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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by FelixA on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by FelixA on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@FelixA?source=rss-2615ced1b61f------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by FelixA on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@FelixA?source=rss-2615ced1b61f------2</link>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Hard fork options are enabled — update mist]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@FelixA/hard-fork-options-are-enabled-update-mist-3eaeb17632df?source=rss-2615ced1b61f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3eaeb17632df</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[FelixA]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 18 Jul 2016 09:38:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-18T09:38:55.324Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*Ln9lNgMRbH50i4vx." /></figure><p><em>Current voting results on</em><a href="http://ethermine.org/stats/votes"><em> ethermine</em></a><em> show a strong support for the hard fork</em></p><p>Parity and Geth both implemented the DAO hard-fork specification. Also voting on<a href="http://carbonvote.com/"> carbonvote</a> closed with 87% of the community voting for a hard-fork. Additionally a<a href="https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/miners-vote-overwhelmingly-support-ethereums-hardfork/"> lot</a> of the mining pools enabled voting on the hard fork, miners are showing great support for it.</p><h4>Return of the Eth (1.4.10)</h4><p>This is the title of the new <a href="https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/releases">Geth</a> client that has just been released. It allows one two options regarding the hard fork.</p><ol><li>To support the DAO hard-fork, start Geth with the — support-dao-fork option</li><li>To oppose the DAO hard-fork, start Geth with the — oppose-dao-fork option</li></ol><p>The default setting for Geth is to support the fork.</p><h4>Parity 1.2.2 with hard fork enabled</h4><p><a href="https://blog.ethcore.io/using-parity-with-mist/">Parity</a> updated its client as well, with the hard fork as default option.</p><p>To oppose the hard-fork, you need to add the — chain=homestead-dogmatic option.</p><h4>Mist with hard fork option</h4><p>The<a href="https://github.com/ethereum/mist/releases"> mist wallet</a> also allows you to choose whether you want to use the hard-forked chain or not. They will ask you to choose your preferred chain directly during startup, so it’s made very easy to choose the chain.</p><h4>Myetherwallet supports the hard fork</h4><p>If you are a user of<a href="https://www.myetherwallet.com/"> myetherwallet</a>, you will automatically use the hard-forked chain.</p><h4>As a user, what should I do now?</h4><p>If you are only using myetherwallet, you will use the hard-forked chain immediately.</p><p>If you are using mist, please update ASAP and then just choose your preferred chain on startup.</p><p>To claim your eth you will need to send your DAO tokens to a withdrawal address. We will add a how-to for it. If you feel unsecure about it, e.g. because you do not use mist, your best choice will probably be to sell your DAO tokens via an exchange.</p><h4>Two chains running in parallel?</h4><p>After the hard fork we will have to chains running in parallel. Regarding the strong support for the hard-fork it is very likely that most people will use the hard-forked chain, but it is possible that the “classic” chain will continue to run.</p><p>You can compare this to an altcoin of Ethereum. If miners continue to maintain this chain, it might be possible that there is Ether and Ether-classic running as parallel coins. Yet it is quite likely that all miners switch to the winning chain, which would mean that the “classic” chain will die either immediatly or some time after the hard-fork.</p><p><strong>Exchanges</strong></p><p>During the transition time of the hard-fork, the exchanges will stop deposit and withdrawals of eth for a limited time.</p><p><a href="https://poloniex.com/press-releases/2016.07.15-Ethereum-Hard-Fork/">Poloniex</a> offers the possibility for a one-time withdrawal of the eth of the losing chain.</p><p>Kraken did not write about such an option, so probably they will just continue with the winning chain.</p><p><a href="https://forum.bitsquare.io/t/ethereum-classic/306">Bitsquare</a> considers to add both chains.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3eaeb17632df" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Ethereum DAO hard-fork on july 20th]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/daohub/ethereum-dao-hard-fork-likely-on-july-20th-9ee8e2c12619?source=rss-2615ced1b61f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9ee8e2c12619</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[daohub]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao-psa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[FelixA]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jul 2016 16:09:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-16T18:05:20.174Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Wd5BSYa28UlN18xw.jpg" /><figcaption>yay, another fork picture!</figcaption></figure><h4>Parity and Geth have a date for the hard-fork</h4><p>Hello Community,</p><p>Both clients, <a href="https://github.com/ethcore/parity/pull/1483">Parity</a> and <a href="https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/2814">Geth</a> have a hard-fork implementation for The DAO now, which is not yet released but can be expected soon.</p><p>Both set the date of the hardfork to Block number 1 920 000.</p><p>This will be shortly before the 21.07., which is the date in which the attacker can split (See the important deadlines in this<a href="https://blog.slock.it/proposed-hard-fork-specification-394245b968dd#.wzudtul43"> post</a> by Christoph Jentzsch).</p><h4>What does this mean for other clients?</h4><p>Other clients like<a href="https://github.com/ethereum/pyethereum/commit/611252b630981a93bd348cc3ed155a75ad71158b"> pyethereum</a>,<a href="https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pulls?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Apr+label%3Adao-fork-part"> </a>or<a href="https://github.com/ethereum/libethereum/pull/305/files"> libethereum</a> already started their implementations of the hard-fork, so it is certain that they will release a new version including the hardfork with the same date.</p><h4>What does this mean for me as token holder?</h4><p>The funds of the whitehat DAOs and blackhat DAO will be moved to a withdrawal contract, in which one will be able to withdraw his or her share of Ether.</p><p>Yet this means that innocent child-DAOs will not be included. People that split in such a child-DAO before the attack would need to do a regular split, this affects ~ 34,000 Ether. People who split after the attack, the best thing is to join the <a href="https://thedao.signup.team/">slack</a> and join the <strong>#child_dao_community </strong>channel for further coordination<strong>.</strong></p><h4>What happens to the extraBalance?</h4><p>According to Vlad Zamfir on <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4sw9mj/hard_fork_specification_slockit_blog/d5cpmxa">Reddit</a>, the extraBalance will be “returned to purchaser”; anyone who can prove that she bought tokens during the creation phase at a higher rate of 100:1 should contact the curators and will get their contribution to the extraBalance refunded.</p><h4>What do I have to do as a token holder?</h4><p>At this moment there is not much more to do than waiting a bit longer and wait for the updated clients.</p><p>We hope this solves most of your questions, if not, please join the <a href="https://thedao.slack.com/messages/_prv_community/mentions/">slack</a> or ask your question here or in the daohub <a href="https://forum.daohub.org/">forum</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9ee8e2c12619" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/daohub/ethereum-dao-hard-fork-likely-on-july-20th-9ee8e2c12619">Ethereum DAO hard-fork on july 20th</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/daohub">DAOhub</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Updated: The next steps — part 2]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/daohub/the-next-steps-part-2-180e58684d81?source=rss-2615ced1b61f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/180e58684d81</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dao-psa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[daohub]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[thedao]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[FelixA]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jun 2016 15:14:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-24T23:05:53.613Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qWPjgHDJwt9SgdID." /></figure><h3>Important: You can no longer split from the DAO, you will lose ALL of your tokens!</h3><p>As of Wednesday June 22, 2016 The DAO has been emptied of all currently accessible Ether. A group of very smart people — as Alex van de Sande states — was able to perform a white hat attack that drained about 6M Ether into a Child DAO (Robin Hood DAO) of which they are the curator.</p><p>See this reddit post for more details: <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4p7mhc/update_on_the_white_hat_attack/">https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4p7mhc/update_on_the_white_hat_attack/</a></p><p>Due to this, <strong>YOU SHOULD NO LONGER CALL splitDAO()!</strong> all splittable funds in The DAO have been drained. Ether does remain in the extraBalance but it is inaccessible. If you split now, you will burn your tokens without getting anything back. This does not affect <em>split proposals creation</em>, only executing a split by calling calling splitDAO().</p><p>The best strategy as a DTH is to sit tight for now, or to contribute to the fork-suggestion by either joining the conversations on</p><ul><li><a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/">https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/</a></li><li><a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/thedao">https://www.reddit.com/r/thedao</a></li><li><a href="https://forum.daohub.org/c/theDAO/fork-proposal">https://forum.daohub.org/c/theDAO/fork-proposal</a></li><li><a href="https://dao.consider.it/">https://dao.consider.it/</a></li><li>Your twitter account</li><li>Or whatever social media channel you prefer</li><li>Or by voting directly via your mining power:</li></ul><h3>How can I vote on the soft- and hardfork ?</h3><h4>as a solo-miner</h4><p>As a miner, If you want to vote for the soft-fork, you can do the following:</p><ul><li>Download the newest version of parity 1.2 which you can find <a href="https://github.com/ethcore/parity/tree/1.2-beta">here</a> (1.2 beta branch) or as a binary package for windows <a href="https://github.com/remyroy/parity/releases/tag/v1.2.0-unstable-1bead4a">here</a></li><li>Download the newest geth version 1.4.8 here: <a href="https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/releases">https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/releases</a></li><li>If you want to vote against the soft-fork, just do not upgrade your minig software</li></ul><p>The soft fork will start with block number 1800000.</p><p>So far we have no information regarding the hard-fork. We will update this post as soon as we hear something.</p><h4>as a pool-miner</h4><ul><li><a href="http://dwarfpool.com/eth/voting/">Dwarf-pool</a></li><li><a href="https://forum.ethereum.org/discussion/7796/dao-soft-fork-voting-on-ethpool-ethermine">Eth-Pool &amp; Ethermine</a></li><li><a href="https://nanopool.org/vote">Nanopool</a></li></ul><p>Voting is only allowed with the hash-power you had before the incident happened. So it is not possible to switch around pools to vote on all of them.</p><p>If you know of other pools that enabled voting, please let us know!</p><h3>What is the current situation?</h3><p>According to our user bitbuzzing we currently have the following vote distribution:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*757gADbJrvuxu-1SMJqUrg.png" /><figcaption>Please note: This graph only calculates yes vs. no votes. Miners who have not voted yet or voted ‘I don’t care’ are not taken into account.</figcaption></figure><p>You can find our data-sources here:</p><ul><li>Dwarf-pool <a href="http://dwarfpool.com/eth/voting/">http://dwarfpool.com/eth/voting/</a></li><li>Ethermine <a href="http://ethermine.org/stats/votes">http://ethermine.org/stats/votes</a></li><li>Ethpool <a href="http://ethpool.org/stats/votes">http://ethpool.org/stats/votes</a></li><li>Coinotron <a href="http://coinwelt.de/2016/06/du-idaot-der-dao-diebstahl/">http://coinwelt.de/2016/06/du-idaot-der-dao-diebstahl/</a></li><li>Nanopool <a href="https://nanopool.org/account/vote_yes">https://nanopool.org/account/vote_yes</a> and <a href="https://nanopool.org/account/vote_no">https://nanopool.org/account/vote_no</a></li><li>MPH confirmed through a direct message</li><li>Mining power <a href="https://etherscan.io/stats/miner?range=7">https://etherscan.io/stats/miner?range=7</a></li></ul><p>We will do our best to keep you informed about these numbers. Be aware that they are just an indicator and can change drastically in a short amount of time. Please feel free to contact us if you have any updates on the numbers.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=180e58684d81" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/daohub/the-next-steps-part-2-180e58684d81">Updated: The next steps — part 2</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/daohub">DAOhub</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Updated: The next steps]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/daohub/the-next-steps-786323e6fac9?source=rss-2615ced1b61f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/786323e6fac9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[daohub]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[thedao]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao-psa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[FelixA]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Jun 2016 20:36:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-22T08:40:05.111Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/0*HtnIsn7h3hYf3Zgf." /></figure><p>Hello community,</p><p>At this point, we can say that The DAO cannot continue as it is. This is sad, but it doesn’t mean that the community cannot continue, nor that the concept of DAO’s is bad. A bug has been exploited, bugs need to be fixed — and then we can move on.</p><p>I think we all have the same question: What actually happened, and what am I supposed to do now?</p><h3>What happened</h3><p>Exploiting a bug in the contract of The DAO allowed an attacker to make repeated transactions of ~280 eth that drained the funds of The DAO. You can see such a transaction <a href="https://etherscan.io/tx/0xa348da60799bff3ca804b3e49c96edebea44c5728a97f64bec3e21056d42f6e3">here</a> — and the contract of the attacker <a href="https://etherscan.io/address/0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c62820b7d83490">here</a>.</p><p>At this time about 30% of the ETH of the DAO has been drained, which is 3,641,694 ETH in numbers. The attack vector is still open, so the attack may continue. Child DAOs and DAOS using the DAO 1.0 Framework are susceptible to the same vulnerability.</p><p>To prevent this and to prevent the attacker from withdrawing the funds, Vitalik suggested a soft <a href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability/">fork</a>. <br>An additional measure that might be taken is a hard-fork that will revert the states of The DAO to the point of the beginning of the attack and will replace the contract of The DAO with a simple contract that allows token holders to withdraw the amount of eth they invested.</p><h3>What am I supposed to do now?</h3><p>That is kind of a tough question. There are some possibilities right now, we do not know which one is the best option:</p><ol><li>Wait until things settle a bit and more viable information is there.</li><li>Sell your DAO tokens on an exchange.</li><li>Wait for the hard fork. There is no guarantee that this will happen. The DAO could continue leaking funds in the interim.</li></ol><p>UPDATED: DO NOT SPLIT ANYMORE</p><p><em>yesterday another attack started, so a whitehat counter-attack started that safely pulled the funds out of The DAO.</em><br><strong>If you split now, you won’t get any eth back!</strong></p><ol><li>Vote yes to an upcoming split as soon as the voting ends, call splitDAO(): Your relative percentage of what is left will be transferred to a new DAO. The new DAO, however, <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4okekv/split_daos_vulnerable_to_hack/">will be vulnerable to the same kind of attack</a>.</li><li>Call splitDAO() if you have already voted yes on split: your relative percentage of what is left will be transferred to new DAO. The new DAO, however, <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4okekv/split_daos_vulnerable_to_hack/">will be vulnerable to the same kind of attack</a>.</li></ol><p><strong><em>UPDATED:</em></strong><em> Advice regarding splitting: you will probably get less than a ~70:1 of portion of the eth you invested back, reasons for </em><a href="http://vessenes.com/deconstructing-thedao-attack-a-brief-code-tour/"><em>this</em></a><em> are highlighted in this article — if The DAO continues to be exploited, this share will decrease. In the case of a hard fork you will </em><strong><em>NOT </em></strong><em>be able to claim the difference.</em></p><h3>Bonus: Where can I contribute my opinion regarding the hard fork</h3><p>There are several places in which the discussion is going on right now. Ethcore came up with <a href="https://blog.ethcore.io/attack-on-thedao-what-will-be-your-response/">this</a> statement and <a href="https://blog.ethcore.io/our-dao-response-2/">this</a> follow-up statment in which they describe the fork possibility.</p><p>You can contribute your opinion on <a href="https://dao.consider.it/miners-and-full-nodes-should-update-their-parity-clients-to-move-ether-to-a-recovery-contract-that-will-allow-dao-token-holders-to-recover-their-ether">consider.it</a>, via <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4okekv/split_daos_vulnerable_to_hack/">Vlad Zamfirs twitter</a> or a discussion on our <a href="https://forum.daohub.org/t/what-will-our-community-response-be-eth-core-and-what-does-it-mean/5206">forum</a> that has been started by one of our members. Other platforms will surely follow soon, we will keep you updated on that.</p><h3>A personal statement from DAOhub</h3><p>The way everyone handles themselves in this situation will shape the path forward. All eyes are on The DAO, Ethereum, and the community. We would like to remind everyone that, even with a difference in opinions and viewpoints, humility, empathy, and civility should be a priority. Do not let this turn us into a toxic, hateful, and spiteful community. Being gracious and mature is in everyone’s best interest. We have the ability to make the best of a bad situation: if we shine, we reveal the true strength in Ethereum and decentralized systems.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=786323e6fac9" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/daohub/the-next-steps-786323e6fac9">Updated: The next steps</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/daohub">DAOhub</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Update3: The DAO is under attack — but Vitalik saved us]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/daohub/the-dao-is-under-attack-8d18ca45011b?source=rss-2615ced1b61f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8d18ca45011b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[daohub]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dao-psa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[FelixA]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Jun 2016 08:46:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-17T11:49:20.388Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/620/0*xjh6ZgmNSC3XaVoU.jpg" /></figure><p>Bad news….</p><p>apparently The DAO is under attack and is leaking eth in huge amounts. Yet Vitalik proposed a solution to rescue the funds. See related post:</p><p><a href="https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability/">https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability/</a></p><p>also see the following posts:<br><a href="https://ipfs.pics/ipfs/QmQByNeSthiE3m22AmPxNX6otJcp1RjP9qZe6Epsi28qhC">https://ipfs.pics/ipfs/QmQByNeSthiE3m22AmPxNX6otJcp1RjP9qZe6Epsi28qhC</a></p><p><a href="https://ipfs.pics/ipfs/QmWDg3Q5Mq6YDbcPwA8qQK9eiczGJrYCfy7EAHtZV68sNo">https://ipfs.pics/ipfs/QmWDg3Q5Mq6YDbcPwA8qQK9eiczGJrYCfy7EAHtZV68sNo</a></p><p><a href="https://ipfs.pics/ipfs/QmUZsPBzNoYjsLhS5KNoXTGS9yKQhDomknzwXQnc3hxAre">https://ipfs.pics/ipfs/QmUZsPBzNoYjsLhS5KNoXTGS9yKQhDomknzwXQnc3hxAre</a></p><h4>Stephan from Slock.it started a live-blog with information as well</h4><p><a href="https://blog.slock.it/dao-security-advisory-live-updates-2a0a42a2d07b#.nm5urccyw">https://blog.slock.it/dao-security-advisory-live-updates-2a0a42a2d07b#.nm5urccyw</a></p><h4>Myetherwallet allows splitting into split proposals:</h4><p>This reddit post explains how to split into a currently ongoing split proposal:<br><a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/TheDao/comments/4oifss/myetherwallet_dao_splits_information/">https://www.reddit.com/r/TheDao/comments/4oifss/myetherwallet_dao_splits_information/</a></p><p>Please understand that this is not any kind of advice — All of us are loosing money right now and this is one strategy on how to get out of the attacked DAO. Might be better, might be worse than just sitting and waiting what happens. We are losing money right now as well, but see it as our duty to share our identified options with you!</p><h4>Griff laid out a strategy to rescue tokens:</h4><ol><li>If anyone knows who has the split proposals Congo Split, Beer Split and FUN-SPLT-42, please contact <a href="https://thedao.slack.com/team/griff">@griff</a> on The DAO’s Slack. We need their help!</li><li>If you have made a split proposal already and have the ability to split, please do so asap.</li><li>If your tokens are blocked vote yes on split proposals.</li><li>If your tokens are free, you have to make your best judgement call.</li><li>If you want to help spam the Network so Christoph Lefteris Vitalik Gustauv and all the other geniuses can mount the counter attack… a community member posted this guide on how to:<em><br></em>Please do this to spam the Ethereum Blockchain:<br>Open terminal:<br>$geth console<br>In second terminal:<br>$geth attach</li></ol><p>In geth console (make sure account[0] has sufficient gas for transaction):u</p><p><em>personal.unlockAccount(eth.accounts[0])<br>for (var i = 0; i &lt; 100; i++) { eth.sendTransaction({from: eth.accounts[4], gas: 2300000, gasPrice: web3.toWei(20, ‘shannon’), data: ‘0x5b620186a05a131560135760016020526000565b600080601f600039601f565b6000f3’}) }</em></p><p>We will try to keep you informed.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8d18ca45011b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/daohub/the-dao-is-under-attack-8d18ca45011b">Update3: The DAO is under attack — but Vitalik saved us</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/daohub">DAOhub</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[New paths for The DAO: Part 1 — The DAO Proposal Framework]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/daohub/new-paths-for-the-dao-part-1-the-dao-proposal-framework-d178fbdba069?source=rss-2615ced1b61f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d178fbdba069</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[thedao]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethereum]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[FelixA]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jun 2016 13:09:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-06-15T13:10:08.199Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*6wwA4C4ImszSRhd5." /></figure><p>Hello DAOhub community!</p><p>The voting period regarding the moratorium is over now. During this time there has been quite a lot of discussion regarding the code of the DAO and the process of submitting a proposal. In this part of the two part-series I will give a short overview regarding the changes that will take place in the proposal process.</p><p>Firstly, there seems to be a great agreement that every proposal should follow this generic framework, since it both increases the security for the token holders as well as it makes the writing of a proposal easier due to its generic structure.</p><p>As a personal announcement it is great to see that not only slock.it is willing to continue working hard on improving The DAO, but that also a lot of community members are starting to take the challenge and make great suggestions on how to move on. For me, this shows that the wisdom of the crowd approach is working and that The DAO is inspiring a lot of people to contribute their time and energy.</p><p>But let’s get back to the proposal framework. An outline of it (which is basically the following text, can be found <a href="https://github.com/slockit/DAO/wiki/Proposal-Framework-v.1.0">here</a>) — the solidity code can be found <a href="https://github.com/slockit/DAO/blob/master/PFOffer.sol">here</a>.</p><p>The contents of the framework are as follows:</p><ol><li>Proposals must allow a grace period to allow for splitting by throwing an exception if executed during the first 8 days after the voting deadline of the proposal.</li><li>Proposals must check whether they have reached a quorum of 20% yes votes and a majority support 2 days before the voting deadline. If not, they should throw when executed.</li><li>To prevent the possibility of double spending, Proposals must accept payment from The DAO once and exclusively, for a fixed amount. Note — this is one time payment to the Proposal, not a one time payment to the Contractor itself. The Proposal code could still disburse the funds to the Contractor on a monthly or daily basis.</li><li>(optional) Proposals must delay any payouts to the Contractor for the first 18 days during which the DAO should be able to get all ether back from the Proposal.</li></ol><p>Point #2 could also be performed by a so-called pre-vote, which works like this:</p><p><em>As part of this mechanism, no Proposal will be added to the whitelist unless the DAO Token Holders have supported an initial, informal ‘pre-vote’ with a 15% yes votes as the minimal quorum to be reached, alongside majority support.</em></p><p>All the current proposals could therefore be counted as a ‘pre-vote’, since they do not ask for funds for which they would have needed to be whitelisted.</p><p>Please note that the contents of the proposal are still subject to discussion. Actually there is already a request in the code of The DAO1.1 code (which will be part 2) that would only count the ‘yes’ votes, but therefore <a href="https://github.com/slockit/DAO/issues/251">lower the quorum to 14,3%</a> and another request which would <a href="https://github.com/slockit/DAO/issues/254">lower the quorum to 10% ‘yes’ votes</a>.</p><p>If you want to contribute to this discussion directly, you can do this via the Slock.it Github <a href="https://github.com/slockit/DAO/issues">repository</a>, or you can join one of the discussions on the forum, e.g. a collective discussion regarding the current voting <a href="https://forum.daohub.org/t/proposal-to-fix-the-broken-voting-process/4927">process</a>, or if there should be the option to change a vote before the end of the voting <a href="https://forum.daohub.org/t/allowing-people-to-change-their-vote-before-the-end-of-the-voting-period/4915">period</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d178fbdba069" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/daohub/new-paths-for-the-dao-part-1-the-dao-proposal-framework-d178fbdba069">New paths for The DAO: Part 1 — The DAO Proposal Framework</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/daohub">DAOhub</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is the proposed Moratorium — and what is it good for?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/daohub/what-is-the-proposed-moratorium-and-what-is-it-good-for-b37696aeb17f?source=rss-2615ced1b61f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b37696aeb17f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dao-psa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[daohub]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[thedao]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[FelixA]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Jun 2016 21:15:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-05T08:59:48.183Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Introduction and possible attack vectors</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/0*o8E-UiXrv-7plQZN.jpg" /></figure><p>On May 27 Vlad Zamfir made a<a href="https://forum.daohub.org/t/a-call-for-a-temporary-moratorium-on-the-dao/3506"> post</a> on the DAOhub forum in which he pointed out, that a moratorium is needed “to protect the DAO’s token holders against the affirmative voting bias, along with mitigating other game-theory based attacks.”</p><p>He also pointed out that he, Dino Mark, and Emin Gun Sirer audited The DAO’s code, with “help from other community members”. Their audit focused on an “analysis of the mechanism design/game theory of participating in the DAO”. This post was followed by a<a href="http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/05/27/dao-call-for-moratorium/"> blog</a> post and a<a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/10kTyCmGPhvZy94F7VWyS-dQ4lsBacR2dUgGTtV98C40/edit"> working paper</a> describing several attack vectors along with possible solutions.</p><p>In this post we won’t describe in detail, nor rate the risk and the possible danger of those attacks. As this role is more suited to those auditing the code, we would favor a risk-matrix that gives a decent overview for the DAO token holders (DTH), enabling them to make a solid decision on the Moratorium without the need to dig into a technical whitepaper and expecting them to understand the DAO code in detail, this is beyond our scope.Instead we will give a brief layman’s summary of each attack vector:</p><ol><li><strong>The Affirmative Bias, and the Disincentive to Vote No:</strong><br>Token holders are incentivized to either vote yes on a proposal or not to vote at all. During the voting time the tokens are blocked, so that a token holder who voted no would be forced to pay for the proposal, while a token holder who didn’t vote has the option to split before the proposal gets accepted.</li><li><strong>The Stalking Attack:</strong><br>The stalking attack has already been discussed quite a lot. Basically it says that during the time it takes to perform a split, an attacker can buy in into the newly created DAO and block the victim from withdrawing her funds — yet the attacker needs a majority of DAO tokens to perform this attack and therefore has an economical risk as well. Slock.it has quite a long <a href="https://github.com/slockit/DAO/wiki/Why-The-Stalker-attack-is-a-non-issue">explanation</a> that explains possible defense mechanisms regarding the stalking attack, yet these mechanisms have been <a href="https://forum.daohub.org/t/stalker-attack-revisited/3947">critizised </a>as well.</li><li><strong>The Ambush Attack:</strong><br>The ambush attack (could also be called last-minute attack) is building up on the disincentive to vote no. This attack is best explained by an example: <br>We have a quite bad proposal running out in 2 hours. The quorum is 15% with 50% yes and 50% no votes. Rational DTH do not feel the urge to vote no on this proposal, since it doesn’t have the required quorum anyways. Last minute a large token holder or pool with personal interest to have the proposal passed votes yes (e.g. the proposer himself). Most DTH won’t detect this attack and fund this proposal against their will, because they had no time to vote no or split.</li><li><strong>The Token-Value Attack:</strong><br>The token-value attack is an attack directly on the value of DAO tokens. The purpose can either be to directly profit (e.g. via shorts or put options), or to purchase DAO tokens back in the open market in order to acquire a larger share of The DAO. This attack can be performed by performing (or pretend to) the other attacks and announcing them loudly via social media channels.</li><li><strong>The extraBalance Attack:</strong><br>In the extraBalance attack the attacker tries to convince token holders to split from The DAO — therefore raising the book value of the tokens because of the funds in the extraBalance.</li><li><strong>The Split Majority Takeover Attack:</strong><br>For this attack a majority of token holders needs to be the attacker. The <a href="https://github.com/slockit/DAO">whitepaper</a> addresses the issue of a majority trying to get 100% of The DAOs funds by releasing one proposal to withdraw them. The failsafe for this attack are the curators, who won’t whitelist the attackers. <br>The split majority takeover attack is building on top of that. Here the malicious majority provides several proposals that only drain a part of the funds. Such an attack is more difficult for the curators to detect.</li><li><strong>Reward Dilution:</strong><br>Another potential <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/TheDao/comments/4ljzic/can_the_split_dao_reward_token_mechanism_be/">attack</a> against token holders who split is for the remaining token holders of The DAO to dilute the dividends they pay out to token holders who split. They can carry out this attack by funding proposals that cycle the fund’s coins, issuing new reward tokens that dilute the rewards that come in from earlier investments. This attack stems from the way reward accounting lumps maintenance costs, internal transfers and genuine investments into a single proposal abstraction. It requires curator participation to launch, but well-meaning curators can inadvertently launch it when reorganizing funds or when the fund fires underperforming contractors; that is, operations which take coins out and return them as rewards.</li><li><strong>Risk-Free Voting:</strong><br>A token holder can vote on proposals without committing to fund them, which is an enabler for launching other attacks and executing strategic behavior. To do so, the token holder simply votes with his funds as usual, but then, when the voting period is over, calls ‘unblockMe’ and executes a split before the proposal is executed. This decouples the attacker’s funds from any risk he might take with them while voting, and enables a large voter to force bad decisions on the remaining token holders as he exits. It is not without risk, as he may be unable to unblock and split in time, but it is nevertheless possible, as correct execution depends on timing assumptions.</li><li><strong>The Concurrent Proposal Trap:</strong><br>In this attack an attacker blocks token holders in The DAO by suggesting a proposal with a very long voting period. During this time the attack can provide another malicious proposal with a shorter voting period. Due to the long-term voting the DTH cannot split and need to defend themselves actively against the malicious proposal</li><li><strong>Independence Assumption:</strong><br>The independence assumption states that there is a design-flaw in The DAO since it does not allow to form any decision-making progress that supports dependencies regarding proposals.</li></ol><h4>How can the Moratorium make The DAO safer?</h4><p>While the discussion is still ongoing, Alex van de Sande summarized three possible <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/TheDao/comments/4m1t24/the_moratorium_and_how_to_move_forward/">actions</a> that can be taken during a Moratorium time. There is also a DAOhub <a href="https://forum.daohub.org/t/proposal-guidelines-1-code/4318">forum</a> discussion regarding these suggestions.</p><ol><li><strong>Child DAOs:<br></strong>A child DAO seemed to have been an idea of him. Yet he stated the following on reddit regarding this idea: “I’ve been convinced there are technical reasons that make mini-DAOs impractical.” — Which is why we won’t discuss this idea further here.</li><li><strong>Full contract upgrade:</strong><br>A full contract upgrade would mean that a new DAO code would need to be developed, tested and deployed. Then the ‘old’ DAO would need to move to the new contract. This can only be achieved by a 53,3% quorum and a simple majority vote.</li><li><strong>A proposal guideline:</strong><br>The curators would “want to set up some proposal guidelines and that can be then built into a standard open proposal contract framework.”<br>This seems to be his favored measure, since according to him “Most of the DAO issues can be handled or at least highly diminished by the proposal contract themselves”</li></ol><p>At the same time, the curators appeal to The DAO, slock.it, the university research groups and the community in general to join forces to work for the DAO 2.0.</p><p>These ideas have already been addressed in a blog <a href="https://blog.slock.it/introducing-the-proposal-framework-bcca7a941887#.7uko5bio3">post</a> by slock.it who gave a positive reaction regarding the ideas submitted by Alex van de Sande.</p><h4>Future outline</h4><p>The <a href="http://vote.daohub.org/">voting</a> period on the moratorium ends on the 2016–06–11 19:31:34 UTC according to <a href="http://etherscan.io/token/thedao-proposal/5">Etherscan</a>.<br>Basically three things can happen then (the results are assumptions and might be different than we project them):</p><ol><li><strong>No quorum reached<br></strong>This would probably be the worst case for The DAO, since it shows a lack of interest regarding the issues and the curators would need to decide how to go on.</li><li><strong>A majority voted “no”<br></strong>This shows that the DTH do not share the same security concerns as the curators. In that case it will be possible to be verified by the curators, to be whitelisted and to submit proposals.</li><li><strong>A majority voted “yes”<br></strong>This result shows support for the concerns the curators have. It will then be necessary to address the attack vectors in detail, see which ones are critical to count as ‘blockers’ (a blocker is considered as a bug that is so critical, that a software is not able to run) — and develop solutions for these issues. It is hard to assume any timeframe how long the submission of proposals will be blocked then, this is strongly depending on the kind solution-approach that will be taken</li></ol><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>As a DTH, one must decide if the risk of these potential attack vectors is great enough to warrant a continued moratorium proposals. Regarding the information by Alex van de Sande and Slock.it, it is very likely that the result of a moratorium will be a proposal contract framework, which possibly could be delivered in a foreseeable timeframe.</p><p>While the list of possible attacks is quite long, all of them are game-theoretical attacks, none of them can be considered as a classical “software bug” that would, for example, allow one to “hack” The DAO.</p><p>To add a personal statement, it is great to see the curators taking on responsibility for The DAO, even if this does represent some scope creep on the defined role of the curator.Yet it can be only be considered positive to have the smartest heads in the Ethereum network improving and securing The DAO.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b37696aeb17f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/daohub/what-is-the-proposed-moratorium-and-what-is-it-good-for-b37696aeb17f">What is the proposed Moratorium — and what is it good for?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/daohub">DAOhub</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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