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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by George Blazeski on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by George Blazeski on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@GBlawyer?source=rss-db3ec9f697f5------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by George Blazeski on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GBlawyer?source=rss-db3ec9f697f5------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ohio Appeals Court Vacates Parking Ticket Due to Missing Comma]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GBlawyer/ohio-appeals-court-vacates-parking-ticket-due-to-missing-comma-61cf8746180f?source=rss-db3ec9f697f5------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[grammar]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[parking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Blazeski]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2015 16:33:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-10-21T16:33:54.289Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I do not typically summarize appeals-level state cases, but this one was sent to me by special request. On June 22, 2015, the 12th Appellate District of Ohio ruled on an unusual parking violation case. This case is a prime example of the importance of proofreading!</p><p>The driver in this case was convicted of violating the following ordinance:</p><p>It shall be unlawful for any person to park upon any street in the Village, any <strong><em>motor vehicle camper</em></strong>, trailer, farm implement and/or non-motorized vehicle for a continued period of twenty-four hours. <strong><em>[emphasis added]</em></strong></p><p>The town had intended for the ordinance to prohibit parking of a motor vehicle OR a camper, not a motor vehicle camper. The trial court decided that when reading the ordinance in context anybody reading the ordinance “would understand that it is just missing a comma.” The driver then appealed to the appellate court.</p><p>The driver argued that the ordinance applies to a motor vehicle camper, which is “ a camper that is propelled by an engine.” The appellate court agreed and essentially ruled that the rules of grammar must be followed. They also pointed out that interpreting the ordinance to prohibit parking of a “motor vehicle camper” does not produce an absurd result. “ If the village desires a different reading, it should amend the ordinance and insert a comma between the phrase ‘motor vehicle’ and the word ‘camper.’ As written, however, legislative intent is clear from looking at the language used in the ordinance itself.”</p><p>To read the whole opinion, which is very short, click here: <a href="http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/12/2015/2015-Ohio-2463.pdf">http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/12/2015/2015-Ohio-2463.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=61cf8746180f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[New Jersey Supreme Court defines what is a building for the Anti-Eviction Act]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GBlawyer/new-jersey-supreme-court-defines-what-is-a-building-for-the-anti-eviction-act-57527ae3fc2?source=rss-db3ec9f697f5------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[new-jersey]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eviction]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Blazeski]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2015 16:11:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-10-08T17:23:41.837Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On October 7, 2015, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously ruled on an eviction dispute in Hoboken. The key issue concerned the definition of the term “building” in NJ’s Anti-Eviction Act. This is a short summary of the case.</p><p>The plaintiff owns land in Hoboken which has two buildings: a six-unit apartment at 627 Washington Street and a “ two-story single-family home built in a converted garage” at 626 Court Street. Those familiar with Hoboken know that Court Street is parallel to Washington Street as is the next street over. The plaintiff rents the units on Washington Street and started renting the Court Street address in 1971. The defendant moved in sometime in 1973. The plaintiff has sent the defendant eviction notices several times over the years so the plaintiff’s children can live in the house.</p><p>Under New Jersey law, a home owner of a single family home can evict a renter if the owner wishes to live there. “No lessee or tenant or the assigns . . . may be removed by the Superior Court from any house, building, mobile home or land in a mobile home park or tenement leased for residential purposes . . . except upon establishment of one of the following grounds as good cause: . . . . <strong>The owner of a building of three residential units or less seeks to personally occupy a unit</strong>, or has contracted to sell the residential unit to a buyer who wishes to personally occupy it and the contract for sale calls for the unit to be vacant at the time of closing.” [<strong>emphasis added]</strong></p><p>The defendant argued that even though the Court Street and Washington Street units are independent structures, the Court Street unit did not count as a separate building from the Washington Street unit. The defendant showed that both units counted as the same property for tax records.</p><p>However, the NJ Supreme Court was unpersuaded by this argument. They ruled a “building” designates “a discreet physical structure, not a number of such structures connected only by the ownership of the land on which they sit.” Therefore, each unit is a separate building as they are clearly separate structures. Now the plaintiff can evict the defendant as the Court Street unit is legally a one family home.</p><p>To read the full case, which features a more robust summary, click here: <a href="https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/supreme/A9813AnnavMarisela.pdf">https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/supreme/A9813AnnavMarisela.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=57527ae3fc2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[NJ Supreme Court clarifies what claims patients can bring against uninsured doctors]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GBlawyer/nj-supreme-court-clarifies-what-claims-patients-can-bring-against-uninsured-doctors-dc344bd9e44?source=rss-db3ec9f697f5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dc344bd9e44</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malpractice]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Blazeski]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2015 20:15:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-30T20:15:45.789Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On September 29, 2015, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a ruling in case concerning injuries received from an unlicensed physician. The court decided three issues: whether “(1) an injured patient may bring a direct action against a negligent, uninsured physician; (2) failure to comply with the statutory liability insurance mandate gives rise to an informed consent claim; and (3) a health care facility that grants privileges to a physician to use its facilities to treat patients has a continuing duty to ascertain a physician’s compliance with the insurance requirement.” First, I will summarize the facts of the case.</p><p>In 2005, the plaintiff, a patient with chronic back pain, was referred to the defendant, an anesthesiologist. The defendant performed a spinal fusion on the plaintiff, who developed new pain after the procedure because the defendant improperly placed screws in the plaintiff and pinched a nerve. The defendant’s malpractice insurance specifically did not cover this kind of procedure. The plaintiff sued the defendant for deceit, misrepresentation, lack of informed consent, and battery based on his failure to maintain insurance.</p><p>The court decided a patient does not have a direct cause of action against a doctor without malpractice insurance. Furthermore, a patient cannot claim a lack of informed consent. However, a patient can sue a hospital for utilizing an uninsured doctor.</p><p>The court ruled this way because the New Jersey statute requiring doctors to carry malpractice insurance can be subject to disciplinary action, the statute does not expressly state that an injured patient can sue the uninsured doctor for damages. The legislative history of the statute indicated that the New Jersey legislature had favored proactive discipline by the Board of Medical Examiners against uninsured doctors rather than waiting for a patient to sue after an injury.</p><p>Two justices dissented in this case. They would have allowed the lack of informed consent claim. They suggested four elements to allow such a claim: (1) the physician was uninsured to perform the medical procedure; (2) the physician failed to inform the patient that he was uninsured; (3) the patient would not have undergone the procedure if properly informed; and (4) the plaintiff can prove damages.</p><p>However, the majority opinion stands and in New Jersey patients cannot sue a doctor for damages or a lack of informed consent purely because the doctor did not have malpractice insurance. Instead, patients can sue the hospital which utilized that doctor.</p><p>This was a quick summary of the case. To read the full opinion containing the full reasoning in this case, go here: <a href="https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/supreme/A4213JamesvRichard.pdf">https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/supreme/A4213JamesvRichard.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dc344bd9e44" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[9th Circuit rules toy maker cannot produce Batmobiles]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GBlawyer/9th-circuit-rules-toy-maker-cannot-produce-batmobiles-abc641573dc8?source=rss-db3ec9f697f5------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[copyright]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[batman]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cars]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Blazeski]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2015 20:55:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-28T20:55:14.492Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On September 23rd, 2015, the 9th Circuit (Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands) issued a ruling on a copyright and trademark case regarding the Batmobile. The judge who wrote the opinion clearly had fun with the case, and I suggest reading the full opinion so find all the Batman quotes.</p><p>The plaintiff, DC Comics, is the copyright owner of Batman. The defendant is the owner of Gotham Garage, which produces and sells replicas of cars from movies and television shows. Specifically, the defendant sells replicas of the Batmobile from the 1966 television show and 1989 movie for about $90,000 a car. The defendant was not authorized by DC to produce these cars.</p><p>The defendant argued that the Batmobile was not subject to copyright protection. In order to prevail, the DC Comics had to prove that it owns a copyright in the Batmobile as it appeared in the 1966 television show and 1989 movie, and that the defendant infringed that copyright by creating unauthorized replica cars.</p><p>Copyright protection “extends not only to an original work as a whole, but also to ‘sufficiently distinctive’ elements, like comic book characters, contained within the work.” This includes characters such as cars. To be sufficiently distinctive, a character must be “sufficiently delineated” and display “consistent, widely identifiable traits.” Even if a character’s traits change over time, the character can still be protected if it’s traits are distinctive. Good examples are James Bond and Godzilla as these characters change in appearance over different movies but retain the same core traits. A detailed explanation for these characters is provided at the bottom of page 14 of the opinion.</p><p>The court ruled the Batmobile was eligible for copyright protection. The Batmobile has defined physical attributes which are distinct and identifiable. Even if it’s appearance changes, it is still a “crime-fighting car with sleek and powerful characteristics that allow Batman to maneuver quickly while he fights villains.” Further, the Batmobile is especially distinctive as it has a unique and highly recognizable name. In other words, it is not an ordinary stock character that can be easily replaced.</p><p>Copyright owners have the right to approve derivative works of the copyrighted content. A derivative work is a “work based upon one or more preexisting works that recasts, transforms, or adapts the preexisting work.” For example, the James Bond movies are derivative works based on the James Bond novels written by Ian Fleming. The original copyright owner maintains a copyright interest in preexisting material within the derivative work. To use the same example, even though MGM studios would own the copyright in the upcoming Bond film <em>Spectre</em>, Ian Fleming retains the copyright interest in the James Bond character that appears in the movie. (I am very much simplifying the James Bond situation. It is actually a mess of copyright issues.)</p><p>Note that a copyright owner could license their rights to make a derivative work. A license is a contract which grants intellectual property rights. In this case, DC Comics did not license the Batmobile copyright for the Batman television show and movie, so DC Comics still retains the Batmobile copyright in these works.</p><p>What does that mean for the Batmobile? The Batmobile was created in comic books published by DC Comics. DC Comics owns the copyrights for the comic books. The Batman television show and movie was based on the comic books. Therefore, DC Comics’ copyright in the Batmobile extends through the television show and movie. To make replica cars based on the television show and movie, the defendant therefore had to get authorization from DC Comics. The defendant did not, so the defendant is liable for copyright infringement.</p><p>This was a summary of the major issues in this case. To read the full opinion, including pictures of the replica cars, go here: <a href="http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2015/09/23/13-55484.pdf">http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2015/09/23/13-55484.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=abc641573dc8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[6th circuit rules Juggalos have standing to sue government over gang classification]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GBlawyer/6th-circuit-rules-juggalos-have-standing-to-sue-government-over-gang-classification-620121348853?source=rss-db3ec9f697f5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/620121348853</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[music]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gangs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Blazeski]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2015 13:46:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-23T13:46:11.386Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On September 17th the Sixth Circuit (Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee) issued a ruling on standing in a case concerning the government’s designation of Juggalos, fans of the Insane Clown Posse (ICP), as a gang. At this stage of the case, the issue at hand was not whether the government was right, but whether the plaintiffs were able to bring a lawsuit in the first place.</p><p>The plaintiffs in this case are all Juggalos, fans of the ICP. In 2011, the National Gang Intelligence Center classified Juggalos as a “loosely-organized hybrid gang.” After this classification, the plaintiffs allege they have been targeted by police and denied entry into the army, amongst other things. Furthermore, the band members of ICP allege a concert of theirs was cancelled after the police called the venue and informed the venue of the Juggalos’ gang status.</p><p>Again, the question at this stage concerned standing. Standing is, generally, whether a plaintiff is actually connected to a case. For example, someone who was in a car accident would have standing to sue the car’s driver. Conversely, someone who reads about accident in the newspaper is not sufficiently connected to the case and would not have standing to sue. This is a very simplistic explanation of standing.</p><p>Common law defines three elements to standing in federal court. 1) injury in fact 2) causation — “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of” 3) redressability — “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision”</p><p>The injury in fact must be actual or imminent. “ In other words, the harm must have already occurred or it must be likely to occur imminently.” The Court believed the plaintiffs had actual injuries to their First Amendment rights to free speech as they had to stop wearing Juggalo paraphernalia to avoid police attention.</p><p>The government had argued that causation did not exist because all of the alleged injuries to the plaintiffs were performed by independent police officers and not the National Gang Intelligence Center. Also, the Center did not directly order the officers to harass the plaintiffs. However, the court did not buy this argument because the Center’s gang classification was a motivating factor in the police’s actions.</p><p>Finally, the court ruled the plaintiffs showed redressability. In other words, a court would be able to provide “substantial and meaningful relief” to the plaintiffs. For example, the courts could declare the gang classification unlawful or grant an injunction to prevent federal agencies from collecting information on Juggalos.</p><p>For all these reasons, the 6th Circuit ruled the plaintiffs had standing and allowed the case to proceed. Now the case will return to federal district court and continue through the litigation process. To read the full opinion, you can click here: <a href="http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0230p-06.pdf">http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0230p-06.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=620121348853" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[9th Circuit rules “fair use” must be considered before issuing a takedown notice on the Internet]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GBlawyer/9th-circuit-rules-fair-use-must-be-considered-before-issuing-a-takedown-notice-on-the-internet-49fa0401b700?source=rss-db3ec9f697f5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/49fa0401b700</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[youtube]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[copyright]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Blazeski]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2015 18:55:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-17T18:55:18.409Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On September 14, 2015, the 9th Circuit (Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Washington, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands) ruled on a copyright case concerning the interaction of the fair use doctrine with takedown notices online. There were a couple other issues at hand but this summary will cover the fair use issue.</p><p>This case stems from a 2007 YouTube video of a child dancing in a kitchen with Prince’s song “Let’s Go Crazy” playing on a stereo in the background. Universal Music Group, responsible for enforcing Prince’s copyrights, sent a takedown notice to YouTube, who then took down the video. A takedown notice occurs under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), essentially forcing a website host to take down a video which allegedly infringes on a copyright. A video owner can restore a video by issuing a counter-notification, “ which must include a statement of good faith belief that the material was removed or disabled as a result of mistake or misidentification.” Ultimately the video was restored, but for several reasons it was not restored until 22 days later. Anyone who abuses the DMCA is liable for damages. In this case, the woman who posted the video is seeking damages from Universal.</p><p>One question before the court was whether the DMCA“requires copyright holders to consider whether the potentially infringing material is a fair use of a copyright” before issuing a takedown notification. The 9th Circuit determined that it does. Fair use is expressly laid out in federal copyright statutes. “The fair use of a copyrighted work, . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”</p><p>When issuing a takedown notification, the entity holding the copyright must have a good faith belief that fair use does not apply. In this case, a jury will have to determine whether Universal has such a good faith belief. The court did note that using computer algorithms to scan video content online could meet a good faith standard for considering fair use, so Universal may still prevail in the case.</p><p>To read the whole case, which includes discussion on willful blindness when issuing takedown notices, click here: <a href="http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2015/09/14/13-16106.pdf">http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2015/09/14/13-16106.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=49fa0401b700" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[9th Circuit concludes Mexican government would be likely to consent to torture of a transgender…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GBlawyer/9th-circuit-concludes-mexican-government-would-be-likely-to-consent-to-torture-of-a-transgender-3eb374deeac3?source=rss-db3ec9f697f5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3eb374deeac3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[transgender]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Blazeski]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2015 19:54:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-09-14T19:54:31.223Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>9th Circuit concludes Mexican government would be likely to consent to torture of a transgender woman and declines to return her to Mexico</h3><p>On September 3, 2015, the 9th Circuit (Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Washington, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands) ruled on a review from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) regarding the Convention Against Torture. The 9th Circuit ultimately granted relief to petitioner and prevented her removal to Mexico.</p><p>The petitioner has born in Mexico and is a transgender female. Because of her background, she was subject to beatings, sexual assault, and rape in Mexico, including from member of the Mexican police and military. Petitioner sought refuge in the United States.</p><p>However, the petitioner had a 2006 felony conviction in California for driving while intoxicated and injured another person. Therefore she was subject to removal from the country by the Board of Immigration Appeals.</p><p>Upon review of the case, the 9th Circuit agreed that the 2006 felony conviction was a serious enough charge to warrant removal. However, the court also noted that the BIA should have granted an exemption under the Convention Against Torture. The Convention Against Torture defers removal of an immigrant upon a showing that the immigrant “is more likely than not to be tortured” either “<strong> “</strong>by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”</p><p>The BIA did not argue that sexual assault and rape qualify as torture, but the BIA concluded that no Mexican public official consented or acquiesced to torture of homosexuals or transgendered individuals. However, the evidence showed otherwise. The BIA tried to characterize prior incidents as acts of “rogue or corrupt officials,” but the 9th Circuit did not buy this argument. A petitioner under the Convention for Torture does not have to prove the entire government would consent or acquiesce to her torture, just that is it more likely than not that some would.</p><p>This was a simple summary of the case. To read the opinion: click here: <a href="http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2015/09/03/13-73744.pdf">http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2015/09/03/13-73744.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3eb374deeac3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[In Washington state, text messages on a public employee’s private phone may be public records]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GBlawyer/in-washington-state-text-messages-on-a-public-employee-s-private-phone-may-be-public-records-fe7f97cf4ccc?source=rss-db3ec9f697f5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fe7f97cf4ccc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[acces]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[washington]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Blazeski]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Aug 2015 14:17:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-08-28T14:17:06.445Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On August 27, 2015, the Supreme Court of Washington issued its opinion in Nissen v. Pierce County. At issue was whether the Public Records Act (PRA) applies when a public employee uses a private cell phone to conduct government business. The court ruled that it does.</p><p>Washington’s PRA “subjects virtually any record related to the conduct of government to public disclosure.” The Washigton Supreme Court had previously ruled that the PRA extended to personal computers, stating “if government employees could circumvent the PRA by using their home computers for government business, the PRA could be drastically undermined.”</p><p>This case arose when a county sheriff requested records from the county prosecutor’s private cell phone. The prosecutor turned over a call and text log, but did not disclose the contents of the text messages, saying they were personal in nature. The text messages pertained to business conducted by the prosecutor in performing his county duties.</p><p>At trial, the District Court ruled “that records of private cell phone use can never be public records under the PRA.” The Court of Appeals reversed because the text message were prepared in an official capacity. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that work product of public employees cannot be exempt from public disclosure just because the work product was not produced using government property.</p><p>The court was clear, however, that this ruling does not open up all public employees’ private cell phones to the public. I will reproduce what the court stated this case is NOT about.</p><p>“This case does not involve a public employer seizing an employee’s private cell phone to search for public records. It does not involve a records request for every piece of data on a smartphone. And it does not involve a citizen suing a public employee for access to the employee’s phone. Instead, this is an action against an agency for two types of records that, while potentially related to the agency’s public business, are in the exclusive control of the agency’s employee. This case asks whether those records can nonetheless be “public records” the agency must disclose and, if so, whether there are limits to how the agency may search for and review those records.”</p><p>This was a quick summary of the case. To read the full text, go here: <a href="http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/908753.pdf">http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/908753.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fe7f97cf4ccc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[First Circuit rules that a sandwich is not protected by copyright law]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GBlawyer/first-circuit-rules-that-a-sandwich-is-not-protected-by-copyright-law-32791f8395c2?source=rss-db3ec9f697f5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/32791f8395c2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[chicken]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[copyright]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Blazeski]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2015 01:35:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-08-26T01:35:48.303Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have to admit, this one made me chuckle.</p><p>On Friday, August 21, 2015, the 1st Circuit of Appeals (Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico and Rhode Island) ruled on an appeal from Puerto Rico over the intellectual property rights of the Pechu sandwich. The court affirmed that district court’s ruling that a chicken sandwich is not eligible for copyright protection.</p><p>Previous case law has established that recipes (or any instructions) are not copyrightable works. Previous case law also established that copyrights do not extend to “ ‘words and short phrases, such as names, titles, and slogans.”</p><p>This case also discussed the plaintiff’s trademark claims (they were unsuccessful). To read all the details, and to witness some bad chicken puns, you can read the full 9 page opinion here: <a href="http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/14-1698P-01A.pdf">http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/14-1698P-01A.pdf</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=32791f8395c2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Posts will resume in another week!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GBlawyer/posts-will-resume-in-another-week-57c99267ca49?source=rss-db3ec9f697f5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/57c99267ca49</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[russian]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[the-chemical-brothers]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[George Blazeski]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 08 Aug 2015 17:39:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-08-08T17:39:34.396Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Posts will resume in another week!</p><p>Expect the next blog summary on about August 17, 2015.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=57c99267ca49" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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