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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Gavin Jackson on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Gavin Jackson on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Speech on the productivity puzzle]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GavinHJackson/speech-on-the-productivity-puzzle-58e54869658?source=rss-595f6e1e4bb6------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 06 Jun 2019 10:12:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-06T10:35:22.878Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The text below is rough notes for a speech I gave at the University of Oxford economics society. It was designed to be read out so the writing is a little rough.</em></p><p>Good evening and thank you very much for the invite to come and speak. I studied economics here at Oxford so I was very honoured to be invited back as someone who now is worth hearing. I matriculated back in 2008 and it feels like hardly any time since I studied here.</p><p>2008, of course, was the year of the financial crisis. Lehman failed almost exactly at the same time as I was starting my PPE degree here. When I was 18 it all seemed very unimportant. There were much more interesting things going on in my life than the turmoil in the global economy.</p><p>However I do remember thinking that three years was about normal for a recession so I was lucky to be going to University. I’d keep my head down and come out just as the economy was hitting its stride again. I’d ride the whole thing out and my career would be unaffected.</p><p>In reality the financial crisis has dominated the entirety of my working life. Not only did I struggle in finding graduate employment in 2011, and it likely set me on the path to becoming an economist, but also as a journalist at the FT I have been continuously writing about its aftermath.</p><p>For the country as a whole, the crisis is still casting its shadow on wages. We avoided mass unemployment, for the most part, but real wages are still about £8 a week lower than they were a decade ago. That has had knock-on effects on the public finances and, eventually, our politics.</p><p>Mostly economists tie this poor wage growth to our weak productivity growth. Productivity is barely higher than it was before the financial crisis.</p><p>Since I’ve returned to an academic setting I’m going to be rigorous and define my terms. By productivity I mean labour productivity. The amount of output produced per hour worked. A simple ratio of output over labour input.</p><p>However there are three different things that are referred to as “the productivity puzzle”. They are often confused so I want to be clear exactly what I’m talking about.</p><p>First, the UK is less productive than similar countries, most importantly France and Germany. This is a long standing feature of the British economy. In about 1960 France and Germany overtook us in terms of output per hour.</p><p>Second, productivity growth, has slowed since the 2008 financial crisis. Before 2008 output per hour worked was increasing by about 1 per cent a year. Since the crisis it has grown by 2 per cent in a decade.</p><p>Lastly we have the third derivative. The slowdown in productivity growth has been more rapid and steeper in the UK than in any other developed economy.</p><p>You can see these three puzzles on the next two charts. We were more productive than France and Germany in the early 1960s but they overtook us and stayed ahead. And then at the end of the chart you can see the slowdown since the crisis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/810/0*e9NDxQpK38XhtLEy" /></figure><p>And then here’s the third productivity puzzle. This chart shows the highest and lowest productivity growth in the G7 group of rich countries. The UK was at the top before the crisis and it’s mostly been at the bottom since.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*PaWstdc6XasO9q6R" /></figure><p>I’m going to largely focus on the second puzzle. What happened to the British economy in 2008 that is still affecting it 10 years later and I want to set forward my theory on why.</p><p>However I do want to make two remarks on the other problems that are referred to as the productivity puzzle.</p><p>First, a lot of the productivity puzzle is about measurement. Most of the focus on measurement has been on the numerator, we ask whether we are measuring output correctly given the rapid changes in the kinds of goods and services that have been produced.</p><p>But the denominator is equally important. This chart shows what happened when the OECD tried to measure hours worked on a consistent basis. Which, surprisingly no one had asked until last year. The UK’s national statistics agency just accepts self-reported accounts of hours worked while the French agency corrects them for strike days and bank holidays.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/775/0*fU9hWWaTzhe04kEQ" /></figure><p>Doing the same for the UK reduces the gap in productivity to about 10 per cent, rather than 20 per cent. That halves this shortfall that economists have been debating for decades. So do not underestimate the role of measurement.</p><p>And do not underestimate how many very basic things the economics profession is likely still missing and getting wrong.</p><p>Now this chart shows what has happened last year. The eurozone growth rate slowed substantially while employment growth continued. The effect of this is to make productivity growth right across developed Europe look a lot more British. We’re not quite the outlier we once were.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*N6KgaNCnTmAhQmZp" /></figure><p>But back to my main focus. Why has UK productivity growth slowed since 2008? It’s tempting to think that there is one big explanation, but what I want to persuade you of in this lecture is that there are a whole set of different shocks that happened to hit the UK economy in 2008. There are multiple causes that just happened to all occur at about the same way.</p><p>This table comes from a great paper from the Economics Statistics Centre of Excellence, this new institute that was set up in London to improve economic measurement and help us get to the bottom of what’s going on with productivity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/628/0*amk-uC3P8TadAoYk" /></figure><p>It shows the British, European and American productivity slowdown since 2008 by sector. What I want to draw your attention to is these two numbers. Together finance and manufacturing explain over half of the productivity slowdown. They were the two leading sectors before the crisis, but since 2008 they’ve been laggards.</p><p>Now that happened to finance in 2008 has been discussed at length. I don’t think we need to go over it again. There was a boom, then a bust. After the bust, policymakers tried to make the sector safer and it did not grow at the same rates as it did before. Banks have added a lot more compliance officers and the sector is safer but less “productive” than it used to be.</p><p>Manufacturing is more interesting. It’s a bit of a puzzle why that should have slowed so much since 2011. The financial crisis certainly led to a demand shock: the bust hit demand for goods worldwide and merchandise trade volumes have grown only modestly since the crisis. But productivity growth has been much slower, even after the economy recovered from the initial hit.</p><p>I believe that a supply shock hit Britain’s manufacturing sector at around the same time as the global economy was recovering.</p><p>This chart shows output in the pharmaceutical sector. The UK has a relatively big pharma sector, we have GlaxoSmithKline and AstraZeneca two of the five biggest drug companies in the world. This is something we specialise in, or I should say we did specialise in before the crisis.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/833/0*vGZ4Qko9VPyf9cQX" /></figure><p>Since the crisis you can see that pharmaceutical manufacturing has collapsed and what was one of the most productive sectors became one of the biggest drags on productivity growth.</p><p>So what happened? Almost certainly there was a demand element, but output did not recover once the global economy stabilised. Car manufacturing did — we approached our previous record for car production in 2016. But pharmaceuticals did not.</p><p>Well it just so happened that Astra and Glaxo faced patent cliffs shortly after the global financial crisis hit. From about 2011–2014 a huge number of drugs lost their patents.</p><p>This slide shows an FT story from 2012. AstraZeneca suffered an 18 per cent fall in revenues in the second quarter that year as a drug went off patent. Something similar happened to Glaxo, which lost exclusivity on a HIV drug, an asthma drug, alongside a few others.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/797/0*lwJg24TIrMNd2DcZ" /></figure><p>This was a substantial hit to these two companies. And they weren’t alone. Big pharma in the US faced similar patent cliffs. For whatever reason, it seems to be much much harder to come up with new drugs these days than it was 30 years or so ago. The number of researchers has exploded, the number of new drugs has not.</p><p>You’d have to ask a scientist about why this happened. What I hear is that drug research has changed, there’s more focus on diseases like cancer which come in hundreds of different variations. I think a lot of the big medical breakthroughs have been in genetics, which is about tailoring medicines rather than mass-producing a few blockbuster drugs.</p><p>So these two shocks seem to be to be a big reason why we slowed down, and why we slowed down more than our peers. We specialised in finance and pharmaceuticals before the crisis and they both happened to face big supply shocks almost simultaneously.</p><p>But that’s not all. These two sectors explain over half of the slowdown but not the whole thing.</p><p>So what else is going on. Here’s telecoms. Now this is weird, given the technological advances of the past decade we would expect telecoms to be rocketing ahead: the iPhone made its debut in 2007, the year before the financial crisis. I find it almost completely implausible that there has been no productivity advances in telecoms.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/628/0*6PgQMVIIBb81mku2" /></figure><p>This seems to be purely measurement error. To measure output the ONS deflate the revenues of companies like Vodafone and BT by some measure of price. It appears they screwed up on this deflator. The idea is to capture the real amount of “telecoms services” that these companies produce, that means measuring the price of a unit of this output. But the nature of the output has changed over the last decade.</p><p>Here’s an FT story from last year. Essentially the statistics agency failed to account for changes in quality and was using the same concept of telecoms output as it did in 2008, back when people still made voice calls. If it instead used price per bit of information prices would have fallen by 90 per cent and output in the sector would be higher.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/779/0*nGVfrPRqQdzGeL7_" /></figure><p>The next one I’ve picked out is my favourite. Productivity in utilities has done very badly since 2008. Something else happened that year, as well as the financial crisis. The UK passed the Climate Change Act. It’s not fair to blame that act really, but it is symbolic. We started to take the environment more seriously, with consequences for productivity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/0*izGXFNC0-ltLnL3V" /></figure><p>Electricity output, sector D, started declining in about 2009. Partly that will reflect the demand shock but there was a supply shock too. We began to use more energy efficient appliances and we insulate our homes better. Productivity also began to decline because we switched to renewables, which tend to require more labour input than big coal-fired power plants.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/846/0*TQtYnaGLt4aMvQku" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/597/0*DWSbWV9-WkM3Vuvt" /></figure><p>Productivity in water supply and waste management, sector E, declined as well. This is basically because we started recycling a lot more. That means we need workers to sort glass and plastic, make sure it gets sent to the right place. The amount of “waste management services output” stayed roughly the same, but we needed more workers to do it.</p><p>Personally I think this is a mismeasurement thing as well. We did not measure the bads, all the environmental costs, we were producing properly before the financial crisis so now we’re putting in effort to get rid of them, that effort does not appear as extra output.</p><p>Okay, last one. Mining and quarrying. This sector has not done well since the crisis either. There’s no climate change or mismeasurement thing here. This appears to be due to geology. Since 2008 our reserves of oil in the north sea have begun to run dry, it’s become far harder to get them out and so the sector’s productivity has declined.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/610/0*Ew6-XNp5222MfKih" /></figure><p>In the US, as you can see, productivity in the sector has actually got better since the financial crisis. I don’t know why this is, but I’d wager it has got something to do with shale gas. The US embraced fracking to an extent we did not in Europe. Partly the productivity puzzle is about the absence of new sectors as well as the decline of existing ones.</p><p>So I’ve given you five reasons why UK productivity has slowed — changes in financial regulation, the patent cliff, mismeasurement of telecommunications, attempts to cope with climate change, and the troubles with getting more oil out of the north sea. I hope I’ve persuaded you that there is not a single origin of this problem, but many.</p><p>I was asked to talk about policy solutions. I’m not sure there are any really. I don’t know what we can do to, for example, make it easier to come up with new drugs. But I do want to talk about what could come next. That ESCOE paper, while brilliant, only goes up to 2015. Since then we’ve kind of entered into a new stage of the productivity.</p><p>As you can see from this chart. Retail, IT and business services are now providing the biggest contribution to productivity growth. I think we can put this down to the digital revolution starting to pay off. This retail figure is the flip side of the decline of the high streets and those stories about Arcadia and Debenhams and so on shutting down.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/708/0*i6uOCw4BGXrX4BRZ" /></figure><p>Here’s the other side. You can see that finance and pharmaceuticals are no longer shrinking in the way they once were. Energy and waste management are still dragging down productivity but the biggest thing is this “the allocation effect”. What that means is there has been an increase in low productivity jobs, more workers are being allocated to low productivity industries. Hospitality, delivery drivers, care workers that kind of thing.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*7jxwLl0kMWy7U0U1" /></figure><p>So what can we do. I don’t think we can or should go back to the past. We do not want to go back on environmental on financial regulation, as the US is doing right now. But what we can do as a society is try to be open to new opportunities and technologies that are coming along and that means investing in the basics of education, infrastructure and research to make sure that we are able to make the most of things like e-commerce and working out what to do about those who lose out from these transitions.</p><p>Thank you very much for having me. Any questions?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=58e54869658" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is Brexit the only explanation for the UK’s underperformance?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GavinHJackson/is-brexit-the-only-explanation-for-the-uks-underperformance-71152a76e6f5?source=rss-595f6e1e4bb6------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jul 2018 14:37:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-07-01T20:59:51.928Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This week, in response to the latest edition of the UK’s national accounts, John Hawksworth, chief economist at PwC said:</p><blockquote>The impact of the Brexit vote in weakening the pound, raising import prices and so squeezing real consumer spending power, as well as dampening of business investment growth, is the only obvious explanation for the UK’s relative underperformance since early 2017.</blockquote><p>The impact of Brexit on the UK’s growth can be most easily seen in consumer services including retail, accomodation and food, which account for about 14 per cent of the economy. The rate of growth in this sector has fallen from around 4 per cent at the start of 2015 to 0.6 per cent in the three months ending in April 2018.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*n1gw8sf04cB7WxSy" /></figure><p>Consumer spending has been squeezed as inflation has risen above wage growth, mostly due to the fall in the pound following the Brexit vote — lowering household disposable income growth for two consecutive years in 2016 and 2017.</p><p>The second place in which we can arguably see a Brexit impact has been on business investment. Business investment growth has been slow since 2015 and commentators, including the governor of the Bank of England Mark Carney, have said that normally when the world economy is humming along as it is at the moment, business investment in the UK would normally be stronger.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*9dZtK9gx2rcbuHd4" /></figure><p>So, we can explain why business investment growth has been weak and why consumer services output growth has fallen in terms of the Brexit vote as Mr Hawksworth says.</p><p>However he is wrong to say there is no other obvious explanation for the relative weakness of the UK economy in the past few years: there is austerity.</p><p>The pace of austerity accelerated in the two years after the referendum: overall government spending fell from growing about 2 per cent a year in 2014 and 2015 to contracting by 0.6 per cent in the first quarter of 2017 — although it recovered in the first quarter of 2018.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*hec0Pzc6wFWzpHd5-IgLDQ.png" /></figure><p>While consumer services have slowed they have grown roughly in line with the overall services sector. Government services — which makes up around 22 per cent of the economy —on the other hand have dragged down overall services growth.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*29OCGV9hAXy90oHd" /></figure><p>And while business investment has slowed, government investment has actually contracted. According to figures published last week, total government capital expenditure was 5 per cent lower in the first quarter of 2018 compared to the second quarter of 2016 when the referendum was called and is still about a tenth lower than in 2010.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*-qGPgmVx4NHXYkzZ" /></figure><p>Austerity has combined with higher inflation to squeeze household spending power since the EU referendum. <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/uksectoraccounts/bulletins/quarterlysectoraccounts/januarytomarch2018#real-household-disposable-income-increased-by-03-in-the-latest-quarter-while-the-2017-growth-rate-was-revised-down-to-negative-05">Figures published on Friday</a> showed that higher taxes and lower benefits payments have also reduced real household disposable income since the EU referendum, having roughly half the effect of higher prices.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=71152a76e6f5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[If you’re so smart why are you so unproductive?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GavinHJackson/if-youre-so-smart-why-are-you-so-unproductive-fdcd97a744be?source=rss-595f6e1e4bb6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fdcd97a744be</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 17 Jun 2018 22:49:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-06-17T23:01:05.868Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>“The chief remedy, then, for low wages is better education,” — Alfred Marshall, as quoted in Grand Pursuit: The Story Of Economic Genius</em></p><p><em>“More to the left was a radicalised, impoverished intelligentsia. Educational opportunities in 1840s Austria had far outstripped employment opportunities for the educated.” — Wikipedia, Revolutions of 1848 in the Austrian Empire</em></p><p>In a previous blog I wrote that Britain’s low level of investment in fixed capital compared to its peers is partly explained by its relatively higher specialisation in services and, in fact, Britain invests more in human capital — education — than any OECD country.</p><p>In this blog, I’m going to look at what this means for the UK’s so-called productivity puzzle, the relatively low growth in output per hour of British workers since the financial crisis.</p><p>Perhaps the most profound shifts in the UK labour force and society over the last 30 years has been the spread of university education. Between 1985 and 2015 the proportion of workers in the UK with a degree rose to a third, from roughly a tenth.</p><p>This growth in university education came at the expense of the size of the share of the population without qualifications — the proportion with GCSEs and A-Levels remained roughly constant while the number without any qualifications halved. In 1985 workers were more likely to have no qualifications at all than a degree, by 2015 just under half of all workers went through tertiary education of some type.</p><p>According to calculations from the Bank of England this increase in education added roughly 0.4 per cent to average wages a year between 1995 and 2010 as the British workforce became better educated.</p><p>A greater supply of educated workers was met by higher demand: a working paper from the central bank’s staff published in 2016 said, “as the supply of skills has increased in the economy so too has the share of high-skilled jobs.” The number of workers in management, professional and technical occupations increased from 34 per cent in 1992 to 44 per cent in 2015.</p><p>However since the crisis the expanding pool of graduates has no longer been met by higher demand for skilled workers. According to data collected by the Department of Education, 65.5 per cent of those with an undergraduate degree were in high skilled employment in 2017 compared to 68.7 per cent a decade earlier.</p><p>To continue the analogy with fixed capital from my previous blog, for Britain’s knowledge-based economy that’s the equivalent of a lot of mothballed factories. In crude terms, graduates in low or medium skilled jobs are underused resources that could be put to better purposes.</p><p>So why is the UK not creating as many high skilled jobs as a decade ago? Why are Britain’s graduates less likely to find themselves in high skilled employment than a decade ago?</p><p>In their working paper Bank of England officials said that the increasing educational level of the UK workforce ought to have been pushing up the level of productivity growth after 2008, which made the UK’s productivity puzzle even more puzzling.</p><p>Two years later and we are pretty close to solving the productivity puzzle. As a recent paper from the Economic Statistics Centre of Excellence says, much of Britain’s lacklustre productivity growth since the crisis can be explained by the performance of a handful of high productivity industries: telecommunications, finance, mining and quarrying, electricity and gas, pharmaceuticals and computer programming.</p><p>The ESCoE paper concludes that in these sectors there was significant ‘capital shallowing’, in other words the amount of fixed capital per worker was less than before the crisis. “The buoyancy of the UK labour market has not been sufficiently matched by investment,” the authors write.</p><p>Companies in these industries are more likely to export and the authors identify two potential causes for the slowdown: lack of international demand — meaning the eurozone crisis’ effect on British exports — or that the scope for catch up with the technology frontier is less than it used to be, both meaning there was less need for companies to invest.</p><p>The ESCoE authors also suggest there may be some measurement problems with ICT and finance and for electricity and gas, and finance, I would also throw in new regulations aimed at reducing the damage caused by these industries to the rest of society through carbon emissions and excessive leverage respectively.</p><p>Employment in the civil service, while not part of the UK’s productivity problem, has fallen too, from roughly half a million on the eve of the 2008 crisis to 430,000 in March 2018.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fdcd97a744be" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Capital in the 21st Century, or an attempt to wind up Jo Michell]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GavinHJackson/capital-in-the-21st-century-or-an-attempt-to-wind-up-jo-michell-265904b1730f?source=rss-595f6e1e4bb6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/265904b1730f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 20 May 2018 13:48:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-20T13:48:16.650Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3VleA8xBXcw2k065AUsvqw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Britain has the lowest rate of investment spending in the G7 group of rich countries. The proportion of national income that is spent on private investment (non-government) is lower than the US, Canada, France, Italy, Japan and Germany. Government investment is the second lowest, above only the even more austere Germans.</p><p>But out of those seven countries the UK has the largest service sector. According to <a href="https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/articles/ananalysisofinvestmentexpenditureintheukandotherorganisationforeconomiccooperationanddevelopmentnations/2018-05-03#oecd-government-expenditure">the Office for National Statistics</a>, there is an inverse relationship between investment spending and the proportion of the economy made up with producing services rather than goods.</p><p>Canada, with its resource-based economy, and Japan and Germany with their big manufacturing sectors have the highest overall spending. The UK, the US and France, who specialise in services, spend less.</p><p>In fact, if we look at the kind of capital formation that is most important to the UK’s service-based economy — human capital — the UK is a leader not a laggard. The UK spends the most on education of any G7 country, and, actually, of any of the OECD group of rich countries.</p><p><a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance_19991487">According to the OECD</a>, the UK spends 6.6 per cent of national income on education, just ahead of Denmark on 6.5 per cent and New Zealand on 6.4 per cent.</p><p>In PPP-adjusted dollar terms the UK spends around $170,000 per student up to the end of secondary school, the fourth highest after Luxembourg, Switzerland and Norway. Most of this comes from the public sector: the OECD reckons 4.2 percentage points of the 4.8 per cent of GDP spent on pre-university education in the UK comes from the government.</p><p>It is a different story for tertiary education however, where resources are much more likely to be private rather than public. Of the 1.8 per cent of GDP spent on tertiary education, 1.3 per cent is private.</p><p>But this higher level of spending on human capital is not enough to make up for the difference in fixed capital investment. The UK spends 2.2 percentage points of GDP more on education than Japan does but Japan spends a whole 7 percentage points more on fixed capital, such as trains, machines and houses.</p><p>Clearly Britain could do with spending more on houses and trains, but there are advantages to the UK model too.</p><p>A <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/732c3b78-329f-11e8-b5bf-23cb17fd1498">recent study by the OECD</a> found that Germany, which spends 2.3 percentage points of GDP less on education than the UK, and Japan were among the rich countries most exposed to automation as they had a greater proportion of routine jobs that could be easily mechanised.</p><p>The UK with its postmodern economy, was among the rich countries least likely to see a wave of job losses from improvements in artificial intelligence. And the best way of getting ready for the future world of work, the OECD says? Education.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=265904b1730f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Inequality and Brexit voting]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GavinHJackson/inequality-and-brexit-voting-bda3d6e6ce44?source=rss-595f6e1e4bb6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bda3d6e6ce44</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[brexit]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Oct 2017 09:45:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-31T09:45:33.681Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>People often say that correlation does not imply causation, but less well-known is that causation does not imply correlation. As a mathematical example x squared is not correlated with x, but is entirely determined by the value of x.</p><p>A number of tweets are going round pointing out that Britain is dominated by a private school educated elite and has massive regional inequality and are suggesting this is possibly a cause of the Brexit result.</p><p>I think this is highly plausible but I expect it determined voting patterns on both sides. A number of Remain voters will have cared a great deal about inequality and wanted to vote for the EU because it protects labour rights and there is often a greater weight placed on solidarity within continental European welfare states.</p><p>A lot of Remain voters will have been turned off by the privately educated Farage and Johnson as Leave voters were by Cameron and Osborne.</p><p>This means that attitudes towards social inequality could have ‘caused’ votes on both sides but, depending on the proportions of voters going each way, may have virtually zero correlation with voting patterns. This is why I think there always needs to be a certain amount of on-the-ground discussion about people’s motivations in social science and you cannot just rely on correlations.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bda3d6e6ce44" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The social contract]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GavinHJackson/the-social-contract-fd676ff4792?source=rss-595f6e1e4bb6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fd676ff4792</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[uber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sharing-economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Mar 2016 18:51:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-03-30T18:51:27.861Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aINpjWv-A9whDi_v8SgZzQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>There is only one economic system in the world, and that is capitalism,” said Margaret Thatcher. “The difference lies in whether the capital is in the hands of the State or whether the greater part of it is in the hands of people outside of State control.”</p><p>Like much else, that statement is pregnant with its contrary: at the heart of capitalism are thousands of mini-states, which direct capital according to the decisions of a powerful central cadre — if communism is a kind of state capitalism then maybe capitalism contains a sort of private communism.</p><p>These mini-states are corporations, whose name comes from the latin corpus meaning body — a corporation is an artificial person. This legal fiction allows companies to do many of the things that humans can do: they can own property; they can be sued and can make contracts; they can own assets and owe people money; they can be hired and they can employ people.</p><p>As an artificial person they resemble the sovereign from Thomas Hobbes’ book <em>Leviathan</em>. You may have seen the cover of this, a king wearing a crown rising up from behind a hill with the king’s body is composed of many other tiny bodies. He holds a sword in his right hand and a town is spread out below him in the valley, which he presumably defends and governs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/731/1*lSo7QKdCIQkw1ONBVdBfUA.jpeg" /></figure><p>This comes from the central and most famous idea in <em>Leviathan</em>: that the people, fearing the violence that Hobbes believes would accompany the absence of government, would bind together and make a social contract to form an artificial person known as the commonwealth. This artificial person, this corporation, has unlimited and rightful power over us even unto our execution.</p><p>Many organisations have been corporations over the years, including universities, churches and famously the government of The City of London: all were established as artificial people and governed by charters. But the heyday of the corporation began with the creation of the Dutch East India Company in Amsterdam in 1602, about 50 years before Hobbes wrote <em>Leviathan</em>. This was not the first corporation but was definitely the first multinational, and the first one to list shares on an exchange.</p><p>Now there are ten listed corporations for every million people in the world, according to World Bank data. This means there are about 70,000 listed companies as well as an untold number of unlisted ones. Other than governments and families, they have become the dominant means of producing and distributing resources.</p><p>For economists this presents a puzzle, why do they exist?</p><p>The answer given by the nobel-prize winning economist Ronald Coase is that they exist because of transaction costs. As Ronald Coase put it, these “islands of conscious power” manage to survive because there is a cost to using the price mechanism. In other words, non-market methods of producing and distributing are often preferable to the market.</p><p>For example, it is more sensible for a company to employ a lawyer than it is to go out and hire a new one every time it has some dealing with the law; the lawyer would likely prefer the stability of this arrangement as well. After a contract is drawn up the price mechanism is replaced by command.</p><p>Externally they deal with a capitalist market but internally corporations are hierarchical structures which operate using central planning, high rises of vertical coordination with the c-suite at the top like some kind of pinstriped gosplan. Entrepreneurs, as Coase calls them, direct its resources as they see fit.</p><p>This is a bit flattering to management’s power. Companies are more like mixed economies: as well as the grand corporate strategy, there is a febrile undergrowth of favour trading, bargaining and status games as well as institutional norms and habits.</p><p>But, still, they are similar to Hobbes’ vision of the sovereign, artificial autocratic people governed by a contract.</p><p>And like all analogies there are differences as well as similarities: it is a lot easier to change your employer than your government, for example. Plus when the state commands we obey because of the threat of violence, we obey those above us in the corporate hierarchy because of the threat of unemployment or, for some, the desire for promotion. Economic deprivation — poverty, homelessness and hunger — fulfil the role of Hobbes’ state of nature in this metaphor.</p><p>Companies like Uber and TaskRabbit, as well as changing contractual arrangements — the self-employed setting themselves up as a holding company, for example — are starting to blur these lines by reducing transaction costs and turning the vertical corporation into more of a horizontal platform: the internet makes it a lot easier to find yourself an ad hoc employee.</p><p>This is a problem because, as well as providing some degree of stability, in many countries corporations have come to fulfil many of the functions of the cradle-to-grave welfare state, providing pensions, healthcare, childcare and education.</p><p>While for some workers the libertarian freedom of the gig economy is no doubt a welcome respite from the commands of their corporate masters, for others, such as the Uber drivers launching a class action suit against their ‘employer’, that freedom comes at too high a cost.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fd676ff4792" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Abundance]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GavinHJackson/abundance-a56aa88f65a5?source=rss-595f6e1e4bb6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a56aa88f65a5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 02 Mar 2016 23:07:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-03-02T23:20:41.702Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/930/1*FRRXl51v4iaj21N71MA9bw.jpeg" /></figure><p>The two fundamental forces in economics are scarcity and surplus. For most of human history scarcity has been most feared: the crop fails, food prices rise, people starve — Pharaoh’s seven thin cows. But surplus is damaging too: a farmer arrives at the market to find it overserved, prices fall, the crop is worthless, the farmer starves.</p><p>Currently, people are talking about the problems that come from Pharoah’s seven fat cows: robots will do all the jobs; streaming will kill the film industry; and, most commonly, central banks are flooding the world with money, distorting its value and leading investors to plough money into absurd business models and take unnecessary risks with your mother’s pension.</p><p>There’s nothing new about these worries. On New Year’s Day 1825, Samuel Thornton, a merchant, wrote in his diary that “the abundance of money has led to a variety of speculations in England, and scarcely a week has passed but some new company was founded to direct a world projected adventure. What must be the cure of this mania only time can show.” Inevitably, the Panic of 1825 followed after the discovery of one of the first and most flamboyant instances of securities fraud, the sale by Gregor MacGregor of government bonds for the fictional central American country of Poyais.</p><p>But let’s go back ten years and look at the debate that emerged following the post-Waterloo recession in the British economy. This recession led to the first attempts by economists to understand how abundance can be more damaging than scarcity.</p><p>Today recession is often characterised by excess supply. There is more labour and capital available than there is demand for what it can produce. As such, workers become unemployed and factories are mothballed, inventories are run down instead of new stuff being produced. So wages and prices fall and there is a general economic slowdown.</p><p>Classical economists rejected the possibility of a ‘general glut’, in keeping with Jean Baptise Say and his law that “production creates its own demand”, which said that everything produced is done so in order to exchange it for something else. Here is David Ricardo’s explanation:</p><blockquote>Productions are always bought by productions, or by services; money is only the medium by which the exchange is effected. Too much of a particular commodity may be produced, of which there may be such a glut in the market, as not to repay the capital expended on it; but this cannot be the case with respect to all commodities; the demand for corn is limited by the mouths which are to eat it, for shoes and coats by the persons who are to wear them; but though a community, or a part of a community, may have as much corn, and as many hats and shoes, as it is able or may wish to consume, the same cannot be said of every commodity produced by nature or by art.</blockquote><p>This reasoning suggests it is possible for industries to suffer but not for an economy as a whole to slow down; the cobbler might struggle if there was less demand for shoes, but this was a boon for the milliner as he can now exchange fewer hats for more shoes. And likewise if more was produced than was desired in one sector then the excess would be saved and, as one man’s saving is another’s investment, spent by someone else.</p><p>But the more pessimistic Thomas Malthus disagreed. He pointed out that commodities could fall relative to the price of the means used to produce them, relative to wages that is. In addition, if everyone were to try to save at once then there would be a decrease in consumption and so production and income.</p><blockquote>While the farmers were disposed to consume the luxuries produced by the manufacturers, and the manufacturers those produced by the farmers, all would go on smoothly; but if either one or both of the parties were disposed to save largely, with a view of bttering their condition, and providing for their families in future, the state of things would be very different. The farmer, instead of indulging himself in ribands, lace, and velvets, would be disposed to be satisfied with more simple clothing, but by this economy he would disable the manufacturer from purchasing the same amount of his produce; and for the returns of so much labour employed upon the land, and all greatly increased in productive power, there would evidently be no market. The manufacturer, in like manner, instead of indulging himself in sugar, grapes, and tobacco, might be disposed to save with a view to the future, but would be totally unable to do so, owing to the parsimony of the farmers and the want of demand for manufactures.</blockquote><p>Karl Marx, dissented from both men. Marx argued that we could not ignore money and think solely in terms of trade in goods as Ricardo and Malthus did. His view is that the transformation of commodities into money and then back again allows for the possibility of a crisis and a general glut:</p><blockquote>At a given moment, the supply of all commodities can be greater than the demand for all commodities, since the demand for the general commodity, money, exchange-value, is greater than the demand for all particular commodities, in other words the motive to turn the commodity into money, to realise its exchange-value, prevails over the motive to transform the commodity again into use-value.</blockquote><p>Which sort of explains the modern economist’s stance that falling demand is deflationary: money increases in value relative to goods. Rather than being separate forces, surplus and scarcity are two sides of the same coin, goods are scarce relative to money or money is scarce relative to goods.</p><p>Joshua Brown, a New York-based wealth advisor, <a href="http://thereformedbroker.com/2016/02/25/abundance/">recently wrote a popular blog on the topic of abundance</a>. He argues that we face a problem of abundance: there is just too much stuff everywhere. Central Bank largesse has led to dysfunctional capital markets, too much online noise has meant that only the noisiest and most outrageous can cut through, a tech bubble is disrupting legitimate businesses and replacing it with nothing that can last.</p><p>“The only way to save the economy is to crash it,” he says. The degradation of standards will be washed out — the seven thin cows will eat the seven fat cows.</p><p>There’s a certain perverse enjoyment in seeing grand structures collapse, but he mistakes a particular glut for a general glut.</p><p>Some sectors of the economy have a problem with abundance, when prices fall and producers suffer: fund managers who need yield, for example, or journalists who can no longer rely on advertising revenues. In other places, it is consumers who face a problem of scarcity and Mr Brown admits as much:</p><blockquote>You can get a job but there’s nowhere you can afford to live that is anywhere near that job. You can create your own job but, absent access to capital markets, you can’t compete with those who have it. Plenty of hiring in New York and San Francisco. Good luck living there.</blockquote><p>Rather than the general glut that Ricardo denied, we have the particular glut that Ricardo affirmed and right now that is doing some redistributing between different producers and different consumers — it is probably easier to feel confident at the moment if you work in construction rather than in the content business, although news has got more affordable while California real estate has slipped further out of reach.</p><p>A recession, however, would mean that everyone would suffer, the good business models and the bad business models alike, the few and the many — though it is likely the many would suffer the most, as they always do.</p><p>It was 200 years ago that the classical British economists wrote about recessions and neither they nor financial crises have stopped in those two centuries. A recession is coming, sooner or later and we will all likely live to regret the choices made in the seven years since the end of the financial crisis. But it is foolish to cheer this process on. We would be better to remember Joseph’s warning to Pharoah:</p><blockquote>Seven years of great abundance are coming throughout the land of Egypt, but seven years of famine will follow them. Then all the abundance in Egypt will be forgotten, and the famine will ravage the land. The abundance in the land will not be remembered, because the famine that follows it will be so severe.</blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a56aa88f65a5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Britain and Europe]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GavinHJackson/britain-and-europe-930584e46749?source=rss-595f6e1e4bb6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/930584e46749</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[united-kingdom]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[european-union]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 20 Feb 2016 21:41:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-02-20T21:41:48.628Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/810/1*oiUXh8waJrLIdKUfgYKJww.jpeg" /></figure><p>The founding myth of the UK goes something like this: once there was an ancient Syrian king who had dozens of wayward daughters. As punishment for their misbehaviour he set them adrift on a boat, leaving their fate to the mercy of the sea. And, because that is how these things go, the daughters ended up being beached on an island populated entirely by demons.</p><p>The first to set foot on the island and eldest of these daughters was named Albina, so they named the island Albion. The daughters, to satisfy their lust, coupled with the demons and gave birth to a race of giants.</p><p>Years later, Brutus, the grandson of the Trojan prince Aeneas, slept wrapped in the hide of a white hart and was visited by the goddess of the hunt Diana, who spoke to him a prophecy:</p><blockquote>Brutus! there lies beyond the Gallic bounds<br>An island which the western sea surrounds,<br>By giants once possessed, now few remain<br>To bar thy entrance, or obstruct thy reign.<br>To reach that happy shore thy sails employ<br>There fate decrees to raise a second Troy<br>And found an empire in thy royal line,<br>Which time shall ne’er destroy, nor bounds confine.</blockquote><p>Brutus renamed the island after himself, as men are wont to do, and built a city by the banks of the the river Thames. He called it New Troy and became the first King of Britain.</p><p>I really like this myth. It has a lot going for it: a wild pre-christian Britain, gods, demons and great warriors. Plus, if you want, you can delve into it and find new parts of the story in the different retellings– for example, according to one version Brutus defeated two giants known as Gog and Magog and chained them up outside his new city as guardians.</p><p>But it is easy to see why medieval historians liked it as well. It serves a number of purposes. First, it makes Britain a continuation of classical civilisation and affords it a great founder on the same lines as Lycurgus of Sparta.</p><p>This was a great advantage for a ruling elite who studied Greek and Latin and who sought to derive superiority from invented links to those civilisations. Second, with the demons and giants it sets up a contrast between civilisation and barbarity. It’s not enough to have a great hero without having a convenient villain as well.</p><p>Last night, David Cameron, the prime minister of Great Britain, announced that a deal had been struck with the other member states in the European Union, a deal, he argued, that would allow Britain to remain part of this union. The list included a set of quite minor changes, like reducing the tiny amount of money that Britain’s welfare system gives migrants and some plausible noises about the financial services sector and releasing Britain from the requirement for ‘ever closer union’. A date was set for Britain’s referendum on whether the country wished to be part of this union of June 23.</p><p>The myth making of the referendum will follow the same pattern as the story of Brutus of Britain. For the British elite the UK is a land of degenerates and monsters that can be redeemed and made modern through its connection with a European aristocracy; the irrationality and parochialism of the British public can be held in check via the institutions of the European Union.</p><p>For examples of this manner of thinking, check out Emma Thompson’s description of Britain as <em>‘</em>A tiny little cloud-bolted, rainy corner of sort-of Europe, a cake-filled misery-laden grey old island.’</p><p>On the other side of the debate a more useful mythical figure may be King Arthur, who protected post-Roman and Christian Britain from German pagan colonialists. Here it is Britain itself that has an inner virtue and must be protected from the adulterating impact of foreigners and their culture. Either way there is be someone to fear; a choice between two kinds of misanthropy, internal or external.</p><p>But there’s an alternative and more optimistic reading of these myths that demonstrates the possibility of hybridisation and cross-cultural fertilisation: supposedly wild Middle Eastern women lie with demons to create the first Britons, then the Greco-Roman Brutus comes from over the sea to start a royal dynasty, and finally the Celtic-Christian Arthur protects the British isles from foreigners, but does so as part of a pan-European tradition.</p><p>The purpose of all this was that someone asked me to imagine what a debate about the European referendum would look like that was not about either fear and greed. The late Umberto Eco had a sort of answer to that. When asked what he thought of a European identity, he called it shallow, but he pointed to changes in the youngest generations.</p><blockquote>The university exchange programme Erasmus is barely mentioned in the business sections of newspapers, yet Erasmus has created the first generation of young Europeans. I call it a sexual revolution: a young Catalan man meets a Flemish girl — they fall in love, they get married and they become European, as do their children. The Erasmus idea should be compulsory — not just for students, but also for taxi drivers, plumbers and other workers. By this, I mean they need to spend time in other countries within the European Union; they should integrate.</blockquote><p>Instead of either fear or greed, the fundamental driving force in Europe is, well, sex. Whatever the outcome of the European referendum this process is likely to continue. In fact, with the growth in the ranks of the legions of international students and the possibility of using cheap flights to go dance with strangers in a country your grandmother thought was barbaric, it is likely to accelerate. More and more Europeans will be created and half-British, half-Lithuanian couples will still fall asleep on one another watching Deutschland ’83 on a Sunday night.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=930584e46749" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Donald Trump and Janet Yellen]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GavinHJackson/donald-trump-and-janet-yellen-4732a6e61050?source=rss-595f6e1e4bb6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4732a6e61050</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bernie-sanders]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[donald-trump]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 14 Feb 2016 20:33:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-02-14T20:33:44.690Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/840/1*0LcFJ_OkVg2F4Lyjcd_sXQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>This past Wednesday two things happened in the United States. The first was that the news broke that Donald Trump, a former reality TV personality, and Bernie Sanders, an independent who identifies as a socialist, had won the New Hampshire primary for the Republicans and the Democrats respectively. The second was that Janet Yellen, the chair of the Federal Reserve, was questioned on the economy by members of the house of representatives.</p><p>Janet Yellen is possibly the most powerful woman in the world. As Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the US central bank, she has enormous influence over the price of a dollar: how much a dollar today is worth compared to a dollar tomorrow, the interest rate, and how much a dollar is worth in terms of some other currency, the exchange rate.</p><p>Through her decisions over these two quantities she can influence how many people have jobs, whether people can afford to pay their mortgages and whether companies remain afloat or go bankrupt. And because of the role the dollar plays in the global economy she can influence these things in countries outside the US — when the Federal Reserve tapered its quantitative easing program in mid-2013 it led to panic all over the developing world as the great flow of dollars out of the US began to reverse.</p><p>This is not just dry economics. Someone once said that the history of money is the history of everything a people were, are and will be, and it is true: monetary policy leads to booms and recessions, it inspires political movements, it can be glimpsed in the setting of films and the margins of novels — it can even be seen in the background of war.</p><p>But no one elected her. She is possibly the most powerful woman in the world and she is an unelected technocrat.</p><p>The principle that central banks have to be independent from politics is sacrosanct among economists; there’s thought to be a trade-off between growth and inflation, if politicians controlled the central bank they may create too much inflation through trying to create higher economic growth. So they say the Fed Chair should be appointed by democratically elected politicians to make these decisions on their behalf.</p><p>And Ms Yellen is not alone. All across the western world politicians have moved economic and legal decisions outside of the political realm and into a different arena.</p><p>Look at the UK government, which has been tussling with all sorts of unelected bodies over whether it can enact its agenda — the European Court of Human Rights wishes to compel it to make prisoners vote while the European Union is restricting its power to reduce migration — or at the US where increasingly controversial political questions are decided by the Supreme Court instead of congress. The Eurozone crisis has frequently pitted elected politicians against technocrats at the European Central Bank and the International Monetary fund</p><p>This situation is what the political scientist Colin Crouch calls ‘post-democracy’.</p><blockquote>The term was indeed a direct analogy with ‘post-industrial’. A post-industrial society is not a non-industrial one. It continues to make and to use the products of industry, but the energy and innovative drive of the system have gone elsewhere. The same applies in a more complex way to post-modern, which is not the same as anti-modern or of course pre-modern. It implies a culture that uses the achievements of modernism but departs from them in its search for new possibilities. A post-democratic society therefore is one that continues to have and to use all the institutions of democracy, but in which they increasingly become a formal shell. The energy and innovative drive pass away from the democratic arena and into small circles of a politico-economic elite. I did not say that we were now living in a post-democratic society, but that we were moving towards such a condition.</blockquote><p>Which brings us back to the presidential primaries. One argument goes that in a society where key decisions are frequently not made by politicians the nature of the political sphere changes. The outcome matters less and less to people’s lives and so voters cease to be participants and become spectators. Politics becomes pure spectacle — with the pantomime villains and heroes to go with it. And we can see this all across democratic societies as populist figures emerge on the left and right.</p><p>This is a pretty ungenerous interpretation. Trump and Sanders both have specific, though unrealistic, policy demands. They appeal to two groups who feel disadvantaged by modern society and with good reason. But, I do believe there is something to it: the fact that many major decisions have been depoliticised makes it easier for politics to become about something else entirely.</p><p>And those who have the most interest and capability to involve themselves in politics are even least affected by political change. They tend to have more money, more education and some degree of economic freedom. So politics becomes less and less about changing the law and more of an arena for people to perform their identity and to find some means of distinguishing themselves, like kids at school picking their music taste and their clothes.</p><p>At Janet Yellen’s testimony, one congresswoman asked what Ms Yellen could do about the racial disparity in wealth. The answer is not much. The Fed Chair cannot redistribute, that is the province of congress itself.</p><p>Most likely the representative was just grandstanding, wanting to demonstrate to her constituents that they had used the time they were given to articulate their interests but her question spoke to a fundamental problem in modern democracies: the attempt by politicians to move policy dilemmas onto technocrats and to avoid making political decisions themselves.</p><p>Now, as Donald Trump leads the field in the Republican party primaries — alongside populist movements elsewhere — and as markets crash after eight years of politically expedient ‘quantitative easing’ the consequences of avoiding facing up to those decisions are now making themselves felt.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4732a6e61050" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Big Short]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@GavinHJackson/the-big-short-5aeefe1816?source=rss-595f6e1e4bb6------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5aeefe1816</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[macroeconomics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Gavin Jackson]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 07 Feb 2016 17:34:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-02-08T15:10:09.687Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*-8UgedAAQsIrVsgnX5E_jw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Being a financial reporter in the aftermath of the greatest crisis since 1929 is a lot like being Bob Dylan.</p><p>“Who killed Davey Moore?” asks Dylan in a song about a boxer who died in the ring in 1963. “Why an’ what’s the reason for?”</p><p>Numerous people respond in the song: the referee who decided to let the fight continue; the bookmakers who profited from it; the audience who demanded a show; and the boxer who swung the blow. And all of them deny being the cause of Davey Moore’s death with the refrain: “No, you can’t blame me at all.”</p><p>It’s the same with the financial crisis. As anyone who’s seen <em>The Big Short</em> will know, there is a surfeit of villains: the bankers who lent the money; the borrowers who accepted it; the ratings agencies who assured investors the securities were safe; and the politicians who regulated the whole business.</p><p>And there are more villains than those featured in the film: the central bankers whose only answer to successive economic downturns was to make credit cheap; the economists who provided the intellectual backing; an aging society with a glut of money looking for something that could provide them with an income in retirement; even the heroes of the film aren’t free from blame — they were the counterparty to the synthetic CDOs that helped accelerate the crisis. Nearly everyone was complicit.</p><p>But people will selectively tell you who is responsible depending on their worldview. Right wingers will tell you it is the fault of the state through misguided regulation, easy monetary policy and the government-backed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Left wingers will often point to the unrestrained free market, greedy bankers, overzealous brokers, and lazy ratings agencies.</p><p>Explanations differ in who they cast as subject and object; who acts on the world and whom is acted on by it. Some people are rendered as automatons reacting in a fixed way to the larger system — “they were responding to the incentives they faced” — while others will be viewed as having agency.</p><p>But this dichotomy in the way we respond to other people is not fixed but itself subjective, as the philosopher Peter Strawson pointed out in the essay <em>Freedom and Resentment</em>.</p><p>We can explain how people behave using either what he calls a ‘reactive’ attitude and viewing them as active participants in the world while others are seen through the ‘objective’ attitude, which he explains as such.</p><blockquote>to see him, perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment; as something certainly to be taken account, perhaps precautionary account, of; to be managed or handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided.</blockquote><p>This ‘objective’ attitude is adopted by the penal system to those deemed mentally ill and therefore not responsible. Whereas the reactive attitude gets its name because we respond to people in the normal emotional ways: we get angry, we resent them, we’re grateful when they do something good.</p><p>You can see these two attitudes in the way different groups respond to the financial crisis. Technocratic types adopt the objective attitude and see it as a case of misaligned incentives, the ratings agencies behaved badly because clients could shop around for better ratings, for example. On the other hand, activist-types react like Steve Carell’s character in The Big Short and get angry.</p><p>Neither attitude is the definitively correct one. And in reality, most of us approach the non-obvious cases with some mix of the two approaches; we are capable of analysing behaviour dispassionately while also getting angry.</p><p>Likewise with the financial crisis. No-one chose the system that was created — policymakers themselves work within complex systems not of their own design — but many people chose their actions within that system. The candidates most at fault appear to be those who knew the most, had the most resources and had the most control over their actions.</p><p>So much for the evaluative side of responsibility, what about the purely descriptive side? What caused the financial crisis to happen?</p><p>This is no clearer. Economists are, in general, pretty poor at thinking about causation. Following the example of the Scottish enlightenment philosopher David Hume they have been chiefly concerned with separating out causation from correlation. His famous example in <em>An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding</em> is of billiard balls striking one another. We see one billiard moving and then the second but at no time do we directly observe one causing the other to move.</p><p>Causation is not observable but is inferred from repeatedly experiencing two events happening in conjunction.</p><p>Economists will point out the flaws in making these inferences: people go to hospital and then they die but hospitals do not (usually) kill them, it is an underlying illness that caused both. Likewise, someone may be well educated and have a high paying job but it could be some underlying skill, personality facet or familial wealth that caused them to get both the education and their high income.</p><p>But they usually stop here and fail to ask deeper questions about the nature of causation. What is relatively simple when it comes to the interaction of bodies like billiard balls is a much more complicated matter when it comes to social phenomena, whose external existence themselves may be in doubt.</p><p>Why does the red ball move when the white ball hits it? The physical cause is well understood but what is the social cause? The intention of the man who wielded the cue? The general tendency of humanity to play games for fun? The rules of a game that made hitting balls important, and that are themselves the product of a wider culture? The economic system which allowed the manufacture and shipping of a billiard table — and balls — to a particular place?</p><p>All are good explanations and they are not mutually exclusive. In fact you could happily accept all of them of as being true on some level; some mediating the social processes rather than causing them and others being necessary requirements.</p><p>This is one of the reasons why we are poorly served in our understanding of the financial crisis: people look for an ultimate cause rather than acknowledging there were layers and processes stacked up on top of one another. Below is a rather good explanation of the problem economics faces from a <a href="http://noapparentmotive.org/papers/DiNardo_on_Freakonomics.pdf">brilliant review of <em>Freakonomics</em></a>:</p><blockquote>To take an example, what does it mean to say that Mrs. O’Leary’s cow caused the Great Chicago Fire of 1871? Even if we were to agree with this version of events:</blockquote><blockquote>One dark night, when people were in bed,</blockquote><blockquote>Mrs. O’ Leary lit a lantern in her shed,</blockquote><blockquote>The cow kicked it over, winked its eye, and said,</blockquote><blockquote>There’ll be a hot time in the old town tonight.</blockquote><blockquote>As to the “ultimate” cause of the fire, we might say the cause of the fire was Mrs. O’Leary’s cow. We could also say that Mrs. O’Leary (and not her cow) was the cause of the fire since her placing of the lantern in the barn had the predictable consequence of igniting a blaze that would engulf much of Chicago. More policy relevant perhaps, we could cite lax fire regulations as the cause: perhaps Mrs. O’Leary would have been more cautious had the placing of a lantern in one’s barn had been illegal. In today’s language we might have talked about the failure to impose penalties that result in effective deterrence. More fancifully, we might even trace the cause back to U.S. agriculture subsidies. Without the government subsidies, maybe Mr. and Mrs. O’Leary would have not decided to take up dairy farming at all!</blockquote><p>Aristotle, a very smart man, distinguished between four sorts of causes: material, formal, efficient and final. The “material” is what a thing is made from, in the case a marble statue it’s the marble itself; the “efficient” is the archetype or form of the thing, the shape of the statue; the “formal” is the source of the change, in this case the sculptor; and the “final” cause is the purpose for which it was done, and statues are made for all sorts of reasons: decoration, for example, or self-aggrandisement</p><p>We know what the financial crisis was made from: debt. And we know what form it took: mortgages. The efficient cause is harder but you can trace it, as they do in T<em>he Big Short</em>, to increasingly lax lending standards, then a rise in interest rate payments that people could not pay, followed by panic and a liquidity crunch that led to bank failures.</p><p>But the final cause is the most obscure of all: why was it done at all?</p><p>There are many candidates including the ideological victory of liberal capitalism in the 20th century, the need for an ageing society to find something to invest in or the hopes of liberal politicians to create a home-owning democracy, or just the two most fundamental motives behind economic behaviour: fear and greed.</p><p>If you’re like me then you’re right back where you started: unsure whether or not anyone was ultimately responsible. Whether the whole mess was caused through a set of impersonal social forces, which can, at most, be resisted; or whether the people involved deserve a portion of the blame for creating and participating in a broken system.</p><p>The film <em>The Big Short </em>does a pretty good job of navigating this ambiguity through the difference between Steve Carell’s character, who makes money to get revenge on bad people, and the Ryan Gosling character, who works with the good guys out of pure self interest. Carell’s character responds to every little wrongdoing he sees by blowing up with anger, Gosling’s with a sardonic smile and a shrug that says “what you going to do?”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5aeefe1816" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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