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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Eric Hysen on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Eric Hysen on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Eric Hysen on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lessons learned from the government’s biggest attempt to fix tech procurement]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@EricHysen/lessons-learned-from-the-governments-biggest-attempt-to-fix-tech-procurement-bd2265421211?source=rss-2807b3d509c7------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[procurement]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Hysen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 15 Jun 2017 20:05:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-06-15T20:06:40.394Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*18aApCqT4nL490dP6b1mDA.png" /><figcaption>Where I did not want to be spending my weekends. (Source: <a href="https://www.google.com/maps/place/301+7th+St+SW,+Washington,+DC+20024/@38.8848596,-77.0219419,3a,75y,315.39h,112.54t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1swwcAfB-hOfjdrPxfYVwcXA!2e0!7i13312!8i6656!4m5!3m4!1s0x89b7b79d46cc9fcd:0xf081a8fcc68a965f!8m2!3d38.8853247!4d-77.0229753">Google Street View</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Late last year, on a beautiful fall Sunday morning, I found myself in a windowless conference room in a run down DC office building pouring over a 900 page report and wondering where my life had gone wrong.</p><p>I was reviewing the technical evaluation results for the Department of Homeland Security’s procurement for agile software development, and preparing to make a decision on which companies would be awarded spots on the $1.5 Billion contract. Deciding billion dollar government contracts sounds like it should be glamorous, with high powered negotiations over fancy meals and Congressmen calling about jobs in their districts. In reality, it’s spending your weekend (and for most of my team, many of the weekends prior) sifting through mind-numbingly boring reports in order to prepare a slightly different mind-numbingly boring report to make sure that every part of every decision is documented ad nauseam.</p><p>DHS launched the Federal government’s biggest-ever attempt to implement a radically new way of procuring software development services, in the form of a $1.5 Billion, three-year contract vehicle that would have helped build everything from online immigration applications to import control systems. We did a lot of things right, most notably evaluating companies by having them design and build working software instead of submitting hundred-page proposals. We also made some huge mistakes which allowed the project to get out of hand. This led to the biggest disappointment of my time in government: the entire effort being canceled over a year in, thousands of hours of work from dozens of people reduced to a few pages of legalese on <a href="http://www.gao.gov/products/B-414175.10,B-414175.11,B-414175.12,B-414175.13,B-414175.14,B-414175.15,B-414175.16,B-414175.17,B-414175.18,B-414175.19,B-414175.20,B-414175.21,B-414175.22,B-414175.23,B-414175.24,B-414175.25,B-414175.26?utm_medium=email&amp;utm_source=govdelivery#mt=e-report">an obscure government agency’s website</a>.</p><p>This is the story of how a former Google engineer dove head-first into the strange world of government contracting, and of what happens when you try to bring modern tech approaches into a system that’s designed around buying fighter jets rather than mobile apps.</p><h3><strong>Part One: Why in the world am I talking to you about government contracting?</strong></h3><p>When I <a href="https://medium.com/@EricHysen/from-google-to-the-department-of-homeland-security-8f0d0c3c46a2">left my job at Google to join the federal government</a>, I thought I’d be using my product management, engineering, and design skills to help build better services. And I got to do a good bit of that. But like everyone who attempted to fix government tech before us, we quickly ran into the monster in the middle of the government’s $80 Billion annual information technology spending. Almost all software development in the government is done by private contractors, and the government almost always runs those contracts in the same way it contracts for everything from helicopters to office supplies.</p><p>If a government agency wanted to buy a helicopter, they’d start out by writing down all of the requirements for what the helicopter would need to do, then ask companies to bid on how much it would cost them to deliver a helicopter that met those requirements. Companies would submit long written proposals with their costs and how they’d approach the project. The agency would pick one, and the company would get to work. When they were done, the agency would test out the helicopter to make sure it flew and met their other needs. The company would be responsible for fixing the helicopter when it needed maintenance. Once it fully broke down or was obsolete and the agency needed a new one, this entire process would restart.</p><p>That approach makes a lot of sense for a helicopter, but think about when it’s translated to software development. A government agency that needs a new piece of software starts by spending months or years writing down all of their requirements for what that system needs to do. Companies submit hundreds of pages of written proposals, written more or less as marketing material and often with very little relevance to their actual work. The agency then takes several more months to review these proposals and awards a contract potentially worth hundreds of millions of dollars based solely on these written proposals and references. The winning contractor spends years building to the exact requirements the agency put together several years ago. Those requirements are fixed in the contract and tough to change. Once they’re finally done, if the software works at all, it’s likely already obsolete because the agency’s needs have changed.</p><p>Anyone who’s built technology in the private sector knows that this approach is doomed to fail. User needs, technology, and product requirements change frequently over the course of a project. The government’s approach closely follows the traditional waterfall model of software development, which has been out of favor in the private sector for well over a decade. Part of the answer is embracing agile development — an approach to building software that focuses on embracing change and delivering small pieces of functionality very quickly.</p><p>When we created the U.S. Digital Service, we realized that changing this approach was one of the most important ways we could have a lasting impact on the services government delivers to the American people. We released the <a href="https://playbook.cio.gov/">Digital Services Playbook</a> which outlines 13 principles for government projects to follow. We also invested heavily in helping the government’s procurement workforce learn and apply these new principles — creating an <a href="https://medium.com/the-u-s-digital-service/meet-the-procuremenati-usds-acquisition-experts-1e99346822b5">in-house procurement team</a> and releasing the <a href="https://playbook.cio.gov/techfar/">TechFAR</a>, a handbook which shows how procurement regulations allow modern practices.</p><p>Agencies across the government started to embrace new approaches to contracting over the last several years. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services transformed a half-billion dollar contract with IBM into <a href="https://federalnewsradio.com/ask-the-cio/2015/01/uscis-eyes-more-collaboration-competition-in-move-to-agile-development/">four smaller contracts</a> where companies compete with each other for future business based on the quality of the software they were building. 18F in the General Services Administration created an <a href="https://18f.gsa.gov/2015/08/28/announcing-the-agile-BPA-awards/">Agile Blanket Purchase Agreement</a> which asked companies to create an open source project on GitHub as part of their bid.</p><p>During my first year in government, I watched all of this with interest but spent most of my time working with important projects at the Department of Homeland Security to help them succeed. As my team grew, we started to notice a trend. More and more of the projects we were working with wanted to embrace these new contracting approaches, particularly evaluating actual code rather than lengthy written proposals, but their contracting teams didn’t have the skills in-house to do it. These projects had spent years building out the skills to do things the old way, which meant they were well equipped to read through thousands of pages of pitches but didn’t have enough government employees who could properly evaluate code and design. The requests for help started coming in, and it looked like we could quickly be spending all of our time evaluating contractors.</p><h3><strong>Part Two: Enter FLASH</strong></h3><p>We saw more and more interest from projects across DHS in running procurements in very different ways, and started to wonder if we could provide a solution for the entire Department instead of helping projects individually. We worked with the DHS Chief Information Officer and Chief Procurement Officer, both of whom were huge proponents of fixing this broken system, to propose an ambitious solution. We would take the successful approaches from earlier efforts and create one large contract that any project at DHS could use to bring on agile development teams. Because everything in the government needs an acronym, we called it FLASH: FLexible Agile Support for the Homeland.</p><p><em>(Side note: I may not have learned many modern tech skills during my time in government, but I am now EXTREMELY good at coming up with acronyms for things.)</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/426/1*VE1YzgFe2mCsleWvnAhx3Q.png" /><figcaption>Wrong FLASH. (Source: <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:L80385-flash-superhero-logo-1544.png">Wikimedia</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Having a big contract that many projects can use is a fairly common approach in the government, but we had a few new ideas to set FLASH apart:</p><p>First, we ditched the written proposals and evaluated companies based on how well they delivered working software. We made every company that bid come into our offices for half a day and work together with a government employee to iteratively design and build a simple product. My team of engineers, designers, and PMs would sit in and evaluate their practices. After they were done, we’d go over their code in detail.</p><p>This exercise, which we called a technical challenge, became far more complicated than we expected when we had over 100 different companies bid on the contract and come in to code. But it proved invaluable. Rather than reading documents which listed out buzzwords, we got to see if they actually could execute. For example, this meant that:</p><ul><li>Instead of reading that they practiced test-driven development, we got to see in real time if they started writing tests early or snuck them in at the last minute. After the challenge, we reviewed their code to see who wrote working tests and who threw in assert(true) everywhere just to get them to pass.</li><li>Instead of scrolling through long lists of Agile Certifications, we got to observe their planning process firsthand and see how their team worked together.</li><li>Instead of hearing how user-centered they were, we were able to see how they talked to a user and incorporated it into their designs.</li></ul><p>You can see how this was a big step up from written proposals. The longtime government employees working with us on the contract started out skeptical but became huge fans. One who had managed complex tech programs for decades told me that she had developed a good sense for when contractors were glossing over something important, but actually being able to ask an engineer to review their code and know for sure was a game changer. Some of the contractors started to tell us how much they hated spending months preparing proposals and how much they preferred to demonstrate their abilities by actually writing code.</p><p>Second, we aggressively sought to get companies that were not traditional government contractors to bid on the contract. This is hard, because the world of discovering and competing for government business is pretty complex and requires a lot of specialized knowledge. We spread the word about FLASH far and wide, and worked directly with newer companies to help them get registered as contractors and understand what they needed to do to compete. We didn’t show them any preference once they bid, but tried hard to get them in the door.</p><p>Finally, we set out to enable DHS projects to bring teams on board with FLASH extremely quickly. That means that from the time a project put out their request, or Task Order, they’d have developers writing code in roughly a month. This was unheard of in government, and many told us it was impossible. But with strong support across the department, we were able to streamline many of the steps involved in the ordering process such as various reviews and security clearances. We were also committed to keeping the number of companies we awarded spots on FLASH to pretty small — 8–12 companies. We wanted every company on the contract to be highly vetted and extremely capable, so that a small team at FEMA or the Coast Guard would be able to get quality services even if they didn’t have the people in-house to do their own tech review. Giving spots to too many companies would make that impossible, as every individual Task Order competition would be longer and more complex.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/1*gOiVShxf9dOIKkLkATGqXA.png" /><figcaption>Still the wrong FLASH. (Source: <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Adobe_Flash_Professional_CS4_icon.png">Wikimedia</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>We first <a href="https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&amp;mode=form&amp;id=2050cbc2ddeedb171090918a7307d295&amp;tab=core&amp;_cview=1">announced FLASH</a> in May 2016 and got feedback from companies about the process for the next two months. We released the formal Request for Proposals in August and ran the technical challenges in September. Shortly after that, I found myself spending my weekend reviewing the results of the challenges and deciding on the winners. We announced 13 winners in November 2016. It was one more than we originally planned, but we were confident they were all outstanding and could do the work.</p><p>We hoped it would be smooth sailing from there, but I soon became familiar with another important part of government contracting — protests. Government has an obligation to be fair in spending the public’s money. Companies that think they were unfairly denied a contract can issue a formal protest to the Government Accountability Office, an independent office that reports to Congress, or go to the courts. This is a good thing. It’s why, for example, the government can’t give away Federal land to build a new Trump Hotel without seeing if another company will give it a better deal.</p><p>Several of the losing companies had filed protests alleging that they deserved spots on the slate of FLASH winners. We reviewed their protests and our own documentation, and found there were a few cases where our justifications were lacking. So we underwent what is called Corrective Action — in this case it meant redoing part of our analysis of the different bids and making a new decision. This took a while, and in March 2017 (just a few weeks before I left the government), we announced a new decision with 11 winners. One of the original 13 had dropped out and we had decided one other shouldn’t have actually won.</p><p>A few days after that, as I was cleaning out my office and packing for a long vacation, we received even more protests on the new decision. Contract protests aren’t a one-time thing — companies have the right to protest after every new action the government takes. I was off to start my sabbatical, so it was up to others on the team to navigate the process from then on.</p><h3><strong>Part Three: The Cancellation</strong></h3><p>When I left government, the FLASH procurement process to that point had been frustrating, but I knew multiple rounds of protests, particularly for big, new contracts, were far from unusual. I expected things to be quiet for a few months, but ultimately for the protests to be resolved with a few changes made and for FLASH to be awarded. That’s more or less how these things work.</p><p>That made it all the more shocking when last week, the news came out that <a href="https://federalnewsradio.com/reporters-notebook-jason-miller/2017/06/dhss-internal-assessment-of-its-1-5b-agile-contract-significant-errors-and-missteps/#more-1415593">DHS decided to cancel FLASH altogether</a>. After thousands of hours of time invested by my old team and others at DHS, and even more put in by the companies who bid, the Department determined errors in the process were so serious that they needed to stop it completely, rather than working to tweak things to find a solution, as almost always happens.</p><p>In many situations like this, government agencies make the problem go away by giving everyone who protested a spot on the contract. This can sometimes work, as each individual project using the contract will run its own competitions, or Task Orders, amongst the pool that make it through. If some of the companies didn’t deserve to be on the slate, they wouldn’t win these Task Order competitions and won’t actually get work. But it would have killed FLASH, as we wanted to allow projects at DHS to run quick competitions against the smaller number of companies on FLASH without needing to do their own deep technical reviews. Letting a few weak companies on just to get past their protests would have made that impossible</p><p>It’s incredibly difficult to see something I worked on for over a year meet this fate, but I ultimately think it was the right call. We screwed up, and the mistakes were serious enough that correcting them would have been impossible or turned FLASH into something that no longer did what it was supposed to do. DHS’s “<a href="https://1yxsm73j7aop3quc9y5ifaw3-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Motion-to-Dismiss-B-414175-public_fnr.pdf">motion to dismiss</a>” (warning: PDF link) document, which effectively ended the process, goes into detail on some of the issues. Ultimately, I think there are a few foundational areas that got us to this point which future efforts should learn from.</p><p>To start, we went way too big with FLASH, way too quickly. We knew the demand for these services was high across DHS and released a $1.5 Billion contract that would serve many big projects for several years. This helped attract over a hundred bids, and we weren’t ready for it. While the techniques we were using had been proven out in other agencies, all of the different teams involved at DHS didn’t have experience with them and they didn’t scale the way we thought they would. We should have put a much lower dollar value on FLASH to start and run a larger contract later on.</p><p>We should never have gotten into a position where 100 companies were participating in half day technical challenges. Running the challenges became a logistical nightmare: we had to scramble to open a second location to hold everyone and had to usher over 1000 people in and out of our buildings over the course of just three weeks. We had to schedule contractors to come in for their challenge with very little advance notice, which led to some feeling they had inconsistent experiences. Multiple companies were participating in the challenge at once, meaning our teams were literally running between different conference rooms rather than focusing all of their attention on one team.</p><p>More importantly, the number of companies participating also meant we were dealing with hundreds of pages of writeups of the results of those challenges. In the rush to award FLASH and meet the needs of many DHS programs, we weren’t as thorough as we needed to be in producing these writeups. This resulted in us saying inconsistent things across different companies — one of the biggest reasons FLASH was on track to lose its protests. It also contributed to one of the more glaring errors that’s being reported — making edits to these documents after they were considered signed and final to try and fix inconsistencies noticed late in the game. I’m confident we picked the right winners, but we didn’t document that properly, and having a well-documented process is key to ensuring the procurement was fair.</p><p>To fix this, we should have used what’s called a down select — asking for an initial, less intensive application and then only inviting a smaller number of companies to participate in the longer challenges. We decided not to do this because companies could have then protested not making it past the first phase, but it ultimately would have been worth the hassle. In the future, I could imagine remote coding challenges for a down select that require companies to write code that hits provided APIs and automatically scans submitted code for evidence of basic good practices. This could help narrow the field before conducting deeper reviews.</p><p>Beyond the challenges, we completely screwed up the pricing portion of our evaluation. We asked companies to submit price ranges for a variety of different staff, but were vague about what skill levels we were looking for. These price ranges never would have mattered much because every future task order using FLASH would ask companies on the contract to propose specific pricing for that project. We needed to figure out a more useful way to evaluate price at this early stage, or just not care about it and focus on technical competence.</p><h3><strong>Conclusion: Where do we go from here?</strong></h3><p>All of this helped put DHS in a position where it would have likely lost the protests or made FLASH unusable by awarding too many contracts. While I agree with the decision to cancel the contract, there’s a disturbing trend in some of the reporting and social media comments about it. Some people are saying this is evidence agile development doesn’t work and government should go back to traditional waterfall development and massive contracts. One contractor <a href="https://federalnewsradio.com/reporters-notebook-jason-miller/2017/06/dhss-internal-assessment-of-its-1-5b-agile-contract-significant-errors-and-missteps/#more-1415593">said</a> “I suspect the whole methodology was flawed” and a representative for the contracting industry <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6277990563341959169/">posted</a> that this shows government should go back to “buy not build” — buying off-the-shelf solutions from big contractors rather than building custom software.</p><p>These people couldn’t be more wrong. While FLASH was flawed, it showed the tremendous potential of running a contracting process that rewards excellence at designing and building working software, rather than competence in writing proposals and navigating bureaucracy. The technical challenges, exhausting as they were to execute, were viewed by government and contract teams alike as a far better way for companies to demonstrate their skills. FLASH also got many innovative firms thinking about doing business for the government for the first time. And the demand for contracts like FLASH isn’t going away. During my last few months at DHS, more and more projects were abandoning old school waterfall development and lining up to use FLASH or similar approaches to move to an agile model.</p><p>We could have run FLASH better as an individual procurement, but this experience also highlights the need to reform how technology procurements are run across the government. While debriefing FLASH, <a href="https://www.fedscoop.com/dhs-officials-failed-flash-procurement-chance-learn-mistakes/">DHS’s Chief Procurement Officer said</a>: “We had an agile process for doing the solicitation and the evaluation, but we fell back to a waterfall documentation process.”</p><p>This gets to the heart of the problem. We can innovate in how we recruit and evaluate companies, but ultimately procurement regulations require massive, waterfall-style documentation to be produced at the very end. The protest process enforces this practice — Government Accountability Office staff only get involved after protests are filed and do their work by reviewing final documents after decisions have been made, during months-long periods where no work can take place. What if instead of coming in at the end, during particularly new and challenging efforts like FLASH GAO auditors participated throughout the entire process, doing even more to keep the procurement fair without adding months of delays?</p><p>We also need to address the incentive structure behind protests in the first place. Let me be clear: protests are a vital part of ensuring government funds are spent wisely and fairly. But the way the system works today, the costs for companies to protest every decision they have even a shred of hope of winning are far lower than the costs to the government of seeing vital acquisitions delayed without end. A <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/protests-rarely-result-in-us-contract-reversals-study-shows/2013/03/10/276cdc3a-873a-11e2-98a3-b3db6b9ac586_story.html?utm_term=.545310cc9a01">2013 study</a> showed that less than one percent of protests “resulted in the objecting vendor winning the work,” while the 1,600 protests in the period studied surely delayed many important government services for months if not years. Something is very wrong if companies find it worthwhile to file increasing numbers of protests with so little likelihood of actually winning the business they sought in the first place. There’s no easy answer here, but we need a system that allows the government to continue serving the public while maintaining the integrity of the acquisition process.</p><p>Finally, procurement challenges show the need for continued focus on bringing more technical talent into government service. For decades, the overwhelming majority of practicing software engineers and product designers working on government services have worked for contractors, not the government itself. This ratio will likely never completely flip (and it probably shouldn’t), but it has been far too unbalanced for far too long. A single non-technical government employee overseeing hundreds of contract developers (a fairly common occurrence) will never be able to make the best acquisition and project management decisions no matter his or her intentions. We need more engineers, designers, and product managers working as Federal employees and involved in contracting decisions. I’m encouraged to see USDS continue to receive <a href="http://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2017/05/there-place-usds-18f-trump-administration/138130/">funding from the Trump administration</a> and support from the new <a href="http://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2017/06/trumps-innovation-office-close-touch-usds/138639/">Office of American Innovation</a>. Bringing technologists into government isn’t a partisan issue, and there’s a lot more to be done.</p><p>Despite what some who have spent decades wasting taxpayer dollars would like to believe, modern software development isn’t going away. The failures of massive contracts, proprietary off-the-shelf systems, and expensive hardware are well documented and understood by Republicans and Democrats alike. FLASH shows that the process of integrating a modern technical approach with the government procurement system isn’t simple and will take time to perfect. But this work couldn’t be more important. If the government is ever going to stop wasting billions on technology and delivering sub-par citizen services, future acquisitions need to learn the lessons of what worked from FLASH and other early efforts, fix what didn’t, and keep iterating until they get it right.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bd2265421211" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[From Google to the Department of Homeland Security]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@EricHysen/from-google-to-the-department-of-homeland-security-8f0d0c3c46a2?source=rss-2807b3d509c7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8f0d0c3c46a2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Hysen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Mar 2017 13:47:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-21T13:47:12.431Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>From Google to the Department of Homeland Security: What I learned from my time in government</strong></h3><p>Two and a half years ago, I dialed in to a videoconference from my office at Google DC for what I thought would be a routine meeting. A colleague and I were talking to Mikey Dickerson, a Google engineer who had just returned from <a href="http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/michael-dickerson-the-invisible-man-behind-obamacares-tech-surge/article/2540253">helping lead the Healthcare.gov rescue effort</a>. I managed civic products for Google at the time, and I was hoping I could get Mikey’s advice on our roadmap and maybe even convince him to join our team.</p><p>I was apparently the world’s worst recruiter, because before I could get more than a few sentences into my pitch Mikey started talking about this crazy idea the Obama White House was discussing with him. Rather than bring in private sector technologists only after a major project like Healthcare.gov failed, they wanted to bring in tech talent for term-limited tours of duty and give them a seat at the decision-making table from the beginning.</p><p>I was hooked, and instead of recruiting Mikey I found myself following him out the door. A few weeks later I had left Google and was sitting in a drab windowless conference room taking the oath of office to become the sixth member of the <a href="http://usds.gov/">United States Digital Service</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*QSETK3S84Qld_o2N3YUQpg.png" /><figcaption>We thought this was a ton of people at the time. (Credit: USDS)</figcaption></figure><p>At the time I thought I was joining what would ultimately be a team of twelve (we thought even that would be an amazing recruiting feat!) who would work on three important projects. That idea didn’t last long. Today USDS consists of 200 world-class engineers, product managers, designers, acquisition reformers, and policy and operations experts who have <a href="https://backchannel.com/inside-the-obama-tech-surge-as-it-hacks-the-pentagon-and-va-8b439bc33ed1#.mwlp6nqif">worked with a dozen different agencies</a> on major initiatives.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4pKHavStDTOkXrS3ZFoKEA.jpeg" /><figcaption>USDS in January 2017. Bonus points if you can find me. (Official White House Photo)</figcaption></figure><p>Last Friday, I ended my first tour of duty with the Federal government. Over the past two and a half years, I’ve had the privilege to build and lead USDS’s efforts at the Department of Homeland Security, first out of the White House and then by creating the <a href="https://medium.com/the-u-s-digital-service/why-i-m-bringing-the-u-s-digital-service-to-the-department-of-homeland-security-c96437bc017d#.ug37dgz8g">DHS Digital Service</a> to bring the work in-house.</p><p>After spending over twice as long in government as I’d originally planned, it’s time for a new group of leaders to drive the organization forward. USDS is term-limited by design to ensure its members never settle for the status quo and have up-to-date technical skills. I have a lot to catch up on after two years of enterprise service buses, ColdFusion and ASP apps, and mainframes. I’m encouraged to see colleagues like <a href="https://www.mattcutts.com/blog/join-the-us-digital-service/">Matt Cutts</a> stepping up to lead USDS and couldn’t be more excited about what they’ll accomplish.</p><p>This journey has been so much wilder and more meaningful than anything I could have dreamed up when dialing into that videoconference in 2014. Never could I have imagined <a href="http://webbyawards.com/features/how-a-small-troop-of-techies-led-the-us-syrian-refugee-surge/">helping tens of thousands of refugees</a> start new lives in the United States, 70,000 <a href="https://www.fedscoop.com/dhs-to-launch-app-for-applying-for-citizenship-online/">new citizens</a> and counting take the Oath of Allegiance, over a million immigrants <a href="https://medium.com/@USDigitalService/technology-is-helping-to-modernize-our-immigration-system-here-s-how-96162d615b6a">renew their green cards online</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/the-u-s-digital-service/how-the-u-s-digital-service-is-making-americas-import-export-systems-more-efficient-929312545639#.uky6rjhd6">billions of dollars of trade move smoothly</a> into our economy, travelers navigate airports more efficiently and safely, and DHS finally start to embrace <a href="https://fcw.com/articles/2016/06/28/dhs-flash-vehicle.aspx">agile contracting</a> and modern collaboration tools. And more than all, I never could have imagined that we could recruit 200 brilliant and talented people to take the crazy leap and make all of this work possible.</p><p>I’m ending my time in government optimistic about the future of USDS and the broader movement to deliver better services to the American people. Any new President would bring uncertainty for a new program from the last administration, but the digital service movement has received broad bipartisan support from the beginning. USDS was one of the few cases of the Obama Administration receiving its full budget request from Congress. We’ve seen only positive signs from the new administration that they will continue to support USDS and appreciate technology’s critical role in service delivery. While our country is certainly in uncharted territory since January 20, USDS’s clearly defined mission to improve public service delivery gives it an anchor to continue doing important work without political interference.</p><p>I am also departing more aware than ever of just how much good can be done by government services. I’ve traveled to refugee camps and sat in interviews as mothers and children described fleeing the Syrian civil war as it followed them from town to town. I’ve visited our southwest border and seen the young children who have trekked across Mexico on foot, running from gang violence in Central America and desperately seeking to be reunited with family in the United States. And I’ve attended naturalization ceremonies and seen the hope and pride in the eyes of immigrants from all around the world, of all races, religions, and backgrounds, as they wave miniature flags and take the oath of allegiance to become American citizens.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/691/1*mK2cnk1MZ2L5r96E_JD9HA.jpeg" /><figcaption>New Americans (Official White House Photo)</figcaption></figure><p>Seeing this firsthand has only reinforced to me how dangerous, cruel, and un-American many of President Trump’s policies are. And digging deep into these programs’ operations and technology have shown me that not only will these policies hurt millions in need, they will also fail to achieve their objectives. This makes the work that actually does improve these peoples’ experiences, both inside and outside government, more important than ever. If nothing else, my time at USDS has made me a very well-informed citizen and left me strongly equipped to work on the issues I care about.</p><p>Finally, I’m leaving government in awe of the work career civil servants do every day. Federal employees are some of the most underappreciated people in our country. They do vital work every day for less money than they could be making elsewhere in a system that makes it almost impossible to be productive. There are bad apples as there are in any large group, but they’re few and far between. Federal employees don’t deserve to be treated as a political punching bag and subjected to ineffective policies like hiring freezes that do nothing but encourage the best of them to leave.</p><p>Across DHS, I’ve also had the opportunity to work with many of our uniformed law enforcement officers, from CBP Field Operations Officers and Border Patrol Agents to TSA Officers and Coast Guard Seamen. These people are literally our government’s front lines, so they can become the physical manifestation of bad policies. Blaming under-supported uniformed officers for the policies of politicians 20 organizational levels above them couldn’t be more misguided. The uniformed officers I’ve worked with are smart, dedicated, and trying to do the best they can in a bad situation. They’re a lot more like <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/sheridanwatson/rod-williams-tsa?utm_term=.er0WDBWxE2#.krypJlpZm8">Rod Williams, the TSA Officer from “Get Out,”</a> than you’d think.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/480/1*dogFsLRtVwpW6jdSWdfdrg.jpeg" /><figcaption>A surprisingly accurate portrayal. (Credit: Universal)</figcaption></figure><p>The next time you’re going through the airport, take a second and say thank you. They don’t hear it enough.</p><p>If you’re a technologist worried about the state of our country, I’m still convinced that a <a href="https://www.usds.gov/join">tour of duty in USDS</a> is one of the most important things you could do to make things better. If government’s not for you right now, I hope you’ll join me in looking for ways to fight for what matters from the outside. More than anything, leaving government has raised the bar sky-high for whatever I do next. I don’t know what that will be yet, but I do know that <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGe5rEDv3g8">I’ll never be the same again</a>. Inside government or out, now is the time for us to step up and use our skills to make our country a better, safer, and fairer place.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FaGe5rEDv3g8%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DaGe5rEDv3g8&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FaGe5rEDv3g8%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/0946e801304ff9669f1e8212a629dd1c/href">https://medium.com/media/0946e801304ff9669f1e8212a629dd1c/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8f0d0c3c46a2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Let’s build the road network of civic tech.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@EricHysen/lets-build-the-road-network-of-civic-tech-79427d968422?source=rss-2807b3d509c7------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/79427d968422</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Hysen]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2014 13:36:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2014-07-17T13:36:06.876Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Keynote at Open Knowledge Festival 2014</h4><p><em>This is the text of my keynote at </em><a href="http://2014.okfestival.org/"><em>Open Knowledge Festival 2014</em></a><em> in Berlin. </em><a href="https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1HhQErMfbvkwzfrzLMuneIwZRSptrNMBhjtMh3HRsESU/pub?start=false&amp;loop=false&amp;delayms=3000#slide=id.g34f1ea197_0571"><em>You can see the slides here</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>Imagine you were a student at Cambridge University in 17th century England. Let’s say you wanted to go down to London. We’re not talking about a huge distance here — just under 65 miles. You could drive that today in about an hour and a half.</p><p>You’d probably be pretty excited to make this journey, because an <em>incredible </em>new piece of technology was just starting to reach broad adoption, that was going to make your life on this trip many times more comfortable and convenient than in the past: the stagecoach.</p><p>The stagecoach was an amazing technological advancement. Previous wagons didn’t really have suspension systems, meaning they were frequently off-balance and really uncomfortable to ride in. It was a common occurrence for drivers to instruct passengers to lean out one side of the wagon and then the other, to balance it and keep it from overturning. These wagons also didn’t have real seats, just benches.</p><p>So the stagecoach was a huge improvement. It introduced one of the first suspension systems, making rides far more comfortable, and even had seats with backs on them. So you would be <em>thrilled </em>to get to ride in one of these things. And you had better be, because you’d be riding in it for a long time. Back in 1750, the Cambridge to London route would take a full two days. That’s moving at a hearty pace of 1.3 miles an hour.</p><p>Why was this trip so slow? It wasn’t the stagecoach itself, these things could go way faster than that. The problem was with the roads. You see, English law at the time put the responsibility for maintaining roads with local parishes, or towns. This worked great for roads that the townspeople used regularly, but really fell apart when it came to the highways, which were principally used by long-distance travellers.</p><p>So to fix this, Parliament started creating entities called “Turnpike Trusts.” These organizations managed resources from several parishes through which highways passed, and collected tolls from travellers. They used these funds to maintain and improve the highways. They erected milestones, telling travellers the distance between major towns. And they set the first rules of the road, mandating things like driving on the left-hand side.</p><p>Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, the Turnpike Trusts helped road transport overtake ships as the best way to move between England’s booming towns. They also helped drive innovations in stagecoach technology: better roads meant lighter and faster coaches could be designed. Faster coaches meant more traffic, which meant more tolls to further improve the road. And so on.</p><p>And most importantly for our Cambridge University student, the Trusts helped cut that brutal two-day Cambridge to London trip in 1750 down to just 7 hours by 1820.</p><h3>So why am I telling you all this?</h3><p>It’s not because I’m a transportation history buff, although I do think this stuff is pretty cool. It’s because when I look at the civic technology space today, I see a whole lot of incredible stagecoaches, but really poor roads to drive them on.</p><p>I and my colleagues at Google are in awe of the impactful work being done by everyone in this room and by others working in this sector worldwide. Together we are improving public service delivery, engaging more citizens in the political process, and making governments more accountable around the world.</p><p>By many accounts our sector is booming. Many of you have likely seen <a href="http://www.knightfoundation.org/features/civictech/">this report from the Knight Foundation</a>, showing that between 2008 and 2012 our field grew annually by 23%. More people are getting involved, more tools and services are being built, more investments are being made, and most importantly more peoples’ lives are being improved.</p><p>But we’re not living up to our potential. Yet.</p><p>You can see this on a number of fronts. For years now we’ve been on the cusp of having our democratic systems fundamentally transformed by the internet. We see exciting changes in campaigning and fundraising, but when it comes down to making big decisions our model of politics hasn’t really changed. The biggest stories about this area in the past year have been overwhelmingly negative, focusing on times when government’s use of technology falls down or goes too far. And perhaps most importantly, public trust in government continues to decline, pushing back against one of the long held beliefs of our space that increased openness through technology can increase public confidence.</p><p>We are doing important work and it is helping people. But too much of our work today is the equivalent of building better stagecoaches in the 17th century. We have produced incredible, innovative technologies, but they are being prevented from achieving maximum impact because we lack necessary public infrastructure. We don’t have good roads to drive our stagecoaches on.</p><p><strong>We need to shift our conversations away from the latest shiny apps and towards infrastructure and collaboration.</strong></p><p>I’m going to talk today about three ways we can make that happen.</p><p>First, we must be clear that <strong>open isn’t enough. </strong>The phrase “open data” should always be accompanied by words like “structured”, “licensed”, and “updated.”</p><p>Second, it’s time to put a spotlight on <strong>interoperable data. </strong>We’re currently just scratching the surface of what open data can enable. Making it easy to combine different datasets and APIs is key to taking our work to the next level.</p><p>And third, we need to focus on building <strong>ecosystems, not apps. </strong>New models of collaboration across our community will help us offer services that have a sustainable and proven impact.</p><h3><strong>First, open isn’t enough.</strong></h3><p>The incredible growth of open data and open government in recent years has been an amazing thing. But our focus on that single adjective has made it too easy for many to think that their responsibilities start and end with being open, and <strong>this is holding us back.</strong></p><p>All too often, open data is not delivered in a way that creates incentives for its re-use. Too much data sits out there, waiting for someone to use it, never achieving its purpose. Or when data is used, everyone building on top of it repeats the same work to get it into a usable format.</p><p>To quantify this, let’s look at some research done by my team at Google and others into open data publishing. When looking at the US and Europe, much of what is published comes in the form of spreadsheets and documents instead of structured data formats. Particularly in Europe, spreadsheets far exceed structured data. Spreadsheets and documents can be useful for some types of data and for performing one-off analysis, but are often not what developers want when building reliable apps and services.</p><p>Releasing data in a structured format makes it technically usable by developers, but it also needs to be legally usable. This means being released under a license that permits reuse, and often modifications of the data. Without proper licensing, open data might be usable at hackathons or in side projects. But if you’re looking to build a business on top of open data, you can’t accept the risks of using unlicensed data and hoping for the best — you need the certainty that comes from a clear license.</p><p>Unfortunately, this hardly ever happens. In fact, the overwhelming majority of open data across 100 top portals has no clear license at all. Now, in many cases licensing for these datasets might be covered by local laws or other regulations, but not clearly mentioned on the portal. That’s not okay. Developers aren’t lawyers — we need licenses to be clearly presented and easily understandable, or we won’t be able to use the data. Public domain releases like <a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/">Creative Commons Zero</a> are the most useful here, giving developers broad permission to turn the data into something useful without worrying about license terms.</p><p>Open data is also infrequently updated, and in many cases when new data is available it’s simply released as a new dataset rather than updates to an old one. Again looking at 100 top open data portals, barely any datasets have ever been updated. There is one clear outlier here — it looks like the Kenyans are schooling the rest of us in keeping their data updated.</p><p>Without timely updates, data is fine for demos and one-off projects, but it will never provide a strong enough case for serious developers to adopt it. Imagine what would happen if just launched the Google Maps API once and never updated it as new businesses and roads opened. How many apps would actually be built on top of it?</p><p>These principles are essential: structured, updated, and licensed. We give “open” prime billing, but that just gives data publishers an excuse to ignore these other key aspects that are just as important to making data useful.</p><p>Some people are doing this very well. The UK, for example, licenses most of its datasets through an Open Government License and has more data in CSV than XLS. Outside government, the Frictionless Data project I know many of you contribute to is making strides towards a lightweight standard for ensuring open data is structured and usable. We’re making progress, but too many others releasing data still stop at open alone. It’s up to all of us to call this out, and extend our push for openness to give equal weight to structure, updates, and licenses. Just as England’s turnpikes made great progress through the first rules of the road like driving on the left, our civic technology infrastructure will be far stronger when we build these new rules of the road into all of our work.</p><h3>Data Interoperability</h3><p>Once we have truly useful and usable data, we can start to focus on the next level, something that we as a community are just starting to understand and advance. <strong>Interoperability is the key to unlocking new potential in open data.</strong></p><p>Today it’s far too hard to bring multiple open datasets together. Let’s say I want to build an app that tells you who donated to your local councillor’s last election campaign. There are two steps to that: first, figuring out who your local councillor is, and then looking up their donors. There are plenty of datasets or APIs out there that cover each of those needs. But automatically connecting the councillor you’ve found who represents someone with the list of councillors in the finance data can become a very tricky problem. You might be able to do this manually for small datasets, but overall without interoperability we’re stuck just scratching the surface of what open data can do.</p><p>Interoperability is also key for expansion. I might build and launch my campaign donors app in Berlin. But if I want to turn that app into a successful business, just serving Berlin probably isn’t enough. Today the costs of expanding my app to other cities in Germany, Europe, or the rest of the world are far too high, because similar open datasets generally are not interoperable across geographies. This serves to help block innovative uses of open data from expanding from side projects into real, scalable businesses.</p><p>Interoperability isn’t unique to our space. The success of many of the technologies we use every day is rooted in it. Think about how we’re all connected to the internet in this room: through wi-fi. We’ve come together from all over the world using devices from any number of manufacturers, and yet we can all open up our laptops or turn on our phones and tablets, enter a password, and get online. Think about how frustrating it’d be if Mac and PC users had to connect to different networks, or if visitors from America couldn’t connect to this European network.</p><p>So Wi-Fi’s clearly enabled massive scale through interoperability. But it’s also led to significant innovation. When the 802.11 spec was first designed in 1988, it wasn’t for personal computers at all — it was a group of corporations seeking to connect wireless cash registers. It’s proponents only later picked up on the incredible potential of wireless networking for personal computers. They couldn’t have imagined the explosion of applications of Wi-Fi today, from connecting new devices like TVs, refrigerators, and watches to new methods of connectivity, like portable hotspots or in-flight Wi-Fi. An interoperable spec opened the floodgates to all manner of innovation.</p><p>We are making some strong early progress towards data interoperability. <a href="http://popoloproject.com/">The Popolo Project</a> has set out to produce international specs for legislative data, which have been adopted by civil society groups on multiple continents. And my team at Google helped start the <a href="http://opencivicdata.org/">Open Civic Data project </a>along with the Sunlight Foundation, Open North, and Granicus. One of the unique elements of this project is a focus on interoperable identifiers, meaning that data can still be published in differing formats but with common identifiers for key elements like political jurisdictions to enable easy connections between data.</p><p>We’re off to a good start but there is much work left to be done. Data interoperability won’t just help scale our tools around the world and to all levels of government. It will unlock new innovations on top of our work that we can’t even imagine today. It won’t be long before civic technology in 2014 looks as simple as when Wi-Fi was just for connecting personal computers. But we have to work together and prioritize interoperability to make that happen.</p><h3>Ecosystems, Not Apps</h3><p>I’ve said “working together” a few times, and I wanted to close by talking about what it means to do more of that. We need to focus on building <strong>ecosystems, not apps.</strong></p><p>Here’s a pattern that’s repeated all too frequently. A government agency decides to open up data. They bring in a civil society partner to host a hackathon. A few exciting prototypes get produced, and some positive stories get written about the agency for being open and innovative. But then fast forward a few months, and in all likelihood none of the hackathon apps are being used or maintained, and the newly opened data is barely being touched.</p><p>The problem here is that hackathons produce apps, when we need ecosystems. It’s easy to talk about the need for a “killer app” on open data, but that just doesn’t exist. The success stories in our space aren’t individual killer apps — they’re healthy ecosystems that involve many organizations.</p><p>For an idea how we can build more ecosystems, once again we can turn to the English turnpikes for inspiration. When the local governments and others invested in roads didn’t have the right incentives to improve long-distance highways, the English set up Turnpike Trusts to bring together governments, companies, and road users and focus on the infrastructure for them all to thrive. We need our own Turnpike Trusts to build new ecosystems in civic technology.</p><p>We’re starting to see more ecosystems emerge in our space like this. One great example that was highlighted earlier this week is <a href="http://codefor.de/">Code for Germany</a>, a project of Open Knowledge Germany that Google is proud to be a supporter of. Since launching in February, Code for Germany has launched labs in 14 cities across the country, and driven over 4000 hours of volunteer development work. Focusing on the ecosystem is helping them build tools and quickly spread them across the country, reducing the amount of repeated work taking place in different cities.</p><p>To see how this type of collaboration can lead to a thriving ecosystem over a longer period of time, we can look to an effort my team’s been privileged to be a part of for 7 years now: the <a href="http://votinginfoproject.org/">Voting Information Project</a>. Back in 2007, many groups in the US were struggling with how to help voters find where to vote and other key information online. Google was one of these — our interest came from a group of engineers reviewing broad aggregate search trends, and seeing spikes every election for queries like [where do i vote].</p><p>When we dug into these spiking queries, we found we did a really bad job at answering them. Elections in the US are administered by hundreds of different state and county governments, and of course they all did things differently. In 2007, voting information was only online at all in 11 of 50 states.</p><p>So along with the <a href="http://pewtrusts.org/">Pew Charitable Trusts</a>, we founded the <a href="http://votinginfoproject.org/">Voting Information Project</a>, which set out to collect and standardize this information. What’s notable here is how different groups came together to accomplish this. After we jointly established a standard data format for voting information, Pew funded civil society groups to work with local governments to get their data into the new standard. At Google, we then ingested and processed all of this data, and served it to users searching for voting information. But we didn’t just use it ourselves, we provided analysis on issues with the data back to governments, and opened the data back up to any developer <a href="http://developers.google.com/civic-information">through an API</a> that made it easier to use. This unlocked hundreds of new uses of the data, everything from building an SMS service to integrating it onto the homepage of CNN.com.</p><p>This type of collaboration goes far beyond hackathons and conferences — it’s enabled a healthy ecosystem of funders, corporations, civil society, and governments. And the results have been incredible. We’ve provided nationwide voting information for the past three US national elections, and are on track for our fourth this November. In 2012 we saw over 24 million lookups from over 600 different sites and apps. The ecosystem approach has also been key to keeping the project sustained over the years. Strong investments from funders and private corporations have kept the project on track despite changes in government or turnover in civil society groups.</p><p>These types of projects and many others are successful because they focus on the ecosystem, rather than an individual app. Bringing together disparate interests from many types of organizations and ensuring regular collaboration helps us achieve scale and sustain projects over time.</p><h3>Wrapping Up</h3><p>I hope you’ll start thinking about the infrastructure we can build together to accelerate all of our work.</p><p>Let’s shift the conversation to be clear that open isn’t enough, but is just part of a path towards structured, updated, and licensed data.</p><p>Let’s invest in data interoperability to make it easier to scale successful work globally and unlock new innovations we can’t even imagine today.</p><p>And let’s stop focusing on the next killer app, but instead on building healthy ecosystems.</p><p>We at Google are thrilled and humbled to be part of such an amazing community, and we’re ready to dig in and work with all of you to make this possible.</p><p>Let’s go build roads together.</p><p>Thank you.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=79427d968422" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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