as emotions, which are not immediately dependent on sensational experience from an external world. Internal states such as these may be separated from the overall psychic state and examined separately, once again in a metaphorical space. In fact, any analytical operation, according to Bergson, results in a fracturing of the fundamental unity of the deep psyche in such a way that individual objects are placed side by side as if they were set out in space.</p><p><strong>Deep psychic states</strong></p><p>The deep psyche is known as <em>duration</em>. Duration is contrasted with extension, where the latter is characteristic of phenomenal states at the surface of the psyche, containing perceptual objects. The typical objects of duration, on the other hand, may be affective states such as love, aversion, fear, and so on. However, all psychic states participate in duration to extent in which their objects are interpenetrating and commingling rather than separated in space, actual or metaphoric. Bergson writes, “[W]e shall no longer consider states of consciousness in isolation from one another, but in their concrete multiplicity, in so far as they unfold themselves in pure duration” (p. 73); and, “[I]nner duration, perceived by consciousness, is nothing else but the melting of states of consciousness into one another” (p. 107).</p><p>An affective state such as fear may be recognized for its origin in the deep psyche in the way that it colours the totality of phenomenal experience for the one afflicted. According to Bergson,</p><blockquote>When it is said that an object occupies a large space in the soul or even that it fills it entirely, we ought to understand by this simply that its image has altered the shade of a thousand perceptions or memories, and in this sense that it pervades them. (pp. 8–9)</blockquote><p>A perceptual object of the external world, on the other hand, betrays its attachment to the surface of the psyche in its very independence.</p><p>The experience of a melody expresses durational characteristics because individual notes must, in some sense, linger in the psyche to combine with succeeding notes. In fact, to the extent that any phenomenal experience expresses more than the present instant, it partakes of durational characteristics. Duration may indeed be thought of as memory. However, with this equation perhaps I am reading more into Bergson’s notion of duration than is actually contained in <em>Time and Free Will</em>. Perhaps I am inadvertently importing more developed notions of duration contained in Bergson’s later work, <em>Matter and Memory</em>. In any case, if duration is memory, and if affective states belong to duration, then it is necessary to explicate the connection between memory and affective states, a task which I am not prepared to undertake in this essay.</p><p>Whereas surface, perceptual objects are distributed in space, whether real or metaphorical, deep, affective states are interpenetrating and commingling. At the deepest level, according to Bergson, each affective state completely interpenetrates the whole soul. The deep psychic states, according to Bergson, are representative of the true self. He writes,</p><blockquote>[J]ust in proportion as we dig below the surface and get down to the real self, do its states of consciousness cease to stand in juxtaposition and begin to permeate and melt into one another, and each to be tinged with the colouring of all the others. (p. 164)</blockquote><p>In a nutshell, “[A]n idea which is truly ours fills the whole of our self” (p. 135).</p><p><strong>Time as space and “genuine” time</strong></p><p>Time can be understood in two different forms. Objective time is the time of the clock, the time of science and measurement. On the other hand, the deepest psychic states, which are fully interpenetrating, and in no sense separate, express the temporal experience of subjective time. These deepest psychic states exist in duration, and duration is another name for genuine temporality.</p><p>I have already alluded to a metaphor that Bergson uses to illustrate the distinction between the objective time of separation and measurement and the subjective time of co-penetration and duration: the notes of a melody. It is possible to attend to each note, so that individual notes are set out one by one and separated. On the other hand, it is possible for the notes to permeate each other and blend, so that the melody evolves as the music progresses. For the melody actually to be perceived earlier notes must in some sense survive into the present, so that the melody is apprehended as an undivided whole. The former case demonstrates objective time, in which the successive notes are represented symbolically in space. On the other hand, the latter case demonstrates the subjective experience of duration, experience of genuine time. In Bergson’s own words, referring to the oscillation of a pendulum,</p><blockquote>Now if, finally, I retain the recollection of the preceding oscillation together with the image of the present oscillation, one of two things will happen. Either I shall set the two images side by side, … or I shall perceive one in the other, each permeating the other and organizing themselves like the notes of a tune, so as to form what we shall call a continuous or qualitative multiplicity with no resemblance to number. I shall thus get the image of pure duration; but I shall have entirely got rid of the idea of a homogeneous medium or a measurable quantity. By carefully examining our consciousness we shall recognize that it proceeds in this way whenever it refrains from representing duration symbolically. (p. 105)</blockquote><p>Subjective time, what Bergson would regard as genuine time, is the process in which each succeeding psychic state evolves organically from the preceding psychic state, and in a sense contains the preceding psychic state. Objective time, on the other hand, belongs to surface states of the psyche, in which objects, or psychic states, are set out in order, separated, one after another. Just as the interval between two points on a line is limitlessly divisible, the interval between two instants of objective time is limitlessly divisible. Each division identifies a new object or psychic state that is separated from the two initial objects or psychic states. Objective time belongs to surface states of the psyche, in which objects, or psychic states, are set out in order, separated, one after another.</p><p>According to Bergson, writing of the two ways of understanding time, and using the melody metaphor,</p><blockquote>There are indeed … two possible conceptions of time, the one free from all alloy, the other surreptitiously bringing in the idea of space. Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our our ego lets itself <strong>live</strong>, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states. For this purpose it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea; for then, on the contrary, it would no longer <strong>endure</strong>. Nor need it forget its former states: it is enough that, in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside its actual state as one point alongside another, but forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another. Might it not be said that, even if these notes succeed one another, yet we perceive them in one another, and that their totality may be compared to a living being whose parts, although distinct, permeate one another just because they are so closely connected? (p. 100, original emphasis)</blockquote><p>As soon as one attempts to analyze the genuine temporal experience of subjective time, to set out successive psychic states, one after another, time becomes objectified and no longer genuine. Temporal experience, upon analysis, becomes, in other words, a form of space. According to Bergson,</p><blockquote>[S]tates of consciousness, even when successive, permeate one another, and in the simplest of them the whole soul can be reflected. We may therefore surmise that time, conceived under the form of a homogeneous medium, is some spurious concept, due to the trespassing of the idea of space upon the field of pure consciousness. (p. 98)</blockquote><p>Elsewhere, he writes, “[T]ime, conceived under the form of an unbounded and homogeneous medium, is nothing but the ghost of space haunting the reflective consciousness” (p. 99).</p><p><strong>Relationship between deep and shallow psychic states</strong></p><p>Deep and shallow psychic states do not Inhabit independent realms, and there is a mutual influence between the two. The realm of matter is apprehended at the surface of the psyche, whereas mind <em>per se </em>is apprehended in deep psychic states. Mind casts its influence over matter, just as matter influences the content of mind. According to Bergson,</p><blockquote>[F]orms applicable to things cannot be entirely our own work, that they must result from a compromise between matter and mind, that if we give much to matter we probably receive something from it, and that thus, when we try to grasp ourselves after an excursion into the external world, we no longer have our hands free. (p. 223)</blockquote><p>Clearly, perceptual objects at the surface of the psyche are often tinged with an emotional tone. There are objects of love, or hate, or fear. Commenting on the influence that deep states have on surface states, Bergson writes,</p><blockquote>[O]ur projection of our psychic states into space in order to form a discrete multiplicity is likely to influence these states themselves and to give them in reflective consciousness a new form, which immediate perception did not attribute to them. (p.90)</blockquote><p>On the other hand, the objectivization of deep psychic states in this way is in itself an implicit separation, and therefore analysis, of these deep psychic states, simply because the external objects that are their embodiments are themselves separated. According to Bergson,</p><blockquote>Yet, it will be said, do we not count feelings, sensations, ideas, all of which permeate one another, and each of which, for its part, takes up the whole of the soul? — Yes, undoubtedly; but, just because they permeate one another, we cannot count them unless we represent them by homogeneous units which occupy separate positions in space and consequently no longer permeate one another. (p. 89)</blockquote><p>Bergson argues that ordinarily we live our lives close to the surface of the psyche, in perception. Indeed, the surface levels of the psyche have great practical significance for language, society, and culture. In consequence, however, sustained access to deep levels of the psyche in their fundamental purity is difficult to attain, and spatialization of duration may be inevitable. With respect to the way that surface states of the psyche alter the experience of duration, Bergson writes,</p><blockquote>We can thus conceive of succession without distinction, and think of it as a mutual penetration, an interconnexion and organization of elements, each one of which represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought. Such is the account of duration which would be given by a being who was ever the same and ever changing, and who had no idea of space. But, familiar with the latter idea and indeed beset by it, we introduce it unwittingly into our feeling of pure succession; we set our states of consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive them simultaneously, no longer in one another, but alongside one another; in a word, we project time into space, we express duration in terms of extensity, and succession takes the form of a continuous line or chain, the parts of which touch without penetrating one another. (p. 101)</blockquote><p>Elsewhere, he writes,</p><blockquote>In a word, our ego comes in contact with the external world at its surface; our successive sensations, although dissolving into one another, retain something of the mutual externality which belongs to their objective causes; and thus our superficial psychic life comes to be pictured without any great effort as set out in a homogeneous medium. But the symbolical nature of such a picture becomes more striking as we advance further into the depths of consciousness: the deep-seated self which ponders and decides, which heats and blazes up, in a self whose states and changes permeate one another and undergo a deep alteration as soon as we separate them from one another in order to set them out in space. But as this deeper self forms one and the same person with the superficial ego, the two seem to <strong>endure</strong> in the same way. And as the repeated picture of one identical objective phenomenon, ever recurring, cuts up our superficial psychic life into parts external to one another, the moments which are thus determined determine in their turn distinct segments in the dynamic and undivided progress of our more personal conscious states. Thus the mutual externality which material objects gain from their juxtaposition in homogeneous space reverberates and spreads into the depths of consciousness: little by little our sensations are distinguished from one another like the external causes which gave rise to them, and our feelings or ideas come to be separated like the sensations with which they are contemporaneous. (pp. 125–126, original emphasis)</blockquote><p>And,</p><blockquote>As we are not accustomed to observe ourselves directly, but perceive ourselves through forms borrowed from the external world, we are led to believe that real duration, the duration lived by consciousness, is the same as the duration which glides over the inert atoms without penetrating and altering them. (p. 154)</blockquote><p>In other words, we may be led to forget the very existence of real duration. More succinctly, in the analysis of our own states, spreading them out in space and naming them, we are “standing before our own shadow” (p. 133).</p><p>Lastly, referring to the influence of surface psyche on deep psyche, Bergson puts it as follows: “Thus, within our ego, there is succession without mutual externality; outside the ego, in pure space, mutual externality without succession” (p. 108); consequently, “[B]etween this succession without externality and this externality without succession, a kind of exchange takes place” (p. 109) and the externality, with all its concomitants, is applied to inner duration.</p><p><strong>Dichotomies</strong></p><p>According to Bergson, the surface psychic states have <em>quantity</em>, in that they are measurable, either in the sense of being countable or in the sense of being associated with some number on a linear scale. On the other hand, the deep psychic states have <em>quality</em>, and they are not measurable. The dichotomy quantity-quality is one of several in <em>Time and Free Will</em>, all of which express similar ideas. Extended-unextended and space-duration are other dichotomies that I have already discussed.</p><p>Bergson’s definition of the objective-subjective distinction is another approach:</p><blockquote>In fact, we apply the term <strong>subjective</strong> to what seems to be completely and adequately known, and the term <strong>objective</strong> to what is known in such a way that a constantly increasing number of new impressions could be substituted for the idea which we actually have of it. (pp.83–84, original emphasis)</blockquote><p>The objective is not lost through analysis, but remains, and is immediately recaptured through the simple synthesis of regarding it again as a whole after analysis. The subjective, on the other hand, cannot be recaptured through synthesis when once it has been objectified and analyzed.</p><p>Bergson refers also to the quantity-quality distinction as a dichotomy between two different kinds of <em>multiplicity</em>:</p><blockquote>Our final conclusion, therefore, is that there are two kinds of multiplicity: that of material objects, to which the conception of number is immediately applicable; and the multiplicity of states of consciousness, which cannot be regarded as numerical without the help of some symbolical representation, in which a necessary element is <strong>space</strong>. (p. 87, original emphasis)</blockquote><p>In other words, there is an objective multiplicity and a subjective multiplicity, respectively. The subjective multiplicity may be grasped in its basic unity as adequately known, or it may be projected into a spatial medium and analyzed. And then, as an objective multiplicity it is limitlessly analyzable. The concept of qualitative, or subjective, multiplicity is one of the stunningly original features of Bergson’s system in <em>Time and Free Will</em>. He writes,</p><blockquote>We should therefore distinguish two forms of multiplicity, two very different ways of regarding duration, two aspects of conscious life. Below homogeneous duration, which is the extensive symbol of true duration, a close psychological analysis distinguishes a duration whose heterogeneous moments permeate one another; below the numerical multiplicity of conscious states, a qualitative multiplicity; below the self with well-defined states, a self in which <strong>succeeding each other</strong> means <strong>melting into one another</strong> and forming an organic whole. But we are generally content with the first, i.e. with the shadow of the self projected into homogeneous space. Consciousness, goaded by an insatiable desire to separate, substitutes the symbol for the reality, or perceives the reality only through the symbol. As the self thus refracted, and thereby broken to pieces, is much better adapted to the requirements of social life in general and language in particular, consciousness prefers it, and gradually loses sight of the fundamental self. (p. 128, original emphasis)</blockquote><p>He continues,</p><blockquote>In other words, our perceptions, sensations, emotions, and ideas occur under two aspects: the one clear and precise, but impersonal; the other confused, ever changing, and inexpressible, because language cannot get hold of it without arresting its mobility. … If we have been led to distinguish two forms of multiplicity, two forms of duration, we must expect each conscious state, taken by itself, to assume a different aspect according as we consider it within a discrete multiplicity or a confused multiplicity, in the time as quality, in which it is produced, or in the time as quantity, into which it is projected. (p. 129)</blockquote><p>Elsewhere, he writes,</p><blockquote>We are thus brought back to the distinction which we set up above between the multiplicity of juxtaposition and that of fusion or interpenetration. Such and such a feeling, such and such an idea, contains an indefinite plurality of conscious states: but the plurality will not be observed unless it is, as it were, spread out in this homogeneous medium which some call duration, but which is in reality space. We shall then perceive terms external to one another, and these terms will no longer be states of consciousness themselves, but their symbols, or, speaking more exactly, the words which express them. (pp. 162–163)</blockquote><p>In a nutshell, “Duration, [when] restored to its original purity, will appear as a wholly qualitative multiplicity, and absolute heterogeneity of elements which pass over into one another” (p. 229).</p><p><strong>Conceptual space</strong></p><p>Neither the extensity containing the surface objects of perception nor the metaphorical space in which otherwise unified psychic states may be separated and set out side by side is the conceptual space of science and mathematics. According to Bergson, conceptualization of universal, homogeneous space is characteristic of higher levels of intelligence:</p><blockquote>We must thus distinguish between the perception of extensity and the conception of space: they are no doubt implied in one another, but the higher we rise in the scale of intelligent beings, the more clearly do we meet with the independent idea of a homogeneous space. (p.96)</blockquote><p>And, “Probably animals do not picture to themselves, beside their sensations, as we do, an external world quite distinct from themselves, which is the common property of all conscious beings” (p. 138). In other words, animals have no notion of conceptual space.</p><p>An interesting question is whether even the earliest humans conceived of a homogeneous external space, or whether this concept is a later, cultural development.</p><p><strong>Motion</strong></p><p>The time-space dichotomy is reflected in our ideas of motion, corresponding, respectively, to an internal and external view of motion. Internally, from the durational aspect, motion is simple and indivisible, whereas from the external aspect, motion takes place in space, and is therefore divisible.</p><p>Bergson argues that the internal, durational aspect of motion cannot be synthesized from the procession of points that result from the external, spatial aspect of motion. The former is qualitative, whereas the latter is quantitative. He writes,</p><blockquote>In a word, there are two elements to be distinguished in motion, the space traversed and the act by which we traverse it, the successive positions and synthesis of these positions. The first of these elements is a homogeneous quantity: the second has no reality except in consciousness: it is a quality or an intensity, whichever you prefer. (p.112)</blockquote><p><strong>Language and society</strong></p><p>At the surface of the psyche, in the perceptual world, are other beings like ourselves, and our interactions with these beings take place through the artifacts of society, culture, and language. Communication, according to Bergson, is of necessity a function expressed through surface states of the psyche. Bergson has much to say, in particular, about language and its distance from the deep psyche and duration:</p><blockquote>We instinctively tend to solidify our impressions in order to express them in language. Hence we confuse the feeling itself, which is in a perpetual state of becoming, with its permanent external object, and especially with the word which expresses this object. In the same way as the fleeting duration of our ego is fixed by its projection in homogeneous space, our constantly changing impressions, wrapping themselves round the external object which is their cause, take on its definite outlines and its immobility. (p. 130)</blockquote><p>He continues,</p><blockquote>In short, the word with well-defined outlines, the rough and ready word, which stores up the stable, common, and consequently impersonal element in the impressions of mankind, overwhelms or at least covers over the delicate and fugitive impressions of our individual consciousness. To maintain the struggle on equal terms, the latter ought to express themselves in precise words; but these words, as soon as they were formed, would turn against the sensation which gave birth to them, and, invented to show that the sensation is unstable, they would impose on it their own stability. (p. 132)</blockquote><p>And,</p><blockquote>If, in proportion as we get away form the deeper strata of the self, our conscious states tend more and more to assume the form of a numerical multiplicity, and to spread out in a homogeneous space, it is just because these conscious states tend to become more and more lifeless, more and more impersonal. Hence we need not be surprised if only those ideas which least belong to us can be adequately expressed in words. (p. 136)</blockquote><p>If those ideas that can be expressed in words “least belong to us,” and if “there is no common measure between mind and language” (pp. 164–165), then the requirements of society, culture, and language may entail alienation from the real self, the deep self, in duration:</p><blockquote>But, in proportion as the conditions of social life are more completely realized, the current which carries our conscious states from within outwards is strengthened; little by little these states are made into objects of things; they break off not only from one another, but from ourselves. Henceforth we no longer perceive them except in the homogeneous medium in which we have set their image, and through the word which lends them it’s commonplace colour. Thus a second self is formed which obscures the first, a self whose existence is made up of distinct moments, whose states are separated from one another and easily expressed in words. (p. 138)</blockquote><p>Alienation of the deep self may be unavoidable. Bergson writes,</p><blockquote>How could this self, which distinguishes external objects so sharply and represents them so easily by means of symbols, withstand the temptation to introduce the same distinctions into its own life and to replace the interpenetration of its psychic states, their wholly qualitative multiplicity, by a numerical plurality of terms which are distinguished from one another, set side by side, and expressed by means of words? (pp. 236–237)</blockquote><p>Even if there were no society, culture, or language, according to Bergson, we would still not completely and entirely grasp the living qualitative multiplicity of inner duration because we would retain the idea of an external space in which objects are sharply distinguished from each other. In a sense, therefore, although society, culture, and language may exacerbate our self-estrangement, a certain level of alienation is unavoidable simply because of the existence of an external world.</p><p>With respect to the inauthentic self, which operates at the surface of the psyche, Bergson writes,</p><blockquote>Hence there are finally two different selves, one of which is, as it were, the external projection of the other, its spatial and, so to speak, social representation. We reach the former by deep introspection, which leads us to grasp our inner states as living things, constantly <strong>becoming</strong>, as states not amenable to measure, which permeate one another and of which the succession in duration has nothing in common with juxtaposition in homogeneous space. But the moments at which we thus grasp ourselves are rare, and that is just why we are rarely free. The greater part of the time we live outside ourselves, hardly perceiving anything of ourselves but our own ghost, a colourless shadow which pure duration projects into homogeneous space. Hence our life unfolds in space rather than time; we live for the external world rather than ourselves; we speak rather than think; we are ‘acted’ rather than act ourselves. To act freely is to recover possession of oneself, and to get back into pure duration. (pp. 231–232, original emphasis)</blockquote><p>The task of the individual, Bergson implies, is to conquer self-estrangement, to return to the fundamental spontaneity and freedom of living duration.</p><p><strong>Freedom</strong></p><p>Freedom, then, belongs to the deep psyche and duration. The Bergsonian notion of freedom is linked with the characteristic of deep psychic states that they are fully interpenetrating and commingling. At the surface levels of the psyche, where objects are set out in space and separated, there is ample room for causal mechanisms to operate in a complex web of interactions. The metaphysical status of causation is immaterial: our phenomenal experience of the external world <em>is</em> an experience of a web of causal relationships. Just because the self is fractured into innumerable objects and relations at the surface of the psyche, there is no self which is truly free. <em>Close to the surface of the psyche there is space both for self and non-self, and it is non-self which constrains the freedom of self</em>. Indeed, among the innumerable separated objects of the external world it may be possible entirely to lose the self.</p><p>On the other hand, in the deep psyche, in duration, where psychic states are entirely interpenetrating and commingling, there is no space (quite literally <em>no space</em>) for the operation of causal mechanisms. <em>All is self in duration, and in consequence the self is free because there is no non-self to constrain the freedom of the self</em>. The self evolves spontaneously, from within itself, in total freedom.</p><p>Bergson writes,</p><blockquote>These feelings [of sympathy, aversion, hate, etc.], provided that they go deep enough, each make up the whole soul, since the whole content of the soul is reflected in each of them. To say that the soul is determined under the influence of any one of these feelings is thus to recognize that it is self-determined. (p. 165)</blockquote><p>He continues, “It is the whole soul, in fact, which gives rise to the free decision: and the act will be so much the freer the more the dynamic series with which it is connected tends to be the fundamental self” (p. 167).</p><p>Now, the evolution of the free self, the total self, manifests at the surface of the psyche as action in the external world. According to Bergson, there are degrees of freedom associated with our acts, corresponding to the extent that acts are manifestations of the free evolution of the whole self. When action springs from the entire personality, according to Bergson,</p><blockquote>… the outward manifestation of this inner state will be just what is called a free act, since the self alone will have been the author of it, and since it will express the whole of the self. Freedom,thus understood, is not <strong>absolute</strong>, as a radically libertarian philosophy would have it; it admits of degrees. For it is by no means the case that all conscious states blend with one another as raindrops with the water of a lake. The self, in so far as it has to do with a homogeneous space, develops on a kind of surface, and on this surface independent growths may form and float. (pp. 165–166, original emphasis)</blockquote><p>It is interesting to compare the Bergsonian notion of freedom with Spinoza’s, which is that we are free to the extent that we are “self-caused.” In Spinoza’s system, likewise, freedom is relative. As we are finite modes, it is impossible for us to escape the causal chain, but, to the extent that our understanding approaches that of God or Nature we are free.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>I have summarized and interpreted some aspects of Bergson’s <em>Time and Free Will. </em>I have omitted much. I have hardly touched on Bergson’s critique of psychophysicalism or his analysis of the various conceptions of free will and determinism. Neither have I discussed Bergson’s critique of Kant. However, these aspects of <em>Time and Free Will</em> represent areas in which Bergson’s pristine intuition conflicts with alternative, more established ideas. I hope that I have able to give an adequate outline in this essay of the essential aspects of Bergson’s system in itself, at least as I see them.</p><p>One of the most interesting features of <em>Time and Free Will</em> for me is the notion of a non-homogeneous substance ontology: in other words, a monistic conception of reality, in which aspects of reality partake more of matter and other aspects of reality partake more of mind. Bergson does not explicitly refer to this conception, but I think the idea is implicit in his system.</p><p>The mind-matter dichotomy, a form of monism rather than a dualism as such, reverberates throughout Bergson’s presentation in <em>Time and Free Will</em>. On the side of mind is his strikingly original conception of a qualitative multiplicity, in which aspects of the deep psyche are fully interpenetrating and commingling.</p><p>Another interesting aspect of the system is Bergson’s conception of freedom, so like Spinoza’s. A free act involves the whole person and evolves from the deepest sources of the self.</p><p>There are some aspects of Bergson’s system that, at least for me, need clarification. Firstly, more could be said with respect to conceptual thought, including the notions of abstraction and generalization. Bergson appears to denigrate concepts, at least those corresponding to linguistic designations, because language, operating at the surface of the psyche, is a poor tool for expressing the deep self. Concepts, according to Bergson, divide and group the objects of the external world. Is it not possible that concepts also may originate in the deep psyche? The concepts, in allowing particular objects to commingle and interpenetrate, at least share some characteristics with objects of the deep psyche. Secondly, Bergson plays down the importance of society, culture, and language; whose influences operate at the surface of the psyche, distant from genuine duration. On the other hand, human relations are a source of deep and authentic satisfaction for many, a factor which l believe is insufficiently explicated by Bergson.</p><p>Nevertheless, any perceived shortcomings of Bergson’s <em>Time and Free Will </em>are dwarfed by the magnitude of his achievement. This first of his major works strikes me as an eruption of intuitive insight from his own durational sources. The subtext of <em>Time and Free Will </em>is a call to reconnect, in “deep introspection,” with authentic life and to regain true freedom. To my mind, it is a deeply personal and spiritual work.</p><p><strong>Reference</strong></p><p>Bergson, H. L. (1960). <em>Time and free will </em>(F. L. Pogson, Trans.). New York: Harper and Brothers. (Original work published 1889)</p><p><em>© Kerry Handscomb 2017. All rights reserved.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2fb335264670" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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